Analysis of Truman: By James H - James

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Analysis of Truman: By James H. Boyd
The year is 1948. The sulfurous smell of burning coal mingles with the fragrant
essence of honeysuckle and wildflowers as the large rural crowd gathers for yet another
“whistle-stop” campaign rally for the thirty-third President of the United States, Harry S.
Truman. Soon, they are witnessing the plainspoken “Man from Missouri” at his “give
‘em hell” finest: Extolling the glories of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal while lambasting
what he perceives as greed and corruption within the Republican ranks. Afterwards, he
shakes hands and socializes with the friendly crowd, then goes off to the next stop.
Whenever the name of Harry Truman comes up in conversation, sentimental
images such as these are often what come to the imagination. Truly, President Truman
was “one of us,” a humble, simple product of small town origins who rose from obscurity
to the highest office in the Land, overcoming seemingly impossible odds every step of
the way. It is an inspirational story, to be sure, but one which frequently downplays the
complexity and intellect of the man himself. Fortunately, those interested in a more
thorough, balanced look at President Truman’s life and legacy can easily look to David
McCullough’s Pulitzer Prize-winning biography, simply entitled Truman.
First and foremost, McCullough writes as an historian, passionate for his
discipline while constantly looking for ways to make it relevant for modern readers. In a
1981 interview with Paul Giambarba, McCullough outlines his personal approach to
history:
History is the story of people. ..Very few professional historians are, at
heart, interested in people. And that's one of the reasons that so much that
is written in the way of history, and in the teaching of history, is boring. I
can't tell you how many people have come up to me and said, "Oh, if
history had only been taught like that when I was in school, I would have
become a history major." Well, there isn't any other way to do it, in my
view. That's what history is, and the crucial thing is to feel, not just to
know, but to feel that people of the past were just as real, just as alive, just
as prey to the same emotions, fears, exhilarations -- whatever -- that we
are. And the only thing that is different is their time was different from
our time, but they didn't think they were living in The Past (1).
Consistent with this philosophy, McCullough presents President Truman as both a
heroic and as a paradoxical figure. He was a public servant with a solid sense of right and
wrong, despite early associations with corrupt political bosses. He was a civil rights
champion who never completely overcame his own personal prejudices. And he was a
leader whose fierce loyalty to his close friends bordered on naïveté, which caused nearly
catastrophic damage to his administration.
It is with this in mind that we will examine McCullough’s classic work in light of
insights from some of the most respected minds in modern political thought, scholars
such as Clinton Rossiter, Richard Neustadt, Samuel Kernell and numerous others. As we
look at various events in President Truman’s fascinating life and career, we will see how
his actions and abilities “stack up” in light of their critical analyses.
The events of April 12, 1945 are now the stuff of legend. Vice President Truman
joins House Speaker Sam Rayburn for drinks and conversation to close out the work day.
Suddenly, they are interrupted by a phone call for Truman to come to the White House as
“quickly and quietly” as he could. There he is greeted with the bone-chilling news of
President Roosevelt’s passing. Truman’s timely response that the weight of “the moon,
the stars and all the planets” had fallen on his shoulders was no simple hyperbole. For
Truman to replace such a revered leader at such a crucial point in history was beyond the
grasp of imagination. As presidential scholars Sydney Milkis and Michael Nelson
observe:
… the contrast between Truman and his predecessor was striking…A poor
speaker who was awkward in the presence of reporters, Truman suffered
persistently low popularity…In other respects, however, Truman was a
solid successor to Roosevelt. He believed deeply in the changes that the
New Deal had made in the United States. Although he was all too aware
of his personal limitations, Truman also recognized the legacy of FDR’s
active personal style and of the expanded government responsibilities that
Roosevelt had brought about required active presidential leadership from
his successors (2).
Regardless of one’s political persuasion, it is impossible not to sympathize with
Truman at this crucial hour. It is here that we will begin the primary focus of this work.
Although there are many facets of Truman’s presidency which would make for a
fascinating study, I will focus primarily on four. We will first look at the Truman
Doctrine, an international strategy which is widely viewed as initiating the Cold War.
Then we will follow with a discussion of the Marshall Plan, which revitalized the
structure of post-World War II Europe. Then, we will examine Truman’s groundbreaking
work in the area of civil rights. Finally, will take a look at his dramatic reelection victory
in 1948, and finish with an overview of his post-presidential life and long-term legacy.
