NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION FOR SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT: QUARTER 2 REPORT
by
Karen Guttieri
April 2014
Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.
Prepared for: US Special Operations Command, JFK Special Warfare Center and School
and the Institute for Military Support to Governance
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30-04-2014
Project Interim Progress Report
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Governance Innovation for Security and Development: Quarter 2 Report
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6. AUTHOR(S)
Karen Guttieri
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Naval Postgraduate School
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US Special Operations Command
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
Civil Affairs (CA) comprises “the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government efforts to assist partner
governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare,
infrastructure, and public education and information” (2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report). The
Governance Innovation for Security and Development research project is supporting initiatives by US
Special Operations Command, the US Special Warfare Center and School and the Institute for Military
Support to Governance (IMSG) to address gaps for Special Operations and the wider CA community. The
research team includes leads for each of the following civil sector areas: safe and secure environment, rule
of law, sustainable economic development, social well-being, effective governance, and homeland
integration. The researchers are examining the requirements for civil affairs civil sector expertise,
particularly during theater security cooperation, support to civil authority and transitional military authority
missions. The project will provide recommendations regarding classifications, qualifications and
certifications for a new area of concentration for CA, designated 38G. This interim project report describes
progress over the period 1 January to 31 March, 2014.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Civil affairs, governance, rule of law, safe and secure environment, social well-being, sustainable economy, homeland integration
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California 93943-5000
Ronald A. Route
President
Douglas A. Hensler
Provost
The report entitled “Governance Innovation for Security and Development: Second
Quarter Progress Report” was prepared for the Institute for Military Support to
Governance and funded by US Special Operations Command.
Further distribution of all or part of this report is authorized.
This report was prepared by:
________________________
Karen Guttieri
Assistant Professor
Reviewed by:
Released by:
________________________
William Gates, Chairman
Global Public Policy Academic Group
________________________
Jeffrey D. Paduan
Dean of Research
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ABSTRACT
Civil Affairs (CA) comprises “the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government
efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability,
governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and
information” (2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report). CA professionals have
historically played critical roles in conflict prevention and post-conflict transformation.
However, CA soldiers commonly describe a struggle for recognition as strategic assets by
battlespace owners. The Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs called
for addressing gaps in opportunities for education and training between CA soldiers in
the reserve and active components. Studies called for improvements to the functional
specialty system for bringing reserve soldiers’ civilian skills to the field. One important
response to these concerns was the 2013 establishment of the Institute for Military
Support to Governance (IMSG) to guide the professionalization of the Civil Affairs force
structure. In particular, the IMSG is leading the development of a new military
occupational specialty (MOS) titled “military support to governance specialists,” or 38G.
The research project titled Governance Innovation for Security and Development
(originally proposed as Military Support to Governance) supports initiatives by US
Special Operations Command, the US Special Warfare Center and School and the IMSG
to address gaps for Special Operations and the wider CA community. The research team
includes leads for each of the following civil sector areas: safe and secure environment,
rule of law, sustainable economic development, social well-being, effective governance,
and homeland integration. The researchers are examining the requirements for civil
affairs civil sector expertise, particularly during theater security cooperation, support to
civil authority and transitional military authority missions. The project will provide
recommendations regarding classifications, qualifications and certifications for a new
military occupational specialty for Civil Affairs, designated 38G. Additional research
areas include consideration of human behavior dynamics, technological enablers, and
strategic planning and strategy for military support to governance.
This research project was launched in September of 2013. This is our second
interim project report, describing progress over the period 1 January to 31 March, 2014.
v
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After a rapid start-up in the first quarter, Governance Innovation for Security and
Development (GISD) researchers in the second quarter fully launched the project among
a wider community of practice. The project organized and conducted three focused
reviews on Rule of Law, Sustainable Economy, and Social Well-Being sectors, producing
for each of them recommendations for civil sector specialties. GISD organized and
conducted a 3-day working group during the annual Department of Defense-sponsored
Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW),continuing
research into the six sectors of Governance, Rule of Law, Economy/Sustainable
Development, Social Well-Being, Safe and Secure Environment, and Homeland
Integration, and their interrelationships. After requests for participation in the GISD
working group exceeded 50-person capacity, the team employed Adobe Connect
launched from the GISD research site on the All Partners Access Network (APAN) to
live stream the meetings to an overflow room and capture presentations and discussion.
GISD activities in the second quarter built upon teamwork, sponsor and
stakeholder conversations and research architecture established in the first quarter –
literature review protocol, development of a collaborative information sharing research
portal, and desk research.
Stakeholder Analysis
The GISD project conducted a preliminary stakeholder analysis during the second
quarter of the project period of performance. Stakeholder analysis is the process of
identifying the individuals or groups that are likely to be affected by a proposed action,
identifying their goals, and sorting those stakeholders according to their impact on the
action. Mapping tools (especially 3D Power-Interest-Attitude graphs) are highly
effective in developing communications strategies and prioritizing engagement efforts to
manage key stakeholders.
The work assessed the awareness, support, and influence of various stakeholders
and the emergent issues associated with governance capacity building, including
strategies for stakeholder engagement related with proposed changes to the military’s role
in supporting effective governance in occupied, failed or failing states. The resulting
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scores and labels are subjective and sensitive to stakeholder engagement. No score or
label should be viewed as a final stakeholder position but rather as the starting point for
initial engagement.
The Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) must account for the
new power/influence and increased interest of empowered U.S. government civilian
stakeholders in stability sectors, now increasingly viewed as a “civilian” versus a military
responsibility. Some stakeholders have overlapping responsibilities and/or activities as
well as institutional and/or a status quo bias. The Department of State (DoS) Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and US Agency for International
Development (USAID) Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) strategy are
examples of recently empowered agencies with overlapping authorities. Any
engagement with these stakeholders should include “Friends” and “Acquaintances” such
as the USAID Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) and DoS Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO). The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Liaison Officers (LNOs) to DoS and USAID are assessed to be in a position of strategic
importance. Engagement with DoS/USAID should be supportive of these offices.
Recent Presidential directives and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review (QDDR) highlight democracy, human rights and governance as a necessary
foundation for sustainable development. The President’s and Secretary of State’s
emphasis on international development (and conflict mitigation) continue to inform the
USAID democracy and governance agenda. However, it is not clear from the QDDR
how defense capabilities, and civil affairs forces in particular, might complement civilian
led development efforts in conflict mitigation, conflict prevention or DRG programs.
There is a clear and timely opportunity for the GISD project to make its case for the
IMSG and civil affairs “governance specialists” (38G) to augment DoS/USAID led
development activities, particularly those related to conflict mitigation and security
sector reform efforts.
Sector Reviews
By the end of the second quarter, GISD had conducted three of six planned sector
reviews. The team planned and conducted a review of the Rule of Law sector at National
Defense University, and reviews of the Economy/Sustainable Development and Social
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Well-Being sectors at the USAID Learning Center, resulting in identification of specialty
areas, educational requirements, and experience requirements for professional tiers of a
new 38G military area of concentration (AOC).
Rule of Law Sector Recommendations
The following recommendations on 38G positions, skillsets, and tiers were
developed from the Rule of Law sector review:
1. Prosecutorial and legislative/constitutional reform/human rights and judicial
(facilitated by Charles Tucker and Rob Vasquez):
 Experience and skills:
o Primary:
Skilled in identifying, collecting, processing, analyzing or utilizing evidence
for criminal prosecutions.
o Supplementary skills and experience:
 Planning
 Formal and informal justice, accountability and dispute resolution systems
at the local/provincial/national/international levels.
 Monitoring, assessing, and evaluating justice and accountability systems
and processes.
 Office administration familiarity (budget, equipment, personnel).
 Managing case processing.
 Preferred:
 Experience with other arms of government (local, state, federal,
interagency, international, intergovernmental).
 Ability to develop and maintain effective relationships across all levels of
command and the interagency/international communities (interpersonal
skills are critically important). 38Gs may function as a team with different
but complementary skills/duties/responsibilities.
 Skilled at prioritizing efforts.
 Proficiency Code “10P” (Basic Justice and Accountability Advisor)
Subject matter expert in the areas of comparative law, transitional justice,
constitutional law, formal and informal accountability and dispute resolution
systems, investigative/prosecutorial/judicial systems and processes, and
organizational/office management.
o Qualifications: Requires Expert Functional Skill Identifier, plus a minimum of
60 months of cumulative experience working in career field correlating to the
Expert Functional Skill Identifier under consideration, and a Bachelors level
degree (BS, BA) from a US or regionally-accredited university.
o Proficiency Code 10P (Senior Justice and Accountability Advisor) “whole of
government experience”
Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the areas of comparative law, transitional
justice, constitutional law, formal and informal accountability and dispute
resolution systems, investigative/prosecutorial/judicial systems and processes,
and organizational/office management.
 Qualifications.
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-
Requires Expert Functional Skill Identifier (EFSI), plus a minimum of
120 months of cumulative experience working in career field
correlating to the EFSI under considerations and:
- Juris Doctorate (JD) from a US or regionally-accredited university;
and 12 (+) months of experience at the interagency level.
o Proficiency Code 10P (Master Judicial & Administrative (J&A) Advisor)
SME in the areas of comparative law, transitional justice, constitutional law,
formal and informal accountability and dispute resolution systems,
investigative/prosecutorial/judicial systems and processes, and
organizational/office management.
 Qualifications. Requires EFSI (10P), plus a minimum of 180 months of
cumulative experience working in career field correlating to the EFSI
under consideration, and
- Doctoral degree (PhD, Doctor of the Science of Law (JSD)) from a US
or regionally-accredited university [or equivalent educational degree
and experience];
- 12 consecutive months of experience at the interagency level and
- 12 consecutive months of experience at the international and/or
intergovernmental level.
2. Cops and corrections -- Law Enforcement, Correction, Judicial /Witness Security
(LE/C/JS) (facilitated by Al Goshi):
 Basic tier:
o
Description: Identifies AOC 38G, soldiers who possess “detailed”
knowledge and working experience in law enforcement, corrections, or
judicial security skills
o
Qualifications: Require award of a CA AOC 38G functional skill
identifier: LE/C/JS certification course; (from appropriate government
authority), military police initial entry training (MP IET), or equivalent;
Bachelor’s degree; 5 years experience as LE/Corrections
 Senior:
o
Description: “Detailed” level of knowledge and experience
o
Qualifications: basic functional skill practitioner plus: for LE, Bachelors
plus at least 1 year overseas experience; 10 years work experience
LE/C/JS, or which 3 years supervisory or management; if judicial/security,
then 5 years judicial/security relevant experience; 3 years supervisory
 Expert:
o
Description: “Expansive” level of knowledge and work experience
o
Qualifications: Senior level plus: 15 years LE/JS/C experience, of which,
for corrections, 1 year overseas experience plus Bachelors; 5 years
supervisory
 Master:
o
Description: “Mastery” of knowledge and work experience
o
Qualifications: Expert level plus: 20 years experience; for corrections, 10
years corrections experience plus Masters; for judicial security, 10 years
x
judicial security plus Masters; 10 years supervisory; executive education
(e.g., NA, Exec LE degrees, or equivalent)
3. Rule of Law cross-cutting --judicial advisory; customary and traditional legal
systems; transitional law; gender mainstreaming in Rule of Law (facilitated by
David Gordon):
Description of Positions:
o
Manages programs, processes, and personnel in property rights,
gender issues, traditional justice and other cross-cutting rule of law
issues.
o
Coordinates between military, other USG, international and host
nation on cross-cutting issues and provides appropriate advice.
Assesses, monitors, and evaluates cross-cutting programs.
o
Qualifications: JD required; post-JD, Master of Laws (LL.M.) or
PhD preferred.
o
Experience as described by Proficiency Codes. Demonstrated
experience in political strategy and tactics.
o
Distinguish between Expert and Master by number of years of
practical experience/ education combined—10 (+) years for
Expert; 15 (+) years for Master.
Social Well-being Sector Recommendations
The Social Well-Being sector review identified the following 38G specialty areas
and levels:
Global Public Health Officer (new)
Description of positions. Identifies positions requiring assessment and advice on
all aspects of health that impact social well-being.
Qualifications.
-Minimum Master of Public Health, preferable with International or Global health
concentration.
-Some combination of following:
Health Emergencies in Large Populations course (ICRC)
Medical Support of Stability Operations (Defense Medical Readiness Training
Center)
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Post-conflict Health Course
State Department Global Health Diplomacy Course
Global Health Stability and Security (Center for Disaster and Humanitarian
Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), United States University of the Health Services
(USUHS))
Veterinary Stability Operations Course
Medical Culture (CDHAM, USUHS)
Disaster Preparedness and Response Officer (Refinement of 5Y)
Description of positions: Identifies positions requiring assessment, advice, and
analysis of all hazards preparedness and response operations for domestic and
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international disasters.
Qualifications:
Master degree in Disasters Management
and
Some combination of additional courses:
 International Diploma for Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA)
 United Nations C-M Coordination Course
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Emergency Management
Assessment Course
 Certificate in Emergency Management
 FEMA Course on International Classification of Diseases (ICD)
 Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) / Hazardous Waste Operations and
Emergency Response (HAZWOPER)
 Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)
 Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (OFDA)
Complex Emergency Officer (refinement of 5Y)
Description of positions. Identifies positions requiring analysis, planning,
implementation, and management of indigenous emergency service assets in the
preparation for or conduct of civil defense response to complex emergencies.
Enables vulnerable populations to progress through protection, normalization,
capacity building and empowerment in order to ensure full participation in civil
society and governance representation.
Qualifications. Requires the completion of FEMA independent; or equivalent
experience as a Regional Civil Defense Director; or Certification as a Certified
Emergency Manager (CEM) through the International Association of Emergency
Managers or a degree in Emergency or Disaster Management through an
accredited teaching institution.
Qualifications. Basic levels (1L) completion of a bachelor’s degree (Major
immaterial) and certificated in Complex Emergency Management with 2-3 years
of field experience; Advanced Levels (1M-1P) require a Master level education in
Peacekeeping Policy / Management, Conflict Analysis and Intervention
(Doctorate for 1P)
Relief to Development Continuum Officer (new – 5Z)
Description of positions. Advises commanders and international or national level
leaders and manager or stakeholders and other experts on adequate planning,
implementation and management across multiple sectors; integrates to achieve
unity of effort across the relief to development continuum in concert with
stakeholders. Enables appropriate responses through the phases of (1) complex
emergency, (2) stability; (3) normalization; (4) development.
Qualifications. Basic level (1L) completion of a bachelor’s degree (Major
immaterial) and certificated in Complex Emergency Management with 2-3 years
of field experience; Advanced Levels (1M-1P) require a Master level education in
Development or in Peacekeeping Policy or Masters in Conflict Analysis and
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Peace Building. (Doctorate for 1P).
Economy / Sustainable Development Sector Recommendations
The Economy/Sustainable Development sector review identified the following
38G specialty areas and levels identified three main home areas of economic functioning:
(1) Production and Industry; (2) Trade and Commerce; (3) Finance. A home-area
approach to 38G in economics would provide recruiters the ability to develop an
inventory in each home area of each stability sector of cross culturally competent civil
sector experts with home area systems thinking capability, which is the more valued
competency over specific specialty technical competencies in most expected 38G
problem sets.
It can be also expected that some specialties within a home area will be populated
by persons more liable to have the personal attributes and experiences that support cross
cultural competence. The home area concept allows for those specialties to be overrepresented in the 38G population for that area, which is acceptable as candidates without
competency are unsuitable regardless of their civilian skills.
Training for 38G is expected to consist of three separate courses. It can be
expected that some specialties within a home area will, by the nature of their civil
requirements have more flexibility in their ability to complete required training without
disruption to their civilian careers. As in recruiting, a home areas approach allows for
weighting towards those specialties within a home area of a sector. This supports
maximum availability of specialist with systems knowledge to support military
government, operational, planning and advisory needs.
While the home area concept may result in the some specific specialties to be
underrepresented, it is useful to note that this can be expected to be a limitation only in
some very specific host nation (HN) support scenarios. It can be expected that the other
aspect of 38G employment – informing strategic planning and advising senior military
leaders – almost solely demands the capability for systems thinking within the home area.
A holistic consideration of the 38G program leads to serious consideration of
identification of a basket of civil sector specialists within home areas of stability sectors
as a very viable methodology to guide the development of a 38G population with the
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skills sets needed to support military government as well as the full range of military
operations.
The 38G will have to be able to do the following:



Assess situation based on incomplete and often intentionally misleading
information
Make decisions and recommendations under uncertainty and time constraints
Complete stakeholder assessment of risks and associated losses and gains
Sample Recommendation for 38G Economy/Commerce Stability Functions:
Production Function - Industry
1.
Experience and Skills
a.
Primary: Possesses superior knowledge in the assessment of the
issues impacting economic stability of the local economy,
specifically in the production and commerce of goods and services.
b.
Supplementary skills and Experience
i.
Value chain dynamics (A2)
ii.
Income generating activities and market linkages (A2)
iii.
Property rights and Titling (B,0)
iv.
Informal sector activities (I,1)
v.
Intergovernmental and international institutions experience
(A2)
vi.
Monetary and financing of development (A2)
vii.
Interpersonal skills and ability to team work and lead high
level sector experts as well as Government counterparts
(A1)
viii.
Public finance (B1)
ix.
Basic natural science background (B0)
x.
Knowledge of Management accounting (I0)
xi.
Management audit experience in public and private sector
(I1)
xii.
Knowledge and experience of similar local settings
(geography, sociology, ethnography) (I1)
xiii.
Cultural sensitivity (A1)
xiv.
Presentation and Communication skills (A1)
2.
Proficiency Level: Basic (B), Intermediate (I), Advance (A).
a.
Personal Experience Requirements: None (0), Moderate (1),
Extensive
Regarding academic prerequisites, interim program review (IPR) discussion
centered on the diverse academic and professional background of potential 38G’s.
According to the level of intervention, the workgroup concluded that there has to be a
general knowledge of basic economic and business courses. This can be achieved by
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demonstration of course completion at relevant academic level (including syllabus) and
or a proficiency exam.
An example of the needed academic background is as follows:
ECONOMICS & FINANCE
Micro-economics
Political Economy
Economic Development Theory & Practice
Trade Theory & Practice
Macro-economics
Public Accounting & Finance
POLICY and PLANNING
Planning Theory & Practice
Sociology & Social Movements
Urban Planning
Regional Development
Policy and Regulation
Land Use Planning and Reforms
Institutional Development & Public Sector Reform
Technology & Innovation
Environmental Policy
Sectorial / Industrial Analysis
Industrial Policy
BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT
Strategic Culture
Strategic Planning
Financial Accounting
Business Accounting & Finance
Competitive Analysis
Organizational Behavior
Marketing and Communication
Psycho-Sociology (human behavior dynamics)
Entrepreneurship
Methods Courses:
Research Methodology (Quantitative; Qualitative)
Analytical Methods
Project Management
Geographic Information Systems
Risk and Game Theory
Demography / Ethnography
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Current Planning
In addition to the efforts in each sector, the team initiated work on a cross-cutting
system/process integration effort to examine the complex dynamics of these sectors in the
operational environment. The GISD project is currently planning reviews of the
remaining sectors (Safe and Secure Environment, Governance, and Homeland
Integration) in May and June, with a final program review in July. The project final
report capturing all work performed on the project is in preparation and will be delivered
at the end of the project period of performance in August.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1
A. OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................... 1
B. APPROACH .......................................................................................................... 1
C. CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES ......................................................................... 2
D. 38G CERTIFICATION: INITIAL ISSUES AND QUESTIONS ..................... 3
E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT ............................................................. 4
II. PROJECT-LEVEL ACTIVITIES .......................................................................... 5
A.
B.
C.
D.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 5
PROJECT ORGANIZATION............................................................................. 5
KEY MEETINGS ................................................................................................. 5
PROJECT MANAGEMENT: SCHEDULE AND COST STATUS ................ 7
1. Project Tasks and Milestones .......................................................................... 7
2. Status of Funds .................................................................................................. 7
E. UPCOMING ACTIVITIES/REVIEW SCHEDULE ........................................ 8
F. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 8
1. Understanding Stakeholder Analysis .............................................................. 8
2. Process ................................................................................................................ 9
3. Summary and Recommendations .................................................................. 14
III.
SECTOR UPDATES .......................................................................................... 17
A.
GOVERNANCE .................................................................................................. 17
Literature Review / Bibliography .................................................................. 17
a. Civil Affairs and Military Government ....................................................... 18
b. Supporting Stable Governance .................................................................... 30
c. Governance Bibliography ............................................................................ 38
2. Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................................... 38
3. Key Participants / Points of Contact ............................................................. 40
4. PSOTEW Session ............................................................................................ 43
a. Plenary Session ............................................................................................ 43
b. Military Support to Governance Session (Work Group 3) ......................... 47
c. Governance Panel ........................................................................................ 51
5. Sector IPR Planning ....................................................................................... 56
6. Enabling Technologies .................................................................................... 56
B. RULE OF LAW .................................................................................................. 56
1. Literature Review / Bibliography .................................................................. 56
2. Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................................... 59
3. Key Participants / Points of Contact ............................................................. 59
4. Sector Review .................................................................................................. 59
a. Background .................................................................................................. 59
b. Goals ............................................................................................................. 60
c. Program ........................................................................................................ 61
d. Review Findings ........................................................................................... 64
1.
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e.
Way ahead .................................................................................................... 65
5. PSOTEW Session ............................................................................................ 65
6. Enabling Technologies .................................................................................... 68
C. SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT ......................................................... 68
1. Literature Review / Bibliography .................................................................. 68
2. Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................................... 76
3. Key Participants / Points of Contact ............................................................. 79
4. PSOTEW Session ............................................................................................ 79
5. Sector IPR Planning ....................................................................................... 79
6. Enabling Technologies .................................................................................... 80
D. ECONOMY/SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ........................................... 81
1. Literature Review / Bibliography .................................................................. 82
2. Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................................... 83
3. Key Participants / Points of Contact ............................................................. 86
4. IPR Findings .................................................................................................... 87
5. PSOTEW Session ............................................................................................ 91
6. Enabling Technologies .................................................................................... 94
E. SOCIAL WELL-BEING .................................................................................... 94
1. Literature Review / Bibliography .................................................................. 94
2. Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................................... 94
3. Key Participants / Points of Contact ............................................................. 94
4. IPR Findings .................................................................................................... 94
5. PSOTEW Session ............................................................................................ 96
6. Enabling Technologies .................................................................................... 97
F. HOMELAND INTEGRATION......................................................................... 97
1. Literature Review / Bibliography .................................................................. 97
2. Stakeholder Analysis ...................................................................................... 98
3. Key Participants / Points of Contact ............................................................. 98
4. PSOTEW Session ............................................................................................ 99
5. Sector IPR Planning ....................................................................................... 99
6. Enabling Technologies .................................................................................... 99
G. SYSTEM/PROCESS INTEGRATION: INTERACTIONS AND
INFLUENCES ........................................................................................................... 100
1. Overview ........................................................................................................ 100
2. Preliminary Literature Review / Bibliography .......................................... 100
3. Stakeholder Analysis .................................................................................... 101
4. 2nd Quarter Progress ..................................................................................... 101
5. Planning for Next Quarter ........................................................................... 102
APPENDIX A.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....... 103
APPENDIX B.
PSOTEW GISD WORK GROUP 3 AGENDA .......................... 109
APPENDIX C.
PSOTEW GISD WORK GROUP MEETING NOTES ............ 115
APPENDIX D.
STAKEHOLDER LIST ............................................................... 173
APPENDIX E.
SECTOR
IN-PROGRESS BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE GOVERNANCE
175
xviii
APPENDIX E.
IN-PROGRESS BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE
ECONOMY/SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SECTOR .................................... 183
APPENDIX F.
MEETING NOTES: SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY AND
SOCIAL WELL-BEING SECTOR REVIEWS ......................................................... 209
APPENDIX G.
IN-PROGRESS BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE HOMELAND
INTEGRATION SECTOR .......................................................................................... 243
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 249
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................ 255
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Concept representation of the research project focus, reflecting both the
policy and practical needs of the Sponsor and the linkages of research outcomes to
education and specification for 38G. .......................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Project Expenditures through 22 March 2014 ................................................ 7
Figure 3. Influence-Interest Analysis (from Imperial College of London) .................. 10
Figure 4. Mendelow’s Power-Interest Matrix (from Mendelow, 1991)....................... 11
Figure 5. Power-Interest-Attitude Matrix and Characteristic Stakeholders (from
Murray-Webster and Simon, 2005) .......................................................................... 12
Figure 6. Governance Conditions ................................................................................. 33
Figure 7. Safe and Secure Environment Conditions .................................................... 72
Figure 8. Oliver Summary of Peace Operations Functions .......................................... 74
Figure 9. Preliminary Perspectives on a Systems-Level View of Sector Interactions.
102
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xxii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.
Cumulative Project Expenditures through 22 March 2014............................. 7
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xxiv
I.
A.
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW
This interim report provides information on progress of the Governance
Innovation for Security and Development project1 over the period 1 January 2014 to 31
March 2014. Principal Investigator (PI) Karen Guttieri of the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) directs and performs this work with researchers and colleagues at NPS, the Naval
War College, the Department of State and other schools and agencies for the Special
Operations Command and partners with the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School (JFKSWCS) and the new Institute for Military Support to Governance
(IMSG) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, directed by BG Hugh Van Roosen. The project
focuses on research into the six stability sectors per the statement of work. In addition,
the IMSG has requested recommendations regarding civil sector certifications for a new
military occupational specialty for Civil Affairs – 38G. On sponsor request, the Principal
Investigator has participated in a number of meetings and the team has convened a
number of meetings to address project objectives.
B.
APPROACH
The GISD project seeks to address identified gaps for Special Operations and the
wider Civil Affairs (CA) community. The project team considers the changing
environment and information communications technologies that present both hazards and
opportunities for practitioners. The PI leads a cross-disciplinary team of experts from
academic, military and policy institutions to identify and study significant policy and
operational questions regarding military support to governance. The research team is
composed of leads in each of the following civil sector areas: safe and secure
environment, rule of law, sustainable economic development, social well-being, effective
governance, and homeland integration. The project examines the requirements for civil
affairs expertise, particularly during theater security cooperation, support to civil
authority and transitional military authority missions. This research supports
deliberations regarding the classifications, qualifications and certifications for 38G
personnel. Additional research areas proposed include analysis of human behavior,
1
Originally proposed under the title Military Support to Governance Research Project.
1
technological enablers, and strategic planning and strategy for military support to
governance.
C.
CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES
Civil Affairs (CA) comprises “the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government
efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability,
governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and
information” (2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report). CA professionals have
historically played critical roles in conflict prevention and post-conflict transformation.
However, Civil Affairs have also historically been under-valued as strategic assets –
according to many reports, it is commonplace for commanders to perceive CA primarily
in terms of maneuver support elements.
A study by the Center for Strategic and International Security in 2009 concluded
“it is not clear that the current system of classifying and managing functional specialists
within the civil affairs community is optimized for accessing specialized skills at the
appropriate level,” (pp. 43-44) and recommended that the Army “require civil affairs
personnel with identified functional specialties to take appropriate civil sector
competency tests to validate and classify the level of functional skills” and “create a
direct commission authority” to bring individuals with advanced functional skills into the
force structure as needed (Hicks and Wormuth, “Future of Civil Affairs,” p. vi).
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Reserve and Manpower Affairs (ASAM&RA) Thomas R. Lamont addressed these deficits in June 2011 with a memorandum
stating his intention to establish a new “… branch proponent that supports the Army’s
total force, with common standards for active and reserve CA forces” (Lamont, 2011).
One important response to ASA Lamont’s concerns was the 2013 establishment of the
IMSG to guide the professionalization of the Civil Affairs force structure. In particular,
the IMSG is leading the development of a new area of concentration (AOC) titled
“military support to governance specialists,” or 38G.
The research focus for the present project is illustrated in Figure 1.
2
Figure 1.
Concept representation of the research project focus, reflecting both the
policy and practical needs of the Sponsor and the linkages of research outcomes to
education and specification for 38G.
D.
38G CERTIFICATION: INITIAL ISSUES AND QUESTIONS
The GISD research team intensified focus on the 38G at the request of the IMSG,
and accelerated the overall research work of the civil sector project inquiries. This work
benefited considerably from early efforts by MAJ Tony Vacha and others for the IMSG,
extensive initial consultation with CA practitioners and other experts and with academic
researchers who study employment classifications. There are a number of research
questions/issues to address:

What are strengths and limits of the various ‘functional’ approaches to specify
38G categories? What are alternatives for relevant skill sets?

Are the Guiding Principles End States the 38G Additional Skill Identifiers (ASIs)
or do the elements listed above under each End State become the ASIs?

How to handle elements that have impact across the continuum of end states?

There are general “cross cutting” elements not shown such as maintenance of
physical infrastructure, communications, information, etc. How to address these?

What issues may arise when seeking to recruit experienced people for direct
commissioning with the commensurate civilian experience in times of peace?
3
E.

Will direct commissioned officers have the needed military background to write
joint strategic plans, understand military culture, systems, etc.?

Should the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command (USACAPOC) and IMSG take an existing Civil Affairs generalist
(38A) who has been through Intermediate Level Education and educate/train them
on strategic thought, contacts, planning? For example, will a person with an
economic background deep enough to write plans to rebuild an economy a) be
willing to leave their careers for an extended period of time for
training/deployment (pay cut, etc.), and b) who is responsible for recruiting or
finding them?

How do 38G relate to 38A in principle and also in practice? What implications
for skill sets and training for 38A?
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
Section I of this report provides introduction, approach, and context and
objectives for this project, preliminary issues for the development of 38G Certification, as
well as management information (project progress and budget). Section II reports on the
organization of the team and the Quarter 2 (Q2) project work activities, including
description of the stakeholder analysis. Section III comprises interim reports by each
major sector under study (Rule of Law, Governance, Sustainable Economy, Social WellBeing, Safe and Secure Environment, and Homeland Integration), including new work in
system/process integration. A glossary of acronyms and list of references are provided
in Appendix A at the end of this interim report. Other supporting materials (e.g.,
PSOTEW and sector review meeting notes) are provided in the appendixes, followed by a
list of references cited in this report.
4
II.
A.
PROJECT-LEVEL ACTIVITIES
INTRODUCTION
The project launched on 30 September 2013. Activities through 31 December
2012 were reported in the 1st Quarter Progress Report. This chapter provides an
overview of project activities during the second quarter of project performance.
B.
PROJECT ORGANIZATION
The project team is organized in six major sectors of study:

Rule of Law (RoL), led by Melanne Civic, Department of State Conflict
Stabilization Office

Governance, led by Karen Guttieri, Naval Postgraduate School

Social Well-Being (SWB), led by Marc Ventresca, Naval Postgraduate School

Economy/Sustainable Development, led by Maria Pineda, Naval Postgraduate
School

Safe and Secure Environment (SSE), led by Jon Czarnecki, Naval War College

Homeland Integration, led by Paula Philbin, Naval Postgraduate School
The PI meets regularly with the IMSG (principally, the Deputy Director, COL
Terry Lindon), and also with the leadership of the Civil Affairs community by phone and
face-to-face meetings. Sector teams schedule separate meetings with team members and
other subject matter experts as needed.
During the 2nd quarter of the project, the RoL, Economy, and SSE sectors
conducted reviews with IMSG, invited experts, and interested parties to examine required
knowledge, skills, and certifications for 38G officers working in those areas. Also during
this quarter, the Economy/Sustainable Development and SSE sectors initiated a new
effort in system/process integration to design a conceptual framework for modeling the
complex interactions across sectors as a training/instructional tool.
C.
KEY MEETINGS
Several ISMG sponsor and research team meetings were conducted during Q2:

Rule of Law Sector Review, conducted 14-15 January 2014 at the Naval War
College, Washington, DC.

GISD track, Peace & Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop
(PSOTEW), conducted 24-27 March 2014 at George Mason University (GMU),
Arlington Campus.
5

Economy/Sustainable Development and Social Well-Being Sector Reviews,
conducted 27-28 March 2014 at the USAID Training Center, Crystal City.
PSOTEW presented a major opportunity to bring the issues of this project to the
CA and partner communities. PSOTEW is sponsored by the Director, Force Readiness
and Training, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), together
with GMU, the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI), and other stakeholders. The GSID research team hosted two full days of panels,
as one of three official Working Groups (WGs) approved by the Workshop conveners
and based on a proposal submitted by the PI. This enabled the project to bring initial
findings into discussion with colleagues, partner agencies, and the sponsor community.
A call for papers for participation in the working group session resulted in several
valuable additions to the project proceedings. The workshop brought together over 150
trainers, practitioners, planners, and educators from U.S. and international governmental
and military organizations, non-governmental organizations, peace and stability training
centers, and academic institutes. Of these, over 70 attended the GISD (PSOTEW
Working Group 3) sessions. A full agenda for the GISD portion of the workshop is
provided in Appendix B. Notes from the GISD WG3 sessions are provided in Appendix
C.
In addition, the project PI presented the research program in meetings with
colleagues from the US Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command and a
number of relevant graduate degree programs:

University of California, Los Angeles

National Defense University

University of North Carolina

Stanford University

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Columbia University
6
D.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT: SCHEDULE AND COST STATUS
1.
Project Tasks and Milestones
Internal management of the research project makes use of standard Gantt chart
tools to identify the major tasks, sub-tasks, milestone dates, deliverables, and key project
meetings. These can be available on request, and will change as necessary to align with
growing understanding of project requirements, evolving challenges, and unforeseen
constraints.
2.
Status of Funds
Through pay period ending 22 March 2014, the project team has expended 47%
of project funds. Table 1 summarizes cumulative expenditures to date. Figure 2 illustrates
expenditures to date (NPS Job Order Number R8GRK), with respect to a linear spend
plan over the period of performance of the project.
Table 1.
Cumulative Project Expenditures through 22 March 2014
Category
Expenditure
Labor
$ 260,850
Travel
$ 63,131
Honoraria
$ 11,000
Equipment/Supplies
$ 2,127
Contract/Services
$ 47,552
Indirect Cost
$ 88,121
Total
$ 472,781
Figure 2.
Project Expenditures through 22 March 2014
7
E.
UPCOMING ACTIVITIES/REVIEW SCHEDULE
Activities underway on the project include continuing literature review, synthesis
and refinement of findings from completed sector reviews, planning and preparation for
upcoming sector reviews, and continuing project coordination and tracking activities.
The current planned schedule for major upcoming meetings is as follows:




12-13 May 2014: Safe and Secure Environment Sector Review (PKSOI, Carlisle,
PA)
17-19 June 2014: Governance Sector Review (Columbia University, New York,
NY)
24-26 June 2014: Homeland Integration Sector Review (DC area, to be
determined)
22-24 July 2014: Project Wrap-Up Review (NPS)
The final project report and project completion date is 20 August 2014.
F.
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
This subsection describes the stakeholder analysis approach examining the likely
impact of emerging US Army doctrine and education for “military support to
governance.” The purpose of this analysis is to assess the awareness, support, influence
and the various issues leading to strategies for communication and assessing stakeholder
satisfaction with proposed changes to the military’s role in supporting effective
governance in failed or failing states. In this section, we define stakeholder analysis and
highlight typical components of stakeholder analysis, including related mapping tools. A
full list of stakeholders considered to date is provided in Appendix D.
1.
Understanding Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder analysis is the process of identifying the individuals or groups that
are likely to affect or be affected by a proposed action, and sorting those stakeholders
according to their impact on the action and their own needs. This analysis is used during
the preparation phase of a project to assess the attitudes of the stakeholders regarding the
potential changes.
The goal of stakeholder analysis is to develop cooperation between the
stakeholders and the project team, helping assure successful outcomes for the project.
Stakeholder analysis is performed when there is a need to clarify the consequences of
envisaged changes at the start of new projects and in connection with organizational
8
changes generally. It is important to identify all stakeholders (Primary, Secondary and
Key) in order to assess their success criteria and turning these into quality goals.2

Primary: Those stakeholders who will be ultimately affected, either positively or
negatively, by an organizations action.

Secondary: The ‘intermediaries’, that is, persons or organizations who are
indirectly affected by an organization's actions.

Key: Those stakeholders (who can also belong to the first two groups) who have
significant influence upon the project or importance within an organization.
2.
Process
The first step in building any stakeholder map is to develop a categorized list of
the members of the stakeholder community. Once the list is reasonably complete it is
then possible to assign priorities and then to translate the ‘highest priority’ stakeholders
into a table or a picture. The potential list of stakeholders for any project will always
exceed both the time available for analysis and the capability of the mapping tool to
sensibly display the results, the challenge is to focus on the ‘right stakeholders’ who are
currently important and to use the mapping tool to visualize this critical group.
Stakeholder mapping categorizes likely stakeholder expectations and relative
power to determine political priorities. The stakeholder mapping process involves making
decisions on the following two issues. First how interested the stakeholder is to impress
their expectations on the organization’s choice of strategies, (i.e. how likely is the
stakeholder to exercise power). Second, to what extent the stakeholder has power to
impose). Three common stakeholder analysis tools are the (1) Influence-Interest
Analysis, (2) Power-Interest Grid and (3) Power-Interest-Attitude Grid.
Influence-Interest Analysis (Imperial College London). The purpose of
influence-interest analysis is to inform the Project Board and Project Manager regarding
who should contribute to the project, where barriers might be and the actions that need to
be taken before detailed project planning. The identification of stakeholders will also
assist in determining who would form part of the Advisory Board and Business
Community in the Project Organization. From your list of stakeholders you may
determine more easily how they fit into your Project Organization and which
2
Stakeholder Analysis, Rodi, 2012
9
stakeholders should be placed higher within the stakeholder hierarchy. 3 Refer to Figure
3.
The Influence-Interest map is best suited to a hierarchical framework for project
management (e.g., the Quadrennial Defense Review). It works best in highly structured
organizations with clear lines of authority. In contrast, this form of mapping is less suited
for projects that cross multiple organizations or stakeholders that do not share a common
accountable body (think “interagency”).
Figure 3.
Influence-Interest Analysis (from Imperial College of London)
Mendelow's Power-Interest Matrix (Aubrey L. Mendelow, Kent State
University, Ohio 1991). The Power-Interest matrix tool can help deal with stakeholders'
conflicting demands. It identifies stakeholder expectations and power and thus helps in
establishing political priorities. The process involves making decisions on the following
two issues. First how interested the stakeholder is to impress their expectations on the
organization’s choice of strategies, (i.e. how likely is the stakeholder to exercise power).
3
“Project Stakeholder Analysis V2.0”, Imperial College of London, www.workspace.imperial.ac.uk
10
Second, to what extent the stakeholder has power to impose). Figure 4 illustrates these
factors.4
Figure 4.
Mendelow’s Power-Interest Matrix (from Mendelow, 1991)
The Mendelow matrix acknowledges that not all stakeholders are equal; some
have more relative power than others. It accounts for levels of interest, regardless of
relative power; but not all stakeholders will care about a project initially. Generally, the
closer you are to implementing change the higher the level of interest of all stakeholders.
This tool is helpful in mapping power and interest and communications strategies and
priorities for political engagement. Particular attention must be paid to key stake holders
(i.e. high interest/high power entities).
Power- Interest - Attitude 3D Mapping (Murray-Webster and Simon, 2005).
The Power-Interest-Attitude mapping approach makes the case for a third dimension and
provides some descriptive labels that can be confirmed during the overall process of
stakeholder analysis and subsequent stakeholder management. These three dimensions
4
“Mendelow’s Matrix”, Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank, www.kfknowledgebank.kapaln.co.uk
11
(power, interest, attitude) are especially important when initially considering
stakeholders:

Power. Their ability to influence the organization. This may be their
potential to influence derived from their positional or resource power in
the organization, or may be their actual influence derived from their
credibility as a leader or expert.

Interest. Their interest in the project or program as measured by the
extent to which they will be active or passive.

