REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
EN BANC
IN RE: URGENT PETITION FOR TRANSFER,
DISQUALIFICATION AND/OR
SUBSTITUTION OF JUSTICES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.,
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
AND LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
REP. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Petitioner.
x ---------------------------------------------------------- x
A.M. No. _____
URGENT PETITION
(For Transfer, Disqualification and/or Substitution of Justices Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta and Lucas P. Bersamin from the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal)
Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully states:
1. Petitioner Representative REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is a Filipino, of
legal age and with address at Barangay Lupac, Boac, Marinduque. Petitioner may be
served copies of processes, Resolutions, Decisions or any other pleading in her office
at the House of Representatives, Room 519, North Wing, Batasan Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City.
2. Petitioner is the duly elected Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque having had the highest number of votes for the said position
during the 13 May 2013 elections with 52,209 votes against Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco who got 48,311 votes.
3. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco is the son of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. a
member of this Honorable Court and the Chairman of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
4. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner by the Marinduque Provincial Board
of Canvassers on 18 May 2013 and, at the time of her proclamation, no final
1
judgment has been rendered against her for her disqualification. Likewise, no motion
to suspend proclamation was filed to arrest her proclamation by, and the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), has not issued an Order for the suspension of
her proclamation in accordance with Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646. To date,
her proclamation has not been lawfully annulled by the only constitutional body – the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal – vested with jurisdiction over election
contests, returns and qualifications of Member of the House of Representatives,
including pre-proclamation controversies and annulment of proclamation.
5. Petitioner assumed office on 30 June 2013 and discharged the functions of
her office from that date up to the present. Attached hereto as Annex “A” is a copy of
the Certification by the House of Representatives that Rep. Reyes is the duly elected,
incumbent and sitting Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque.
6. At present, there are two (2) quo warranto cases against the Petitioner filed
and pending with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with
another petition filed as an intervention. The cases are:
6.1. Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca
L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as
Annex “B”);
6.2. Case No. 130037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes (A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as Annex “C”); and
6.3. Petition-in-Intervention by Victor Vela Sioco (A copy of the Petitionin-Intervention is attached hereto as Annex “D”).
7. Aside from the foregoing cases, an election protest filed by Lord Allan Jay
Q. Velasco, the son of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. who is also the Chairperson
of the HRET, against the Petitioner, was dismissed by the HRET on 28 November
2013. A copy of the 28 November 2013 Resolution is attached hereto as Annex
“E.”
8. As early as 28 November 2013, the HRET proclaimed its jurisdiction over
the case against Petitioner as representative of the Lone District of Marinduque in the
case entitled Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac vs. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes (Lone District of Marinduque) in HRET Case No. 13-036. The
HRET, in Resolution No. 13-2421, said:
On July 11, 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Quo Warranto of
even date against respondent, alleging, among other things, that
respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque because the latter had been declared as not a
Filipino Citizen.
1
A copy of the Resolution is attached hereto as Annex “F.”
2
However, in the petition, petitioners also allege that:
2. Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
(Respondent hereafter) is a Filipino citizen, a resident of Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque. Respondent may be served with pleadings,
summons and other processes in her residence as stated above.
(Underscoring supplied)
By admitting that respondent is a Filipino citizen, petitioners
have no more cause of action against respondent and, therefore, the
petition may be summarily dismissed for being insufficient in form and
substance under Rule 21 (1) of the 2011 HRET Rules.
In Resolution No. 13-093 date August 15, 2013, the Tribunal
directed petitioners to show cause, within a non-extendible period of
ten (10) days from receipt hereof, why their Petition for Quo Warranto
should not be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Records show that a copy of Resolution No. 13-093 was
received on September 9, 2013 by a certain Pedro Salindong, the
father of counsel for petitioner, Atty. Danilo F. Salindong, at the
latter’s office address of record at JCLGE Building, 3573 Sandico St.,
Barangay Tejeros, Makati City.
To date, however, petitioners have not yet complied with the
show-cause order in Resolution No. 13-093.
Specifically, Rule 21 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides, among
other things, that a petition for quo warranto may be summarily
dismissed by the Tribunal without the necessity of requiring the
respondent to answer if the petition is insufficient in form and
substance.
Although the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the present
case, as the sole judge of all contests relating, inter alia, to
the qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives, the petitioners, however, have no more cause of
action against the respondent for reasons mentioned above. The
petition is, therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its
dismissal. (Emphasis supplied)
9. On 12 March 2014, Victor Vela Sioco filed with the HRET a Petition-inIntervention alleging, among others, that herein Petitioner is illegally occupying the
office of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque and the HRET has
therefore no jurisdiction over the cases against her. The filing fees for the Petition
were not paid until 14 March 2014.
