REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Electoral Tribunal Building
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City
NOEME MAYORES TAN and
JEASSECA L. MAPACPAC,
Petitioners,
- versus
HRET Case No. 13-036
(QW)
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Respondent.
x ---------------------------------- x
ERIC DEL MUNDO JUNIO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
HRET Case No. 13-037
(QW)
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Respondent.
x ---------------------------------- x
MOTION TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID
The Resolution dated 14 December 2015
Respondent, by counsel, respectfully moves to declare as null and void the
Resolution of the Honorable Tribunal dated 14 December 2015 (undersigned lead
counsel of Respondent has not yet been served with the official copy of the
resolution), based on the following discussion:
The 14 December 2015 Resolution is NULL
AND VOID or INVALID for not having been
passed by the required number of votes
It appears from the 14 December 2015 Resolution of the Honorable Tribunal
that it was passed by a vote of four as against 3 (4-3) with Justice Peralta, Reps.
Boanoan and Enverga, and Ms. Ilagan in favor and Reps. Bautista, Mendoza and
Trenas against the Resolution.
1
While such a voting may appear to comply with the new provision in the 2015
Revised HRET Rules where only a majority of those present in a meeting
constituting a quorum is required, one of the votes cast in favor thereof is however,
invalid, null and void. That is the vote cast by Ms. Ilagan who, as early as 15 October
2015 and even at the time of the voting, already forfeited her seat as Representative
of the party-list group Gabriela and thereby ceased to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.
For the information of the Honorable Tribunal, Ms. Ilagan filed on 15
October 2015 her certificate of candidacy as councilor for the third district of the city
of Davao. She filed as a member and under the local political party of HUGPONG
SA TAWONG LUNGSOD of Mayor Rodrigo Duterte. A copy of her certificate of
candidacy (COC) and certificate of nomination and acceptance (CONA) is attached
hereto as Annexes “A” and “B.”
Having changed her party affiliation, Ms. Ilagan, the erstwhile nominee of the
party-list group Gabriela, forfeited her congressional seat when she filed her COC
where she admitted to having joined a local political party, HUGPONG SA
TAWONG LUNGSOD.
This is clearly provided for in Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List Act,
Section 15 of which states:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months
before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.1
Considering that Ms. Ilagan has forfeited her congressional seat as early as 15
October 2015, she was ipso facto resigned from her membership in the Honorable
Tribunal as of said date and the vote cast by her from then on, including in the one in
favor of the Resolution dated 14 December 2015, is null and void and of no force and
effect.
Without her vote, the voting for Resolution dated 14 December 2015 stands
at three against three (3-3) and the resolution was therefore not carried as the
required majority was not obtained. Rule 68 of the 2015 Revised HRET Rules is
clear on this point, to wit:
RULE 68. Votes Required. – In resolving all questions submitted
to the Tribunal, all the Members, inclusive of the Chairperson, shall
vote.
1
See Amores vs. HRET (G.R., No. 189600; 29 June 2010).
2
Except as provided in Rule 5 (b) of these Rules, the
concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be necessary for the
rendition of decision and adoption of formal resolutions, provided,
that in cases where a Member inhibits or cannot take part in the
deliberation, a majority of the remaining Members shall be
sufficient.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, considering that the 14 December 2015 Resolution of the Honorable
Tribunal did not secure the necessary votes in order for the same to be considered a
validly rendered resolution. It was therefore of no legal force and effect and did not
bind the parties for that matter. It may not even be taken judicial cognizance of as it
may not be considered an official act of the Honorable Tribunal.
That being the case, the Resolutions of 28 November 2013 and 11 September
2014 declaring the Honorable Tribunal as having jurisdiction in these pending cases
stands. Corollarily, the petition-in-intervention, as well as the motion to dismiss
incorporated in the Motion for Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is denied and
the case should be set for further proceedings.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Respondent registers her arguments against
the issues raised in the Resolution dated 14 December 2015 and further states:
In Acting on and Granting the Petition
Intervention Which is Neither a Protest Nor a
Quo Warranto Petition, the HRET has NO
Jurisdiction Over it and Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack or
Excess of Jurisdiction
In its Resolution dated 14 December 2015, the Honorable Tribunal granted
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Victor Vela Sioco whose entry into the
above-captioned cases was by way of a Petition for Intervention. However, a
petition-in-intervention is not a recognized petition under the HRET Rules
cognizable by the Honorable Tribunal.
While in his Petition for Intervention, Victor Vela Sioco, made the following
prayer:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the instant
petition-in-intervention be admitted.
It is respectfully prayed that a Decision be rendered against
respondent Reyes.
3
1. Adopting the May 14, 2013 Resolution of Comelec in SPA
NO. 13-053(DC) (Annex “A” of petition, the June 25, 2013
Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 207264 (Annex “C” of
petition), the July 9, 2013 Resolution of Comelec in SPC No. 13-010
(Annex “D” of petition), the July 10, 2013 Order of Comelec in SPA
No. 13-053(DC) (Annex “E” of petition), and the July 16, 2013
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning
Candidate (Annex “F” of petition).