Attitude. Their attitude to the project or program as measured by the
extent to which they will “back” (support) or “block” (resist) change.
Using all three dimensions allows for more complex groupings of stakeholders,
resulting in eight categories shown in Figure 5 and described below:5
Figure 5.
Power-Interest-Attitude Matrix and Characteristic Stakeholders (from
Murray-Webster and Simon, 2005)
“Making Sense of Stakeholder Mapping”, Ruth Murray-Webster and Peter Simon, PM World Today,
November 2006, www.pmforum.org
5
12
(1) Savior – powerful, high interest, positive attitude or alternatively influential,
active backer. These stakeholders need to be constantly engaged. Do
whatever is necessary to keep them on your side – pay close attention to their
needs.
(2) Friend – low power, high interest, positive attitude or alternatively
insignificant, active, backer. These stakeholders are excellent sounding
boards for expressing new ideas within a safe and collaborative environment –
facilitate their involvement as a “collaborative partner”
(3) Saboteur – powerful, high interest, negative attitude or alternatively
influential, active, blocker. These stakeholders need to be engaged and closely
monitored. The project lead must be prepared to answer their questions with
well thought out answers. Consider engaging a Saboteur by communicating
with them in collaboration with other high power stakeholders (e.g. Savior
and Sleeping Giant).
(4) Irritant – low power, high interest, negative attitude or alternatively
insignificant, active, blocker. These stakeholders need to be engaged early on
to identify their “hot button” issues so that they can be assured the project
leadership values their input, regardless of their low power status.
(5) Sleeping Giant – powerful, low interest, positive attitude or alternatively
influential, passive, backer. These stakeholders need to be engaged in order to
awaken them. They are the giants amongst other stakeholders and once
awakened can offer additional leverage and amplify the communications of
the project lead. Consider engaging the Sleeping Giant(s) early on, by with
and through the Savior stakeholder(s).
(6) Acquaintance – low power, low interest, positive attitude or alternatively
insignificant, passive, backer. Theses stakeholders need to be kept informed
and communicated with on a “transmit only” basis. Keep them updated on the
project, as needed.
(7) Time Bomb – powerful, low interest, negative attitude or alternatively
influential, passive, blocker. Similar to the Irritant, the Time Bomb
stakeholder must be understood so they can be managed. Similar to “clearing
13
a route” before movement, the project lead should check in with them before
making big changes (movements).
(8) Trip Wire – low power, low interest, negative attitude or alternatively
insignificant, passive, blocker. These stakeholders need to be understood so
you can “watch your step” and avoid unnecessary interruptions to the project.
Seek their input and give them a means to inform the project in order to avoid
the negative perception that they must awaken a powerful stakeholder (e.g.
Sleeping Giant or Time Bomb) to express their concerns.
The Mendelow Matrix allows for eight complex groupings of stakeholders and
strategies for engagement.6 Using the criteria of power, interest and attitude, the matrix
provides a three-dimensional graphic of likely stakeholder positions and descriptive
labeling for political prioritization and strategies for stakeholder engagement.7
3.
Summary and Recommendations
In summary, stakeholder analysis is the process of identifying the individuals or
groups that are likely to be affected by a proposed action, identifying their goals, and
sorting those stakeholders according to their impact on the action. It is important to
identify all stakeholders (Primary, Secondary and Key) in order to assess their success
criteria (what does success look like to them). Mapping tools are useful at the beginning
of a project to determine likely attitudes and levels of influence and interest in the project.
Mapping tools (especially Power-Interest-Attitude graphs) are highly effective in
developing communications strategies and prioritizing engagement efforts to manage key
stakeholders.
Stakeholder mapping tools are for mapping stakeholders at the beginning of a
project and are of limited value if there is no follow through. The initial positioning can
be wrong with consequent risks to the project and to relationships. Given the level of
complexity with this project and the strategic importance of accurately assessing and
ultimately influencing multiple non-DOD stakeholders, a three dimensional (3D)
mapping tool is preferred, if time permits. The Mendelow Power-Interest two
dimensional grid could also be used for a more rapid assessment of stakeholder
“Making Sense of Stakeholder Mapping”, Ruth Murray-Webster and Peter Simon, PM World Today,
November 2006, www.pmforum.org
7
“Mendelow’s Matrix”, Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank, www.kfknowledgebank.kapaln.co.uk
6
14
engagement. Influence-Interest analysis is of limited value for this project because there
are too many stakeholders outside of the DOD hierarchy.
The GISD project has both internal and external empowered stakeholders.
Internal (DOD) stakeholders should be evaluated using the Mendelow (Power-Interest)
mapping tool in order to identify key stakeholders. External (non-DOD) stakeholders
will be evaluated using the Murray-Webster and Simon (3D) mapping approach in order
to identify communications strategies for these external stakeholders.
15
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16
III.
A.
SECTOR UPDATES
GOVERNANCE
Although the civil dimension of military operations is well-known to be vital to
mission success in locales as diverse as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, and the Horn of
Africa, it remains little understood. Military support to governance and dedicated civil
affairs elements in particular have suffered neglect due to several factors: the policy and
military communities – despite specific responsibilities under international law and US
DoD policy - are skittish about the appearance of “occupation” and wary of “military
government” responsibilities that stem from it; the literature on governance is largely
crafted by civilians with little attention to, or understanding of, military norms and rules;
the literature on military operations is generally focused on kinetic missions with little
attention to, or understanding of, civil domain factors. In short, the literatures that are
available do not effectively speak to one another. Moreover, the subject area is extremely
complex, as state-society relations and expectations vary from place to place, and
technological developments including new roles for social media in civic participation
and empowerment, and new ways of monitoring political governance are constantly
being developed and/or refined. Governance embraces provision of security, rule of law,
basic needs and economic regulation and is therefore the umbrella concept for all sectors.
1.
Literature Review / Bibliography
The US military has with few exceptions failed to prepare effectively for civilian
obligations in war. Once boots are on the ground, two themes characterize the military’s
approach to transition. The first is civilianization – military efforts to handoff civilian
responsibilities to civilian agencies. The second is indirect rule - a local authority that
will enable US troops to depart, ideally leaving a reformed state with legitimate authority
to govern. Today indirect rule is remade in the form of host nation or partner capacity
building. These themes persist into the recent era, when US policy-makers naively
believed that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq would not require occupations,
federal policy put the Department of State in the lead for stability operations, and
diplomats and commanders sought reliable host-nation partners to assume the mantle of
governance. The history of American civil affairs and military government shows that
17
while many of the patterns, such as debates about military or civilian roles, are recurring,
there has also been change over time. New agencies, new norms emerged. The civil
affairs function shifted from keeping civilians out of the way to providing for their relief,
to addressing the civilian population as the center of gravity. Another, much larger body
of literature addresses governance more broadly, and a subset of this literature addresses
challenges of governance in fragile states or transitional societies.
a.
Civil Affairs and Military Government
Civil affairs – “the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government efforts
to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance,
public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information” (2010
Quadrennial Defense Review Report) – has historically played critical roles in conflict
prevention and post-conflict transformation. However, the civil affairs capability has not
lived up to its full potential.
Civil affairs as an historical term of art describes the United States military
relationship with the civilian realm. General George Washington at Valley Forge
conducted civil affairs to secure civilian supply, labor and loyalty.8 Since then, civil
affairs has been prominent during engagements ranging from humanitarian assistance to
stability operations, to counterinsurgency campaigns and its fullest expression in military
government. Military government may seem an anachronism, but it was once a common
form of temporary rule, and the roots of current US military doctrine on stability
operations can be seen in doctrine set forth as early as 1898 and formally issued in World
War II.9 Significant chapters in American military history – the expansion west, the
reconstruction of the South, the liberation of Europe, the formation of partnerships abroad
– are civil affairs stories.10
8
Sandler, Stanley. Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical
Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991. Fort Bragg, NC: US Special Operations Command, 1998.
9
Birkhimer, William E. Military Government and Martial Law, 2nd Revised ed. (Kansas City, MO:
Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1898; 1904). United States Army, F.M. 27-5 Military Government
(1940). The 1940 manual is the first so titled, although an earlier manual on international law addressed the
issues of military government, and earlier texts informed the army. General Winfield Scott’s General
Orders 20 in the Mexican-American War and the Lieber Code or General Orders 100 in the Civil War
predate the Birkhimer study.
10
Guttieri, Karen Military Government and Civil Affairs: Lost Lessons in the American Way of War and
Peace Draft m.s.
18
The US military as an institution has had difficulty embracing the civil
affairs mission. Although the US has conducted more stability operations than
conventional wars,11 the mobilization of overwhelming force remained the mantra of “the
American way of war”12 and the myth of stability operations as exceptional missions
persisted.
(1) Civil Affairs in Historical Perspective
The history of civil affairs is intimately related to that of stability
operations, small or guerrilla wars and counterinsurgency. Keith Bickel’s study of the
Marine Corps development of its small wars doctrine, Mars Learning, although it focuses
on tactics such as ground patrols, provides insight into the rationale for “civil measures,”
for example, in Haiti between 1915-1920.13 A commander was to be “fully posted as to
irrigation, roads, bridges, topography, postal service, telegraphs and telephones,
sanitation, and concessions, and he must also report on all work being performed by the
judiciary, municipal and government officials.”14 Public works projects such as roads
served dual purpose of providing means to bring goods to market and to bring troops to
trouble spots. It was hoped that works projects would help secure the loyalty of the
population, given low troop to population ratios, and that reform of the civil government
would address the core grievances behind insurgency.
The most comprehensive history of civil affairs to date, Stanley
Sandler’s Glad to See Them Come, focuses on the tactical to operational level of war.15
Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg volume of World War II documents Soldiers Become
Governors and John T. Fishel’s analysis of late 20th century interventions in Civil
Military Operations in the New World provide a more operational to strategic view.16
11
Yates, Lawrence A. The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
12
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1973.
13
Bickel, Keith B. Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.
14
Bride, Frank “The Gendarmerie d’Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 3, no. 4 (Dec. 1918), pp. 297-298;
cited in Bickel, p. 77.
15
Sandler, Stanley. Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical
Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991. Fort Bragg, NC: US Special Operations Command, 1998.
16
Coles, Harry L., and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, United States Army
in World War Ii. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
1964. Fishel, John T. Civil Military Operations in the New World. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997.
19
Jeremy Suri’s Liberty’s Surest Guardian reflects on nation-building as a component of
America’s national character.17 Taking an historical perspective helps to show how the
military makes sense of its own practices through changes in context, including
transformations in basic constructs such as military and civilian, war and peace.
For example, the concentration of the legitimate use of force in the
state is central to our understanding of civil-military relations, yet few appreciate that
monopoly as the product of social change, namely, the demilitarization of the nobility
around 1576 in England.18 Moreover, while today many nations differentiate between
domestic police and armies oriented against external attack, that distinction is more
recent still in European history.19
(2) Military Doctrine and Occupation Law
From the earliest days, civil affairs sought to balance the principles
of military necessity and humanity. Early requirements for civil affairs were driven
primarily by military necessity. Civil affairs were left largely to the commander’s
discretion. This worked well when a commander—such as General Scott during the
Mexican-American War—displayed keen understanding of the relationship between
political means and military ends.20 But the annihilation strategy adopted by the Union
Army during the Civil War made it difficult to reconcile the South with the North at the
end of the war, and for that reason the leadership in Washington commissioned Francis
Lieber to develop a code to define civilian protections.
The April 24, 1863 Lieber Code, General Orders 100, formed the
basis of the American legal doctrine on war known as The Laws of Land Warfare. 21 The
Suri, Jeremi, Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building From the Founders to Obama. New
York: Free Press, 2011.
18
Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 65. This allocation of coercive authority constitutes a form of
relationship between civil and military spheres, and is one of the defining features of the modern state.
19
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: A.D. 990 - 1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil
Blackwell, 1990). The police/army distinction is also a civil/military differentiation.
20
Guttieri, ms.
21
In 1892 Major General William E. Birkhimer issued Military Government and Martial Law, along with
a revised edition in 1904 to account for the experiences resulting from the Spanish-American War. In 1914,
the Laws of Land Warfare was revised to take into consideration international conventions. It was revised
again in 1934, 1940, 1956 and 1976, the last revision ostensibly to take into account the breakdown
between combatant and civilian. Donald A. Wells, The Laws of Land Warfare : A Guide to the U.S. Army
Manuals (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992).: 17; full discussion 1-20.
17
20
Lieber Code served as a model for European and international regulations, including the
Brussels Declaration in 1874 and ultimately, the 1899 Hague Conference.22 The 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions (also known as the Hague Regulations), were the first
multilateral agreements relevant to military occupation.23 The Hague Conventions form
the cornerstone of the international law of armed conflict, and their guidelines regarding
treatment of civilians in conflict are frequently cited in American policy and doctrine – in
this way, coming full-circle.
The primary text of international law addressing military
occupation is Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (IV). In order to balance the
needs of the populace with those of the occupying power, the law of occupation spells out
obligations, as well as rights of the occupying power. It makes clear, for example, that the
occupying power should meet the basic needs of the populace with respect to police and
social functions.24 The critical passage follows:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety [civil life],
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.25
The Hague Regulations established a duty to provide
administration, as was widely practiced at the time.26 However, the conventions of the
time were more modest than those that would arise after the advent of the welfare state.
22
Hull, William I. The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contribution to International Law (Boston; New
York: Ginn and Company; Kraus Reprint Company, 1908; 1970).: 467. Army Service Schools U.S. War
Department, Military Aid to the Civil Power (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The General Service Schools
Press, 1925).: 32-33.
23
See specifically Articles 42-56 of the 1899 Hague II Regulations and the 1907 Hague IV Regulations.
The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907.
24
Davis P. Goodman, "The Need for a Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation," p.
1578.
25
Art. 43 of CONVENTION (IV) RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND
Signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907. ENTRY INTO FORCE: 26 January 1910
gopher://gopher.law.cornell.edu/00/foreign/fletcher/HA07-IV.txt. As noted by Edmund Schwenk, "public
order and safety is an inaccurate translation of the authoritative French text, "l'ordre et la vie publics,"
refers to order and more broadly, to social and commercial functions of the community. A better translation
would be "public order and civil life." Schwenk, Edmund H. "Legislative Power of the Military Occupant
under Article 43, Hague Regulations," Yale Law Journal (1945) Vol. 54: 93-416.
26
Benvenisti, Eyal. The International Law of Occupation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1993. p. 4.
21
(3) Evolving Norms for Civil Affairs
Two major normative developments in just the most recent
generation have altered the ground on which the soldier treads: the shift in United
Nations non-intervention doctrine of the 20th century to the Responsibility to Protect
(R2) in the 21st, and the related shift in the locus of sovereignty from regime to
population. The growth of government aid agencies after World War II and the rise of
non-governmental organizations since the 1990s have further complicated the civilmilitary relationships.
The nature of war itself, including the technology to fight it and the
vision of the peace to follow, shape the conduct of civil affairs. The landmark study
Military Aid to the Civil Power, published in 1925, described three kinds of occupation:
in the first, exemplified in the occupation of Puerto Rico (1898-1900), the US
permanently retains the conquered territory; in the second, exemplified in Cuba (1898),
the US does not hold the occupied territory once its people are able to stand on their own;
and in the third, exemplified in both postwar Germany (1918) and, much earlier, in
Mexico (1847), the US returns the territory to its former possessor.
Policy intention affects the occupation, but commanders are also
able to shape facts on the ground regardless. General Winfield Scott sought but did not
receive guidance from Washington on troop conduct toward civilians. To propose martial
law in the era of Jacksonian democracy was unpopular, and the Polk Administration
neither approved nor denied Scott’s memorandum. At risk to his own career, Scott then
proceeded to take on the duties of military governor, issuing General Orders 20 to declare
martial law and establish military commissions to prosecute crimes that did not fit within
the purview of a court-martial—crimes committed by inhabitants against US forces, their
retainers and followers; or by the latter against the inhabitants or other elements of the
force.
The appropriate role of the military in governance is a
longstanding question. Putting the military in charge of civil affairs seems contrary to the
sensibilities of a modern liberal state, in which civilian control of the military is sacred.
In the early phases of World War II, US President Franklin Roosevelt had insisted that
the administration of occupied territories would be a civilian responsibility, but after
22
civilian agencies proved unable to handle the situation in North Africa, the duty fell to
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Those events prompted the War Department to create a
Civil Affairs Division (CAD) in 1943 with Major General John H. Hilldring as its
director. CAD became a joint Army-Navy planning agency for civil affairs and military
government.
Looking to the larger occupation duties ahead, Roosevelt shifted to
the view that “occupation, when it occurs, should be wholly military.”27 In the words of
John McCloy, a civilian “would be lost that quickly after the close of hostilities.”28
Civilian agencies were unprepared, the Hague Convention obliged the military to care for
civilians under effective control, and military necessity required stabilization of territorial
gains in the war.
The Second World War introduced the first formal doctrine, set out
in two field manuals written by Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Judge Advocate
General and top legal expert in the US Army. In 1939, Guillion published FM 27-10 The
Rules of Land Warfare, including a section on civil administration; and in 1940, in light
of the war in Europe, he set to work on FM 27-5 Military Government. These two
volumes became known as “the Old and New Testaments of American military
government,”29 and underscored the connection between civil affairs and international
humanitarian law.
(4) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
(CORDS)
The Vietnam War brought a profound shift due to a footprint of
civilian agencies prior to large-scale military escalation. President John F. Kennedy took
an unconventional approach—later known as special warfare—to the escalating conflict
in Vietnam. In 1961, he created the US Agency for International Development to assist
in the economic development and stability of Vietnam and other impoverished nations. In
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 124, issued in 1962, he characterized
27
President Roosevelt cable reported in Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York: Macmillan,
1948, Vol. 2, p. 1245.
28
John J. McCloy, US Military Governor and High Commissioner for Germany, 1949-1952 in Robert
Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls, p. 119
29
Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, Army Historical Series
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975; 1990).: 3-4.
23
insurgency as a form of politico-military conflict, and called for the development of new
doctrine and better cooperation among agencies to meet the challenges of insurgents.
Kennedy directed US civil-military efforts toward strengthening the South Vietnamese
army and its government.
After Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson shifted the focus to
combat missions; however, in 1967 Johnson also directed the formation of the Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization. A
component of the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) under military
commander General William C. Westmoreland, CORDS encompassed all US agencies
relevant to civilian field operations and pacification except the Central Intelligence
Agency.30 In sum, Vietnam was characterized by militarization rather than civilianization
of the other war.
Since Vietnam, governmental and non-governmental civilian
agencies have grown in number and authority. However, Congress significantly cut
budgets for USAID, for example, so that the Foreign Service and Civil Service staff
dropped from 12,000 during the Vietnam era to about 2000 today.31 The administration
of William J. Clinton expanded outsourcing to non-governmental and private contractors
during peacekeeping missions.
(5) Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US of September
11, 2001, President George W. Bush directed the military to aid an insurgency against the
Taliban in Afghanistan, given that the Taliban had provided haven to the al Qaeda leaders
who directed the attack. The accompanying humanitarian effort was given to logisticians
with minimal civil affairs engagement at the outset, never fully utilizing the doctrinal
Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).
As it became apparent that the Afghanistan mission would require
a more sustained effort than previously envisioned, Civil Affairs officers on the ground
innovated. COL Michael Stout and others recognized the Afghan government’s interest
30
Guttieri, op cit.
Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin. 165-94.
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009
31
24
to expand the influence of President Hamid Karzai’s government outside Kabul to
address challenges from the provinces. These officers reconceived the JCMOTF as a
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and sold the JCMOTF as a combined civilmilitary effort like the CORDS program with an international-host-nation capacity
building component. The PRTs were made up of civilians from the State Department and
other agencies as well as civil affairs - although these were by 2003 already in such
seriously short supply that in November 2008 Robert Bebber described the PRT
composition as follows:
American PRTs are approximately 80-90 personnel headed by a
commander at the O-5 level, usually a Navy Commander or Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel. PRT members are drawn from the Army, Navy, Air
Force and National Guard as well as respective Reserve components.
Typically, members have a variety of backgrounds and specialties and
may or may not be engaged in work related to their normal military
occupation. Co-located with the PRTs are civilian representatives from the
Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture as well as
contracted local nationals serving in a variety of capacities, from linguists
and laborers to cultural advisors and specialists in law and health care.
(italics added)32
(6) Planning Shortfalls
Administration planning for the US-led invasion of Iraq seriously
omitted civil dimension considerations for many reasons. Senior leaders in the civil
affairs community have conceded privately that the planning team sent to CENTCOM at
Tampa was ineffective. The policy leaders and war planners expected the humanitarian
component to be short. The Bush Administration hired a contractor - retired General Jay
Garner - to lead the Office of Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to provide basic services
in the wake of the invasion. Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the U.S.-financed Iraqi National
Congress, said the day before Garner’s arrival in Iraq on April 21, 2003, "On the issue of
the interim authority, I think General Garner's work of reconstituting the basic services
will finish in a few weeks...Meanwhile, we must start the process of choosing an Iraqi
interim authority to take over the reins of power in the country and the various
32
Bebber, Robert J. "The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Counterinsurgency
Operations: Khost Province, Afghanistan". Small Wars Journal. Retrieved 28 December 2013.
25
departments of the government."33 Instead, Iraq devolved into chaos. Chalabi failed to
consolidate authority.
President Bush replaced Garner with a retired diplomat, L. Paul
(Jerry) Bremer, who transformed ORHA into a more robust proconsular entity, the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer acted as chief executive in Iraq with
power to rule by decree - CPA Order 2, disbanding the Iraqi Army, would become the
most infamous among them.
(7) Civil Affairs Shortfalls
A system of reserve civil affairs experts was intended to develop
and sustain specialized civilian skills - functional expertise - that could be drawn upon as
needed. Problems with the system of functional specialty concentrations among civil
affairs personnel became apparent in the midst of intense demand for CA forces during
the occupation of Iraq after 2003. The Army shifted the organization of reserve units in
teams of functional specialists (Civil Affairs Team or CAT B) as compared to teams of
generalists (CAT A). The distinction between the two became blurred (Malik, p.6). The
“functional specialists” became associated with unfulfilled promise. Changes to civil
affairs doctrine in 2006 narrowed the number of functional specialties to six general areas
-- rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure,
and public education -- that did not align neatly with the then-emerging Department of
State and Army special operations doctrine stability sectors.
A study by the Center for Strategic and International Security in
2009 concluded “it is not clear that the current system of classifying and managing
functional specialists within the civil affairs community is optimized for accessing
specialized skills at the appropriate level,”(pp. 43-44) and recommended that the Army
“require civil affairs personnel with identified functional specialties to take appropriate
civil sector competency tests to validate and classify the level of functional skills.” and
“create a direct commission authority” to bring individuals with advanced functional
skills into the force structure as needed (Hicks and Wormuth, “Future of Civil Affairs,” p.
vi).
Martin, Gail , PBS Newshour Iraq in Transition “Iraq: Key Players” date unknown
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/keyplayers/garner.html
33
26
(8) Civilian Surge
The Bush Administration and Congressional leaders gave new
powers to the Department of State. In December of 2005 the White House issued
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 declaring the US Department of State
the focal point 1) “to coordinate and strengthen efforts...to prepare, plan for, and conduct
reconstruction and stabilization assistance…” and 2) “to harmonize such efforts with US
military plans and operations.”34 NSPD 44 seemingly empowered the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (S/CRS),
created in 2004. The Department of Defense developed plans to support the “civilian
surge” - a civilian response capacity.35 The S/CRS planned to hire deployable civilians,
and the DoD offered support to an integrated training strategy and the plan to hire, train,
and deploy 250 Active Response Corps (ARC), 2000 Standby Response Corps (SRC),
and 500 Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). Together various agencies collaborated on the
development of an Interagency Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (ICAPF).
The expression “whole of government” replaced the term “interagency” in policy
discourse.
(9) Stability Operations as Core Mission
At the same time that these events seemed to shift energy to
civilian agencies, they also put the civil affairs elements in the military at the forefront of
major developments in the mission of the United States military and its relationship to
civilian agencies. In November 2005, a DOD Directive 3000.05 for the first time
identified stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission,” that the military should
be prepared to conduct “throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military
operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.” This message, affirmed
in a 2009 DOD Instruction, presented a policy-level determination on the American way
of war debate that had simmered at least since Vietnam.
34
United States. "National Security Presidential Directive / Npsd-44." White House, Washington DC:
Reprinted by Federation of American Scientists, December 7, 2005.
35
Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin. 165-94.
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009
27
Despite the obvious importance of civil affairs, the CA force
structure was partitioned. In 2006 the Army - home to the largest number of CA forces,
mostly residing in the reserves - split its force structure between special and conventional
elements, under US Special Operations Command and US Army Reserve Command,
respectively. This split roughly aligned with a division between active and reserve
components, until complicated by the addition of a conventionally-oriented active
component brigade in 2010. Proponency and doctrine remained with Special Operations
Command, home to a small percentage of the total force structure. Disparities in training
and education between the active and reserve - where resides the preponderance of the
force structure - became more pronounced. In particular, it is difficult for reserve
personnel to access education that is the hallmark of a professional force.
Unfortunately, the hoped-for panacea of a surge of civilian experts
failed to materialize. Career incentives were just not there to induce government workers
to leave their home departments for expeditionary deployments. Unlike military
personnel, civilians could not be compelled to work in dangerous environments.
Meanwhile, although the State Department’s S/CRS had many champions at DoD, there
were too few at the State Department. S/CRS was underfunded and understaffed, and
operating in an institutional culture unwelcoming to its mission. After struggling for
several years, the S/CRS was transformed into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations following the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR). One commentator noted at the time, “State’s competence in S&R [Stabilization
and Reconstruction] is hanging on by a thread.”36 The “civilian surge” and plans for a
cadre of expeditionary civilians as part of S/CRS have now been largely set aside. In light
of these events, the authorities of NSPD 44 ring hollow.
For its part, the US military leadership by the turn of the decade
included larger numbers of veterans familiar with the civil dimension of conflict and
interagency cooperation. In 2010, the DoD reinforced at the policy level the reality of
military obligations. DoD Directive 5100.01 required the Army to be prepared to, when
necessary and directed, “occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial
The Future of S/CRS – What’s in a Name? Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011. Posted by Heather Price.
36
The Future of S/CRS – What’s in a Name? Journal of International Peace Operations
36
36
28
establishment of a military government, pending transfer of responsibility to other
authority.”
Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations in September 2011
identified the following stability operations functions: security, humanitarian assistance,
economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation,
and the need for military contributions to operations design and planning. Civil Affairs
perform key roles in stability operations, as JP 3-07 notes “A civil-military operations
staff element (cell, branch, or directorate) and appropriate employment of civil affairs
(CA) forces provides connectivity and understanding that enables unity of effort within
the headquarters and among stakeholders.” (xi)
In January 2013, the US National Defense Strategy, Sustaining
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, called for the ability to
“secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a
small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended
period with mobilized forces” as part of a primary mission to deter and defeat aggression
(p. 4). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council in December 2011 recommended
development of joint civil affairs education “with the overarching goal of equipping and
transitioning a CA officer from a tactical focus in support of Brigade to Corps level
formations to a strategic and operational focus.”
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Reserve and Manpower
Affairs (ASA-R&MA) Thomas R. Lamont addressed structural Civil Affairs deficits in
June 2011 with a memorandum stating his intention to establish a new “… branch
proponent that supports the Army’s total force, with common standards for active and
reserve CA forces” (Lamont, 2011). One important response to ASA Lamont’s concerns
was the 2013 establishment of the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG)
to guide the professionalization of the Civil Affairs force structure. In particular, the
IMSG is leading the development of a new military occupational specialty (MOS) titled
38G - military support to governance specialists.
The need to clarify military support to governance is particularly
acute today, given the number of missions and organizations now concerned with civilmilitary planning and execution. The information domain has become much more
29
diverse with the advent of new technologies – hardware and software – that enable people
to communicate, organize, and share information. Understanding of the socio-culturalpolitical dynamics is critical to success in “the human domain,” defined as “the totality of
the physical, cultural, social, and psychological environments that influence human
behavior. The success of unified action depends upon the application of capabilities that
influence the perceptions, understanding, and actions of relevant populations and decision
makers.” (7 August, 2012 Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, Army Capabilities
Integration Center (ARCIC) and USASOC meeting of General Officers).
b.
Supporting Stable Governance
US joint doctrine clearly assigns responsibility to military commanders for
civil military operations (CMO), including “directly supporting the attainment of
objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or
host nation (HN).”37 In this context, civil affairs forces supporting commanders
“specialize in indirect approaches in support of traditional warfare (e.g., stability
operations) and irregular warfare. CA forces conduct military engagement, humanitarian
and civic assistance, and nation assistance to influence HN and FN populations.”38 In
sum, a major civil-military mission for military commanders and civil affairs assets
supporting them is partner capacity building.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Roadmap defined partner capacity
building as follows:
“Partnership capacity includes, but is not limited to, the capability to:




Defeat terrorist networks
Defend the US homeland in depth
Shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
Prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
37
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. "JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations." Washington DC, 11 September
2013. p. ix.
38
JP 3-57 p. xii. “CA forces assess impacts of the population and culture on military operations; assess
impact of military operations on the population and culture; and facilitate interorganizational coordination.
CA Responsibilities CA joint responsibilities include plan, coordinate, conduct, and assess CAO, and
support building partnership capability. Civil Affairs Operations CAO are actions to coordinate with HN
military and civilian agencies, other government departments and agencies, NGOs, or IGOs, to support US
policy or the commander’s assigned mission.”
30



Conduct irregular warfare (IW) and stabilization, security, transition and
reconstruction (SSTR) operations
Conduct “military diplomacy”
Enable host countries to provide good governance
Enable the success of integrated foreign assistance”39
Stable governance, as described in the USIP and PKSOI Guiding
Principles, is a condition characterized by “ability of the people to share, access, or
compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective
benefits and services of the state.”40 Because governance includes delivery of core
services such as security, rule of law, economic governance and basic needs, this sector is
in many ways an umbrella for the others. Delivery of services enhances legitimacy - the
right to rule, or the rightness of a regime.
Legitimacy implies acceptance of political order: “any political regime, in
order to endure and govern, requires that people believe that those who rule have a right
to do so, that they are not governing in their own selfish interest, and that they are entitled
to use force to sustain order.”41 This definition implies a positive persuasive component
of an attraction to justice as well as the darker influence of coercion in attaining
compliance with rules.42 Voluntary acquiescence is obviously desired. If based not on
the legitimacy of rulers but adherence to accepted processes, a constitution or rule of law
as in Max Weber’s legal-rational authority provides a more stable foundation. However,
in transitional states, not only are rulers often problematic but these processes are
themselves liable to be contested by self-interested actors seeking to shape that larger
structure.
Kal Holsti’s analysis in The State, War, and the State of War describes
legitimacy as twofold: vertical legitimacy pertains to the hierarchical authoritative
relationships in governance, and horizontal legitimacy pertains to the communities that
39
United States Department of Defense. "QDR Execution Roadmap Building Partnership Capacity." 22
May 2006. p.4
40
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. United States Institute of Peace and United
States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009.
41
Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 8.
42
Karen Guttieri, “Making Might Right: The Legitimation of Occupation,” 45th International Studies
Association Convention, Montreal Quebec 2004.
31
make up the polity.43 Exclusionary categories of community such as ethnicity create a
weak basis for legitimacy and often, grounds for war. Expanding on Weber’s sociological
types of authority, Holsti offers eight types of authority claims, including consent as
already discussed, religion, ethnicity and task performance. Military victory, according to
Holsti, created legitimate occupation regimes in Germany and Japan following World
War II. Seymour Martin Lipset had years before also cited Germany and Japan as
examples, but his argument rested not on the military victory but the ability of the new
democracies to overcome a legitimacy deficit by means of effective performance of basic
governance functions over time.44 Must military occupiers meet some criteria of
effectiveness if they are to legitimize and thereby stabilize the order they seek to shape?
Two tests - effectiveness and consent - vie for prominence as markers for
recognition of state sovereignty in international law. The de facto or effective control test
for recognition refers explicitly to the regime’s ability to secure habitual compliance of
all within its influence without necessarily being concerned for the means by which that
compliance is attained.45 The Reagan Doctrine in the 1980s rejected the notion that
effective control was sufficient to recognition of government standing, preferring instead
a test of consent of the governed and respect for rights of citizens. Although this
ideological legitimism was rejected at the time, it made a comeback after the victory of
liberalism in the cold war ideological contest. The triumph of liberalism included a
globalization of its democracy and human rights agenda that would become a basis for
“humanitarian interventions” in the 1990s.
The international system, absent a global leviathan, is characterized by
anarchy, yet hierarchy characterizes relations within state structures. The rules of the
game established in the 20th century were rules about avoidance of interference in the
domestic affairs of other states. As the 21st century approached, failures within states
came to be viewed as the primary threat to security. The al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001 symbolized for many the consequences of state
failure in Afghanistan and elsewhere, that provided a breeding ground for resistance to
43
Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge University Press, 1996.
S.M. Lipset, Political Man, The Social Basis of Politics New York: Doubleday, 1959.
45
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Anders Wedberg trans. New York: Russell and Russell,
1961; discussion in Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1999.
44
32
the prevailing international order. The literature on governance in transitional societies is
premised on the notion that a system of states is the most effective form of political order.
The Guiding Principles identifies four sub-sectors of stable governance, as
depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6.
Governance Conditions
(1) Provision of Essential Services
Francis Fukuyama’s measures of stateness include the scope of
governmental activity and the strength of the state, “the ability to plan and execute
policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently.”46 This focus on institutional
capacity is one of the hallmarks of the literature on post-conflict reconstruction. Ashraf
Ghani and Clare Lockhart in Fixing Failed States focus specifically on key functions of
the state.47 Primary among these functions in both accounts is the provision of a
monopoly on the use of force. For Max Weber, it was the successful claim on a
46
Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2004 p. 7.
47
Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. Fixing Failed States : A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured
World. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
33
monopoly on legitimate use of force within a given territory that defines the state.
Particularly in the early days of an intervention, establishing public order and providing
basic services are essential to the success of the mission.
(2) Stewardship of State Resources
Stewardship of state resources is about public administration.
Transitional administrators, or interim regimes, can form in many different ways, and
often go through several transformations.48 Nonetheless, they make crucial decisions
affecting the fundamental rights of the people.
Security sector and civil service reform are some of the most
challenging issues in post-conflict states. Development of good practices of
custodianship of state resources, transparency and accountability are required.
(3) Civic Participation and Empowerment
The International Declaration of Human Rights proclaims:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in
his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures. (Article 21)49
The Declaration does not declare any particular form of taking part
in governing - just that some institutional form of governance will enable the expression
of the will of the people.
As James Fishkin notes, one problem with civic participation is
that most people are “rationally ignorant” - “their vote is only one among millions, so
why should they care?” Fishkin developed a an approach called deliberative democracy
48
Guttieri, Karen, and Jessica Piombo. Interim Governments : Institutional Bridges to Peace and
Democracy? Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
49
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
34
that involves sampling, education and small group discussion. His aim is “to show is that
these people don’t lack the competence to make informed decisions. If we give them the
right information, in an institutional design where they become seriously engaged in
competing arguments, they will make informed and thoughtful judgments.”50
Deliberative democracy, and other civil society building
approaches, may offer tools for civil affairs as facilitators of governance abroad.
(4) Political Moderation and Accountability
The goal of political moderation is to channel conflict through
institutions. Liberal theory emphasizes the role of civil society and institutions to rein
impulses to violence. At the heart of liberal theory is “a search for principles of political
justice that will command rational assent among persons with different conceptions of the
good life and different views of the world.”51 National constituting processes set the rules
for expression, representation and reconciliation of interests. The idea of government by
and for the people begs the question, “who governs and in whose interest should prevail
when there are differences among the people?” Arend Lijphart, in his classic text Patterns
of Democracy provides two alternative answers to that question: (1) the majority of the
people (majority rule); (2) as many people as possible (consensus).
Majority rule concentrates power, often in a mere plurality. The
consensus approach, by contrast, uses “rules and institutions [that] aim at broad
participation in government and broad agreement on the policies…” Lijphart’s taxonomy
of such systems around the world identifies ten differences arranged in terms of two
dimensions: 1. executive power related to party systems and 2. federal-unitary
distribution of decision making authority:
1. executives-party dimension
1.1
single-party majority cabinets versus executive
power sharing
50
http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/783-fishkin-james/784-deliberative-democracy#
John Gray in the preface to his volume on liberalism characterizes the perspective as individualistic,
egalitarian, universalist and meliorist. That is, liberal theory tends to emphasize the rights of individuals,
viewed as equals, irrespective of culture or time, and perhaps most significantly, the possibility of progress
for social and political institutions.
51
John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 91, p. x.
51
35
1.2
executive dominance versus executive-legislative
balance of power
1.3
two-party versus multi-party systems
1.4
majoritarian versus proportional representation
1.5
pluralist interest groups versus coordinated and
“corporatists” interest groups
2. federal-unitary dimension
2.1
unitary and centralized versus federal and
decentralized
2.2
unicameral legislature versus two equally strong but
differently constituted houses
2.3
flexible versus rigid constitutions
2.4
legislature final word on constitutionality versus
judicial review
2.5
central bank dependence on the executive versus
independent central banks52
Some liberals emphasize the potential for international
organizations to fill a vacuum of authority at the international level.53 Another variant of
the liberal school relies upon the character of states themselves for peace, claiming that
liberal states are more stable and peaceful.54An article published by Francis Fukuyama in
1989 fits the second stream.55 This article was significant, but not only because of its
seeming prescience about the end of the Cold War. Fukuyama’s argument had political
52
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999.
This discussion is taken from Guttieri, Toward a Usable Peace Phd Dissertation, 1999. This approach
effectively extends the so-called 'domestic analogy,' or the democratic procedures for settling disputes
within democratic states, to the international realm. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order:
From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Idealism of an
earlier era resonates in David Held’s recent advocacy of an international governance system based upon a
model of cosmopolitan democracy.
54
Michael Doyle observes that liberal states create a ‘separate peace.’ Making reference to Kant’s depiction
in an essay on “Perpetual Peace,” written in 1795, the liberal thesis of democratic peace holds that war is
not thinkable between democratic states. Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part
1” Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983) and “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs, part 2” Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983); also Bruce Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1993).
55
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest Vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-16.
53
36
consequences, legitimating the American model of governance and the drive to export
democracy.56 The article was also significant as scholars in the 1990s established
empirically that democracies do not war with one another. As the Soviet empire
collapsed, Francis Fukuyama declared an end of history. However, as Jack Snyder has
shown, the transition to democracy is, on the other hand, typically violent.57 Snyder’s
work is one of the most important references for anyone participating in a political
transition.
The tasks for military support to governance range from providing day to day
assessments and support to US, host nation, international and non-governmental agencies
to directly conducting military government. Delivery of essential services, provision of
administration, election and legistlative support, protection of state resources and so on
are needed as well as provision of space for civil society, independent media and
opportunities for publics to participate in their own governance. Domestically, these are
skills that might be found among those with experience in public service at various
levels, and with education in social sciences, particularly political science, public policy
/public administration and law. The American Planning Association (APA) is an example
of an agency that itself offers education (https://www.planning.org/educationcenter/) and
certifiers planners. Various jobs descriptions may be useful for the 38G Governance
category; see https://www.planning.org/jobs/. Planning for identification of competencies
and certifications may also begin with the Department of Labor occupational
classifications. Some relevant categories identified include:

11-0000 Management Occupations

11-1000 Top Executives

11-1030 Legislators

11-3000 Operations Specialties Managers

11-3010 Administrative Services Managers

11-3030 Financial Managers
Timothy Dunne notes the political consequences of Fukuyama’s thesis, in particular the rationale
provided therein for humanitarian intervention, the promotion of democracy by force. Timothy Dunne,
“Liberalism” in John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.) The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), pp. 147-163, p. 155.
57
Snyder, Jack L. From Voting to Violence : Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. 1st ed. New York:
Norton, 2000.
56
37

11-3120 Human Resources Managers

11-9000 Other Management Occupations

11-9010 Farmers, Ranchers, and Other Agricultural Managers

11-9020 Construction Managers

11-9030 Education Administrators

11-9040 Architectural and Engineering Managers

11-9050 Food Service Managers

11-9060 Funeral Service Managers

11-9110 Medical and Health Services Managers

11-9120 Natural Sciences Managers

11-9130 Postmasters and Mail Superintendents

11-9140 Property, Real Estate, and Community Association Managers

11-9150 Social and Community Service Managers

11-9160 Emergency Management Directors

43-0000 Office and Administrative Support Occupations

43-1000 supervisors of Office and Administrative Support Workers

43-1010 First-Line Supervisors of Office and Administrative Support Workers
c.
Governance Bibliography
Current references in the Governance bibliography are provided in
Appendix E.
2.
Stakeholder Analysis
“Above all, it is important to keep in mind that wars are fought not to be won but
to gain an objective beyond war.”58
In the design meeting on September 18, 2013 the team explored the question
“who is the client”? A humanitarian assistance perspective might name the host nation
civilian as the client; however, the civil affairs are needed because military force has been
used in as an expression of foreign policy. This point to the conceptualization of policy
and force set out by Carl von Clausewitz.
58
Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War, p. 3
38
Clausewitz described war as a continuation of policy by other means. The
decision to use military force implies a transition in which a mode of policy gives way to
a mode of force. Policy implies a general direction for state action. In war the state takes
up arms and military as opposed to civilian instruments are the locus of movement. Postconflict military operations are concerned with a return transition, in which the mode of
force gives way to a mode of policy. The transition from force to policy can be
understood in this light as the natural reciprocal of the transition from policy to force.
Photo 1: GSID PI NPS professor Karen Guttieri depicts policy and force in
Clausewitz with implications for civil affairs. Stakeholder analysis at the December 2013
IPR at Stanford University with research team and sponsors, including BG Van Roosen.
The helix configuration illustrates the ultimate predominance of policy, and the
complex challenge for military commanders who must implement it. As an intervention
progresses, military forces shape and also must adapt to new conditions in the policy
environment. Military intervention to create or support a friendly regime depends upon
non-military processes for the mission to bear fruit. Intervening troops seek to win
indigenous, or host-country civilian cooperation to establish order and depart, as quickly
as they are able. Intervening forces hope to establish a friendly regime capable of self39
defense, however, the regime may continue to rely on the intervening military forces for
public order and service provision for some time. In sum, the cyclical nature of war and
peace sets the context for a civil dimension to military operations.
Previously, the GISD design meeting of 18 October grappled with the
stakeholders, political and military, foreign and domestic, with many perspectives:
national, organizational, humanitarian. We recognized the political purposes of the use
of force. We developed the following goals:

Sustainable peace

Protection/resilience

Security and development

Consistent with US foreign policy goals
Also see the stakeholder analysis discussion in Section II.
3.
Key Participants / Points of Contact
A number of key participants in our sessions regarding governance have
contributed thoughtful input to the projects:






BG Cosentino, National War College, National Defense University
James Fishkin, Stanford University
Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University
Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness
Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector-General for Iraqi Reconstruction
BG Ferdinand Irizarry, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC
G 3/5/7)
Many agencies are concerned with the various sectors of governance, as follows:

Provision of essential services
o Program on Poverty and Governance, CDDRL (Stanford University).
http://governance.stanford.edu
o Center for Effective Global Action (UC Berkeley).
http://cega.berkeley.edu
o Development Impact Lab (UC Berkeley). http://dil.berkeley.edu
o Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (Afghanistan).
http://mrrd.gov.af/en
40

Stewardship of state resources
o Center for Global Development (Washington, DC).
http://www.cgdev.org
o Governance Project, CDDRL (Stanford University).
http://governanceproject.stanford.edu

Political moderation and accountability
o Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (Stanford University)
http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-andcenters/stanford-center-on-international-conflict-and-negotiation-scicn
o Center for Deliberative Democracy (Stanford University).
http://cdd.stanford.edu/
o Quality of Government Institute (University of Gothenburg, Sweden).
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se
o Department of Social Welfare & Development (Philippines).
http://www.dswd.gov.ph
o National Solidarity Programme (Afghanistan).
http://www.nspafghanistan.org
o Participatory Budgeting Project (Brooklyn).
http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/
o Carter Center (Atlanta). http://www.cartercenter.org
o Democracy International (Bethesda).
http://democracyinternational.com
o World Bank Institute: Governance.
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/topic/governance

Civic participation and empowerment
o Freedom House (Washington, DC). http://www.freedomhouse.org

General governance
o Academic Institutions (US)

Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law (Stanford
University). http://cddrl.stanford.edu
41

Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford
University). http://cisac.stanford.edu

Program in Democracy and Governance (Georgetown University).
http://government.georgetown.edu/cdacs
o Government organizations (US)

US Agency for International Development (Washington, DC)
http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-andgovernance

US Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (Washington, DC).
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/index.htm

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(Washington, DC) http://www.ndi.org
o Government organizations (non-US)

Australian Agency for International Development (Australia).
http://aid.dfat.gov.au

Non-Governmental Organizations (US)

Asia Foundation (San Francisco). http://asiafoundation.org

Urban Institute Center on International Development and
Governance (Washington, DC). http://www.urban.org/center/idg
o Non-governmental organizations (non-US)

Transparency International (Germany).
http://www.transparency.org

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (Netherlands)
http://www.nimd.org
o International organizations

United Nations: Department of Political Affairs.
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
http://www.unrisd.org
42

United Nations Development Programme: Democratic
Governance.
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgo
vernance/overview.html

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
http://www.osce.org
4.
PSOTEW Session
At the PSOTEW conference, keynote speakers addressed the need for civilmilitary engagement, coordination, anticipatory planning, public-private partnerships,
and recognition of host nation existing or nascent capacities.
Sessions on military support to governance, and challenges of governance in
peace and stability missions are summarized below. See Appendix C for a full set of
notes from the Governance session.
a.
Plenary Session
In the plenary session, Ms. Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness
emphasized a continued need for US engagement and public private partnerships. A key
theme was that “shortage of resources is rarely the problem; scarcity of effective design is
often the problem.” Ms. Lockhart addressed the “Sovereignty Gap/Paradox” illustrated
by the 40-60 governments that do not meet requirements of sovereign management.
Problems include mis-governance and corruption. Post-Afghanistan, publics questions
value/efficacy of engagement. She cited regional crises in MENA, Africa, Asia and the
Americas as examples of double failure including both governance and external
responses. She discussed the changing context for stability with globalization and the
emergence of new powers, and demographic trends including urbanization and youth
bulge. Ms. Lockhart addressed the perception that budgets are under pressure. She
described opportunities and lessons about when and where to take action. Often foreign
internal defense is addressed without governance. We need a better understanding of
governance failures in prevention/mitigation/recovery. Context understandings often fall
short. For example, in Afghanistan a peace deal is seen as capitulation – how to think
instead about processes that lead to functioning political order?
43
Needs assessments develop long lists of what we need, but ignore the civil
servants already in place. There are always assets on the ground, and maps of assets are
needed. Some failures include not adapting to changing circumstances or aligning with
host nation realities. There has been mismanagement between mil-pol-civic responses.
She asked, “What are the education and training requirements so that we don’t rely on
outsourcing without necessary skills and capabilities?” The outsiders participating in
peace and stability operations possess strengths such as building armies, and delivering
basic services such as health and basic education. Medium strengths are evident in public
finance/national accountability systems (combating corruption), police in the context of
justice, and rule of law. Weaknesses include working with civil society and youth and
addressing gender issues – do we need to refocus priorities from primary education lens
to address adolescent needs, for example?
Ms. Lockhart noted that outside participants in stability tend to provide better
support to elections than parties. Addressing leadership and management change agents,
she asked, “Do we spend an adequate amount of time learning how to support the good
guys, the reformers?” As many reviews have noted, there is too often much information
without strategic understanding of what the needs are. Operational plan was missing. Ms.
Lockhart noted a number of advances. The World Development Report 2011: Conflict
Security and Development, the G7+ New Deal, a Revision of the UN Millennium
Development Goals and a UN High Level Panel Report have noted that poverty won’t be
addressed without peace and stability. However, the OECD assessment on best practices
implementation was sobering. Debate continues on what works and what doesn’t. We
have seen the engagement of new actors – CSO innovations at UN Peacebuilding Support
Office, and new actors such as the Chinese government. To what extent is this reflected
on the ground?
Ms. Lockhart concluded that peace and stability operations won’t go away after
Iraq and Afghanistan. The Arab Spring/ MENA Tragedy of Syria, conflicts in Africa,
including South Sudan and HOA persist. Four years after the Haiti earthquake, what are
the lessons of disaster response? New challenges include youth, demanding participation,
new politics, religion, citizenship, urbanization, corruption, and criminal networks.
These will co-exist with those we’ve had over last decade: poverty, narcotics, terror, and
44
natural disaster. Innovations include partnering with host nation actors. “We’ve become
trapped in sovereignty paradox,” Lockhart noted, citing Afghanistan. The existing mantra
to support the government is not going to work. How to support popular movements,
where people seek to participate [in their own governance]? How to understand the
dynamics of private sector contributions; how to recognize when large contracts are
appropriate and when light weight approaches may be better? Considerations include the
“advisor model” and the “twinning model.” Many countries spend only 40% of their
budget every year. Ms. Lockhart notes, “One man’s fragile state is another man’s frontier
economy.” Many have significant natural resources. How to move from an industrial
[delivery to people] to networked mindset? How to say to Western taxpayers: “Put away
your wallets – let’s find different ways.” Ms. Lockhart noted that the civil/politicalmilitary nexus is widely misunderstood: it includes synergy and linkages; diplomacy
often depends upon a credible threat of the use of force (Brahimi); and citizens see
security as priority and foundation for development
This does not necessarily mean combat forces, she notes; rather, a more nuanced
delivery of order. Ms. Lockhart concluded that the community needs to build need
consensus on medium and long term engagement strategies, appreciate the importance of
design of peace agreements and political processes, because a peace accord is not “the
end.” How to be flexible on means, design? She discussed sequencing: peace accords,
build armies, police forces –how much can be on the plate? Learning from success:
media focuses on negative; maybe engage business or arts pages? Developing
capabilities: PSOTEW is doing this work. Catalysts help to limit cost. Communication is
essential so that publics understand the importance of the endeavor.
A question from the audience asked about skill building to address the challenge
of the youth bulge. Ms. Lockhart responded that two steps are needed: synchronize with
jobs available…not manpower planning but align education in HN with job needs.
Sometimes over-training occurs. Jordan has 100k+ IT engineers but not enough jobs.
Afghanistan had to import teachers and construction workers while there was 80%
unemployment. Structural unemployment longer term needs to change the way career
expectations are shaped.
45
Another question asked was: what are the top three lessons for Safe and Secure
Environments? Ms. Lockhart noted the need to understand host nation capacity to secure
and safeguard itself; constraints to realizing its capacity. In Afghanistan, for example, it
was payroll and literacy. Second, one must identify where the gaps are – will external
forces be needed? Third, the Weberian imperative for a monopoly on the legitimate use
of force remains relevant, but there are other ways that social trust supports order.
A third question asked about assessment, noting that often, troops are deployed to
stop the dying, stopping the negative. How can we build on the positive? How could we
more effectively approach that assessment process? In response, Ms. Lockhart cited an
ISE study on current assessment and planning methodologies that leads to mistakes in
planning stage. She emphasized development of methodologies for quick response from
local constituents.
In another plenary presentation, Mr. George Lopez, USIP, posed several
questions: What is the definition of prevention? Are we equipped in agencies to keep
creative conflict non-violent? How do agencies and organizations train for dilemmas? He
sparked a discussion about depth of knowledge regarding environments and the need to
conduct anticipatory analysis and programs to work “Left of Bang.” He also spoke to the
need to conduct an analysis of the socio-cultural factors present in any society.
BG Ferdinand Irizarry opened his plenary address with reference to the Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 558th referring to the 7th warfighting function. He
discussed the need to involve private enterprise in Theater Security Cooperation. He
noted that functional expertise did not mature and needs reform. Three tests include how
to create the discipline in the context of the operating environment, how to create
capacity – a health care system rather than a doctor, a legal system rather than an
attorney, and how to understand the context of the society in which the military operates.
BG Irizarry discussed developing ties to civilian education, noting that military support to
universities helped to give rise to area studies as a discipline. A database can help to
ensure access to talent already in the force, keeping in mind that many soldiers prefer to
do something different from their civilian occupations in their military assignments.
Both reach back and reach forward are needed – the medical community with
telemedicine for example, is ahead. BG Irizarry spoke to many of the issues being
46
pursued by the Governance Innovation for Security and Development (GISD) project.
The vision for the Institute for Military Support to Governance is to be something of a
hybrid of civilian, private sector and military engagement to address the challenges of
military occupational specialties.
b.
Military Support to Governance Session (Work Group 3)
In the opening session of the Work Group 3 track, Dr. Karen Guttieri gave
an historical-political review of civil-military support, especially post-conflict. Civil
affairs are considered the “vanguard” of DoD’s support to U.S. government efforts to
assist partner governments, per the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Key recent events
in U.S. Army Civil Affairs include the 2006 division of Civil Affairs into reserve and
active components. Civil Affairs is considered divided and neglected, under-valued as a
strategic asset in planning/operations, yet highly valued in US foreign and defense policy.
Current review has stated that the “current system of classifying and managing needs” are
flawed (RAND) and should be reformed as a new Military Occupational Specialty –
MOS 38G (more correctly, an area of concentration). Governance Innovation for Security
and Development (GISD) is “a research project that seeks solutions to the challenges of
supporting governance in fragile environments” and is researching and addressing current
issues and competencies needed for the problem sets. Ultimately, Civil Affairs wants to
develop requirements, competencies, classifications and certifications for the 38G – Civil
Sector Specialist. The sponsor for this project is SOCOM through the IMSG, which
“manages the provision of civil sector expertise across the range of military operations in
order to support USG obligations under international law and promote stability. On order,
supports Theater Security Cooperation, Transitional military Authority, and Support to
Civil Administration operations.” The group comments focused on a need to build
accountability into these sectors from the beginning. How will this affect the current
system of ASI (additional skill identifiers)? Colonel Lindon replied that the current
system doesn’t work in the Reserves. The future plan is to pull these resources in from
the civilian sector to meet these needs/competencies. Karen Guttieri suggested that the
Guiding Principles is a wish list of what needs to be done, but lacks an empirical
understanding of causality.
47
Robert Jones, USSOCOM, began by noting that one must acknowledge
and understand the role of governance in causation before one can discuss it in resolution.
He argued that human nature is largely constant and universal. Can we provide an
Einstein like approach to have a frame work to approach these developments? The world
is in an era of unprecedented popular empowerment, he noted. Governance has never
been harder, or more important. Cold war stasis makes the scope and scale larger and our
bias hinders our understating. In population based conflicts, the sum of tactics does not
equal strategy.
State-based conflicts are inter-state and Clauswitizian war; population
based conflict are intra-state and of a different genus and species, requiring different
logic. Twelve years of waging peace as war has been “a strategic disaster,” he noted, and
the prospect of engaging peace as “phase 0” does not promise much better. “Less is
more,” he says, noting that “it is far better to do the right thing poorly than to do the
wrong thing well.” Capture tactical lessons learned. We really need to consider how to
collectively produce results. Some key points:

Natural things (tyranny, gravity, insurgency)are what they are: not in the
context of what they do. Beware the labels or doctrines we follow.

How do our actions provoke? An ounce of prevention may equal a pound
of cure. A pound of provocation can create a ton of problems.

SOCOM realizes our actions are connected. Need to realize our
interconnectedness.

