RESEARCH NOTES
^ Academy of Management Journal
1994, Vol. 37, No. 1, 137-152.
CHANGING OBLIGATIONS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRACT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY
SANDRA L. ROBINSON
New York University
MATTHEW S. KRAATZ
DENISE M. ROUSSEAU
Northwestern University
In an exploratory longitudinal study of business school alumni, we
investigated changes in employment obligations as perceived by employees. During the first two years of employment, employees came to
perceive that they owed less to their employers while seeing tbeir employers as owing them more. An employer's failure to fulfill its commitments was found to be significantly associated witb decline in some
types of employee obligations. We discuss implications for managing
employees' beliefs regarding obligations and for future research on psychological contracts.
Contracts are a ubiquitous and necessary feature of organizations. They
serve to bind together individuals and organizations and regulate their behavior, making possible the achievement of organizational goals. Accordingly, they merit a prominent place in the study of organizations. Unfortunately, although macro research has given some attention to contracts (e.g.,
Williamson, 1975], such a focus has been largely absent from research on
organizational psychology. This study begins to redress this shortcoming by
examining the nature of perceived contractual obligations and changes in
these obligations over the first few years of employment.
Mutual obligations are the essence of the employment contract (Rousseau, 1989) defining the relationship between employee and employer. Employees agree to make specific contributions to an organization in return for
benefits from the employer (Nicholson & Johns, 1985). Recently, trends in
the nature of these mutual obligations have received considerable attention.
Managers have decried the decline of employee loyalty, while at the same
time work force members have been counseled to eschew reliance on job
security or employer commitments and to "pack their own parachutes" instead (Hirsch, 1988).
Sandra Robinson and Matthew Kraatz share first authorship. We wish to thank the two
anonymous reviewers for this journal, whose comments greatly improved this article.
137
138
Academy of Management Journal
February
The present research is an exploratory longitudinal study that examined
changes in newly hired individuals' beliefs regarding mutual employment
ohligations. The ohligations under study were those new employees attrihuted to themselves and to their employers. We looked at how those perceived obligations evolved over the first few years of employment. This
study addressed two basic questions: (1) How do perceived mutual obligations change during the first few years of an individual's employment? and
(2) How do employers' failures to fulfill their obligations affect employees'
beliefs in obligations?
THE NATURE OF OBLIGATIONS
We defined obligations as beliefs, held by an employee or employer, that
each is bound by promise or debt to an action or course of action in relation
to the other party. These obligations may derive from implicit or explicit
promises of future exchange or reciprocity, but our construct is nonetheless
an inherently perceptual one (Farnsworth, 1982). Each party possesses his or
her own perception of the mutual obligations defining a relationship. To
understand perceived employment obligations, it is useful to consider the
social phenomena with which they are intertwined.
Obligations, Social Exchange, and the Psychological Contract
Employment obligations, embedded in the context of social exchange,
constitute the psychological contract (Rousseau, 1989; Rousseau & Parks,
1992). Obligations are basic components of social exchange relationships.
Social exchange has been defined as cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Exchange is pervasive in all cultures and is a fundamental condition of organizational membership (Barnard, 1938). Social exchange relationships permeate business
and organizational activities in which benefits are expected to result from
past contributions or anticipated comparable future contributions (Clark &
Mills, 1979).
Perceived obligations compose the fabric of the psychological contract.
Psychological contracts consist of sets of individual beliefs or perceptions
regarding reciprocal obligations (Levinson, 1963; Rousseau, 1989). The perceptual, individual nature of the psychological contract is the defining attribute that distinguishes it from other forms of contracts, such as implied
(Rousseau, 1989) and implicit contracts (Weick, 1979), which are typically
characterized by third-party observers to the contractual relationship, such
as researchers or jurists (Rousseau & Anton, 1988; Weick, 1979). Employees'
psychological contracts specify the contributions that they believe they owe
to their employer and the inducements that they believe are owed in return.
