33. CTBT, A Review

advertisement
Emporium
Current Essays
H fJUfWfW
A MfcMife
M_
The UN General Assembly adopted a crippled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on
September 10, 1996, whereby
158 member states voted for the treaty, five states, i.e., Lebanon, Cuba, Mauritius,
Tanzania and Syria abstained while India, Bhutan and Libya to and end the 31-month
incessant efforts by 61 member Conference on Disarmament. CTBT is required to be
signed and ratified by 44 states, including eight nuclear capable states, and three
threshold states i.e., India, Pakistan and Israel, out of which 20 have yet to ratify the
Chemical Weapon Convention signed in 1993. It is indeed amazing that the treaty cannot
be enforced by. five nuclear powers extending their own moratorium which already
exists. If the treaty has no ostensible relevance to nuclear test explosions conducted by
five nuclear weapons states, it is also insignificant for 175 non-nuclear weapons states
having abjured their nuclear weapon option through NPT. The question arises what is the
relevance of the treaty?
The US and Western nuclear powers, bitter opponents of CTBT till 1992 have suddenly
become its major proponents in order to perpetuate nuclear apartheid. Having conducted
715 out of 1,030 knonn nuclear tests and exercising nuclear option, Washington was
instrumental in having the NPT extended unconditionally and indefinitely. The effort is
to universalisc it by foreclosing the nuclear option for threshold states. The US support to
zero vie{d CTBT is conditioned by continuances of weapons related activities under a
Stockpile Stewardship (SS) programme, maintenance of weapons labs and facilities to
keep the latent capacity to test nuclear weapons. Frank Van Hippcl of Princeton
University has pointed out that "under SS programme sub-critical tests would be a
verification nightmare, making it impossible to distinguish between zero yield and low
yield underground tests". In fact this sham nuclear explosion ban treaty is only the first
step in the fissile materials production cut off treaty. Both these treaties arc ostensibly
directed against China to freeze its nuclear warhead technology and its fissile materials
availability, which the US and other NWS advance on new generations of weapons.
US interest lies in selective nuclear disarmament which would enable it to*retain
substantial nuclear stockpiles both for purposes of mutual deterrence and preponderant
collective leverage138
Emporium Current Essays
Emporium Current Essays
139
vis-a-vis rest of the world. The West vehemently objects fo the linkage of the treaty with
disarmament by maintaining that it is not the disarmament treaty but a nuclear test ban
treaty under negotiations, US has also been able to enlist China's support after protracted
negotiations and revision of the verification clause, which originally envisaged that 26
out of 51 states could request for on-site inspection if any signatory violated the treaty. It
now provides that
30 states have to agree for the same. Significantly, China has given its support after
conducting its 45th nuclear test. US is using different strategies to lure India and Pakistan
to sign the CTBT in fulfilment of its nuclear proliferation goals and South Asian agenda,
as the support of these two countries is essential in order to make the treaty credible. One
view however is that except for obduracy, it would not make any qualitative difference
even if India and Pakistan sign the CTBT. Mr, Christopher Paine, US nuclear weapon
expert and senior researcher at the Natural Resource Defence Council, in an interview to
Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun on July 1, 1996 stated: "While India could go for untested
crude weapons, Pakistan could update its nuclear capability without any explosions
which the CTBT would ban as it had received detailed design data including nuclear
weapon materials from China".
Indian principled stand on the CTBT has been consistent, moral and courageous. It is in
marked divergence and totally antithetical to Western objectives towards weapons of
mass destruction India's views about the CTBT are as under:
*" It believes that a meaningful treaty should inextricably be linked to global
disarmament, including a time-borne framework for elimination of nuclear weapons. In
1988 it had proposed an international convention on the prohibition of threat or use or
nuclear \\eapons by 2010. It is strongly viewed that with 175 states having abjured their
nuclear weapons options as signatories to NPT, CTBT only targets threshold statcs-vi/.India, Pakistan and Israel.
•"* India desires as all encompassing nuclear non-proliferation treaty, leading to the
vertical, horizontal, qualitative, quantitative as well as global disarmament, which the
proposed treaty fails to meet. Pertinently, France and China conducted series of tests
recently and in the absence of the <•, ban on sub-critical testing, simulation process and
techniques, qualitative improvement by three nuclear states would continue.
f India feels that an iniquitous world order has been reinforced consequent to the signing
of NPT by the NWS which are also permanent members of UN Security Council. f The
NWS have carried out innumerable tests since midfifties, including hydro-nuclear
explosions. The CTBT docs not prohibit them from cither possessing or improving the
design, quantum or lethality of their nuclear weapons. Thus -(••• the fact that nuclear
powers are investing billions of dollars in modern facilities to create advanced nuclear
weapons with lab testing and computer as.sistcd design, to provide functional equivalent
of full scale testing, makes their bona fides suspect.