2. Declaring the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
respondent Reyes for the position of member of the House of
Representatives representing the lone district of Marinduque in
relation to the May 13, 2013 election pursuant to the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec En Banc in SPA No. 13-053(DC) entitled
“Joseph Tan vs. Regina O. Reyes” and the June 25, 2013 resolution of
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 207264 “Regina O. Reyes vs.
Comelec and Joseph Tan”;
3. Declaring respondent Reyes ineligible for the said position of
representative of Marinduque under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution on the ground that she is a U.S. citizen and a non-resident
of the Philippines of not less than one year immediately preceding the
May 13, 2013 election pursuant to the aforementioned May 14, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 13-053(DC) and the June 25,
2013 Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 207264;
4. Declaring the nullification of the May 18, 2013 proclamation
of respondent Reyes pursuant to the July 9, 2013 Resolution of
Comelec in SPC No. 13-010 (Annex “C” of petition) and the finality of
the July 16, 2013 proclamation of Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as
Marinduque Representative and ordering said respondent to vacate the
position of member of the House of Representatives representing the
lone district of Marinduque.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises in further
prayed.
Quezon City, March 12, 2014.
He betrayed his intent when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the 11
September 2014 Resolution of the Honorable Tribunal. While the petition-inintervention seemingly invoked the quo warranto jurisdiction of the HRET, Vela
Sioco completely and absolutely disavowed such jurisdiction of the Honorable
Tribunal when he prayed in his motion for reconsideration as follows:
4
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitioner most
respectfully pleads and prays unto the Honorable Tribunal:
(1) The present Petitions for Quo Warranto be DISMISSED
outright, without further proceedings, for being LACK OF
JURISDICTION;
(2) The present Petitions for Quo Warranto be DISMISSED
outright, without further proceedings, for being MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.
Quezon City, September 23, 2014.
In essence, Vela Sioco invoked the jurisdiction of this Honorable Tribunal
only to repudiate the same. Such inconsistent posturing of Vela Sioco should not be
countenanced and especially since he has no personality to appear in these
proceedings. He is neither a petition seeking to disqualify Respondent on the ground
set under the law and the Constitution, nor is he a Respondent who is a Member of
the House of Representatives whose disqualification is sought. Hence, he should
forever be barred from these proceedings.
The HRET Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion Amounting to Lack or Excess of
Jurisdiction When it Did Not Make an
Independent Determination of the Facts and
Applicable Laws After Conducting a Trial on
the Merits and Merely Relied on Reyes vs.
Comelec2 Whose Dispositive Portion Did Not
Oust Her from her Office as A Member of the
House of Representatives
It is a settled doctrine that when jurisdiction is conferred, it comes with the
competence to decide on the limits of such jurisdiction. Such competence is not a
mere empty rhetoric but comes with the compelling obligation to make its own
independent determination of the extent of its jurisdiction and should not be readily
set aside on the mere say so of another body or tribunal that is without jurisdiction
thereon.
Sadly, however, this was what the three other Members of the Honorable
Tribunal did when they readily ceded the jurisdiction of the HRET in favor of body,
notwithstanding that it is the Supreme Court, that has no competence to determine
and pass over all contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives.
2
G.R. No. 207264; 25 June 2013.
5
Respondent respectfully brings to the attention of the Honorable Tribunal the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court given with due deference to this Honorable
Tribunal in the case of Gomez vs. Codilla (G. R. No. 195191; 20 March 2012), to
wit:
Codilla’s Election Protest contests the counting of 101,250
votes in favor of petitioner. He claims that the denial of the Certificate
of Candidacy of Gomez rendered the latter a non-candidate, who
therefore could not have been validly substituted, as there was no
candidacy to speak of.
It bears stressing that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. This exclusive jurisdiction
includes the power to determine whether it has the
authority to hear and determine the controversy presented;
and the right to decide whether there exists that state of
facts that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters
arising from the case legitimately before it. Accordingly, the
HRET has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into,
the question of its own jurisdiction both as to parties and as
to subject matter; and to decide all questions, whether of
law or of fact, the decision of which is necessary to
determine the question of jurisdiction. Thus, the HRET had the
exclusive jurisdiction to determine its authority and to take cognizance
of the Election Protest filed before it.
Further, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
HRET on this score. An election protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and
the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them has
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
hold the office. The foregoing considered, the issues raised in Codillas
Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and is within the
jurisdiction of the HRET. (Emphasis supplied)
The Honorable Tribunal, cannot, as its three (3) other Members did in this
case, just leave the determination to a different tribunal and adopt the finding
thereof. It is duty bound to make its own determination of whether, indeed,
Respondent failed to meet the requirements of the Constitution and the law as
Representative at the time the jurisdiction of HRET took effect.
For this reason, Respondent hereby adopts her arguments in support of her
Motion for Reconsideration in the Mandamus case entitled Velasco vs. Belmonte
6
(G.R. No. 211140) in support of her position that Reyes vs. Comelec did not annul
the proclamation of Respondent on jurisdictional grounds, among others, to wit:
said:
1. FIRST. In justifying the Decision, the Honorable Court
The important point of reference should be
the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was
on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when
Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility
to run as Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque -for without a valid COC,
Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the
election and much less as a duly proclaimed
winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC
was promulgated even before Reyes's proclamation,
and which was affirmed by this Court's final and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and
October 22, 2013.