3
10. Immediately, the Petition-in-Intervention was made part of the agenda of
the HRET for its session on the next day, 13 March 2014. It cannot be determined
who caused the inclusion of the Petition-in-Intervention in the calendar of the HRET
for its session on 13 March 2014. It could not also be determined whether there was
a report on the non-payment of the filing fees which is a ground for the summary
dismissal of the petition under Rule 21 of the HRET Rules.
11. However, on 13 March 2014 --- or a MERE ONE DAY after the
filing of the Petition-in-Intervention by Victor Vela Sioco --- the HRET issued
Resolution No. 14-0812 with respect to HRET Case [HRET Case No. 13-036 (QW)]
and the case entitled Eric Del Mundo Junio vs. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Lone
District, Marinduque) [HRET Case No. 13-037 (QW)], to wit:
Acting on both petitions for quo warranto, the Tribunal, without
necessarily giving due course to the said petitions, REQUIRES
respondent to comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.
12. On the same day, and in the same cases, instead of summarily dismissing
the Petition-in-Intervention, the HRET likewise promulgated Resolution No. 140823 which states:
Acting on the Petition-in-Intervention dated March 12, 2014, filed
by Victor Vela Sioco on even date, the Tribunal, without necessarily
giving due course to the said petition-in-intervention, REQUIRES the
respondent to comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.
13. The excerpts of the foregoing Resolutions ended with the following note:
“Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. inhibited from this case and stepped
out of the room. Justice Diosdado M. Peralta presided over the
deliberations in the instant case.”
14. The Supreme Court’s representatives to the HRET are Justices
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta and Lucas P. Bersamin. Considering
that it was supposedly only Justice Velasco who allegedly inhibited from the
proceedings in the above cases and Justice Peralta acted as the Chairman in Justice
Velasco’s absence, it is reasonable to suppose that Justice Bersamin also participated
in the proceedings.
15. It must be recalled that Justice Bersamin voted with the majority of the
Justices of the Honorable Court in the case entitled Reyes vs. COMELEC4 in its
Decision dated 25 June 2013 while Justice Velasco inhibited therefrom and Justice
A copy of which is attached as Annex “G”.
A copy of which is attached as Annex “H”.
4 G.R. No. 207264.
2
3
4
Peralta was on official leave. In the Resolution5 of the Motion for Reconsideration,
all three Justices took no part in the proceedings with Justice Velasco specifically
inhibiting himself from the case.
Designation of HRET Members
16. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
designation of Justices as representatives of the Judiciary to the HRET. The provision
reads:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
17. It must be stressed that the provision uses the term designation, not
appointment. Designation does not imply permanency as opposed to an
appointment. This distinction was made clear by the Honorable Court in the case of
Binamira vs. Garrucho6 where the Court said:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of
the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is
said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
5
22 October 2013.
6
G.R. No. 92008; 30 July 1990.
5
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment
because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a
specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term.
However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by
the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named. (Emphasis supplied)
18. And while the duty to designate the representatives of the Judiciary to the
HRET devolves upon the Chief Justice, it is respectfully submitted that the power
resides in the Supreme Court as a whole under its expressly enumerated powers7
and/or necessary or implied powers. The power to designate necessarily carries with
it the power to withdraw the designation.
The Case for Disqualification and Transfer of Justice Velasco
19. The Honorable Court must not begrudge a forthright, upfront, and
candid outpouring of misgivings, apprehensions -- strong suspicions even -- by the
Petitioner and the general public at large given the unprecedented and very
peculiar circumstances of the subject case.
20. After all, the subject case involves, not only the son of a sitting
member of the Supreme Court, but the Justice-Father himself continues to head
the body (i.e. HRET) that is vested by the Constitution with the power to decide
whether to award the disputed Congressional seat to his own son.
21. His inhibition notwithstanding, the Justice-Father (a) remains the
boss, head, and superior of everyone in the HRET, (b) retains
administrative control over all the operations of the Tribunal, (c) is
vested with inseparable moral suasion over all HRET employees, and (d)
enjoys unavoidable camaraderie with the judicial and congressional
members of the Tribunal.
22. There has never occurred an equivalent incident in the entire history of
the Supreme Court --- or in any other Philippine governmental body for that
matter --- where a son’s desire to be awarded a Congressional seat would
depend on a body headed by his own Justice-Father. The Supreme
Court runs the risk of incurring historical infamy if it ignores this unprecedented
scenario and contents itself with a complacent and run-of-the-mill inhibition by
the Justice-Father from the case, even if said Justice/Father/HRET-Head still
retains administrative control and moral suasion, and enjoys collegial camaraderie in
the HRET.
7
Section 5 (6), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
6
23. In addition to the peculiar scenario of Father-Justice-HRET-HeadEmpowered-To-Award-Seat-To-Son, the Father-Justice himself has been THE
CENTRAL FIGURE in several controversies that do not work to assuage fears
but rather fan the flames of fears of injustice in the making. Again, the Petitioner
begs the Supreme Court not to begrudge a further candid elucidation of
misgivings, given the peculiar circumstances of the instant case.