Although psychological contracts can involve a variety of inducements
and contributions, MacNeil's (1985) typology of contracts can be used to
categorize psychological contracts. MacNeil argued that there are two con-
1994
Robinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau
139
tract types: transactional and relational.^ Transactional contracts involve
specific, monetizable exchanges between parties over a finite and often brief
period of time. Competitive wage rates and the absence of long-term commitments are characteristic of transactional contracts. Relational contracts,
in contrast, involve open-ended, less specific agreements that establish and
maintain a relationship. These contracts involve both monetizable and nonmonetizable exchanges. Inducements in relational contracts characteristically include training and development opportunities and a long-term career
path within a firm.^
THE DYNAMISM OF OBLIGATIONS
This research explored how perceived mutual obligations changed over
the course of employment relationships. Obligations can be expected to
change for a variety of reasons. First, the development of the exchange relationship between an employee and employer, coupled with the employee's perceptual biases regarding that development, may create significant
changes in the employee's view of the contract. Second, behaviors of the
parties to a contract also influence the contract. Social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), for instance, would suggest that information employees obtain from observing their own behaviors and their employers' will alter the employees' perceptions of what they owe the employers and are owed in return.
Patterns of Change in Ohligations
Building upon the notion that obligations do change in the first years of
employment, we can hypothesize a variety of patterns these changes might
take. From the perspective of the norm of reciprocity, one party's receipt of
a benefit obligates another party to pay a cost. This perspective suggests that
continued receipt and payment over time is likely to create an increasing
number and diversity of obligations between the parties in an exchange
relationship (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). This escalation is expected to occur for two reasons: First, as Blau (1964) argued,
individuals attempt to create a positive imbalance in their exchange relationships to avoid becoming indebted to the other parties. This constant
striving to maintain positive net obligations may lead to escalation over
time. Second, obligations are expected to increase with the trust that develops within maturing relationships. Trust is the essence of social exchange
^ This distinction between relational and transactional contacts is similar to Blau's (1964)
notion of two types of exchange, social and economic.
^ Rousseau (1990) found support for this typology of contracts in a survey of new recruits.
Relational contracts bound employers to job security and their employees to loyalty and a
minimum length of stay. Transactional contracts entailed high pay, performance-based pay,
and employee notice of resignation.
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Academy of Management Journal
February
and, as mutual trust flourishes, so does the extent of the exchange (Blau,
1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).
Alternatively, operating from an instrumental perspective, one could
argue that over time new recruits might perceive their employers' obligations to increase while their own decrease as a function of their having both
taken and remained on their jobs. The explanation for this change lies in the
employees' desire to maintain equity between contributions and rewards
(Adams, 1965). Continuing to work for the employer is, in itself, a contribution that increases the einployees' perceived entitlement and decreases their
perceived debt. Put differently, the opportunity and investment costs incurred by the employees through their continued association with the firm
is seen as sufficient (and in fact, surplus) payment on their social debt (Blau,
1964; Homans, 1961). This instrumental pattern of change may be especially
likely to occur given that self-serving biases often lead to individuals' overestimation of their own contributions and underestimation of the costs incurred by exchange partners (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Hence, employees will
believe they owe less while their employer owes more. Civen these two
plausible competing perspectives, we investigated the following research
question: Will change in perceived mutual obligations follow a norms-ofreciprocity pattern, with perceived employee and employer obligations both
increasing, or an instrumental pattern, in which perceived employer obligations increase while employee obligations decrease?
VIOLATIONS AND CHANGES IN OBLIGATIONS
We have argued that the development of a relationship and the subsequent behaviors of the parties to the exchange may effect change in perceived ohligations. One particularly salient and potentially powerful example of such behavior is the failure of one party to fulfill its obligations to the
other. Such failures are referred to here as violations.
Obligations are based upon beliefs in a promise or debt. The failure of
one party to comply with its obligations to another can be expected to erode
both the relationship and the affected party's beliefs in the reciprocal obligations of the two parties. Violations by an employer may affect not only
what an employee feels he or she is owed by the employer but also what that
employee feels obligated to offer in return. Further, violations may have
different effects upon different types of obligations. We explore this possibility below.
Impact on Transactional Ohligations
Violations are likely to affect transactional obligations primarily by creating inequity in the economic exchange. Employees seek to maintain equity
between their costs and benefits in exchange relationships (Adams, 1965).
Violation by definition reduces the benefits that an employee receives. Further, violation can be seen as a negative experience that generates psychic
costs for the employee. The costs include more than just loss of what was
1994
Robinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau
141
owed; contract violation may subject the employee to feelings of injustice
and betrayal (Bies, 1987; Rousseau, 1989). The employee can attempt to
recoup these costs by increasing perceived entitlements or decreasing perceived obligations, or both. Thus,
Hypothesis la; Employer violations are associated with a
decrease in employee transactionaJ obligations.
