The Role of the “Informal Sector” in African Regional Integration: In
Quest for Common Ground and Sustainable Path
Abstract: Regional integration and the informal sector are generally diametrically alienated given scale
and substance of discussion. While regional integration is, more, a matter of macro-policy, the informal
sector is an aspect of microcosmic economics. Despite this analytical and practical divergence, critical for
policy dialogue is the determination of the character of this loose, albeit important nexus. In Africa, the
urban informal sector is marked by conspicuous ubiquity. Yet, this phenomenon is no longer a single
country subject; it transcends country boundaries. Evidence includes the pervasive practice of crossborder trading, and the provision of essential services and infrastructure to the migrants engaging in
informal sector as a survival coping strategy. Latent in the debate is the notion of ‘powerless places and
placeless powers’. Major questions of concern include whose responsibility it is to provide services to the
international informal sector practitioners in a given municipalities? What scope is there for taxing the
informal sector players to manage ‘free riding’ effectively? Can regional integration ensure policy
coherence charting a sustainable path for development? In light of these questions, this article, by way of a
desktop study, aims at exploring and defining the roles of the informal sector in Africa’s regional
integration agenda highlighting pitfalls and antics.
Introduction
This paper seeks to analyse the relationship between regional integration and the role of the
informal sector in Africa. Simultaneously, it aims to resolve such questions as regards the
responsibility to provide services to the international informal sector practitioners in a given
municipalities, the scope for taxing the informal sector players to manage ‘free riding’
effectively, and, how regional integration can ensure policy coherence charting a sustainable
path for development. The paper is crafted from documentary and literature review. Taken as a
whole, both regional integration and the informal sector as discussed in this paper are contested
and fuzzy concepts. Their practice is marred with discontent and haphazardness. As to be
argued in the discourse, regional integration is, more, a matter of macro-policy (Kindleberger,
1958; McCann, 2001), the informal sector is an aspect of microcosmic economics (William and
Round, 2008). Framing an argument about how these two can ‘work together’ is not only a
mammoth but also taxing task. However, for the sake of dialogue and possible practical
implementation of trans-statal policy it is imperative to examine the relationship of the two
aspects. Important to note, form the outset is the fact of difficulty of the informal sector as a
mindboggling activity in many cities and towns in Africa as well as the difficulty in dismantling
colonial boundaries for effective regional cooperation among African member states. Regional
integration could go a long way in resolving internationalised contemporary challenges one of
them being urban informality. In essence, this urban informality is epitomised in creating a
‘gray zone’ in which criminal activities are rife as well as challenges of citizen taxation.
Instead of the informal sector, being static hence confined within one place, it has tended to
assume a ‘mobile character’ for example the rampancy of cross-border trading. In keeping with
the provisions of the disequilibrium migration models, non-performance in one region or
country often leads to outflow of labour and skills into the one performing better (McCann,
2001). For instance, now, in Southern Africa, South Africa has witnessed a huge influx of people
from the neighbouring Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho,
1
Democratic Republic of Congo, and sometimes migrants from as far as Ethiopia and Somalia. In
this movement, not only do the skilful move but also the unskilful ones who then seek to eke a
living tapping on informal activities. They also seek to house themselves informally. The South
Africa example shows that such influx of international migrants from the sub-continental region
explains the rise of xenophobia in the country. In the wide debate of the treatment of the
migrants are the questions of the provision of essential services and infrastructure. The
disequilibrium model in regional economics concurs with the globalisation paradigm and the
notion of ‘powerless places and placeless powers’.
Theoretical Framework: Informal Sector, the State and Regional Integration
The informal sector is not a new phenomenon. Its integral position in the survival and basic
economic arrangement of humankind is well documented. Nevertheless, Becker (2004:3)
contends that the sector can “...can however no longer be considered as a temporary
phenomenon.” Iwalewa (2011:6) describes the informal sector as “... the unregulated and mostly
unregistered sector of the economy ... the numerous petty or small scale businesses operated by
artisans, peasants and other micro entrepreneurs, within the economy.” For Lawrence (1999:1),
“... regardless of the level of state involvement in the economy, the informal sector provides
employment for a significant number of the unemployed and underemployed.” Box 1 shows
the Zimbabwean case as of 2012. Ninety percent (90%) of poorer developing countries is
informal employment. According to estimates by the International Labour Organisation (ILO),
1.8 billion, compared to 1.2 billion (formal sector) people are employed in the informal sector.