24. It must be remembered that multiple accusations of misuse of
influence have been leveled against the Justice/Father/HRET-Head and the said
accusations are memorialized in no less than a book of investigative journalism. 8
25. In these
published and memorialized accusations,
the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head himself was reported to have engaged in a practice
of calling up judges and justices to intercede in behalf of litigants and intervene in
pending cases. No less than six judges and justices have been narrated in the book
to have reported receiving calls from the Justice/Father/HRET-Head who
allegedly sought to intervene in pending cases.9
26. If only to emphasize the grounded-basis of fears of injustice
engendered by the status of the Justice/Father/HRET-Head, the propensity of the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head to intercede --- not only in favor of litigants not
related to him by blood --- but more relevantly in favor of his son, is even
the subject of pointed accusations in the subject book of investigative journalism.
The book
narrates detailed stories about how Justice/Father/HRET-Head
interceded with government officials in pushing for the Congressional candidacy
of his son in the disputed province of Marinduque.10
8
Vitug, Marites Danguilan. Shadow of Doubt Probing the Supreme Court, pp. 91-92.
9
“And true again to what Bantay Katarungan and Peña pointed out, Velasco continued
to intercede for litigants before the Court of Appeals and lower courts. The judiciary
and legal community are small and tight circles where information such as this spreads
quickly. Lawyers said Velasco was “notorious for pressuring judges” this way: he
would call the justice or judge on the phone and attempt to influence the decision. “If
the judges did not take his calls, Velasco went through other judges to relay his
message,” one lawyer with good access to judges said. “About six judges (at the
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, and Court of Appeals) shared their
experience with Velasco with their colleagues.”
“In one instance, the lawyer continued, “Velasco attempted to fast-track a criminal case
in a provincial RTC. One of his staff members called the provincial RTC judgeto inform
him that the Justice wanted to talk to him. When the judge refused to talk to Velasco,
he called two other judges in the same Hall of Justice to pass on his message.”
“Over his years in the judiciary, lawyers and judges gave Velasco the moniker
“practicing justice.” Initially, it referred to his frequent visits to his former law firm
when he was a Court of Appeals justice, as alleged by Peña. This since evolved to
refer to his penchant to intervene in cases, as the judiciary watchdog, Bantay
Katarungan, complained about to the JBC. (Vitug, Marites Danguilan. Shadow of
Doubt Probing the Supreme Court, pp. 91-92.Emphasis supplied)
10
“But how far car a father help a son Win an election race—if he happens to be a Indio,
of the Supreme Court ? Not That far, if judicial ethics were to be followed.
7
“Justice Velasco, in this case, was navigating an ethical minefield. Accounts from
residents in Marinduque show that he was active in organizing Allan's ticket. He
invited at least two local officials to run with his son as councilor and promised to
underwrite campaign expenses; he was-also present in Allan's meetings with local
leaders in Iris beachfront residence in Turrijos, Marinduque.
"He (Justice Velasco) called to invite me to run for counselor with his son and to
attend a mining in his residence. I couldn’t attend the meeting and I declined his
offer," Marife Pastrana, barangay captain, said in an interview. "He said I shouldn't
worry about campaign expenses, he'll take care of the funds" Pastrami said she
preferred to stay on as barangay captain.
“Norma Villar, also a barangay captain, received the same offer from Justice Velasco.
Villar declined as well.
“Pastrami said she was able to attend a meeting in the elder Velasco’s residence once.
These meetings, hosted by Allan, gathered barangay officials and were usually held
on weekends. The Justice was usually around and spoke with some of the local
leaders, shook their hands, and asked them to support his son.
“Torrijos is a town of twenty live barangays, with about seven officials (kagawad)
each. The meetings in the Velasco residence were known in the community.
“After every meeting, the barangay officials were reimbursed for their transport
expenses, anywhere from P100 to P300 each. Justice Velasco did not participate in
distributing the cash.
"I know that government officials cannot engage in partisan political activity which is
why I refrain front activities which may be construed as such," Justice Velasco wrote
in reply to questions seal la him. “I seldom go to Marinduque and during those
occasions, some people, including government officials talk to me about the problems
in Marinduque. I try to avoid discussing with them the political plans of my son.
“On the Court, Justice Velasco voted along personal lines in Quinto v. Comelec which
allowed appointive public officials to stay in their posts even after filing their
candidacies. This ruling benefitted his son, who was Marinduque's provincial
administrator at the time.