If we just stare at Ukraine, we miss opportunities.
Where does instability come from and where does it go? One must
understand the life cycle. Don’t look at the specifics. Why the US has a Marine Corps
cannot be derived from why Joe S. joined the marines. From Clauswitz: know what kind
of war you’re in and when it’s not a war at all. Legally, we may have to call it a war – to
get the authority to do what we do. If we got rid of our anti-terrorism plan, we have no
net. SunTsu: strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory, tactics strategy is the
noise before defeat. A perfection of means and a confusion of aims seems to be our main
problem.
48
He went on to discuss trust—what does it look like? As it came out of the
reformation wars: homogony made it easy. In Balkans, they had to break the country
down to nine different groups in order to gain trust. Some identities are ethnic, cultural –
identity and community are not strictly geographical. Red Sox fans are everywhere, as
are Al-Qaeda fans. How does one build the circle of trust?
The Human Domain started with Land Domain, then Sea Domain, then
Air Domain, then Space Domain and then finally the cyber domain. Now we focus on the
Human Domain as well. The Services deal with the human domain. The aspects outside
the range of the military human domain: the SOCOM deals with that. Relationships with
the population are critically important. Respond to our government in certain way.
Building relationships with people are difficult. It is complex. How do we deal with
complexity? If we can’t deal, how do we create a methodology? When Einstein’s peers
were in a lab, Einstein looked within himself to find constants. There are constants in
human nature that give us a framework to figure out what’s important. Key
considerations are social-cultural awareness; human geography, human nature
(biological), and human terrain; and socio-cultural analysis (anthropological). We address
every single populace solution.
Sovereignty – right and appropriate within their country – we may not
agree, but that doesn’t make it “wrong,” Legitimacy,-system of governance- sometimes
we do thing based on our mores and reasons, but we don’t think about how our laws
affect others. Justice – Rule of Law. Perceive the law as it affects them. Respect,
Empowerment. Don’t get confused with the definition but with the understanding of it.
While we are disgusted with our government, we are okay with our governance.
Insurgency is: Internal populace based, political in purpose and illegal.
Most insurgencies vary between violent and non-violent states and actions. Two
populations inside, and two outside, the outside are vulnerable – Unconventional warfare
campaigns. Governments need to make concessions. Rule of law: Make the circle bigger
or smaller – civil rights, LGBT rights. Expand the population who perceives themselves
included. Give people something – maybe something less inclusive like the circle: but we
need to look outside the box. Stability does not equal static. Life is like riding a bicycle.
To keep your balance you must keep moving.
49
Norm Cotton followed with presentation of the stakeholder analysis
approach being applied to this project. A stakeholder analysis identifies the groups likely
to be impacted by a proposed action. Sorting stakeholders according to their impact on
the action and their needs, and mapping those groups based on their power, interest and
attitude.
The 2010 Quadrennial defense review spoke significantly to civil affairs
as it relates to irregular warfare. The review recognized the need for growth in civil
affairs in the branches. CA force modernization and military governance. US Defense
Secretary Robert Gates assigned the army the responsibility to develop capabilities for
military occupation to include military governance. Assistant Secretary Lamont endorses
a plan to improve army CA force modernization proponent functions including the
development of AM/Military Government future operating concept (Nov 2012). How is it
included in training strategy?
On the civilian side, Presidential policy on Global Development PPD 6
stated development is as vital to US national security and elevated development as a core
pillar of American power. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR) aligned a growing number of civilian agencies engaged in international activity.
2013 USAID Democracy, rights and Governance focuses on human rights, promoting
stronger democratic institutions and participatory governance. DRG center of excellence:
technology and innovation in governance. Innovate ways to work with other agencies.
Mapping military and civilian stakeholder Power + or – : to what extent
the stakeholder has power to impose the stakeholder’s potential to influence derived from
their positional or resource power in the us foreign policy arena, or their actual influence
derived from their credibility as a perceived leader or expert. (Such as special ops)
Interest +or -, how interested are they on the IMSG/GISD effort? Attitude+ or -: what’s
their gut reaction? Backer or blocker. Eight potential positions on the Mendelow’s Matrix
98 initial stakeholder positions: acquaintances, sleeping giant, time bomb, trip wire,
savior, friend, saboteur, irritant. They may also be A: active; P: Passive; BA: Backer;
BL: Blocker; IN:Influential; IS: insignificant.
Dr. Steven Hall followed with a presentation on representing complex
adaptive systems for instruction. The objective of this work is to support the instruction
50
of 38G students, provide hands-on experience of the state building process, and highlight
the dependencies involved in rebuilding. There’s reason to believe we’ll be state building
for quite a while. What do we expect of a state? It defines “Us” and “Them,” and values,
willing to sacrifice to looks after “Us” and engage “them.”
There are varying concepts of inter-state relations affect state building
goals, such as: materialism vs. idealism; persistence vs. adaptation. What is required to
build a state? State Governance – legitimate policy; Rule of Law – social identity; Safe
and Secure Environment – risk; Sustainable Economy -- goods/services; Social WellBeing – consent. It’s a big machine. As parts rise and fall, other aspects are affected. If
one part goes down, it brings other aspects down as well. It’s all about balance.
Reifying a nation and constructing a state, centralizing power and
distributing control; supporting autonomy and exercising compassion; controlling a threat
and building a partner; building the means and delivering the goods (and services)—and
keep it all from tumbling down.
There are many different perspectives, from donor nations to international
organization and NGOs, but mostly it is about understanding interactions: how objectives
interact; how institutions emerge; how unintended consequences occur; where tipping
points exist; how intuitional conditions dominate. No plan lasts for long, and how a good
story about where you’ve been. Trade-offs – (paradoxes within societies – such as
security vs. privacy). Need to look deeper into trade-offs. There is often a temporal
component. Crackdown on illegal economy; security and government legitimacy;
economy and social well being, and much more.
An approach is to build simple agents interacting through systems to
generate complex phenomena. Agents are basically targeting individuals interacting
through and with social networks and the environment (e.g., politically passive backbone
of goods/services delivery). Additional information from Dr. Hall’s presentation is
provided later in this report.
c.
Governance Panel
The Governance session of the PSOTEW Working Group 3 track included
a panel, with presentations and audience Q&A and discussion. The Guiding Principles
define Stable Governance as “ability of the people to share, access, or compete for power
51
through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of
the state.” This panel addressed challenges of supporting governance abroad —provision
of essential services, political moderation and accountability, stewardship of state
resources, and civic participation and empowerment—as a means to promote both peace
and well-being. Panelists included Dr. Karen Guttieri, NPS; Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.,
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; and David C. Becker, Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University.
Dr. Guttieri opened the session presenting concepts of governance.
Military leaders in history innovated as military governors. General Winfield Scott:
General Orders 20 (1847) came from military necessity – the need to discipline troops
and maintain good relations with civilians, as well as the principle of humanity. He
avoided civilian populations en route to Mexico City. The Civil War’s Lieber code in
1863 was a precursor to the Hague Article 43 responsibility of military forces to restore
and ensure order in a country: responsibility lies with military.
Historically, according to the Rousseau-Portales doctrine, the occupier is a
custodian of the territory for the sovereign in exile. Today we speak of popular
sovereignty. Magoon’s Report 1903. The principle of humanity and military necessity.
(you can only overcome the humanity principle with the military necessity). The legal
norms are evident in the Hague treaty.
In 1950’s Robert Slover: Military Government: where do we stand today?
Annals of the American Academy of Political Scienty. A perennial problem for Military
Government, to communicate with maneuver commanders and for maneuver
commanders to appreciate the assets that they have at hand.
Era: WWI: Hunt Report – military aid to civil power was written after a
conflict in which the occupations were limited, and the population separated from
military. Wilson wanted to work out treaties. How does this shape the post-war order?
Unfortunately, treaties did not resolve conflict.
Soldiers played a role in the resolution of WWII, when “Bullets fly too
thick for civilians.” With the advent of nuclear weapons, Dwight Eisenhower lamented
that “Soldiers can no longer obtain a peace visible to the world.” Lucius Clay confessed
that he did not visit the State Department before he departed to run the occupation of
52
Germany. The Monuments Men set a precedent for protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict that emerged with the 1954 Hague convention protocol.
Cold War Stabilization led to Military Civic Action and FM 41-10 Civil
Affairs Military Government operations. Then the 1957 Draper Report. In the counter
insurgency era: National Security Action Memo NSAM 124 FM 41-5 Joint Manual for
civil affairs focused on foreign internal defense. These activities are known by many
names, such as low intensity conflicts, stability operations, and so on. The military
entered Vietnam where civilians were already dominant.
Peace and stability: civil affairs had different names across eras. Recently,
we speak of complex contingencies, as in FM 41-5 and FM 41-10. Stability Operations:
SSTR DoD 3000.05/NSPD 44 FM 3-07, (there is a new document) JP 3-57, FM 3-24.
To get supplies and support, George Washington used Civilian Affairs.
We still have problems ensuring lasting peace. Is a larger response better
than the desire to work with the population? Conflict termination 5 years+ without
reoccurrence. If the parties fight it out in civil war Prof Licklider has shown the
consequence is often genocide.
Civil Affairs have grown since 2001 – from 5,149 to 11,152 personnel in
2013. Policy makers are reluctant to use CA if it signals where another Vietnam. There
are political and policy issues. Logisticians are often desired to get there materiel there
fast, but who will interface with civilians on the ground? Historically, CA is best with
tension between kinetic and non-kinetic (war termination); military and civilian (roles
and missions); active and reserve (force structure) prejudices; external and internal
emphases (capacity building).
Machiavelli warned that there is nothing “more difficult to take in hand,
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things.” Transitions are by nature turbulent. Stable
governance is defined by the Guiding Principles as “Ability to share or compete for
power through non-violent political processes and to enjoy collective benefits and
services of the state.” Provision of essential services and resources: you find effective
governance at the point where goods and services are supplied to the people.
53
The tension in the US is how to manage transitions. Democracies are
stable when fully institutionalized, but incomplete democratization is associated with
war-proneness. Interim government is under-studied, but has relevance to both theory
and practice. Most states go through multiple transitional regimes - every dictator starts
with a transitional government. What are the characteristics of a successful interim
government?
A taxonomy of interim governments includes revolutionary regimes,
power-sharing, caretaker governments (empirically associated with successful transition)
and international administrations (vary depending upon degree of authority). It is
important to examine how the wars began that brought about transitional regimes. Wars
are fought for independence, irredentism (reunion with historic confreres); competition
for control of resources. Some interim governments are part of post-authoritarian
transition.
Conclusion: Power is persistent: institutions matter. The effects of
transitional regimes are stratified. Incomplete accords hold perils for what emerges.
Negative peace vs positive peace as seen with dictatorship.
Stuart Bowen raised the question “Is the rebuilding just a military issue?”
It’s going nowhere thanks to Goldwater Nichols act. Is there anyone doing planning from
this point out? Not really. The planes were built in flight. Looking at the expensive point
of the rebuilding. These are the costs and struggles. Mr. Bowen’s job was to report on
$61B spent. 35 trips made. The pits and attempts to rise out of it the problems of
governance. $8 billion spent on military contracts, but toward reconstruction. This is the
integration point acutely.
The lessons learned from rebuilding: Iraqis spent too much time listening
to us argue. Spent mostly to build capacity. The Community Action Program and local
governance programs: too much $ spent, for not enough result. PRT audits pointed out
success depended on who led the program; it was personalities rather than more
traditional effects. Our track record isn’t very good, and it seems to go up and down.
2010 and recent elections didn’t go well. Created a dynamic of election over a demand
economy (that can’t be right).
54
Here’s what we should do: integrate. It has to happen institutionally! Are
we moving toward integration? No, not enough. There are possibilities have evaporated
and has devolved back to a liaison function. Within 6 weeks we went from war to
rebuilding – not enough planning.
David Becker spoke about the significance of the grass roots, from
strategy to operations. Listen to locals, he advised, rather than needs assessments. Build
on local assets. Building trust is essential: but how? Mobilize resources and find the good
guys. He listed a number of programs that have had relative success, but not many in the
audience had heard of them. Some of the most successful programs are the least known.
They are civilian, and not called counterinsurgency.
Simple rules: complex adaptive systems; use small projects, simple
projects; insist on local choice – this equals local “ownership” (if they think it’s
important, it builds). Responding to local demands, not a need assessment. Locals are the
ones deciding on if they can get away with it. What does this mean? If we leave it to the
locals, they can decide if they can finish the project themselves: small units –
neighborhoods. Locals know each other, who they can trust to get things done. If we
don’t care what they’re building, they won’t care. Once they consider themselves a
community, they consider trade-offs, and make the decisions themselves. Must have local
contributions (vs. blank checking) CERF program. If we try to generate a “burn rate,”
then system is broken: it needs to be driven by the locals. Public meetings are essential.
If you can’t hold a public meeting, you shouldn’t be doing the project. Has to be a public
budget. Same goes for timeliness. If they had local leaders, programs need to launch
quickly. Build a cadre of local leaders thinking about projects they can take on.
Award success and walk away from failures! Know when to fold’em.
Hands off. Ideally, you’d like to be 100% successful. It’s difficult to accept trial and
error. Sometimes it fails, but if it works, go back as soon as possible, and the interest
spreads. It’s hard to not over-commit, they have to be small projects as you assume you
will lose some of them. You can grow leadership. You can use these tactics for urban
planning.
55
5.
Sector IPR Planning
Current efforts are focused on the review for the Governance Sector, tentatively
scheduled for the week of June 16, 2014. Columbia University has offered to provide a
venue for the review to be near to the United Nations and to engage scholars there.
6.
Enabling Technologies
Governance is one of the richest areas for enabling technologies. Social media,
data storage, web portals,, communications technologies and mapping all provide tools
for administration of governance, mobilization of peace constituencies, and articulation
of interest.
B.
RULE OF LAW
1.
Literature Review / Bibliography
A preliminary survey of the literature on the Rule of Law in civilian-military
stability operations (focusing primarily on the period 2004-2013) indicates that the
primary issues identified by the authors include the following, many of which appear in
several documents:












Lack of support from military commanders for military and civilian rule of law
activities. Not providing security, transportation, or other resources required. 59
Need to develop civilian agency capacity to conduct rule of law activities in
stabilization actions.60
Need for civilian agency practitioners and military rule of law practitioners to
coordinate and work together to achieve common goals.61
Lack of a coherent strategy for conducting rule of law programs.
Inadequate understanding of the operational environment for rule of law
activities.
Importance of Host Nation Engagement and Building Rule of Law Culture.
Access to Justice, Accountability and Amnesties.
Transitional Justice.
Conflicts and inefficiencies resulting from different organizational cultures in
civilian agencies and military organizations.
Inadequate funding for civilian and military rule of law operations.
Who is in charge? Determining lines of civilian agency and military authority.
Inability to articulate how rule of law activities and goals contribute directly to the
overall objectives of the military engagement and the overall policy objectives of
the US Government.
59
Klein
Perito, others
61
Klein, etc
60
56






Need for civilian-military integration, beyond a comprehensive and/or whole of
government approach to addressing rule of law activities
Need for crosscutting and holistic approach to rule of law, security and related
operations including and integrating rule of law, as opposed to "cylinders of
excellence".62
Need for some sort of organizational structure for identifying, training and
deploying rule of law experts.63
Most authors assume that civilian agencies are more suited for doing rule of law
activities in stability operations than are military personnel or organizations.
Most authors focus primarily on operational environments found in late Iraq and
Afghanistan, with little consideration for requirements in future conflicts.
In particular, there is little consideration for requirements in the event of major
ground combat operations triggering occupation responsibilities under the Hague
Regulations and the Geneva Civilians Convention.
These areas of investigation have been grouped into related themes for discussion
and further investigation. Some conclusions can be drawn from the work to date.
From the review of the literature, it is necessary to ask an uncomfortable question:
Given that, even with the substantial motivation of over thirteen years (2001-2014) of
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the various US military and civilian agencies have
been less than successful in developing a "sustainable, repeatable, and transparent
interagency process for coordination," 64 what is the likelihood that they will develop
such processes without immediate and pressing needs, and with greater budget
constraints?
In determining how to deal with future scenarios, we cannot make our plans for
stabilization efforts, to include rule of law activities, based on what resources we are able
to spare for the project. Instead, we must be able to meet our responsibilities under
international law65 as the world, and--more importantly--the American people, expect us
to do. We must realistically determine what resources are necessary to restore and
administer essential government services during and immediately after combat
operations. This analysis should include determining the tasks that would need to be
done, the skills that would be required to do the tasks, and the number of people and
62
Courtney
Perito, Klein
64
Michelle Hughes, "The Relationship Between SSR and DDR: Impediments to Comprehensive Planning
in Military Operations," in Melanne Civic and Michael Miklaucic, Monopoly of Force, NDU Press (2011),
39.
65
Hague Regulations 1907, Geneva Civilians Convention of 1948.
63
57
other resources needed to do them on the scale required. We can investigate this question
by research into our own history of post-conflict operations from the beginning of the
nation to the present, and we can conduct experimentation to test possible methods of
effectively dealing with these requirements in future conflicts.
Referring back to Orton and Lamb, the division of managerial teams into
strategic, operational and tactical levels is a very useful concept. Clearly, it is very
important to have integrated interagency teams with full participation of all relevant
agencies at the strategic level in order for all perspectives and expertise to be included in
the analysis of the strategic problems and in the development of strategic goals, and it
will be important to have effective integration to the greatest extent possible at the
operational and tactical levels as well.
It is very important for the appropriate civilian agencies to attempt to preserve and
improve the capabilities and capacities they have developed during the Iraq and
Afghanistan operations, and for the US government agencies to develop sustainable,
repeatable and integrated interagency processes and organizations to maximize our
chances of success in dealing with the complex problems our hard-won experiences teach
us we are likely to encounter in future.
However, given that no Congress in the last twelve years has authorized and
appropriated funds for creating increased permanent capacity for civilian agencies in
post-conflict situations, much less for creating new organizations for that purpose, it is
highly unlikely that any of the civilian agencies will receive either the authorities or
funding they need to develop increased capacity or meaningful interagency integration.
It may be (and this is heresy) that the only way to effectively carry out
stabilization operations (at least those involving substantial numbers of military
personnel) would be to discard the model of civilian-led interagency integration, and
instead require that various agencies provide personnel, expertise and other resources as
required and as available to the DoD, which has consistently been the agency best
resourced for carrying out the required tasks, and which has been tasked by default with
the bulk of the effort in the past.
Such an approach would require that the military departments, in particular the
Army, be tasked to develop and sustain a force structure that has both the personnel and
58
other resources, and to make the investment of the intellectual capital necessary to
understand potential population-centric operational environments and develop methods of
conducting effective operations to favorably influence those environments.66 It would
also be necessary to inculcate into would-be generals that their ability to achieve mission
success is contingent upon their ability to successfully stabilize an area after they have
conducted military operations therein, and provide them the appropriate tools (force
structure, effective doctrine, adequate training) to conduct such operations when required.
2.
Stakeholder Analysis
Refer to Section II.F
3.
Key Participants / Points of Contact
Refer to the list of attendees at the Rule of Law sector review and the project
Quarter 1 Report.
4.
Sector Review
a.
Background

Selection of speakers and participants.
o Presenters and participants were all sophisticated rule of law
experts, selected on the basis of four baseline criteria:

Field experience in Rule of Law as part of a whole of
government approach to peacebuilding and complex
operations;

USG civilian-military experience operational and/or policy
experience;

Direct policy experience developing/ establishing civil
surge and/or rapid response mechanisms and/or serving as a
civilian surge responder in the field ; and

Analytical experience in Rule of Law.

Invitees were representative of a cross-section of USG civilian
agencies and DOD; multilateral and regional international
organizations, and private sector organizations – representatives of
which all with substantial USG background. Interagency
participants included the following:
o

Department of State
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
66
DoD has recently adopted as policy the requirement that the military shall be able to provide expertise in
civilian sector functions and be able to establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or
government can be restored. DoD Dir. 2000.13, Subject: Civil Affairs (March 11, 2014).
59



o


o


o
o
o
o



o
o
o
b.
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INL)
Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ)
Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PMA)
US Agency for International Development
Office of Foreign Development Assistance (OFDA)
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
Department of Justice
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance
and Training (OPDAT)
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP)
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Labor
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)
DOD / Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Policy
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW)
Rule of Law
Army Civil Affairs
Army JAGs
US Air Force (Ret.)
Goals
The primary goals of this working group were to identify rule of law
competencies, specialties and sub-specialties across “cops, courts and corrections, and
tiers of expertise, informed by participants’ prior operational experience.
On the first day, experts from across the USG agencies and former USG
presented on lessons learned through civilian surge and field operations, and offered
preliminary recommendations on the skillsets needed in such operations.
On the second day insights were consolidated and knowledge and
experience was applied through focused discussions in three break-out sessions, each
facilitated by Rule of Law experts.
Deliverables included recommendations for three Rule of Law position
descriptions with comprehensive subspecialties identified and integrated, and tiers of
professionalism described (Expert Functional Skill Practitioner; Master Functional Skill
Practitioner).
60
c.
Program
The IPR for the Rule of Law was conducted at the National Defense
University January 14-15, 2014, with the following agenda.
AGENDA
Civil Affairs 38Gs:
Exploratory Working Group
to Develop Civil Sector Specialties in Rule of Law
National Defense University
Lincoln Hall
300 5th Ave SW
Room 1107
Fort Lesley McNair
Washington DC 20319
January 14: 8:30-4p.m.
January 15: 8:30-3:30p.m.
Civil affairs operations are essential in both conflict prevention and postconflict transformation, most notably in the following missions: Theater
Security Cooperation (TSC), Support to Civil Administration (SCA) and
Transitional Military Authority (TMA). Civil Affairs (CA) professionals
have been identified as “the vanguard of [the Department of Defense’s]
support to US government efforts to assist partner governments in the
fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and
welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information (2010
Quadrennial Defense Review).
Given the significance of stability operations, the Joint Staff’s Joint
Resources Oversight Commission conducted an assessment of capabilities
that identified gaps within all stability sectors and directed changes to civil
affairs (JROCM 162-11 2009). The Commander, US Army Special
Operations Command directed that the Institute for Military Support to
Governance (IMSG) be created to address the identified gaps.
The IMSG is considering the reform of classification and validation of
“functional specialties” in the CA force structure, as recommended by an
earlier study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS
2009). In this working group we will specifically develop the Rule of Law
sector and as it relates to the five major stability sectors.
Rule of Law Review, Day 1--January 14
9:00-10:30 Introductory Remarks: Brig. Gen. Hugh VanRoosen
61
Director, Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), US Army JFK Special
Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS)
Opening Panel: Governance Innovation and Functional Specialties
This panel will introduce the initiative and consider the following:
 What are the needs under various circumstances, the trajectory of interaction; the
interaction across “functional specialties w/in the CA structure?
 Interaction with civilian agencies at various levels: strategic, theater-strategic,
operational, and tactical levels.
Moderator: Col Terry Lindon, Institute for Military Support to Governance
Panelists:
 Naval Postgraduate School--Dr. Karen Guttieri – Principal Investigator,
Governance Innovation for Security and Development
 Department of Defense – OSD Civil Affairs Policy, Office of Partnership Strategy
& Stability Operations, Col Eric S. Haaland, Assistant for Civil Affairs Policy
 Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University – Dr. Kurt Muller,
Senior Research Fellow
10:30-11:00-Break
11:30 – 1p.m.
Discussion Session I: Factors in Operations
What are the factors that gave rise to USG civ-mil rule of law surge capacity approaches
to stability operations, what are lessons learned, and how can we apply these to future
operational approaches?
Moderator: Col (ret) Christopher Holshek, Senior Fellow, Alliance for Peacebuilding
 Joint Forces Command (ISAF Joint Command), Military support to rule of law,
governance and Security Sector Assistance (Michelle Hughes, Esq. via VTC in
Kabul)
 NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission – Afghanistan – Multidisciplinary
international military support to rule of law – An approach adopted in an active
theater (LTC Goshi, Judge Advocate, USA Ret)
 Civilian Response Corps -- Ambassador John E. Herbst (Ret), Director, Center for
Complex Operations, NDU-- Lessons for integrating a civ-mil approach to
civilian surge
 Security Force Assistance (SFA) Working Group – Transitional Law
Enforcement--Kelly Uribe, Department of Defense Fellow, USAID/OTI; and
Richard M. Wrona, Jr. LTC, U.S. Army, Partnership Strategy and Stability
Operations (PSO), DOD/OSD -- assessing capabilities gaps post-conflict in
stability policing and train/equip local police forces/institutions
1p.m.-2:30 p.m.
Lunchtime Speaker: Dr. Robert D. Lamb, Director and Senior
Fellow, Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3)
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Good Governance and Rule of Law- new assessment tools for promoting accountability,
transparency, government responsiveness to citizen voice, inclusiveness, and equitable
delivery of essential services
(no-host lunch selection available in cafeteria in Lincoln Hall)
2:30-4 p.m.
Discussion Session II: Innovative Approaches
62
Innovative approaches to rule of law boots on the ground – what expansive range of skills
do rule of law experts need in the field in advisory role?
Moderator: Melanne Civic, Esq.
 Setting the stage—Rule of Law, Next Generation Reform (Dr. Rachel Kleinfeld,
Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Founder
and President Emeritus of the Truman National Security Project)
 Cops and Corrections and the “deployment gap” (Denver Fleming, DOJ/ICITAP)
 Civilian Police (CivPol) (Michele Greenstein, Acting Director DOS/INL/CAP)-lessons on the development of response capacity of US specialists and those in
support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
 Judicial and non-judicial transitional justice (Andrew Solomon, Esq. USAID)-Specialties required to support International and National Prosecution; Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, Commissions of Inquiry, and National Dialogues
4:00 p.m. -End of the first day
Rule of Law Review, Day 2 -- January 15
Consolidating and applying knowledge – This second and final day will be an intensive
working session with the end-goal of a deliverable of two to three Rule of Law position
descriptions with comprehensive subspecialties identified and integrated, and tiers of
professionalism established.
9:00-9:30 a.m..
Opening Remarks: BG Guy T. “Tom” Cosentino
Commandant, National War College, National Defense University (TBC)
9:30-10:00
Review of Civil Surge Formulations of Rule of Law Specialties
 Civil Affairs Functional Specialties -- Terry Lindon
 Existing permanent functional specialties and standards
 JAG international lawyer specialty
 Interagency Task Force recommendations on Rule of Law Specialties and SubSpecialties for USG Civilian Surge—Melanne Civic, Esq.
 DOJ international Rule of Law Position Descriptions-- Denver Fleming
10-10:30 a.m.
Break
11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
Break-out Groups
Building on templates discussed at the end of the first day, identify comprehensive range
of specialties and sub-specialties, and classify tiers (e.g., Master/ Expert). Participants
self-select break-our group.
Facilitators:
 Col David Gordon, Esq. (ret)-- Rule of Law cross-cutting, including transitional
justice, and customary law; gender mainstreaming)
 Al Goshi -- cops and corrections
 Major Gen Chuck Tucker, Esq. (Ret) --prosecutorial and legislative/
constitutional reform/ human rights and judicial
12:30-2p.m.
Lunch
2-3:00 p.m.
Report-out and Map solution sets
3-3:15 p.m.
Break
63
3:15- 4:00 p.m.
Plenary Discussion: Mapping Solutions and
Recommendations
Final Remarks – Terry Lindon and Melanne Civic
Working Group Concludes
4:00-4:15 p.m.
4:15 p.m.
4:30-6p.m. -- related event of interest: Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Lessons from
Afghanistan and Strategic Options for the Future
Dr. Robert Egnell, Dr. David Ucko, COL (Ret) David Maxwell, and Mr. Frank Hoffman
College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University
(to RSVP to this Book Launch event, please email Rebecca.Patterson@ndu.edu)
d.
Review Findings
The working group opened with an overview of the initiative, and a
discussion the intended role of the 38G functional specialists within the Army Civil
Affairs structure as well as relative to civilian specialists. The anticipated interaction of
the 38Gs with civilian agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels was also
considered
It was confirmed that military support to governance will cover the
“bridge period” between occupation or intervention during the period of characterized by
a non-permissive environment and the transition period permissive for turning over to
civilian advisors and/or the host nation legitimate authority.

o
o
o
o
o
General insights:
Civil Affairs military support to governance should embody the
whole of government approach “on steroids” – integration of
civilian and military assets (reservist specialties and experiences)
in this body of experts.
Should include multi-disciplinary efforts and integration
horizontally and vertically.
Civilians (USG, and nongovernmental) viewing military support to
governance will view military role in peacebuilding with
skepticism.
CA 38Gs should be nested with the Combatant Commands before
the surge is needed so that they would have greater understanding
and credibility.
“Peace is not the absence of violence, it is the presence of justice”
(MLK) – security alone will not advance peace – rule of law
advances justice.
64


e.



5.
o Position descriptions must be flexibly drafted to account for
regional requirements
General advisory skills -- need appropriate mindsets, not just
skillsets:
o Interpersonal skills;
o Organizational savvy;
o Understanding strategic alignment (vertical relationships);
o Must have integrity (honesty, transparency);
o Must be good relationship builders. Needs to know what resources
are available inside USG (reach-back), internationally (e.g.,
International Security Sector Assessment Team), in-country. Needs
to know who’s who – players, backgrounds, relationships,
responsibilities. Advisor needs to be able to educate and explain
why things are the way they are – cultural understanding, legal
systems. Need to understand urgency and help commanders
prioritize.
Rule of Law specialist skills:
o The group reached agreement that the specialties will range from a
broad based understanding of rule of law systems, to include
“cops, courts and corrections” to manage holistically, and distinct
sub-specialties within each of these areas.
o Specialties will need to cover the six “C’s”: cops (law enforcement
and investigation; forensics), courts, (justice), corrections, counsel
(empowering the professionalization of the bar), and custom
(understanding local customs), and codification (legislative and
constitutional reforms).
o Need to think in terms of power – who among the advocates for
reform within the host nation are in positions of influence/power;
how power is held and exercised.
o Should recognize that US DoD is one player in a very complex
stage.
Way ahead
Continue concept refinement with rule of law community of
interest
Continue outreach and engagement through PSOTEW
Deliverables:
o Develop position descriptions through consultative process with
rule of law community.
o Stakeholder Analysis
o Literature Review
PSOTEW Session
Melanne Civic opened the RoL session by introducing the principal speakers for
the session.
65
David Gordon provided an overview of literature on Rule of Law in Civilian
Military Stability Operations. He identified the following issues: lack of support from
military commanders; lack of coherent strategy; lack of understanding of environment;
transitional justice process; conflicts and inefficiencies; inadequate funding for civilian
and military RoL operations; need for cross-cutting and holistic approach to RoL,
security, and related operations, as opposed to “cylinders of excellence”; need for some
sort of organizational structure for identifying, training, and deploying RoL experts; most
authors assume that civilian agencies are more suited for doing RoL activities in stability
operations than are military personnel or organizations; most authors focus primarily on
operational environments found in late Iraq and Afghanistan, with little consideration for
requirements in future conflicts; and little consideration for requirements in the event of
major ground combat operations triggering occupation responsibilities under the Hague
Regulations and the Geneva Civilians Convention. RoL needs to be discussed in concert
with the other sectors. It is important that we understand the cultural
background/environment and develop a general overall strategy looking at how to reduce
the drivers of conflict instead of just strengthening the rule of law. We need to develop
ideas that will work in the NEXT major conflict, determining what needs to be done, how
would we do it, and what resources are needed to make that operation work.
Michelle Hughes presented on the important roles the military plays in conflict,
pre-conflict, and steady-state environments and how to translate requirements into tasks
for forces to be trained to do. Regarding core competencies CA officers need to have, we
need to separate out two sets of competencies: a substituted capacity (park in other
person’s government and serve as a policy maker; practically speaking, putting a military
government in place) and legal obligation. For development of capacity building, RoL
and Governance development is a core government function involving a process to adjust
laws, make new regulations, make new interagency processes, and set up new
organizations or agencies. We need to establish the mindset, not of bringing in a given set
of answers, or translating what we know from our experiences back home into the other
nation; but how to train the trainers and reform the reformers. It is critical to understand
how things work in government—this is more important than having a particular degree.
Accountability and oversight are critical needs. We must prepare people to understand
66
mechanisms to have eyes on the function, including community oversight and media
oversight. The number one priority is holding ourselves and senior leaders accountable.
Major General Charles Tucker (USAF, Ret.) raised a number of questions about
the role and conduct of CA in modern and emerging world situations. Which path do we
want to down on in defining the 38G field? What will the 38G field look like, what are
roles and responsibilities (job description and training plan based on a mission)? Are we
looking at irregular missions in complex environments or traditional warfare? Who are
we (as a career field)? How do we turn current officers with RoL mission (law schools,
JAG, promoted by being prosecutor/advocate/litigator) into RoL officers? What will it
mean to be a RoL officer? Will we be rough carpenters, finish carpenters, cabinet
makers? Journeymen? Specialists? A lot of work is now being done by contractors—do
CA officers need to be contract specialists? Roles and missions have to be specified. One
reason we have not succeeded well in the past is we try too much to provide THE
solution, in our image.
Meghan E. Steward followed with a presentation on RoL reform. There are two
skill sets: (1)hard law, the technical skill; (2) interpersonal, soft skills. How do
international advisors help? Five lessons:
1-- Dozens of configurations of legal reforms that can address the objectives
(human rights protection, governance structures, special protection mechanisms, electoral
systems) – parties can do different models of reforms, so most important step is
understanding the underlying interests of the parties.
-- Have to be able to LISTEN. Learn what their biases are, what they want, what
they don’t want, understanding party’s language and terms. Can use common terms with
different meanings.
2-- Local laws and traditions are really important – good to find a point of contact
who can explain the local perspective
-- Determine how the client/parties want to move forward
3-- Complex issues – important to start international assistance as early as
possible
4-- Providing international assistance – tailored to the audience
67
5-- Always unique challenges (multiple parties, concerns, perspectives); draw
lessons, provide options
Douglas Batson, a Human Geographer from the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency, spoke about land use and property rights. It is important to study human
settlement patterns and institutions covering allocations and use of land. About 50 nations
out of 196 have a property and land registry system. Of 6 billion land parcels, only 1.5
billion are in a registry, making many people vulnerable to land grabs and other abuses.
38G officers should know something about land use and land registry. Even in military
kinetic operations, it is important to ask the question, who owns the land? In many cases,
an area can have state land (legal) can overlaid with state-grant or lease (legal),
customary agriculture (extra-legal), customary grazing (extra-legal), and squatters
(illegal), creating competing claims. There is an international standard for land
administration from the International Standards Organization (ISO 19152, Nov 2012).
OpenTitle is a low-cost registry compliant with the ISO standard. Of course, this is not a
standalone consideration, but has to be part of an overall RoL strategy with an effective
enforcement mechanism.
The presentations were followed with open Q&A and discussion covering the
material presented. One key take-away: it is important to “know who the client is” when
conducting RoL operations.
6.
Enabling Technologies
No update at this time.
C.
SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT
The Safe and Secure Environment (SSE) sector is a cross-cutting area of study in
many ways, most prominently as between military and civilian providers of security. The
SSE team has developed a presentation (posted on the project APAN site) that attempts to
capture the complexities of this topic.
1.
Literature Review / Bibliography
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is
enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live
without other security than what their own strength and their own
invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for
68
industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no
culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be
imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and
removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of
the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is
worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
- Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Chapter 13
Societies require stability in order to function. That stability is based on good
public order enabling a sense of security among the populace. This is a core argument of
The Leviathan, its most famous passage quoted above as the first paragraph. The
challenge for societies is how to achieve such security, herein defined as a safe and
secure environment. There are many options for such a societal creation. They run the
gamut from an extreme police state, like the ill-named Democratic Peoples’ Republic of
Korea or Hobbes’ utopian Leviathan state, to the laissez-faire, market-based democratic
republic called the United States of America. Societies that suffer from the effects of
significant disruptions, either human or nature caused, inherently have trouble
establishing or reestablishing safe and secure environments. When such societies fail,
they are referred to by the rest of the world as fragile, failing or failed nation-states. The
populace that live in such nation-states exist in a world that often comes close to the hell
described by Hobbes.
We believe that the establishment of a safe and secure environment is necessary
but not sufficient for the societal stability. There is a systems-like relationship among all
the components of a society: political, cultural, economic, and military. One component
reinforces or undermines the others. In such an environment, one cannot isolate the cause
and effect of a part of a system without considering the context of the whole.67
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a
world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom
of speech and expression–everywhere in the world. The second is freedom
of every person to worship God in his own way–everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want–which, translated into world terms, means
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy
peacetime life for its inhabitants-everywhere in the world. The fourth is
67
For definitions of systems, consult Russell Ackoff, Redesigning the Future; New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1974. Chapter 1 contains Ackoff’s approach to systems.
69
freedom from fear–which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough
fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor–anywhere in the world.
- Franklin Delano Roosevelt68
Much of what follows is based on The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and
Reconstruction, written by the United States Institute of Peace and the United States
Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.69 This document is the first
comprehensive strategic examination of what is necessary to improve the chances of
mission success in complex stability operations. Safe and secure environments is a
subset within the discipline of Civil Security; however due to U.S. military doctrinal
considerations, only the overseas or international aspects of Civil Security are included in
this section.70 This section of the report contains references to safe and secure
environments in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations, thus expanding
beyond the framework of the two aforementioned subject boundaries. Where the
Guiding Principles… and JFKSWCS doctrine focus on safe and secure environments in
the wake of conflict operations, this section more generally addresses the environmental
issues in the wake of crisis operations. This expansion is consistent with the United
States Department of Defense concept of Stability Operations.71
Safe and secure environments exist where affected populations “have the freedom
to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, [random] or
large scale violence.”72 These environments are characterized by “an end to large-scale
fighting; an adequate level of public order; the subordination of accountable security
forces to legitimate state authority; the protection of key individuals, communities, sites
and infrastructure; and the freedom for people and goods to move about the [community],
68
Annual State of the Union Message to Congress, 6 January 1941
From the document of the same name and authors, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2009.
70
Based on presentations concerning the development of the 38G Civil Affairs specialty by the United
States Special Operations Command John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, December 2013.
71
See DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations; Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,
September 16, 2009. Also Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff: Washington,
D.C., 29 September 2011 (it should be noted here that this regulation is currently undergoing revision.)
72
Guidelines…, p. 6-38. The term “random” is added by the author to account for those acts of violence
that typically accompany the breakdown of law and order in the wake of natural/human disasters.
69
70
country and across borders without fear of undue harm to life and limb.”73 Establishing a
safe and secure environment is a necessary condition for enabling all other sectors of civil
military operations to function; however, because of the extreme interdependence
complexity among the sources of social power in any given societal unit, safe and secure
environments are insufficient by themselves to enable further re-development of the
sectors.74 Time can be considered the preeminent factor for obtaining a safe and secure
environment; if the state fails to decisively act to begin creating a safe and secure
environment within a 72 hour window following the crisis or conflict, communities begin
to fail irreversibly, thus allowing alternative and perhaps threatening competitors for state
order to develop.75
The Guiding Principles provides five necessary conditions for a safe and secure
environment:

Cessation of large scale violence

Public order

Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence

Physical security

Territorial Security76
A pictorial representation of the relationships across these conditions is shown in
Figure 7.
Ibid. Again, the term “community” is added by the author to account for local mobility to affected
populations.
74
Most recently, consider Michael Mann’s The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power
from the Beginning to AD 1760; Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Chapter 1 describes the
general theory and approach in which Mann identifies four interdependent sources of social power: military
(the major component of establishing safe and secure environments), political, ideological and economic.
75
Robert Dourandish, Nina Zumel, Michael Manno, “Command and Control During the First 72 Hours of a
Joint Military-Civilian Disaster Response,” paper presented at the 2007 Command and Control Research
and Technology Symposium, Newport, Rhode Island, June 19-21, 2007.
76
Guidelines… pp. 6-38 – 6-39.
73
71
Figure 7.
Safe and Secure Environment Conditions77
These seem consistent for any crisis operation, whether conflict or disaster
induced. One should note the condition relationships with the other sectors: Public Order
is closely correlated with Rule of Law; Physical Security is closely related to Social Well
Being. Presence of all the conditions enables effective governance and a wellfunctioning Economy and Infrastructure. Though this interactive list of conditions
seems comprehensive, it is not the only list available. David Cavaleri, building on
publications from the RAND Corporation, has developed and discussed a list of nine
stability operations planning themes that look very much like principles of operation.
They are:
77

Legitimacy

Security

Commitment

Situational understanding

Unity of effort

Infrastructure
From The Guidelines…, p 6-37.
72

Economic status

Planning effort

Media78
These themes have great commonality with the Guiding Principles… overall
conditions for stability and reconstruction, but importantly contain one theme common to
the safe and secure environment: that is the topic of security. In fact, in his doctoral
thesis, George Oliver reviewed literature dealing with peace operations and found two
common threads in the literature dealing with peace operations: the need for security and
for economic development. It is worth noting his review in his Table 3.1 depicted below
as Figure 8 for this report.
78
Lieutenant Colonel David P. Cavaleri (ret), Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between
Combat Operations and Stability Operations; Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press,
Occasional Paper No. 7. Pp. 13-15.
73
Figure 8.
Oliver Summary of Peace Operations Functions
The same document also provides general guidance on how to achieve safe and
secure environments:

Build host nation ownership and capacity

Act only with an understanding of the local context

Prioritize to stabilize (managing expectations)

Use a conflict lens as opposed to considering the operation a development

Recognize (task) interdependence79
The first two points of guidance focus on decentralized local education, training,
and empowerment. These reflect the new foundations for developing or reestablishing
79
Ibid, pp. 6-39 – 6-40.
74
good governance found in the literature.80 The next three points focus on interpersonal
skills applied to the situation. The Civil Security literature is replete with emphases and
recommendations concerning the necessity for interveners in crisis situations to establish
personal credibility with the relevant social elements that require assistance in
building/re-building safe and secure environments.81
However, this guidance seems incomplete. Is that all there is to establishing a
safe and secure environment: to go local and to be credible? The Guiding Principles…
appear to assume full situational awareness and complete task integration of the
organizations providing a safe and secure environment. A better approach, albeit keyed
to the United States experience, can be found in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s National Response Framework (NRF).82 The NRF must take into account the
intergovernmental complexity of American governance – federal, state and local political
institutions each with substantive and overlapping powers and jurisdictions. It
emphasizes development of a common situational awareness among these different
institutions, thus enabling more effective marshalling of assets to relieve communities in
dire need of assistance. The NRF does not assume task integrity, but rather provides a
command and control framework that encourages coordination and sharing of critical
information among organizations initially responding to crises (first responders.) In
providing a safe and secure environment, militaries are likely candidates for being first
responders. This observation leads to a sixth guidance element:

Establish a shared and common information awareness with all stakeholders both
domestic and international (where necessary)
There is a second aspect of the guidance on how to establish safe and secure
environments that seems missing. In addition to a decentralized, contextual approach,
skilled interpersonal dynamics, and shared, current and relevant information, a safe and
secure environment requires a real capable presence that can produce the sense of
security necessary for development and stable governance. The Guiding Principles…
80
For example, consult Asraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008. In particular, read Chapter 1 to appreciate the argument.
81
For example, consult Danielle Beswick and Paul Jackson, Conflict, Security and Development: An
Introduction; New York: Routledge, 2008. The need for interpersonal skills is woven throughout this
introductory text, but is captured explicitly in the last chapter. Go to page 131 for a specific instance.
82
National Response Framework; Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008.
75
itself notes this in a discussion of security as a cross-cutting principle.83 The United
Nations recognizes the need to address this in its Considerations for Mission Leadership
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.84
2.
Stakeholder Analysis
The Safe and Secure Environment stakeholder analysis input comprises two sets.
The first set looks internally at the Department of Defense potential stakeholders in what
will become the 38G Governance specialty within the Army. The second set looks
externally to those potential stakeholders both domestically and internationally who
might have an interest in what 38Gs are intended to do, with respect to Safe and Secure
Environments, when deployed.
Before addressing each set, it is informative to remind oneself as to the general
function of the 38G specialty. According to information provided during the most recent
Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW), held at the
George Mason Arlington, Virginia campus between 24-27 March 2014, soldiers with this
specialty should be able to provide the necessary military support to governance
institutions across the spectrum of operational planning; however, the main phases of
operations for which the specialty is designed are conflict prevention or engagement,
post-hostilities/post-crisis operations, and transition to civilian government. The 38G
soldier is supposed to interact with host nations requiring their assistance at the
operational and ministerial level, not at the tactical levels. These soldiers are supposed to
be educated and experienced in the conditions or sectors that comprise stable governance
according to the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, a book length
document developed jointly by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the US
Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) that is considered a major
reference in the field of stability operations. These conditions or sectors are (1) safe and
secure environments; (2) rule of law; (3) functioning economy and infrastructure; (4)
social well-being; and (5) governance.
Guidelines… p. 3-20.
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Considerations for Mission Leadership in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Edita Vastra Aros AB: Stockholm, 2010. Especially read
Chapter 4. Hereafter referred to as Considerations…
83
84
76
The first set of stakeholders, concerning internal DoD organizations, begins with
the direct sponsor for the 38G, the IMSG. In turn, the Institute is suborned to the JFK
Special Operations Warfare Center and School (SWCS). A SWCS answer to the Army
Special Operations Command, which itself answers to Headquarters, Special Operations
Command (SOCOM.) IMSG, SWCS, Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC),
and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) must be considered primary stakeholders
for the 38G.
The major provider for soldiers holding the 38G specialty is to come from the
Army Reserve. The central organization with the Reserve dealing with the 38- specialty
group is the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (CAPOC). CAPOC
obtains its relevant forces from the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC.)
USARC in turn answers to the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), an agency of
Headquarter, Department of the Army. CAPOC, USARC, and OCAR all must be
considered primary stakeholders for the 38G.
Because the 38G is an Army specialty, nested within the general 38- series of
Civil Affairs specialties, because Civil Affairs is an Army branch, and because the Army
has executive agency over civil-military operations for the DoD, there is an Army
stakeholder interest in the 38G. The first Army agency with a stakeholder interest is the
Human Resources Command (HRCOM), the agency that manages all Army personnel
and their specialties. The second Army agency of interest is TRADOC, which has the
responsibility to develop training curricula, organizational structures, and operational
doctrine for all Army soldiers, including the 38- series. Within TRADOC, as pointed out
in the Stability Essential Task Matrix, the United States Army Combined Arms
Command (USACAC) has doctrinal responsibility for identifying force application of
several Security tasks; USACAC must be considered at least a secondary stakeholder.
The third Army agency of interest is Forces Command (FORSCOM), which has the
responsibility to provide Army force units, including Civil Affairs units, to relevant
warfighting commands. Finally, there is Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)
itself, which has the administrative command and control responsibility for all Army
units and soldiers. Even though much deployment agency has been delegated to SOCOM
for employment and training of Civil Affairs soldiers and units, one cannot deny the
77
inherent responsibilities of these Army agencies with respect to a new 38G specialty.
HRCOM, TRADOC, FORSCOM and HQDA must be considered at least supporting, if
not primary stakeholders for 38G.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other military services, there
are likely potential stakeholders for the 38G. Two primary offices are the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC),
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA). On the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the J-7, holding responsibility for joint training and education, appears to
be at least a supporting stakeholder. Within the other services, the most notable potential
stakeholder is the Navy Expeditionary Combatant Command, the agency in charge of
Navy civil affairs; in this case, it would appear that NECC is a secondary and supporting
stakeholder.
The second set of stakeholders, concerning those external to the DoD, also is
substantial. First, the Department of State clearly holds a stakeholder position in what
and how the 38G operates in other countries; precisely which DoS agencies have the
most interest is unclear at this time (the Agency for International Development is one
possible candidate). However, embassies and consulates would have a primary stake in
38G activities. Because this part of the stakeholder analysis concerns Safe and Secure
Environments, the Department of Justice, particularly the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms should be considered at least secondary stakeholders due to their significant
overseas presence working with governments. Additionally, the United States
Coastguard, under the Department of Homeland Security, should be considered a
secondary stakeholder as they often provide overseas training and assistance to countries
in their special areas that cover safe and secure environments. The Intelligence
Community (IC) likely will be very interested in 38G activities and thus must be
considered at least a secondary stakeholder.
The United Nations would have a significant potential stakeholder interest in 38G
activities, particularly in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) as these agencies have UN
responsibilities for achieving safe and secure environments. If one focuses on human
78
security, a critical component of Safe and Secure Environments, then the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees should be considered at least a secondary stakeholder.
Other UN agencies likely are potential stakeholders for 38G, but they should be covered
under separate sector reports (e.g. World Health Organization under Social Well Being).
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) also have at least a secondary
stakeholder interest in 38G activities although the precise NGOs will vary significantly
depending on the context and geographic situation. Finally, the media will likely be very
interested in what 38Gs do or do not do; again, like NGOs, the precise media agencies
and organizations will vary from situation to situation.
3.
Key Participants / Points of Contact
Refer to the 1st Quarter Progress Report.
4.
PSOTEW Session
SSE facilitated the PSOTEW WG 3 Safe and Secure Environment panel at the
PSOTEW. Speakers were MG (ret) Selmo Cikotic, Michael Dziedzic, Corrine Wegener,
and MAJ Andrew DeJesse. Papers and presentations have been posted to the GISD
APAN site. There were almost 70 attendees at the panel; they will become our
Community of Interest for future coordination, collaboration and information. The list of
attendees has been posted on APAN.
5.
Sector IPR Planning
The SSE IPR Workshop now is scheduled for 12-13 May 2014 at the Army
Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. We prepared a draft IPR
Workshop Schedule and posted it on APAN. We expect a workshop composed of 20-40
experts to hone in on the Security tasks for the 38G.
A draft schedule for the IPR is provided below. This is in review at the time of
this writing and is subject to change.
Draft Safe and Secure Environment IPR Schedule
Day One, 12 May 2014
1000
Welcome and introductions. (Reason for late start is to enable
DC outbound attendees to weather the traffic.)
1030 - 1200
Project lead and/or Sponsor comments.
79
1200 – 1330
Lunch (on your own.)
1330 – 1500
Session One. Presentations on SSE. Desirably from UN
DPKO, BG Van Roosen, an NGO (?) perspective, and a DOS
(?) perspective. Presentations should address the current state
of SSE, and the desired direction and characteristics of SSE. If
time permits, conduct a brainstorming session with the
workshop attendees on the same subject.
1500 – 1515
Break and informal discussion
1515 – 1700
Session Two. Begin brainstorming what the key tasks a 38G
should have reference SSE, for each of the three specialty levels.
1900
Video showing of “This is what winning looks like.” Should be
in a place where drinks and snacks (e.g., popcorn) can be
consumed.
Day Two, 13 May 2014
0830 - 0900
Return welcome and reflection on first day’s events. Capture in
hotwash fashion.
0900 – 0945
Finish Session Two items.
1000 – 1200
Session Three. Brainstorm what the SSE operating conditions
are for each level of the 38G MOS.
1200 – 1330
Lunch
1330 – 1530
Session Four. Brainstorm what are the SSE educational
standards/requirements for 38G at each level.
1530 – 1545
Break
1545 – 1715
Session Five. Hotwash. What have we missed? What did you
like about the workshop? What didn’t you like? What would
you like to see added that we haven’t already discussed?
1715
Adieu
6.
Enabling Technologies
No findings at this time.
80
D.
ECONOMY/SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The IMSG is working to develop a new approach. On the new model specialists
in several areas (including Economics) would be recruited with a higher level of skills
and experience in order to support military and interagency efforts in the future operating
environment, across of the range of military operations, but most importantly in stability
operations settings. Another line of effort is aligning expertise along the general lines of
widely accepted stability frameworks instead of traditionally defined Functional Areas in
military doctrine or personnel policies. The second quarter of research for the
Economy/Sustainable Development sector was focused on delivering on the research. It
involved fully understanding the reach, scope and scale of the mission and on following
the guidance and research foundations established during the meetings at Mountain View
CA and Fort Bragg with senior, Army and IMSG leadership, and at the Stanford
December 2013 review sessions. We held continuing conversations with project sponsor
and CA community of practitioners to help us understand better the 38A roles and focus
fully on the mission to prepare and enable 38G specificities and utilization for the
Functional areas of the Economy.
The message from CA leadership to us is to look at 38As as the integrators,
interlocutors and interpreters while the 38G is seen as an expert in the field (not a hyperspecialist), an interloper who can move back and forth between the military and the
private/academic/community-of-practice sectors in order to bring back knowledge to bear
on complex problem sets. CA senior leaders who have significant experience in complex
environments are describing accurately what senior military leaders expect from their
38A and 38G's: “Commanders will use the 38A to identify those areas that require the
deep expertise from 38G, but the integrating planning functions are 38A work”. Col Jose
Madera explains further:
“To coin a phrase that attempts to capture this dichotomy the 38A is an
integrating generalist while the 38G is a functional integrator. Leadership
seams not to want super experts (i.e., PhD types) and express a need for
the 38G to be able to identify when those are needed. For instance, an
economics G could identify that an inflation situation caused by
intervention may require an IMF or WB expert to be asked to advise to a
Task Force Commander or Ministry official, rather than providing the
advice.”
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1.
Literature Review / Bibliography
Framing the literature review on this area is being performed in three iterative
steps. The first was to identify the topical and disciplinary areas that inform the activities
and challenges of 38G current and potential future tasks related to economic activities. In
this first step, we focused mainly on the fields of economic business and development
functions. Relevant bibliographic topical and disciplinary areas include:
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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
FINANCE AND MACRO-ECONOMICS
MICRO LENDING
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION
SOCIAL ECONOMY
MARKETING & ECONOMIC COMMUNICATIONS
LANDUSE & AGRARIAN REFORM
ECONOMIC REGULATION
ENERGY ECONOMICS
UTILITIES AND NETWORK INDUSTRIES
TRANSPORTAION ECONOMICS
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
RISK AND RESILIENCE
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS DYNAMICS
COMPLEX APAPTIVE SYSTEMS
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
LABOR ECONOMICS
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
GENDER ECONOMICS
URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
PRIVATIZATION & PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
EXPEDITIONARY ECONOMICS
ILLICIT ECONOMIES
The second step was to validate the identified areas with CA-MISO professionals
as well as economics and business experts and to proceed to select the key theoretical,
empirical, and causal-experiential relevant works to identify the key areas of debate. This
field is interdisciplinary where theoretical and methodological approaches can give very
different pictures of reality and therefore suggest very different and often conflicting
82
courses of action. Understanding these complexities is one of the most important parts of
this literature review.
The third step is to validate and select key references for annotation and organize
them by relevance and optionality as well as applicability to different economic and
development functions.
The literature review is a work in progress. The current bibliography is provided
in Appendix E.
2.
Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholders are entities-people and institutions- that have an interest in the
process or outcome of the current state of affaires, or in any change of the status quo or
future state of reality. The stake and its interests are also at risk—exposed to the
possibility of losing the interest or gaining something from any action or change in
circumstances. The stakeholders for the economy and sustainable development areas are
best identified when a clear objective is stated, and as seen in the literature reviews
categories, different stakeholders can be identified for different approaches, theories and
methods, to economic issues and functions.
For the 38G one of the most important tasks will always be to asses and identify
the stakeholders, as well as those, whose interest and risks profiles might be affected by
any change in economic relationship. It is the way to approach stakeholders, and find the
emergent stakeholders or the hidden interest, that get mobilized upon economic
relationship changes, that is critical for 38G in the economic realms. These stakeholders
are very different for the different functions of the economy. The stakeholders are also
involved in varied ways in each of the economic functions, among and between each
other and the way they pursue their interest. It is therefore not possible to have an
exhaustive list of stakeholders, but more importantly to indicate the types of stakeholders
that can be encountered, so that the 38G have a way of checking their initial assumptions
in each phase of activity and continue looking for the evident, as well as the hidden and
emergent stakeholders.
A sample list follows according to the interests at stake.