The Truman Doctrine
In assuming the presidency at the time that he did, it became Truman’s unenviable
duty to be Commander-in-Chief of a nation in the bitter throngs of World War II. This
culminated in both the fall of Nazi Germany, and the heart-wrenching decision to use the
Atomic Bomb on Japan, thus bringing the War to a bloody, but victorious conclusion.
However, the feeling of security that followed was not to last long. Although initially
seen by Truman as a trusted ally, Joseph Stalin’s ruthless grip on Communist Russia cast
an ominous shadow over post-war Europe.
In was under this shadow that, on February 27, 1947, President Truman received
word that, due to severe economic conditions, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was
withdrawing forty thousand troops from Greece, and ending all economic support, with
the hope that the United States would assume the responsibility (3). This would leave
Greece in dire straits, as the British had been aiding them in a bloody civil war with
Communist guerillas. Newspaper publisher Mark Ethridge would later describe Greece as
a “ripe plum” ready to fall into Soviet hands (4). Also in a grave condition was the
Nation of Turkey. General Walter Bedell Smith, the American ambassador to Moscow,
stated that Turkey had “little hope of independent survival unless it is assured of solid
long-term American and British support (5).”
President Truman made his dramatic appeal to Congress on March 12, 1947.
Laying the foundation for later Cold Warriors such as Barry Goldwater and Ronald
Reagan, he presented his case in no uncertain terms:
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had
totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government
of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and
intimidation in violation of the Yalta agreement in Poland, Romania, and
Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have
been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose
between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished
by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees
of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from
political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a
controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal
freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies
in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial
aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes
(6).
This fiery speech earned the President a standing ovation. Subsequently, the press
response was very positive. The New York Times compared it to the Monroe Doctrine.
Life magazine said the speech was “Like a bolt of lightning.” Likewise, Collier’s said that
Truman had “hit the popularity jackpot (7). “ However, there were also significant
reservations expressed toward the message. For example, PM accused the President of
scarring Roosevelt’s entire Russian policy (8). Members of Congress on both sides of the
isle expressed concern over the economic ramifications, as well as the effect on future
relations with Russia (9).Samuel Kernell, a professor of political science at the University
of California, San Diego, sums it up well:
After having experienced the cold war rhetoric of the 1950s, one may not
find much in Truman’s statements that is particularly arousing or
inflammatory. But it must be remembered that this was the first time a
president had publicly identified the Soviet Union as an enemy and
depicted so starkly the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism
(10).
So did Truman’s speech, in and of itself, usher in the Cold War? Kernell observes
that these sorts of claims seem to be overstated:
Large numbers of citizens rallied behind the president’s legislative
proposals, but there is little evidence that the speech triggered a massive,
domestic anticommunist phobia or exploited anticommunism already
prevalent I the country at the time.
The effects of President Truman’s speech on public opinion are, therefore,
consonant with the conventional wisdom of politicians rather than with
history…Instead, (his) capacity to lead the nation into a new, foreboding
era of foreign affairs reflected in large part the citizenry’s trust in him as
its leader (11).
McCullough further emphasizes that, in spite of Truman’s staunch anticommunist
convictions, he adamantly refused to take part in the stateside conspiracies of mass
Communist infiltration, stating that “Much too much was being made of the ‘Communist
bugaboo.’” and that the country was “perfectly safe so far as Communism is
concerned-we have far too many sane people.” Nonetheless, to protect his administration
from accusations of being “soft on Communism,” Truman did later establish a Federal
Employees Loyalty and Security Program, stating that “I am not worried about the
Communist Party taking over the government of the United States, but I am against a
person, whose loyalty is not to the government of the United States, holding a
government job (12).”
Politically, these actions were a strong clarion call to congressional Republicans,
who, according to Time magazine’s Capitol Hill correspondent Frank McNaughton, were
“now taking Truman seriously…The Republicans are beginning to realize Truman is no
pushover (13).” When it was time for action on Capitol Hill, the results were dramatic.
McCullough describes the scenario:
On April 22, 1947, the Senate overwhelmingly approved aid to Greece
and Turkey by a vote of 67 to 23. On May 9, the House, like the Senate,
passed the bill by a margin of nearly three to one, 287 to 107. On May 22,
while visiting his mother in Grandview, Truman sat at the Mission oak
table in her small parlor and signed the $400 million aid package. The
Truman Doctrine had been sanctioned (14).