“But Justice Velasco said that he "dissuaded him (Allan) from running and explained
the sacrifices and difficulties relating to a political career." Re went on in his letter: "He
decided that he has a good chance of winning in view of his exposure as provincial
administrator. I told him to fully familiarize himself with election laws and Comelec
rules and to act within the confines of law."
“In the Philippines, where family ties are strong, ethical conduct demands much more
from the Justices. Two sections in the New Code of Judicial Conduct (2007) provide
guidance on this sensitive area: Judges should not "use or lend the prestige of the
judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family";
and "Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct."
“Allan Velasco needed all the help he could get to win the contest against the Reyeses,
an entrenched political family. The question is how much of this would have come
from his father? (Vitug, Marites Danguilan. Shadow of Doubt Probing the Supreme
Court, pp. 238-239. Emphasis supplied)
8
27. It is true that the charges and accusations have not been proven in any
proceedings. But it is likewise equally true that the charges and accusations
remain hanging, unresolved and are highly material considerations
in the application of the Supreme Court’s mantra-like admonition
that “(l)ike Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion.”
“Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion. A judge’s private as well as official
conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of
impropriety, and be beyond reproach.”
28. Time and again, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished its
judges of their obligation to be “like Caesar’s wife.” In the eyes of judges and the
public at large, this subject case will now test whether the Supreme
Court practices
what it preaches.
It is not enough that
Justice/Father/HRET-Head inhibits himself from the case, because he will
continue to have access and influence as HRET Head, and therefore, unlike Ceasar’s
wife, he will engender strong suspicions of impropriety. He must not occupy
the position of HRET Head but should be properly reassigned to another position
( e.g. SET Head), if the Supreme Court is to prove to all and sundry that it leads
by example and will live up to its own teachings.
29. While all persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty, the
foregoing background is the one that the Honorable Court has to contend with in
presenting as its representative to the public, Justice Velasco. More specifically, that
is the background under which the Honorable Court, presented Justice Velasco to
the public when it designated him as its representative to, indeed the Chairman of,
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
30. Although Justice Velasco has ostensibly inhibited himself from the cases
against the Petitioner herein, the foregoing is the background under which any
decision he makes will be viewed. It is the burden that the Honorable Court has
asked the public to carry when it designated him to the HRET and it is a burden that
is not easily dismissed.
The Propriety of Designating Justices
with Ties to Political Families to
Electoral Tribunals
31. Whether Justice Velasco likes it or not, the Velasco family has become a
“political family” with his son, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, running for the
Congressional post for the lone district of Marinduque coupled with his wife11 herself
as a representative of a party-list group from the sector of persons with disability –
the group of the blind.
11
Lorna Velasco, representing Ang Mata ay Alagaan.
9
32. The unresolved accusations and attendant suspicions
that the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head intervenes in pending cases is not helped, but in fact
exacerbated, by Justice Velasco’s involvement in what is formally a judicial exercise
but is essentially, an exercise in political horse-trading that necessitated the
introduction of the Justices as a foreign element to temper the political influences.
33. Whether the Court likes it or not, a time will come when the HRET will
be faced with an issue that will involve members of political families to which the
justices of the Court belong. This is true with respect to Justice Velasco and possibly,
Justice Bersamin.
34. For Justice Velasco, that time has come. Although he has officially
inhibited himself from the cases against the Petitioner, the HRET – the Members of
which are not hampered from continuing their interactions with Justice Velasco in
other pending HRET cases and administrative issues– is not thereby shielded from
his influence. By maintaining Justice Velasco as part of the HRET, that is the image
that the Honorable Court projects to the public and the whole world.
35. Some government agencies may be oblivious to the cries of other people
regarding the government, but the Honorable Court, more than any other
institution, is mandated to be sensitive to such lamentations on matters involving
justice. Thus, judicial officers are required not only to avoid improprieties but
appearance of improprieties, to wit:
Notwithstanding the above findings, this Court is not prepared
to concede respondent Judge’s liability as to Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides: “A judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” The failure of the
petitioners to present evidence that the respondent acted with
partiality and malice can only negate the allegation of impropriety, but
not the appearance of impropriety. In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,
this Court underscored the need to show not only the fact of propriety
but the appearance of propriety itself. It held that the standard of
morality and decency required is exacting so much so that a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. The Court explains thus:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more
than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not
only through his official acts but also through his
private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It
is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal
behavior both in the performance of his duties and his
daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety
10
as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v.
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly
mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing administrative policies in
order to maintain the faith of the people in the
administration of justice.
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of
judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. A judge’s
conduct must be above reproach. Like Caesar’s wife,
a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. A judge’s private as well as official
conduct must at all times be free from all
appearances of impropriety, and be beyond
reproach.
In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that
the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s
official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity
and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life
should be above suspicion.