This Court will not give premium to the illegal
actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC,
the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14,
2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the
winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also
be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of
days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already
received the said decision cancelling her COC. These
points clearly show that the much argued
proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said
COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
2. Notably, the Honorable Court has not cited even one
constitutional or statutory provision to support its conclusion of
“illegal actions of a subordinate entity” and “clear defiance of the
said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.”
3. Respondent respectfully requests the Honorable Court
to take judicial notice of the fact that a delay in the proclamation
of the candidate who garnered highest number of votes, in the
absence of an Order of suspension of such proclamation issued
by the Comelec, is an election offense. If non-proclamation or
delay in the proclamation of the Respondent as the winning
candidate is considered an election offense, how can doing the
exact opposite then be considered as “illegal actions”?
7
4. Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates the
continuous and expeditious canvasing of the results of the
elections and the immediate proclamation of the winners thereof
upon preparation of the certificate of canvass. The provision
states:
Sec. 231. Canvass by the board. - The board
of canvassers shall meet not later than six o'clock in
the afternoon of election day at the place designated
by the Commission to receive the election returns
and to immediately canvass those that may have
already been received. It shall meet continuously
from day to day until the canvass is completed, and
may adjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting the
other election returns from other polling places
within its jurisdiction. Each time the board adjourns,
it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far
for each candidate for each office, furnishing the
Commission in Manila by the fastest means of
communication a certified copy thereof, and making
available the data contained therein to the mass
media and other interested parties. As soon as the
other election returns are delivered, the board shall
immediately resume canvassing until all the returns
have been canvassed.
The respective board of canvassers shall
prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and
affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right
hand of each member, supported by a statement of
the votes received by each candidate in each polling
place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as
elected the candidates who obtained the highest
number of votes cast in the province, city,
municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with
this requirement shall constitute an election
offense.
Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board
of canvassers must complete their canvass
within thirty-six hours in municipalities, forty-eight
hours in cities and seventy-two hours in
provinces. Violation hereof shall be an election
offense punishable under Section 264 hereof.
With respect to the election for President and
Vice-President, the provincial and city boards of
8
canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate
of canvass supported by a statement of votes
received by each candidate in each polling place and
transmit the first copy thereof to the Speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa. The second copy shall be
transmitted to the Commission, the third copy shall
be kept by the provincial election supervisor or city
election registrar; the fourth and the fifth copies to
each of the two accredited political parties.
(Emphasis supplied)
5. In fact, even if not all the of the returns have been
received (or set aside) by the Board of Canvassers, the board is
still required to proclaim the candidate who got the highest
number of votes if the returns not yet received (or set aside) will
not materially affect the result of the elections. Thus, Sections
Sec. 233. When the election returns are
delayed, lost or destroyed. - In case its copy of the
election returns is missing, the board of canvassers
shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain such
missing election returns from the board of election
inspectors concerned, or if said returns have been
lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon
prior authority of the Commission, may use any of
the authentic copies of said election returns or a
certified copy of said election returns issued by the
Commission, and forthwith direct its representative
to investigate the case and immediately report the
matter to the Commission.
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding
the fact that not all the election returns have
been received by it, may terminate the canvass
and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis
of the available election returns if the missing
election returns will not affect the results of the
election.
6. When the canvass of the returns that were set aside will
affect the result of the election, it is only then that “no
proclamation shall be made except upon orders of the
Commission after due notice and hearing.” This is the only
instance where the proclamation made in violation of this section
is declared “null and void.” Section 238 states:
Sec. 238. Canvass of remaining or
unquestioned returns to continue. - In cases
9
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 hereof, the
board of canvassers shall continue the canvass of the
remaining or unquestioned election returns. If, after
the canvass of all the said returns, it should be
determined that the returns which have been set
aside will affect the result of the election, no
proclamation shall be made except upon orders of
the Commission after due notice and hearing. Any
proclamation made in violation hereof shall be null
and void.
7. From the foregoing, it is clear that the general rule is for
the board of canvassers to proclaim the winner upon completion
of the canvass where the results of the election will no longer be
affected. It must be emphasized that failure to do so is defined as
an election offense for which the person responsible shall be
liable for imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more
than six (6) years” pursuant to Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
8. Aside from the foregoing mandatory provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code, the Comelec itself issued Resolution No.
