BELONGING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY:
RECONCEPTUALIZED ‘TURKISHNESS’ IN THE NARRATIVES OF ANKARA
ARMENIANS
Özgür Bal-Uzun
This paper explores the alternative conceptualizations of Turkish nationhood and national
identity with reference to a broader research which was conducted in Ankara, the capital city
of Turkey, with the Armenian and Jewish communities on their self-perception of identity.
Life-story narratives collected through oral history interviews making up the basis, the paper
aims at arriving an understanding of how ‘national identity’ is re-constructed and transformed
in the narratives of Armenians, both Catholic and Gregorian, with a special emphasis on the
interaction of this re-construction with ‘minority identity’ and ‘citizenship’. The subject of
study being a population that is ascribed and hailed an identity, minority identity, which often
indicates not only a legal-political status, but also a social status in Turkey (Yumul,
2006:106), the current paper bases its method on the premise that searching for the selfperceptions of identity of such a population is critical not to be trapped in an “epistemological
violence” Spivak refers to (Hall, 1992b). Understanding ‘self-perceptions’ is also significant
for sociological purposes, since it provides for comprehending on how the ascribed identities
are embodied, transformed and asserted by their addressees. Within this framework, this
paper claims that self-definitions and multiple belongings of Armenians provides for a
potential ground for alternative conceptualizations of nationhood and national identity in
Turkey. It argues, moreover, that these self-definitions and multiple belongings are
influenced not only by the official and media discourses, but also, and most importantly, by
their ‘habitus’, which is shaped by socio-political space of Ankara and Turkey, on the one
hand, and by their community identity, on the other.
HOW TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY IS DEFINED
Main elements of the definition
There is a clear relation between definitions of minority, citizenship and nationhood. This is
especially so in the context of the nation-state “as an ideal typical model of membership” and
we are long aware that “diverging definitions of the citizenry embody and express distinctive
1
understandings of nationhood” (Brubaker, 1990:379-380). Therefore, it is important to
understand how ‘minority’ and ‘citizenship’ in Turkey was conceptualized and what
meanings they connoted in terms of nationhood.
In Turkey, ‘minority’ refers, within a legal-political framework, to the three traditionally
largest non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire, namely Armenians, Jews and0
Greeks, who were defined to be ‘religious minorities’ in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, that is at
the very beginning of republican state/nation-formation period. Citizenship in Turkey, on the
other hand, is argued to be taken officially as “one of the key elements of successful nationbuilding” and the state to be the main determinant and actor in the development of citizenship
(Icduygu et.al., 1999:187). Turkish state in this role has been characterized to be highly
central and unitary with a deep republican tradition (Toktas, 2005a); and ‘monist’ in terms of
its definition of nation (Oran, 2005a). Not independent from such an organization of the state,
Turkish citizenship is usually understood to be pointing to a passive subject position, to a
republican/communitarian political spirit, and to be one that is definitive not only in the public
sphere but also in the private sphere.
The above characteristic of Turkish citizenship being widely agreed on, another aspect -which
is crucial to understand the constitution of national identity- is a highly debatable one: the
ethnic content of Turkish citizenship (Yegen, 2004: 53-54). This aspect refers to a
differentiation made between two historical models of citizenship, the French and the German
models as they were clarified by Brubaker (1990). Accordingly, the point is whether
‘Turkishness designed by Turkish citizenship’ is defined in territorial-political terms, as in the
former model, or in ethnic terms, as in the latter one. One argument suggests that “Turkish
citizenship, especially at the time of its original constitution, signifies a political–territorial
definition of Turkishness instead of an ethnic one”, thus points to an expansionist and
inclusive Turkish citizenship; while other argument refers to the existence of “both a political
and an ethnicist logic in the very definition of Turkishness”, and thus points to the exclusivist
and differentialist aspects of Turkish citizenship (Yegen, 2004:54-55, 64). It is, however,
important to note that even in the latter case, the ethnicist content of Turkish citizenship is
argued to be ‘accidental’, a result of actual state practice deviating from the formal definition
of citizenship and national identity that emphasizes territoriality (Yegen, 2004). The third
position in the debate, occupied by Yegen himself, points to an “undecidable”, “inconsistent
terminology” in the “very texts constituting Turkish citizenship” revealing the “oscillation of
2
Turkish citizenship between a political and ethnic idea of citizenship” (Yegen, 2004: 55).