11
As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not
only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
Viewed vis-à-vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that
respondent judge violated Rule 1.02, as well as Canon 2, Rule 2.01
and Canon 3. In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito
Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City,
that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that
“judges should not only be impartial but should
also appear impartial.” Jurisprudence repeatedly
teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements
of due process, like notice and hearing, would become
meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a
partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render
just, correct and impartial decisions, but must
do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to
their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have
direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus,
their official conduct should be beyond reproach.12
(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
36. Under the background painted in the book Shadow of Doubt, it may be
argued that Justice Velasco’s continued stay in the HRET, especially as its
Chairperson, may prejudice the institution. Petitioner respectfully submits that it
need not come to that. What the Honorable Court is faced with is not so much the
question of whether Justice Velasco’s stay in the HRET is prejudicial to the
institution as much as whether Justice Velasco’s continued stay therein creates an
appearance of impropriety considering the cases involving his son and possibly, his
wife.
37. Aside from the appearance of impropriety generated by the fact that he
continues to be an integral part – its HEAD, even --- of an institution that will decide
12
Angping vs. Ros (A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC ; 10 December 2012).
12
on the fate of his son, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, there are badges, hints, and
indications of impropriety despite the claim of inhibition on the part of the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head. These are evidenced by the following:
37.1. The Petition-in-intervention of Victor Vela Sioco that argues favorably
in favor of the son of Justice Velasco, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, was received by the
Secretariat of the Tribunal despite the fact that the Rules of the HRET do not allow
for petitions-in-intervention.13
37.2. Despite the Secretary to the Tribunal being empowered to determine
whether a pleading filed with the HRET is “properly presented,”14 the Petition-inintervention was readily accepted on 12 March 2014 and immediately calendared as
part of the agenda on 13 March 2014.
37.3. Despite not having paid the required fees for initiatory pleadings, the
Petition-in-intervention was readily accepted by the Secretariat and the Tribunal and
made part of the agenda on the next day it was filed when the HRET Rules require
that it be summarily dismissed.
37.4. Worse, the Tribunal acted on the petition-in-intervention by requiring
the Petitioner to file, not an Answer on the petition-in-intervention and the other
two (2) pending petitions, but a comment.
38. While Justice Velasco may have inhibited during the deliberations on 13
March 2013, the undue haste – a phrase that is a recurring refrain involving the case
of Justice Velasco’s son15 – it cannot be said that it did not rear its ugly head in the
acceptance of the questionable petition-in-intervention despite non-payment of fees
or in its being made part of the agenda of the Tribunal for its 13 March 2014 session.
39. That is the only conclusion that can be made considering that, as
Chairperson of the HRET, there is no way that Justice Velasco can completely detach
himself from the cases involving his own son as the opponent of the Petitioner in the
congressional elections in Marinduque.
40. As Chairperson of the HRET, Justice Velasco has the following powers
and duties, to wit:
RULE 10. The Chairperson; Powers and Duties. – The Chairperson shall
have the following powers and duties:
(1) Act as the Chief Executive Officer of the Tribunal;
(2) Exercise administrative supervision over the Tribunal,
including the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal and the
administrative staff of the Tribunal;
The HRET Rules allow only for two (2) types of Petitions and these are for Protest and Quo
Warranto.
14 Rule 12 (1).
15 See Justice Brion’s Dissenting Opinion in Reyes vs. Comelec (G.R. No. No. 207264; 25 June
2013).
13
13
(3) Issue calls for the sessions and meetings of the Tribunal
and preside thereat, and preserve order and decorum during the same;
and pass upon all questions of order subject to such appeal as
any member may take to the Tribunal;
(4) Take care that the orders, resolutions, and decisions of the
Tribunal are enforced;
(5) Appoint, dismiss or otherwise discipline the personnel of the
Tribunal in accordance with Civil Service laws and regulations. The
confidential employees of every Member shall serve at the pleasure of
such Member and in no case beyond the tenure of such Member; and
(6) Perform such other functions and acts as may be necessary or
appropriate to ensure the independence and efficiency of the Tribunal.
41. Given such all-encompassing powers, it is therefore doubtful whether
Justice Velasco, as Chairperson of the Tribunal, can indeed distance himself from the
cases involving the Petitioner.
42. To cite an example, while the first two (2) HRET cases above were filed
sometime last year, it was not until a Petition-in-Intervention was filed on 12 March
2014 that action was taken by the Tribunal on the pending petitions by involving
Petitioner in the cases. Who set these cases as part of the calendar for the 13 March
2014 deliberations of the Tribunal is as yet to be disclosed by the Tribunal. Any
disinterested person cannot be faulted from suspecting – concluding even --- that
given his powers, it was the Chairperson of the Tribunal who set the cases in the
calendar of the HRET.