9648 which mandated the proclamation of the winning candidate
in the absence of an Order for the suspension of the proclamation
issued by the Commission. Section 28 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9648 clearly requires this, to wit:
n) PROCLAMATION OF THE WINNING
CANDIDATES
A candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes shall be proclaimed by the
Board, except for the following:
1. In case the certificate of candidacy of
the candidate who obtains the highest number
of votes has been cancelled or denied due course
by a final and executory Decision or Resolution,
the votes cast for such candidate shall be considered
stray, hence, the Board shall proceed to proclaim the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes, provided, the latter’s certificate of candidacy
has not likewise been cancelled by a final and
executory Decision or Resolution;
2. In case a candidate has been declared a
nuisance candidate by final and executory
Decision or Resolution, the votes cast for the
10
nuisance candidate shall be added to the candidate
who shares the same surname as the nuisance
candidate and thereafter, the candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed;
In case of two or more candidates having the same
surnames as the nuisance candidate, the votes cast
for the nuisance candidate shall be considered as
stray votes and shall not be credited to any
candidate;
In case the nuisance candidate does not have the
same surname as any candidate for the same
position, the votes cast for the nuisance candidate
shall be considered as stray votes; and
3. In case a candidate has been
disqualified by a final and executory Decision or
Resolution and he obtains the highest number of
votes cast for a particular position, the Board shall
not proclaim the candidate and the rule of
succession, if allowed by law shall be observed. In
case the position does not allow the rule of
succession under Republic Act No. 7160, the
position shall be deemed vacant.
In all cases, a Decision or Resolution is deemed final
and executory if, in case of a Division ruling, no
motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, or in cases of the ruling of the
Commission En Banc, no restraining order was
issued by the Supreme Court within five (5) days
from receipt of the Decision or Resolution.
In cases where a Petition to Deny Due Course or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, Declare a
Nuisance Candidate, or for Disqualification remains
pending with the Commission on the day of the
canvassing and no order of suspension of
proclamation is issued by the Commission En
Banc or Division where said Petition is pending, the
Board shall proceed to proclaim the winner.
In cases where the generated/printed COCP does
not reflect the true winner for a particular position
by reason of the circumstances stated above, the
Board is authorized to effect the necessary
correction on the entry for said position, to reflect
11
the true winner as determined in accordance with the
foregoing rules, provided all the members of the
Board countersign such entry. Such fact shall be
entered in the Minutes. (Emphasis supplied)
9. It is clear from the foregoing administrative regulation
that in the absence of a “final and executory Decision or
Resolution”, proclamation should ensue as a matter of course.
This was the holding ruling of the Honorable Court in Jalosjos vs.
Comelec (G.R. No. 192474; 26 June 2012), to wit:
It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law
department insisted, that the proclamation of
Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated
rule. Since the COMELEC declared him ineligible to
run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation was
void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia. For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has
jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on
Section 6 of Republic Act 6646. Section 6 provides:
Section 6. Effects of Disqualification
Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate
is
not
declared
by
final
judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Here, however, the fact is that on election
day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet
to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second
Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case
against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final
judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of
candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The
12
last standing official action in his case before
election day was the ruling of the COMELECs
Second Division that allowed his name to stay
on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc
did not issue any order suspending his
proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case. With the fact of his proclamation and
assumption of office, any issue regarding his
qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the
required residence, was solely for the HRET to
consider and decide. (Emphasis supplied)
10. SECOND. This brings the discussion then as to when a
decision or resolution becomes final executory which is the
second issue herein being questioned in this Motion for
Reconsideration. The Honorable Court concluded that the 14
May 2013 Resolution became final and executory immediately
after its issuance “since no restraining order was forthcoming”
from the Supreme Court. The Honorable Court said:
That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant of the present
petition for mandamus is supported by the following
undisputed facts that should be taken into
consideration:
First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation,
her COC was already cancelled by the COMELEC
En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated
May 14, 2013, the effectivity of which was not
enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the
prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining
order within a period of five (5) days as required by
Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since
no restraining order was forthcoming, the PBOC
should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.
10. Respondent respectfully submits that such ruling is
contrary to the very clear provisions of the applicable law and the
Constitution.
11. Under the 1987 Constitution, only the election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials are “final,
executory, and not appealable.” Article IX C, Section 2 (2) states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
13
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts or general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decision, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
12. Thus, the Constitution clearly provides that only in the
exercise of its appeallate jurisdiction involving municipal and
barangay offices are the Comelec’s decisions and resolutions
considered final and executory.
13. On the other, Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 6646
mandates that the decision or resolution of the Comelec becomes
final and executory only after the lapse of five (5) days. The
provision reads:
Section 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance
Candidates. xxx
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission
shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the parties, be final and executory
unless stayed by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
14. Section 5 of R.A. No. 6646 or the procedure outlined
therein is applicable to cases of cancellation of certificate of
candidacy pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646 which states:
Section 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. - The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
15. From the foregoing provision of Section 5 of R.A. No.
6646, there can be no doubt as to the meaning thereof that the
“decision, order or ruling” of the Comelec does not become
immediately final and executory upon its issuance but only after
the lapse of five (5) days from receipt by the parties.
14
16. In the case of Respondent, the 14 May 2013 Resolution
was received by her only on 16 May 2013 and going by Section 5
(e) of R.A. No. 6646, it only became final and executory five days
thereafter or on 21 May 2013. Thus, as of the 18 May 2013
proclamation of Respondent, there was no legal impediment for
her proclamation.