Consequently, there appears “different degrees of Turkishness” in the terminology of these
texts: ‘being a subject of the Turkish Republic/being a Turkish citizen’, ‘being a Turkish
subject’, ‘being Turkish/being of Turkish race’ (2004:56). Further, it is claimed that such an
undecidability has become a textual spirit in all Turkish constitutions which is evident in their
selective usage of the terms ‘everyone’, ‘every Turk’, ‘citizens’, ‘subjects of the Turkish
State’, ‘Turkish citizens’ (Yegen, 2004:62).
The above debate discloses that there are certainly other qualifiers of Turkishness besides
citizenship. Muslimhood in its role in the definition of Turkishness is referred to be one such
qualifier, which is usually viewed to be inherited from the Ottoman millet system (Yumul,
1992). It is argued, accordingly, that “millet system has still (implied) affects in the current
understanding of Turkish citizenship” and “non-Muslim groups are regarded as Turkish
citizens as a continuation of their community status in the Ottoman Empire” (Icduygu et.al.,
1999:195-196). Such role of Muslimhood is clearly expressed by Lewis (quoted in Yumul,
1992:74-75) stating that “in the Republic of Turkey a non-Muslim ‘may be called a Turkish
citizen, but never a Turk’; and by Yegen (2004:58) stating that “Muslimhood was considered
by the Turkish authorities to be the key to achieving Turkishness; [while] non-Muslimhood
was seen as ‘the natural’ obstacle to achieving Turkishness”. However, it is still noted that
such role does not indicate a ‘categorical closure’, that is “Turkishness is neither categorically
open to the Muslims, as in the ‘uneasy’ relation of the Kurds to the state, nor categorically
closed to the non-Muslims”, as in the case of Jews; and that “the supra-principle deciding the
inclusion to Turkishness is the loyalty to the state” (Yegen, 2004:174-175).
Consequences of such definition for ‘minorities’
It is now time to discuss what consequences such conceptualization of Turkishness and
Turkish citizenship brought forth for minorities. Icduygu and Kaygusuz (2004:36) argue that
there are two important consequences of early ‘national enclosure’ of Turkish citizenship:
First, the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin, namely the Greeks, Armenians
and Jews were definitely excluded from the future ‘community inside’. Secondly, the
Ottoman-Muslim majority, which was composed of various ethnic and religious
communities -Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Lazes, Arabs and some other smaller sects- were
3
portrayed as a single organic cultural unit, which would be the principal social basis of the
new political organization.