For example, in Zimbabwe, The Standard of 4 November 2012 defines informal economy as
“… activities and income that are partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation and
observation.”
The informal sector comprises both legal and illegal activities. In the urban areas, street vendors
and service providers of “every need imaginable” (Chambwera, 2012: 1) characterise the space.
In the rural areas, informal players produce goods for subsistence and include a number of
small-scale enterprises. The actors have a role to play in the management of natural resources.
Chambwera (2012:3) argues that they are involved in such activities as “... the collection of nontimber forest products such as honey, fruits, mushrooms, medicines... The[se] products often
end up in formal and informal retail outlets in these countries or in the developed world.”
Given this interface between the informal sector and the formal sector, some complexity is
obvious.
A continuum exists between the informal and the formal economy in which
backward linkages and forward linkages are involved. With respect to the sustainable
management of local resources hence greening the economy, the informal actors are better
informed to deal with the environment given their closeness to environmental products.
Besides, sustainability embraces the notion of social justice. Chambwera (2012:4) observes that
the informal actors are commonly “...powerless and voiceless, particularly women” hence the
empowerment embedded in informal opportunities can be capitalised upon towards poverty
eradication and promotion of gender equality. Specifically, Chambwera (2012:8) asserts that
local action can “... ensure that green policies are driven by local actors and are appropriate to a
particular context. Merely regulating the big players could be ineffective if these standards get
lost at the interface with informal players.”
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Box 1: The upsurge of the informal sector in Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat) in a 2011 Labour Force and Child Labour Survey
(LFCLS) acknowledges the informal economy is the major employer of the working population in
Zimbabwe (aged 15 years and above). This means that about 5.4 million or 84% are in informal
employment with only 11% being in formal employment and 5% in employment not classifiable. Sixtynice percent (69%) of the informal sector employees are in the expansive age group of 20 to 39 years. the
largest number of employees (52%), are in the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and
motor cycles. Fourteen percent (14%) are in other services and manufacturing, respectively, adding to
28% both. Eighty five percent (85%) of the informal sector employees have primary or secondary level of
education. Zimbabwe’s high unemployment rate, pegged at well above 80% is attributed to the sustained
decline in economic production levels.
Source: Standard, The (4 November, 2012)
Scholars like Rukmana (2009) have argued against seeking the elimination of the informal
sector. Rather local authorities have to find ways to accommodate it in urban economies
through urban planning. Specifically in developing countries, the informal sector is known for
the creation of urban environmental eyes sores and undesirable activities. Conflict arises
between informal sector plays as they (ab)use space planned and designated for contrary
purposes by the municipalities. Eviction is the major instrument used by urban local authorities.
Rukmana (2009:23) argues that, “In many cases, authorities forcibly evict informal sector
activities in the name of urban order and cleanliness. Yet, such eviction does not address the
problem with the informal sector. It only relocates the problem and even exaggerates the
conflicts between urban authorities and the informal sectors. Often many operators return to
their places a few days after being evicted by the urban authorities.” With the ever-increasing
urbanisation in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and Asia, and with the
informal sector accounting for most of the total employment, accommodating the sector
promises to be a progressive and positive step. In the words of Becker (2004:11),
“Traditionally, the informal economy was perceived as comprising mainly survivalist
activities. Various negative aspects were used to describe the informal economy ranging
from undeclared labour, tax evasion, unregulated enterprises, illegal and criminal
activity. Nevertheless, the vast majority of informal economy activities provide goods
and services whose production and distribution are legal. In addition, informal economy
activities are not necessarily performed with the deliberate intention of evading the
payment of taxes or social security contributions, or infringing labour legislation or other
regulations. The informal economy can however include restricted illegal and restricted
legal operations or legal and irregular operators, but no criminal operators. The informal
economy should therefore not be confused with the criminal economy.”
The informal sector marked by a number of features. First, its major mark is non-compliance
with the legal requirements, standards and procedures analogous with the formal sector.