The Marshall Plan
Richard E. Neustadt, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government Emeritus at the
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, describes the Marshall Plan as
“perhaps the greatest exercise in policy agreement since the Cold War began (15).”
Arthur Krock, the “Dean of Washington newsmen,” would call it “the central gem in a
cluster of great and fruitful decisions made by President Truman (16).” Ultimately,
Truman’s policy of reconstruction in post-World War II Europe would be one of his most
acclaimed contributions to history. As McCullough states:
The idea of economic aid to Europe had been on Truman’s mind for some
while…In his own State of the Union message in January, Truman had
struck the theme of sharing American bounty with war-stricken peoples,
as a means of spreading “the faith” of freedom and democracy, and on
March 6, even before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, he had
said in a speech at Baylor University, “We are the giant of the economic
world. Whether we like it or not, the future pattern of economic relations
depends on us (17).
Already upset by the indifference he had encountered during a visit to Moscow,
Secretary of State George Marshall was continually receiving reports of the grave
situations in Western Europe. Truman responded by sending Dean Acheson to sound a
“warning bell” in a speech in which he emphasized that financial help was imperative,
but the objective was not relief, it was the revival of industry, agriculture and trade (18).
Receiving an honorary degree from Harvard, Marshall used this rather unusual occasion
to unveil this crucial undertaking:
Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival
of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of
political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for our Government to undertake
to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet
economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think,
must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of
friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of
such a program so far as it is practical for us to do so. The program should
be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations (19).
McCullough comments that “Two ideas were new and distinguishing. He was
calling on the Europeans to get together, and, with American help, work out their own
programs. And, by inference, he was leaving the door open to the Soviets and their
satellite countries to take part (20).” Furthermore, Neustadt points out the crucial
follow-up work on the part of British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin:
He well deserves the credit he has sometimes been assigned as, in effect,
coauthor of the Marshal Plan. For Bevin seized on Marshall’s Harvard
speech and organized a European response with promptness and
concreteness beyond the State Department’s expectations. What had been
virtually a trial balloon to test reactions on both sides of the Atlantic was
hailed in London as an invitation to the Europeans to send Washington a
bill of particulars. This they promptly organized to do, and the American
Administration then organized in turn for its reception without further
argument internally about the pros and cons of issuing the “invitation” in
the first place (21).
As McCullough further describes:
With Britain’s Bevin taking the lead, a hasty conference was organized in
Paris, to which the Soviets sent a sizable delegation headed by
(Vyacheslav) Molotov. The provisional and largely
Communist-dominated government of Czechoslovakia had already
indicated that it wished to be included in the program. Communist leaders
in Poland and Romania had shown interest. But five days into the
conference, after being handed a telegram from Moscow, Molotov stood
up from the table and abruptly announced that the Soviet Union was
withdrawing. The Marshall Plan, he said, was “nothing but a vicious
American scheme for using dollars to buy its way” into the affairs of
Europe (22).
By taking this approach, however, the Soviets played directly into the Truman
administration’s hands. As McCullough further observes, “By refusing to take part in the
Marshall Plan, Stalin had virtually guaranteed its success. Sooner or later congressional
support was bound to follow now, whatever the volume of grumbling on the Hill (23).”
The Marshall Plan went on to be passed in April, 1948 with overwhelming
support from both houses of Congress. Truman would proudly recall that “In all the
history of the world, we are the first great nation to feed and support the conquered…Our
neighbors are not afraid of us. Their borders have no forts, no soldiers, no tanks, no big
guns lined up (24).
In this, one of the finest moments of his presidency, Truman
epitomized Cornell Professor Clinton Rossiter’s observation that:
The reasons why he, rather than the British Prime Minister or French
President or an outstanding figure from one of the smaller countries
should be singled out for supranational leadership are too clear to require
extended mention. Not only are we the richest and most powerful member
of any coalition we may enter, not only are we the chief target of the
enemy and thus most truculent of the powers arrayed against him, but the
Presidency, for the very reasons I have dwelled upon...unites power,
drama, and prestige as does no other office in the world (25).
Civil Rights
Up to this point, our study has focused primarily on two key elements of
Truman’s foreign policy. We will now turn our attention on one of the greatest aspects of
his domestic legacy. Even early in his national political career, Truman was an outspoken
supporter of civil rights at a time and place in which it was truly groundbreaking.