The above referred consequences of the early ‘national enclosure’ led namely to the
“differentialist practices of citizenship” (Yegen, 2004) or, in other words, to the
“Turkification policies” (Aktar, 2004) in the early republican Turkey. Accordingly, nonMuslim groups were seen as outsiders (Icduygu et.al., 1999); second, this exclusion of nonMuslims from the future political community and from proper membership rested on an
emerging concept of ‘national security’ which is still a part of the present day ‘politics of
citizenship’ in Turkey (Icduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004); third, since the dominant ideology of
the time was national interest supplemented by unity and collective purpose, the special rights
granted in the Treaty of Lausanne gave rise to enmity against minorities in the eyes of the
public,1 and non-Muslims were expected to willingly opt out of the articles on minorities in
Lausanne (Toktas, 2005a);2 and the Law enacted in 1926 specified Turkishness, instead of
Turkish citizenship, as a requirement for becoming a state employee (Yegen, 2004: 56).3
The second consequence indicated in the above quotation implies, moreover, that such a
conceptualization of citizenship prioritizes social cohesion over individualistic aspirations,
universal rights over group rights, suggesting a uniform society despite its religious, ethnic
and cultural diversity (Toktas, 2005a). Within this framework, it is argued that Turkish
citizenship refers mostly to equal rights and responsibilities like paying taxes, performing
military service and voting, entitled as positive freedoms in republicanism and points, as a
result, to a duty-based, passive identity (Icduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004). Thus, it could be
concluded that citizenship in Turkey, especially in the early years of the newly establishing
state, has been a ‘universal citizenship’ that appeals to equality with universal rights and
responsibilities rather than a ‘differentiated citizenship’ that appeals to difference in the
1
For instance, between 1923 and 1927, non-Muslims were discharged from their positions in state offices and
state owned companies (Levi, 1998: 37).
2
In 1925, all the three minorities opted out in the Art.42 of the Treaty which granted them the “privilege of
maintaining their own law on family and inheritance matters” (Yumul, 1992: 70). Karpat states that this
renouncement of privilege was in view of the forthcoming introduction of the Civil Code (quoted in Yumul,
1992); and Aktar points that this act of ‘opting out’ was not that a ‘willingly’ act (Aktar, 1996b: 328-329). Aktar
also argues that due to ‘opting out’ “the last remnants of Ottomans have disappeared; non-Muslim citizens were
Turkified ‘legally’ being stripped off all the privileges of being a member of a religious and ethnic community
which were defined under protection of international laws” (Aktar, 1996b: 329).
3
Yegen, referring Aktar (1996b), states that this law, specifying the ethnic Turkishness as a precondition for
becoming a state employee, was in use until 1965; while Article 657, which is currently in use, specifies Turkish
citizenship instead of Turkishness as a precondition for becoming a state employee (2004: 56).
4
context of distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural minorities in multi-ethnic societies
(Kymlicka and Norman, 2000).
Consequently, Turkish minority citizenship was defined to be “limited, conditional, at the
margin” and minorities in such definition were regarded mostly to be ones “who are not
anyway from us” (Parla, 1995: 209). It is now time to turn how minorities themselves define
their identities with regard to minority status, citizenship and national identity, after a brief
historical background for Armenians in Ankara.
A SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUD FOR ARMENIANS IN ANKARA
Though the existence of an Armenian church in Ankara is thought to date back to Roman and
Byzantium periods, the first concrete demographic information about the Armenians in
Ankara is that during ‘the big runaway’ [“büyük kaçgun”] between 1590-1610 a large amount
of Armenian population came from the Eastern provinces and the urban population had
increased consequently (Atauz, 2004: 139). We know, moreover, that in 1828 around 6000
Catholic Armenian who were originally from Ankara but lived in Istanbul, were deported to
Ankara (Aydın et. al., 2005: 215); and there were Armenians coming from Sivas, Iran and
Caucasians to Ankara at different periods. However, according to 1914 census the population
had already decreased before WWI; although, we do not have any data on the reason (Atauz,
2004).
The Armenian population, being the largest non-Muslim group in Ankara, was composed of
Catholic, Gregorian and Protestant Armenians, the Catholic Armenians being the largest and
the Protestants being the smallest of them. Moreover, Ankara is stated to be almost the only
city in Turkey where the Catholic Armenians has been living as a large community, since
Armenian communities except in Ankara are mostly Gregorian Armenians. Catholicism
among Armenians started at the 18th century with a Dominican priest coming to the city and
converting some families to Catholicism (Etöz, 1998: 73; Aydın et. al., 2005: 215).