Hypothesis Ib: Employer violations are associated with
an increase in employer transactional obligations.
Impact on Relational Obligations
Employer violation is also expected to affect relational obligations, but
in a different manner. Whereas violation affects transactional obligations by
creating inequity in the economic exchange, it may influence relational obligations by changing the very nature of the social relationship in which they
are embedded and hence, decreasing their inherent value.
Relational obligations involve a variety of socio-emotional concerns,
such as trust and beliefs in good faith and fair dealing (MacNeil, 1985). When
employees perceive that a violation has occurred, their faith and trust, and
accordingly, their relational obligations, are likely to be eroded. Violation
may nullify the socio-emotional obligations that are most central to relational contracts. An employee who experiences a violation may no longer
want a long-term relationship with a current employer and hence, may no
longer feel the employer is obligated to provide job security or personal
support. This employee may similarly feel much less obligated to be loyal or
perform extrarole behaviors because the relational dimensions of the contract are no longer valued. Hence,
Hypothesis 2a: Employer violations will he associated
with a decrease in employee relational obligations.
Hypothesis 2b: Employer violations will be associated
with a decrease in employer relational obligations.
Impact on Relational and Transactional Obligations
Although we expected both transactional and relational obligations to
change with violations, the magnitude of the respective relationships may
differ appreciably. Violation tends to create mere inequity in transactional
exchange. Such inequity may be resolved by adjusting transactional obligations to restore the balance between inducements and contributions. In contrast, violation may have the effect of nullifying relational obligations and
destroying the relationship itself. Accordingly, the damage to the relational
obligations caused by violation may often be irreparable. Thus,
Hypothesis 3; Employer violations will be more strongly
associated with change in relational obligations than
with change in transactional obligations.
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Academy of Management Journal
February
METHODS
Respondents
The population sampled for this study was the 1987 alumni of a master
of business administration (M.B.A.) degree program in a midwestern management school. This group was composed of 35 percent women, 9 percent
minority memhers, and 10 percent international students. Their average age
at graduation was 28, and 97 percent had acquired at least two years of work
experience hefore entering graduate school. Upon graduation, the memhers
of this class found employment in the following industries: finance, 34 percent; food-heverage-tobacco, 14 percent; consulting, 8 percent; consumer
products, 8 percent; accounting, 6 percent; computers, 4 percent; real estate,
4 percent; health, 4 percent; advertising, 4 percent; and other, 14 percent.
Starting salaries, in 1987, ranged from $24,000 to $90,000, with a median of
$43,500.
This population was sampled at two points in time. In 1987, we distributed a questionnaire to 260 of the 480 students in this class three weeks
prior to their graduation. This subgroup represented the students who had,
at the time, accepted an offer of employment. A total of 224, or 86 percent of
those eligible to participate, responded to the first questionnaire.
In 1989, we mailed a second questionnaire to each graduate for whom
the school alumni office had a contact address (N = 448). A total of 215
(48%] returned a completed questionnaire. Of those who had responded to
the first questionnaire, 128 (57%) responded to the second questionnaire. Of
those respondents, 32 had left their first employers and hence were excluded
from the analysis, leaving us with a final group of 96 respondents.
Measures
Both questionnaires assessed employees' beliefs regarding obligations to
their employers and their employers' obligations to them. The first questionnaire assessed the employee perceptions that developed during recruitment,
and the second examined the employee perceptions that existed two years
later.
Obligations. To obtain a measure of the perceived obligations that develop during recruitment, we interviewed personnel and human resources
managers from 13 engineering, accounting, and manufacturing firms. These
managers were participants in advanced executive programs, graduate students in a part-time evening program, or research or consulting contacts.
Interviewing them either in person or over the telephone, we asked the
managers to describe: (1) the kinds of promises and commitments their firms
sought from recruits during the selection process and (2) the promises and
commitments the firm made to the new employees. The responses elicited
formed the basis of the list of obligations assessed here.
The questionnaire that was developed through these interviews asked
recruits to indicate what they believed to be their obligations to their employers and their employers' obligations to them. We assessed perceived
1994
Robinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau
143
employer obligations (on a five-point scale from 1, "not at all," to 5, "very
highly") by asking recruits to wbat extent they believed their employer was
obligated to provide them with the following items: rapid advancement,
high pay, pay based on current level of performance, training, long-term job
security, career development, and support with personal problems.