Campaigning for the Senate before an all-white audience in Sedalia, Missouri, he stated
that:
I believe in the brotherhood of man: not merely the brotherhood of white
men, but the brotherhood of all men before the law…Negroes have been
preyed upon by all types of exploiters, from the installment salesmen of
clothing, pianos, and furniture to the vendors of vice. The majority of our
Negro people find but cold comfort in shanties and tenements. Surely, as
freemen, they are entitled to something better than this (26).
In the modern era, we generally take it for granted that our public servants,
particularly the president, will echo these sentiments. Rossiter sums it up well:
The people have done much to make (the Presidency) what it is today; the
man who holds it reaches out to them for support and repays them with
guidance and protection. There is no more impressive evidence of this
truth than...the elevation of this office to a commanding position in the
ongoing struggle for civil rights. We have become increasingly conscious
of our shortcomings and wrongdoings in these related fields in recent
years. Even as we sin against one another in the area of freedom of
expression, even as we drag our feet in the march toward justice for our
minorities, we feel the gaze of the whole world upon our necks and we are
uncomfortable. And as we have become more conscious, the President,
who has a sizable part of this world for a constituency, seems to have
grown in stature as a friend of liberty (27).
While Truman was definitely a pioneer in this, there were, unfortunately, some
serious discrepancies between his public and private persona on this issue. As Neustadt
points out, “ Truman certainly deserves to have the cause of civil rights cited among his
purposes, but if he were to be judged in temperamental terms according to the standards
of, say, Eastern liberals, he scarcely could be called a man of passion on the point (28).”
The fact is that Truman, in spite of his rhetoric to the contrary, continued to harbor some
of the old prejudices of his upbringing.
As McCullough reveals, “Privately, like the country people whose votes he was
courting, he still used (the “n” word) and enjoyed the kind of racial jokes exchanged over
drinks in Senate hideaways. He did not favor social equality for blacks and said so.”
Furthermore, his sister, Mary Jane candidly stated that “Harry is no more for n***
equality than any of us (29).”
Obviously, this is a troubling aspect of Truman’s character, a serious flaw in what
was otherwise a very noble life. Although some may be able to rationalize it as simply
being a “part of the times” in which he lived, our modern conscience still asks how valid
this excuse ultimately is. Nonetheless, Truman was in a pivotal point in time to address
the issue. As Yale Political Science Professor Stephen Skowronek, observes;
(Franklin) Roosevelt had seen the fight for civil rights coming, but he
refused to make it his own, fearing the devastating effect it would have on
the precarious sectional balance in his newly established party coalition.
Harry S. Truman had seen the fight break out and temporarily rupture the
party in 1948. His response was a balance of executive action and
legislative caution (30).
On June 29, 1947, Truman became the fist president ever to address the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Speaking, fittingly, at the Lincoln
Memorial to a crowd of ten thousand, he delivered the most passionate presidential call
for civil rights since Lincoln himself:
When I say all Americans I mean all Americans.
Many of our people still suffer the indignity of insult, the harrowing fear
of intimidation, and, I regret to say, the threat of physical injury and mob
violence. Prejudice and intolerance in which these evils are rooted still
exist. The conscience of our nation, and the legal machinery which
enforces it, have not yet secured to each citizen full freedom from fear.
We cannot wait another decade or another generation to remedy these
evils. We must work, as never before, to cure them now (31).
As he listened, NAACP head Walter White compared Truman’s speech to
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address: “I did not believe that Truman’s speech possessed the
literary quality of Lincoln’s speech, but in some respects it had been a more courageous
one in its specific condemnation of evils based upon race prejudice…and its call for
immediate action against them.” Afterward, Truman turned to White and assured him that
he “meant every word of it-and I’m going to prove that I do mean it (32).”
True to his word, he had taken significant action within the next year. On
February 2, 1948, much to the chagrin of southern Democrats, Truman’s Civil Rights
Commission released the first ever message specifically addressing the issue of civil
rights:
Not all groups are free to live and work where they please or to improve
their conditions of life by their own efforts. Not all groups enjoy the full
privileges of citizenship…
The Federal Government has a clear duty to see that the Constitutional
guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the law are
not denied or abridged anywhere in the Union. That duty is shared by all
three branches of the Government, but it can be filled only if the Congress
enacts modern, comprehensive civil rights laws, adequate to the needs of
the day, and demonstrating our continuing faith in the free way of life
(33).