17. Contrasting the provision of Section 5 (e) of R.A. No.
6646 with the above-quoted portion of the Decision of the
Honorable Court, there can be no other conclusion than that the
pronouncement of the Honorable Court is clearly contrary to the
said provision of the law. For the Honorable Court to espouse a
rule contrary to the applicable provision of the law,
notwithstanding some regulation as its basis, is to enforce an
“illegal action” or sanction an illegality for the benefit of the “son
of a Member of the Court.”
18. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that the
aforesaid ruling of the Honorable Court is supported by the
Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules, it is still invalid for
being contrary to the Constitution and the laws. Article 7 of the
Civil Code is very clear on this matter, to wit:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern,
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
19. But then, even a cursory examination of the applicable
provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec does not
support the interpretation of the Honorable Court that the
Comelec’s resolution is immediately final and executory unless a
restraining order is secured from the Supreme Court within five
(5) days from its receipt by Respondent. Section 13 or Rule 18 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure states:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. a. In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision
or resolution of the Commission en banc shall
15
become final and executory after thirty (30) days
from its promulgation
b. In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or
resolutions of the Commission en banc shall
become final and executory after five (5) days
from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.
c. Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably
filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five
(5) days in Special actions and Special cases and
after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or
proceedings, following its promulgation.
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Thus, like Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 6646, the abovequoted provision of the Comelec Rules is very clear in that the
resolution becomes final and executory only after the lapse of five
(5) days from promulgation. Even counting the five (5) days from
the promulgation of the Resolution on 14 May 2013, the
resolution was still not final and executory when Respondent was
proclaimed on 18 May 2013 since the five (5) days was due to
lapse on 19 May 2013.
20. THIRD. The Honorable Court likewise ruled as
determinative the following, to wit:
Second. This Court upheld the
COMELEC decision cancelling respondent
Reyes's COC in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013
and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are
already final and executory.
21. With all due respect, the Honorable Court acts as
though its Resolutions of 25 June 2013 and 22 October
2013 were rendered in a vacuum and nothing happened in
the interim. The Honorable Court conveniently forgot or
dismissed the fact that Respondent was proclaimed on 18
May 2013, took her oath of office on 7 June 2013 before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and on 27
June 2013 before the President of the Philippines, and
assumed the duties of the office of Representative at noon
of 30 June 2013.
22. Thus, as early as 30 June 2013, Respondent
fulfilled all the three (3) requirements laid down by the
16
Honorable Court in its 25 June 2013 Resolution. It must be
noted that as of 30 June 2013, the 25 June 2013 Resolution
of the Honorable Court was not yet final and executory.
23. Moreover, the 22 October 2013 Resolution of the
Honorable Court essentially arrogated unto itself the
jurisdiction of the HRET by annulling the proclamation of
Respondent on the novel doctrine of that she was not
“duly proclaimed” despite knowing very well its lack of
jurisdiction to do so. Considering the absence of
jurisdictional competence on the part of the Honorable
Court in rendering its Resolution, the ruling is void and can
be questioned anytime as discussed in the following
sections. It is respectfully submitted that the Honorable
Court should not rue the “re-litigation” of these issues but
should view this instead as an opportunity for it to correct
a clearly unconstitutional, illegal and erroneous ruling
whose sole beneficiary is the “son of a Member of the
Court.”
24. FOURTH. The Honorable Court wants to
reverse the effects of such undeniable facts by inventing
the legal fiction that Respondent did not have, allegedly, a
valid proclamation, to wit:
Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of
office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
in open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR
a valid proclamation.
Thus, to consider Reyes's proclamation and
treating it as a material fact in deciding this case will
paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu
between her and Velasco.
25.
Aside
from
the
Honorable
Court’s
unconstitutional, illegal and erroneous claim that the 14
May 2013 Resolution became immediately final and
executory which should have made the board of canvassers
refrain from proclaiming Respondent on 18 May 2013, the
Honorable Court has not cited any provision of the
Constitution, the laws or Comelec Resolution (aside from
the wrongly interpreted Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules) to support such novel doctrine of no valid
proclamation.
26. On the contrary, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
require that in order for the proclamation to be suspended,
a motion therefor should be applied for and granted by the
17
Commission. The provision states:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied)
27. Without a doubt, the Comelec did not issue an
Order for the suspension of the proclamation of
Respondent. Likewise, there was no motion filed in SPA
13-053 (DC) for the suspension of the proclamation of
Respondent. Hence, there was no legal impediment for her
proclamation.
28. To reiterate and in accordance with the Jalosjos
ruling, at the time of Respondent’s proclamation on 18
May 2013, there was no final and executory judgment
cancelling her certificate of candidacy. Hence, there can be
no question on the validity of Respondent’s proclamation.