Perceived employee obligations were assessed using the same five-point
scale. Respondents indicated the extent to which their obligations to their
employer included the following items: working extra hours, loyalty, volunteering to do nonrequired tasks on the job, giving advance notice if taking
a job elsewhere, willingness to accept a transfer, refusal to support the organization's competitors, protection of proprietary information, and spending a
minimum of two years in the organization.
Employer violation. Employer violation of obligations was assessed on
the second questionnaire. Respondents were asked to indicate how well
their employers had fulfilled obligations. A five-point scale, ranging from
"very well fulfilled" to "very poorly fulfilled" was used. Hence, a high score
indicated a high degree of employer violation.
Reliability of the Measures
In order to assess the reliability of the single-item measures of obligations and employer violation, we conducted a test-retest analysis (Ghiselli,
Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981), administering the same survey instrument to 79
evening M.B.A. students, all of whom worked full time, on two occasions,
two weeks apart. We computed test-retest reliability by correlating the responses to the same items on the two occasions. Correlations ranged from .72
to .91, with a mean of .80. These correlations suggest a moderate to high level
of reliability for these measures. These reliability coefficients appear in the
diagonal of the correlation matrix (Table 1).
RESULTS
Employee obligations and employer obligations were factor-analyzed
separately, with principal components extraction and "varimax" rotation, at
both time 1 and time 2. In the case of both employer and employee obligations, two distinct factors emerged that are clearly consistent with the predicted relational-transactional typology of obligations. This pattern emerged
at both the time of hiring and after two years. Tables 2 and 3 present the
results of these factor analyses.
At both time points, employers' obligations to provide rapid advancement, high pay, and pay based on performance loaded onto one factor. This
factor reflects transactional obligations in that the obligations are specific,
monetizable, and of a quid pro quo nature that requires they be fulfilled at a
definite time. Employers' obligations to provide long-term job security,
training, and development also loaded onto a single factor at both times. This
factor reflects relational obligations in that the obligations serve to maintain
the relationship and are not of a quid pro quo nature but rather, require
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Academy of Management /ournal
February
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations"
Variables
Employer obligations.
timel
1. Advancement
2. High pay
3. Merit pay
4. Training
5. Job security
6. Development
7. Support
Employer obligations,
time 2
6. Advancement
9. High pay
10. Merit pay
11. Training
12. Job security
13. Development
14. Support
Employee obligations.
time 1
15. Overtime
16. Loyalty
17. Extrarole
behavior
18. Notice
19. Transfers
20. No competitor
support
21. Proprietary
protection
22. Minimum stay
Employee obligations,
time 2
23. Overtime
24. Loyalty
25. Extrarole
behavior
26. Notice
27. Transfers
28. No competitor
support
29. Proprietary
protection
30. Minimum stay
31. Violation
Mean
s.d.
1
2
3
4
5
e
7
2.90
2.76
4.11
3.61
2.42
3.81
2.04
1.31
1.19
0.96
1.04
1.01
0.96
0.92
(.601
.65
.16
.09
.28
.15
.15
(.65)
.19
.09
.28
.05
.07
(.751
.00
-.04
-.13
-.16
(.91)
.28
.46
.03
(.74)
.13
.24
(.63)
.12
(77)
3.76.