In the US:
o US Congress & commissions
o Specific congressman and senators
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o
o
o
o
o
o
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NSCOUNCIL/CIA/NSA Others
USAID
TDA
EXIMBANK
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation
DEPARTMENTS OF:
 AGRICULTURE
 ENERGY
 LABOR
 TREASURY
 JUSTICE/ DEA
 TRANSPORTATION
 REGULATORY AGENCIES:
 EPA
 SEC
 FCC
 FDA
 BANKING COMMISSION
o US Military
 Each force
 Civil Affairs
 National Guard
o US Regional and State interest
 According to trading partner
 County Diasporas
MULTILATERAL GOVERNMENTAL ORG:
o UN AGENCIES:
 ECOSOC (UN Economic and Social Council)
 FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
 WFP World food program
 IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
 UNDP Development Program
 UNECE, UNECLA, (AFRICA, ASIA )
 ILO International Labour Organization
 WTO World Trade Organization ( UN related org)
 UNICITRAL Commission on International Trade Law
 IMO (International Maritime Organization (IMO)
 IPCC/ International panel on Climate Change
 WMO World Meteorological Organization
 ITU International Telecommunication Union
 GLOBAL COMPACT
 UNFIP (fund for international partnerships)
 UN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM
 UNWOMEN
 UNCTAD UN conference on Trade and Development
 UN Millennium Development Goals
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 UNHCR High commission for Refugees
 IOM International Organization for Migration
 UNFPA Population Fund
 UN HABITAT- settlement
 UNDG International development group
 UNITAR Institute for training and research
 UNRISD Research institute for Social development
 UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
 UPU Universal Postal Union
 UNOCHA
 UNWTO World Tourism Organization
 WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
 WHO, World Health Organization
 UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
 Organization
 UNICEF, UNEDUCATION ( SOCIAL WELL BEING)
o WORLD BANK
 IMF International Monetary Fund /
 IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
 IFC International Finance Corporation
 IDA International Development Association
o OTHER MULTILATERAL ORG:
 MDB ( AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, IDB)
 RELIEF AGENCIES
 OECD
 Development Banks
Private sector:
o Merchant Banks, Investment banks,
o Insurance companies/Reinsurance companies
o Credit rating agencies
o Sovereign wealth funds
o Specialty funds
o Sector funds
o OPEC
Allied countries/ COALITION stakeholders
o UNDPKO
o In country stakeholders
 Military
 Political agents
 Mayors/ Governors
 Armed factions
 Civil society leadership
 Intellectuals opinion leaders
 Industrialists/Manufacturers
 Local regional and national criminal organization and racket rings
o PRIVATE SECTOR:
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3.
INDUSTRY& COMMERCE/ Sector (SIC code)
 Energy/ Up stream - downstream
 Mining companies/extractive industries
 Telecommunication equip
 Equipment Manufacturers/ Trucks tractors
 Weapons manufacturers/brokers and sellers (& Governments)
 Airlines
 Shipping
 Transportation/ ports and airports
 Consulting firms
 Law firms/engineering firms/economic advisory
 Security firms
 Trading firms (also hybrid)
Industrial associations BY SECTOR
 Manufacturers associations
NGO’S:
 Cultural/language
 Affinity groups
 Faith-based organizations
 Crowdsourcing
 Energy
 Environment
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Key Participants / Points of Contact
Key members of the sector team include: Dr. Maria Dubravka Pineda, Sector
Lead, Dr. Steven Hall, MOVES Institute and expert in Complex Adaptive Systems; and
Col. Jose Madera, Military Operational and Strategic Planning. Other participating
experts include: Andrew Paterson, Public Private Partnerships; Patrik Willot, Private
Sector; Dr. Leobard Estrada, UCLA, Transformation of Educational Design; Dr. Selmo
Cikotic, Economy & Security co-dependencies; Branko Terzic, Regulation of Economic
Sectors; and Mara Batlin, Economic Development and Growth. The work is consulting
with the following organizations: WB, IFC, IMF, ECLAC, UNECE, GCSP, USAID,
DECAF, UNCTAD, GLOBAL COMPACT, WEF, IDB, FAO, UNITAR, UNIDO,
USEXIMBANK, TDA, DOE, IEA, WTO, EBRD, and OECD. The team is informed by
input from CA officers who are alumni of the NPS SSDCO certification. Additional
expert inputs during the IPR were provided by Tom Baltazar, Mark Kelly, John
Czarnecki, Bob Jones, Brian Panton, Mike Dziedzic, Glen Goddard, and Mike Hess,
among others.
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4.
IPR Findings
The team developed an initial influence diagram to assess and compare the
original functional area specialties related to this sector with the Emerging Economics
area requirements of capabilities and expertise needed that were becoming apparent from
a more in-depth dynamic analysis done by the team and the consulted experts.
Integrating the silos of military tasking and command hierarchy and reporting,
with the changing environments and flexible demands of a political economy, and the
strategic objectives of the mission, is a challenge for officers in the field and for
leadership alike. What education and level and expertise are necessary for the 38G to be
effective in those circumstances is the challenging question.
We started our IPD by framing the issues and the context:
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Experiential testimony and case studies and Gap analysis from the field of CA
practitioners and leadership.
Higher learning institutions shift in educational design and credentialing as an
outlook to the future use and availability of talent and knowledge for IMSG.
Understanding of Adaptive System Dynamics at play in a political economy and
what that means for 38G capabilities planning.
From this we identified the following issues in the field:
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A need for strategic and systems thinking, at all levels of decision making
o Importance to recognize and evaluate trade-offs, risks, influence and impact of
‘emerging’ actors, agents and stakeholders, not just the ‘usual suspects’.
Interdependencies of agents, actors, and interests in each domain and among the
fields/areas
Dependence on initial conditions and expected outcomes.
The dynamic nature of change and its feedback and lag loops for the economy and
actions of agents.
The need to look at the dynamic nature within the fields (Economy, RoL, SWB,
Security, Governance, etc.), and dependencies among the fields, to be able to
address better the educational needs and qualifications of the potential 38G.
Some additional identified gaps and issues for 38G Econ:
Must have exposure or comfort in planning at operational and strategic planning.
Proof of proficiency and competence necessary
Building blocks of cumulative education, training is not enough.
Need to be able to operate under uncertainty
Adroit at analogical reasoning and knowledge transfer.
Force generation problem: how to find or enable 38G.
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The Economy/Sustainable Development sector review identified the following
38G specialty areas and levels identified three main home areas of economic functioning:
(1) Production and Industry; (2) Trade and Commerce; (3) Finance. A home-area
approach to 38G in economics would provide recruiters the ability to develop an
inventory in each home area of each stability sector of cross culturally competent civil
sector experts with home area systems thinking capability, which is the more valued
competency over specific specialty technical competencies in most expected 38G
problem sets.
It can be also expected that some specialties within a home area will be populated
by persons more liable to have the personal attributes and experiences that support cross
cultural competence. The home area concept allows for those specialties to be overrepresented in the 38G population for that area, which is acceptable as candidates without
competency are unsuitable regardless of their civilian skills.
Training for 38G is expected to consist of three separate courses. It can be
expected that some specialties within a home area will, by the nature of their civil
requirements have more flexibility in their ability to complete required training without
disruption to their civilian careers. As in recruiting, a home areas approach allows for
weighting towards those specialties within a home area of a sector. This supports
maximum availability of specialist with systems knowledge to support military
government, operational, planning and advisory needs.
While the home area concept may result in the some specific specialties to be
underrepresented, it is useful to note that this can be expected to be a limitation only in
some very specific HN support scenarios. It can be expected that the other aspect of 38G
employment – informing strategic planning and advising senior military leaders – almost
solely demands the capability for systems thinking within the home area.
A holistic consideration of the 38G program leads to serious consideration of
identification of a basket of civil sector specialists within home areas of stability sectors
as a very viable methodology to guide the development of a 38G population with the
skills sets needed to support military government as well as the full range of military
operations.
The 38G will have to be able to do the following:
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Assess situation based on incomplete and often intentionally misleading
information
Make decisions and recommendations under uncertainty and time constraints
Incomplete stakeholders assessment of risks and its associated losses and
gains.
Sample Recommendation for 38G Economy/Commerce Stability Functions:
Production Function - Industry
3.
Experience and Skills
a.
Primary: Possesses superior knowledge in the assessment of the
issues impacting economic stability of the local economy,
specifically in the production and commerce of goods and services.
b.
Supplementary skills and Experience
i.
Value chain dynamics (A2)
ii.
Income generating activities and market linkages (A2)
iii.
Property rights and Titling (B,0)
iv.
Informal sector activities (I,1)
v.
Intergovernmental and international institutions experience
(A2)
vi.
Monetary and financing of development (A2)
vii.
Interpersonal skills and ability to team work and lead high
level sectorial experts as well as Government counterparts
(A1)
viii.
Public finance (B1)
ix.
Basic natural science background (B0)
x.
Knowledge of Management accounting (I0)
xi.
Management audit experience in public and private sector
(I1)
xii.
Knowledge and experience of similar local settings
(geography, sociology, ethnography) (I1)
xiii.
Cultural sensitivity (A1)
xiv.
Presentation and Communication skills (A1)
4.
Proficiency Level: Basic (B), Intermediate (I), Advance (A).
a.
Personal Experience Requirements: None (0), Moderate (1),
Extensive
Regarding academic prerequisites, IPR discussion centered on the diverse
academic and professional background of potential 38G’s. According to the level of
intervention, the workgroup concluded that there has to be a general knowledge of basic
economic and business courses. This can be achieved by demonstration of course
completion at relevant academic level (including syllabus) and or a proficiency exam.
An example of the needed academic background is as follows:
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ECONOMICS & FINANCE
Micro-economics
Political Economy
Economic Development Theory & Practice
Trade Theory & Practice
Macro-economics
Public Accounting & Finance
POLICY and PLANNING
Planning Theory & Practice
Sociology & Social Movements
Urban Planning
Regional Development
Policy and Regulation
Land Use Planning and Reforms
Institutional Development & Public Sector Reform
Technology & Innovation
Environmental Policy
Sectorial / Industrial Analysis
Industrial Policy
BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT
Strategic Culture
Strategic Planning
Financial Accounting
Business Accounting & Finance
Competitive Analysis
Organizational Behavior
Marketing and Communication
Psycho-Sociology (human behavior dynamics)
Entrepreneurship
Methods Courses:
Research Methodology (Quantitative; Qualitative)
Analytical Methods
Project Management
Geographic Information Systems
Risk and Game Theory
Demography / Ethnography
Notes from the Economy and Social Well-Being sector reviews are provided
together in Appendix F.
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5.
PSOTEW Session
Dr. Maria Pineda introduced the Economy and Sustainable Development session
describing the basis of economy as engaging the risk and pricing the risk, with the
capacity to lose and to gain. The study in this sector is starting with the USIP framework,
but going beyond it.
Col Jose Madera, acting commander of 353 CA command and former NPS
Security, Stability, and Development in Complex Operations (SSDCO) student, started
his presentation by describing recent experience in Colombia, commander’s emergency
response program (CERP: “money as a weapon system”), and others, describing himself
as an “accidental economist.” He emphasized that Colombians were seeking a
comprehensive approach with a sustainable long term solution. In his experiences, he
needed to become acquainted with different markets and economies, also adding cultural
context. He stated that the Army does not need functional specialists, but functional
integrators. There is a need to attack problems holistically. He recommended developing
a focused approach improving access to economics-related civilian skill sets: the Army
must leverage individuals who are grounded on critical core economic skills and
understand the need for a systems approach to complex adaptive systems in conflict,
transitional, and stability environments. He discussed ways to educate the force, and
suggested funding PhDs in exchange for service, with additional methods for recruiting
from inside and outside the force. Consider the “river” of talent the civilian world has and
tap into that early, bringing civilians into the reserves; finding more creative ways to
bring experienced personnel into the services beyond retirement/beyond uniform);
developing assessment, intake, and credentialing mechanisms that improve Army
personnel practices; and expanding training and educational opportunities with
interagency, academic and corporate partners and stakeholders. The desired end state is a
CA force capability that is organized, trained, and available on a sustainable basis to
support Army Service Component and Geographic Combatant Commander objectives by
providing economic development and stability planning and execution capability.
Patrik Willot also emphasized a system-based approach. He raised a number of
important questions regarding the civil society / private sector: Where does crisis start
and where does development start? The answer is that it is not a threshold. Budget lines
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created that mentality. We emphasize integration and interdependence yet we do not
commit to it. What are the needs? What are the windows of opportunity for military
support? Taking a systems view, you need to identify the triggers. You plant the seed for
development during the crisis.
Mr. Willot described the characteristics of post-conflict situations (Private Sector
Development in Post-Conflict Countries, N. Mac Sweeney, DCED 2008) – economic
(loss of assets, distorted markets, …); political and security-related; social; and
demographic. The world population is becoming more urbanized, creating problems in
RoL, functioning markets, functioning economy, etc.. We need to take an integrated
approach to community development, breaking down “silo-thinking” and creating more
“cross-vision.” Need to focus on who is being taught, not what is being taught; i.e.,
individuals (spiritual, emotional, physical, intelligential development) – social human
beings (community institutions – social, law, economy, security) – and supporting
infrastructure. He discussed the importance of women in post-crisis economics (the
microeconomy), recognizing their role and interest in infrastructure development, to
include design of housing and settlements. We need to think of the value chain, structure,
evolution – long-term for resilience and sustainability, not short-term. The approach
requires credibility to deal holistically, systemically (structure, evolution, process), and
with participation (national and local ownership; these are the beneficiaries and must be
there at the start or they won’t be there at the end).
Branko Terzic, Executive Director of Deloitte Global Center for Energy,
presented some of the realities of global energy conditions. There are 7B people in world;
but only 2B with reliable electricity. Also interesting to note that 50% of humanity,
mostly in the tropics, still relies on wood for fuel (with air pollution as the #1 cause of
death around the world). Problems are principally due to governance and regulation
issues. Regulation is the imposition of government controls over the decisions of firms in
order to prevent exploiting of market power to extract pure economic profits; an
alternative to nationalization; a reason to encourage competition. Objectives of regulation
of private capital include protecting consumers from abuse by companies; protecting
investors from abuse by government; and promoting economic efficiency. He noted that
infrastructure and public utility services have monopoly characteristics; they are capital
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intensive and vital to public health and safety (e.g., electricity, natural gas, water
distribution, urban mass transit, etc.). A government needs to have clear energy policy
objectives addressing efficiency and supply reliability. Upon initiation of control, there
are several likely outcomes, to include ineffective management, inadequate service,
unreliable service is unreliable (daily outages, voltage and frequency fluctuations) and
inadequate revenue (rates too low, illegal connections, large amount billed but not paid).
There is a proven failure of regulation evident in the fact that 72% of people in subSaharan Africa have cell phones (from entrepreneurship), while only 27% have electricity
service (state monopolies). To attract investors, there needs to be good regulation. Private
capital is available to meet global energy infrastructure requirements; but attracting
private capital at reasonable cost requires good regulatory policy (law) and performance
(administration). The parameters of good regulation are known and knowable from a
century of international experience. Some additional information is available at: UNSG
data on domestic air pollution: http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7464 –
Secretary Generals remarks at General Assembly thematic debate on Water, Sanitation,
and Sustainable Energy in the Post-2014 Development Agenda: “by 2030 we will need
35% more food, 40% more water, and 50% more energy.”
Andrew Paterson, Environmental Business International, raised the question of
from where does the money come? How do we make the transition from the “spending a
budget” model to attracting funding and what are the alternatives. Has the spending
model run its course? There is an ongoing transition from spending model (get money
and spend it) to an investment model (attracting finance). Challenges to Governance
Innovation – there will not be enough funding from US Congress, so do the current
development/transition models “work”? Is “stabilize and exit” the best model or plan?
What are the alternatives – build-operate-transfer? It is no longer a CA problem when
you create the situation and environment that attracts outside investment. CA always
needs to understand the environments – better to say, when is it no longer a maneuver
commander’s problem, when do you no longer need a kinetic force? The objective is to
take an investment and turn it into loans (shared risk). CA officers have a lot of
experience in project management, but no training. Need training to manage the projects
in the context of hand-off. There is over $200 Trillion in world stock and bond value –
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plenty of capital, partitioned by risk and return. However, this is even understated, since
it does not include the “gray” market which may be on the order of $600 Trillion.
Follow-on discussion noted that CA needs to provide capabilities in pre-conflict
situations where violence is present and risk is high. What is the proper working
relationship between private entities and government? There is a focus on initial
response, creating stability, and then transition. It is important to be able to identify key
actors and influence to prevent long-term destabilization in the economic realm. What are
some indicators that can be identified in the economic realm that military can influence?
There is opportunity to influence or create economy when in-country, but when
we leave, it leaves a vacuum in the country, and greater competition at local level since
we pulled our resources out. This spirals as we withdraw our resources (“DoD taper”).
6.
Enabling Technologies
No update at this time.
E.
SOCIAL WELL-BEING
1.
Literature Review / Bibliography
No update at this time.
2.
Stakeholder Analysis
Refer to Section II.F.
3.
Key Participants / Points of Contact
Refer to the SWB sector review meeting attendee list (Appendix E).
4.
IPR Findings
The SWB sector review was conducted March 27-28, 2014, in the USAID
training facility in Crystal City. Notes from the Economy and Social Well-Being sector
reviews are provided together in Appendix E. The SWB sector identified the following
descriptions of positions as relevant for 38G consideration:
Global Public Health Officer (new)
Description of positions. Identifies positions requiring assessment and advice on
all aspects of health that impact social well-being.
Qualifications.
-Minimum Master of Public Health, preferable with International or Global health
concentration.
-Some combination of following:
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Health Emergencies in Large Populations course (ICRC)
Medical Support of Stability Operations (Def Med Readiness Training Center)
USIP Post-conflict Health Course
State Department Global Health Diplomacy Course
Global Health Stability and Security (CDHAM_USUHS)
Veterinary Stability Operations Course
Medical Culture (CDHAM_USUHS)
Disaster Preparedness and Response Officer (Refinement of 5Y)
Description of positions: Identifies positions requiring assessment, advice, and
analysis of all hazards preparedness and response operations for domestic and
international disasters.
Qualifications:
Master degree in Disasters Management
and
Some combination of additional courses:
 Int’l Diploma for Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA)
 UN C-M Coord Course
 EMAP Emergency Management Assessment Course (FEMA)
 Certificate in Emergency Management
 FEMA Course ICD
 HAZMAT/HAZWOPER
 CBRNE
 Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (OFDA)
Complex Emergency Officer (refinement of 5Y)
Description of positions. Identifies positions requiring analysis, planning,
implementation, and management of indigenous emergency service assets in the
preparation for or conduct of civil defense response to complex emergencies.
Enables vulnerable populations to progress through protection, normalization,
capacity building and empowerment in order to ensure full participation in civil
society and governance representation.
Qualifications. Requires the completion of Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) independent; or equivalent experience as a Regional Civil
Defense Director; or Certification as a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM)
through the International Association of Emergency Managers or a degree in
Emergency or Disaster Management through an accredited teaching institution.
Qualifications. Basic levels (1L) completion of a bachelor’s degree (Major
immaterial) and certificated in Complex Emergency Management with 2-3 years
of field experience; Advanced Levels (1M-1P) require a Master level education in
Peacekeeping Policy / Management, Conflict Analysis and Intervention
(Doctorate for 1P)
Relief to Development Continuum Officer (new – 5Z)
Description of positions. Advises commanders and international or national level
leaders and manager or stakeholders and other experts on adequate planning,
95
implementation and management across multiple sectors; integrates to achieve
unity of effort across the relief to development continuum in concert with
stakeholders. Enables appropriate responses through the phases of (1) complex
emergency, (2) stability; (3) normalization; (4) development.
Qualifications. Basic level (1L) completion of a bachelor’s degree (Major
immaterial) and certificated in Complex Emergency Management with 2-3 years
of field experience; Advanced Levels (1M-1P) require a Master level education in
Development or in Peacekeeping Policy or Masters in Conflict Analysis and
Peace Building. (Doctorate for 1P).
5.
PSOTEW Session
The Social Well-Being session in PSOTEW Working Group 3 was introduced by
Marc Ventresca with the following questions:
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
What are current best practice conceptions of ‘initial response’ priorities and
capacity-building?
What inter- and intra-organizational challenges in alignment with partner
agencies, missions(s)?
How do existing research, policy and practice conceptualize ‘transformation,’ or
short-term development and intervention?
What are CA desiderata and limits for ‘fostering sustainability,’ or long-term
development?
What insights for HA-SW policy and practice from innovation and infrastructure
studies? Substantive and functional knowledge – how to make it practical. What
can be learned from large-scale project management and related issues.
Col Glenn Goddard spoke on Infrastructure, examining the interrelationships and
interdependencies across the sectors. He presented several approaches, considering
benefits and issues with each, for how to bring the functional experts to the battlefield
(e.g., hire civilian contractors, provide reachback to experts, pull and deploy functional
experts from reserve units, and virtual presence).
Norville DeAtkine discussed the need to take a closer look at peculiarities of
urban warfare on the local culture, considering the psychological and cultural impact of
displaced persons. He described the predominance of women and children in refugee
camps, with the breakdown of the family structure and presence of many young men
undisciplined and tending toward criminal activities. The conditions breed a syndrome of
dispossession where people become dependent on their providers, becoming hostile to
those who do not meet their needs.
James Sosneky presented on the role of CA in social well-being, identified as a
state of affairs where the basic needs of the populace are met. This is a society where
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income levels are high enough to cover basic wants, where there is no poverty, where
unemployment is insignificant, where there is easy access to social, medical and
educational services. The military role, in times of warfare or natural disaster, is to
address urgent needs, while not attempting long-term development. In man-made or
natural disasters, CA can keep lights on, banks open, people fed, people healthy, people
safe, people moving, share the burden, offer hope, remember that hope is not a method,
and leave. In peacetime, there is no SWB role for military CA; the military is not a
development agency.
Leo Estrada spoke on the importance of exploiting demography in civil affairs.
Population is the key – who is there, what are you trying to do, and who are you working
with. Key issues relate to fertility (fertility responds to economic conditions), mortality
(how populations decline), morbidity (causes of death), and migration (people entering
and leaving a region). Demography can meet the need to be able to document knowledge
in a way that others can follow up on, including demographics of leadership (who is most
likely to take leadership).
The attendees were divided into small groups of 2-3 persons to discuss these
topics, followed by a general Q&A and discussion period.
6.
Enabling Technologies
No update at this time.
F.
HOMELAND INTEGRATION
1.
Literature Review / Bibliography
The team continued to add to the project Refworks site. Research continues to
reinforce initial findings. First, there is noticeably thin literature about the concept of the
military’s role in homeland defense. Second, there is a complete misunderstanding of
what is or might be possible. The work will continue to develop these initial findings.
Bibliographic searches of all data bases initially yielded a wealth of articles;
however, upon careful reading one realizes that the authors consistently misused the term
“homeland defense.” Rather, what they generally are describing is “homeland security,”
the civilian-led effort, vice the military function of defense. The publication dates on
many of the articles in the bibliography brings a stark reminder that many of the
questions we are grappling with today have been asked for almost a century, and we have
97
yet to settle on answers or even the terms of the debate. This area is markedly different
from the other five sectors, in that it does not have a “petal” in the USIP diagram.
Therefore, homeland defense integration has markedly different needs to develop as a
research and policy focus. As noted, there is a thin scholarly substantive literature to draw
from. However, there is no lack of media/pundit commentary, although much of it is
inaccurate. To date, scholars have not shown much interest in exploring the area. This
may be a result of the prevailing view that “Posse Comitatus begins with ‘No’,” when
indeed, there are 26 exceptions to that policy in existing law. One literature focus for the
project is the legal and policy legacy of Posse Comitatus: origins, variant claims, and a
new reading for policy. This is also the reason the team is drawing from a variety of
existing literature in several disciplines to define the research agenda.
The focus of continuing research will be to interview practitioners, at both the
strategic and operational levels, as well as scholars in the field. The goal is to develop the
outline of another “petal” in the overall concept, incorporating such areas as strategic
communications, managing crisis and political challenge, and military response in
complex catastrophes (or “beyond Katrina”). The end result will be an annotated
bibliography, as well as a policy paper outlining the way ahead for the IMSG in thinking
about homeland defense.
2.
Stakeholder Analysis
Refer to the project stakeholder analysis in Section II.F.
3.
Key Participants / Points of Contact
The following are considered key points of contact for this sector:
 MG Peter Aylward (ret), USANG

Dr. Marilyn Cobb Croach

Norm Cotton

Edward Edens

Col David Gordon (ret)

Michelle Hughes

Dr. Larry Morgan, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Major Robert Shepard, USA

LTC Jeffrey Voice
98

Senator John W. Warner

Col Ray Decker (ret), USMCR
4.
PSOTEW Session
In working to assemble the panel for the PSOTEW session on Homeland
Integration, 73 persons were contacted, with replies from 59 and direct contact with about
45. Most were supportive of the effort, but had no desire to “speak on the record” about
the issue. All were in violent agreement, however, that “someone” had to do so. Some
made commitments to provide perspectives to help the team shape a policy paper
outlining the existing authorities for this area. At this point in the research, these
authorities seem to be sufficient to enable the use of active duty troops in both man-made
and natural disaster situations without running afoul of Posse Comitatus. What is very
clear, however, is that there is a important need to develop strategic communications to
educate the Active Duty/Reserve/National Guard communities as well as the general
public in order to manage expectations as well as execute appropriate missions.
Panelists for the homeland defense integration session included MG Peter
Aylward (USANG-Ret), Major Robert Sander, USA, Operational Law Attorney at
OTJAG-IOLD/DAMO-OD, and LtCol Jeffrey Voice, USAR and graduate student in
USACAPOC’s SSDCO and Rule of Law certificate programs. The PSOTEW panel was
well-received by the attendees. We have received follow-up communications from about
a dozen participants.
5.
Sector IPR Planning
The team has compiled a list of invitees to the IPR, scheduled for June 24-26 in
Washington DC. The 3 panelists from the PSOTEW panel will be included, as well as
several other participants from the conference who were very engaged in discussion with
the panelists and indicated interest in contributing further to this area. We have reached
out to ascertain their availability on the June dates (3 have already committed), and will
work with them long distance to lay the groundwork for substantive discussion when we
convene in DC. We are assembling several “read-aheads” and have asked the participants
to suggest any they feel would add to the discussion.
6.
Enabling Technologies
No findings at this time.
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G.
SYSTEM/PROCESS INTEGRATION: INTERACTIONS AND
INFLUENCES
1.
Overview
The System/Process Integration Theme is a new project focus that was added to
this effort as a consequence of the recognition that the state building process often
requires a nuanced understanding of how the development of the various sector
objectives interact and must consequently be carefully orchestrated, as a function of the
host nation circumstances, in order to achieve success.
Many of the operations that can be feasibly conducted entail tradeoffs between
long-term progress towards achieving one or more of the objectives while producing
short-term regress on one or more of the other fronts. How to make these tradeoffs has
been identified as a critical skill for a 38G.
2.
Preliminary Literature Review / Bibliography
Preliminary review of the literature on generic system dynamics and complex
adaptive system modeling was conducted along with an initial screening of the literature
on modeling the various context sensitive interdependencies amongst the development
objectives that evolve during the state-building process.
Participation in the PSOTEW served to facilitate access to the subject matter
experts in the development of each of the state-building objectives sectors.
The fundamental conclusion arrived at in the process of reviewing the relevant
literature is that a dynamic model of the state-building process, including the primary
context-sensitive Sector interactions, is a requirement for both instructing 38G on the
complex 2nd and 3rd effects of selected operations and, in the long term, for conducting
military operations in support of stability and governance operations. The consequences
of operations are simply too complicated for practitioners to reliably predict from either
academic principles or field experience.
Review of systems dynamics and multi-agent modeling tools provided a
foundation for making recommendations for requirements for a full modeling initiative.
100
3.
Stakeholder Analysis
The stakeholders for a dynamic, user oriented, model of the state building process
include: the 38G students that will be trained on/with the tool; the military leadership that
will utilize these newly minted 38Gs; and the civilian leadership that these 38Gs are
intended to facilitate communication with. In a sometimes indirect sense all of the
stakeholders in the Sector Themes defined above are stakeholders in this process as well.
2nd Quarter Progress
4.
The System/Process Integration Team is working under the direct supervision of
the Economy/Sustainable Development and SSE sector leads. The team participated in
the PSOTEW and Economy / Social Well-Being sector IPRs, providing a high-level brief
of the work objective and approach. Initial progress reported on included efforts to: (1)
simplify the notion of a ‘state’; (2) impose some structure on the nature of varying donor
objectives in contributing to state-building; (3) propose a high level characterization of
inter-sector influences/interdependencies; and (4) provide a glimpse into a current
modeling approach concept. Six slides extracted from that larger presentation are
included below (Figure 9).
What we Expect of a State
Defines ‘Us’ and ‘Them’
Looks After ‘Us’
Then think about where ‘we’ want to go
Materialism
(survival)
Engages ‘Them’
Realism – Hobbes, et al.
• Unilateralism
• Hegemony
Liberalism – Kant, et al.
• Multilateralism
• Coordination
•
•
•
•
Mutual Aid
State Stability / Power-Balance
Mutual Trust
Interstate Stability / Shared Values
Persistence
(knowing)
Defines & Defends ‘Boundaries’
Attends to Constituent’s Welfare
Manages Interstate Engagement
• Providing national values and
narratives
• Exercising exclusive violence to
manage hostile foreign/criminal
elements
• Providing ‘territorial’ integrity
•
•
•
•
Defines collective action
problems … ‘appropriately’
Collects taxes ... from those
whom will ‘benefit’
Distributes goods and services
to those ‘in need’
•
•
Manages response to non-state
actors
Negotiates interstate collective
action roles … for the state
Enters into long-term ‘symbiotic’
relations with other states
Adaptation
(believing)
Constructivism – Onuf, et al.
• Partnership
• Identity Reification
•
•
Relationality – Yaqing, et al.
• Improvisionalism
• Transcendence
Mutual Obligation
National Identities & Diversity
•
•
Mutual Acceptance
International Governance Process
Idealism
(meaning)
Donor conception of inter-state relation value determines how they engage
(and how they will measure success)
An effective State acts in and speaks to the interest of the Nation
4
Functions of a ‘State’
Varying Donor Objectives
What’s Required to Build a State
(with select interactions)
ia
Soc
l Id
+)
ty (
enti
Safe and
Secure
Environment
5
Sample Model: Security Sector
Ris
k(
-)
Sustainable
Economy
licy (+)
Goods
ate Po
Legitim
/Service
s (+)
Rule of
Law
Stable
Governance
Negative feedback tells me to …
Social Well
Being
Consent (+)
Choucri, “Understanding Modeling State Stability: Exploiting Systems Dynamics”
State Building … is a bootstrapping process
9
•
Beware of Collateral Damage
•
•
•
Track Acceptable Level of Violence
Watch Desire for Government
Monitor Security Force Ratios
14
101
Abstract Sector Influences
System Dynamics Modeling
Key ‘Agents’ of a Nation State
Development Model
•
Individual Agents (Passive and Politically Relevant)
–
Attributes
•
•
•
•
–
Multi-tiered Self Attachment Structure
Resources (real capital and labor)
Associated Value Matrix
Associated Expectation Matrix
•
Make self-interested profit investments and concessions
•
Make other-focused value reification/denigration expenditures
–
Influenced by perceived risk-driven ROI
Influenced by perceived adaptiveness of organizational structure
Social Networks (Host State, Sub-State SIGs, Donor States, INGOs)
–
Attributes
–
Behavior
•
•
•
•
•
•
Ethnic
Distributions
Behavior
–
•
Early Concept of 38-Golf
Nation State Building Training Tool
Managed Real Capital
Managed Social Capital
Investment in Sectors: Security, Economics, Social Well Being, Politics, Rule-of-Law
Investment in / Negotiation with External Entities
Distribute ‘dividend’ payments of Real and Social Profits to ‘Investor’s
Expected Security from
‘Red’ Faction
Environment (Politically Passive Backbone of Goods/Service Delivery)
–
Attributes
•
•
–
Constitutive Infrastructure: Security, Politics, Economics, Rule-of-Law, Social Well Being
Physical characteristics of the environments: terrain, vegetation, weather, sustainability …
Behavior
•
Interactions between and amongst the physical and Infrastructure components
16
Complex Adaptive Modeling
Figure 9.
5.
Measure of National Identity
17
Context Sensitivity Training
Preliminary Perspectives on a Systems-Level View of Sector Interactions.
Planning for Next Quarter
Plans for the next quarter entail participation in Sector Reviews, as possible, and
ongoing attempts to engage with Sector and System Integration SMEs both as recorded in
the literature and in person, where/when the opportunity avails itself. Most importantly,
however, a goal for the forthcoming quarter will be an attempt to formalize the tradeoffs
as characterized in the USAID Guiding Principles document in a form susceptible to
formal modeling.
102
APPENDIX A.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND
ABBREVIATIONS
3D
3-Dimensional
AOC
Area of Concentration
APA
American Planning Association
APAN
All Partners Access Network
ARC
Active Response Corps
ARCIC
Army Capabilities Integration Center
ARSOC
Army Special Operations Command
ASA
Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASD/SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense / Special Operations in Low Intensity
Conflict
ASI
Additional Skill Identifier
BDE
Brigade
BG
Brigadier General
CA
Civil Affairs
CAD
Civil Affairs Division
CBA
Cost Benefit Analysis
CBRNE
Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear and Explosives
CCDR
Combatant Commander
CDDRL
Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law
CDHAM
Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine
CEM
Certified Emergency Manager
CENTCOM
Central Command
CERF
Central Emergency Response Fund
CERP
Commander’s Emergency Response Program
CEW
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce
CMC
Civilian-Military Cooperation
CMM
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
CMO
Civil Military Operations
COIN
Counter-Insurgency
COL
Colonel
103
CORDS
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CPA
Conditional Provisional Authority
CPOF
Command Post of the Future
CRC
Civilian Response Corps
CSO
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DCAF
Defense Control of Armed Forces
DoD
Department of Defense
DoJ
Department of Justice
DoS
Department of State
DPKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DR
Disaster Relief
DRG
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
DRL
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
DSCA
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
E3
Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment
EB
Economic and Business Affairs
EFSI
Expert Functional Skill Identifier
EMAP
Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EPPD
Economic Public Analysis and Public Diplomacy
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM
Field Manual
FN
Friendly Nation
FORSCOM
Forces Command
GCJ
Global Criminal Justice
GISD
Governance Innovation for Stability and Development
HA
Humanitarian Assistance
HAZMAT
Hazardous Material
HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
HD
Homeland Defense
HI
Homeland Integration
HN
Host Nation
HQDA
Headquarters Department of the Army
HRCOM
Human Resources Command
104
HS
Homeland Security
ICAPF
Interagency Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework
ICD
International Classification of Diseases
ICITAP
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
IDHA
International Diploma for Humanitarian Assistance
ILE
Instructional Learning Environment
INL
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IPR
Interim Program Review / In-Progress Review
IMSG
Institute for Military Support to Governance
ISE
Institute for State Effectiveness
IT
Information Technology
IW
Irregular Warfare
J&A
Judicial and Administrative
JAG
Judge Advocate General
JCMOTF
Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force
JD
Juris Doctor
JFK
John Fitzgerald Kennedy
JSD
Doctor of the Science of Law
LE/C/JS
Law Enforcement, Correction, Judicial/Witness Security
LGBT
Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender
LL.M.
Master of Laws
LNO
Liaison Officer
MAJ
Major
M&RA
Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MACV
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MDG
Millennium Development Goals
MOS
Military Occupational Specialty
MP IET
Military Police Initial Entry Training
MSG
Military Support to Governance
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NPS
Naval Postgraduate School
NRF
National Response Framework
105
NSA
National Security Agency
NSAM
National Security Action Memorandum
NSPD
National Security Presidential Directive
OCAR
Office of the Chief Army Reserve
OCHA
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OFDA
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMC
Office of Military Cooperation
OPDAT
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
ORHA
Office of Humanitarian Assistance
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTI
Office of Transition Initiatives
OTJAG
Office of the Judge Advocate General
PEA
Political Economy Analysis
PhD
Doctor of Philosophy
PI
Principal Investigator
PKSOI
Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute
PMA
Political Military Affairs
PPD
Presidential Policy Directive
PRT
Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSOTEW
Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop
QDDR
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
R2
Responsibility to Protect
R&MA
Reserves and Manpower Affairs
RoL/ROL
Rule of Law
S/CRS
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State
SE
Stable Economy
SG
Stable Governance
SIGIR
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SME
Subject Matter Expert
SRC
Standby Response Corps
SSE
Safe and Secure Environment
SSG
Security Sector Governance
SSR
Security Sector Reform
106
SSTR
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
SWB
Social Well-Being
SWCS
Special Warfare Center & School
TRACDOC
Training and Doctrine Command
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
US
United States
USACAC
United States Army Combined Arms Command
USACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAF
United States Air Force
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
USARC
United States Army Reserve Command
USASOC
United States Army Special Operations Command
USIP
United States Institute of Peace
USNORTHCOM
United States Northern Command
USPACOM
United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM
United States Special Operations Command
USUHS
United States University of the Health Services
WG
Work Group / Working Group
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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108
APPENDIX B.
PSOTEW GISD WORK GROUP 3 AGENDA
Governance Innovation for Security and Development
Project Sessions
PSOTEW Day 1, Monday March 24
Monday AM: Plenary
- WG3 Track: Clare Lockhart keynote speaker
Monday PM: Plenary
- WG 3 BG Irizarry
- 3:25-4:00: Work Group breakout: WG3 Introduction in Room 111
For overflow viewing and online chat, we plan to stream WG-3
sessions to the Internet on the APAN Adobe Connect site:
https://connect.apan.org/gisd/?launcher=false
Day 2, Tuesday March 25
The goal of our 2-day working group is to open a multi-stakeholder dialogue about
governance innovation for security and development. In particular, we hope for this
dialogue to build from greater understanding by the communities of experts of current
issues, trends and needs with respect to military support to governance. We conceive of the
project broadly to include an integrated, holistic approach across the major stability
operations sectors: provision of essential services, civil security, rule of law, governance,
economy and infrastructure, and homeland integration. We invite researchers and
practitioners with insight on these topics, including required expertise qualifications for
these sectors, gender dynamic issues in them, human behavior dynamics in support of
conflict prevention and mitigation, and innovation and technological enablers for stability
and peace building.
8:00-8:30
Arrivals & Registration
8:30-10:00
Military Support to Governance – Karen Guttieri, Naval
Postgraduate School
Main room: 121
109
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
Project introduction, goals
Discussion: 467
Robert C. Jones USSOCOM
Panel/Speakers:
Norm Cotton, “Stakeholder Analysis”
Steven Hall, “Representing Complex Adaptive Systems for Instruction”
10:00-10:30
Break
10:30-12:00
Governance -Karen Guttieri, Naval Postgraduate School
Main room: 121
The Guiding Principles define Stable Governance as “ability of the people
to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political
processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.”
(8-97) This panel addresses challenges of supporting governance abroad
—provision of essential services, political moderation and accountability,
stewardship of state resources, and civic participation and
empowerment—as a means to promote both peace and well-being.
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
Discussion: 467
Panel/Speakers:
Karen Guttieri, Naval Postgraduate School – state of the art on the art of
the state
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction –
systems of transparency and accountability
David C. Becker, Center for Technology and National Security Policy,
National Defense University – Community Counterinsurgency
12:00-1:30
Lunch
1:30-3:00
Safe and Secure Environment - Jon Czarnecki, US Naval War
College
Main room: 121
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
This panel seeks to explore the many facets of the subject, Safe and
Secure Environments. We hope to address at least some of the
following questions: How does one define Safe and Secure
Environments? What is “Safe and Secure Environments” – a policy, a
task, an objective, all the preceding, something else? What does a
110
Discussion: 467
successful (and unsuccessful) Safe and Secure Environment look
like? What are the determinants (and detriments) to Safe and
Secure Environments? How is a Safe and Secure Environment
related to other necessary aspects of recovering from human and/or
natural disasters? Because the topic is so broad, this panel will focus
on exploration of the subject. It will depend on the audience’s
participation as much as the panelists’ comments and presentations.
Panel/Speakers:
Jon Czarnecki/Tom Moore, sector co-leads
MG (ret) Selmo Cikotic
Corrie Wegener
Mike Dziedzic
Andrew DeJesse
3:00-3:30
Break
3:30-5:00
Rule of Law - Melanne Civic, Dept of State
Main room: 121
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
In this panel, practitioner/scholars will present their current research and
field-based lessons on rule of law operations, to include transitional
justice; legal, judicial and constitutional reform; land use / property
rights; and access to justice.
Discussion: 467
Panel/Speakers:
Melanne Civic, Department of State
Douglas Batson, National Intelligence University
David Gordon, Colonel (US Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Ret.),
General Dynamics Information Technology
Michelle Hughes, President and CEO, VALRAC Innovation
Major General Charles Tucker (USAF, Ret.), World Enterprise Institute
Meghan E. Stewart, Vice President, Senior Counsel Public International
Law and Policy Group (PILPG)
111
Day 3, Wednesday March 26
8:00-8:30
Arrivals
8:30-10:00
Social Well-Being - Marc Ventresca, Naval Postgraduate School
Main room: 111
Social Well-Being includes a broad concern with well-being and quality of
life, and specific focus on several institutional domains including
education, health, and refugee resettlement. The challenge is to review
the broad debates occurring in the component domains about specific
questions of expertise, capacity, and modes of delivery to understand how
to couple Civil Affairs current and potential capacity with sector needs.
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
Discussion: 475
Panel/Speakers:
Norvell DeAtkine, Urban Warfare and Humanitarian Concerns
James Sosneky
Leo Estrada, UCLA
10:00-10:30
Break
10:30-12:00
Sustainable Economy and Resilient Development – Maria Pineda,
Naval Postgraduate School
Main room: 111
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
Discussion: 475
The Sustainable Economy and Resilient Development panel’s purpose is to
explore salient issues related to the gaps in practice and theory
that impact the performance and outcome of Civil Affairs the missions in
this sector. The panelists will address the economy as a Complex Adaptive
System (CAS) and stress the need for an integrated approach to
understanding the cross-dependencies of agents, their interests and trade
offs in the economy, and the interrelation with other pillars of stabilization
and development. We will:
1-Review military field experience in the Iraq, Afghanistan and Colombian
conflict and post conflict environments; 2-Compare civilian and private
sector experience in the economic assessment of post disaster/conflict
settings from a development Bank and European Allies perspective; 3Review the importance of Regulatory Frameworks for creating the building
blocks of an economic development; and 4-Address the role of the Energy,
Water, Food Nexus for resilient development and a sustainable economy.
112
Panel/Speakers:
Dr. Maria Pineda – Introduction, Economic Risk and Resiliency
Col Jose Madera – aspects of illicit economies
Patrik Willot – PoC and Private Sector in Post Disaster/conflict settings: the
need for a systemic approach
Branko Terzic – role of regulation in economic reconstruction
Andrew Paterson – energy for reconstruction and development
12:00-1:30
Lunch
1:30-3:00
Homeland Integration - Paula Philbin, Naval Postgraduate School
Main room: 111
Why add a focus area on homeland defense? What is the purpose of
it? Is it even necessary? What is the proper role for the military in
Overflow room: 470 complex catastrophes? Are there existing authorities to allow for a
(stream from main
more robust response, or do authorities and policy need to be
room)
developed? How would we begin a dialogue to train/educate military
personnel for this task?
Discussion: 475
Panel/Speakers:
Jeffrey Voice
3:00-3:30
Break
3:30-5:00
GISD Working Group Wrap-Up
Main room: 111
Overflow room: 470
(stream from main
room)
Discussion: 475
Day 4 PSOTEW Wrap-up, Thursday March 27
WG-3 Room 111; Work Group Outbriefs
113
Read-aheads
●
●
●
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations: https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf
Lamont memo
PKSOI-USIP Guiding Principles:
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf
●
Rule of Law Handbook: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-oflaw_2011.pdf
114
APPENDIX C.
PSOTEW GISD WORK GROUP MEETING NOTES
**DISCLAIMER**
The views presented in these meeting notes are personal and represent the
opinions of the individuals that are respectively participating. The
information and views within do not represent any other parties associated
or related.
Connectivity:
Twitter: https://twitter.com/PKSOI1; #PSOTEW #GISD
APAN: https://wss.apan.org/s/GISD/default.aspx; look for Adobe Connect
Prior to the start of the separate Working Group sessions, there were a number of
plenary addresses to all attendees on Monday, March 24. Gen Gordon Sullivan (US
Army, ret) described several issues relating to peace and support operations. In Somalia,
a large portion of the population is working for NGOs. Coalition forces worked to resettle
the Kurds in Iraq (see Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds by Gordon
Rudd, February 2004). There must be an NGO that can train people in negotiations. A
number of interesting perspectives are provided in Army Magazine,
companycommand.com. It is noteworthy that the Indus River could be a source of
conflict but it is not—the Pakistanis and the Indians have come together to manage the
water together. In other places, water will be a source of conflict, putting an emphasis on
onflict prevention. “People are in trouble, and the USA is willing to stand up.” We
cannot avoid it.
In discussion, the General was asked how long will it take for stability operations
to take hold in the US. Ans: The US population has a short attention span, but demand is
increasing. PKSOI was almost on the way out, considered extremist. We were trying to
do away with it as we were going into Iraq. Q: What have you seen in the generation
change in the military? There is a greater awareness today between stability and “mission
accomplishment.” The problems are at a PhD level. Joint efforts with NGOs . What did
we learn from Rowanda. For trainers, we know you are doing these exercises, but how
are you training? Q: How do we begin to integrate health to peacekeeping ops? Ans:
Would be good to create a global health specialist. Consider Rwanda as an example. The
objective was to stop the dying. Q: Getting involved with UN peacekeeping. How do we
115
get US soldiers involved with the UN? And: We did it anyway. It was under the radar.
We were in Macedonia. We found lots of people to talk to in the UN but hard to find who
was responsible. Are we talking about putting US troops in blue helmets?
Clare Lockhart, CEO of the Institute for State Effectiveness and author of Fixing
Failed States, followed up with discussion on the sovereignty gap, now more like a
sovereignty paradox. Discussed the costs and efficacy of intervention, the failure of
governance to the internal society, and external response. We are hearing a demand for
more, not less US leadership. The first failure is taking time to understand the context.
Also a failure to listen to the voices in the society. We have the ability to deliver service
in the context of disaster response. We have gotten good at the process of elections, but
what about other aspects? Need to refocus the priorities for education. Strengths
Scoreboard:
Medium:
 Public Finance /National accountability systems.
Low:
 Civil Society: youth gender
 Political practices /elections
 Market-building, job creation
 Investment in skills
 Support the leadership and management –supporting the “good guys”
Looking at the reality, peacekeeping and stability efforts don’t go away with Iraq
and Afghanistan. Tunisia and Yemen are successful cases vs. the tragedy of Syria. What
lessons can be learned from the disaster response in Haiti? The Balkans, SE Asia – these
are examples of instability. We don’t have the right policy response in the following:

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Youth and citizens: demanding participation, accountability, and jobs
Old regimes overthrown: new politics emerging? Interaction of religion, politics
and citizenship
New urbanization
Corruption, criminal networks, organized crime, piracy
Will continue to co-exist with other challenges: poverty narcotics, terror, and
natural disasters.
We are getting trapped in the sovereignty paradox. Supporting corrupt
governments is not going to work. How do we support popular movements? Hydropower
is “white gold.” Financing should not come solely from Western taxpayers. We need to
find other sources of funding for stability. When do the politics of certain countries
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become about the development agenda? “Do we know what success looks like?” We
have a tendency to jump straight to action instead of taking the time to get the planning
right. How do we synchronize the government’s and military’s planning for security.
There is a greater need for synergy between the military and civil planning. Wasn’t there
a plan of governance for Iraq that was developed before 2003 that was then disregarded?
How do we focus on the positive? We need to rebalance the narrative. How do we engage
with the media and journalists? We need to focus on the success stories because it
underpins that things are working.
Q: How do you address the question of what the youth need to be involved in?
Ans: Two steps. First there must be a connection with skill-building and the opportunities
available. How are they focusing the vocation? There is going to be unemployment, but if
we rethink the skills being taught to match up with demand, there would be greater
success (e.g., construction). Q: In developing safe and secure environments, how to teach
soldiers? Ans: Top lessons:
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Understanding the capacity and latent capacity of the society itself to secure and
safeguard itself. For example, in Afghanistan, the payroll was not developed and
there were literacy problems. Understand the gaps to develop better peacekeeping
operations.
The monopoly of the use of force. Trust between the citizen and the state is
critical.
Q: Assessments in planning methodologies. Ans: Ask the locals what they think.
Tactical example: Nepal. Q: What one thing would you focus on in the training and
education of the people who are going in to help a country? Ans: Understanding the
minds of the locals and not just rushing in with the “S” on our chest. Listen first. Act
second. Q: A new model of financing? Ans: A move away from Western taxpayers
footing the bill for stability. The multinational development banks – a note of caution –
have limited ability to confront security risks. Bottom line: There isn’t a shortage of
capital. The private sector revenues are abundant, they just aren’t being taxed.
Leveraging private capital? 10-20 years away.
Dr. George Lopez, USIP, works with USG agencies, US military, civil society
members and NGOs. He spoke on partnering, training, and educating to mitigate and
resolve conflict where we find it. Partnerships: What are the new ways of cooperation to
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meet the needs of the future? Training: How do agencies and organizations train for these
conflicts and disasters? Innovate: Planning for the future; staying ahead of our needs.
What characters do we need to plan for in our shared community? What does our
experience to date tell us regarding skills we need to plan for? Who are the facilitators to
provide adequate training? Q: What are the innovations? Ans: Civilian-Military think
tank – PKSOI is the closest thing to it. Spend 8 months considering Honduras. How often
in downrange locals that the greatest threat is disease? In that case, isn’t healthcare the
most important response? Q: Crime and Corruption in relation to fair trade. Ans: Using
private initiatives for economic development. Q: If you had your Civ-Mil think tank what
is the follow through? Ans: training opportunities with clusters of people like what we
see here at PSOTEW. Intense conflict analysis of the political & social divides that exist
in the areas you are walking into. Using gaming analysis and simulations is how we do
this. Q: Left of Bang. Concept – going in ahead of the conflict and assessing the drivers
of instability before it escalates to violence. With DOD as big as it is, why don’t we focus
more on the drivers of instability before they become wars? Why don’t we do this? How
do we shift the focus? Ans: Early warning indicators fuel the NGO think tank sector. If
DOD wants to do its own analysis for what is happening where those synergies already
exist, fine, but this dynamic is already present.
Dr. Ciro Ugarte, WHO Advisor and Acting Director of the Department of
Emergency Awareness in Peru, discussed Humanitarian assistance during conflicts and
its link with peace and stability. Regional priorities for health and peace:
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Red Cross movement
Clarissa Barton
WWII
NIH, CDC, EPA, FDA
Alliance for Progress – Peace Corps
Health for All
Health new dimension… Peace.
Health as a bridge for peace: Vaccinations; Emergency Preparedness as a part of
the WHO; merging of security and public health. How do they overlap and integrate?
The real challenge is coordination. Everybody wants to coordinate, but nobody wants to
be coordinated. Potential scenarios: Ebola intervention in Guinea; Syria; South Sudan.
Risk reduction is key. In theory, all countries should be peaceful. In theory, all sectors
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have the means to reduce the risk. In practice, the sectors don’t have the resources or the
money to counter risk, so there is a need to prioritize by what each region needs. Q:
PAHO’s implementation of International Health regulations. Ans: Better communication
networks. We need collaboration between networks so that each individual country has
the support of the international community to response to emergency. Q: Emergency
preparedness. What about military to military? Ans: The work has to be done during
peace. We must work closely with national authorities. During conflicts the military may
be seen as combatants, so not developing preparedness with civilian resources during
peacetime will result in a failure. Trust must be built during peacetime. Q: DHHS.
Discuss the broader cooperation between the UN and the WHO to improve the
community. Ans: The standards are already there. The problem is enforcing the standards
and applying them in practice. For example, inspecting generators on a schedule that is
consistent everywhere (every 3 months vs. every 3 years).
BG Ferdinand Irizarry, II talked about the private-public initiative, conventional
force, and Title 10. It’s crazy if we as a capital society don’t promote our private
business. Our military is unique that its one of the few that utilize private enterprise. The
thorough test is having experts that have the thorough discipline. That is, you can get a
high performing group of attorneys from the states, but if you put them in a new
environment, a great team can fall flat. Understanding cultural context is key. Building a
database so we can make a plan and effectively pursue our goals. Collaboration with
USOG, creation of the 38G position play a role. 40% of U.S. Army capability is in the
Army Reserves. The majority of the medical resources are in the reserves. Army reserve
engagement cells can move resources forward into theatres. Create a regional orientation
inside Army formations to provide better response to demand. Title 10: The select
reserves preplanned mission for involuntary mobilization. Command to mobilize 60,000
people per year. Q: Has CA done any work with your organization? Ans: I think fair
trade should be the standard. Q: Lockhart pointed out you need whole of government and
whole of society to oversee these capabilities. Ans: Security Sector Reform. I don’t think
there is another nation that demonstrates tolerance. Gender equality. Soldiers that also
manage their civilian lives is magic. Q: How are you creating and maintaining the
competences at the local level? Q: Disaster Response & Humanitarian Assistance. What
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should the Army be doing? Ans: Haiti – unrelated built in training slowed down the
response. We are in the process of rewriting the bureaucratic protocols for conflict
management units.
Frank Digiovanni presented on how to make CivMil happen: “Trust and
interpersonal relationships.” People say, “If we train for force on force warfare… we can
handle the simpler stability ops.” This is unfortunately a general consensus despite being
blatantly wrong. An ounce of prevention is a pound of cure. This is what we do. There
remains a demand for US leadership in the world community. The media conveys a
message that there isn’t a demand.
Tues Mar 25, 2014
Opening Session:
Karen Guttieri, NPS Military Support to Governance Introduction (see slideset)
 Strategy: The cognitive Challenge of War Prussia 1806, Peter Paret: “…wars are
fought not to be won but to gain an objective beyond war”
 Goals and objectives in military operations: policy realm and operational realm –
goal, objectives, tools, beliefs, incentives
 “Failure to anticipate our catastrophic success in Iraq”
 CA “vanguard of DoD’s support to US government efforts to assist partner
governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public
health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information (US
Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010) – highly valued in US foreign and
defense policy; under-valued as strategic assets in planning/operations; divided
and neglected (Lamont memo)
 Functional specialties are flawed (the system of classifying and managing needs
reworking – RAND); to be reformed as new Military Occupational Specialty 38G
 GISD project objectives and concept (pyramid diagram) – problem set (support to
civil authority, transitional authority, theater security cooperation, JP 3-57),
research (stable governance, rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable
economy, social well-being, homeland integration), education (civilian, military,
tailored), 38G (requirements, competencies, classifications, certifications)
 Mission statement: IMSG manages the provision of civil sector expertise across
the range of military operations in order to support USG obligations under
international law and promote stability. On order, supports Theater Security
Cooperation, Transitional Military Authority, Support to Civil Authority.
 GISD sectors, leads, key colleagues (NEED TO ADD STEVE TO THE
MODELING COMPONENT)
 Project history – meetings, reviews
 38G concept – preliminary analysis diagram – trade-off between specialization
and breadth of coverage of needs
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Comment – Aren’t we in situation where we are focusing on environments that are
complex, nth order effects – this framework will help, but don’t we need to disrupt the
discussion and ask different sets of questions (e.g., from NGO perspective)? Need to be
more inclusive. (Chip Hause, Alliance for PeaceBuilding) How to listen to the people on
the ground? How to build capacities that last longer than the time we are there? How do
you create capacity for enduring governance for the host nation, where they can solve
problems themselves? Are we asking the right questions? Are we using the right tools for
the environment? How do we create self-sustaining spaces where the locals can solve
their own problems? What kinds of mistakes were made – see Robert Jones brief.
Michelle Hughes – re core competencies – looking at MSG and RoL interventions over
past 30 years. One problem is mainstreaming accountability and oversight of anticorruption. Programming and development frameworks do not mainstream this.
Someone needs to have that responsibility to build these mechanisms into each of the
sectors, and to oversee and enforce those mechanisms. Innoculate the institution. This
should be addressed in the 38G concept diagram. In Afghan, wanted to look at ministerial
development plan and do a program review on each of the 26 lines of effort and build in
explicit capabilities/milestones for accountability and oversight mechanisms. Response
was that it would be too hard – need separate line of effort for accountability and
oversight for anti-corruption. That dilutes the importance of the effort. Needs to be in the
paradigm for governance and RoL. We need to build in milestones to ensure
accountability. Need accountability and transparency in all the sectors of concern.
Andy Boyce – Army has system of skill identifiers – economist, RoL – how will these be
affected by the 38G change? LTC Lindon: These will become 38G. Decision made not to
do active duty ASIs. Looking at how they are described, what are the qualifications.
Jim Adams (PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution) – sector components are important
in helping in understanding; divide between structural elements (institutions) and
relational elements (human interactions, sentiments). E.g., Bosnia, reconstruction is
essentially done, but constitution is fundamentally flawed – done to accommodate the
dysfunctional human relationships. Majority of funding has been on the structural side
(also see Kleinfeld book). Talked about use of modeling as a training and briefing tool.
His PhD at GMU used the Guiding Principles for Reconstruction (added a “2.0” to it).
Robert C. Jones, USSOCOM J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy – Strategic
Understanding: Rethink, Reframe, Refocus (see slideset)
 Opening thoughts – one must acknowledge and understand the role of governance
in causation before one can discuss it in resolution; human nature is largely
constant and universal, providing and Einstein-like approach85 to complex issues
in governance and populace-based conflicts; the world is in an era of
unprecedented popular empowerment – governance has never been harder or
more important; cold war stasis makes the scope and scale larger, and our bias
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If Einstein has an hour to save the world, he would spend 55 minutes planning and 5 minutes acting. We
spend 3 weeks planning for Afghanistan and stayed there 12 years.
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hinders our understanding and responses – today is driven by rapid change; in
population-based conflicts, the sum of tactics does not equal strategy; state-based
conflicts are Inter, and Clauswitzian war – population-based conflicts are Intra,
and of a different genus and species requiring different logic; 12 years of waging
peace as war has been a strategic disaster (Iraq no longer serves as buffer between
Shia and Sunni; Afghan – may rapidly return to Taliban control) – the prospect of
engaging peace as “phase 0” does not promise much better; less is more and it is
far better to do the right thing poorly than to do the wrong thing very well
Natural things – be it gravity, tyranny or insurgency are what they are caring little
about the labels or definitions we apply, the doctrine we follow or the inherent
bias of our perspective, culture or ideology; pound of provocation can create a ton
of problems.
SOCOM – global SOF network initiative – interconnectedness
Where does instability come from and where does it go?
Step behind on how to deal with state-based conflicts.
Strategic Questions – where does instability come from and where does it go?
What makes a society naturally stable or unstable? Is there a critical difference
between “why men fight,” and why societies become unstable? Why is the
absence of populace violence or the presence of governmental effectiveness such
poor measures of stability?
Sun Tzu: “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without
strategy is the noise before defeat.”
Einstein: “A perfection of means, and a confusion of aims, seems to be our main
problem.” (e.g., drone strikes)
Systems of Governance – what does Trust look like? Social Trinity (Government
– Military – People) to Emerging Model (Government, Security, ethnic identities,
…) – Justice, Trust, Sovereignty, Legitimacy, Respect forming a Circle of Trust
(instead of state borders), Good Governance: it’s not about how to keep a
government in power or building a force, but how to build understanding and
influence relationships with the people. How to build a circle of trust? Only in the
last 100 years have we developed capacity in the air domain. Recently, cyber
domains empower anybody to challenge great powers. Now, how to think about
the human domain? Rule of law perceived as unjust is a problem. Political and
popular legitimacy are important. Many Americans are disgusted by their
government but believe in their system of governance.
Visualizing Domains – Human Domain  technology across land domain, sea
domain, air domain, space domain, cyber domain – these empower the State.
Visualizing Domains (2) – Human Domain – psychological; Services primarily
shape the human domain within the government and the army, with secondary
effects on the people. SOF has primary effects on the human domain of the
people, with secondary effects on government and military.
Complexity – “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”
– Einstein. There are constants in human nature that give us a basis for thinking
about populace-based conflicts.
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Socio-Cultural Awareness – the sum of many disciplines: human geography
(geographical), human terrain (doctrinal), human domain (psychological), human
nature (biological), socio-cultural analysis (anthropological)
Good Governance – universal constants in human nature – sovereignty
(governance acts in a manner deemed acceptable by affected populaces),
legitimacy (recognition by those governed of the right of governance to affect
them), justice (how people feel about the RoL as applied to them and theirs),
respect (official fairness and opportunity by governance across affected
populaces), empowerment (belief in trusted, certain and legal means to shape
governance/government)
Inevitable Clash: populace violence (low to high) vs governance/conditions of
insurgency (good to poor)
Insurgency is not always a violent action against government (four features of
insurgency: internal, populace-based, illegal, political in purpose); violence vs
non-violence is a tactical choice. The only difference between insurgency and
democracy is legality.
Breaching the Circle / Poor Governance – nation-state at risk from borderless
threats – segments of population outside circle of trust are vulnerable to
exploitation
Getting to Trust – enforce the RoL; expand the circle; create a lesser included
circle; make more circles. Success is when the majority of a population feels they
are included in the circle of trust.
Have to keep moving; keep things current. Stability does not mean “static.” It
means “balance.”
Steven Hall, Understanding the Complex Adaptive Nature of Nation/State Building
– objectives of team attempting to build a model of this complex environment
(interactions across sectors – sustainable economy, RoL, governance, safe and secure
environment, social well-being)
 Project Objectives – support instruction of 38G students; provide hands-on
experience of the state-building process; highlight dependencies involved in
rebuilding the required sectors; increase sensitivity to tradeoffs. This is a systems
dynamics problem – we have to think about the emergent behavior of actors in the
system.
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The USIP Guiding Principles suggests tradeoffs that push one sector up, another
down. Whether that’s a good idea or not depends on the type of system you are in.
What we expect of a state – defines “us” and “them” (defines and defends
boundaries); looks after “us” (attends to constituents’ welfare); engages “them”.
Beyond Maslow, people are motivated beyond basic needs and have others, like
the need to “belong.”
Varying concepts of inter-state relations affect state-building goals – persistence
to adaptation vs idealism to materialism dimensions
What’s required to build a state (with select interactions) – several positive
feedback loops appear to exist: stable governance (legitimate policy) to rule of
law (social identity) to SSE (risk reduction) to sustainable economy
(goods/services) to social well-being (consent) to stable governance …
Balance – reifying a Nation and constructing a State; centralizing Power and
distributing Control; supporting Autonomy and exercising Compassion;
controlling a Threat and building a Partner; building the Means and delivering the
Goods … and keeping it going
Perspectives – donor nations, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, host nation
Understanding Interactions – Systems Dynamics Model – how objectives interact,
institutions emerge, unintended consequences occur, tipping points exist, initial
conditions dominate, no plan lasts for long. Want to understand how the networks
that connect groups help define their identity.
Tradeoffs (from the USIP Guiding Principles) across the sectors
Looking deeper into tradeoffs – often a temporal component – delays in effects
Understanding Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) – simple agents operating in
control networks exhibiting complex behaviors; motivations/behaviors; social
networks; environment
Governance Session:
Karen Guttieri, NPS – kick-off
Norm Cotton, Measuring Stakeholders Support for IMSG (see slideset)
Passed out stakeholder input forms
 Described stakeholder analysis approach taken for the project – identifying the
groups that are likely to be impacted by a proposed action and sorting those
stakeholders according to their impact on the action and their needs, and mapping
those groups based upon their power, interest, and attitude. Security and
Development stakeholders are agencies across the “whole of government”,
military and civilian that are empowered by the US Government
 Emergent issues in security and development – reconstruction and stabilization;
2010 quadrennial development review (recognized need for growth in Army,
Navy, USMC CA – in Army, led to some conflict in proponency; Directive
5100.01 updated Dec 2010 – military occupation, military governance); CA force
modernization and military governance (vanguard of DoD support to these kinds
of operations) – Asst Secretary of Army Lamont memo; Presidential Policy on
Global Development (PPD 6) – international development is vital to US national
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security and elevates development as a core pillar of American power; 2010
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (aligned growing number of
civilian agencies that engage in international activity); 2013 USAID Democracy,
Rights, and Governance Strategy – reaffirms and invigorates DRG as integral to
the agency’s overall development agenda, promoting stronger democratic
institutions, respect for human rights, and participatory governance; elevates
human rights as a key USAID development objective. DRG Center of Excellence
– point of contact for DoD engagement.
Mapping Military and Civilian Stakeholders – power (to what extent the
stakeholder has power to impose, the stakeholders potential to influence derived
from their positional or resource power in the US foreign policy arena, or their
actual influence derived from their credibility as a perceived leader or expert),
interest (in IMSG/GISD effort and related initiative to establish 38G position),
attitude
Looked at scoresheets – asked attendees for inputs from their perspectives
(USAID/OMC now CMC)
Mendelow’s 3D matrix (8 initial stakeholder positions (savior
[influential/active/backer], friend [insignificant/active/backer], saboteur
[influential/active/blocker], irritant [insignificant/active/blocker], trip wire
[insignificant/passive/blocker], time bomb, acquaintance, sleeping giant
[influential/passive/backer])
Karen Guttieri, Military Governance the American Way (see slideset)
 Nation Expansion – general orders 20 (1847), Lieber Code (general orders 100,
1863) – consideration of population. Magoon’s Report (1903) – emphasis shifts to
indirect rule and civilianization after long episodes of military government. Now - sovereignty now resides with the people (emersion of popular sovereignty).
 Hague Convention – respecting the laws and conventions
 Military Government – Robert Slover (1950) – “lack of military experience and
training many times led to friction when military government personnel came into
contact with military troops…”
 Wars Great and Small – Military Government and Martial Law (1898/1904);
Hunt Report (1920); Military Aid to Civil Power (1925); FM 27-5 Basic Field
Manual on Military Government (1940) – US designates troops specifically as
military government, establishes a school for military government, develops
formal doctrine on military government
 Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict – 1954 Hague
Convention, 1954 Protocol, 1999 Second Protocol
 Cold War Stabilization – FM 41-10 CA Military Government Operations (1957;
Draper Report; National Security Action Memorandum 124 (1962); FM 41-5
Joint Manual for Civil Affairs (1962); FM 31-22 Command, Control and Support
of Special Forces Operations (1981); FM 100-22 Low Intensity Conflict (1981),
FM 41-10 CA (1985)
 Pacification – Vietnam went from civilianization to militarization
 Peace and Stability – Complex Contingencies: FM 41-5 (1993); FM 41-10 Army
CA Operations; Stability Operations (SSTR, DoD 3000.05 / NSPD 44): Stability
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FM 3-07 Stability Operations; JP 3-57 Joint CMO; FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency –
Recommendation to add ATP 3-07.5, Stability Operations Techniques. Namechanging has been confusing to civilians and civilian organizations. More indepth detail for tactical insight for the Army; better than the COIN manual.
Conflict Termination – figure on Trends in Conflict Recurrence (Hewitt et al.,
Peace and Conflict, 2010)
Civil Military Operations Center – change in names
Use of Forces – CA force authorizations 2001 5,149; 2009 7,834; 2013 11,152 –
“What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about
if we can’t use it?” – Madeline Albright to Colin Powell
Civil Affairs – pervasive and ambiguous; tensions (kinetic and non-kinetic;
military and civilian; active and reserve; internal and external)
Lost Lessons
Turbulent Transitions – stable governance (ability to share or compete for power
through non-violent political processes and to enjoy collective benefits and
services of the state); coercive democracy; interim government; legal, rational
authority
Stable Governance – ability of the people to share, access, or compete for power
through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and
services of the state
 Provision of essential services; stewardship of state resources; civic
participation and empowerment; political moderation and accountability
How to manage transitions – transitional democracies have a lot of turbulence;
fully institutionalized or incomplete democratization?
“Legitimacy is not static, but an ongoing process of public discussion.” – Dewey
Interim Government (Between Interim Governments – Guttieri and Piombo)
Interim Government’s Historical Moment: practice vs theory
Taxonomy of Interim Governments – revolutionary provisional; power-sharing;
international (degrees: administrative authority; executive authority, supervisory
authority); incumbent caretaker
Empirics – beginnings (independence, irredentism, authoritarian transition,
competition for control of the state); conclusions (regime selects agents, victory
without capitulation, domestic power-sharing)
Findings – power is persistent, institutions matter; stratified effect; …
Negative peace vs positive peace – rush to stability has to take structural and
cultural violence into account, also for sustainable economy
Pete Smith: Clarify “domestic power-sharing” – various rebel leaders agree with
separation of resources, end up fighting over them anyway (invited to prepare
paper for case study from experiences)
Machiavelli: “there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to
conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction
of a new order of things”
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction –
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
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Integration – in planning, executing, and overseeing; IMSG is a step towards that
Are these matters of civ-mil? Historically, and currently, the operations are
combined civ-mil.
Current bill not going anywhere – 5 diverse agencies
Anyone planning the next S&R operation – not really. Planes built in flight do not
fly well.
Oversight under fire has a human cost
Reconstruction experience -- 2006-2011
$8B spent on governance – mainly spent to build capacity; a huge amount of
money for not much gain
Over 75% of contracts in Iraq were DoD (www.sigir.mil – how the money was
spent)
Success of PRT in Iraq depended on who was leading it. Iraq now struggling with
most recent election. $26B spent building Iraq Army and Police Force.
What should be done to ensure greater success? Integration – has to be
accomplished institutionally. Have to achieve inter-agency integration in planning
and execution of S&R. But Civilian Response Corps is now gone. Conflict
Stabilization Operations Bureau in Department of State. Looks like Office of
Transitions at USAID. Some of the important organizations are stove-piped.
$24M invested in prosecutorial piece – in its own lane, not part of an integrated
strategy. DoD Stability Ops capacity. Need to evolve to greater integration, but
the system is not moving in that direction. Integration is about training, planning,
executing, overseeing together. Didn’t do this in Iraq because of a structural
challenge. Went from planning to spend $2B to $22B to $62B. When you shift
from A to B, be sure you can do B.
David C. Becker, retired Foreign Services Officer – Community Counterinsurgency
 Clare Lockhart – listening to the locals, building on the local assets, mobilizing
local resources. It’s all about building trust.
 Not many have heard of: Municipalities in Action, Democratic Community
Development, CERP, National Solidarity Program, Haiti Stabilization Initiative,
Village Stability Program… Some of the most successful programs are the least
known. Mainly civilian, and don’t consider themselves counterinsurgency.
 Simple rules: local choice (local ownership); responding to local demands; locals
decide whether they can do a project or not; all about the process the community
goes through to do something – provides allies to what government is offering,
US military is offering, etc.; local contribution to the project; accountable
transparency (public meetings); has to be a public budget; timeliness is crucial
(have to engage local leaders quickly to reduce that person’s exposure); have to
award success and walk away from failures (set up rule sets and let it go); cannot
over-commit; growing local leadership
 Common development theory that is often neglected in practice; often replaced
with “how fast can we spend this money” – that needs to be determined at the
local level. Community-driven development in peaceful situations is difficult
because it isn’t your plan.
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Safe and Secure Environment Session: Jon Czarnecki, Tom Moore, Naval War College
Jon Czarnecki, Naval War College (at Naval Postgraduate School) – Approaching Safe
and Secure Environments (see slideset)
 Theoretical Foundation pyramid: physiological needs to safety and security
 How we differ from the mainstream literature on SSE – inclusive of HA/DR
issues; SSE challenges occur earlier in crisis timeline (think of USMC “three
block” war doctrine); SSE is more than Security Sector Reform (SSR) and
Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegrate (DDR); SSE not dependent on ideal liberal
state aspects (many ways to reach SSE); SSE includes crises that build upon
foreign and indigenous capabilities
 Nested layers of security – self  neighborhood  community 
provincial/state  national  planetary
 Types of security – human; social; physical; cultural; economic; environmental
 Security providers – populace; legal; military.
 Illustrative possible SSE progression across time graph – level of state effort vs
operational phase (US doctrine) – conflict situation creates breakdown in the
sectors.
 Final slide – level of populace effort – increases while conflict situation builds;
may drop significantly in police state, turning over responsibility to the people.
When you have a police state, the level of effort from the population approaches
zero.
MG (ret) Selmo Cikotic, Professor, former Defense Minister Bosnia-Herzegovina –
viewpoints from a small country
 Result of globalization – many positive consequences, free flow of goods and
communications; also making countries more vulnerable, introducing a greater
range of security threats and creating greater interdependence
 Increased speed of overall change – further acceleration expected
 Growing importance of technological domain (domains of power: military,
economic, technological, cultural); best illustrated by cyber domain. World
becomes a virtual entity; creating 5th dimension of the world (land, sea, air, space,
cyber).
 Role of leadership is constantly increasing – leader – follower – situation triangle.
Situation changing rapidly; follower becoming more sophisticated.
 Example of positive approach – defense reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina was very
successful. Future in alliance of civilizations. Opponents merged into single
ministry of defense. Base for overall country reconstruction and progress.
Different ethnic interests best protected by strong national structures. Defense
reform has created concept of multi-polar loyalty – state, ethnic group, political
party complementing each other. Importance of cultural diplomacy –
understanding, respecting, smart power is more effective than hard power.
Encourage people from defense organizations to work in regional activities.
Internal and international activism and integration – strength not measured by the
level of integration in the international architecture.
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Armed forces provider of security services in international affairs – could be
dangerous and costly but important for international cooperation efforts.
UN Resolution 1135 – instituted in B-H built from positive impact of defense
structures
Mike Dziedzic, Independent Consultant – Illicit Power Structures: Overlooked Threat
to a Safe and Secure Environment (see slideset)
 How does one define SSE? Armed opposition groups responsible for political
violence have largely been defeated, subordinated to legitimate government
authority, or disarmed and reintegrated into society. National security forces,
operating lawfully under legitimate government authority, provide a safe and
secure environment for citizens. (Source: Measuring Progress in Conflict
Environments)
 What does it look like? Diminish drivers of conflict (political violence, threat
from ex-combatants, popular support for violent factions, use of national security
forces, …)
 Strengthen institutional performance – compliance with security agreements
strengthened; performance of national security forces strengthened, …
 Conflict Transformation – diminishing the means and motivations for violent
conflict; developing more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the competitive
pursuit of political and economic aspirations – what are the drivers of conflict
(Quest for Viable Peace and FM 3-07)
 Determinants of a SSE – seek reliable local intelligence o guide operations and
prevent harm to the peace/stabilization process; mount framework operations in
support of civil authority to find, fix, and strike against militant extremists/illicit
power structures; …
 How is this related to other necessary aspects of stabilization – most conflicts are
driven at least in part by illicit power structures; this is routinely overlooked
 Illicit power structure – criminalized economy of power; exploitation of revenue
derived from criminal activities to obtain and maintain power; illicit revenue may
be a means or a motivation for capturing power; can either capture the state or be
an armed opposition to it (both may be present and they may collude to profit
from the conflict)
 Prominent Examples (see Overlooked Enemies of Peace: Subduing Illicit Power
Structures, forthcoming)
 Implications for Civil Affairs – conduct proper assessments prior to intervention
to determine whether illicit power structures are a barrier to peace and
stabilization; become proficient at integrating joint military and police planning
for intelligence-led operations; assist USIP with the development of a guide to
assessment and planning for IPS (will be developing educational tools)
Andrew DeJesse – Cultural Property in Transitional Societies (see slideset)
 Quantitative cross-walk: COIN history, heritage protection, stability – Counter
Insurgency Scorecard 1978-2008; UNESCO members and heritage sites; failted
state index
 SSE and Cultural Property – Counter Insurgency Scorecard – 22 losses, 8 wins
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Cultural Heritage Scorecard 1978-2008 – UNESCO member, * of world heritage
sites; declared before/during/after conflict – lowers: few heritage sites; UNESCO
member 17 of 22; only 1 had heritage sites before conflict; winners: all (8) were
UNESCO members, many heritage sites; many declared during/after conflict
74% losers; 26% winners – significant growth in capacity
Failed State index – failed states have fewer declared sites
What are determinants and detriments to SSE – indicators – measure –
methodology – preferred trend: access and promotion; host nation and local
cultural institutions participate in international treaties and conventions; legal
frameworks are enforced; criminal prosecution of theft/destruction; transparency;
HN protector and steward of cultural property; ethnic groups value all groups’
heritage
Not about “art” but about stability – creating a SSE by building capacity to protect
cultural property through partnerships and legal frameworks supported by HNs,
IOs, NGOs, …
Corrie Wegener, Smithsonian – Modern Day Monuments Men and Cultural Property
Protection in the 21st Century – cultural property and cultural identify in relation to
stability
 Monuments Men (and women) – presidential commission, put under military
governments / civil affairs; found millions of pieces of art. Over 350 of these
agents in WWII.
 Many contemporary examples: Kuwait museum holdings taken to Baghdad;
Bosnia intentional destruction of cultural items
 Minimum number of people with background to do this job in CA today
 12000 registered archeological sites looted
 CA saved the Iraqi Jewish Archive in Iraq, worked with animals at the Baghdad
zoo
 Why protect cultural property? International and domestic law; better
coordination with allies; promotes force protection; denies resources to the
enemy; …
 Reputation for leaving a trail of destruction
 Negotiations with tribal leaders over damage to water system
 1954 Hague Convention – contracting parties agree to respect cultural property
and cooperate with civilian entities – undertake to prohibit, prevent, and if
necessary put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, …
 Supposed to be training for this in the military forces – need to have services or
specialist personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property
and to cooperate with the civilian authorities responsible for maintaining it
 Need people who can advise on the no-strike list and help on the ground
 Smithsonian – doing cultural property training for CA
Q&A / Discussion
Maria – do you take volunteers for cultural protection?
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Chip – re mistakes – all the presentations expand the circle regarding what is brought into
the considerations. If we can expand who is involved in these processes (NGOs or DoD),
it can improve our ability.
Start with local populace and get as many people involved as possible. Place where
people can come, share concerns, seek solutions.
Discussion of importance of democracy – majority rule? Too simplistic. US has a
representative democracy. Minority with inalienable rights, specified or implied.
Democratic process where people participate in the form of government. See UN
Declaration of Human Rights.
Idealized liberalism – individuals, free market participation, … -- stress that this is
WESTERN political theory. Post modernist world – everything is based on perception.
Amy, NDU – measuring states by their level of integration rather than size, power,
economy. Selmo: Yugoslavia used to play regional role, now small actors have different
roles to play. Need to be integrated to have greater impact – transportation, energy, trade.
Strength of the state is measured by level of integration. Operate in globally relevant
structure/organizations.
Rule of Law: Melanne Civic, Department of State
Melanne Civic – introduced the speakers
David Gordon, General Dynamics Information Technology – worked on first 2 RoL
handbooks (with Michelle Hughes) – Rule of Law in Civilian Military Stability
Operations: Review of the Literature (see slideset)
 Issues identified: lack of support from military commanders; lack of coherent
strategy; lack of understanding of environment; transitional justice process;
conflicts and inefficiencies; inadequate funding for civilian and military RoL
operations; need for cross-cutting and holistic approach to RoL, security, and
related operations, as opposed to “cylinders of excellence”; need for some sort of
organizational structure for identifying, training, and deploying RoL experts; most
authors assume that civilian agencies are more suited for doing RoL activities in
stability operations than are military personnel or organizations; most authors
focus primarily on operational environments found in late Iraq and Afghanistan,
with little consideration for requirements in future conflicts; little consideration
for requirements in the event of major ground combat operations triggering
occupation responsibilities under the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Civilians
Convention.
 Lack of civilian capacity
 Civilian response corps did not manifest as was envisioned.
 Civilian and military cooperation – conflicting cultures; people working crosspurposes. Different agencies are structured with different mandates/purposes.
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RoL needs to be discussed in concert with the other sectors; requires economic
development and security.
Understand the cultural background/environment; developing a general overall
strategy
Most authors assume that civilian agencies are more suited for doing RoL
activities in stability operations that are military personnel or organizations.
How to reduce the drivers of conflict instead of just strengthening the rule of law
Most authors focus on operational environments found in late Iraq and
Afghanistan with little consideration for requirements in future conflicts. Need to
develop ideas that will work in the NEXT major conflict; need to be able to
administer occupied territory in accordance with Hague regulations and the
Geneva civilians convention.
What needs to be done, how would we do it, what resources are needed to make
that operation work
Michelle Hughes, President and CEO, VALRAC Innovation
 RoL Handbooks -- what are the important roles the military plays in conflict,
preconflict, and steady-state environments; how to translate to tasks for forces to
be trained to do
 Over 110 agencies and bureaus
 RoL development as core governance function
 What are core competencies CA officers need to have, both uniformed and
civilian areas? Have studied this over a number of years, based on Iraq,
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Philippines, others – good advisor/NCO doing
cooperative engagement has a specific set of personal attributes. What are the
personal attributes we need to look for in the people we put out front?
 Jan RoL workshop – three major points:
 Need to separate out two sets of competencies – substituted capacity (park
in other person’s government and serve as a policy maker; practically
speaking, putting a military government in place); legal obligation
 Development / capacity building – strengthening the RoL capacity in
someone else’s government. RoL development is a core governance
function. Process to adjust laws, make new regulations, new interagency
processes, setting up new organizations or agencies – core government
functions. This is what RoL is about. Have to have mindset, not of
bringing in a given set of answers, or translating what we know from our
experiences back home into the other nation – no, need to strengthen
change agents in the other country – train the trainers, reform the
reformers.
 Need to professionalize RoL field and determine how to assess/evaluate what our
forces are doing. Has to be transferrable, not just pushing the ball forward.
 Critical to understand how things work in governance – more important than
having a particular degree. How do power politics operate? Understanding the
dynamics – informal and formal structures – can teach them the technical part.
Cannot take a specialist in a particular place and make them work in the
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battlespace without this ability to develop greater awareness in the local people.
Teaching Governance 101 to the right kind of people.
A lot of active duty people do not have a good feel for the way things work in the
civilian world. What are the groups that drive conflict?
Governance 101 – how things work, core competencies. Human rights
protections, governance restructuring, federalism, decentralization, special
protections, electoral systems. Because these are complex, efforts need to be
started as early as possible.
Accountability and oversight – critical need. Must prepare people to understand
mechanisms to have eyes on the function – community oversight, media
oversight. Reporting on performance.
Hard skills (law) and soft skills (interpersonal).
Security Assistance mission to Ukraine – people who understood Soviet mindset
that had to be transformed. Put weight of effort on accountability and oversight.
Recent events -- level of restraint and discipline exhibited by Ukraine forces in
recent weeks is a credit to security assistance committed to accountability and
oversight.
Should be number 1 priority – holding ourselves, senior leaders accountable.
Identify risks, assess risks, plan mitigations.
Takes issue with cultural relativism – has not encountered a culture that accepts
graft and corruption.
Major General Charles Tucker (USAF, Ret.), World Enterprise Institute – over 30
years RoL experience
 We are in the selling governments business and philosophy business. Government
philosophy – “any ass can kick in a barn, but only a carpenter can build one”
(Sam Rayburn). Buddha – “all roads lead to enlightenment” – but some are a
helluva detour (Chuck). Which path do we want to go on in defining the 38G
field? What will the 38G field look like, what are roles and responsibilities (job
description and training plan based on a mission)?
 Irregular missions, complex environments? Traditional warfare? Which path?
 Who are we (as a career field)?
 Have CA officers with RoL mission – law schools, JAG, promoted by being
prosecutor/advocate/litigator – this is what we have. How to turn these into RoL
officers? Have to decide what RoL officer means.
 Will we be rough carpenters, finish carpenters, cabinet makers? Journeymen?
Specialists?
 Not the only people on this road – gave work away to contractors. Coordinators
(UN people claim to be that)? Contract specialists? What will CA officers be?
 Roles and missions have to be specified
 Regional experts in constitutionalism in Africa? Is that our role?
 One reason we have not succeeded well in the past is we try too much to provide
THE solution, in our image. How to take international law expert and turn that
person into RoL practitioner.
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Can I buy/sell property, can I give it away, how to start a business –
constitutionalism.
Define core competency, boutique mission – how far down the path will we go? If
tied to exit strategy, then maybe we should do fewer things. We can do this, not
do any harm, can pass it off to someone else. Often have problem where no one is
there to pick up the baton.
Meghan E. Steward, VP, Senior Counsel Public International Law and Policy
Group (PILPG) – advised over 12 countries on RoL reform
 Peace process invited by one of the parties to achieve their aims in the process;
advises foreign governments, rebel groups, prosecuting war criminals
 Two skill sets – hard law, technical skill; interpersonal, soft skills
 Minority protections – many recent conflicts deal with obtaining representation
(e.g., Sri Lanka)
 How do international advisors help? Five lessons:
 Dozens of configurations of legal reforms that can address the objectives
(human rights protection, governance structures, special protection
mechanisms, electoral systems) – parties can do different models of reforms,
so most important step is understanding the underlying interests of the parties.
 Have to be able to LISTEN. Learn what their biases are, what they want,
what they don’t want, understanding party’s language and terms. Can use
common terms with different meanings.
 Local laws and traditions are really important – good to find a point of contact
who can explain the local perspective
 Determine how the client/parties want to move forward
 Complex issues – important to start international assistance as early as
possible
 Providing international assistance – tailored to the audience
 Always unique challenges (multiple parties, concerns, perspectives); draw
lessons, provide options
 Need substance with ability to work with your audience
Douglas Batson, Human Geographer, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency –
land use and property rights (see slideset)
 Study human settlement patterns and institutions covering allocations and use of
land
 (paper) Napoleonic Know-How for Land Use Metrics – cadaster – land and
property registry
 About 50 nations out of 196 have a registry system
 6 billion land parcels; only 1.5 billion are in a registry – many people are
vulnerable to land grabs, other abuse. Unregistered land can result in land
disputes.
 38G need to know something about land use, land registry
 Considering a military operation – who owns the land?
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State land (legal) – overlaid with state-grant or lease (legal), customary
agriculture (extra-legal), customary grazing (extra-legal), squatters (illegal) –
competing claims (can also be documented in the registry). Interests in land
versus rights to land.
Now have international standard for land administration from ISO (ISO 19152,
Nov 2012)
OpenTitle is a low-cost registry – compliant with ISO standard
Documenting rights, restrictions, responsibilities
Because land governance undergirds social fabric – more important than elections
– civic empowerment
PKSOI Papers – Batson paper downloadable from PKSOI web site
Not standalone – has to be part of an overall RoL strategy with effective
enforcement mechanism
Q&A / Discussion
Look at PKSOI book Ground Truth in Building Human Security.
Michelle – issue of “who is your client” is important to emphasize. JAG did lesson
learned from Iraq – client is US government, military commander, funder of the program.
Changes the relationship between donor and donee. Needs to be part of the continuing
education. Chuck – we pick winners and losers. Imperative to understand we decide
which system to support – set up enforcement system. Tom – would we find Shari’a law
acceptable if that is what the people want? Michelle – have to be careful about judging
other legal systems. All recognize fundamental fairness and justice. Cannot say one
system over another is preferable, more appropriate, etc. Really about the culture of the
application within the framework – anytime we try to change the underlying legal
framework, it leads to problems.
Chuck: Not our job to undermine their underlying legal system. Taliban may come back
with Sharia Law – we did not inoculate the society to prevent it.
Wilson – how RoL complements or conflicts with reconciliation? Meghan – instituting
system of RoL is necessary to enable reconciliation; make different groups feel like they
are heard and have security to speak effectively. RoL structures are needed.
Re RoL and what 38G might do, are we talking about UN definition or some concept
beyond group, or established rules that can be superseded from higher perspective? Deal
with that country where it is and advocate a code of law? Going with the UN definition.
Irrespective of place.
--------Short on conversation – invite participants to write something on the discussion sheets.
Morning recording posted to APAN.
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Wed Mar 26, 2014
Observations on 3/25 proceedings:
Jon – culminating exercise for SSDCO curriculum; robust scenario located on Borneo.
Will post the scenario on APAN – inviting inputs from participants on problems for
students to address (e.g., will be given a cultural heritage problem). Statement of problem
and description of solution. Opportunity for immediate influence on curriculum to see
how students address (or fail to address) the problem.
James Adams – model/tool development – mapping complexities; training/briefing tool
Paula – SSDCO curriculum description – course beginning next week; much useful
material from this workshop, especially the systemic approach
MAJ Chris Hartley representing JAG in Stability Operations spoke on their program that
expanded from two days in 2009 to a 3.5 day program that was busting at the seams to
integrate the content. Covers stability operations and RoL, working with interagency
partners, civil law systems, Islamic law systems – a wide range of topics. The program
was created based on feedback from practitioners. Hartley emphasized the need to cast a
wide net to meet the need. He added that it is important to accurately assess the expertise
that you are surrounded by in meeting the demand for training.
Tom Baltezar stated that one of biggest gaps in the process of road to war or preparing
for deployment, in deployment, post-deployment is the inability for the practitioner to
emphasize to the senior leader WHY it is important to understand what the governance
field can add. He provided examples from Afghanistan of inarticulate diatribe between
DOD and governance folks. We don’t teach them how to do that. Practitioners have to
understand senior leader context and how they make decisions.
A Major from Civil Affairs stated that this is a gap in training. It is not offered at the
Special Warfare Center and School for CA officers. CA officer added that they walk in
without money or equipment and have to "beg, borrow, and steal" from the outset. This
pushes the conversation between USAID and CA officers to can I have money for this
project? Not often nested with a plan developed by the senior leader because he does not
understand development.
Andrew – CA officers are basically liaisons/salesmen. What needs to be taught is need to
look at what their commander wants. Interpersonal – connecting to the populace, but
equally important in connecting to higher command. Audience includes faculty teaching
soldiers of Civil Affairs and we have faculty teaching at civilian universities. We also
have "end users" in the classroom today. We need to understand what they need our
training to include before it reaches the "end user". This is being taught, maybe not to the
degree needed. Not taught in entry-level schools. Need to talk about this in a way that
communicates to the commander. How are these issues connected to the bigger strategic
mission and how do they relate to each other? Need to understand how actions like
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protecting antiquities contributes to the mission. DeJesse/Wegener presentations were
watershed moments. Need to understand maneuver commanders needs, USAID.
Chuck, Maneuver Center of Excellence, doctrine writer. Definition: Sources of instability
are actors, actions, or conditions that exceed the legitimate authority’s capacity to
exercise effective governance, maintain civil control and economic control; e.g.,
ineffective or corrupt security forces. Insurgents forming shadow governments, natural
disasters, resource scarcity, super-powered individuals, ineffective security structures,
and other examples were provided.
Ramey Wilson, medical educator re presentations yesterday – developing ICAPF-like
(interagency conflict assessment and planning framework) framework for health domain
– found RoL discussions interesting, similar to concerns in medical. Capacity-building
and institutional capacity. Health – substitutional capacity that can be brought. Army has
been slow to this game; Air Force and Navy have greater engagement. All of this lives in
the CA community in Army.
Karen re Monday plenary – Ugarte from World Health Organization – brings up
emphasis on who is the client. In-country agent or US military? Managing multiple
clients. Karen Guttieri suggested that the Guiding Principles is a wish list of what needs
to be done, but lacks an empirical understanding of causality.
Nicholas Dickson – I would debate the idea that we need the 38G to determine Sources of
Instability, or Critical Civil Vulnerabilities. I feel that is still largely the domain of the
38A, with the 38G being the practioner of the specified operations, activities and actions
which address that identified vulnerability. In this way, the 38A still is the main
proponent for CMO on the staff, works with the commanders etc.
Social Well-Being, in conversation with Sustainable Economic Development:
Marc Ventresca, NPS and University of Oxford
Co-convener: Maria Pineda
Marc – introduction (see slideset) – HA-SWB sector questions
1- What are current best practice conceptions of ‘initial response’ priorities and capacitybuilding?
2- What inter- and intra-organizational challenges in alignment with partner agencies,
missions(s)?
3- How do existing research, policy and practice conceptualize ‘transformation,’ or shortterm development and intervention?
4- What are CA desiderata and limits for ‘fostering sustainability,’ or long-term
development?
5- What insights for HA-SW policy and practice from innovation and infrastructure
studies? Substantive and functional knowledge – how to make it practical. What can be
learned from large-scale project management and related issues.
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Orienting frames for PSOTEW panels – Assess – Partner – Innovate
Col Glenn Goddard, commands CA brigade, licensed engineer – Infrastructure (see
slideset)
 “Am I a 38A or a 38G? Can I be both?”
 We spend 90% of our time discussing soft sciences like rule of law but how is it
tied to the hard science. Goddard participated in the development of the first Iraq
campaign plan. The threads of lines of effort were inter-related. They had to mix
together to provide them strength and the endstate that they desired. Goddard
provided a chart with the SWEATMS acronym on the horizontal left to correlate
with the Governance, Economics, Rule of Law, Counter-Insurgency vertical
threads. Stated that people would not be concerned with the soft sciences of good
governance if they did not have their basic needs meet. He believes that we do not
deploy sufficient experts in infrastructure development. He introduced the
solutions that currently exist: civilian contractors, reachback to experts, pull
experts from reserves, virtual presence, and functional expert Wikipedia.
 Interrelation – governance, economic development, RoL, essential services,
counter-insurgency – lines of effort. All interdependent – threads bound together
into “rope” that has strength
 Social fabric – sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety across
the lines of effort of governance, economics, RoL, and counter-insurgency
 Getting the functional expert to the battlefield – hire civilian contractors ($$$);
reachback to experts (what’s the question); pull out functional experts from
reserve units and deploy (breaks units); virtual presence (bandwidth); functional
expert Wikipedia (no management)
Norvell “Tex” DeAtkine, 18 years with Special Warfare Center -- Cultural and
psychological impact of displaced persons, refugees [try to obtain write-up]
 Personal experience as an attache observing conflict in Amman, Jordan and in
Lebanon. Draws from the experiences of his students at SWC.
 Those fleeing urban war have more extensive wounds than those coming from
rural areas. The refugees don't help themselves because they come from statist
societies where the government is the only provider, no civil society. Division of
labor between men and women leaves women without the ability to fend for
themselves. This is different in rural areas where they women do the majority of
the work. City folks are also more compartmentalized in Middle Eastern urban
cities. Communities are walled off. Additionally, the refugee camps are full of
women and children lacking a father figure. Gangs form within to establish a
hierarchy in the absence of fathers. The loss of roots or cultural property is a
significant issue. The scars do not go away. There is a great attachment to where
they came from and who they really are.
 Need to take a closer look at peculiarities of urban warfare on culture
 Middle Eastern population is largely urban – 80% of refugees in Iraq from
Baghdad and environs
 Less likely to be able to support themselves
 Aggravated by sect-based society
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Division of labor between men and women (predominant victims in urban
warfare) in urban areas
People obligated to kin, rather than neighbors
More compartmentalized by Middle East urban environment – nuclear families
rather than extended families
Predominance of women and children in refugee camps – breakdown of the
family structure, many young men undisciplined and tending toward criminal
activities
Heritage – hard to pull the people away from their home region; great adherence
to cultural property
Syndrome of dispossession; emotional attachment to where they came from, what
they were
Political problem is prevalent -- e.g., Shi’a who went to Jordan are unwelcome.
People who are always alienated.
From corrupt societies; people do not trust officials.
Become dependent, becoming hostile to those who do not meet their needs.
James Sosneky, Small Enterprise Assistance Funds, Army CA reserve officer –
“Last in Peace, First in War”: the Role of Civil Affairs in Social Well Being (see
slideset)
 SWB – a state of affairs where the basic needs of the populace are met. This is a
society where income levels are high enough to cover basic wants, where there is
no poverty, where unemployment is insignificant, where there is easy access to
social, medical and educational services.
 Military role in SWB – wartime / natural disaster – address urgent needs, don’t
attempt long-term development. Peacetime – no role. The military is not a
development agency. Every dollar to DOD is a dollar that doesn't find the
professional development folks. DOD should focus on the immediate needs and
share the burden. An example was the modern FOBs versus the Iraqi cities with
next to nothing. Countered the argument that MacArthur led Japan by saying that
this was a different time, different politics, and we helped them against an
existential threat. CA should focus on rapid action response and tailor their teams
and mission to support this.
 In man-made or natural disaster CA can keep lights on, banks open, people fed,
people healthy, people safe, people moving, share the burden, offer hope,
remember that hope is not a method, leave
 Not just CA – there are other groups in the Army that know how to do things
(medical, engineering, etc.)
 What about historic governance role? No – that was a different time, different
values, different political circumstances – followed defeat of existential threats,
not wars of choice. If this changes, then reconsider. Until then, leave the
development stuff to others.
 A new way to CA --- mission focus on wartime and natural disaster response; task
organize with other branches; consider restructuring the MTOE of a CA BDE or
BN to make organic to the unit, specialized people and equipment from other
branches; leave development to others, even if there aren’t others
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Suggested reading: A Bell for Adano (Hershey); Street Without Joy (Fall);
Savage Continent (Lowe)
Leo Estrada, UCLA, social demographer, urban planning
 Need to exploit demographics in civil affairs – must understand the demographics
of the population. Demographics is a global phenomenon, working at small level.
 Population is the key – who is there, what are you trying to do, who are you
working with
 Fertility – about women -- fertility responds to economic conditions. How
children develop indicates how population will go years into the future.
 Mortality – how populations decline.
 Morbidity – causes of death. What is creating differences, losing children. What is
likely to happen as the population goes forward.
 Migration – departing an area; entering an area. Who comes for aid, how are
supplies distributed. Understanding spatial aspects – tribal, ethnic groups, cultural
heritage groups. What is the spatial influence? Are they divided or are they
working together?
 Have underrated, underestimated CA understanding of demographics – need to be
able to document knowledge in a way that others can follow up. CA officers are
aware of demographics but we are not capturing the data.
 Demographics of leadership – who is most likely to take leadership
 Inequities exist – how to lessen them to achieve SWB
 Economy – can’t work without workers – age-dependency understanding
indicates what can be done in the community.
Broke into groups of 2-3 people to discuss what was heard.
Discussion: Tom – places we sent forces had some SWEAT systems, possibly disrupted
by violence or not meeting American standards, how to bring right expertise to provide
essential services? Glenn – have resources to provide necessary services (e.g., wastewater
treatment, electricity). Need expertise to identify what is needed, to set it up, then keep it
running by teaching locals proper operation of the systems. Chuck – Would be useful to
have reachback capability – sometimes can’t be done by military personnel with limited
knowledge and experience in dealing with diverse needs and conditions. Terry – a lot of
the discussions are more in the 38A tactical level. Need to think about needs at more
strategic level (38G).
Michelle – enjoyed the presentations. Have not talked about gender in a meaningful way.
Needs to be addressed. Where are our political imperatives, how do they transition to
mission. Women as producers of security in conflict (e.g., Honduras and Salvador; Jordan
– early childhood education). Stabilization mechanism/tool. How to be smarter in
executing gender empowerment agenda that sets better conditions for stabilization and
social well-being. Leo – women in key roles in homes. Once women are asked to
participate they do so willingly. At community level, must work with women. Jim –
every proposal on national development cannot win unless they address gender equality
or gender empowerment. Defense diplomacy interconnected directly with USAID
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countries (focusing on gender empowerment). Tex – these have to be approached
cautiously. Problem when the men return to the region after the women have been
empowered.
Other questions:
Laura Coy – definition of peacetime – instability in regions where there are no wars
Jon – include sociological literature on quality of life, social impact analysis, urban
planning
Andrew Paterson – when is it no longer a CA problem? How do we avoid mission creep,
CA creep? Will help define educational envelop.
Comment – You don't implement or empower gender. That is a fault of the published
strategies. A better way to look at it is to see what the women are doing. They are
producing food (70% in the world). If you cannot eat you do not have stability. Another
example is the women serving in combat roles in developing countries (Liberia – 40% of
combatants were girls – was not understood). The DDR programs don't include women.
That is where the gender discussion should begin, not in a USAID contract that audits the
contractor for gender inclusion. This is a significant issue from the standpoint of stability
and security.
Sustainable Economy -- Maria Pineda, NPS
Maria, Introduction (see slideset)
Economy about engaging the risk and pricing the risk, capacity to lose and to gain. Will
be looking at USIP framework, but going beyond it. Experiential to public sector
restructuring.
WEF: Major Global Risks 2014, Global Risk Landscape
WEF: system view of global risk landscape (interrelationship of risks)
Col Jose Madera, acting commander of 353 CA command, SSDCO student (see
slideset)
 Recent experiences – Accion Integral (Colombia; Governance/DDR/Crop
Substitution); post disaster economic recovery efforts; Iraqi Dinar conversion,
banking, consumer subsidies; commanders emergency response program (CERP;
“money as a weapon system”); microfinance strategy; oil sector economic and
security dynamics (Colombia/Iraq); task force for business and stability
operations, provincial reconstruction teams. “Accidental” economist.
 Emphasized that the Colombians were seeking a comprehensive approach with a
sustainable long term solution. Discussed governance and DDR in Columbia. It
was focused on men only. COL Madera later went to Iraq in the middle of the
Surge. He needed to get acquainted with different markets and economies. He did
not have experience with this and then also had to add the cultural aspects of
economic contests.
 Concept Logic Summary 38G Economic Functional Capability – the Army does
not need Functional Specialists. It needs Functional Integrators. Develop a
focused approach improving access to economics-related civilian skill sets: the
Army must leverage individuals who are grounded on critical core economic
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skills and understand the need for a systems approach to complex adaptive
systems in conflict, transitional, and stability environments.
We are fast forwarding to the design process, fleshing out the complexity at the
same time, and then we apply solutions that are not appropriate. We need to avoid
repeating at all costs the mistakes that we have made. Discussed ways to educate
the force. Suggested funding PhDs in exchange for service and additional
methods of recruiting from within and outside.
Core actions – identify potential source population with civilian required skill sets
(tributary streams analogy – look at river of talent the civilian world has and tap
into that early, bringing civilians into the reserves; finding more creative ways to
bring experienced personnel into the services beyond retirement/beyond uniform);
develop assessment, intake, and credentialing mechanisms that improve Army
personnel practices; expand training and educational opportunities with
interagency, academic and corporate partners and stakeholders – leverage
alternative resources.
Desired end state: CA capability supporting Army Service Component and
Geographic Combatant Commander objectives by providing economic
development and stability planning and execution capability organized, trained,
and available on a sustainable basis.
Need an integrated approach (Heinlein: “specialization is for insects”)
Gen Odierno – need to reinvest and transform educational programs – have to
look beyond current solution; need more wide aperture abilities to attack
problems holistically
Zeon: “Send lawyers, guns, and money.”
Patrik Willot, private sector, investment banker, assessments for recovery after
disaster
PoC and Private Sector in Post Disaster/Conflict settings: the need for a systemic
approach (see slideset)
 There is a need for a systemic approach. Civil society is also the private sector.
Where does crisis start and where does development start? The answer is that it is
not a threshold. Budget lines created that mentality. We emphasize integration
and interdependence yet we do not commit to it.
 What are the needs? What are the windows of opportunity for military support?
Necessity of a systemic approach. Identifying the triggers. You plant the seed for
development during the crisis.
 Characteristics of post-conflict situations (Private Sector Development in PostConflict Countries, N. Mac Sweeney, DCED 2008) – economic (loss of assets,
distorted markets, …); political and security-related; social; demographic
 PoC examples – more and more urban, therefore no food, have guerilla activity,
human density, etc. – problems with RoL, functioning markets, functioning
economy, etc.
 Everything is interdependent – why do we keep repeating the same mistakes
 Need for an integrated perception in community development – too much
thinking in silos, don’t have the cross-vision. Not “what do you teach” but “whom
do you teach.”
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Individuals (spiritual, emotional, physical, intelligential development) – social
human beings (community institutions – social, law, economy, security) –
supporting infrastructure
Linking the different parts – developing vision, linking to community
aspirations/expectations
Basic principles for rehabilitation and reconstruction – holistic, systemic
Example – importance of women in post crisis economics – microeconomy
Women role and interest in infrastructure development; design of housing and
settlements (where to put public facilities)
Has not been done in Haiti – total disaster
In Syria, whole humanitarian approach is controlled through the UN.
Have to think about value chain (Value Chain Diagnostics for Industrial
Development, UNIDO, 2010)
Have to think about structure and evolution
Windows for military support in crisis – human made: during crisis, by mandate;
post-crisis, by mandate
Natural crisis: during crisis, by necessity; post-crisis, by mandate
Infrastructure, RoL, free markets for essentials, health, food/cash for work, hope
versus Government, Civil Society, Business, Development Banks, NGOs,
Military
High-level gaps and challenges
Systemic approach is needed by requires credibility, holistic approach, system
approach (structure, evolution, process), participatory approach (national and
local ownership – beneficiaries, must be there at the start or they won’t be there at
the end)
Maria commentary: Businesses, operate in gray areas – manage risks, supports liquidity,
has reward. Illicit economies are economies.
Approach systemically to see the flows between actors, stakeholders and how things
change. How to set up the building blocks so that other legitimate things can be built and
achieve acceptance.
Branko Terzic, executive director Deloitte Global Center for Energy, world-wide
consulting term, public sector restructuring, especially energy (flywheel of economy)
(see slideset)
 7B people in world; only 2B with reliable electricity – due to governance and
regulation
 Regulation – imposition of a government of controls over the decisions of firms in
order to prevent exploiting of market power to extract pure economic profits; an
alternative to nationalization; a reason to encourage competition
 Objectives of regulation of private capital – protect consumers from abuse by
companies; protect investors from abuse by government; promote economic
efficiency
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Infrastructure and Public Utility Services – have monopoly characteristics; capital
intensive; vital to public health and safety – electricity, natural gas, water
distribution, urban mass transit, etc.
Government duties – selection of workable market model; recognize regional
realities
Government need to have clear energy policy objectives – efficiency, supply
reliability
National issues in energy – what should be the structure of the energy industries
of electricity and natural gas (monopoly, competition)? Who should own assets
(public, private, mixed)?
Problem of attracting private capital
Establish stability of operations
Sustainability
Likely status upon initiation of control – management is ineffective; service is
inadequate; service is unreliable (daily outages, voltage and frequency
fluctuations; revenue is inadequate (rates too low, illegal connections, large
amount billed but no paid)
Principal duties of regulation, independence of regulation
Need for effective electric utility regulation – 50% of humanity, mostly in the
tropics, still rely on wood for fuel
Air pollution is #1 cause of death around the world – cooking in enclosed spaces
Proven failure of regulation – 72% of people in sub-Saharan Africa have cell
phones (from entrepreneurship), while 27% have electricity service (state
monopolies)
To attract investors, need good regulation
Private capital is available to meet global energy infrastructure requirements;
attracting private capital at reasonable cost requires good regulatory policy (law)
and performance (administration); the parameters of good regulation are known
and knowable from a century of international experience
UNSG on domestic air pollution http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7464 –
Secretary Generals remarks at General Assembly thematic debate on Water, Sanitation,
and Sustainable Energy in the Post-2014 Development Agenda: “by 2030 we will need
35% more food, 40% more water, and 50% more energy.”
Maria commentary: regulation plays important role in provision of essential services, key
to Social Well-Being
Question – Want to sell meters, investment costs are so large, it is not workable. Shadow
price of producing and delivering electricity. Branko – all US customers pay shadow
costs (cost of service / distribution – not a market-based price). Central Europe – had
system of no price, came with housing. Soviet society had been subsidizing costs.
Metering is new investment. Re cell phone – pre-pay for service. Electrical – paid after
the service; prepaid electrical meters is one solution.
Maria – transition areas – no government to make subsidies. How to do provision of
services in novel ways.
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Andrew Paterson, Environmental Business International – from where does the
money come?
 How do we make the transition from the “spending a budget” model to attracting
funding and what are the alternatives. Has the spending model run its course?
Transition from spending model (get money and spend it) to investment model
(attracting finance).
 Challenges to Governance Innovation – there will not be enough funding from US
Congress, so do the current development/transition models “work”? Is “stabilize
and exit” the best model or plan? What are the alternatives – build-operatetransfer?
 No longer CA problem when you create situation that attracts outside investment.
 What needs to be government-only function and what can attract outside
investment?
 Can World Bank, AID approaches be improved? How are stabilization/transition
projects prioritized?
 CA always needs to understand the environments – better to say, when is it no
longer a maneuver commander’s problem, when do you no longer need a kinetic
force?
 EPAct 2005, Recovery Act 2009 – DoE had to shift to Energy Policy empowering
DoE to give loans
 Take $6B and turn it into $34B in loans (share risk)
 Crown Corp model (Crown assumes the risk) versus Public Enterprise Entity
compared by main goal, governance, economics, finance, organization, scope,
enemies/allies, mediation, skill sets, drawbacks
 Federal Corp – TVA – 14 senators protecting the debt, resist privatizing
 CA officers have a lot of experience in project management, but no training. Need
training to manage the projects in the context of hand-off.
 Public-Private Partnerships evolving – PPP 3.0 Risk-based subsidies and
regulatory reform – engages parliaments and requires training with energy and
regulatory agencies (federal, local)  commercial scale projects
 Need to understand price and subsidizing when needed
 Traditional procurement model to project financing model – will require different
skills
 World stock and bond value – over $200 Trillion – plenty of capital, partitioned
by risk and return
Patrik – TVA created during the Depression. Government spending. US debt is now a big
problem. Many municipal bonds are now broken. Cannot escape government funding.
Can’t just throw subsidies at the problem. Affects skills and expertise CA brings to the
problem.
The model presented by Petersen may too complex. It cannot be implemented in South
Sudan and is not even realistic for a CA officer.
Amateurs deal in strategy; professionals deal in logistics.
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Q to Selmo – relation between security and economy – no sustainable security without
economic development and vice versa. Battles are won by soldiers; wars are won by
logistics. Strength measured by strength of the economy, not by the military might. No
minister ever satisfied with a budget. Politics always prevails over security.
Jon – global financial data understated, doesn’t include the gray market which may be
greater than $600T. PPP levels – variable depending on situation? Yes. PPP 3.0 requires
a level of sophistication that may not be possible in some environments (e.g., South
Sudan). Maybe CA should not be involved at these levels?
Glenn – CA needed when bullets are flying. CA deals with immediate needs versus
longterm development.
Comment/question – That view is no longer current. Need to provide capabilities in preconflict situations, although violence is present and risk is high. What is the proper
working relationship between private entities and government?
Chip Horn – initial response, transition, stability – usually a threat element. Secure and
prevent from destabilizing. Identify key actors and influence to prevent longterm
destabilization in the economic realm. What are some indicators that can be identified in
the economic realm that military can influence?
Jim Embery comment – CA should not be involved in privatization of assets.
Andrew – “when bullets stop flying” – oil industry is one that has shown interest in
investing even while bullets are flying. (CA does not decide when to stop being engaged.)
How to mobilize private capital from market, NGOs, other than US government sources.
Will require some subsidy, some regulations, some definition of risk.
LTC Linden – how we shift resources, operations is a policy decision. Out of military
hands at theater level.
Norm – CA and economy – help our military not make the situation worse (e.g., as we
did in Panama – nothing written in the plans about spending US dollars creating runaway
inflation). CA should not be in national economic development. Do they need to be
knowledgeable enough to work with development agencies?
Chuck Tucker – Iraq reconstruction aid – would have been helpful to have CA advisors.
Sizeable portion of the funds went into security. CA could have brought a lot to the table.
Comment – opportunity to create economy when in-country. When we leave, it leaves a
vacuum in the country, and greater competition at local level since we pulled our
resources out. This spirals as we withdraw our resources (“DoD taper”).
Maria: CA requires strategic thinking. Tactical actions in relation to strategic vision.
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How to move into a new security paradigm? Previous – replacement situation, serious
security environment. How to provide military representatives in a non-post-conflict
environment in a shared space with other actors in RoL, economies, ect. To work
together and not talk past each other, multi-national, multi-agency operations. New
paradigm – need to size for and train for new paradigm.
Patrik – Why is CA training not done holistically from the start (why an add-on)? Need to
be in development paradigm from the start.
Documentary “What Winning Looks Like” – the Major had the training, but he was
limited in what he could do and couldn’t get fuel for his own FOB.
-------Karen: Described NPS library page developed by librarian Greta Marlatt for Governance
Innovation for Security & Development (http://libguides.nps.edu/Governance). Called
attention to WG3 posters by Jerome Dixon (economics in Afghanistan), Pruett
(education/training), and Guttieri (information communications technology) that have
been on display in the workshop marketplace room.
-------Homeland Integration
Paula Philbin, NPS – Opening Remarks: Homeland Defense is a National
Imperative
Wrote national strategy for homeland integration
Homeland Defense – posse comitatus means “no” – but 26 exceptions in through US
history. New territory: NSA and digital domain.
MGEN (ret) Pete Alwad, was deputy commanding general for joint forces in Iraq;
White House subcommittee for national disaster and tsunami warning
 Churchill: “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we must think.”
 Military often supports in disasters, dealing with media criticism of slow
response. NSPD 56; NSPD 44; National Response Plan and National Response
Framework; PPD 8, National Preparedness. Every administration says this is
important. Neighbors helping neighbors. Common lessons/themes in saving lives,
mitigating property damage, support local governments. Homeland Defense (DoD
is lead) vs Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DoD supports another agency).
 Lessons learned provide doctrinal basis for how neighborhood returns to stability.
 What is the proper role for military in complex catastrophe?
 What’s the authority? Civilian oversight will always remain. DoD should always
remain in a supporting role. Multi-jurisdictional – competing for same resources
under conditions of chaos. DoD has the tools in the toolkit.
 Who’s in charge?
 Who’s paying the bill?
 LA riots, OK City bombings, Katrina, etc. Consider invoking insurrection act
(LA Riots) – proclamation telling people to cease and desist. Prior to that, Gov
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Brown had called up the National Guard. Once the Act is invoked, Atty General
appoints civilian representative who has to review/approve all plans/actions.
GAO report – hurricane Andrew. Criticism: lack of coordination and
communications; lack of preparation; lack of maintaining public confidence. DoD
argued it could have done better if sufficient authorization exists.
Title 10 / Title 32 / Title 14 / Title 50 / Title 5 (DEA) / Title 21 (DoJ)
Have to define the requirement and decide what gives you the most flexibility and
speed. Folks prefer black and white constructs but this situation would be
conducted in a complex and chaotic environment.
How to begin dialog on how to move forward? Train as we are going to fight.
Tend to hold onto structures that don’t reflect how we need to operate; e.g.,
perhaps replace Joint Task Forces with Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF).
Junior enlisted training – include interagency partners. Look at how you do that in
JIATF construct. Train with the people who have the experience. Make sure
people understand fiscal law – there will be congressional audit and investigation.
Maj Bob Sander, International Law, federal prosecutor for counter-terrorism
 JAG in Army Operations Center, dealing with crisis action teams, strategic
planning, overseas and domestic
 Need to include JAG early and often, as well as medical
 Difficult to push back on international human rights law
 JAG has moved from prosecution to protection
 Army reserves have seen this – JAGs are now commander right-hand man,
dealing with law, policy, politics involved – problem-solving ability
 RoL in Afghan – reserve JAG in charge
 Authorities in domestic operations – have authority to do pretty much whatever
we need to do. Who is the decision-maker on that authority. Difference between
having the authority and decision-maker following a policy.
 Political dynamics of local, regional, national actors.
 Need to look at the type of operation – matters which federal agency is in which
role and position. HSPD 5 and National Framework spells it out. DoD brings
manpower, equipment, manner, capability. Also in constant planning compared to
other federal agencies.
 Pandemic epidemic, Gulf oil spill – different events have different leads.
 Often look at domestic operations being National Guard related – National Guard
now considered “line units.” Reservists and National Guard bring unique
capabilities from their civilian positions. How to bring them on? Now can call up
reservists as needed. National disaster – need to be able to mobilize in 3-5 days.
 National Guard commander – can be put under authority to command forces. E.g.,
Super Bowl.
 How to deal with National Guard and dual-status commander when disaster
crosses state boundaries? Open question at this time.
 Look at the funding considerations – fiscal laws are in place. Another reason for
involving JAGs early on.
 Posse Comitatus Act – prohibits DoD from being involved in law enforcement
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Stafford Act – authorizes federal government to help state and local in national
disasters and emergencies
Insurrection Act – allows federal government to help local government
Have to know fiscal, environmental, and international law; domestic roles and the
legalities of DOD involvement. The roles have increased and are more applicable
to the current environment.
Law, policy, politics, type of operation (who’s in charge), involve JAGs early and
often
Jeffrey Voice, CA officer, NPS student – working on paper on Homeland Defense
 Difference between homeland defense and homeland security (largest agency in
Federal Government)
 Homeland Defense – defined in JP 3-27 – our nation’s first priority: defeat threats
to the homeland from a safe distance
 Homeland Security – concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce
vulnerability to terrorism minimize damage and recover from attacks that do
occur. Homeland security rests on the constitution and using DOD requires a
relinquishing of rights. Consider our history as we assist other nations with their
rule of law or security structures.
 Historical context: insurrection and sedition; constitutional foundation (use of
federal forces violates our constitutional rights to one degree or another); cultural
influence (federalists); political influence; legislation (multiple)
 Evolution of militia – originally, operating internally up until about 1933
(National Guard Act); conflict with constitution; separation of Title 10 and Title
32
 Posse Comitatus 1878 – guidelines for application of force in the US; 26
exceptions, very wide-ranging; new territory – NSA, digital domain (do NSA
cyber efforts are a violation of Posse Comitatus of 1878?).
Q&A / Discussion:
Laura Coy, USSOUTHCOM – In Central America, partners using military in law
enforcement capacity – how do we work with them? Jeff – have to consider and look at
their constitutional foundation to have an adequate answer. Our laws are directed at
regulating force within the US, do not apply in their context. Pete – DoD always looking
at appropriate role for use of assets in US. Even stay away from National Guard role.
Held to standard for what is authorized by state authorities. Bob – doctrinal issue – who
has authority. Have to defer to Department of State for those activities. DoD is uniquely
positioned for mil-mil engagement with other countries. In combat, DoD has the lead for
RoL; under other conditions, DoS has the lead on RoL. Pete – standing rules for use of
force overseas and domestic.
Michelle – authorities covering homeland defense/homeland security, complicated by law
enforcement and jurisdictions – what are the challenges of coordinating in this range of
security actors under a range of authorities? Pete – for preplanned events (PDD 97,
critical infrastructure protection, designated public events), can think through the division
of tasks (troop-to-task analysis), authorizations that contribute to speed of
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action/response. For emergent events (Olympic Park bombing), bring together numerous
agencies to work the problem. Local community creates the groups to address the
planned events, bringing in others agencies as needed. Problems with use of medical
personnel across state boundaries. Bob – after 9/11, came up with Joint Terrorism Task
Force (local, county, state, border patrol, FBI, …). Has created more
interaction/coordination for more than just counter-terrorism cases. Similar issues in
FEMA regions.
Trick – recon/security missions in border defense, unmanned aerial assets. Pete – JTF 6,
Marine shoots a kid, Rumsfeld asks why are we still doing this. Do not want DoD
violating surveillance oversight executive orders. ICE or Border Protection authorization.
Coast Guard is not affected by posse comitatus – they do law information activities. Bob
– going forward, will have to deal with use of UAS assets and other capabilities available
in the military to assist with civilian situations. Have the authority, but will it be
exercised. Immediate Response Authority exists to save lives. Paula – great pressure to
deploy Predator in case of DC snipers, but there are other safety issues in flying those
assets over civilian areas.
Jon – What you see as the appropriate role of CA in homeland defense or security? Pete –
particular skills – National Guard and Reserve components in cyber domain have people
operating at cutting edge that cannot be brought into the military. When you have the
capabilities, they should be applied. If you walk through specific case studies, match
capability, flexibility, speed with authority, money across interagency to answer the
question. Jeff – CA in Iraq, training police – ICDC (Iraqi Civil Defense Corps). Overseas
doing stability operations, a case like this may arise. Our job to advise on limits, legal
framework, conditions. Bob – going forward, things will be joint and collaborative. In
domestic setting, DoD will probably not be exercised as much as people will like, but
will be a whole of government approach on what will be used.
Study on homeland security on another project looking at DoD eight specified DSC
missions – mass migration, preparing for a pandemic, others. E.g., 1980 boat migration
CA forces used. Might be a way to scope this. Pete – consider potential application
against specific scenarios/use cases to help define requirements, capabilities, application.
Paula – example of release of small pox scenario – instant response was federalize, but
when military gives away its authority, it gives away the local government authority. Bird
flu epidemic example – shelter in place. How to deliver medicine? Need soldiers to
protect postmen? Making laws in a crisis does not bring out the best in our character.
WG3 Wrap-up Session
LTC Linden – What did we miss in the last two days looking at these sectors? Maybe a
whole host of cross-cutting issues.
George Oliver – this has been a wonderful workshop. Great turn-out, participation,
interest. Missed –assessment aspect (how to assess the situation); what needs to be done,
including the local people; what agencies can help (international community); perhaps
other sectors/lines of operation will be revealed. The assessment would tell us that maybe
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the guiding principles do not capture everything. This is a good starting point but we
haven't integrated the international community either.
IMSG is coordinating organization, eventually an operating capability. Revitalize 38A to
create 38G – 580 positions are going to change. What are the skills we need across the
sectors, how to describe it, title it, what are the qualifications? Interagency partners,
IGOs, NGOs – want to sign on with all of them.
The sectors represent the main lines of attaché but we need to fill in the cracks; i.e.,
addressing corruption.
Michelle – missed or slightly overlooked? Hit development, skills. (1) What does CA
officer need to do before transition, all have to be tied to the security impact? Gender,
cultural preservation – impact, but in limited spheres. Political pressure to put 5,000
women into Afghan national police – scattered, not protected, not used. SOF people start
creating crisis response units – could not do evidence-based investigations because only
women can search vehicles, rooms where other women are. Commanders of the most
male-dominated units, where we did not put positions for women. What is the security
impact for this particular line of effort? (2) Role of CA officers – impact and role in
security assist, train and advise missions training capable partners. Need things that
develop strong institutional structure.
The real imperative is the security imperative.
Selmo – more emphasis on leadership role. Increased complexity of structures involved.
Less and less simple hierarchical structures. Role of leadership more important –
coordination among actors. Also, role of education – basic perspectives of the nation –
for lasting and coordinated, self-propelling capacity for security.
Madera – re age, have structures and presumptions about personnel management –
educating the youth but not using the experienced; need to better use people across the
generational spectrum (“SOF for life”)
Baltazar: The lexicon is complicating things. If you ask a military man what you call
training and equipping a partner nation they will say it is training. If you ask another
agency they will call it development. Development takes thirty years, training does not.
Where do we want these partners? Do we want an institution or do we want a trained
unit? Conceded that he now feels that he has done more harm than good in his Army
experiences with development, but it sure felt good when he was doing it. We have to
understand what it is that we are trying to accomplish. Need to be sensitive to
terminology. Also, contextual response. Civ-mil – perceived unwillingness to achieve
effects.
Moore: Cut the issue into stovepipes, heard from experts in the stovepipes, talked about
making functional experts. They bring their own toolkits to the fight. Need the integrator
– how to create that person with the right background to work across the functional areas.
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A CA officer as an integrator of 13 plus fields as well as the NGOs, multinational and
interagency. How do we integrate with the future other parts of the government and
NGOs who need to come in later? Need to be doing things at the tactical level that do not
do harm and set up other organizations for future success in 15th to 20th year. How to get
a 38G to have that skillset?
Bernie Carreau, NDU: Great discussions. Overarching impression is that we are asking
CA to do too much. What is the actual role that they can play? Specializations are fine,
but do not want to lose sight over the overarching impact as integrators. Not just stability
impact but also political impact (this is what their specialty should be). Can know
enough to know you need to figure out the local situation and find the local
person/stakeholder in that situation. The specialists that we bring in will not have the
broad view. Security impact and political stability is where the CA needs to be
concerned.
SOCOM: We need to be intellectually honest – we did not get the job done in Iraq or
Afghanistan. Lessons learned must be considered in that context. COIN – do not try to
make somebody a lesser version of yourself; need to help people become better version
of themselves. We had tactical success stories, but not a strategy. We used Fix to stand
for Foreign in FID. That did not work. We would be better suited to use the Philippines
and Columbia models. We used less personnel, less resources, and were forced to use the
host nation. The hosts learned. They became better able to integrate with the population.
We need to check our egos at the door. Accept more risk. Appropriate (to local, regional,
global, domestic populations) is more important than legal. If it is not this will damage
our reputation. Everything that we do is to shape perceptions. It is not enough to build a
road but to change the perceptions by building the road. If we’re not shaping perceptions,
we are hurting the overall effort. Less is more. Redefine the problem.
Karen: concluding remarks and preparation of WG3 outbrief. For clarity, the 38G is a
Strategic Specialist and marks a transition for the Civil Affairs officer.
Reflections on last couple days – Nonviolence International – Africa, conflict
management. When a state is not able to provide security it is violence against its people.
Army basic training, transitioning into CA – hearing from experts here has been very
rewarding. How can we adapt to increase effectiveness?
Karen Pietrus – what kinds of initiatives might be important for CA community to
support? Geographer in 38G? Would be good to have geospatial capabilities – how to
gather data in a structured manner for others to map.
Nick – raising good questions. 38G – are they going to be the ones interfacing with the
GCC commander or will they be reaching back to the ones who will do the interfacing.
Marc – geographers – huge absence in this conversation; social community; segregation;
etc.
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Amy Gorman, NDU – research project TIES – sustainable technologies for disaster
response. Engage heavily with NGOs – clean water, shelter, power, etc. Participation
here helped in looking more at soft side rather than just technology side. Understanding,
mapping the society. What are the appropriate technologies to bring in to build trust and
partnerships?
Maria – global change and international governance, look at how chaos is created. While
establishing stability, have to think about what can change that stability and framework
we are creating. Solution now is temporary – demography will change conditions,
economy will change. Change is illusionary. Need to work toward robust stability, able to
adapt to change and maintain stability conditions. Dynamic systems of permanent
change.
PSOTEW orienting frames for the panels – assess – partner – innovate. Educational
development. Ability to engage in seminar-type environments without constraint from
organizational concerns is valuable. Education itself needs to innovate – what does the
host nation want/need for stabilization? What does the humanitarian need for this to
happen? Those being deployed, what do they need to be effective? Thinking of a survey
for stakeholder inputs. Encouraged people to fill in information for Norm’s stakeholder
analysis. What is the problem, who is the client?
Col Goddard – where this might be leading for 38G – qualification levels currently based
on education. Counsel against that – what’s more important is professional licensing –
demonstration of practical knowledge. Ability to understand problems and implement
solutions. Can have too many empty slots if the qualifications are too rigid/demanding.
Trying to solve a technical issue or a project management problem? What is the skill set
that needs to be applied to the problem? When a call comes downrange asking for 5
38Gs, how do we know what skill set we will get? Need to create those broadly based
skilled operators.
Our solutions are always temporary, fictitious success stories. We have to adjust to the
demographic changes. We have to educate our practitioners to operate in uncertainty
because it is an inevitable condition.
Outbrief Presentation Development – see Thursday presentation
Closing Reflections
 Does CA provide stop-gap solutions or long-standing solutions?
 Where are we and where do we want to go? There has been progress over the past
10-15 years in getting this area recognized.
 How to do what needs to be done (what is it that needs to be done)?
 Unconstrained planning process, and then apply the constraints, then perhaps can
distill what is possible? Constraints lead to innovation.
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Appropriate professional observation of what we have endured and encountered
over the past several years but need to get to the point of recommending the
appropriate level of support for something that is target-nation driven. How do
you tell the top-level leadership that says we have to solve this problem quickly
that you will drive and achieve buy-in for to obtain the resources. When decision
is screwed up, come up with task force about what went wrong in the decisionmaking for a new mechanism to apply next time, which no one will use.
Thurs Mar 27, 2014
General Session
Over 160 attendees this week, would not have seen that 10 years ago.
Quality of individual – depth in knowledge and perspectives. Great work by panel leads.
Work Group OutBriefs:
Work Group 1: Conflict Prevention – Jim Gannon, Amy Chamberlain – examined case
studies (e.g., Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan); strengths and weaknesses in education (see
slideset)
 Assessments – no standards (and no lack of assessment frameworks; moving
towards multilateral institutions; UN trying to get at assessments; normal
consolidated field project, humanitarian context; DoD assessments are very
threat-focused; need ability to look outside own framework and see how to
interplay with others to achieve unity of understanding of shared environment);
understand the operating environment; identify sources of resilience and friendly
networks (partners); use asset maps (not just an Excel spreadsheet; want to
capture incentives of each of the groups, understand motivations, understand time
horizons); there may be multiple layers of conflict resulting in a diversity of
assessments; question assumptions (e.g., South Sudan – aggressive actions of the
military)
 Sources of resilience – new term with regard to Conflict Prevention (ability to
absorb a shock to the system or adaptability, changing in response to shock to the
system to prevent later shocks); society/systems that rebound after crisis; sources
may be found in government, religion, culture, faith, health, economics,
education, family and security; sources could be organizations, individuals,
public/private, community-based; sources of resilience should be focal points;
allows and alternative to threat-based analysis
 Whole of society approach – leverage and integrate US Government, Multilateral,
Host Nation, Business, Private, NGOs, and Diasporas (sources of resilience; asset
maps and friendly networks, accountability, communication); inclusive solutions;
interdependencies; early warning systems (do we have the political will and
national interest to act on early warnings?); new deal of engagement for fragile
states
 New deal for engagement of fragile states – provides a framework to engage
fragile states; host nation is in the lead; US is a member; provides an approach to
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conflict prevention; membership and participation is voluntary; security and
justice are part of the framework; framework is widely accepted by NGOs
Intelligent Partnerships – understands the operating environment; quick to listen
and slow to speak; sequences partnerships; seeks local solutions; doesn’t let tools
drive operations; seeks opportunities to expand Partner’s Roles; practices
expectation management; does not pilfer host nation talent (example from medical
arena – demonstration of good will to nations; unintended message is host nation
is not able to provide for the populace – now partnering with nations to share
ideas; improving impact)
Findings and Recommendations – Institution changes – capture demand signals
for use of sources of resiliency and intelligent partnerships and improve
socialization of terms. Make use of interdependencies, intelligent partnership,
sources of resiliency, asset maps, effective/inclusive messaging. Way Forward –
short term (articles, curriculum, table tops, communities of interest) and longterm
USAID, State, DoD – much of this has been explored over past several years in security
sector reform, culminating in policy for security sector assistance (PPD 23)
Work Group 2: Health Sector Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction (how we
assist host nation prepare to respond) – Brian Payne, Caroline Raclin (see slideset)
 Reframing the problem – building partner government health capacity for disaster
preparedness. Host/Partner Nation developed capacity to respond to disaster
themselves (self-sufficiency) or reduce the reliance on external support.
Commonly identified obstacles to progress: process; participation; who leads.
Outcome – identified common required functions for framing/structuring process:
assess; build capacity (train/educate); plan; exercise
 Exploring the problem – formed teams to explore the functional framework for
each of the functions – answer 5 Ws in each function
 Assessment – internal (partner-initiated/led) and external (advisory assistance).
Assessments based or shaped by purpose (what is out national interest, what is the
threat); population (what capacity exists); professionals/partners (who is
available); process for deriving/meeting need (lessons learned/local knowledge;
funding; establish and adopt standards); patterns and cycles; continuous and
iterative
 Build capacity and maintain/export capacity – Iterative, cumulative, sharable
 Planning – actor (e.g., interagency) to assessment actions (e.g., identify gaps) to
crosswalk/discussion topics (e.g., strategic areas of interests hazards, current
preparedness) to outcome (e.g., priority list of hazards to address)
 Capacity building – internal: process (Service/DoD, Interagency, Civil Society,
Private Industry), competencies (cultural, language, skills, negotiation); external:
level of engagement (individual, community, organization, PN government);
method (distance learning, functional assistance learning, security force
assistance/regionally aligned force, NGOs/IOs)
 Exercise
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Purpose – validate/assess disaster plan/DRR plan and capability; long term
– improve existing plans and work ourselves out of a job
- Opportunity – pre-existing forums/partnerships (JIIM, COCOM, Embassy,
TSCP/DATA – fall within the predetermined priority list of nations to
engage
- Method – vendors (USG, contractor), types (off the shelf, simulation,
TTX), traits (scalable, dependent on HN risk profile)
Plan – must be feasible, conscious, structured/feasible
Challenges – unity of internal effort; common operational language; process
continuity; know the playing field; including whole of society; reversion;
convener (need place to work on this framework)
Way forward – continue opportunities for interagency interaction; develop
understanding of organizational culture and capability; refine work group
products and observations to form initial planning guidance for a IA WG /
Planning Team, OFDA-DDR WG; expand systems planning process identified
beyond health services; share with interaction
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Work Group 3: Governance Innovation for Security and Development (GISD) –
LTC Terry Linden, Karen Guttieri (see slideset)
 Project overview – GISD – seeks solutions to the challenges of supporting
governance in fragile environments – strategic framework for stabilization and
reconstruction
 Primary sponsor: Institute for Military Support to Governance – manages the
provision of civil sector expertise across the range of military operations in order
to support USG obligations under international law and promote stability. On
order, supports Theater Security Cooperation, Transitional Military Authority,
and Support to Civil Administration operations.
 Special Warfare Center and School, Ft Bragg – doctrine, training and education.
580 practitioners, 1 Oct 2015 change from 38A to 38G Governance specialists.
Civilian education, experience, certification. Looking at reserve force and direct
commissioning as Capt/Maj/LTC/Col of civilian specialists.
 38G development (requirements, competencies, classifications, certifications)
pyramid through problem set, research and education (civilian, military, tailored)
– transitional military authority, support to civil authority, theater security
cooperation
 Research team focusing on stability sectors
 Major questions considered – How to do things better than the last 10 years (ad
hoc vs integrated planning; need for systemic thinking and action)? What should
the Civil Affairs community bring to partners (key skill identifiers for 38G;
political primacy: end states of our actions)?
 regarding processes – as we figure out what tasks and skills, do it in a
parallel process – there will be gaps as we go forward
 how CA meshes in with other military units; issue of unity of effort, unity
of command; parallel structures, receive attachments. End up with two
parallel chains – can create some friction. Need a cleaner approach for
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quicker integration and application of effort. Need better internal military
coordination. What can CA contribute to command element?
 Ground owner looking for someone to inform the civilian operational
picture, but when competing interests his level of interest in CA team is
doing may vary. Added personnel responsibility to commander – what
does/should CA contribute.
 CA is civilian face of the Army; resistance because of religious
background, language barrier – CA can be intervener tailored for the
environments in which they are working. Select people from local
populace for connections/links.
Assess the future environment – missions/operations (dynamic, mission
evolution; in demand); engagement up front (don’t wait for after the crisis, shape
conditions); political primacy, legitimacy, local capacity – now recognized, host
nation governance capacity, demographic factors in resilience; strategic
assessment and thinking for 38A and 38G
Churchill: “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we must think.”
Partner key differences – overlap among agencies; organizational functions
(culture, decision cycles, funding cycles, time horizons); expectations; US law;
exclusive v inclusive planning
Recommendations – invest in continuing educations (not training only – reinvest
and transform institutional educational programs; develop analogic reasoning,
critical, creative thinking); use the whole force (CA/USAR/etc. – better utilize the
talent); stakeholder analysis (coordinate and embed in Branches and Agencies;
find modalities of work with Partners; assess the stakeholder values at risk);
develop funding models
No silver bullets; progress is incremental; 38G is another tool in the toolbox
What are the appropriate principles of engagement – respect for international
norms; build on existing capacity; select national policy goals; do no harm; speed;
flexibility; expertise; local context; inclusiveness; check assumptions; civil
control of military; pursue unity of effort; patience, partnership and parsimony;
plan realistic change
Key take-aways – new paradigms (government spending model is obsolete;
engage with stakeholders, capital or funding sources, regulatory issues, and risk
negotiation [economy]); employ CA “integrators” / project managers, not just
specialists; define and package projects that can be taken over by appropriate
others with resources and expertise; reach back to civil society, public-private
partnerships, academia, IGOs, NGOs, and convener organizations
Engagement:
- Collaboration portal: www.apan.org;
https://wss.apan.og/s/GISD/default.aspx
- Program reviews / call for papers
- Governance Innovation resources (http://libguides.nps.edu/Governance)
Q&A:
Looking for someone politically adept, culturally adroit, language skills – doesn’t the
Army already have them as Foreign Affairs Officers? Ans: Functional specialties have
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existed, just being further professionalized. The CA mission is different -- governance.
People who can build capacity within ministries.
Concept of CA integrators is intriguing – USAID when well-funded had overseas
structure where there might be a child-health specialist in a particular province, with a
supervisor performing an integrator function at a higher level. Is that the idea? Ans:
Would prefer state and aid could do it. This is a good model – identify where agencies
like AID have it in place and where not in place, provide data and assessments for that
work. Smooth transition.
FAOs – CA round-table last year looking at military support to foreign engagement
(Phase 0 cooperation) – how to better integrate a whole-of-military support to larger
country piece, support governance writ large. Look at 21st Century DoD CA capability to
integrate capabilities to become a conduit for ministries to integrate the capabilities.
Previous idea of Civil International Military Affairs (CIMA) out of ARCEN.
What the CA people can provide is a local capability that cannot be found inside an
embassy. CA role will be to work with local military working with the local populace.
Need the skill set to work at the local level. Comment: Way information is received at the
command level. CA officer providing one perspective for commander to use in decisionmaking.
Bill Flavin – re work in the sectors – Joint Publication on Stability in re-write starting
next month. Sector work and feedback can feed into that work. (call for papers –
opportunity to influence the doctrine)
2003, didn’t know what CA was, not a founding father – squeaky wheel gets grease; two
active duty brigades; starting to hear this is just a wartime function – major concern. Can
help avoid cultural missteps. Stop repeating the past, wiping away what has previously
occurred. This is an opportunity to make sure that does not happen.
Re FAO utility – are we blurring the terms diplomacy and governance? Are FAOs trained
to do governance? Ans: Generally, no. Not large enough and not trained for that.
Important integration with Chief of Mission.
Position for 38G is a reclassification (580 positions), not new positions.
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PSOTEW Notes Annex A. Flip Chart Content (from WG3 sessions and wrap-up
meeting)
Challenges/Recommendations: group’s views on how senior leaders should address these
challenges within integrated education and training
- gender challenges
- not teaching how to articulate relevance
- understanding temperament
- role of decisionmaker
- sell it!
- what is regulation function
- who owns assets
- how do tactical reality connect to operational and strategic?
- who is the client?
- how to reconcile local practice with sustainable doctrine and institutionalization
New efforts/methods for mutual success: Figure out what we are trying to do, how it can
be done, then figure out who should do it – see UN/NATO designs
Working definition; major questions considered; assess future environments; partner
selected; innovate; change recommendations
What’s missing?
- Gender roles in security assistance
- Emphasis on leadership role, coordination among actors
- Role of education, security and development structures
- reach back (SOF for life)
- Delta in lexicon – capacity vs development; contextual response (time)
Key differences among us
- Governance
- Liberal democracy versus other forms of governance
- Republic versus democracy form of government (in Republic, minority rules; in
democracy, majority rules); emplace democratic process
- Reseachers/educators/”end users”
- Bureaucratic politics: some agencies not inclined to “make decisions”; military can’t
expect USAID to tell them what to do, but can build inclusive process – seminar vs at
podium
- US/EUR/PUB-private  motivations, view of “client”\
- military always works on a much shorter timeline than AID and DoS do. And will do
the same types of activities but for totally different reasons/objectives, which can
sometimes be perceived as the military not knowing what they are doing or not being an
expert at things or functions that typically fall under DoS or AID mandate
Our working definition
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- Sources of Instability – Actors, actions, or conditions that exceed commander’s capacity
to exercise effective governance
- Beyond 3-07 / Guiding Principles – moving from wish list to research with empirical
data for causal tests
- Support/reconcile 38G CA specialists in support of SCA/TMA/TSC
Efforts to adapt/share to increase effectiveness
- adaptation is reactive. The effectiveness we seek is usually fanciful or not even
understood. So we default to reacting. We are adaptive, maladaptive that is.
- opportunities (needed) to acuire familiarity with capabilities of various federal agencies
– CA partners are far broader than the 3D’s
Innovate – new topics and methods we require
- redefine problem
Partner selected efforts – relevant and useful content/methods
- understand multiple “clients”
- “if they’re (publics) not there at the beginning, they won’t be there at the end”
Programs/methods to share to increase effectiveness
- increase CA and JAG Corps coordination as both branches identify and refine future
roles in Rule of Law
- UN/NATO systemic processes: success = f(public inclusion, systemic design)
Defining 38A positions:
General Qualifications: interpersonal skills; human group facilitation;
planning/program/project management; qualitative/quantitative reasoning
Subjects: RoD. Economy, SWB, SSE, Governance
Level 1: intro level courses; BA equivalent; education
Level 2 Master professional certification; education and experience
Level 3 Expert: (some PhD equivalence); education +experience + management
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PSOTEW Notes Annex B. Participant Inputs for Safe and Secure Environment
Participants were asked to provide 5 characteristics of a safe and secure environment by
completing the following statement: “A safe and secure environment …”
Participant responses:
…is characterized by trust.
…is not excessively influenced by external systems of governance perceived as
illegitimate.
…recognizes the right of formal and informal systems of governance to affect
their lives.
…is served by security forces dedicate more to ensuring the pursuit of life,
liberty, and happiness in the context of their culture and expectations than it is in
protecting the government from the people.
…provides the hope that my children will have as good or better opportunity than
myself.
…[is an environment where] armed opposition groups responsible for political
violence have largely been defeated, subordinated to legitimate government
authority, or disarmed and reintegrated into society.
…[is an environment where] national security forces, operating lawfully under
legitimate government authority, provide a safe and secure environment for
citizens.
…is one where people can conduct their daily activities without fear of personal
harm.
…is one where people expect violent criminals to be caught, prosecuted, and
punished.
…is one where people can feel that their home and personal property will not
suffer harm while at home or away from home.
…is one where people can exercise their personal freedoms without fear of social
or economic repercussions.
Other participant comments:
 Soldiers should be better trained in nonlethal force to ensure civilians are as safe
in CT [counter-terrorism] actions overseas as they are in the US.
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PSOTEW Notes Annex C. Chat Content from Adobe Connect Sessions
**DISCLAIMER**
The views presented in these meeting notes are personal and represent the
opinions of the individuals that are respectively participating. The
information and views within do not represent any other parties associated
or related.
Session 1
Karen Guttieri: Chip Hauss is asking what kind of questions we should ask?
Karen Guttieri: How to be inclusive?
Karen Guttieri: Chip: How do you listen to the people on the ground?
Karen Guttieri: Chip: How do you build sustainable capacities?
Karen Guttieri: Chip: How do you create capacity for enduring governance? Avoid
mistakes made under Presidential Directive for the last 10 years?
Karen Guttieri: KG: This is the challenge of SCA, TMA and TSC
Karen Guttieri: Michelle Hughes: if we look where we've made mistakes, how do we
handle oversight for counter-corruption?
Karen Guttieri: Accountability and oversight are not represented in these five circles.
Who will have the rose pinned on them to build in oversight and accountability, not as an
afterthought, audit, etc.?
Karen Guttieri 2: Bob Jones: How to build circles of trust?
Karen Guttieri 2: Jones: only in the last 100 years have we developed capacity in air
domain. Recently, cyber domains empower anybody to challenge great powers. Now how
to think about the human domain?
Natalie Cake: Bob Jones: "The only difference between insurgency and democracy is
legality."
Hank Nichols: I believe we often confuse Law and Order with ROL.
Karen Guttieri 3: For the UN, the Secretary-General defines the rule of law as “a
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private,
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to
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the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law,
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decisionmaking, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
transparency." (Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice
in conflict and post-conflict societies” (2004))
Karen Guttieri 3: Steve Hall: this is a system dynamic problem and we have to think
about the emergent behavior of the actors in the system
Karen Guttieri 3: Steve Hall: the Guiding Principles tradeoffs will push one sector up,
another down. Whether that's a good idea or not depends on the type of system you're
in...
Hank Nichols: It is my preferred definition too but ask 99% of the US military and the
first words out of their collective mouth is police, coercive measures and use of force.
Karen Guttieri 3: Steve Hall: beyond Maslow, [people are motivated beyond basic needs
and have others, like need to "belong"
andrew.dejesse: MIL and a large population of CA generalists look at police, coercive
measures and use of force because they are looking at symptoms.
andrew.dejesse: CA has far too many generalists. They are assigned varied, difficult and
complex assignments. This creates a huge learning curve and CA Soldiers are hand tied
to play catch up during the first few months of deployment. 38Gs would focus
knowledgeable personnel in their area of specialty and unique skill set to tackle relevant
core issues.
Hank Nichols: Andrew- Good point
Session 2
Hank Nichols: It is also more "sexy" to provide on train on the neat stuff like weapons
and commo gear rather than trying to teach the difficult principles of supremacy of law,
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law.
Hank Nichols: We have enough problems with that here at home.
Charlie Pilkington: @Andrew = think career progression model. It
Charlie Pilkington: It doesn’t work for enlisted. Does it work for the Officer side?
Karen Guttieri 3: Norm Cotton: 2010 talks about civil affairs quite a lot
Karen Guttieri 3: Norm Cotton: stress on proponency with demands on Civil Affairs
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andrew.dejesse: PRTs was a great concept that fell flat. Look up- Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
andrew.dejesse: & Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Karen Guttieri 3: DOD Directive in 2010 gives responsibilities to the Army for Military
Governance; included in Lamont memo to CA in Nov 2012
Hank Nichols: CA didn't participate in PRTs after about 2006.
Karen Guttieri 3: PPD 6 says development central to US power --> Diplomacy, Defense,
Development approach
Hank Nichols: The idea was anybody can get a few weeks of training and become a CA
expert
Karen Guttieri 3: "shake and bake"
Karen Guttieri 3: to Hank - it's ironic, because a PRT is a version of a CMOC
andrew.dejesse: They did in Afghanistan all the way thru. Run by Navy and Air Force
with Army CA Teams
Karen Guttieri 3: USAID's Democracy Rights and Governance is new resource
Charlie Pilkington: @Hank and Karen, RC CA units conducted PRT missions up until
2013, last I noticed...
Hank Nichols: There was also a supply and demand problem of CA troops.
andrew.dejesse: PRTs started to do a better job when they changed focus to governance
and capacity building.
Hank Nichols: Long ago USAID moved to providing expertise rather than "stuff" . DOD
liked to provide stuff because it was easily quantified and looked good on PowerPoint.
Hank Nichols: DoD learned more about the mentoring and expertise line as time went on
in Iraq & Afghanistan.
Hank Nichols: Now building partnership capacity is the big Army thing, not just in CA.
Karen Guttieri 3: Stuart Bowen: do you believe that the operations are civ-mil?
Karen Guttieri 3: How to integrate? There's a bill on the hill - why isn't it going
anywhere...is it Goldwater Nichols effect?
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Karen Guttieri 3: Is there planning for stabilization and reconstruction?
SWCS CA M-B: Please provide details of the bill you mentioned.
Karen Guttieri 3: Iraq and Afghanistan reconstructions were planes built in flight
SWCS CA M-B: more like existing planes with incompatible radios and no air traffic
control or flight rules
Nicholas Dickson: Karen: you mentioned earlier that the Active component has a fair bit
of prejudice against the reserve community. I would not debate that, but offer that it is a
two way street, there is an extensive amount to go around from Reserve to Active, from
Active to Active and from reserve to reserve.
Nicholas Dickson: even prior to the "Great Schism of 2006"
Hank Nichols: I would point out that less money is available for building when not in
flight. We generally address near term problems.
Hank Nichols: did we leave a legacy and foundation for future elections or just
addressing the near term objectives?
Karen Guttieri 3: Nick - good point! Thank you
Karen Guttieri 3: Stuart Bowen: greater success requires institutional Goldwater-Nichols
type reform
Karen Guttieri 3: "It requires integration"
Karen Guttieri 3: Is the CSO planning for Stab/Recon? No -- more like Office of
Transition Initiatives -- more reactive than proactive Office of Technical Assessment at
Treasury good at what it does within its lane. ICITAP at Justice for Rule of Law again in
its own lane - how to integrate as strategy years on?
Hank Nichols: Goldwater -Nichols forced Joint activities. Forced is the operative word.
SWCS CA M-B: We are working to place a SWCS instructor at FSI
Nicholas Dickson: I would argue that in some instances CSO is planning.
Nicholas Dickson: but, it is a case by case basis.. the comparison to OTI is apt, but they
are planning.
Karen Guttieri 3: David Becker: Community Counterinsurgency - getting to tactical level
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Nicholas Dickson: discounting all potential information (to include surveys .. if present)
does not make sense to me
Karen Guttieri 3: Municipalities in Action
Karen Guttieri 3: Democratic Community Development
Karen Guttieri 3: Haiti Stabilization Initiative
Karen Guttieri 3: National Solidarity Program
Karen Guttieri 3: Becker: "CERP wasn't a counterinsurgency program but people thought
it was"
Karen Guttieri 3: Village Stability Program (?)
Nicholas Dickson: VSO
Karen Guttieri 3: Thanks, Nick - Village Stability Operations
Karen Guttieri 3: Becker: "most of these opposed when they were put into place"
Karen Guttieri 3: Becker: simple rule set: Very small projects, local choice, people decide
for themselves.
SWCS CA M-B: CA 101 the problem with CERP is that approval/expenditure was not
retained in CA channels but put into command channels.
Karen Guttieri 3: Community driven development in peaceful situation difficult because
it isn't your plan
Nicholas Dickson: M-B: Good point, among many problems with CERP.. to include our
complete metrics system
Nicholas Dickson: Common development Theory: figure out how you are going to
measure your impact.. before you impact
Karen Guttieri 3: The "burn rate" problem - how fast can we spend the money? SIGIR
report notes the value of multiyear money to avoid big spending in August-September
Karen Guttieri 3: Build a cadre of local leadership that helps them think about larger
projects they can take on...
Hank Nichols: his burn rate point is excellent. I was frustrated in Afghanistan because my
PRT commanders were in such a hurry to do things and expressed the feeling that the
Afghans were too slow to to things . It led to a lack of ownership by the local citizens.
166
Karen Guttieri 3: Becker: "learn to reward success and walk away from failures" It is
difficult to break sense of commitment to people when there are failures
SWCS CA M-B: I still subscribe to the theories of Joseph Tainter that you must produce
a level of "social energy" which can sustain the desired level of governance. If not
enough energy then you must externally sustain governance until it can become self
sustaining.
Session 3
andrew.dejesse: If the community truly has by in, failure is greatly reduced.
Karen Guttieri 2: Mike Dziedzic: police-military-intelligence connections?
Karen Guttieri 2: FYI Bill Flavin is up here in 470--good sidebars!
Karen Guttieri 2: Dziedzic; must be careful because of interests of various armed groups
sometime align with peace process, sometimes they seek to take out their competition
Karen Guttieri 2: Andrew Dejesse: "it's a valuable task to preserve cultural heritage. It's is
important to sell that task as a value to the commander."
Paula Philbin: Andrew Dejesse: "what unites a diverse group of children as they enter a
museum? When they cross the threshold, they are as one."
Paula Philbin: Andrew is one of our distinguished alums from the SSDCO and Rule of
law certificate programs
Karen Guttieri 2: Corine Wegener: there is not a standing team to address cultural
property, not even UNESCO
Karen Guttieri 2: Civil Affairs teams saved the Iraqi Jewish Archive in Iraq
Karen Guttieri 2: Smithsonian is providing training for the military on protection and
preservation of cultural property. Great presentation by Cori Wegener!
Karen Guttieri 2: Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. Everyone has the right of equal access
to public service in his country. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures. https://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/declaration/21.asp UN
Declaration of Human Rights
Karen Guttieri 2: The US and Britain late in the day acknowledged occupation
responsibilities in a letter to the UNSG
167
Karen Guttieri 2: Michelle Hughes: it's not just about technical competence - a good
advisor who is doing cooperative engagement also has a set of personal attributes needed
Karen Guttieri 2: What are those?
Karen Guttieri 2: 1. substituted capacity: when an outsider steps in to act in a position or
military government putting it in place.
Karen Guttieri 2: Rule of Law development is a core governance function
Paula Philbin: development of capacity building which leads into RoL being core
governance function
Nicholas Dickson: they were here.
Nicholas Dickson: Great questions being brought up by the speakers.. do we intend on
answering any of them
Karen Guttieri 2: Lessons learned: minority conflicts include dozens of configurations of
reforms for minority protections
Karen Guttieri 2: See http://wikisum.com/w/Lijphart:_Democracy_in_plural_societies
Karen Guttieri 2: Lijphart’s taxonomy of such systems around the world identifies ten
differences arranged in terms of two dimensions: 1. executive power related to party
systems and 2. federal-unitary distribution of decision making authority:1. executivesparty dimension1.1. single-party majority cabinets versus executive power sharing1.2.
executive dominance versus executive-legislative balance of power1.3.
twoparty versus multi-party systems1.4. majoritarian versus proportional representation1.5.
pluralist interest groups versus coordinated and “corporatists” interest groups2.
federal-unitary dimension2.1. unitary and centralized versus federal and
decentralized2.2.
unicameral legislature versus two equally strong but differently
constituted houses2.3. flexible versus rigid constitutions2.4. legislature final word on
constitutionality versus judicial review2.5. central bank dependence on the executive
versus independent central banks
Karen Guttieri 2: Panel #1 Link now on APAN
https://connect.apan.org/admin/meeting/sco/recordings/local/info?account-id=7&filterrows=20&filter-start=0&page=true()&sco-id=1015449&select-all=true
Karen Guttieri: How does rule of law conflict or support reconciliation?
Karen Guttieri: A: Depends. Instituting a system of the rule of law enables a
reconciliation system
168
Session 4
Nicholas Dickson: I would debate the idea that we need the 38G to determine Sources of
Instability, or Critical Civil Vulnerabilities. I feel that is still largely the domain of the
38A, with the 38G being the practitioner of the specified operations, activities and actions
which address that identified vulnerability.
Nicholas Dickson: In this way, the 38A still is the main proponent for CMO on the staff,
works with the commanders etc
Scott Stanford: I'd agree, except to add that the identification of sources of instability has
to be interdisciplinary, as is the course of action development in which decisions are
made about how, or if, to deal with them. The CMO officer will not have complete
visibility on factors in the environment that contribute to SOIs in the same way the S2,
working alone, does not know enough about the environment to perform a correct IPB.
Scott Stanford: In my experience, when the CMO takes on SOI analysis in a stovepipe,
the results tend not to reflect the mission requirements as much as they reflect the CMO
mission requirements from the CMO annex.
Nicholas Dickson: that goes without saying, it needs to be integrated into the staff
process from beginning to end..
Nicholas Dickson: you do it by yourself, in a closet, locked away, and you think you have
solved the world's problems.. you should probably just go home and quit wasting money
Nicholas Dickson: :)
Nicholas Dickson: Good thing to look at when determining Key Critical Civil
Vulnerabilities. More important is to understand WHO is really the USG lead for those
issues.
Karen Guttieri: to Nick on 38A - there is obvious need for 38A to see the whole system.
38G are specialists
Nicholas Dickson: yep.. however, in discussion before we were talking about just that.
Maybe a refocus on the conference purposes is needed?
Karen Guttieri: but do 38A have the perspective they need. We discussed that yesterday.
But will re-emphasize
Karen Guttieri: Leo Estrada: demographics address population
Nicholas Dickson: Good point, but not relevant to determining the requirements for 38 G
Karen Guttieri: Social demographics look at segregation in cities, ethnicity, etc. Looking
at sustainability for whom - a question for demographics
169
Amy Gorman: Let me recommend the Free Coursera Course "The Age of Sustainable
Development by Jeffrey Sachs to get a good overall understanding of worldwide
demographics and the global issues that are faced today.
https://www.coursera.org/course/susdev
Karen Guttieri: Thanks Amy!!
TomB: Timing of interventions remains a challenge. Issues like Sewer Treatment Plants,
Gender, and Voting are normally NOT appropriate in immediate post-conflict
environments.
Karen Guttieri: Gender: understanding role of women in decision making; empowerment
of women
Karen Guttieri: Question: what is the role of CA in a place where there is not active war?
Karen Guttieri: Question: when is it NOT a Civil Affairs problem?
Karen Guttieri: Jim S: "Civil Affairs should not be in the development game"
Natalie Cake 2: Comment: overlap of gender. Women produce food. In Liberia 40% of
combatants were women. Reintegration programs did not incorporate women effectively.
Natalie Cake 2: "Gender has to get beyond being 'a word in a contract'"
Session 5
Karen Guttieri: Madera: "we have a legal requirement, we have an environment in which
these roles are needed."
Karen Guttieri: By "we" meaning the US military
Karen Guttieri: Odierno: "we need to reinvest and reform educational programs"
Karen Guttieri: Madera: we need more 'wide aperture' for those with responsibility to
understand the system. Look at the pool or requirement of civilian talent"
Karen Guttieri: Willot: civilian/European/private sector
Karen Guttieri: Compare success cases: inclusion of local stakeholders and consideration
of value chains
Karen Guttieri: Willot: we are mixing human-made disaster and private sector: if people
don't believe in what is happening, [there will be no progress?]
170
Karen Guttieri: this perspective is very much oriented to UN/state and local population as
client?
Karen Guttieri: Fantastic presentations - for more, join the econ-soc program review this
Thurs/Fri at USAID
Karen Guttieri: Willot: "If they're not there at the start, they won't be there at the end" great point
Karen Guttieri: UNSG on domestic air pollution:
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7464 18 February 2014 - SecretaryGeneral's remarks at General Assembly thematic debate on Water, Sanitation and
Sustainable Energy in the Post-2015 Development Agenda
Karen Guttieri: Pineda: "we need novel ways to provide services, governance"
Karen Guttieri: Andrew Paterson, "Branko Terzic is the 'Godfather' of regulators -- in the
positive sense of both words"
Karen Guttieri: How to attract finance?
Karen Guttieri: Paterson wants to know 'when is it no longer Civil Affairs' problem? In
one sense, it is always CA problem - they remain on standby, educated, engaged in
prevention- Theater Security Cooperation. The better question is 'when is it no longer a
maneuver commander-kinetic situation - transition to civilianization.
Karen Guttieri: Paterson: Congress gave $6b in 'superloans' that enabled more loans up to
$34b"
Karen Guttieri: TVA has 14 senators supporting TVA
Karen Guttieri: Branko's P3 2.0 is subsidies WITH regulation
Karen Guttieri: P3 3.0 would be subsidies, regulation reform, and negotiation of the risks
with in-depth stakeholder negotiation.
Nicholas Dickson: Not an accurate view.. Persistent engagements around the globe?
Karen Guttieri: Norm Cotton: CA helps the military not make things worse" example of
Panama - it was not written into the plan not to spend US dollars--within days 'everything
cost a dollar'
Karen Guttieri: Example from Iraq: "CA wasn't at the table. Could have used that input.
Where are electric generation projects, what effects do those projects have? There's a lot
that CA could have brought to the table but they did not. They could not."
171
Karen Guttieri: Selmo Cicotic: "wars are won by logisticians"
Karen Guttieri: Jim Embry: so much of what we are talking about is how do you move
into a new security paradigm. Some cases are temporary government.
Karen Guttieri: Embry: new paradigm is to be multilingual with the other agencies. We
have not been talking together in terms that we mutually recognize.
Karen Guttieri: Willot: to change the paradigm, why wait until 'after' - why not train and
educate together up front to start the dialogue?
172
APPENDIX D.
STAKEHOLDER LIST
DOD Organizations Responsible for Civil Affairs and Military Government
Operations
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD
SO/LIC)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Americas’ Security Affairs
(ASD HD&ASA)
Joint Staff (JS)
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)
Chief of Staff, Army (CSA)
U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (Army G-3/5/7)
US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWC)
U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC)
US Government Agencies (Non DOD) involved in Governance and Stability
Operations
Department of the Treasury (TREASURY)
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Department of Energy (DOE)
Department of Labor (DOL)
Department of State (DoS)
DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)
DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)
DoS Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB)
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)
USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)
USAID Office of Civilian-Military Coordination (CMC)
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)
USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
U.S. Treasury Department (TREASURY)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank)
Global Organizations in Governance and Stability Operations
United Nations (UN) – www.un.org
173
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) –
http://ochaonlin.un.org
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko
International Court of Justice (ICJ) – www.icj-cij.org
International Criminal Court (ICC) – www.icc-cpi.int/
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – www.un.org/icty/
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) – www.ictr.org
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) – www.sc-sl.org
Other UN and UN-Affiliated Entities
UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) – www.un.org/Depts/dpa/
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) – www.fao.org
International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) – www.ifad.org
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – www.imf.org
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) – www.unicef.org
UN Development Program (UNDP) – www.undp.org
UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – www.unesco.org
UN Human Settlements Program (HABITAT) – www.unchs.org
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – www.orchr.org
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – www.unhcr.ch
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) – www.mineaction.org
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) – www.unodc.org
World Bank Group – www.worldbank.org
World Food Program (WFP) – www.wfp.org
World Health Organization (WHO) – www.who.int/en/
Organizations outside the UN System
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – www.icrc.org
International Organization for Migration (IOM) – www.iom.int
174
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APPENDIX E. IN-PROGRESS BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE
ECONOMY/SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SECTOR
This in-progress bibliography for the Economy/Sustainable Development sector is
organized as follows:
STARTING POINTS
GENERAL BACKGROUND
BUSINESS ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
EXPEDITIONARY ECONOMICS
INFRASTRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
RISK AND RESILIENCE
SOCIAL ECONOMY
URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING
FINANCE AND MACRO-ECONOMICS
GENDER ECONOMICS
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
RESOURCE CURSE
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
CONFLICT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS
COLLAPSE, CHANGE, (CASTELLS, DE SOTO, DIAMOND)
WORLD BANK RESOURCES
OTHER DEVELOPMENT BANK RESOURCES
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES – COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
OTHER SOURCES
ANNEX: Issues Driving Bibliography on Development Theory
STARTING POINTS
Economist (Jan. 2009): Failed states: Fixing a broken world [3 pages]
http://www.economist.com/node/13035718
Kozul-Wright, Richard, Editor. Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic
Development in Post-Conflict Countries
http://www.bloomsburyacademic.com/view/Securing-Peace/chapter-ba-9781849665872chapter-008.xml
Conclusion: A crucial issue during post-war transitions is the building of State capacities
to mobilize domestic revenue to provide sustainable funding for new democratic
institutions and for expenditures to improve human well-being, strengthen public security
and ease social tensions. Depending on the overall cost of the conflict, reconstruction and
the early stages of economic development will be heavily dependent on external
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resources. Ultimate success or failure will be determined, therefore, by how each side
discharges its part of the shared responsibility for recovery. On the recipient side,
innovative policy responses to fiscal management will be required. The donors must
resist imposing their own institutional and policy preferences on the receiving country.
[Numerous references]
Khan, Mushtaq H. Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s
[Univ. of London] http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp54_2007.pdf
Abstract: Liberal economists have developed a framework of good governance as
market-enhancing governance, focusing on governance capabilities that reduce
transaction costs and enable markets to work more efficiently. In contrast, heterodox
economists have stressed the role of growth-enhancing governance, which focuses on
governance capacities to overcome entrenched market failures in allocating assets,
acquiring productivity-enhancing technologies and maintaining political stability in
contexts of rapid social transformation. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
but current policy exclusively focuses on the former, and ignores the strong empirical and
historical evidence supporting the latter to the detriment of the growth prospects of poor
countries.
Baker, Andy. Shaping the Developing World: The West, the South, and the Natural
World
http://www.coursesmart.com/shaping-the-developing-world-the-west-the/andybaker/dp/9781608718559
A useful and current "fly over" survey of different models and approaches (Aug 2013):
Why are some countries rich and others poor? Shaping the Developing World explores
the different theories that attempt to answer this thorny question. Interdisciplinary in his
scope, Baker adeptly uses a threefold framework of the West, the South, and the Natural
World to categorize and analyze the factors that cause underdevelopment—from the
consequences of colonialism, deficient domestic institutions, and gender inequality to
the effects of globalization, geography, and environmental degradation. Covers full
breadth of influences on a nation’s political, economic, and social development.
De Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in West and
Fails Everywhere Else. Basic Books, 2000
Economists like Hernando de Soto (Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Peru) have
focused on the importance of enforcing and documenting property rights with
transparency so that markets can function more efficiently and broadly for the benefit of
lower income property owners with land reform efforts, thereby promoting economic
growth with better application of information technology. “The poor inhabitants of
these nations—five-sixths of humanity—do have things, but they lack the process to
represent their property and create capital. They have houses but not titles; crops but not
deeds; businesses but not statutes of incorporation. It is the unavailability of these
essential representations that explains why people who have adapted every other
Western invention, from the paper clip to the nuclear reactor, have not been able to
produce sufficient capital to make their domestic capitalism work.”
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/d/desoto-capital.html
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Root, Hilton, “Risk, Uncertainty and Social Progress,” Capital and Collusion,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006)
Root avers, “Leaders of East Asia’s “tiger economies, for example, built regime
legitimacy by creating institutions that upheld their promise to share growth, which
helped woo big business [chaebols in Korea] with assurances of social cohesion. Such
innovations in governance, which implemented broad-based access to the benefits of
development, helped East Asia to experience sustained economic growth.” Importantly,
for Root, reducing economic and political uncertainty are not sufficient. Social cohesion
is vital to legitimate the political regime so that it can actually offer economic certainty
to draw investment and development. Witness the chaos in Ukraine now, or Arab
Spring earlier, rooted not only in political differences, but more deeply in a divided
society. And uncertainties need to be resolved with capable institutions to enable risktaking, rather than quashing it.
Fukuyama, Francis, State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st
Century, Cornell UP, 2004. Also, “The Imperative of State-Building,” Journal of
Democracy, vol. 15, #2, April 2004, pp. 17-31.
Weak or failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan are quietly causing some of the
world’s most pressing problems and will continue to do so, according to political analyst
Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama uses a simple, two-dimensional model of "stateness" –
strength and scope of states -- to analyze why states fail. He focuses on what countries
can do, rather than using some theoretical model of what they ought to do. Fukuyama
describes the supply of and demand for government institutions, why states often don’t
deliver what their "customers" want and the organizational pathologies that prevent
developing nations from "getting to Denmark," development theory parlance for
achieving an efficient, transparent and legitimate government.
Easterly, William. The Elusive Quest For Growth: Economists’ Adventures and
Misadventures in the Tropics, 2001
Easterly directly references (p. 78-80) Greg Mankiw (now at Columbia) who was more
prominent in the 1990s and "augmented" the base Solow model by boosting the role of
human capital, differentiated from raw physical labor or tangible capital equipment. In
other words, education, research and innovation matter as augmentations to Solow's
model of growth. Further, Mankiw posits that because education and human capital are
not as well developed in poor countries, their path to "convergence" or development will
be slower. So, just dumping money into physical infrastructure to fill Domar's
"financing gap" is not enough to trigger economic gains for convergence.
http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/mankiw-romer-weil-a-contribution.pdf
Easterly, rooted in empirical study, also points out three problems with Mankiw’s
development theory (p. 80-81): (1) Mankiw focused too much on secondary education
rather than the full K-12; (2) Mankiw did not account for "brain drain" out of poor
countries as educated leave rather than stay; (3) faulty casuality of differences in savings
rates as incomes grow with education. Instead, Easterly concludes his survey of the
development landscape by advocating smarter coordination of incentives for
governments, aid donors, and private individuals. If individuals educate themselves
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toward higher productivity but governments do not offer clear or sound incentives for
investment and earnings from innovation, then individuals leave. Aid donors need to
invest in enterprises in ways that do not undermine local productivity, for example,
dumping grain at the port to alleviate starving children undermines domestic agricultural
production. Better to invest in farming and better food processing methods.
Rodrik, Dani, “Development Strategies for the Twenty-First Century,” in New
Development Strategies: Beyond the Washington Consensus, Akira Kohsaka, ed.,
(Houndsmills, Basingstoke, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 13-38.
“Macroeconomic disequilibrium and lack of growth have occurred more in countries
with high degrees of income inequality and ethno-linguistic fragmentation, and less
likely in countries with democratic institutions or high-quality public institutions” -‘Institutions Matter’. Rodrik explains how the past two centuries have been a global
experiment in economic policy, the 19th Century introduced Capitalism to the world
with all of its advantages and disadvantages, and the 20th Century taught us how to
‘tame’ it and “render it more productive by supplying the institutional ingredients need
for a self-sustaining market economy: central banking, stabilizing fiscal policy anti-trust
legislation and regulation, social insurance and political democracy”. However this was
not recognized widely until the past few decades because of the apparently successful
example of the Soviet Union and its “heavy state-centric development strategies” after
WWI, while the West suffered a prolonged Depression (with hyper-inflation in
Germany).
The economic policies of the ‘Washington Consensus’ during the Reagan-Thatcher era
in the 1980s emphasized deregulation and privatization at the expense of strong state
institutions. For Rodrik social conflicts and institutions have a larger effect on the
economy than do trade strategy or industrial policies. He points to five types of types
‘market-supporting institutions’ he believes support healthy markets: (1) property
rights; (2) regulatory agencies; (3) institutions for macroeconomic stabilization; (4)
social insurance typically for the elderly or dependents; and, (5) “institutions of conflict
management”. Rodrik notes that the biggest difference between the Latin America and
East Asia economies is “not that the former remained closed and isolated while the latter
integrated itself into world economy. Rather, that the former did a much worse job of
dealing with the turbulence emanating from the world economy”; Latin America high
quality public institutions that would help it to negate the unexpected economic shocks
of the time period.
Rodrik, Dani and Subramanian, Arvind, “Primacy of Institutions”, Finance and
Development, June 2003, pp. 31-34.
Rather than geography or growth through comparative advantage in trade, Rodrik and
Subramanian point to the importance of Institutions in explaining development gaps
among nations. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions overrides everything
else. Controlling for institutions, geography has, at best, weak direct effects on incomes,
although it has a strong indirect effect through institutions by influencing their quality.
Similarly, trade has a significant effect on institutional quality, but it has no direct
positive effect on income. In their absence, markets either do not exist or perform very
poorly. But long-run economic development requires more than just a boost to
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investment and entrepreneurship. It also requires effort to build three other types of
institutions to sustain the growth momentum, build resilience to shocks, and facilitate
socially acceptable burden sharing in response to such shocks. These institutions might
be called:
• market regulating —namely, those that deal with externalities, economies of scale,
and imperfect information. Examples include regulatory agencies in
telecommunications, transport, and financial services.
• market stabilizing —namely, those that ensure low inflation, minimize
macroeconomic volatility, and avert financial crises. Examples include central banks,
exchange rate regimes, and budgetary and fiscal rules.
• market legitimizing —namely, those that provide social protection and insurance,
involve redistribution, and man- age conflict. Examples include pension systems,
unemployment insurance schemes, and other social funds.
Stiglitz, J.E. The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our
Future, W.W. Norton, 2012
Stiglitz notes that financial liberalization during the 1970s and 80s created an
environment ripe for financial instability. Natural outgrowths of our current financial
institutions are excessive leverage and industrial fluctuations. The core issue is not with
reckless lending, it is the current system of monopolized currency issue and cartelized
banking. How does “financialization” cause unnecessary inequality? Credit based
expenditure makes borrowers debtors, representing a transfer of income from debtors to
creditors. This transfer is not necessarily inequality inducing, since generally the
borrower gets something in return (whatever she purchased with the borrowed credit).
The run up in housing prices during the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century was
unique in magnitude, but not as a trend. Those who buy these assets by accumulating
debt are particularly vulnerable to the consequent deflation of mispriced assets and
durable goods; when housing prices collapsed, creditors tended to enjoy income
corresponding to inflated prices, while debtors were burdened with deflated assets and
savings. A major culprit behind the asymmetric impact of the financial crisis is current
bankruptcy law: while large firms are usually afforded some leniency when declaring
bankruptcy, unable mortgage owners were not allowed the same luxury.
Baker, Andy; Shaping the Developing World: The West, The South, and the Natural
World; University of Colorado, 2013
Shaping the Developing World explores the different theories that attempt to answer this
thorny question. Interdisciplinary in his scope, Andy Baker adeptly uses a threefold
framework of the West, the South, and the Natural World to categorize and analyze the
factors that cause underdevelopment—from the consequences of colonialism, deficient
domestic institutions, and gender inequality to the effects of globalization, geography,
and environmental degradation.
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty, MIT 2012
187
This book is about the huge differences in incomes and standards of living that separate
the rich countries of the world, such as the United States, Great Britain, and Germany,
from the poor, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and South Asia.
Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are?
Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to
explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest-growing countries in the world,
while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired
in poverty and violence? Man-made political and economic institutions underlie
economic success (or the lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating
examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are
among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among
the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and
allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus
spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to
citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured
decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions—with
no end in sight. Differences between the Koreas are due to the politics that created these
completely different institutional trajectories.
Stiglitz, J.E. Making Globalization Work, W.W. Norton, 2006 [former Chief
Economist at the World Bank]
There have been two faces of globalization-one that has lifted some countries out of
poverty but the other that has kept the poor countries poor. In fact, poverty has increased
in the last two decades. Stiglitz notes that poverty has increased in the developing world
outside China. In 2006 some 40 per cent of the world population or 6.5 billion people
lived in poverty, using the World Bank criteria of US $ 2.00 a day. (Extreme poverty is
defined as those living below US $ 1.00 a day). What is more disconcerting is that
poverty has increased from 36 per cent in 1981 to 40 per cent in 2006. Worse, extreme
poverty has increased even faster. Sub-Saharan Africa has fared the worst with extreme
poverty rising from 41.6 per cent in 1981 to 46.9 per cent in 2001[3]. Given this
outcome Stiglitz sets up an agenda in the chapter that is taken up in the rest of the
chapters. Stiglitz defines globalization in general terms. He notes that economic
globalization entails the closer integration of the countries of the world through the
increased flow of goods and services, capital and even labor. Moreover, he identifies
those problems of globalization that bear mostly on developing countries, where eighty
per cent of the world population lives.
Sharma, Ruchir. Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the next Economic Miracles, W.W.
Norton, 2012
We live in a post-crisis economic world. Using a persuasive mix of macroeconomic data
and on-the-ground personal observation, Sharma outlines the vulnerabilities of the
fading powerhouses: briefly put, China has simply grown too comfortably middle class,
and far too dependent on building new roads and factories, to continue growing at a
double digit pace. Russia’s extreme reliance on oil and gas has produced a class of petro
tycoons who have turned Moscow into a capital of decadence reminiscent of the last
days of Ancient Rome. Brazil is so afraid of a return to the economic volatility of the
188
1980s and 90s that it has focused almost exclusively on protecting people from
economic pain, producing one of the weakest growth records among big emerging
markets. India, once hyped as the next China, has given way to gloom as growth slowed
in the last year, but its real prospects are very difficult to assess, because it is
fragmenting into a collection of state economies. The state of global capitalism is
careful, nuanced, as blunt on the surprisingly strong prospects of breakout nations like
South Korea—still a manufacturing miracle entering its fifth decade—as on the weak
prospects of the BRICs. There has been a slowdown across all the emerging markets,
with the most hyped emerging markets—particularly Brazil, Russia, India and China—
faring among the worst, and new success stories appearing in previously unsung nations
like the Philippines, Turkey and Nigeria. American Revival is built on its traditional
strengths: its ability to adapt quickly in the face of emerging rivals, and in particular on
its technological prowess, which is now helping to draw manufacturing back to the
United States, driving the revolution in shale oil and gas that promises to make America
less dependent on Middle East Oil, and helping to address the worst of our lingering
problems, the debt burden. US companies are reducing debt much faster than foreign
rivals, in part because they are able to adopt new technologies to raise productivity and
profit. In a world economy defined by competing forms of capitalism, the American
brand is winning.
Ghemawat, Pankaj. World 3.0: Global Prosperity and how to Achieve it, Harvard
Business Press, Boston 2011
Instead of seeing the world through our lenses of the past–with a protectionist viewpoint
or a “world is flat” viewpoint–we must start looking at our world through a new 3.0
view. This view more realistically incorporates the facts and acknowledges the
opportunities and increased consumer choices opened up by technology. In World 3.0,
Ghemawat says we aren’t even close to being globalized:
Only 2 percent of students are at universities outside their home countries.
Only 3 percent of people live outside their country of birth.
Only 7 percent of rice is traded across borders.
Only 7 percent of directors of S&P 500 companies are foreigners.
Less than 1 percent of all American companies have any foreign operations.
Exports are equivalent to just 20 percent of GDP.
Less than 20 percent of venture capital is deployed outside the fund’s home
country.
Only 20 percent of shares traded in stock markets are owned by foreign investors.
Less than 20 percent of Internet traffic crosses national borders.
Bates, Robert H., Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development,
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001).
Prosperity and Violence examines how underdeveloped societies progress from agrarian
to industrial states by examining how governments foster investment and per capita
growth and how they manage their political power and use of force. Drawing on the
history of highly developed countries, such as those in Europe, Bates compares them with
developing countries in Latin America and Africa. For example, he finds in Kenya a
government and an economic organization working collaboratively toward prosperity,
189
which he contrasts with the militaristic, economically destructive situation in Uganda.
When the USSR collapsed, he notes, the United States lost interest—and reduced
investments—in former clients like Somalia, whose strategic value had vanished
overnight. The author also presents convincing evidence that developing nations sowed
the seeds of their own destruction during the international debt crisis of the 1980s when
they adopted protectionist policies for their industrial products. They simply could not
produce and export enough goods to earn the money to repay their enormous loans.
Balaam, David N. and Bradford Dillman, Introduction to International Political
Economy, 6th ed., (Boston: Longman, 2011).
Surveys the major theoretical perspectives in international political economy. Examines
the political, economic, and social relationships-or structures-that tie together
international actors. Discusses a wide range of policy problems in international political
economy. Includes case study boxes that provide in-depth and current applications of
key IPE concepts.
Myrdal, Gunnar, "The Challenge of World Poverty. A World Anti-Poverty Programme
in Outline." Penguin
W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960)
Landes, David. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations
Sachs, Jeffrey D. The End of Poverty. Penguin Books, 2006.
Costas Azariadis and John Stachurski, "Poverty Traps," Handbook of Economic Growth,
2005, 326.
De Soto, Hernando. "Law and Property Outside the West: A Few New Ideas About
Fighting Poverty", Optima Special Issue on Sustainable Development. Vol. 48 No. 1,
September 2002, p 2–9
Stiglitz, J.E. Globalization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton, 2002
Ross, Michael. The Oil Curse: How Petro wealth shapes development of nations, Sept
2013
De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World.
Harpercollins, 1989
Ghemawat, Pankaj. "Why the World Isn't Flat" Foreignpolicy.com. (March/April
2007).
Development… and a Resource Curse? Not so fast; Institutions and incentives remain
key factors
190
Is it really true that underground riches lead to aboveground woes? No, not really.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/06/what_resource_curse
“The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis - Hardcover - Glenn
Morgan; John Campbell; Colin Crouch; Ove Kai Pedersen; Richard Whitley - Oxford
University Press.” 2010. June. http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxfordhandbook-of-comparative-institutional-analysis9780199233762;jsessionid=D9A2B02D6E20445AD857FAF674B7E5DD?cc=us&lang=
en&.
Development and Conflict : Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development
in Post-Conflict Countries : Bloomsbury Academic. at
http://www.bloomsburyacademic.com/view/Securing-Peace/chapter-ba9781849665872-chapter-003.xml
THEORY OVERVIEW
Scope of Government vs. Autonomy in Society (based on several authors)
191
America’s Position in the Global Political Economy
“America’s Imperial Dilemma” Foreign Affairs. 2014.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59370/dimitri-k-simes/americas-imperialdilemma.
“The Reluctant Empire” Hoover Institution. 2014.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/8070.
“The Beginning and End of Globalization and US Hegemony” | Articles | Canadian
Dimension. 2014. http://canadiandimension.com/articles/5505/.
“The Brief: Is the US a Reluctant Empire?” - Empire - US Beyond Syria - Al Jazeera
English. 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/beyondsyria/2013/09/brief-us-a-reluctant-empire-201392817826660931.html.
“The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire by Leo
Panitch —http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/15125352-the-making-of-globalcapitalism.
“A New Anti-American Axis?” - NYTimes.com. 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/opinion/sunday/a-new-anti-americanaxis.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
“Economic History: What Was Mercantilism?” | The Economist. 2014.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/08/economic-history.
“Heritage Lewis.ppt - Heritage Lewis.pdf.” 2014.
http://www.newworldeconomics.com/archives/2011/101611_files/Heritage%20Lewis.pd
f.
List of Countries by Failed States Index. 2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_countries_by_Failed_States_Index&ol
did=588525736.
“Project MUSE - Does the Financial Crisis Threaten Democracy?” 2014.
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/sais_review/v030/30.1.
davies.pdf.
192
GENERAL BACKGROUND
“Advancing Our Interests: Actions in Support of the President’s National Security
N Strategy | White House.” 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/advancing-our-interests-actions-support-presidents-national-security-strategy.
Collier, Paul "Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of causation
and Policy Interventions," (Washington: World Bank, 2003)
Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History, (New
York: Anchor, 2002)
Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The wars of the 21 century
Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999)
Kaldor, Mary; Karl, Terry Lynn; Said, Yahia, eds, Oil Wars, (London: Pluto Press,
2007)
Karl, Terry Lynn The Paradox of Plenty, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1997)
Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2003)
Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World, (New York:
N Penguin Books, 2008)
Niall Ferguson, Civilization
Perkins, John, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, (San Francisco: Berret-Koehler,
2004)
Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler Ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive
Guide to the Peloponnesian War, (New York: Touchstone, 1998)
“Failed States: Fixing a Broken World | The Economist.” 2009. January.
http://www.economist.com/node/13035718.
“The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis - Hardcover - Glenn
Morgan; John Campbell; Colin Crouch; Ove Kai Pedersen; Richard Whitley - Oxford
University Press.” 2010. June. http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxfordN
handbook-of-comparative-institutional-analysis9780199233762;jsessionid=D9A2B02D6E20445AD857FAF674B7E5DD?cc=us&la
ng=en&.
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SOCIAL ECONOMY
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URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING
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FINANCE AND MACRO-ECONOMICS
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Benería, Lourdes, Günseli Berik, and Maria Floro. Gender, Development, and
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Rai, Shirin M. Gender and the Political Economy of Development. Polity Press, 2002.
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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Advances in Behavioral Economics (Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics)
by Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, Matthew Rabin (Paperback)
Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Roundtable Series
in Behavioral Economics) by Colin F. Camerer (Hardcover)
Behavioral Economics: A History (Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics)
by Floris Heukelom (Hardcover)
Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines by G. L. S. Shackle
(Paperback)
Expectation in Economics, by G. L. S. Shackle (Paperback)
The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think, by Professor Mary S.
Morgan (Paperback)
Choices, Values, and Frames by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky (Paperback)
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment by Thomas Gilovich,
Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman (Paperback)
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases by Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, Amos Tversky (Paperback)
The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization by Peter M.
Senge (Paperback)
The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (McGraw-Hill Series in Social
Psychology) Scott Plous (Author)
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy Of American Empire by
N Leo Panitch — Reviews, Discussion, Bookclubs, Lists. at
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De Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West
and Fails Everywhere Else. Basic Books, 2000
Stiglitz, J.E. The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our
Future, W.W. Norton, 2012
Myrdal, Gunnar, 1970 "The Challenge of World Poverty. A World Anti-Poverty
Programme in Outline." Penguin Harmondsworth
Environmental Economics online
http://www.env-econ.net/
Harvard Environmental Economics Program
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/heep/#
Columbia – Earth Institute
http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/sections/view/9
RESOURCE CURSE
Ross, M. L. "The political economy of the resource curse". World Politics 51 (2):
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Ross, Michael (2006). "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War". Annual
Review of Political Science 9: 265–300
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Sept 2013
N Frankel, Jeffrey "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey " Discussion Paper 201021, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Environmental Economics Program, September
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Tietenberg, Lewis. Environmental & Natural Resources Economics, 9 ed., Prentice
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Hall, 2012
Stavins, Robert “Environmental Economics” Discussion Paper 2009-05,
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Meeks, Robyn. "Water Works: The Economic Impact of Water Infrastructure,"
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N http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/04/why-africa-ismissing-the-solar-electricity-boat.
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Books, 2002 [Undermining the “Shining Path” in Peru]
Panić, Mica, 2005 "Reconstruction, Development and Sustainable Peace."
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Shaping the Developing World: The West, The South, and the Natural World
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Andy Baker, University of Colorado-Boulder
Sharma, Ruchir. Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the next Economic Miracles,
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W.W. Norton, 2012
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960)
Easterly, William. The Elusive Quest For Growth: Economists’ Adventures and
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Misadventures in the Tropics, 2001
N Landes, David. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations
N Sachs, Jeffrey D. The End of Poverty. Penguin Books, 2006.
Costas Azariadis and John Stachurski, "Poverty Traps," Handbook of Economic
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De Soto, Hernando. "Law and Property Outside the West: A Few New Ideas About
N Fighting Poverty", Optima Special Issue on Sustainable Development. Vol. 48 No.
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Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
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Prosperity, and Poverty, MIT
De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World.
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Harpercollins, 1989
Ghemawat, Pankaj. World 3.0: Global Prosperity and how to Achieve it, Harvard
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Business Press, Boston 2011
Ghemawat, Pankaj. "Why the World Isn't Flat" Foreignpolicy.com. (March/April
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2007).
Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed: Revised
Edition, (New York: Penguin Group, NY, 2005)
Diamond, Jared. The World Until Yesterday: What Can we Learn from
Traditional Societies, (New York: Penguin Group, NY, 2012)
WORLD BANK RESOURCES
World Bank, 1998 "Assessing Aid : What Works, What Doesn't and Why." Oxford
University Press Oxford, United Kingdom
Sen Amartya., "The man without a plan." "Foreign Affairs." March-April 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20060301fareviewessay_v85n2_sen.html?pagewanted
=print&_r=0
Easterly, William. The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have
Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Penguin Press, 2006, 417 pages
The UNDP Human Development Report [formulated somewhat by Nobel Laureate
Amartya Sen]
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2013
World Bank (Aug. 2013): Achieving Development Success – References by Region [8
pages]
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC4QFj
AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwider.unu.edu%2Fpublications%2Fpolicybriefs%2Fen_GB%2Funupb32013%2F_files%2F89245599562203398%2Fdefault%2FPolicy%2520Brief%25201303_Web.pdf&ei=E472UvW5GaOCyAGhwIGgDQ&usg=AFQjCNGnJ0AJYzmtfLSeAh
K2-qQkFqrh-Q&sig2=aBDYCrW7mqaOoBlBmb43Gw
Development Case Studies focused on Economics and Finance [214 pages]
http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/277/284582/todarocasestudies.pdf
Excellent references at end of each of 20+ case studies.
OTHER DEVELOPMENT BANK RESOURCES
“Public Private Partnerships - IFC’s Global Experience Public_Private_Partnerships_IFCs_Global_Experience.pdf.” 2014. Accessed February 8.
http://www.energytoolbox.org/library/incentivebased_operating_contracts/reference+background_documents/Public_Private_Partnership
s_IFCs_Global_Experience.pdf.
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“It’s Time for a New Development Model | Rick Rowden | Global Development |
Theguardian.com.” 2014. Accessed February 8. http://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2011/apr/05/time-for-new-development-model.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES – COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
"Insights from Complexity Theory: Understanding Organisations better". by Assoc. Prof.
Amit Gupta, Student Contributer - S. Anish , IIM Bangalore. Retrieved 1 June 2012.
"Ten Principles of Complexity & Enabling Infrastructures". by Professor Eve MitletonKelly, Director Complexity Research Programme, London School of Economics.
Retrieved 1 June 2012.
"Evolutionary Psychology, Complex Systems, and Social Theory". Bruce MacLennan,
Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science, University of Tennessee,
Knoxville. eecs.utk.edu. Retrieved 25 August 2012.
Steven Strogatz, Duncan J. Watts and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi "explaining synchronicity
(at 6:08) , network theory, self-adaptation mechanism of complex systems, Six Degrees of
separation, Small world phenomenon, events are never isolated as they depend upon each
other (at 27:07) in the BBC / Discovery Documentary". BBC / Discovery. Retrieved 11
June 2012. "Unfolding the science behind the idea of six degrees of separation"
"Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community The Wiki and the Blog". D. Calvin
Andrus. cia.gov. Retrieved 25 August 2012.
Solvit, Samuel (2012). "Dimensions of War: Understanding War as a Complex Adaptive
System". L'Harmattan. Retrieved 25 August 2013.
"The Internet Analyzed as a Complex Adaptive System". Retrieved 25 August 2012.
"Cyberspace: The Ultimate Complex Adaptive System". The International C2 Journal.
Retrieved 25 August 2012. by Paul W. Phister Jr
"Complex Adaptive Systems". mit.edu. 2001. Retrieved 25 August 2012. by Serena Chan,
Research Seminar in Engineering Systems
"A Complex Adaptive Organization Under the Lens of the LIFE Model:The Case of
Wikipedia". Retrieved 25 August 2012.
"Complex Adaptive Systems as a Model for Evaluating Organisational : Change Caused
by the Introduction of Health Information Systems". Kieren Diment, Ping Yu, Karin
Garrety, Health Informatics Research Lab, Faculty of Informatics, University of
Wollongong, School of Management, University of Wollongong, NSW. uow.edu.au.
Retrieved 25 August 2012.
Holland, John H.; (2006). "Studying Complex Adaptive Systems." Journal of Systems
Science and Complexity 19 (1): 1-8. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/41486
Paul Cilliers (1998) Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems
Robert Axelrod & Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity. Basic Books, 2001
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Muaz A. K. Niazi, Towards A Novel Unified Framework for Developing Formal,
Network and Validated Agent-Based Simulation Models of Complex Adaptive Systems
PhD Thesis
John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to
Computational Models of Social Life, Princeton University Press Book page
Melanie Mitchell, Complexity A Guided Tour, Oxford University Press, Book page
Springer Complex Adaptive Systems Modeling Journal (CASM)
Adami C (2002). "What is complexity?". BioEssays 24 (12): 1085–94.
doi:10.1002/bies.10192. PMID 12447974.
McShea D (1991). "Complexity and evolution: What everybody knows". Biology and
Philosophy 6 (3): 303–24. doi:10.1007/BF00132234.
Carroll SB (2001). "Chance and necessity: the evolution of morphological complexity and
diversity". Nature 409 (6823): 1102–9. doi:10.1038/35059227. PMID 11234024.
Furusawa C, Kaneko K (2000). "Origin of complexity in multicellular organisms". Phys.
Rev. Lett. 84 (26 Pt 1): 6130–3. arXiv:nlin/0009008. Bibcode:2000PhRvL..84.6130F.
doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.84.6130. PMID 10991141.
Adami C, Ofria C, Collier TC (2000). "Evolution of biological complexity". Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 97 (9): 4463–8. arXiv:physics/0005074.
Bibcode:2000PNAS...97.4463A. doi:10.1073/pnas.97.9.4463. PMC 18257.
PMID 10781045.
Oren A (2004). "Prokaryote diversity and taxonomy: current status and future challenges".
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond., B, Biol. Sci. 359 (1444): 623–38.
doi:10.1098/rstb.2003.1458. PMC 1693353. PMID 15253349.
Whitman W, Coleman D, Wiebe W (1998). "Prokaryotes: the unseen majority". Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 95 (12): 6578–83. Bibcode:1998PNAS...95.6578W.
doi:10.1073/pnas.95.12.6578. PMC 33863. PMID 9618454.Schloss P, Handelsman J
(2004). "Status of the microbial census". Microbiol Mol Biol Rev 68 (4): 686–91.
doi:10.1128/MMBR.68.4.686-691.2004. PMC 539005. PMID 15590780.
OTHER SOURCES
Urban Planning:
http://www.greshamsmith.com/Dialogue/GSP-Dialogue/December-2012/Blueprint-for-aBoom-Town-Lessons-Learned-for-Mast
The Mining companies have funded socio-economic research in this niche:
http://im4dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Infrastructure-and-Resource-Regions.pptx
WEF Perspective
http://www.weforum.org/reports/strategic-infrastructure-steps-prepare-and-acceleratepublic-private-partnerships
206
http://communityandregionaldevelopment.wikispaces.com/file/view/Boomtowns+in+Hist
ory.pdf
World 3.0
http://ghemawat.com/
Econ Bibliography ANNEX: Issues Driving Bibliography on Development Theory
Need to setup some basic dichotomies about Stabilization and the Structure of Society...
"Restored... to what?"
Are “Failed States” or “Transition Economies” different? For example, coming out of
Arab Spring,
A. Neo-liberal (laissez-faire) approach to retail economy and entrepreneurship; or Neoactivist government with strict licensing of vendors. Government as "Provider"
(Egypt, France) or as "Referee"? (USA, Hong Kong, Washington Consensus)
Key sector: Agriculture and food distribution. How much food and water must be
imported?
B. Social Coherence (nationhood; tight immigration laws), or Diversity (open to
migration)
C. Politically Stable (hard to change; long terms of office; perhaps inherited leadership
or dynasty) or Dynamic / Unstable (tribal infighting; border skirmishes; divided
citizenry.)
D. Ownership of large basic economic elements (fuels, energy, electricity, food
distribution, hospitals), some of which are natural monopolies.
If some countries are left to the private market, then chaos ensues with little
investment.
What capacities exist for entrepreneurship and micro-lending?
Some countries might have fuel or resources; almost all will need to import
computers, telecommunications, vehicles, electrical equipment, engines, and motors.
What is the status of water supply and treatment?
E. Capital markets: Restricted or Open -- how much regulation?
How much incentive and capital controls to attract outside investment?
How to avoid "hot”, in-and-out capital, and yet attract investment to rebuild
infrastructure. Countering “Dependencia”
F. Buses, Roads and Rail: Who builds; who owns? How financed (Development
banks)?
G. Vehicles and parts will be imported (few countries can manufacture):
How will vehicles and fuel be paid for?
H. Education. How funded? Infrastructure. Resources?
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208
APPENDIX F. MEETING NOTES: SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING SECTOR REVIEWS
**DISCLAIMER**
The views presented in these meeting notes are personal and represent the
opinions of the individuals that are respectively participating. The
information and views within do not represent any other parties associated
or related.
NOTE: These meeting notes contains material from the joint session and Social WellBeing subgroup meeting.
Attendee Roster:
Name
Organization
James Adams
Tom Baltazar
Mara Batlin
Curtis Blais
Natalie Cake
Michael
Chagaris
Selmo Cikotic
Norman
Cotton
Jon Czarnecki
Bob DeFraites
Andrew
DeJesse
Mike Dziedzic
Leo Estrada
Jennifer
Glossinger
Glenn
Goddard
Kyle Green
Karen Guttieri
Steve Hall
Bob Jones
Mark Kelly
Diana M. Luan
Jose M.
Madera
Tom Moore
Brian Panton
Maria Pineda
Phone
Email
Subgroup
Econ SWB
GMU
Engility Corp
ICEG
NPS MOVES Institute
PKSOI
IMSG
703-626-0093
703-664-2816
214-914-6978
831-656-3215
717-557-2267
910-432-5683
jadams_400@hotmail.com
thoma.baltazar@engility.com
mbatlin@yahoo.com
clblais@nps.edu
Natalie@nataliecable.com
michael.j.chagaris.mil@mail.mil
Sarajevo University
Consultant
+387 62 335440
410-693-6402
Cselmo1133@gmail.com
norm.cotton61@gmail.com
NWC
Uniformed Services
University of Health
Services
413th CA
831-656-2653
301-295-0777
jczarne@nps.edu
robert.defraites@usuhs.edu
X
X
713-492-9364
andrew.s.dejesse.mil@mail.mil
X
Consultant
UCLA
USACAPOC(A)
718-668-6178
310-825-6574
850-384-8894
michaeldz71@gmail.mil
leobard@ucla.edu
jennifer.a.glossinger@mail.mil
354th CA Bde
907-301-7960
glenn.a.goddard.mil@mail.mil
4th CAG
NPS
NPS
SOCOM
USAID
NDU
353rd CA Command
571-606-5413
831-869-5275
408-807-3437
813-826-1294
202-712-1822
202-685-5217
718-668-6178
kyledg@gmail.com
guttieri@nps.edu
sbhall@nps.edu
robert.jones@socom.mil
mkelly@usaid.gov
dianamluan@gmail.com
jose.m.madera2.mil
US NWC at NPS
353 CACOM
NPS
831-656-2642
202-550-7875
202-460-8269
tpmoore@nps.edu
bianpanton@yahoo.com
mdpineda@gmail.com
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
209
Name
Organization
Phone
Email
Diana Parzik
DHA-International
Health
EBI
703-863-3354
diana.parzik@us.army.mil
571-308-5845
adpaterson@gmail.com
X
DoS/HIU
G-3 SOD
202-634-0343
703-614-7681
puschuskl@state.gov
cameron.s.sellers.mil@mail.mil
X
X
WEINSTITUTE
NPS
312-802-7524
949-439-3017
ctucker@weinstitute.org
marc.ventresca@sbs.ox.ac.uk
X
X
NPS
Smithsonian
Consultant
Walter Reed
National Medical
Center
215-353-3902
202-633-5003
+377607930077
910-315-0009
Bravo6@verizon.net
wegenerc@si.edu
info@willot.com
ramey.wilson@usuhs.edu
X
X
Andrew
Paterson
Karen Puschus
Cameron
Sellers
Chuck Tucker
Marc
Ventresca
Jeffrey Voice
Cori Wegener
Patrik Willot
Ramey Wilson
Subgroup
Econ SWB
X
X
THURSDAY MARCH 27, 2014, USAID BUILDING, CRYSTAL CITY
OPENING PERSPECTIVE (2pm - 3:30pm)
14:-14:15
Welcome
LTC Linden – Welcome and Project Overview: Establishment of Institute for Military
Support to Governance (IMSG); new 38G position in Army CA – to address recognized
lack of ability to influence governance
What skills are needed – previously conducted a Rule of Law workshop to identify
certain specialties
IMSG – CAPOC – SWC
Want to address how to address Sustainable Economy and Social Well Being (SWB)
Oct 2015 – 580 positions in Army Reserve reclassify to 38G (out of about 11,000 CA
officers)
Tiered approach to provide mobility/growth in the position
Karen Guttieri – Governance Innovation for Security and Development (GISD) project
(see intro slideset)
14:15-14:30
Plan for the Interim review – seeking outputs defining position
requirements of 38G
OVERVIEW OF DRAFT KNOWLEDGE BUILDING BLOCKS – how different
approaches can inform the process
- Testimonials from the Field - [CA professionals, partner agencies]: "What expertise /
training especially useful or were you missing?"
- Col Madera – perspectives – what is a good expert who happens to be a good
integrator able to interlocute. Maybe trying to create a hybrid of skillsets – what
has worked in the past and new thinking.
210
What has not worked – centralized databases for talent, accession (sp)
requirements
- Not just the way the Army works but how it puts people into certain bins –
other competing priorities
Leo Estrada, UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs: Changing PhD Level
Training: A UCLA Case Study (see slideset) – perspective on dynamics of
education
- Re curricular reform
- Training for new skills needed – pure research, applied research, combination
- 4 years to accomplish the change
- Scientific research is increasingly interdisciplinary; department structure
working against interdisciplinary efforts
- BioSciences – across several schools/departments
- Created consortium of PhD programs to facilitate improvements in curriculum
(with more specialized courses), increased faculty involvement, increased
interdepartmental grant seeking, increased shared laboratory project, student
training that is more relevant, administrative functions
- Issues to resolve – how to give up their doctoral degree programs, how to
create a joint College of Letters and Science and Medical School degree, how
to integrate faculties from 10 departments, how to provide services to students
- Consortium of Doctoral Programs – have departments to abandon or make
their PhD programs dormant; home areas, multi-dimensional and focused –
faculty from all former departments choose to join 1-3 home areas; significant
number (7) of core faculty needed to establish a home area; students have
flexibility to move between home areas; one year core class created for all
students; specialization for students related to lab experience86
- Home Areas: biochemistry, biophysics, and structural biology; cell and
development biology; etc – knowledge, skill, specialty
- Home areas gave faculty a place to “land”
- Defined roles across home areas, MBIDP, and Medical School (individual or
shared) for activities (recruit/admit, advise, curriculum, seminars, career
counseling, diversity/outreach, grant/funding support, tracking and evaluation,
finances)
- New arrangement – curriculum enhanced with faculty teaching in the College
and Medical School; home areas broke down department silos; students are
encouraged to select more than one home area; departments will not
“disappear” as they are needed for university organizational reasons (hiring,
promotion processes, etc.) but their functions are greatly reduced
- Home areas are a better reflection of the current state of research activity in
the biosciences; other science areas are looking at BioScience as a model and
may soon follow (Earth Sciences and Atmospheric Sciences); other social
science areas admire the model but are reluctant (more territorial; nothing
culturally pushing them together); innovation in training doctoral students
represents a new way to find biological solutions for the future
-
-
86
Possible to have CA self-organize their profession?
211
-
-
-
Faculty buy-in to home area idea (ownership); letting the faculty home areas
rule themselves
Seeks greater relevance for the field
Entering experimental stage
CA context – need to shift to a different kind of thinking / paradigm shift –
how do people feel about the “goodness” of governance
Home areas – like fields in a department; Russia – very specialized
(departments are fields) – home areas are intended to be more flexible than a
“field” – built more around research activity than knowledge
Change in student population? When designed, amount of interest in the
program increased by 80%
Who gives tenure? Home area. Degree? Home area based.
Will this result in better research / better biologists / better doctors? May take
years to determine.
Marketplace driven changes (put out cheaper product, create greater
accountability for research dollars) – comment about PhD in Economics
having no practical value
(Patrik) Company restructuring – what was needed at the end – in this case,
students who would meet market requirements for bioscience. For 38G,
clients are the various governments – what do those people need? What are
the functions the 38G will perform? Not job description, but what is the added
value? What attributes describe the functions? Then design curriculum or
draw from pool already existing in Army or society.
(Tom) Inertia applies to humans and organizations. What external force(s)
overcame the inertia? At UCLA, knew something was wrong because the
number of PhD students was declining dramatically. The way NSF was giving
out funding in biosciences changed (had to work cross-department). This was
a solution to do the job better.
(Andy) Do we also have to address incentives? Are there different kinds of
incentives DoD can put on the table (e.g., tax-free overseas salary)? How to
pull in the people with the right training – what’s the incentive package to
bring them in?
14:30-15:30
Understanding the Complex Adaptive Nature of Nation/State
Building – Steve Hall (see slideset)
 Model-building; one way to break down stovepipes, how things interact
 Guiding principles – “Guidance for the provision of essential services providing
security, the rule of law, economic governance, and basic human needs are
interdependent priorities.”
 Idealism (meaning) <-> Materialism (survival) versus Persistence (knowing) <->
Adaptation (believing)
 Donor conception of inter-state relation value determines how they engage (and
how they will measure success)
 SSE – SWB – Sustainable Economy: positive feedback between the emerging
conditions dominates… and the nation and state spiral upward together
 Important consideration, whether this is a closed system or an open system
212