In light of these convictions, Truman spoke forcefully against the barbaric
practice of lynching, called for an end to poll taxes and promoted the establishment of a
Fair Employment Practices Commission. He further asked Congress to act on the claims
of Japanese-Americans who had been forced from their homes and placed in confinement
during World War II. Asked at a press conference what he had drawn on for background,
Truman simply responded “The Constitution and the Bill of Rights (34).”
Dewey Defeats Truman?
The image is forever fixed in our nation’s political history: President Harry S.
Truman stands, newly reelected, holding up a premature edition of the Chicago Tribune
announcing his defeat at the hands of New York governor Thomas Dewey.
In spite of the numerous successes during his first term, Truman was in serious
trouble as he ran for reelection in 1948. He was faced with a sharply divided Democratic
Party and approval ratings of 36%, and his hopes of being renominated, let alone
reelected, seemed almost nil. Many prominent Democrats, including Franklin Roosevelt’s
son, James, were involved in a movement to draft the popular General Dwight
Eisenhower as the Democratic candidate. As McCullough summarizes:
He had been castigated by southern Democrats over civil rights,
repudiated by a Republican Congress…Seen himself portrayed in the
press as inept and pathetic. His party was broke. And now the New
Dealers were abandoning him, and noisily. No president in history, not
even Herbert Hoover in his darkest days, had been treated with such open
contempt by his own party (35).
Again, all of this seems quite ironic in light of Truman’s very impressive list of
accomplishments. In a diary entry, former TVA director David Lilienthal rightly asserted
that:
Truman’s record is that of a man who, facing problems that would have
strained or even floored Roosevelt at his best, he has met these problems
head on in almost every case. The way he took on the aggression of
Russia…his civil rights program, upon which he hasn’t welched or
trimmed-My God! What do these people want (36)?
Nonetheless, when the party gathered for its 1948 National Convention,
pessimism was the order of the day. Senator Alben Barkley, the eventual
Vice-Presidential nominee said that you could “cut the gloom with a corn knife. The very
air smelled of defeat (37).” Later, the event was fractured even further by a nasty floor
fight over civil rights that, in spite of walkout threats from southern delegations, resulted
in the party drafting its first ever plant on the issue.
Eventually, Truman was able to secure the nomination and gave a rousing speech
promising that “Senator Barkley and I will win this election and make these Republicans
like it-don’t you forget that.” McCullough states that:
For the first times since 1945 he was speaking not as a leader by accident,
by inheritance, but by the choice of his party. He was neither humble nor
elegant nor lofty…In manner as well as content he was drawing the line so
that there could be no mistaking one candidate for the other (38).
And there would be no such mistaking. In start contrast to Truman, Governor
Dewey was youthful, urbane and had a prestigious Columbia education. McCullough
tells us that “As governor he had cut taxes, raised salaries for state employees, reduced
the state’s overall indebtedness by over $100 million, and put through the first state law
prohibiting racial discrimination in employment (39). In addition to Dewey, Truman also
had to deal with the fringe defectors from his own party: Henry Wallace on the left, and
Strom Thurmond on the right.
While both Truman and Dewey were quite progressive in their political
philosophies, it was up to Truman to revive the base of disgruntled New Dealers with
strongly populist posturing and rhetoric. A key avenue in this strategy was the
afore-mentioned “Whistle-Stop” campaign tour, in which he traveled a total of 21928
miles. His outgoing personality and genuine love of people made won him friends and
supporters everywhere he went. Speech after speech was characterized by fiery reminders
that “The Democratic Party puts human rights and welfare first…I’m not asking you to
vote for me. Vote for yourselves…You stayed home in 1946 and you got the 80th
Congress, and you got just exactly what you deserved (40).” Was this demagoguery?
Perhaps, but it was also classic New Deal politics. Milkis reminds us that:
The modern liberalism that became the public philosophy of the New Deal
entitled a fundamental reappraisal of the concept of rights…Although
equality of opportunity had traditionally been promoted by limited
government interference in society, Roosevelt argued, recent economic
and social changes…demanded that America now recognize “the new
terms of the old social contract (41).”
These factors did much to endear voters to the President, but ultimately, it seemed
to be Dewey’s overconfidence and arrogant demeanor that was his eventual undoing. An
example was the incident in which he described a train engineer as a “lunatic” and said
that he “ought to be shot at sunrise. (42)” Slowly, gradually the tide began to turn in
Truman’s favor. By carrying key states such as Ohio, Illinois and California as well as
most of the south, Truman pulled off the most stunning upset victory in American
history.