3.52
4.45
3.35
2.37
3.95
1.96
111
0.99
0.66
1.20
1.07
0.92
0.99
.23
.36
.15
.24
.25
.29
.12
.21
.51
.19
.03
.00
.04
.08
-.17
.06
.12
.22
.02
.04
-.10
.13
-.06
.03
.34
.03
.16
.08
.15
.18
.01
.22
.28
.08
.19
.04
.01
.06
.22
.05
.12
.03
3.91
3.67
0.80
0.93
.07
.13
.15
.14
.21
.08
.21
-.02
-.03
.09
3.30
4.15
2.52
1.00
1.04
1.09
.06
.09
.18
.07
.15
.26
.03
.29
.19
.07
.16
.10
3.32
1.36
-.05
.07
-.04
4.85
2.99
0.49
1.36
-.01
.01
.04
.10
3.66
3.24
1.35
1.23
.01
.13
3.13
3.39
2.26
0.99
1.22
1.13
3.54
4.74
2.05
2.72
1.11
a
9
10
11
12
13
.10
.16
.10
.19
.27
.06
.56
.47
.04
.00
.20
.20
.10
.33
.10
.06
-.00
.06
.25
.01
.01
.10
.21
.32
.23
.44
.16
.00
.05
.04
.02
.01
.01
.01
.12
.13
.16
.01
.10
-.12
-.12
.11
.02
.13
.10
-.04
.22
.07
-.08
-.03
.19
-.08
.11
.00
-.06
-.07
.14
-.13
.06
.03
.14
..12
-.04
-.05
.16
.12
-.09
.13
-.03
.04
.02
.10
-.01
.03
-.07
-.14
-.05
.00
.05
-.02
-.05
.02
-.13
.05
.16
-.05
.30
.10
.16
-.21
.13
-.05
.14
.00
.06
.15
.11
-.06
.15
-.03
.05
.04
-.05
.01
.07
.15
.11
-.02
.05
.05
.14
.01
-.07
.10
.24
.09
.13
.34
.25
.24
.14
.15
.07
.03
.20
-.13
.00
.06
.06
.01
.14
.06
-.01
.14
.03
.03
.05
.00
.10
-.01
.09
.20
.07
.07
-.07
.08
.01
.21
.17
-.05
.21
.26
-.07
.04
-.05
.13
-.03
-.12
.13
.16
.15
.20
.37
.10
.03
.19
1.35
-.11
.04
.05
.08
-.02
-.04
.01
-.01
.01
.05
.10
-.03
.00
0.54
1.28
.00
.14
.09
.01
.15
-.07
.03
.04
.01
.08
-.08
-.04
.00
-.01
.05
.21
.12
.10
.01
.08
.01
.08
.13
.19
.00
-.05
-.13
-.03
-.13
-.01
.02
-.00
-.12
-.01
-.05
-.00
.07
-.29
- 06
• N = 96. Correlations above .16 are significant at the .05 level; correlations above .22 are significant at the .01 level. The test-retest
reliability of each variable ia presented on the diagonal in the row of the time 1 measure of that variable.
fulfillment over an indefinite period during the course of the relationship.
The only relational obligation that did not consistently load on this factor at
hoth time points was "support with personal problems" This obligation
loaded onto the relational factor at time 1 but did not load onto any factor at
time 2, although it was more related to the relational than the transactional
factor.
With regard to employee obligations, we also found two distinct factors
that approximated our relational and transactional dimensions of obligations. Employees' obligation to work extra hours, to be loyal, and to volunteer to do nonrequired tasks on the job all loaded onto the same factor at both
time 1 and time 2. This factor represents relational obligations. At both time
points, employees' obligations to give advance notice if they were taking a
job elsewhere, to be willing to accept a transfer, to refuse to support the
1994
Robinson, Kraatz, and
flousseau
145
TABLE 1 (continued)
19
.11
.05
(.81)
.28
(.791
.13
.04
.26
.32
.11
.02
.33
.14
.12
.01
.12
.08
.19
.13
-.11
-.14
.16
.21
(.81)
.10
.05
20
21
22
23
24
29
26
(.83)
.28
(.76)
-.06
.14
.17
(.79)
.19
.14
.00
.18
.21
-.02
-.02
.26
.13
-.02
(.72)
.04
(.83)
.26
.19
.05
.35
.26
.32
-.06
.09
-.02
.14
-.01
.01
.13
.02
.00
.01
.33
.05
.14
.22
.18
.04
-.03
.38
.02
.01
.37
.05
.15
.05
.15
.12
.10
.12
.44
-.05
.06
-.00
.00
-.01
-.10
.03
.11
.18
.29
.06
.04
.45
.29
.14
-.06
.14
.12
.03
.11
.07
.16
.05
.13
.35
.07
.08
-.12
.14
.03
.10
.02
.05
.04
-.11
.18
.07
.20
.10
-.09
.03
-.03
.09
.04
-.02
.09
.04
.05
.21
.16
.02
.27
.34
.08
.21
.16
.12
-.07
-.29
-.06
-.13
.01
-.10
.07
-.42
-.46
-.43
-.20
27
28
29
30
31
-.15
-.08
-.24
-.21
(.77)
organization's competitors, and to protect proprietary information loaded
onto a single factor. This factor reflects transactional obligations in that the
obligations concern legal issues and possibly constitute formal rules that are
necessary in a transactional relationship in which the focus is not long-term
trust. The only transactional obligation that did not consistently load on this
transactional factor at both time points was "spending a minimum of two
years with the organization." This obligation loaded onto the transactional
factor at time 2, but at time 1 it did not load on any factor, although it was
more related to the transactional factor than to the relational factor.