Second, it has the latent and patent capacity to offer job creation because in its practice there is
generation of conduits for distribution. Third, the informal sector is a parallel vehicle for
shopping and trade nuclei, especially in the developing countries. Lastly, the sector comes in a
variety of forms including entertainment, transport, manufacturing, building, arts and crafts
and personal services. This diversity and variety ensures that a cross-section of goods and
services are on offer to those needing them. In most cases, these goods and services are
provided with greater ease and flexibility than the formal sector would offer. Besides this
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advantage, the informal sector also a major contributor to national economies especially by
providing employment and reducing poverty in developing societies. Entrepreneurs are in a
position to self-support. Business start-up is easy and overhead expenses are not as large as in
the formal sector. However, the drawbacks of the sector include non-remission of tax to the
government hence revenue loss of the public sector, difficulties in controlling the sector and
messiness that it creates in a given environment. There is a general belief that the informal
sector harbours and accompanies illicit dealings including drug dealing and prostitution. The
fact that the informal sector tends to clutter the formal sector is the reason why the latter tends
to anathematise its presence.
There are several ways of approaching the informal sector. For the World Bank (1990), two
types of informal sector activities are noted. The first is that of coping strategies (better referred
to as ‘survival activities’). These include casual jobs, temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence
agriculture, multiple job holding. The second category includes unofficial earning strategies; the
business is defined by illegality. In this framework, the unofficial business activities include “...
tax evasion, avoidance of labour regulation and other government or institutional regulations,
no registration of the company” as well as clandestine activities in the form of crime and
corruption. Such activities are not registered by statistical offices. Williams and Round (2008)
offer some critical taxonomy of the sector, which they define in the following manner:
 The informal sector as a residue, that is, remains of the earlier forms of production, which
are not advanced but rudimentary.
 The informal sector as a by-product of the formal economy; this implies epiphenomenalism.
Thus, as formal economy progresses, a parallel and inferior system of operations is born
and its significance cannot be ignored.
 The informal employment as a complement to the formal employment, that is, what the formal
economy cannot provide, the informal economy comes in to square that off.
 The informal sector as an alternative to formal employment; it is acknowledged that the
informal sector plays a substitute role for those willing to get into it.
The disorderliness and inability of the state to control it can provide an alternative view of the
informal sector as an indicator of ‘weak states and strong societies’. The ascendancy of the
modern states presumably having the powers to regulate and tax economic relations to the
advantage of the state has not yielded the expected outcome. On the contrary, as argued by
Lawrence (1999:1), “...as modern states continue to gain control over the peoples they govern,
semi-autonomous economic activity has also grown, not only providing jobs that the state does
not have the capacity to create but also operating outside of the range of state control.” In
Africa, Latin America and Asia, the ubiquity of informality especially in urban areas is evidence
of weak states. They are weak because they cannot provide employment to those in need of it.
The people create ‘own employment’ and practice it where they deem it suitable to do so. The
state fails to control the practice because it has no remedy to the poverty haranguing the poor
and unemployed. The weak state is rendered fait accompli as it fails to deliver according to
expectation, its raison d’être. For Acemoglu (2005:1224) citizens “… can replace the ruler when
he pursues policies that are not in their interest. When the state is politically weak, it cannot
impose high taxes, and anticipating this, the ruler invests little in public goods. Consequently,
the same trade-off between economically weak and strong states also arises between politically
weak and strong states.”
4
The Politics of Accommodation (Midgal, 1988)
In his book, ‘Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in
the Third World', Midgal (1988) tries to explain why state control is minimal over societies in
most developing countries. For Midgal, the different factors to this development include the
inability of the state to mobilise society and resources for a coherently operating state. This
deprives government of the political influence that it requires for state action. In the developed
countries, political influence was achieved through creating standing armies, improving
taxation systems and expanding the judiciary systems. The state is thus understood as
influential if it can achieve what Midgal calls social control that set institutions and rule to
bridle and direct human behaviour. There must be a balance between rights to be enjoyed by
the people against the state capacity to create and enforce rules. This social control must wield
the power to coerce and incentivise the citizens. Midgal asserts that strong societies are either
those with highly centralised systems in terms of state power or those whose power is
fragmented across several organisations in society. Such settings weaken the expected function
of state. The state loses grip of directing society. It fails to propagate its policies effectively as the
‘web-like’ structures of society form a barricade against the state. There are levels of state
control that are reflected in three indicators of compliance, participation and legitimation. Nonstate organisations also use these in their quest for social control. Globalisation and colonialism
are two exogenous factors that have assisted in the creation of strong states, undermining the
survival strategies of societies.