Protestantism, on the other hand, spread among Armenians due to the American and English
missionaries coming to Anatolia in the late 1860s (Etöz, 1998: 73). The three Armenian
groups are stated to have some different characteristics. For example, Catholic Armenians
have always been the largest and the wealthiest among other Armenian groups (Atauz, 2004:
138); they took part in the city governance councils and expressed their ideas and discomfort
5
openly (Etöz, 1998: 74). It is argued, moreover, that while the Gregorian Armenians were
more traditionalist and willing to carry on and perpetuate ‘eastern culture’, Catholics were
more ‘western sided’, lived in the city like Europeans, and wished the community modernize
and integrate to Europe as soon as possible (Atauz, 2004: 140). This difference is supported,
indeed, by the claim that Catholic Armenians of Ankara had chosen an idea and identity
definition that they were not Armenians but Catholics only (Ortaylı, 1994: 110). Atauz states
that though there was almost no problem between Armenians and Muslims, at least not in the
court records, there seems to be problems between these two Armenian groups. Protestant
Armenians,4 on the other hand, are pointed to compose the most liberal groups of Ankara,
together with the Greek population, the reason for this being their close contact with foreign
merchants (Etöz, 1998: 74). It was mostly the Armenians, along with Greeks, who dealt with
large-scale trade in Ankara. Exportation and importation were mostly at their hands especially
from the late 1890s on when the European traders left the city due to the decrease in the
importance of angora and mohair production. In relation to the monetary accumulation and
fiscal capital ownership bankers, usurers, moneychangers, accountants were also mostly
Armenians (Etöz, 1998: 95). Professional occupations, moreover, are stated to be held mostly
by Christians, in that, clerks/notaries, lawyers and doctors were mostly Armenians and Greeks
(Atauz, 2004: 100).
Ankara is stated to be a metropolitan center for both Catholic and Gregorian Armenians (Etöz,
1998: 159). While Aydın states that at the 19th century Catholic Armenians had two churches
and two monasteries (2005: 215); Etöz gives the numbers for Catholic Armenian to be four
churches, one Cathedral, and two monasteries (1998: 159-160). On the other hand, Gregorian
Armenians had two and Protestant Armenians had one church. The language used in daily life
was Turkish; education at schools and ritual at churches were in Turkish with Armenian
alphabet. However, at the Armenian school foreign language was also thought to a great
degree (Ortaylı, 1994: 111). Etöz states, moreover, that at the Catholic Armenian monasteries
Armenian language was thought, and, as a result, attitude of religious and educational
institutions were influential on a certain degree of ethnic positioning (1998: 133). Catholic
Armenians had four schools for children [“sıbyan mektebi”] and Gregorian Armenians had
two (Etöz, 1998: 151).
Aydın, Emiroğlu, Türkoğlu and Özsoy, state that at the beginning of the 19 th century there was a Protestant
Armenian community in the city center which was composed of 1000 people (2005: 214); however this data is
not shared by other sources.
4
6
HOW ARMENIANS DEFINE THEIR POLITICAL IDENTITY
Main Elements of the Definition
Throughout the life story narratives of 11 Armenians and in the replies of 7 Armenians to
open-ended questionnaires, it became clear that Armenians of Ankara construct their
identities basically at three levels: city, state, community. Although identifications at the
second level, which reveals encounters with state policies, is central for the current paper,
depending on its capital city status identifications at the city level are also important.
At this level, Ankara was not only ‘home’, whereby Armenians have inhabited for
generations, thus, argued to be ‘natives’ of the city, or only a ‘metropolis’, which permits
anonymity for different ethnic and religious groups, but also the ‘capital city’, which, in the
early construction era, was projected to be a symbol for the Turkish Republican nation-state.
Ankara was the model platform for the invention of a ‘new citizen’, thus was burdened by the
missions of achieving a daily life, whereby modernization and westernization aims of the
Republic were actualized in practice; and it was projected to be the source of the
homogeneous population that would help to construct the nation as an ‘imagined community’
(Şenol-Cantek, 2003:42). Thus, it is important to understand in what ways the minorities, who
were defined at the margin, if not outside, of the newly ‘imagined nation’, identify themselves
with the capital city.