In sum, the factor analysis results reveal that both employee and employer obligations can be categorized as either relational or transactional.
The fact that these factors were found consistently over a two-year period
lends support to our typology of psychological contracts and further legitimizes its use in assessing our hypotheses. It is important to note, however,
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Academy of Management Journal
February
TABLE 2
Rotated Factor Loadings for Employer Obligations"
Time 1
Variables
Advancement
High pay
Merit pay
Job security
Training
Development
Support
Eigenvalues
Percentage of
variance
explained
Communality
.74
.75
.41
.43
.49
.55
.22
Time 2
Transactional
.84
.86
.50
.38
.05
Relational
Communality
.19
.11
.45
.77
.36
.59
.41
.63
.16
-.40
Relational
Transactional
.22
-.01
.05
.62
.77
.79
.33
.64
.88
.60
.02
.17
.06
.70
.53
.74
.46
2.11
1.50
2.00
1.38
30.08
21.40
28.54
19.73
-.04
-.05
.21
" Bold type indicates factor loadings that are greater than .45.
that although we view the individual obligations as related to each other, we
do not conceptualize them as substitutable indicators of an underlying construct. On the contrary, the individual obligations are our primary constructs
of interest. Thus, we used these items separately in the subsequent analyses
rather than aggregating them into scales.
The first research question suggested that changes in employer and employee obligations could follow one of two patterns. Taking the norm-ofreciprocity perspective, we posited that both employee and employer obligations would increase over time, but taking the contrasting instrumental
perspective, we predicted that employee obligations would decrease and
employer obligations would increase. First, we computed multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) for both employee and employer obligation,
TABLE 3
Rotated Factor Loadings for Employee Obligations"
Timel
Variables
Overtime
Loyalty
Extrarole
behavior
Notice
Transfers
No competitor
support
Proprietary
protection
Minimum stay
Eigenvalues
Percentage of
variance
explained
Communality
Relational
Time 2
Transactional
Communality
Transactional
-.09
.45
.75
.69
Relational
.58
.52
.76
.65
-.11
.32
.58
.69
.60
.41
.42
.77
.15
.07
.02
.62
.64
.57
.22
.28
.11
.47
.53
.74
.06
.07
.24
-.00
.50
.57
.72
-.23
.28
.15
-.09
.07
.52
.38
.31
.37
.54
.56
.14
.23
1.86
1.34
2.23
1.36
23.22
16.78
27.91
16.94
' Bold type indicates factor loadings that are greater than .45.
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Robinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau
147
treating the time 1 obligations as dependent variables and the time 2 obligations as covariates. The resultant Hotelling's Ts (Hotelling, 1931) revealed
that both employer obligations (T^ = 1.25, p < .001) and employee obligations (T^ = 1.35, p < .001) changed over time. Next, we conducted pairedsample t-tests to assess differences between the individual obligations at
time 1 and time 2. Examination of these results suggests support for the
instrumental perspective (Table 4). That is, most of the perceived employee
obligations decreased over time, but most of the employer obligations increased.
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we separately regressed each obligation at
time 2 on the value of that obligation at time 1 and on violations. Hypotheses
la and lb respectively predict that violations will be associated with a decrease in perceived employee transactional obligations and an increase in
perceived employer transactional obligations. Failure by an employer to
honor its commitments was found to have a strong effect on many of the
obligations perceived hy employees [see Table 5). Violation decreased three
of five employee transactional obligations but did not significantly increase
any of the employer transactional obligations initially identified as transactional. Thus, Hypothesis la was supported but Hypothesis lb was not.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b respectively predict that violations will be associated with a decrease in perceived employee relational obligations and a
decrease in employer relational obligations. Violation had a strong negative
impact on all the employee relational obligations, but it decreased only one
of four employer relational ohligations (job security). This pattern suggested
strong support for Hypothesis 2a but only weak support for Hypothesis 2b.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that employer violations will more strongly affect
relational obligations than transactional ohligations (see Table 5). Violation
affected all the employee relational obligations and one of the employer
relational obligations but affected only three of five employee transactional
obligations and none of the employer transactional ones. Further, and perhaps more important, the regression coefficients indicate that the strength of
the associations between employer violation and changes in relational obligations were, without exception, much stronger than those between violation and change in the transactional ohligations that were affected.