Opposite conditions can occur – positive feedback between the disintegrating
conditions dominates and the nation and state spiral downward together
 Each objective is uniquely complex, consider SWB – there are context sensitive
conditions
 Many tradeoffs described in the literature across the sectors – many donor actions
have context sensitive impacts on the direction state building will go
 How do we start modeling this? Introduction to System Dynamics modeling
(stocks, flows, influences/variables)
 Sample macro causal loop diagram of state constitutive capacity (Enos and Far,
“State Security Dynamics and the Impact of Intervention to Build Country
Capacity”)
 Sample model: Security Sector (Choucri, “Understanding Modeling State
Stability: Exploiting Systems Dynamics”)
 Sample model: Economic Sector (Sterman, “Business Dynamics: Systems
Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World”)
 Modeling process itself provides insights
 Understanding complex Adaptive Systems – show interactions between the parts
(i.e., feedback loops); generate the complex emergent group behavior we see from
the simple constituent agent behaviors that we understand; …
 Key “Agents” of a Nation State Development Model – individual agents (passive
and politically relevant – “what will I sacrifice in order to protect”); social
networks (host state, sub-stage SIGs, donor states, NGOs – networks of people
who share values); environment (politically passive backbone of goods/service
delivery)
 Economically rational, self-optimizers (rational self-interest) with desire to
interact with the “other” (willing to spend resources to have relationships with
“other”)
 Early Concept of 38G Nation State Building Training Tool – recognizing tradeoffs and influences across sectors
 Identifying 38G specializations and required competencies – how should they be
identifies, what should performance requirements be, how would the 38G
generalist coordinate efforts – how does this system dynamic modeling effort
support this objective? Model can facilitate thinking of this problem as a system
engineering task
(Tom) How many have seen systems dynamics process before today? Not many.
Influence diagram can be a useful method moving forward for better understanding the
world of the 38G.
(Jon) Systems dynamics model for re-engineering US Army – significant costs. Highlevel – illustrative, informative. Detailed modeling – very high cost to develop powerful
tool. Goal for project is to create a conceptual framework for the work.
Marc Ventresca – lead for Social Well-Being (SWB) Sector
Systems thinking perhaps in contrast to the 14 CA functional specialties – want to think
about interfaces, integration (know-how, not know-what)
[BREAK]
213
15:30-16:30
Work groups
OVERVIEW OF DRAFT KNOWLEDGE BUILDING BLOCKS, PROBLEM
FINDING, GAP ANALYSIS
- Testimonials from the Field - [CA professionals, partner agencies]: "What expertise /
training especially useful or were you missing?"
- Discussion of key gaps in expertise
Parallel Tracks:
[1] Sustainable Economy (break-out session)
1. Macro stabilization (monetary and fiscal plan, banking regulation)
2. Private sector (investment, production and markets; infrastructure development)
3. Employment generation (agriculture production and growth)
4. Illicit economy (Control of resources, contraband, of combatants)