Although an uneasy relation of minorities to the capital city could be expected, when the
above mentioned symbolic status of the city is concerned, it appeared, rather, that
identifications of Armenians were very much in line with the ‘modernization’ and
‘westernization’ discourse, which dominated the construction era of the capital-city and,
indeed, the nation-state. They identified themselves with the symbols of ‘modern’, ‘western’,
‘progressive’, ‘laicist/secular’, and ‘civilized’. They, moreover, identified the city with the
republican regime and the figure of Atatürk. These were also the elements for their selfidentifications and, therefore, they embraced the idea of living in a city, which was designed
with references to these symbols. Moreover, their memories of having once involved in the
very construction and maintenance of the symbolic spaces of the capital city, namely the
recreational spaces whereby civilized and modern citizens were projected to be created at the
early republican era, enabled them to feel belonging in the city.
7
‘Belonging’ was the main focus of the narrators, and apparently had a spatial dimension,
whereby space was understood as articulated movements in networks of social relations
(Yuval-Davis, 2001). One level of spatial belonging being the city, the other and the more
important was the level of ‘homeland’. Turkey was perceived to be the ‘homeland’. Ankara
Armenians defined themselves to be ‘Türkiyeli’ (from Turkey), and to be ‘Anadolulu’
(Anatolian). ‘Being a citizen’, ‘being a true child of the country’, ‘being born and bred here’
were other expressions whereby these feelings of belonging were revealed. Such emphasis is
in line with a territorial understanding of national identity, since it was apparent in many
narratives that assertion of Turkey as ‘homeland’ served for a claim to be counted as a ‘true
Turk’. The narrators were posing for an identity definition based on territorial grounds. They,
in other words, posed for their integration in the ‘community inside’ (İçduygu and Kaygusuz,
2004).
The below narrative, whereby ‘1’ (1929, Cath.Arm., F, Primary Sch.) compares the position
of Armenians in Turkey with the positions of her relatives who have emigrated to European
countries from Turkey, appears to question the existing construction of national identity and
generate an alternative construction:
They have more freedom. They are viewed as complete French citizens. We, too, are so
on paper, but we are treated as minority. … They don’t accept us as Turk, but the
foreigners call us Turks. They have the idea that a Turk would be Muslim. … Recently,
there was a documentary on Gagauz Turks on TV. They are Christians indeed. Their
Turkish is bad but they are accepted as Turks. … I mean we see ourselves to be Turk,
Turkish-Christian.
It is clear in the above quotation that ‘religious affiliation’ as a criterion for ‘national identity’
is criticized; importance of ‘language’ as a criterion is focused, which is meaningful since
Ankara Armenians are proud of ‘speaking Turkish well’; points to ‘minority identity’ in
negative connotations; and engenders an alternative conceptualization of Turkish national
identity, with an ‘hyphenation’, which has crucial potential consequences for the existing
monist structure. In the related literature, hyphenated-identity is pointed to be one of the
forms ethnic identities take in the multi-ethnic world. Accordingly, in an analysis of the
hyphenated model of American identity, Hedetoft (2004: 39-40) states that:
[It is] based on the assumption that the core of identity is undivided loyalty to …
constitutional values, but that this can be orchestrated, individually or collectively, in a
8
variety of ways, and that attendant forms of cultural belonging and homeness can be
multiple as well.
Following Hedetoft, it could be claimed that hyphenation of Turkish national identity in the
expression of “Turkish-Christianity” points, on the one hand, to the ‘undivided loyalty to the
constitutional values’; and, on the other, to the multiple forms of belonging -national or
religious-communitarian. Moreover, it should be added that ‘1’s claim in being a “TurkishChristian” is also a claim in ‘being an equal part’.