DISCUSSION
This exploratory study showed that the mutual employer-employee obligations new employees perceive change strikingly during their initial years
in an organization. The apparent trends suggest that employees' perceived
obligations to their employers decline over time while the ohligations they
attribute to their employers increase. This finding is consistent with the
instrumental approach and ostensibly refutes the competing norm-ofreciprocity perspective.
Findings for the effects of violation upon the various types of ohligations
were also reasonahly supportive of our hypotheses. Violation strongly af-
148
Academy of Management Journal
February
TABLE 4
Results of Paired-Sample Tests
Variables
Perceived employer obligations
increasing mean values
Advancement
High pay
Merit pay
Development
Perceived employer obligations
decreasing mean values
Training
Support
Job security
Perceived employee obligations
increasing mean values
No competitor support
Perceived employee obligations
decreasing mean values
Overtime
Loyalty
Transfers
Notice
Minimum stay
Proprietary protection
Extrarole behavior
Timel
Mean
s.d.
Time 2
Mean
s.d.
2.90
2.76
4.11
3.81
1.31
1.19
0.96
0.96
3.76
3.52
4.45
3.95
1.11
0.99
0.66
0.92
6.51
7.35
3.45
1.28
3.61
2.04
2.42
1.04
0.92
1.01
3.35
1.96
2.37
1.20
0.99
1.07
-2.21
-0.90
-0.42
3.32
1.38
3.54
1.35
1.45
3.91
3.87
2.52
4.15
2.99
4.85
3.30
0.80
0.93
1.09
1.04
1.38
0.49
1.00
3.68
3.24
2,26
3.39
2.05
4.74
3.13
1.35
1.23
1.13
1.22
1.28
0.54
0.99
-2.28
-5.70
-2.99
-5.79
-6.31
-1.79
-1.65
with
.001
.001
.001
n.s.
with
.05
n.s.
n.s.
with
with
.001
.001
.05
.001
.001
n.s.
n.s.
TABLE 5
Results of Multiple Regression Analysis*
Obligations, Time 2
Obligation, Time 1
Violation
Adjusted fl^
F
.21*
.30***
.28***
.30**
.28***
-.42**
-.46***
-.35***
.22
.30
.24
.07
.17
.00
.28
13.67***
20.63***
15.77***
4.34**
10.54***
0.64
18.86***
.06
.07
.09
.17
.14
.04
.26
.00
3.75*
4.35**
5.22**
10.46***
8.30***
2.68
17.08***
0.68
Relational obligations
Overtime
Loyalty
Extrarole behavior
Training
Job security
Development
Support
Transactional obligations
Notice
Proprietary protection
Minimum stay
Transfers
No competitor support
Advancement
High pay
Merit pay
° Beta coefficients are reported.
* p < .05
** p < .01
***p < .001
.07
.53***
.16
.08
.24**
.41***
.38***
.24*
.53***
.12
.07
-.34***
-.09
-.08
-.22*
-.28**
-.23*
-.12
-.13
-.00
-.05
.01
1994
flobinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau
149
fected both relational and transactional employee obligations in the predicted direction. However, the observed effects of violation upon relational
and transactional employer obligations were weaker. One explanation for
why violations affected employee obligations more than employer obligations is that employees who have experienced violations may find adjusting
their own obligations to be the most feasible reaction. Employees may perceive themselves as powerless to effect change in their employers' behavior
and thus, may simply adjust their own perceived obligations in order to
redress the situation.
In general, our findings contribute substantially to the limited research
on psychological contracts that, to date, has been cross-sectional and has
failed to illuminate the dynamic and evolving nature of psychological contracts. The study of psychological contracts is valuable because this perspective augments and extends organizational attachment constructs, such as
citizenship and commitment. The contract perspective uniquely focuses on
hoth employee and employer (Rousseau & Parks, 1992). In contrast, research
on organizational citizenship behavior emphasizes only the "good soldier,"
neglecting the "good general" (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Organ, 1990). Second, contracts are reciprocal. Commitment research focuses on employees'
attachment to their employers but not on the employers' attachment to their
employees.