43. The same thing can be said of the Petition-in-Intervention which was
hastily acted upon one (1) day after it was filed. Considering that Justice Velasco only
inhibited himself during the deliberations of the cases, any disinterested person
cannot be faulted from suspecting --- concluding even --- that, at the very least, it
was with his tacit approval (if he was altogether involved) that the petition-inintervention was included in the calendar of the HRET for hearing on 13 March
2014.
44. It is thus inconceivably unavoidable that Justice Velasco, as Chairperson of
the Tribunal, will have to involve himself again or even suspected of having
informally and confidentially involved himself, at the very least, in the setting of the
cases or motions for deliberation by the HRET.
45. Considering the inevitability of involvement or mere appearance of
involvement on the part of Justice Velasco, it is respectfully submitted that he be
transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal so that there can be no occasion nor
opportunity either for an actual impropriety or appearance of impropriety. The
transfer of Justice Velasco to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, it is respectfully
submitted, would be the best course of action to remove any appearance of
impropriety in the proceedings of the HRET.
14
Propriety of Disqualification and Substitution
of Justice Bersamin as Member of the HRET
46. As regards Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the fact that he is also a member of
a political family in Northern Luzon may give rise for an occasion if not appearance of
impropriety. While there is no Bersamin in the House of Representatives at present,
his family’s involvement in local politics may provide not even actual motive but
even mere imputations of motive or appearance of improper motive, that his
decision was prompted by considerations of political favors, horse-trading, or
favor-swapping that would affect political alignments in the intense politics in the
province of Abra.
47. Aside from being a part of a political family which may give rise to an
occasion or appearance of impropriety per se, Petitioner respectfully moves for the
substitution of Justice Bersamin as a Member of the HRET considering that he was
one of the Justices who pre-judged the case of Petitioner when he voted with the
majority of the Court in its Resolution dated 25 June 2013 in the case entitled Reyes
vs. COMELEC.16
48. To recall, the vote in the said Resolution of the Honorable Court was 7-4
with Justice Bersamin voting with the majority. In the said Resolution, the Court
said:
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino
citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it
to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.17
49. Not content therewith, the Court went on to discuss point by point the
pieces of evidence presented by both parties in the case so as to leave no room aside
from the conclusion that “These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt
was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such
doubt.”18
50. By going into the very pieces of evidence in the case before the
COMELEC, Justice Bersamin, in agreeing with the Resolution, effectively prejudged the case against Petitioner especially since the grounds relied upon in the
COMELEC case appear to be the same claims in the quo warranto petitions before
the HRET.
51. By sitting in judgment before the case for quo warranto filed with the
HRET, it is unavoidable for the good Justice Bersamin not to hark back to the
G.R. No. 207264.
p. 10.
18 p. 13.
16
17
15
pronouncements of the Honorable Court in its 25 June 2013 Resolution which he
participated in.
52. It would now be unthinkable for Justice Bersamin not to carry such
judgment that he made in the 25 June 2013 Resolution of the Court into the
deliberations in the cases for quo warranto against the Petitioner before the HRET –
if it would even come to that considering the deviation from the established rules of
the Tribunal that has been so far decreed in the case of the Petitioner.19
53. It is truly lamentable that this Petition has to be filed given the clear case
of disqualification of Justice Bersamin. It is a testament to how the injunction for
judges and judicial officers to be “like Ceasar’s wife” has been disregarded and cast
aside. If the Supreme Court continues to be silent and gives implicit imprimatur for
Justice Bersamin to retain his membership in the HRET, the Court will add fuel to
the long running yarn in the legal profession that the injunction to be like Ceasar’s
wife applies only to judges but not to justices.
54. Justice Bersamin had more than one (1) year since the promulgation of the
Decision in the Reyes vs. Comelec case within which to disqualify himself from the
proceedings before HRET. He has not done so and appears not inclined to do so. It is
in the spirit of renewing or maybe restoring the integrity of the Courts that this
petition to disqualify Justice Lucas P. Bersamin is therefore being filed considering
that he was merely designated to the post.
A Case for the Substitution of Justice Peralta
55. With respect to Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, there are indications that he
is equally guilty of failing to appear impartial. The good justice was on leave when the
Decision in the Reyes vs. Comelec Case was promulgated on 25 June 2013. While
nothing can be ascribed to it by itself, his subsequent conduct appears to be tainted
with impropriety.
56. When the Honorable Court promulgated its Resolution in the said case of
Reyes vs. Comelec on 22 October 2013, Justice Peralta “took no part” thereon
presumably because he was part of the HRET. However, in the case of Tañada vs.
Comelec,20 he did not recuse himself on account of his being a Member of the HRET
and voted with the majority.
57. Subsequent thereto, the HRET, on 28 November 2013 issued a
Resolution, while declaring to have jurisdiction over the case, dismissed above-
Resolution No. 14-081 and 14-082 may seem like innocuous and harmless run of the mill
resolutions promulgated by any court or administrative agency but the HRET Rules require the
issuance of a summons requiring the submission of an answer in ten (10) days, not a Resolution
requiring the respondent to comment on the petitions for quo warranto or, even, a petition-inintervention.