The ‘minority’ status is often perceived, by Armenians, to be an obstacle for being an equal
part. In many narratives ‘minority’ appears to be somewhat degrading which connotes
‘inferiority’ or ‘inequality’. Accordinly, A.I. (1953, Greg.Arm., M, University), stated “the
citizens who were born and bred here are not minorities”. Similarly, K.S. (1928, Greg.Arm.,
M, High Sch.), who argues that ‘minority’ is a discriminating expression states “When you
use the word “minority”, you see me as lacking, as “ekalliyet”5, I am not “ekalliyet”; I am too,
a true child of this country born and bred.” These narratives are in line with the argument that
minority status in Turkey does not only refer to a legal-political status but also a social one.
The focus on the territorial identification, thus, could be seen as a claim on belonging, on
equality and on ‘homeness’. Another narrative, which focuses more on citizenship practices
as an invalidating factor for minority status belongs to B.T., (1957, Cath.Arm., M, High Sch.
Left):
I have settled here, I pay tax to this state, I do my military service, I get my child
educated at Turkish schools …Well, that’s why there shouldn’t be a need for such a
differentiation I think. There shouldn’t be, I mean a Muslim, a Christian, a Catholic, a
Greek, I do not accept these differentiations, indeed.
The implicit suggestion that the concept ‘minority’ points something ‘less’, at least
‘different’, than ‘equal’ citizen is crucial in the above narratives. Here, citizenship, at least at
the ideal level, provides for ‘equal membership’ to the political community, since it is
perceived to be an enabling ground for the co-existence of different identities.
To this point it appeared, on the one hand, that in the narratives of the Ankara Armenians
monist, uniform structure of Turkish national identity is questioned and an alternative
‘Ekalliyet’ was the term used for minorities in the Otoman period and it usually bears negative connotations
indicating the exsistence of a ‘problem’ as in then widely used expression ‘The Problem of Ekalliyet’/’The
Minority Problem’.
5
9
conceptualization was posed via hyphenation; while, on the other, citizenship was emphasized
as a central element constituting Turkishness, thus as a challenge to the ethnicist discourses on
national identity. Lastly, the paper argues that the frequent references of narrators to the
elements constituting dominant discourses on national identity in Turkey are attempts to
participate “in the idea of nation” (Hall, 1992a), which extents citizenship status and defines
them within, not at the margin or outside of the ‘community inside’ (İçduygu and Kaygusuz,
2004). These elements are usually ‘homeland’, Turkish Flag, Turkish language, the figure of
‘Atatürk’ and fulfillment of military service (having shed blood for the ‘home’).
It is already stated that a focus on territorial belonging was posed as a legitimate claim to be
counted as a ‘true Turk’. In other narratives, too, meaning of ‘home’ was formulated directly
in terms of ‘national identity’. C.E. (1969, Cath.Arm., M, Secondary Sch.), for example,
noted that he did not thought of migrating to any other country; and gave the reason for the
preference of staying in Turkey as “we are already Turks”. When the occasions of exiles,
deportations, forced or ‘voluntary’ migrations minority populations have experienced in
Turkey are remembered, it is not surprising that the concepts ‘migrating’, ‘leaving’, ‘going
away’ reflected ‘uneasy’ connotations and ‘homeland’ was articulated as an element of
‘participating in the idea of nation’.
‘Speaking Turkish well’ or ‘speaking only Turkish’ was another articulation in this line. Such
emphasis might be following from the fact that within the Armenian community in Ankara,
contrary to Istanbul, for instance, the language used in daily life, even in the late Ottoman
period, was Turkish and education at schools and rituals at churches were in Turkish, though
Armenian alphabet was used in written texts. The proud of speaking Turkish without accent
was so visible that one narrator, ‘1’ (1929, Cath.Arm., F), put it as a factor following from
their being residents of the ‘capital city’ when she told a story about a visit to St. Mary
whereby she and her sister was suspected to be ‘Turks’ by the other Armenian visitors -from
Istanbul mostly- of the church.