Our findings suggest that citizenship may, in fact, result from the employees' perceptions of their obligations to organizations and the degree to
which they are reciprocated rather than from attachment, loyalty, or satisfaction, as has been most frequently suggested (e.g.. Organ, 1990). Similarly,
obligations and their fulfillment may underlie organizational commitment.
Commitment can be construed as an array of obligations that employees
incur as a result of the inducements they accept from employers. Popular
conceptualizations of commitment as affective attachment to an organization (Buchanan, 1974), identification (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982), or as
an employee's investment in the organization (Becker, 1960) touch on but do
not directly confront the role of obligations, reciprocity, and fulfillment.
However, although violation decreases relational obligations, the absence of
violation may sustain them. This finding suggests that commitment to an
organization is intertwined with maintaining a relationship of consistency
and good faith.
The results of this study and the general notion of psychological contracts highlight several potential implications for employers. We suggest that
managers pay more attention to managing beliefs regarding mutual obligations and, in particular, to how well organizational actions maintain rather
than hreach the contract between employer and employee. In recent years,
much writing has counseled employers on the importance of specifying
optimal contracts in order to achieve a convergence hetween individual and
organizational goals (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975). This
study suggests that understanding employee perceptions of mutual ohligations may be at least as important as creating a contractual relationship with
one particular set of terms. By showing how employer violations can affect
150
Academy o/Management/ournal
February
employees' perceptions of their contracts with employers, our study suggests an important relationship hetween managers' actions and employees'
perception and fulfillment of their ohligations.
Several limitations of the study's design and findings require discussion. First, the measurement of all the critical variahles hy the same selfreport method introduces some potential for common method hias, though
the longitudinal design of the research somewhat reduces this risk. Second,
our assessment of central variahles of ohligations and violation through single-item measures is potentially prohlematic. Although our test-retest analysis demonstrated the temporal stahility of these measures, we could not
calculate the more commonly assessed measures of equivalence, such as
split-half reliahility or Cronhach's alpha (Rossi, Wright, & Anderson, 1983].
This potential lack of reliahility may explain, to some extent, the lack of a
demonstrahle relationship hetween violation and some ohligations. Our inahility to explain change in some ohligations also suggests a need to search
for explanatory variahles other than violation. For example, improvements
in organizational policies or changes in an employee's position may alter the
mutual ohligations inherent in the employment relationship. Finally, the
single-item measure of employer violation may not he as valid as a multipleitem measure that could assess specific episodes of violation.
Of interest to us in this study were employees' heliefs regarding employment ohligations, independent of their employers' perspective or some
ohjective standard of ohligations. This focus is consistent with the psychological contract and social exchange literature in which this research is
emhedded (Rousseau, 1989). This is not to say, however, that this research
domain would not henefit from an examination of employers' perceptions of
employment ohligations. For example, it would he interesting to examine
hoth changes in employers' perceptions of ohligations and the nature and
causes of discrepancies hetween employees' and employers' perceptions of
mutual ohligations.
Another fruitful area for future research would he to investigate how
employees' perceptions of ohligations continue to change after their first two
years in an organization and similarities and differences in patterns of
change across individuals and johs. We would expect ohligations to change
less rapidly after the early years of employment as employees hecome hetter
ahle to anticipate and predict employers' actions and responses. Although
violations may he less frequent in the later years of an employee's tenure in
an organization, such organizational changes as cuthacks and restructurings
may have considerahle impact on the fulfillment of the psychological contract.
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Sandra L. Robinson is an assistant professor of management at the Stern School of
Business, New York University. She received a Ph.D. degree in organizational behavior
from Northwestern University. Her current research interests include workplace deviance, psychological contracts, employee voice, and employees' behavioral responses to
dissatisfaction.
Matthew S. Kraatz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Organization Behavior
at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. His
current research interests include strategic and organizational change and top management succession and demography.
Denise M. Rousseau is a professor of organization behavior at the Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University. She received a Ph.D. degree in industrial/organizational psychology from the University of California, Berkeley. Her research interests
address psychological contracts and human resource practices and the multilevel factors shaping organizational performance.