Success? Enable our CA soldiers to know/practice appropriate economics to
succeed in their mission.
knowledge backpack
strategy – knowledge – awareness (strategic awareness)
advise/consult  38As and Ministries
What are functions: Product (making things), Trade (connecting domestic and
international), Finance (relates value) across dimensions of (1) education and
generic experience and (2) critical relevant experience
Transactions, trade-offs, risks, added value
Defining attributes/characteristics of 38G individuals – well educated, military
background, temperament (EI)
What is relation between security and economics?
Flexible principles of organization is essential.
Communication capacity of personnel is to be emphasized – hearing/listening;
emotional intelligence; transitional mindset developed
Must understand informal economic sector
Needs to be adaptable
What are the dysfunctions?
Problem is informal economy – illicit?
Problem is political economy
Don’t really want PhD economists
Where/what level of intervention
Must be sustainable by Host Nation
Need to know what is driving strategic leadership
3-dimensional axes: Function, Education/experience, Practical
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Let’s starts with the assumption that there are three functional sub-specialities within the
38G billet:
1. Production -> The know-how of how to facilitate the making of things.
2. Trade -> The know-how of how to facilitate of trade … but domestic and
international
3. Finance -> The know-how of how to support investments and to maximize value
And determine what each such specialist needs to understand. But, is this the wrong
question, we need to worry about what disrupts a stable economy … like an illegal
economy. That’s a serious problem. It disrupts the economy and in various ways the
stability of the state. We would need to focus on how the illicit economy can corrupt the
legitimacy of the political process.
We need to enable the 38G. We need to know what they must know to be effective.
There are two different kinds of knowledge that are needed: Knowledge of business
economics (how to run a successful business) and macro economics (how to run a
nation/state).
What is the appropriate role of the 38G? What is it that they are being asked to be capable
of doing? And what level of competencies do they need as a function of engagement
phase … in order to be supportive of the host nation? The mission phase determines skills
requirements. Requirements change as the mission is unexpectedly extended (that can
screw up the measure of mission success). The 38G is especially in need of a clear
understanding of the commander’s intent. And the 38G must understand the tradeoffs
both within the sector and amongst the sectors.
Must consider the 38G Econ advisor in the context of the military commander. He must
understand the principles of organization within the military. “All great strategies
fail/succeed in their implementation.” Training should be focused on "emotional
intelligence.” 38G must be competent in both the economic realm and in the military
realm. He must have a strong ‘transitional’ mindset … I.e., constantly changing. 38G
must be able to define where we are and where we are going. Must be able to interface
effectively with NGOs and other stability ops personnel. Must be flexible (which requires
knowledge). Must be able to maintain mission relevance.
We need to define basic building blocks, essential characteristics of a 38G
- Emotional Intelligence
- A PhD. in Econ will fail in the EQ realm of the Military Culture
- The skills of the kinds of person being described here has already been defined in the
USDP … need for adaptability, etc.
- More Attributes: Intelligence/Knowledge of Econ Domain; EQ; Military in orientation;
Specialization
Our focus is only on the non-military education. Others will be responsible for military
education
Enablers of CA Soldiers:
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Knowledge/practice of appropriate economic theory … that is required for
mission success
“Knowledge Backpack” (where to find required expertise)
Strategy Awareness
There are three dimensions in which a 38G should be evaluated:
 Functional expertise: Production, Trade, Finance
 Theoretical competence: Theory Mastery
 Successful practice: relevant experience (how many of the required 10,000
[Gladwell] they have?); theoretical knowledge is not a substitute for practical
experience
Ph.D. (pure theoretically expertise can be dangerous in this realm … too many
untested assumptions)
Remember: bureaucrats will have to understand and interpret any theoretical sourced
guidance. There is much room here of original intent to be lost. Probably needs a well
educated implementation cadre.
There are two kinds of required specialists
 One broad enough to be able to make an independent mission relevant
contribution on their own
 One broad enough to know who to turn to for help.
Who does the 38G report to, and who reports to him? What really are his responsibilities?
It will be hard to define educational objectives without a clear sense of roles and
responsibilities.
[2] Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being (break-out session)
1. Sector focuses on basic needs such as food distribution, housing refugees and displaced
persons, and providing sanitation.
2. Long-term social well-being development in programs such as education and public
health ensure host nation government can develop citizen abilities to provide for their own
welfare, which further sustains stability
Marc started the session with introductions around the group:
- Glenn Goddard, CA Brigade commander
- Jim Adams, Sr ops officer, coordinating refugee; CA in Kosovo with UN, affairs of
minorities; governance officer; PhD at GMU in Conflict Analysis and Resolution
- Bob Jones, ret SpecOps Colonel, J5 Strategy & Vision; law school, prosecutor; SOCOM
– about 9 years ago drilled into what this dynamic is about, systems in conflict
- Tom Moore, NWC at NPS; ret Army Col; G-1 and G-4; Water Board
- Diana Parzik, health policy, Global Health Engagement, med service, environmental
science officer, disaster preparedness, CA Co commander
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- Norm Cotton, ret CA Col, joint/strategic level; security sector reform advisor;
stakeholder analysis for the GISD project
- Andrew DeJesse, CA officer; community subgovernance level
- Chuck Tucker, ret MGen USAF, JAG; Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghan, Iraq; running
capacity development efforts overseas
- Karen Guttieri, NPS; public policy; international and domestic, civil-military
- LTC Jeff Voice, CA officer; NPS SSDCO graduate; 38A officer plans team chief –
Bosnia, Iraq; CA since late 80’s
- Curt Blais, NPS MOVES Institute – project management support, modeling
What is current problem in the space and what 38G is trying to solve? Current incapacity?
What is 38G trying to solve?
 Number of people living in large urban environments, gender roles – as 38A
exposed to public health but nothing on urban planning; population-centric
conflicts – gap
 Another one filled by human terrain teams (HTTs) is idea of mapping the human
environment; CA could not grow to fill it – should it now be moved into CA
structure? Seems more appropriate to CA than to Intel.
 New models across agencies – how does that affect CA thinking? Move from
function-driven expertise to some other level of expertise.
 Space-time-forces – understanding the operational environment. Does 38G need to
turn into his own intel apparatus? Need to keep CA and Intel distinct for political
reasons.
 G-2 informs targeting. Every HTT was used differently depending on who
employed them.
 Fill void of HTT going away by bringing in geo-mapping expertise/practitioner.
 Intel apparatus collects information – do we say don’t bother to collect information
relevant to CA, the CA team will do that? Need to keep Intel out of the picture.
Intel will collect, CA will have access to it.
 What are other gaps? Planning – phase of the engagement. Preservationists,
archivists – put into safe and secure environment – by international law, have to
protect cultural sites. 38G needs to be able to advise planning.
 Intel not good at telling you what business plan is needed to establish capacity, just
what to take down. Where do we put our resources?
 SpecOps – understanding influences and relationships. Intel community deals with
threats, but have significant analytical capability; can’t get them to understand the
soft things. How does CA affairs dealing with governance to tap into the Intel data?
 UN perspective – sectors generally include Governance, Justice, Economy, Social
Welfare. Humanitarian affairs officers, civil affairs officers (administration of the
institutions – 38A equivalency; 38G more equivalent to guiding/higher level
personnel, directors), political affairs officers (policy interactions with the
leadership), military affairs officers. P1 (entry level management – administration,
functional responsibilities), up to P5 level of professionalism
 Conventional force, how it does COIN – confuse ways as ends. If we build these
systems and functions, the sum will achieve the ends. In these environments, the
ends reside in perceptions. Understanding the population, what their current
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perceptions are, how to influence and assess perceptions over time. Who thinks
about these things in the CA community today – do the 14 functional areas add up
to a functional society? Nobody has the systemic view. USCAPOC worried about
training management of soldiers right now. Unless you have a forward-thinking
CACOM commander, it does not happen. What does that kind of person do? CoG
– CACOM commanders. Where do we intervene so 38G becomes integrated, not
an appendage. Have to work interagency. CACOMs are rarely deployed.
Combatant Commanders need to be thinking this way – needs 38G
advice/assessment.
Not military problems, policy problems. Engagement will be problematic. Talking
about a mindset – even though CA officers are not in charge, need mindset that
they are doing a function to shape perceptions to bring population into the fold.
Where to apply the capability to establish legitimacy of the host nation.
What we do is trying to influence perceptions. Who tries to balance allocation of
resources across the sectors to maximize effects? 38G who live and breathe these
actions every day are what is missing. Cannot create a 38G super-CA person. How
to put together a team that has the right kind of thinking and skill sets? 38A work
with IMSG and CAPOC to identify who is needed.
What types of projects – health affairs are 50% of project funds. AFRICOM did
not have any relation with South Africa until we did a Medical Civic Action
Project (MEDCAPS). Same with Azerbaijan. Disaster relief has opened doors for
these relationships. USS Comfort Pacific Partnership projects (through US mission
to host nation). Medical, dental, and veterinary. One of 6 lines of engagement is
Global Health Engagement. Needs to be a focus of CA. Navy has jockeyed for
position, not recognized by Army AMED.
It’s not the disaster relief we do, but gaining entry to enable greater engagement.
Need to do the mission to promote the host nation.
Jennifer – in Ethiopia, medic could not do CA type stuff. Maybe do a global health
certificate in the future.
Don’t forget about cultural heritage. Governance and big operations – don’t forget
about the parts of CA that are to keep us out of international legal issues (don’t
strike zones, etc.). GIS planning/mapping. Need to respect cultural memory. Trust /
good will – hard to build, easy to lose.
Bounding strategic and tactical – could more easily accomplish low-level projects,
but now need to address broader issues with fewer assets
Winning hearts and minds – building trust.
Hard to do structural construction projects to meet human value problems. 38G can
bridge that gap.
Have to map this out as simply as possible – use the guiding principles – look at
the conditions of SWB and identify the areas. Pull out the relevant Additional Skill
Identifiers (ASIs).
Maybe talk a bit more about center of gravity in relation to this
Integration gap – 38G need know more than specific skills – where and when to
perform a project and how to find the right agent to do the project
Skill gap -- how to find these folks and convince them to join the Army
Conflict transformation perception
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If 38G is functional expert, need to identify the ASIs to assign. What do we do to
take a collection of them, training wise, and get them to work with the other agents
to learn how to perform their tasks.
Dwell time and ops tempo – impacts ability to provide the right people for the right
jobs at the right time. How to retain the folks. Rotation / job sharing, constantly
communicating with each other. Connectivity gap.
[Jeff’s diagram below]
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In Iraq, important to win hearts and minds? No, important for Iraqi government to
win hearts and minds. Many of the CA projects were perceived as “just don’t kill
us”.
Planners need to be working at the top to identify where assets/resources can be
spent and accomplish something.
How to promote and secure our vital interests? Not thinking about all of it
combined to shape to desired ends.
Phase 1, 3 implications, what level (tactical, operational). How to incentivize a
civilian? When out of the field, they are losing money. Typically join because of
passion. Give them real-world experiences that enhance their civilian resume. Do
short-term assignments. Civilians don’t care about going to battle assembly but
giving them valuable real-world experiences.
“Thinking that created the problem is unlikely to solve it.” (Einstein) Content of
planning and execution based on human nature context. People like seeing
immediate results -- don’t just do the easy jobs because we can. Better the right
thing poorly than the wrong thing well.
Look at State Partnership Plan (60+ countries around the world – no CA
involvement).
White board:
- human terrain “map” gap
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- influence gap – OPLAN <- analysis (data points)
- urban planning gap
- integration gap
- skill gap
- relief to development
- experts (e.g., med) don’t know CA
- parts of CA that keep us out of trouble with international law are important
- social well-being
- conflict transformation perception gap
- connectivity gap (community of practice) -- civilian job / military job rotation
- “Thinking that created the problem is unlikely to solve it.” (Einstein) Content of planning
and execution based on human nature context. People like seeing immediate results -don’t just do the easy jobs because we can.
“these are the things that define a failed state”
FRIDAY MARCH 28, 2014
Sustainable Economy Sub-Group
9:00-10:00 OUTBRIEF
from Day 1
10:00- 10:30 Educational Requirements for 38G Econ
SPEAKERS FROM THE FIELD
Dr. Hilton L. Root / Amb. Klauslerich (Invited)
Discussion of inter-dependencies
Discussion of key gaps in expertise
System viewpoint
Interaction with Field Operative
Most importantly, what do the 38Gs need to know?
Need deliverables: What are the types of 38-G Econ Specialists? What do they need to
know?
Col Linden: These 38-G should be thought of as leaning on the experts. They should
know how what they do will shape the future.
Might be useful to see what and where the responsibilities of both the 38A and 38G lie.
That would help frame the discussion about what they need to know.
‘Who they gonna call … and how they gonna know when to do it’. I.e. the 38G Econ
‘Ghostbusters’
Given the primary mission of the 38G to provide military support to governance perhaps
this will be a good means to focus our considerations. What must the military be prepared
to do to ‘support’ the development of the Host Nation’s economic development in
support of the ultimate objective of creating a nation capable of stable self-governance?
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This will focus our discussion on transition … from foreign control of development and
management to host nation control and management … from military control to public
control … and from military control to private control?
We need to focus now on what knowledge and skills are required to successfully develop
and manage a sustainable economy in a failed or failing state. How to successfully
transition that knowledge to the host nation will come later.
P1 (CA 38A)
We should try to define the 38G ‘prerequisites’
Suggestions:
Background: Mix of International Experience and Academic Foundations; Ability to
mentor for Provincial Government
Quantitative / Mathematical (Business Math): 12 credits upper division math …
including statistics
Economic Theory
Macro
Micro
Monetary and Banking
Public Finance
Natural Science
(Support for Electrical, Health, Education, Social/Welf)
Physics
Chemistry
Botany
Zoology
Business
Accounting (Book Keeping)
Managing Account
Cost Accounting
Marketing
Organization Theory and Behavior
Information Science / Computer Science
Systems Analysis
Social Science
Political Science
Sociology
Psychology
Project Management
Strategic (US Policy and Goals)
Strategic Planning
Patrick: Another Vision of Required Skills:
Commercial/Econ
Public Finance (where money is coming from)
Macro Econ (input and output) and balances
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LCD Small and Medium Enterprises
Agricultural Economic in LDC (cycles)
Trade and Logistic
Energy Economics
Social Sciences
Cultural Anthropology
Social Psychology
Game Theory
Negotiation Skills
Marxist Economic Theory and Comparative … and the impact on the economy
Critical Thinking
Systems Theory
Critical Historicism (how do you criticize information … how do you make an
argument)
Business and Management Skills
Communication
Interpersonal skills
Leadership
Media and Propaganda
One page summary of problem
Industrial Marketing
Case Study: Harvard Business Cases (e.g. corruption in Germany)
Scribe: How to teach host nation leaders all these skills
CA2:
38G will be deployed at multiple echelon levels tasked with supportive the governance of
regions of different sizes and scopes. Do the kinds of prerequisites apply equally to all
deployment levels? Maybe the skills required to govern a city are different from those
required to manage a nation? Maybe the 38-G specializations ought to be broken down
by the scope of the governance that is trying to be built.
Maybe the 38G-Econ specializations ought to be defined in terms of the level of state
development. Certainly the skills required to kick start the nation/state building process
are quite different than those required to transition responsibility to the Host Nation
and/or bring in Private Investors.
The prerequisites we’ve been discussing are core knowledge that any 38G will need to
have mastered.
The 38G is like a skilled General Practitioner (MD). He can cure many common
problems … but he also knows whom to call when the problem is beyond his
competency. These specialists (like an oncologist) is not a 38G … he’s a civilian). The
38G has to know when it will be possible to attract the private sector, how much leverage
(financial underwriting / risk reduction) it will require … and if/when bringing in the
private sector will undercut developments in the other sectors.
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The 38-G Economic specialist must be trained so that they share a common language in
the interfaces with the other 38-G specialist. That will be part of their power … that they
can talk to each other. The 38-G must have some sense of when their actions might
impact developments in another sector … and when developments in any sector might
influence their developments. This must be part of their shared understanding. (A Venn
diagram was drawn on the white board to illustrate the point.) These relations between
38-G specialists have associated transaction costs. We must be cognizant of these and
define specialists and structure their education so as to minimize those costs.
More suggestions for needed skills:
 Sociological (social constructivists theory)
 Economics (transaction costs and related topics)
 Political (power relation)
 Collective Intentionality (including Complex Adaptive Systems Theory):
Example (women planting … lots of expertise conscripted … did well … can hire
neighbors … economically successful … came back and asked for good tea sets
… was a hard sell for us … but was critical for social cohesion for them … 4th
year lost in terms of economic growth … but 5th year was very productive
(Consistent with a expanding practice of ‘gratitude’ expression in social
service/humanitarian organizations). Illustrates how a competent 38G of any
specialty is going to need to be sensitive enough to the interactions (here of Econ
and Social Well Being) to know when to back off on the development in one
sector to maintain a balance amongst the others.
 Social Construction of Reality (Content & Process). Particularly important for the
38G in helping her understand how a ‘national’ identity forms … which is
arguably the essential ingredient of a resilient (and adaptive) state … and how the
process of sector development plays a role in that identity formation.
Matrix on the White Board
Economics
Political
Social
Economic
Political
Social
Economics
Political Economics
Social Economics
Political Economics
Politics
Social Politics
Social Economics
Social Politics
Social
These interactions of stability interactions are an essential area of core and common
training for the various kinds of 38Gs.
How will the 38G be deployed? Just in the context of traditional military engagements
there are a very large range of tasks in very many different circumstances that the 38G
could be asked to do. If we expand the DoD responsibilities ‘left of boom’ the range of
tasks would grow further still. We need to understand what they will be asked to do to
effectively define what they need to know.
Private industry perspective: Private industry has the technical capability to rebuild the
constitutive elements of the state. The question is how and when they should be brought
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in to maximize the development of a ‘stable’ (autonomous) state. And what will be the
financial structure under which it occurs (governed in part on what financing / risk
reduction can be put in place. Knowing how and when to engage the public versus private
sector is the highest value added that a 38G will bring to the table.
The Oil Sector is good example to think about because it needs to (and often does) arrives
early in the state building process (even while bullets are still flying) because of effective
negotiation of risk between the private sector and the host state and/or donor state
support.
Negotiating this ‘Space’ between the public and private sectors is a key skill.
When and on what terms does it make sense for the public to engage the private sector in the state
building process.
What building blocks … what foundation … must be in place before guys like USAID
are willing to and felicitous to have step in.
 The 38-G will need to be conversant in multiple Domains of Theory. Abstract
thinking is a requirement.
 There is a skill in knowing when a ‘Private Sector’ can and should be developed
in the Host Nation. In some cases a western style ‘private sector’ doesn’t even
make sense. It’s a waste to even asked the consultants to develop a plan. 38G
should know at least enough to know when and when not to ask for a plan to be
developed (… and how to defend the conclusion when others are pushing to move
forward).
Consider Bosnia: Selmo’s background as Defense Minister and Military Command is
particularly relevant. As difficult as war is it gets more difficult after war. Need to
simplify the approach to nation/state building. Don’t want to be learning on the job. Who
will help me keep me alive?
Need definition of terms (a common language to speak): Some General Approach
Suggestions
 Unity of Effort – Jointness – “Mutual Support” is a critical notion to have shared
o Many lives can be dependent on coordinating at Local … State and NGO …
Military levels … all must share an underlying conviction of mutual support.
o Jointness … in widest … every actor … strength is measured by weakest link
o Must have strong shared conviction / understanding of ‘mutual support’
o (Resp: Authority and Funding Lines …. Needs to work (Toad in the Road)
…. Stake Holder Analysis)
 Basic Professional Competencies: Military & Economics)
 Emotional Intelligence (this can be seen as core of resilience) … those that make
you angry gain the victory). Some of the key skills include:
o Most important one … ability to maintain high level of stress …
o Maintain self consciousness
o Maintain social consciousness
o Control of self emotions
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o Control of other emotions
o (Importantly … control of negative emotions … if you let them persist then
you lose control … if you do control them it helps you focus collective
thoughts on achieving mission … ‘mutual support’ must be drilled in …
‘mutual support’ helps immunize you against negative emotions and increases
resilience.
o Viable stress relief mechanism
o Viable learning mechanism … understand challenges as chance to learn …
mistakes are opportunity to learn …
o Must emphasize Individual and Collective quality of resilience of groups in
high stress rapid changes environments … Flexibility
o And Constant Self Improvements
o The Soul (importantly) makes the body … nurture it.
o And maintain mental activity ... learn how to institutionalize this.
The 38G educational process should support the development of all of these skills. This
should be endemic across all of the communities supporting the nation/state
reconstruction process. Europe gets this … relationship building. The Western NeoLiberal drives towards transaction analysis … has become a source of friction. European
culture is relatively ‘Female’; relative to the US ‘Male’ culture. A stronger marriage is
needed. American gets sucked into the same old isolationist trap over and over. It
becomes perceived as interested more about when are we leaving than in how to establish
a relation. I.e., more interested in a ‘one night stand’ than in a ‘marriage’. The US
doesn’t fully process why this generates reluctance to engage … and resentment when we
disengage. It’s a kind of youthful hubris.
Entrepreneurship is both critical to understand and at best wisely engaged.
Challenges to existing hierarchies are sometimes critical … talking about assuming risks
… and reaping the reward … development requires taking risks … and managing those
risks. The courage to speak ‘truth to power’ … if you fail you’ll suffer the consequences
but if you succeed commander will take credit … this kind of norm must not be allowed
to prevail.
The 38G needs to be able to manage the overall flow of financial and social capital.
Current measures of success for CA teams are often defined in terms military objectives
… and are consequently short term. This makes sense within a strictly military context
… but when operating in a support role the military must understand and evaluate their
own performance in terms of the objectives of the country team that they are supporting
(i.e., the ‘commander’s’ intent). This represents a challenge within the military where
success measurement is defined within the context of short term assignments.
Need to understand what is needed and wanted. It is ease do what you think is ‘good’ but
is not valued or productive to the host nation/state. Example: Killed a ‘bad’ loan only to
get in trouble because there was a political need to make that loan … even though it was
unlikely to ever be repaid. (And sometimes a narrowly focused political objective can
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undercut an even longer term evolutionary of legitimacy, social well being and,
eventually, stability. (I.e., it’s critical to see how all the pieces fit together.)
Remember; for those who work for a military commander … success is measured by
tasks accomplished. Your first measure should be to the people (idealistic). The Military
Commander … should be defining tasks for the 38G … like ‘achieve stable governance
in this sector’. But often maneuver commanders don’t understand the governance sector
inter-dependencies as well as the 38 does and assign specific sector related tasks that are
counter-productive to the overall achievement of stable governance. Example: Give
them seeds (38G know is bad idea) … but 38 salutes and does their best to equally and
fairly distributes seeds … achieving a ‘task’ accomplished even while knowing it will be
counter-productive to the country-team’s mission of nation-state rebuilding.
An important skill of the 38 is that they can communicate effectively across the various
parties contributing to the state building process. E.g., they can speak, “Standardized
Industrial Codes.” What is a ‘SIC’? It is a standardization of the functions of a developed
country. Each state actor has a SIC code. (PI: but SICs primarily apply only to
functions performed by a developed country. It can be confusing or even counterproductive to assume that the required functions of a developing country should cover the
range of SIC functions.) But … what’s good about SICs is that they apply at international
level … everyone understands the same language. We need something like SICs for
states at various levels of development.
Military objectives are often measured in terms of (task) outputs. They should be
measured in terms of outcomes.
38Gs … are first and foremost Military Officer … … e.g. you will mentor the
providential government in terms of what the military can do to support the (nonmilitary) mission objective. Initiative is … critical. As an officer it is not your job to
agree with your superior.
Military Specific Suggestions
 Knowledge of Military Organization and Hierarchy is essential. You’re not a part
of the solution if you don’t know where you fit in.
 Must maintain a Mission Oriented Approach
 Knowledge and experience that supports defining which objectives support the
initiative is essential
 Commander Intent … should clearly define the measure of success. That
expression must provide the latitude to exploit the knowledge and skills of the
team … if mistakes are to be avoided.
 Clear understanding of task’s role in achieving the objective is fundamental.
(Expertise in achieving the assigned task is only part of what we’re looking for. )
 Task based networking is a priority. We are looking for people that know who to
turn to for help and when to turn to them.
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What can you say … about what you would have done or recommended … for managing
the security, stability and economics in Bosnia? Ans: All great strategy succeed/fail in
implementation stage … must be selected on what will work on the ground.
The approach is not universal … e.g. in Liberia (fiery exchange ensues).
Let’s step back to the USIP Daisy Venn Econ Diagram: The Sustainable Economy –
Functional Areas (USIP Slide). How do we translate these objectives into the required
context sensitive development processes required to revitalize a nation’s functioning
economy. Let’s talk about the sectors:
 Productive Sector
 Trade & Services Sector
 Banks and Finance Sector
These are offered as distinctive and completely different domains of expertise
[Note: MPICE is a measure of effective of the SCRS Essential task matrix and supporting
metrics]
We need to focus on disruptive influences on the reemergence of a stable and productive
economy. It’s beyond the military scope to manage the whole process. It’s the
military’s role to thwart the influences that disrupt the reemergence. For example it’s
within the scope of the military mission to control over illicit economy.
This is not a distinctive area … it exists in all three areas … but it is governed by
different things. Macroeconomic is really the fundamental knowledge that is required for
a 38G Econ. The 38G must foremost understand how to ensure the financial support of
Host Nation Governance … all else serves this objective. Governance revenue streams
rely on a legal economy (and the ability to collect the established ‘taxes’). The question is
… how is ‘value’ created in an economy. It’s different in the three modes: Production,
Trade and Finance.
38G – Economic is really not the best name for the job we’re trying to define (‘ 38-G Commercial’ would be a more descriptive name). The three proposed specialties are
interesting in that they natural tend to draw from different academic disciplines:
Finance (MBA)
Production
(Engineer)
Trade and Services
(…)
An economist wouldn’t think this way … that these three guys are really different guys.
What professional discipline would support this (Trade and Services Specialist)? We’re
still struggling with semantics. USIP Guiding Principles was the source of this … but is it
correct? The Organizing Principle … is intended to provide a lexicon for talking to other
38G specialists.. The 38G – Econ’s fundamental job is to know to draw on the available
(private sector expertise) involved in these three critical economic functions. The 38GEcon knows how to use the three areas of functional area expertise to address the
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Principles objectives. The 38G must understand the necessary conditions … e.g. required
constitutive infrastructure upon which the state’s ability to delivery products and services
to the people depends.
Back to basics: How does the 38G know that an objective is pragmatically achievable in
a specific circumstance. This seems like a critical requirement. If the objective can’t be
reasonably achieved then it is a fool’s quest to keep tilting at it out of principle. This
guidance won’t be provided by strategic guidance in its current form.
The army / joint unified task list is going to guide the 38G to an environment where he’s
wanted and needed. Military Commander may want the 38G to execute the assigned task
even while the USAID and Country Team want an alternate task be executed. Who does
the ‘Troops to Task Analysis’ … who does this … who should do it? Strategic Planners
should but don’t often do this well. ‘How has SWIT’ codes to transfer funds, for
example, been managed in our recent engagements. Strategic planners didn’t really
understand the central importance of quickly establishing the ability to transfer funds.
Don’t think the 38G specialist should go down below the Economy level. I.e., don’t
think there should be 38G-Econ/Finance … that’s too specialized for the CA38 team.
May be enough to have a 38A (with an credentialed) Econ/Commercial specialization.
These three sectors engage the private sector in very different ways. I think we’ll need a
specialized military 38G Econ (Production, Trade or Finance) if we are to effectively
engage the private sector. There is a lot of required expertise to know how and when the
risk should be bought down in order to successfully engage the private sector.
Back up a level … what should be the specialists within the 38G-Econ? Is there another
way that specialists with a 38G Econ could be defined? E.g., specialists in terms of
nation/state development phase? Early phase development requires expertise that is quite
distinct from the expertise required to manage later phase developments … even in terms
of the quantity and target of private sector engagement.
Should add ‘security’, ‘regulation’ and ‘education’ (from the social well being sector) to
the list of skills of a 38G Econ. They’ll need to understand how these sectors influence
their objectives and vice-versa. But, these are different sectors … Some have very
different stakeholders … IOC must understand this.
World Bank gives conditional loans (ERDB sovereign loans). Traditional banks use
rating (e.g. ‘Triple A’) to determine how to assign risk fairly. The World Bank doesn’t
use have a way of publicly pricing risk in the same way. They aren’t using market
money but rather donor (nation) money. The conditional are more nuance and often
‘political’.
In Bosnia, they had to rebuild banks … interview banks to see if they would set up.
RBC, Scotland … 1999. Turned out to be difficult to get banks to be willing to take the
chance … without leverage. Afghanistan has a similar issue … banks don’t want to come
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in. Commercial banks won’t take the risk … Africa, North Korea … They don’t enter to
help … they are looking for low risk opportunities. They want risk insurance.
38G must understand why the private banks are or are not willing to enter into
investment.
Back to the discussion about what 38-G Econ specialties we should have. Must be
comprehensible … and they must match the private sector … and generally agreed upon.
Alternative sub-specialties: Industry Expert; Agricultural Expert; Finance Expert.
Primary, secondary, tertiary … there could be multiple specializations. Agriculture
could/should be broken out of Production. That would match a common way ministries
are structured. Especially in countries that have failed or failing states … agriculture is
likely to remain a critical industry.
There should be Functional Specialties - Econ/Commerce … Defined specialties may be
fine …
Component Commands … have already defined functional specialties. 38G is trying to
define specialties that are more suited to the job. Issue is: We’re trying to make it easier
to reestablish a self-governing nation.
What are the minimum prerequisites for being a 38G - Econ specialist …
Experts … tend to (self) organize into the 3 areas we proposed. The 38A skills identifier
already has an Econ Specialist identified, but those 14 pre-defined categories have been
eliminated. Currently have 1 generalist and 11 subcategories. They still exist …
There are 3 defined areas: Production 6U; Trade 6E; Finance 6C.
Humanitarian Assistance / Social Well-Being Sub-Group
9:00 – 10:30
GAP ANALYSIS
Discussion of inter-dependencies with partner agencies
Assessment of key gaps in expertise
Substantive functional knowledge: ‘know what’, in contrast to ‘know how’
Lessons from field experience
Lessons from research on large-scale ‘technology’, infrastructure systems
-
Traditional functional silos/boxes are relatively less effectiveness at being supple
Next 10 years, CA tasks will look considerably different than past 10 years – can’t
keep doing what we’ve been doing. Challenge is to push the boundary of the language.
How to turn these into something useful for LTC Linden – descriptors, skills, and
levels (but not recreating the 14 functional specialties in more elaborate form)
Series of functional specialties – HA, water, health, sanitation, … -- with specific
skills, levels. Patterned after findings of RoL sector review.
Maybe not skill levels by substantive function, but set of descriptors for process skills
based on stakeholders/partners. (don’t need specialists, need integrators)
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-
-
-
-
What also is the role of 38A (assess and build teams of experts; team leader) in light of
emerging 38G (expert and integrator)?
IMSG is not the holder of the 38Gs – they are embedded at COCOM levels. May need
greater discussion – IMSG may also hold a stable of experts who can be called upon,
assigned.
How do the pieces fall out on the battlefield from tactical to strategic? 38G at corps
level? Can be called upon by the team leaders? The skills/capabilities are what matters
– will be packaged according to mission requirements. Bring closer to support
governance efforts at provincial level. Commanders will decide how to use the blocks.
Skills to be defined have to be broad enough to fit the phases and tactical to strategic.
CA teams (38As) in 38 countries right now – they are the maneuver element – how do
they move around, how do they communicate. Supporting embassies – how to call
back for reach back for expertise in a particular area.
Future requirement may look like: regionally aligned forces, distributed (smaller teams
operating with general guidance), embedded (UAP), expeditionary, task-organized
Recently, mission changed rapidly from HA to security assistance in many
countries
Commanders identify subject matter skillset needed and pull that person
38Gs shift to substantive knowledge; they have specific expertise
38G will be that one thing, not with specific ASIs (more like JAG and medical
specialists)
Reach back may be an empty purse – 38G should be strategic, with “street cred” with
other agencies – how to get that “street cred”? Experts, with military experience –
sounds like a retiree. Need discussion about how to bring the right people in. E.g., re
medical, who will have the contacts in WHO? How to put people into places that are
career-broadening.
Out of synch with new frameworks (e.g., millennium development goals)
Jim shared UN framework – country (e.g., Kosovo) – state-region-municipality levels
(see diagram below, courtesy of Jim Adams)
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-
-
-
Re recruiting – why not bring in people from other countries?
CA community at tactical level – one BN at 26% of the number it should have – from
where will the people come? Special Warfare Command has the training and education
piece. Recruiting piece is recognized but being dealt with in a different venue. Here we
need to identify what skillsets are needed.
What kind of person needs to know about Social Well-Being (issues come out of
Geneva). Need to understand the UN system. UN hiring/contracting/logistics systems.
Argument for career-broadening assignments – must completely understand the
international system. AUSAID, EU/EC will be key players. Need to understand
PhD/post-PhD areas of study (e.g., public management department at Indiana
University) – puts people in contact with important internationals. Need to plug into
international community.
UN taxonomy – political affairs officer, humanitarian affairs officer, civil affairs
officer, military affairs officer, social well-being affairs officer
Had functional skill identifiers, but had no doctrine for how to apply them – that is
being developed now
How does military support governance – what skills are needed in social well-being to
do that?
38G – think of him as a professional staffer, like a Limited Duty Officer – brought in
for their civilian skills to have impact on the military planning process
38G is 38A with a strategic ministerial level influence? 38A with value-added
expertise? Specialist/Expert/Consultant (38G, advising stakeholder and commander) vs
Generalist/Manager (38A, advising commander and ambassador)
What are the overlapping skill sets, what are the added skillsets (what distinguishes the
38G)?
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-
-
38As are in many countries working for the Chief of Mission; they are the maneuver
element (own logistics, own force protection, etc.) – providing extra capacity to AID,
State, UN. “New CA officer is community affairs officer with a gun.”
CA does various tasks (medap, drilling well); must be commander/manager of CA
people doing things; needs to be a staff person advising ambassador, conventional
commander, host nation ministry – 38A has to do all of these – where is division of
labor for 38A and 38G?
How to affect security factors at the strategic/national level?
How fine-grained should be the distinctions across 38Gs
Pre-conflict through Phase 5 – too broad. Concentrate on pre-conflict and end of
conflict.
Environmental science officers have public health / social medicine backgrounds
What credentials are needed in areas like health, education, refugees, IDPs, etc.?
Cross-cutting – demographic mapping
Skill set:
- “street cred”
- understand other frameworks (UN, WHO, …) – external stakeholders (will be
operationalized through demand signal from external agencies)
- know capability of partner/stakeholders
- career broadening assignments part of life-cycle for MOS
Social Well-Being
- [UN] health, education, social welfare, refugees, IDPs, civic participation, community
development – what broad skillsets need to be brought into the mix
- Cultural security
- Religious security
- Commo security
- Environmental security
SWB Breakout Groups: Health, Refugees, Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects
What can we learn from available models? What specific expertise is required?
[1] Health – Diana Parzik
What can we learn from available models?
Army – 72A Radiation; 72B Entomol; 72D Environmental Service Officer (food handling,
industrial hygiene); 72E Engineering (BS Engineering); Nursing 66 Public Health Nursing;
Physicians 60C PM; 60D OM, 61N aerospace; Hospital Admin 70A; Med Ops/planner; animal
health; food source inspection
Models – Special Medical Augmentation Respoinse Team; Socio-cultural Research Adversary
Team; Special MAGs (Military Assistance Group?) in Horn of Africa
What specific expertise is required?
Med / Health / Public Health / environment
Global Health Specialists / International Health – Ethics, Legal, Global Public Health;
Disaster/ Emergency Response; Culture; Health Services; Language
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38G Public Health – (BS PH, M PH, MS PH, Dr PH)
- water and sanitation
- food sanitation (nutrition/malnutrition)
- health systems – admin; emergency fire; hospital capability; public health governance;
facilities; clinics; personnel manning (#mds / #nurses / #technicians); health culture; planning;
financing
Work Experience – medical director (state/county/national); health federal agencies
Civ capability exp + training & education in CA + international experience
+
HELP, MSOC cert programs
LNO with health agencies; engagement
Degree (M PH, MS PH, Dr PH, etc.)
Rebuild/reconstruct health care in post-conflict – need much higher level strategic effort
Same expertise, different use (more planning/execution)
Any generic skills? MS in Public Health (systems-thinking), maybe with International Health
emphasis. Explosion in Global Health programs in last 5 years. Undergrad programs are very
new. Maybe with certificate in complex emergency
JHU – health emergencies in large populations; USIP post conflict health course; global health
diplomacy course
Public Health Services and CDC have some footprint overseas (e.g., disease surveillance,
research)
Money and MOA, maybe don’t need so many 38G but could reach back to pull from domestic
public health services
Not just emergency responder, but planner/developer
Civil Defense Officer (FEMA mode) – don’t know if this will be retained
[2] Refugee/IDPs (vulnerable populations) – Jim Adams
- Cultural and identity groups
- Religious groups
- Former combatants (DDR)
- Gender/children
What can we learn from available models (prior experience / frameworks)?
- functions: protection, normalization, and empowerment
- tasks (some overlap with other sectors): jobs (re discrimination), freedom of movement
(RoL), food/water, shelter/housing, medical, return/reintegration conditions (RoL;
human/civil/civic rights), security (SSE)
What specific expertise is required?
- Complex emergency responders – logisticians (understand complex emergencies)
- Minority affairs (protection) – governance and cultural dynamics; fairness factor
- Emergency medical services (assess and coordinate)
- Demography – understanding demographics and population migration, mapping needs
- Business administration?
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- Understanding interplay of this area with other areas of SWB and the other sectors
- Coordination with civil-military
- Relief-to-development continuum advisor (integrator)
- City management / urban planning
- Conflict analysis and peacebuilding
- Contracting
- Utility advisor
Education: certificate programs (e.g., at USIP – complex emergency management, with sector
specialities wrt return & reintegration, health, food/agriculture; medical management;
demobilization/reintegration of combatants)
- Bachelor – no requirement
- Master – peacekeeping policy, peacekeeping management, conflict analysis and intervention
[broad areas – would need to specify specific coursework]
- PhD – peacekeeping policy, peacekeeping management, conflict analysis and peacebuilding,
peace and conflict studies
38A – generalist; mission sets: civil information management, population resource control
(assessments), nation assistance (advising; OCONUS)), support to civil authority (US),
humanitarian assistance / disaster relief
- some now have Additional Skill Identifiers (14), but difficulty filling those
38G – specific expertise
Maybe can achieve much of this by refining the CA Civil Defense officer – lean this part
toward disaster preparedness (can impact security support) and management.
[3] Large-Scale Systems (Infrastructure Projects) – Glenn Goddard (see 38G Essential
Services document in SWB tab on APAN; also inserted below)
38G: Essential Services and Infrastructure
There are four essential services areas:
 Potable water and wastewater systems (new ASI needed)
 Communications systems (6R)
 Electricity, natural gas and other power systems (new ASI needed)
 Transportation systems (roads, bridges, airports, seaports and logistics systems)
(replaces 6G and 6F).
Required Expertise:
For proficiency code 1L:
 Knowledge of and expertise in the technical aspects of the planning, construction,
maintenance and management of at least one of the four essential service and
infrastructure areas.
 Ability to assist local host nation government authorities with management,
maintenance and/or restoration of the type of local essential service mentioned
above.
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For proficiency code 1M:
 Proficiency at level 1L.
 Knowledge of project management;
 Knowledge of essential services and infrastructure in at least one foreign nation.
 Ability to advise U.S. military leaders and local and provincial authorities
regarding management, maintenance and/or restoration of the type of local
essential service for which the officer has expertise.
For proficiency code 1N:
 Proficiency at level 1M.
 Experience managing a significant infrastructure project.
 Knowledge of and expertise with at least two of the essential services and related
infrastructure.
 Ability to advise U.S. military leaders and provincial host nation authorities
regarding management, maintenance and/or restoration of two or more types of
local essential service areas.
For proficiency code 1P:
 Proficiency at level 1N;
 Ability to advise host nation authorities regarding any essential service (and
related infrastructure) that is owned, maintained, managed or regulated by the
host nation government.
Rank Qualifications
O3
Undergrad degree in project or engineering management or an engineering field
related to one of the four essential service areas (see list of possible engineering
degrees below)
O4
+ EIT or similar certification or equivalent experience + overseas experience
O5
+ Masters degree in project management or an engineering field or P.E. or
equivalent experience
O6
+ Ph.D. in an engineering field or significant program management experience or
Masters degree in project management; plus significant overseas experience
*Qualifying engineering fields for entry level 38G—Essential services:
 Civil
 Electrical
 Mechanical
 Industrial
 Logistics
 Systems
 Engineering management
 Geotechnical
 Aerospace
 Environmental
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