20 G.R. No. 207199-200; 22 October 2013.
19
16
mentioned case of Tan vs. Reyes docketed as HRET Case No. 13-036 (QW) through
its Resolution No. 13-242.
58. On the same day, the HRET also granted the Motion to Withdraw the
Election Protest filed by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in HRET Case No. 13-028 via its
Resolution No. 13-228. Only a copy of the Resolution is attached hereto because the
Secretariat of the HRET decided not to issue a certified true copy since undersigned
counsel was not the counsel of Petitioner in the Protest Case, despite counsel having
entered its appearance as Petitioner’s counsel in the pending cases and despite he fact
that the document requested is a public document.
59. However, when it appeared that the House of Representatives was not
about to let Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco sit as Representative for the Lone District of
Marinduque, a Petition was filed with the Honorable Court for Mandamus by Justice
Velasco’s son and a Petition-in-intervention was filed with the HRET for Justice
Velasco’s son to be recognized as the Representative for the congressional district of
Marinduque.
60. As stated above, the Petition-in-intervention by Victor Vela Sioco was
filed and accepted on 12 March 2013, calendared for hearing on 13 March 2013 and
favorably acted upon by the Tribunal by requiring Petitioner to Comment, NOT
ANSWER, the petition-in-intervention as well as the other two (2) pending
petitions. The HRET was then supposedly presided by Justice Peralta who, instead of
summarily dismissing the petition-in-intervention in accordance with the HRET
Rules, favorably acted on the same.
61. It appears from the foregoing that the actions of the HRET, presided by
Justice Peralta, is in sync with the actions taken by Justice Velasco’s son, or his
followers, with the end in view of having the latter sit in Congress in place of the
Petitioner. It must be underscored that it was only on 14 March 2014 that the filing
fees21 for the petition-in-intervention was paid and yet, the HRET presided by Justice
Peralta favorably acted on it on 13 March 2014.
62. Moreover, notwithstanding the earlier declaration of the HRET that it has
jurisdiction over the Tan vs. Reyes HRET Case, the language used in the latter
Resolution of 13 March 2014 in the quo warranto cases pending with the HRET for
Petitioner to Comment on and not Answer the Petitions is a set up for, possibly and
quite probably, the dismissal of the cases on account of lack of jurisdiction premised
on what it may claim as Petitioner’s having been removed from office on account of
the Supreme Court ruling notwithstanding that it is Petitioner who is the person
recognized by the House of Representatives as the duly elected Representative of
Marinduque in view of the absence of an HRET Decision declaring her proclamation
invalid or removing her from office.
21
A copy of the Official Receipts is attached hereto as Annex “I.”
17
63. Considering the foregoing, Petitioner most respectfully moves for the
Honorable Court to likewise substitute of Justice Peralta as one of its representatives
in the HRET in the cases involving the son of Justice Velasco.
The Supreme Court must impose the “like Caesar’s
Wife” standard on Justices Velasco, Bersamin, and
Peralta
64. The Supreme Court --- Justices Velasco, Bersamin, and Peralta in
particular --- must hark back to the exacting pronouncements of the High Court
when even just the mere use of a court’s letterhead in a judge’s unofficial
communication was considered violative of the “like Caesar’s wife” standard
imposed by the Court on judges. In the case of “In Ladignon vs. Judge Garong
(A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712; August 20, 2008), the judge was found violating the
exacting standard
that proscribes any appearance of impropriety for his mere
unofficial use of the court’s letterhead. This High Court ruled in this wise:
“We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that
"Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities".1 Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be
free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their
official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday
life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness
and uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Where we significantly differ with the Report is in its sweeping implication
that any use of a court’s letterhead for non-official transactions would
necessarily expose the user to liability for "impropriety" or giving the
"appearance of impropriety".
“The Judge’s claim that he used an ordinary bond papers and placed
thereon his official station as return address is not totally without merit. For,
indeed, this is not an unusual practice and it would be hypocritical to deny its
occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary. For example, some members of the
Judiciary may use a social card with the letterhead of their office to indicate
their address as well as their station within the judicial hierarchy; some also
use notepads bearing their names, designation and station.
“A thin line, however, exists between what is proper and what is
improper in such use, and this was the line that the respondent Judge crossed
when he used his letterhead and title the way he did. As the Report stated, his
use of the letterhead and his designation as a Judge in a situation of potential
dispute gave "the appearance that there is an implied or assured consent of the
court to his cause." This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the
respondent Judge’s use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words,
the respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the
18
letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the
circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title.