Midgal argues that rulers face dilemma when they try to achieve, simultaneously, social
mobilisation and strong central states. Where there is fragmented social control, states survive
by accommodations a development that has often led to what Midgal calls a ‘triangle of
accommodation’ between implementers, politicians and strongmen. Politicians seek to survive
by accommodating the populace demands and aspirations even when they do not necessarily
believe in the same. In Africa, one can loosely infer that the informal sector has been
accommodated in space as an aspect of the ‘politics of survival’. Politicians and governments
have often found it to be a ‘way out’ towards asserting relevance to the otherwise contradictory
demands of strong societies. In this regard, according to the World Bank (1990), the informal
sector plays a significant and contentious role in society. Overall, in Africa, the informal sector
is riddled with the problem of lack of accountability in the use of public infrastructure; this
implies economic leakage and free-riding (Chirisa, 2008). Urban managers are often engrossed
with programmes for city-beautification at the expense of dealing with urban poverty that the
actors in the informal sector thrive to grapple with.
As already stated, in most African economies, the informal sector is the principal driver of the
economy. Nevertheless, the sector remains little developed. Iwalewa (2011) attributes this to the
general disposition of the businesses involved, largely lack of registration and regulation whose
work ethics are loose. These two dichotomous points of departure make it rather imperative
that synergies be fostered between the informal and the formal sector for sustainability. For
Iwalewa (2011:13) critical is a “massive drive to register and have a database of all businesses in
the informal sector [that] can also be carried out to ascertain the number and needs of the
operators in the informal sector.” Besides, given the various development agendas needing
mainstreaming, the informal sector cannot simply be ignored as instrumental in achieving the
5
set motifs. As Chambwera (2012) has pointed out, with respect to greening economies, there is
much potential given its size, rapidity in growth potential and aptitude for the provision of
livelihoods for the poor. Specifically Chambwera (2012) argues that a green transition “...
including low carbon growth, appropriate valuation of natural resources and social justice
mechanisms must consider the role of the informal economy. If not, our efforts could miss the
mark.”
Mainstreaming the Informal Sector into Regional Integration Praxis
The 1648 Westaphalian Treaty is attributed as the one behind the creation of nation-states.
States were therefore to be defined according to the principles of territoriality, sovereignty and
legal equality (Ong, 2004). Defined boundaries were set and they has to be respected. For Africa,
the 1884/85 Berlin Conference saw the demarcation of state boundaries among the European
nations scrambling for Africa. The notion of regional integration seems to ‘unmake’ the the
Westphalian concept of world order. Telò (2007:17) has advised that,
“The more the majority of regional associations of states converge in deepening their
institutional dimension and somehow pooling sovereignties of their member states, the
more they can seriously challenge the Westphalian concept of world order and provide a
contribution to a new multilevel multilateralism in the making.”
Regional integration is a concept first tried in the 19th century. Then, it was not widely
accepted until after the First World War (Conkling and Yeates, 1976). Proponents for regional
integration assert that the rationale for establishing a regional economic bloc is so economic,
political and security benefits can be harnessed; such benefits bring to participating countries
and their citizens positive downstream externalities. Historically, successful examples of
regional integration have tended to entail gradual and flexible co-operation between member
countries on a range of issues, spanning a great deal more than trade integration (World Bank,
2000). Overall, there are five gradations of integration (Conkling and Yeates, 1976), namely
 the Free Trade Area (FTA),
 the Customs Union,
 the Common Market,
 the Economic Union, and
 Full Economic Integration.
Mwaniki (2003) asserts that regional integration both opens and closes up certain doors (cf.
Ong, 2004). Thus, as nations tends towards full integration, traditional borders of countries no
longer matter; national sovereignty so diminishes as well (Swaine, 2001). As argued by
Chambers (2012) “ … whether old or new, the strategy of regional integration requires
relinquishing, to some degree, individual sovereignty, as well as subordinating the national,
individual interest to the regional, collective interest. For this reason, successes in regional
integration have been [rare] and have been incremental and disjointed at best. Even the
European Union, which stands today as the most successful example of regional governance in
an interrelated system, has not been without its problems in this regard.” It is considered that
there is free movement of goods and services. One visa is required to visit as many nations as
possible in the regional bloc. For example with the Schengen visa, one is able to move freely in
the following twenty five European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
6
and Switzerland. However, with specific reference to Africa, Khadiagala (2008) has observed
that,
“The governance of regionalism in Africa is mired in crisis because of the unresolved
questions of managing the relations between continental and sub-regional institutions.
As long as the bulk of the continental agenda is framed largely in the context of subduing
and submerging sub-regions, these tensions will not be resolved any time soon.