**
India is convinced that the US docs not believe that cither the NPT or CTBT
would end the future proliferation. Consequently it is making heavy investment in
Counter Proliferation Strategy (CPS), which seeks to prevent the emergence of new
"rouge" states. According to William Perry "Us has to remain in preparedness to have
defensive system against potential nuclear attack of non-deterrable rogue states, i.e. Iran,
Iraq Libya. It also needed CPS to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction
arising out of regional conflicts. Thus, for the US disarmament is inconceivable and
unacceptable whether it be Article V of NPT or Preamble for CTBT." The pertinent
question is if the US believes in the effectiveness of NPT and CTBT why is it spending
enormous resources in counter proliferation strategy?
•*"
-India's main emphasis is on the absence of foolproof verification measures to
check transfer of materials and weapons from nuclear weapons states to nonnuclear weapon states. It has no mechanism to stop proliferation through clandestine
transfer of weapons and technology. Experts however maintain that Indian objections do
not stem from any moral commitment to disarmament but are being used as a ploy in
order to complete its ongoing multi-faceted nuclear projects ad it conduct tests in order to
join the nuclear club.
However, Indian obduracy has been hardened by West's policy of appeasement towards
it. Despite its obstinacy Wisncr kept assuring that Indian stand would not affect US
investment or trade. Warren Christopher further insured that notwithstanding its
intransigence the US would not seek sanctions against India. In140
Emporium Current Essays
further defiance Indian FM announced the resumption of long-range missile test, thus
floating CTBT.
Pakistan ostensibly shares Indian views about solemn and binding commitment from
NWS for complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But unlike India's consistent and well
defending stand, fully debated in Parliament and print media, Pakistan's position has been
ambivalent and contradictory. Pakistan has all along maintained that it is prepared to sign
the NPT and CTBT provided India docs the same. Recently, however in order to please
the US. Pakistan changed its stand by suyinii that it would sign the treaty at an
appropriate time taking into account its security concerns and position of other countries.
The Benazir government censured by all political parties, and put in the dock by the
Press, for unilaterally bartering away country's interests for political expediency,
backtracked, reverting to its earlier position linking its signing of CTBT to that of India.
This conditional linkage is, however, baffling, as acceding to NPT and CTBT should be
decided on the basis of Pakistan's national interest alone and not as a reaction to
government's Indo-centric foreign policy. If India, after extracting maximum possible
concessions from the West, i.e., seat as a permanence member of UN Security Council,
authorisation for export of sensitive technology, provision of equipment which would
enable it to simulate nuclear explosions without conducting nuclear tests, additional
economic concessions, eventually signs the CTBT it would leave no option for Pakistan
but to si};n the treaty, which would have negative consequences undermining its national
security. The COAS, however, with a more rational approach maintained that "we will
take any decision after much consideration even if India signs the CTBT.
Another favourite theme being propagated by the government is to join the mainstream in
long-term interests and let India be 'isolated'. The bait is'being given in the form of
unreliable security assurances, simplistic interpretation and pressure. On August 14, FM
boasted of our superior diplomacy having isolated India, how? No plausible explanation
was given. While the PM for reasons of political expediency makes Pakistan signing
consequent to India, the FM highlights that "Pakistan will keep its options open to sign or
not after we are more or less satisfied with the CTBT draft." "Munir Akram expressed
satisfaction at the safeguards for monitoring implementation of the treaty before
inspection and said that "despite shortcoming, the draft treaty will constrain further
development of weapons thus contributing to the goal of nuclear disarmament." Pakistan
strangely supported the Australian
Emporium Current Essays
141
initiative-to- bring the CTBT before UNGA as part of 'Friends of CTBT.
What signals do these conflicting statements radiate and what course of action should
Pakistan adopt? It must be reconciled to three cardinal facts: a)Despite a number of
amendments the CTBT would only lead
to nuclear apartheid not nuclear disarmament.
b)- It would place a qualitative cap on nuclear potential of Pakistan.
c)- Even if India agrees to join the CTBT West efforts would be to further denuclearise
Pakistan's nuclear programme. If Pakistan succumbs the next step would be to rollback
and eliminate its nuclear and missile capabilities already capped by Benazir government
in 1989.
Pakistan must realise that out of three threshold nuclear states it would be most affected
as the other two are already well recognised nuclear weapons states. India according to
specialists is producing substantial quantity of plutonium and enriched uranium for
production of 10 to 15 nuclear bombs annually and its intentions of manufacturing
nuclear submarine is also well-known. Can any sane government consider giving-up its
nuclear deterrent undermining its nationalsccurity?
It would be'suicidal to acquiesce to the new US strategy in South Asia at tK?'cost-of
Pakistan's national interest. A consensus should therefore, be evolved through Parliament,
Press and intelligentsia, whether Pakistan should sign the treaty keeping in view its
security concerns? These include peaceful and honourable settlement of Kashmir dispute
and regional non-proliferation underwritten by the US and Western powers including
removal of missile, threats.
Download