“To be sure, this is not the first case relating to the use of a letterhead
that this Court has encountered and passed upon. In Rosauro v. Kallos,2 we
found the respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03 of the Code of the
Judicial Conduct when he used his stationery for his correspondence on a
private transaction with the complainant and his counsel – parties with a
pending case in his court. The Court held:
“By using his sala’s stationery other than for official purposes,
respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office x x x in violation of
Rule 2.03 of the Code.
“We do not depart from this rule on the use of official stationary. We
clarify, however, that the use of a letterhead should not be considered
independently of the surrounding circumstances of the use – the underlying
reason that marks the use with the element of "impropriety" or "appearance
of impropriety". In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of
propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged
violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge
with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have
conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported
violation.
“The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use
of the title of "Judge" or "Justice" in the correspondence of a member of the
Judiciary. While the use of the title is an official designation as well as an
honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the
circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used for
social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to
use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family
or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used
or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge.3 To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of
impropriety.
“Time and again, this Court has reminded the members of
the Judiciary that one who occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him; his private as well as his official conduct must
at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. Because
appearance is as important as reality in the performance of
judicial functions, a judge – like Ceasar’s wife – must not only be
pure and faithful but must be above suspicion.4 The respondent
Judge, even if he did not intend to take undue advantage of the use of his
19
letterhead and his title, at least gave the appearance of impropriety when he
did so under the circumstances of his use. To this extent, we find him
sufficiently liable to merit the admonition and warning of this Court regarding
any future inappropriate use of his letterhead and title. We limit ourselves to
an admonition and warning since this is the respondent’s first brush with our
ethical rules and no bad faith or ill motive attended his actions.” (emphasis
supplied)
65. If only to emphasize and remind the standards made clear in the abovementioned case, the Supreme Court --- Justices Velasco, Bersamin and Peralta in
particular --- must listen to, and make themselves accountable to the Supreme
Court’s very own admonition and proscriptions in the above case, as follows:
“Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and
should be free from any appearance of impropriety in
the discharge of their official duties as well as in their
personal behavior and everyday life. No position exacts
a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness on the individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.”
“x x x.
“Time and again, this Court has reminded the members
of the Judiciary that one who occupies an exalted
position in the administration of justice must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him; his private as
well as his official conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as
important as reality in the performance of judicial
functions, a judge – like Ceasar’s wife – must not only be
pure and faithful but must be above suspicion.”
66. As a final note, more than avoiding appearances of impropriety on the part
of Justices Velasco, Bersamin and Peralta, the Honorable Court is duty bound not to
put its Justices in a situation where the opportunity to commit impropriety is highly
possible if not probable thereby presenting to the public unavoidably, appearances of
impropriety involving Justices of the Honorable Court. Hence, the disqualification,
transfer and substitution of Justices Velasco, Bersamin and Peralta is imperative.
20
PRAYER
Premises considered, Petitioner most respectfully moves for the
Honorable Court to:
1. DISQUALIFY and TRANSFER JUSTICE PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
from the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) to
the SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and to TRANSFER JUSTICE ANTONIO T.
CARPIO as Chairman of the HRET;
2. DISQUALIFY JUSTICE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN as a representative of the
Supreme Court to the HRET on account of his participation on the Decision of the
Court in Reyes vs. Comelec and to SUBSTITUTE on his behalf another Justice of the
Honorable Court who did not pre-judge the case of Petitioner or is suffering from
any condition that may disqualify the Justice to be designated; and
3. DISQUALIFY JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA as a representative of
the Supreme Court to the HRET on account of his partial and prejudicial conduct as
above-specified (or failure to maintain appearance of impartiality and propriety) and
to SUBSTITUTE on his behalf another Justice of the Honorable Court who did not
pre-judge the case of Petitioner or is suffering from any condition that may disqualify
the Justice to be designated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Makati City, Philippines; 18 August 2014
ROQUE & BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Petitioner
Antel Corporate Center
Unit 1904, 19th Floor
121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City 1227
Email: mail@roquebutuyan.com
Tel. Nos. 887-4445; 887-3894
Fax No. 887-3893
By:
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR
Roll No. 36976
PTR No. 4264493/30 Jan 2014/Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01749/PPLM
MCLE Exemption No. IV-000513/15 Feb 2013
21
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN
Roll No. 36911
PTR No. 4264495 /30 Jan 2014 – Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01742/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-0011417/Jan 11, 2013
ROGER R. RAYEL
Roll No. 44106
PTR No. 9308264/3 Feb 2014/Quezon City
IBP Lifetime No. 02159/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-017519/19 Apr 2013
EXPLANATION
A copy of the foregoing pleading was served by registered mail due to the
inadequacy of messengerial service of the office.
ROGER R. RAYEL
Copy furnished:
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.
Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Electoral Tribunal Building
Commonwealth Avenue
Quezon City
22