Protective of sub-regional identities and comparative advantages, Africa’s sub-regions
will continue to contest the terms of engagement with the continent.”
The African vision of regional integration is multi-faceted (Abbas and Niyiragira. 2009; SARDC,
2001). It has a peace-building component, similar to the European integration project in its early
days, whose aim was to reduce conflict through greater interdependence and co-operation, as
well as by putting in place region-wide security arrangements. Uniting sub-regionally and
ultimately continentally is meant to enhance international bargaining power. Beyond this is a
fundamentally economic rationale of harmonising policies and reducing non-tariff barriers,
which are critical elements in the regional integration process. Models of regional integration in
Africa aim at the formulation of priorities on joint project aimed at overcoming production and
infrastructure deficiencies, and building up regional public goods. The subsequent
development integration builds on functional integration and stresses the need for close
political co-operation (World Bank, 2000). Contrary to African priorities, the approach of the
European Commission (EC) to regional integration for former European colonies via Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) is primarily focused on trade liberalization as well as behindthe-border measures such as investment rules and competition policy. These facets for
organisation have clearly influenced SADC’s efforts towards regional integration.
The need for African regional integration has been underscored in various fora. In the 1960s, the
United Nations Economic Commission stressed for “... regional Integration in Africa for Africa”
Mwaniki (2003:1). For example, the United Nations Economic Commission emphasized regional
Integration in Africa for Africa UNECA in the 1960s. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
Treaty of 1963 stipulated the same. To put this into practical reality, various regional blocs have
been created over the years and these include ECOWAS (1975), Mano River Union (1973), West
Africa Monetary Union (1994), COMESA (1981), SADC (1980) and Arab Maghreb Union (1989).
The OAU changed to become the Africa Union (AU) in 2002. The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980
and the 1991 Abuja Treaty of Declaration have asserted the need to achieve so by 2020 for Africa
but also recognised the regional initiatives already undertaken. Despite these efforts, in the
terms of Mwaniki (2003), regional trade within the continent remains trivial. Empirically, there
is evidence of the cornerstone role of informal trading in Africa. For instance, Mwaniki (2003:2)
observes,
“Several studies conducted indicate that informal contacts strengthen regional
integration networks and relationships. Some aspects of integration are taking place
especially in Southern Africa through official efforts aimed at strengthening of
institutions to keep records on informal trade and implementing policies. Nonetheless,
several other areas need institutional reform to accommodate informal cross border trade
that remains invisible despite the contribution it makes in the economy. Studies done in
the sector indicate that the informal cross border trade is contributing immensely to the
process of regional integration. It is building on the informal networks that have been
developed by people over years, even if they were not initially meant for trade.”
7
The informal sector has a gender-defining parameter, for example as depicted in the debate of
‘women without borders.
Challenges of Informality and the Rationale for Regional Integration
Africa faces immense leakage of money from the continent. Although the region enjoys
sufficient resources that are in the form of investable capital, the economic growth has not
yielded the needed prosperity. There is acknowledgement that Europe remains a major trading
partner though countries in Africa may need to create export opportunities between
themselves. Intra-African trade in the region remains little developed hence the issue of
comparative advantages is not advanced. Comparative advantage ought to define the issue of
appropriateness in the goods and services provided, including their quality and quantity and
prices. Indeed a new growth model that is more inclusive and targeting the jobless and poor is
appropriate. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) cited in Goredema (2012:1), illicit financial outflows “… constitute a major
source of resource leakage from the continent, draining foreign exchange reserves,
reducing tax collection, dwindling investment inflows, and worsening poverty in
Africa. The methods and channels of illicit financial outflows are many and varied
including tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions, over-invoicing, underpricing, and
different money laundering strategies.”
Cross border traders face a number of challenges (UNWOMEN, 2011a; 2011b; Njiwa, 2013). As
such, cross-border trade is a high-risk venture that involves corruption, sexual abuse and other
forms of human rights violations. The traders have to brace with the elements of weather as this
normally involves sleeping in the open space. To minimise accommodation costs some sleep on
the pavements. The cross-border traders cannot afford a decent accommodation hence
sometimes embark on having shelter through temporary lodgings under squalid conditions.