Another symbol being articulated on, as a pointer of ‘Turkishness’, was Turkish flag. S.O.
(1962, Greg.Arm., F), for instance, suggested me to check the houses of Christian families on
‘national celebrations’ where I would find the flag hanging over the windows. Recalling that
her father, in her childhood, too, paid special attention to lift the flag over their apartment on
these days, she suggested that “there is first Turkishness in this attempt and then there is the
10
Christianity”. Similarly, she focused that “we are Turks first, and then go on with our
Christianity”.
Many narrators had a story to tell about Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. We might think that having
been lived in the capital city made an occasion for many first generation people to have a
direct experience with or in relation to him. We observe, moreover, that these stories were
transferred to the latter generations, were narrated in each case very willingly, and were very
much in line with the common representation of the figure of Atatürk in the national culture.
Thus, ‘the strong paternal figure of Atatürk’ as the founder of the country and of the basic
principles of the nation was, for the narrators, an important element to refer with regard to
their claim to be taken in the community inside. ‘Being an Ataturkist’, moreover, was a
frequently expressed statement.
As already referred above, loyalty to the state has been a constant tension point in the
discursive construction of Turkish national identity; and frequent references of such discourse
are having fulfilled ones military service (Üstel, 2004) or ‘having shed blood for the
homeland’ (Bali, 1999) were important as criteria to be counted as ‘Turk’. It is, thus,
meaningful that there was a continuous mention, in the narratives of participant Armenians, to
their “military services completed in long years” and “the difficulties faced during the state of
warfare”, for the older generation, and, for the younger generation, to their “grandfathers
wounded in the WWI”. Male narrators, specifically, have articulated long stories about their
military services, and repeated stories about how much they were ‘trusted’ and ‘honored’ by
the senior soldiers at the military. All these narratives seemed to be collected in order to point
to ‘their proved loyalty to the state’ and within this framework it could be argued that official
discourse and representation were important reference points for the identity constructions of
the minorities in Turkey.
However, to argue that all these articulations were a part of the claim in ‘participating the idea
of nation as it is represented in the national culture’ (Hall, 1992a) or in the ‘collective national
memory’ (Hedetoft, 2004) is not to claim that these are mere strategies. On the contrary, this
paper argues that such claim follows from ‘habitus’ of the minorities in Turkey, which was
shaped not only through their ethnic, or religio-community identities but also, and most
importantly, through their generations-long experiences within the economic, social, political
space of Turkey. This is to argue that they have a claim on the present and future and not only
11
on the past of the ‘homeland’ where they were ‘born and bred’, spent all their life, had
education and established work lives, and had familial relations, neighbors and friendships.
Therefore, their claim for the community inside is not only a result of an attempt to imagine
or assume a “socio-psychological security” and “homeness” (Hedetoft 2004: 24-25), but also
a result of the very fact that they perceive themselves to be a genuine ‘part’, to be a ‘host’ and
not a ‘guest’ of Turkey.
To conclude, it appears, in the narratives of Ankara Armenians on ‘Turkishness’, ‘minority’
and ‘citizenship’, that their claim stemming from their habitus, which was shaped all through
time and space conditions of their experiences, is not only to citizenship, to equal membership
to the political community, but also to the ‘homeland’, to the participation in the ‘idea of
nation’, the imagined community. Such a claim of Ankara Armenians, moreover, is woven
into their multiple identifications, namely the capital city, Anatolia, their ethno-religious
community. What followed from these multiple belongings and identifications, as the paper
revealed, was that existing construction of nationhood and national identity in Turkey were
questioned and alternative conceptualizations were posed. Accordingly, a form of
‘Turkishness’ that is based on territorial citizenship and belonging was emphasized and
‘minority’ identity, so far as it points to exclusion, was rejected.
12
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