Post-Presidency and Legacy
The events of Truman’s second term were no less dramatic than the first: War in
Korea, an assassination attempt and bitter clashes with Generals MacArthur and
Eisenhower. He remained a controversial figure, leaving office with record low
popularity. In his farewell address, Truman nonetheless reminded the Nation that:
The American people stand firm in the faith which has inspired this Nation
from the beginning. We believe that all men have a right to equal justice
under law and equal opportunity to share in the common good. We believe
that all men have the right to freedom of thought and expression. We
believe that all men are created equal because they are created in the
image of God…From this faith we will not be moved (43).
Afterward, Truman quietly retired to his Missouri home, refusing to capitalize on
his status as a former president. In doing this, he set a wonderful example that is all too
often ignored by politicians today. Over time, historians have come to view Truman in a
much more favorable light. Rossiter observes that:
Mr. Truman kept the pressure turned on throughout his eight years, even
when his hopes of accomplishing anything constructive must have been
entirely empty, and by the end of his second term even the Republicans in
Congress professed an eagerness to have his thoughts on such red-hot
issues as labor, taxes, inflation, and education (44).
At the same time, he also notes that:
I confess manfully, with dragging feet, that Harry S. Truman will
eventually win a place as President alongside Jefferson and Theodore
Roosevelt. There will be at least a half-dozen Presidents strung out below
him who were more able and large-minded, but he had the good fortune to
preside in stirring times and will reap large credit for having survived
them…I cannot, in good conscience, predict the greatness of Washington,
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Wilson, and Jackson for his name. Certain
deficiencies of intellect and perception must always bar him from the seats
of the mighty (45).
Four days after becoming President, Truman told a joint session of Congress that
he desired “only to be a good and faithful servant to my Lord and my people.” Opinions
may differ concerning his success in these endeavors, but few will doubt that the
integrity, diligence and courage that characterized his life still stand as an example for
people of all ages, creeds and political persuasions. After all, the buck stopped there.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1-Giambarba, Paul. Paul Giambarba Photo and Article: Interview with David
McCullough. © 1981, 2006 by Paul Giambarba.
http://www.giambarba.com/mccullough/mccullough.html ,
August 4, 2007
2-Milkis, Sidney M. Nelson, Michael. The American Presidency: Origins &
Development: Third Edition. © 1999. Congressional Quarterly, Inc, Washington D.C. pp
277-278
3-McCullough, David. Truman. © 1992 by David McCullogh. Simon & Schuster, New
York, NY. pp 539-540.
4-Ibid. p 540.
5-Ibid.
6-Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. © 1997.
CQ Press, Washington, D.C. p 192
7-McCullough, p 548
8-Ibid, p 549
9-Ibid
10-Ibid. p 193.
11-Ibid. p. pp 206-207.
12- McCullough, pp 550-552
13- Quoted in McCullough, p 553
14- McCullough, pp 553-554
15- Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. © 1990.
Richard E. Neustadt. The Free Press, New York, NY. P 40.
16- McCullough, p 583
17- Ibid, pp 561-562
18- Ibid, pp 561-562
19- Quoted in McCullough, p 563
20- McCullough, p 563
21- Neustadt, p 43
22- McCullough, p 565
23- Ibid
24- Quoted in McCullough, p 583
25- Rossiter, Clinton. The American Presidency. © 1960 by Clinton Rossiter. Mentor
Books, New York, NY. p 37
26- McCullough, p 247
27- Rossiter, p 117
28- Neustadt, p 170
29- McCullough, pp 247, 588
30- Skowronek , Stephen. “Presidential Leadership in Political Time.” Michael et al. The
Presidency and the Political System: Eighth Edition. © 2006. CQ Press, Washington
D.C. p 111.
31- Quoted in McCullough, p 570
32- Quoted in McCullough, p 570
33- McCullough, p 587
34- Ibid, p 587
35- Ibid, p 633
36- Quoted in McCullough, p 634
37- McCullough, p 636
38- Ibid, p 642
39- Ibid, p 671
40- Quoted in McCullough, pp 658-660
41- Milkis, Sidney M. “The Presidency and Political Parties.” Published in Nelson, p 342.
42- McCullough, p 697
43- Truman, Harry S. Farewell Address. January 15, 1953.
www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/harrystrumantrumanfarewelladdress.html. August
9, 2007.
44- Rossiter, p 106
45- Ibid, p 153
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