With respect to human violations, cross border traders face ill treatment taking the form of
abuse by authorities. The road is a rough one, from obtaining passports and travel documents,
to being in the hands of customs and police officials who normally show hostility and negative
attitude to the traders. Some officers push excessive customs duty charges on the traders. This
pushes the traders out of business. Sometimes the traders face unwarranted impounding of
goods as they face misconstruction as smugglers and drug-traffickers. Walther (2013) has
underscored that traders have increasingly adapted to social and spatial changes in economic
activities through social networking. Besides social networking, organisations like UNWOMEN,
has put effort to ensure regional bodies working for the enhancement of women cross borders
hence resolving their problems. The principal philosophies of UNWOMEN (2011a:1), for
instance, include that,



“Women informal cross border traders keep African markets going!”
“Governments, Regional Economic Communities and development partners should
enhance their opportunities to benefit from regional trading agreements”
“Empowering women informal cross border traders will have a multiplier effect on
poverty reduction, employment creation, intra-African trade and regional integration”
According to UNWOMEN (2011b:1), cross border trade can be a tool for women empowerment
in Africa. With this in mind, the UN Women’s key areas of focus are:
i) Supporting informal cross border traders so that their voice is enhanced at subnational,
national and supra-national levels,
8
ii) Creating partnerships of regional economic bloc, governments, the Aufrican Union and
the relevant United Nations bodies for “... enhanced leadership, commitment, and
accountability to address issues facing women informal cross border traders, and
mainstream gender issues in trade agreement and processes”,
iii) Producing and disseminating innovative knowledge products regarding wealth creation,
poverty reduction, employment creation and regional integration, best practices and the
fight of stigmatisation and violence against women informal cross border traders, and,
iv) Advancing the work of UN Women’ on gender and security sector reform for example
fight against “sexual harassment, rape, imprisonment or detention, confiscation of
goods, and financial extortions.”
Classical and neo-classical economics postulates the idea that regional disparities are function
differences in resource endowments between regions and countries. Nevertheless, the matter
has grown tentacles to include factors that are political like governance, social like community
integration and the fight against regressive behaviour like xenophobia. Security sector reforms
have emerged as an issue given the rise of ill-treatment of women and migrants, in general. The
UNWOMEN is doing a lot to improve the welfare and better operations of informal operators
in informal sector. This work no doubt answers the bulk of the challenges that women informal
traders face. One important idea UNWOMEN has expressed concern over is treating matters of
women as not just affecting one country or state. It is a regional issue. The same effort being put
by UNWOMEN can be expanded to include male operators who are not nationals to a given
country. Such a gendered approach appears missing in discourse and practice.
Policy Direction and Conclusion
The foregoing paragraphs have demonstrated that regional integration and the informal sector
are matters ‘divorced’ in general policy discussion and theory. This is explained by the
divergent nature of these subjects. Demonstrated is the fact that regional integration is a macropolicy matter while, the informal sector is microcosmic. The rampancy of informality in Africa
is expressed by practices including cross-border trading and other survivalist strategies by poor
households. Migration to other countries is triggered by the disequilibrium in resources
between countries. Poor individuals and households are crossing borders for stay or trade.
Happening in the context of globalisation the notion of ‘powerless places and placeless powers’
is in full force. Once they cross borders, informal traders face a number of hardships including
ill-treatment by security people. Besides, the face general challenges like xenophobia. These
difficulties are part of the debate in which social integration and acceptability of migrants in the
new destinations are the panacea. State authorities often segregate informal migrants against
those members and households, which are their nationals. Such discrimination puts the
migrants at various risks. For policy, the responsibility to provide basic services to the
international informal sector practitioners in a given municipalities should a matter of concern
so that risks on the migrants are prevented. The migrants and informal actors must be cushions
as citizens with full rights and obligations as citizens. Taxing the informal sector players is
possible to manage ‘free riding’. The study has hinted that with regional integration, there is a
possibility of ensuring policy coherence. Initiatives by organisations like UNWOMEN, as
described in this paper, need to be adopted by many more players. A gendered approach is the
principal key to address the fully plight and challenges faced by the informal sector. Regional
policy of an economic bloc has to create a common ground for dealing with the informal actors
9
be it in sorting housing challenges or trade benefits. Collaborative and integrative approaches
weave together towards a sustainable path for development. The informal sector as a subject in
regional integration in Africa offers itself up as a significant theme in which African states can
realise that they have discuss matters that affect the common people in their territories for their
beneficiation. States have to go beyond the colonially imposed boundaries and broaden their
collaborative efforts in fighting common problems including poverty and terrorism.
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