29. In this connection, it would not be amiss to point
out that under Section 25 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, requires for the proclamation to be conducted
forthwith upon completion of the canvass, to wit:
SECTION 25. Canvassing by Provincial,
City, District and Municipal Boards of
Canvassers. - The city or municipal board of
canvassers shall canvass the votes for the president,
vice-president, senators, and parties, organizations or
coalitions participating under the party-list system by
consolidating the electronically transmitted results or
the results contained in the data storage devices used
in the printing of the election returns. Upon
completion of the canvass, it shall print the
certificate of canvass of votes for president, vicepresident, senators and members of the House of
Representatives and elective provincial officials and
18
thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal
officials, as the case may be.
The city board of canvassers of cities
comprising one or more legislative districts shall
canvass the votes for president, vice-president,
senators, members of the House Representatives and
elective city officials by consolidating the certificates
of canvass electronically transmitted or the results
contained in the data storage devices used in the
printing of the election returns. Upon completion
of the canvass, the board shall produce the
canvass of votes for president, vice-president, and
senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected
members of the House of Representatives and
city officials.
xxx
The district board of canvassers of each
legislative district comprising two municipalities in
the Metro Manila area shall canvass the votes for
president, vice-president, senators and members of
the House of Representatives by consolidating the
certificates of canvass electronically transmitted from
the city/municipal consolidating centers or the
results contained in the data storage devices
submitted by the municipal board of canvassers of
the component municipalities. Upon completion of
the canvass, it shall produce a certificate of
canvass of votes for president, vice-president and
senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected
members of the House of Representatives in the
legislative district.
The district/provincial board of canvassers
shall canvass the votes for president, vice-president,
senators, members of the House of Representatives
and elective provincial officials by consolidating the
results electronically transmitted from the
city/municipal consolidating centers or the results
contained in the data storage devices submitted by
the board of canvassers of the municipalities and
component cities. Upon completion of the
canvass, it shall produce the certificate of
canvass votes for president, vice-president and
senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected
members of the House of Representatives and
the provincial officials.
xxx
19
30. Hence, the proclamation of the winning candidate is
mandatory in character and may only be suspended by order of
the Commission. In the absence of such suspension order, the
proclamation is legal and valid.
31. FIFTH. The Honorable Court likewise ignored the
Constitution when it ruled as follows:
Third. As a consequence of the above
events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
cancelled respondent Reyes's proclamation and,
in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly
elected
Member
of
the
House
of
Representatives in representation of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque. The
said proclamation has not been challenged
or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.
32. The Honorable Court conveniently ignored the fact
that at the time SPC No. 13-010 annulled the proclamation of
Respondent on 10 July 2013, the Commission on Elections was
already devoid of jurisdiction over the Respondent. At that time,
Respondent was already proclaimed, has taken her oath of office
and assumed her duties as Representative – thus, a full-fledged
Member of the House of Representatives even under the
standards set in the 25 June 2013 Resolution of the Honorable
Court in Reyes vs. Comelec.
33. In this connection, the Honorable Court is respectfully
reminded of the relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on protest and quo warranto petitions.
34. Petitions for protest under the Omnibus Election Code
is found in Section 250 thereof which requires that the petition
should be filed within ten (10) days from proclamation. The
provision reads:
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional,
provincial or city official shall be filed with the
Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office, within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
(Emphasis supplied)
20
35. The same rule is true with respect to the filing of the
petition for quo warranto, to wit:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any
voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.
Any voter contesting the election of any
municipal or barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the regional trial court or
metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively,
within ten days after the proclamation of the results
of the election. (Emphasis supplied)
36. It is the proclamation that is the reckoning date for the
filing of the petitions for protest and quo warranto. It is likewise
the reckoning date when the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal kicks in and the Comelec is
kicked out.
37. Thus, as pointed out by Respondent in her Comment in
a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court said that proclamation
delineates the jurisdiction of the Comelec and the HRET. In the
aforecited case of Jalosjos, the Court said:
While the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without
limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of
when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and
when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation
of a congressional candidate following the
election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
21
disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative
in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued
its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already
been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the
office of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
xxx
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474
that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its
jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the
position of representative for the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections,
since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his
case. Necessarily, Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704
and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the
COMELECs failure to annul his proclamation also
fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the
Constitution solely on the HRET. (Emphasis
supplied)
38. Given that the Comelec was without jurisdiction when
it issued its Resolution dated 10 July 2013 annulling Respondent’s
proclamation, the Resolution was void and can be attacked
collaterally or at any time following the ruling in Galicia vs.
Manliquez (G.R. No. 155785; 13 April 2007) where it was ruled as
follows:
The settled rule is that a judgment rendered
or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed
any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches. Indeed, jurisprudence
upholds the soundness of an independent action to
declare as null and void a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction as in this case.
22
39. SIXTH. Given the foregoing discussion of the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, the conclusion
of the Honorable Court that Respondent has “absolutely no
basis” to serve as Representative is clearly bereft of any
constitutional, legal and administrative basis. The Honorable
Court said:
Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes
HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to
serve as a Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS
NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized
as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding
before the HRET.
And this is precisely the basis for the BRET'
s December 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging and
ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin
petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes. Its
finding was based on the existence of a final and
executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
that Reyes is not a bona fide member of the House
of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.
To reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its
Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections45
—
The averred proclamation is the
critical pointer to the correctness of
petitioner's submission. The crucial
question is whether or not
petitioner
[Reyes]
could
be
proclaimed on 18 May 2013.
Differently stated, was there basis for
the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013?
Dates and events indicate
that there was no basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the
petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent
oath of office, there can be no valid
and effective assumption of office.
"More importantly, we cannot
disregard a fact basic in this
controversy — that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
23
already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its
Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After
14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending
case on petitioner's qualifications to
run for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives. x x x."
As the point has obviously been
missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who
continues to argue on the basis of her
"due proclamation," the instant motion
gives us the opportunity to highlight
the undeniable fact we here repeat that
the proclamation which petitioner
secured on 18 May 2013 was
WITHOUT
ANY
BASIS."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Put in another way, contrary to the
view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the
HRET is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
such recourse is not a legally available remedy to
any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the
sitting Member of the House of Representatives if
it were not for the disregard by the leadership of
the latter of the binding decisions of a
constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the
Supreme Court.
40. While the HRET, led by Justice Velasco, points to the
case of Reyes vs. Comelec as its basis for its 14 December 2015
Resolution, the Honorable Court in this case points to the HRET
Resolution in support of its ruling in this case. In all case, the
rulings woefully failed to cite any Constitutional and legal basis
therefor. Thus, as shown in the foregoing discussion whereby all
the points raised by the Honorable Court were discussed vis-à-vis
the relevant and applicable provisions of the Constitution, the law
and administrative regulations, all that the Honorable Court can
come up with is a reference to a clearly unconstitutional, illegal
and erroneous decision that favors the “son of a Member of the
Court.”
41. While it can be argued that the Honorable Court
certainly had jurisdiction in affirming the Comelec Resolutions
when it rendered its 25 June and 22 October 2013 Resolutions,
the same cannot be said when it usurped the powers of the HRET
24
when it extended the effect of the Comelec resolution to justify
and annul the proclamation of Respondent. Such a void judgment
for want of jurisdictional competence can never be a source of a
right.
42. SEVENTH. The Honorable Court was duped and
became an unwitting tool into believing that the 14 December
2015 Resolution of the HRET was validly rendered just so that
the “son of a Member of the Court” can be hurriedly allowed to
sit in Congress. This is what happens when the Court acts without
the benefit of a comment from the other concerned parties and
merely relies on their unnamed sources.
43. For the information of the Honorable Court, the 14
December 2015 Resolution of the HRET was rendered with Ms.
Luzviminda Ilagan as the swing vote that gave herein petition the
majority in the HRET. The Honorable Court is hereby informed
that as early as 15 October 2015, Ms. Ilagan ceased to be a
Member of the House of Representatives as she forfeited her seat
when she filed her candidacy for councilor in Davao City under
the party of HUGPONG SA TAWONG LUNGSOD (a copy of
the COC and CONA is attached hereto as Annexes “A” & “B”).
44. Section 15 of R.A. 7941 is clear on such forfeiture of
the congressional seat in case of change in party affiliation, to wit:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected
party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of
office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
within six (6) months before an election, he shall not
be eligible for nomination as party-list representative
under his new party or organization. (Emphasis
supplied)
45. The Petitioner herein, and perhaps, his father as well,
may not be strangers to this issue as Petitioner’s mother who was
once a party-list representative has filed her certificate of
candidacy for a local position. It is not far-fetched to imagine that
she may have done so under using a political party, not a sectoral
party, as a vehicle for her campaign. Thus, the Philippine
Congress may possibly have at least two (2) persons occupying
party-list seats who no longer have a right thereto.
46. The foregoing discussion clear show that Petitioner, the
LOSER in the 2013 congressional elections in Marinduque, has
25
NO RIGHT whatsoever in the office that he claims and is
therefor not entitled to a writ of mandamus.
47. NINTH. Lastly, the Honorable Court takes the view
that the Public Respondent’s “disregard” of binding decisions of
the Comelec and the Supreme Court is the only thing keeping
Petitioner from sitting as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
48. Respondent respectfully submits to the Honorable
Court that all the respondents in this case as well as all the
Members of Congress took the oath to support and defend the
Constitution and to obey the laws. They not only have the right or
option to do so, they have the compelling obligation to do so.
That being said, the Honorable Court, with all due respect, does
not have the monopoly over the Constitution and the laws.
49. It is first and foremost the Congress that is saddled with
the bounden duty to interpret the Constitution in relation to the
laws they are crafting. It is the Congress who has the singular
competence to dictate and ensure the intendment of every law
that they pass. It is Congress’s ultimate responsibility to ensure
that the laws they pass are being enforced dutifully and are not
being defeated by faulty and erroneous interpretation.
50. Especially when it involves the jurisdictional
competence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Especially when it involves the election of Members of the House
of Representatives. Contrary to the conclusions of the Honorable
Court considering the invalidity of the HRET Resolution dated 14
December 2015, there is still pending with the said Tribunal two
petitions for quo warranto whereby the HRET has
unquestionably declared its jurisdiction.
51. Congress and the Public Respondents herein, by their
intransigence, nay reasonableness, in upholding and defending the
Constitution and the laws should not be faulted for their stubborn
refusal to sit Jusitce Presbitero Velasco’s son as a Representative.
Congress should be thanked for giving the Honorable Court the
opportunity to correct its unconstitutional, illegal, null and void
rulings beginning with the case of Reyes vs. Comelec.
52. This is also an opportunity for the Honorable Court not
merely to cite the Codilla vs. De Venecia case but to altogether
abandon it for being contrary to the Constitution and as a
usurpation of the powers of the HRET. The mere fact that
jurisdictional question was not raised before should not preclude
the same from being raised and considered in the present case.
26
53. TENTH. The remedy of Mandamus has for its purpose
the performance of an act mandated by law. The Honorable
Court, with all due respect, has not cited even a single provision
of the law or the Constitution that compels Public Respondent to
perform their duty as directed by the Honorable Court. All that
the Honorable Court has done was cite its own resolution that
favored the “son of a Member of the Court.”
54. It is high time, it is respectfully submitted, for the
Honorable Court to clarify the distinction between a writ of
mandamus and a writ of execution and so as not to confuse the
two as it has done in this case. In a writ of mandamus, the basis is
the clear provision of the law that confers an unmistakable right
upon the petitioner and a compelling duty on the respondent
only. When it is not the law that is relied upon for the basis of an
alleged right claimed by the petition but a decision of the courts,
the proper remedy is an application for a writ of execution. That
is a basic rule that may have been lost in the justification whose
obvious, manifest and blatant effect is to sit in Congress the “son
of a Member of the Court.”
55. Lastly, the Honorable Court’s Decision decreed that the
decision is immediately executory without citing “good reasons”
as required under the Rules of Court and the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. Respondent respectfully submit that this
exceptional use of the powers of the Court should no longer be
invoked and granted especially when there are multiple parties or
respondents as it essentially deprives the person who is served last
of due process of the law. A decision is not binding and effective
as against a party if he or she has not been served with a copy
thereof notwithstanding that all the other respondents may have
already acceded to and executed the decision pursuant to the
directive that it be “immediately executory.”
56. In parting, a wrong cannot be corrected by another
wrong. Especially when the obvious, manifest, blatant and
immediate effect is to sit in Congress the “son of a Member of the
Court.”
The foregoing discussion shows in contrasting fashion the ruling of the
Supreme Court vis-à-vis the position of Respondent in that whereas Respondent
cited the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the laws, the Supreme Court
can only advert to its resolution in Reyes vs. Comelec. It shows that while
Respondent’s position is well supported by the facts, the Constitution and the laws,
the Supreme Court’s discussion relied only on a new doctrine of “invalid
proclamation” that has no concrete basis under the laws. While Respondent cited
jurisdictional grounds for the unconstitutionality of the actions of the Supreme Court
27
and the Comelec, the Supreme Court can only rely on its own resolution devoid of
any basis in the Constitution, the laws and the facts of the case.
PRAYER
Given the foregoing, Respondent most respectfully prays for the Honorable
Tribunal to declare the 14 December 2015 Resolution as null and void and without
legal force and effect and is thus set aside and that the 28 November 2013 and 11
September 2014 Resolutions of the Honorable Tribunal as valid and subsisting.
Respondent also prays for the Honorable Tribunal to set the case for hearing
forthwith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Makati City for Quezon City, 20 January 2016.
ROQUE & BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Respondent
Antel Corporate Center
Unit 1904, 19th Floor
121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City 1227
Email: mail@roquebutuyan.com
Tel. Nos. 887-4445; 887-3894
Fax No. 887-3893
By:
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR
Roll No. 36976
PTR No. 5334537/11 Jan 2016/Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01749/PPLM
MCLE Exempt. No. IV-000513/15 Feb 2013
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN
Roll No. 36911
PTR No. 5334536 /11 Jan 2016 – Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01742/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-0011417/11 Jan 2013
ROGER R. RAYEL
Roll No. 44106
PTR No. 2208483/7 Jan 2016/Quezon City
IBP Lifetime No. 02159/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-017519/19 Apr 2013
28
EXPLANATION
A copy of the foregoing Motion was served upon the other parties by
registered mail due to inadequacy of the messengerial service of the office.
ROGER R. RAYEL
Copy furnished:
LARRAZABAL LAW OFFICE
Collaborating Counsel for Respondent
703 BF Condominium
Soriano Ave. cor. Solana Street
Intramuros, Manila
DANILO SALINDONG
Counsel for Petitioners in HRET Case No. 13-036 (QW)
JCLGE Building, 3573 Sandico Street
Barangay Tejeros, Makati City
PEDRO D. GENATO
Counsel for Petitioner in HRET Case No. 13-037
207 Gedisco Building, 1148 Roxas Boulevard
Ermita, Manila
GIZELLE LOU M. CABAHUG-FUGOSO
Counsel for Movant Petitioner-Intervenor
Unit 58C Stephanie Place, Road 3
Quezon City
Regina Reyes HRET Motion for Reconsideration/
29