Agricultural
Manufacturing
Production
What can we learn from available models?
Qualifying engineering fields: civil, electrical, mechanical, industrial, logistics, systems,
engineering management, geotechnical, aerospace, environmental, agricultural, manufacturing,
production
Public Works officer – project manager to bring in expertise to address needs of overall
system. 38A should be the project manager (generalist, broad picture, trying to achieve a
defined mission). Experts are the 38Gs. At another level, can have Program Manager, with
multiple projects under multiple project managers – knows interrelationships, multiple
systems. How broad should a 38G become as he rises in rank (higher education, higher
experience, higher certification).
E.g., Reconstruction Management Office in Iraq.
What specific expertise is required?
Project Management – PMP certification
Defined bona fides
-------COL Linden – provided printouts of CA/Functional Specialty Overview (see handout set)
Proponent – Spec Warfare Center and School
Can do minor change to existing designation easily, if one already fits.
Ultimately, need to give a job title with description of position(s) and qualifications.
-------Recommendations on Social Well-Being 38G Positions, Skillsets, and Tiers (basic, senior,
expert, master)
1. [Position]
- Description:
- Experience and skills:
- Primary:
- Supplementary skills and experience:
- Preferred:
- Proficiency Code: [for each of the tiers/levels]
- Qualifications:
- Supplementary skills and experience:
13:30-16:00 WORKGROUPS HUDDLE
Discussion on determination of background and credentials needed for 38G
Work in small work groups
Social Well-Being definition of new positions / new positions
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(new) Global Public Health Officer
Description of positions. Identifies positions requiring assessment and advice on all
aspects of health that impact social well-being.
Qualifications.
-Minimum Master of Public Health, preferable with International or Global health
concentration.
-Some combination of following:
Health Emergencies in Large Populations course (ICRC)
Medical Support of Stability Operations (Def Med Readiness Training Center)
USIP Post-conflict Health Course
State Department Global Health Diplomacy Course
Global Health Stability and Security (CDHAM_USUHS)
Veterinary Stability Operations Course
Medical Culture (CDHAM_USUHS)
Refinement of 5Y
“Disaster Preparedness and Response Officer”
Description of positions: Identifies positions requiring assessment, advice, and analysis of
all hazards preparedness and response operations for domestic and international disasters.
Qualifications:
Master degree in Disasters Management
and
Some combination of additional courses:
Int’l Diploma for Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA)
UN C-M Coord Course
EMAP Emergency Management Assessment Course (FEMA)
Certificate in Emergency Managemnet
FEMA Course ICD
HAZMAT/HAZWOPER
CBRNE
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (OFDA)
Complex Emergency Officer (refinement of 5Y)
Description of positions. Identifies positions requiring analysis, planning,
implementation, and management of indigenous emergency service assets in the
preparation for or conduct of civil defense response to complex emergencies. Enables
vulnerable populations to progress through protection, normalization, capacity building
and empowerment in order to ensure full participation in civil society and governance
representation.
Qualifications. Requires the completion of Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) independent; or equivalent experience as a Regional Civil Defense Director; or
Certification as a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) through the International
237
Association of Emergency Managers or a degree in Emergency or Disaster Management
through an accredited teaching institution.
Qualifications. Basic levels (1L) completion of a bachelor’s degree (Major immaterial)
and certificated in Complex Emergency Management with 2-3 years of field experience;
Advanced Levels (1M-1P) require a Master level education in Peacekeeping Policy /
Management, Conflict Analysis and Intervention (Doctorate for 1P)
Relief to Development Continuum Officer(new – 5Z)
Description of positions. Advises commanders and international or national level leaders
and manager or stakeholders and other experts on adequate planning, implementation and
management across multiple sectors; integrates to achieve unity of effort across the relief
to development continuum in concert with stakeholders. Enables appropriate responses
through the phases of (1) complex emergency, (2) stability; (3) normalization; (4)
development.
Qualifications. Basic level (1L) completion of a bachelor’s degree (Major immaterial)
and certificated in Complex Emergency Management with 2-3 years of field experience;
Advanced Levels (1M-1P) require a Master level education in Development or in
Peacekeeping Policy or Masters in Conflict Analysis and Peace Building. (Doctorate for
1P).
Econ/SWB Sector Reviews: APAN Adobe Connect Chat Content
Some participants attended portions of the meeting through the APAN Adobe Connect
capability in the GISD group on APAN. Content from the Chat window during the
proceedings is provided below.
James Embrey 2:Hello from PKSOI at Carlisle
Karen Guttieri:All views expressed are personal and do not represent those of angecies
or other entities
James Embrey 2:observation: the measure of the CA officer's success is his/her ability
to be conversant and persuasive across organizational cultures - communicate for, and
translate effectively back to the commander/command for which they work.
James Embrey:My point would be that while the commander may trust you to speak for
him, he has to first understand effectively in order to conceptualize guidance to provide
to you. Key role you play is to explain to the commander the econ challenges in
operational terms/importance, and then to the econ community effectively using the
words/concepts that they can understand. the CA officer must be multilingual across
organizational cultures, and be respected and heard in both.
James Embrey:I did listen in on later part of UCLA, and then on the sim/modeling
Karen Guttieri:**All views are personal and not reflective of those of any official
positions of agencies.**
Karen Guttieri:Dr. Maria Pineda is speaking to her working group on sustainable
economic development
238
James Embrey:would also offer that the MPICE, as an adjunct to the guiding principles,
would offer some perspectives as well; additionally, the former SCRS Essential task
matrix and supporting metrics developed.
James Embrey:the measures of performance in conflict environments are useful in the
assessments for each of these. The brief that Mike D gave on illicit power structures at
SOTEW gave some good insights into the adversary's use/interests in each of these areas
- to include revenue generation/denial through corruption and purposeful coercion
James Embrey: tangible/physical value as well as virtual/non-tangible value through
provisi0oning of supplies/services in exchange for adversary services/preference/favors
James Embrey:or is it his/her role to make the case to the commander and senior civil
leaders involved that the resources are best placed here not only to increase security, but
to set the stage for a stable environ upon which to continue to build?
James Embrey:or is the will work/won't work a matter of discussion with USAID,
NGO's, and other regionally engaged partners in projects to ensure sustainability over
time?
James Embrey:the reason I ask this question, is we can too quickly default back to AFG
and Iraq experience where our money/resources were the drivers vs future environs
where we must partner and share?
James Embrey:TSCP efforts can establish initiatives and open doors, but the
sustainablity portion to ensure these efforts endure and continue to adde to Host Nation
government legitimacy must be factored in through looking past the projects to ensure
NGO's, development partners, etc are willing to continue to funds/support until HN can
fund / sustain for itself.....
LTC Ramey Wilson, MPH Student/Internal Medicine Staff, and Fellow, General Internal
Medicine, offered the following perspectives on the meeting in his summary
memorandum of 31 March 2014 to Captain David Tarantino, Director, Defense Medical
Language Initiative, Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine:
“38G In Progress Review. A review of the 38G development strategy was
conducted at the USAID Training Center at Chrystal City, VA during the
afternoon following the conference. This interim review is part of the
larger evaluation of the Institute for Military Support to Governance’s
(IMSG), which is part of the JFK Special Warfare School and Center at
Fort Bragg, NC, to consider a new approach to the recruitment, selection,
assessment and training of what are traditionally called Functional
Specialists in Civil Affairs.
A. This review sought to address the following issues/questions. What are
the major issues these specialists should be prepared to deal with? What
are the areas/domains of expertise required of these practitioners? What
are requisite civilian skills? What (minimum through optimal) education
and credentialing qualifications would you recommend? How can we best
prepare these specialists? What training mechanisms and continuing
education models come to mind as effective options?
239
B. Changes and impetus for evaluation of the 38G is based upon the vision
set out in ARSOF 2022
(http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf).
There are currently 538 current positions in the Reserve that are going to
convert to 38G over the next 18 months. The study being led by Dr.
Gutierri that will make recommendations on this transition is due to COL
Lindon in August 2014. Implementation of those changes will begin 1 Oct
2014 and must be fully implemented by 1 Oct 2015. During this review,
there appears to be some debate on how the 38G would be used, located,
and attracted in the future. There was consensus that the current way of
doing business doesn’t work and shouldn’t be counted on to work in the
future. To start this process, they began by asking where Civil Affairs adds
value? The 2010 QDR spoke of partnering/assisting other governments in
providing for basic rule of law, governance, safe secure environments, etc.
It was suggested, however, that the group needed to stop thinking of
governance in terms of effectiveness, but how interventions impact how
people think about their governance (i.e., how “good” does it make them
feel).
6. Notes/Thoughts:
A. Governance and organization of the 38G initiative. One of the big
challenges of this program is how it is organized and structured. From my
perspective, this need and capacity is best met through a networked
approach that links willing/interested stakeholders today to provide this
capability. This is because much of the reach-back/intrinsic capacity is
distributed throughout the force, both in the Active and Reserve
components. The challenge, however, is figuring out how to build a
network-based organization within a rigidly hierarchical organization with
parochial and service-specific interests. In the health domain, there is very
little health that is service specific.
B. What is needed? From my perspective, what is needed first for the 38G
is to define what the actual goals and objectives are for this individual. Are
the 38Gs going to build capacity or bring capacity? Are they supposed to
build something lasting, or something good enough to meet an immediate
need? Maybe the answer is that they need to do both, but they need to be
clear in their mind and their communications (in order to manage
expectations). What is the 38G the strategic/operational
integrator/program manager? Should it learn to be the “lead” in this
“network?”
C. Ecological Model. Many of the briefers have used a version of the
ecological model in their briefings
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_systems_theory or
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_ecological_model) that suggests the
240
interconnection between society, individual, and their environment.
Maybe this is a good model to base the 38G structure/purpose upon.
D. There was very little discussion regarding the development of a
graduate-level certificate on Global health for the Civil Affairs
community. COL Lindon articulated that CA was still very interested in
this possibility, but appeared to be actively engaged on the 38G project as
his primary focus. COL Defraites was able to attend the second day of the
internal review and provided additional input into the competencies
needed in the health domain.
E. Further thought and discussion with the development of a Global
Health certificate has highlighted the benefit of conducting a survey to
assess and solicit the perspectives and perceived needs for global health
training in the active and reserve civil affairs community. I plan on
pursing this in the next several months and will reach out to COL Lindon
to see if he will support (which will likely be necessary for dissemination
and distribution of the survey).”
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APPENDIX G. IN-PROGRESS BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE
HOMELAND INTEGRATION SECTOR
Amr, Hady and P. W. Singer. "To Win the "War on Terror," we must First Win
the "War of Ideas": Here's how." Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 618, no. , Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face (Jul., 2008):
212-222.
Although on the surface this article seems to be an odd fit for the HI sector, it serves as a
starting point for participants to begin to think about the role of “strategic
communications” in addressing HI issues. The article addresses the critical role that
public diplomacy plays in improving the deteriorating image of the United States in the
Muslim world. The authors argue that both public diplomacy and public policies,
including those on civil liberties are vital to US success on the war on terrorism and that
the next US president must designate this effort as a matter of highest national security
importance. Many in the Muslim world believe that the war on terror is a war on Islam,
which almost dooms the success of any foreign policy strategy. Previous efforts at public
diplomacy have lacked funding, energy, focus, and an integrated strategy. The authors
define 6 principles to improve America’s security through winning the war of ideas,
including addressing civil liberties concerns and engaging diverse constituencies.
Birkland, Thomas and Sarah Waterman. "Is Federalism the Reason for Policy
Failure in Hurricane Katrina?" Publius 38, no. 4, Attribution of Governmental
Blame in Times of Disaster (Fall, 2008): 692-714.
Blatus, Richard J. "Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as
Intelligence Gatherers." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA488633
A provocative thesis from an NPS student who argues for an expansion of the traditional
role of the firefighter from preventing destruction of lives and property to becoming “first
preventors” in the war on terrorism. The author argures that this opportunity is
unmatched by any other emergency response agency, and coupled with the warrantless
search provisions afforded firefighters by the Constitution, makes firefighters the logical
choice for training and inclusion into an expanded terrorism awareness initiative.
Expansion of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of first responders, specifically
firefighters, will not be without difficulty. The lack of training and educational
opportunities afforded firefighters in this area, the changes in firefighting culture, the
status of firefighters as an integral part of the community, are all obstacles that must be
addressed. Firefighters respond to homes and businesses with unprecedented frequency.
A multi-faceted approach involving training, community involvement, and operational
awareness will streamline the utilization of firefighters in the area of threat recognition.
Brook, Brian C. "Federalizing the First Responders to Acts of Terrorism Via the
Militia Clauses." Duke Law Journal 54, no. 4, Thirty-Fourth Annual Administrative
Law Issue: Incrementalism and the Administrative State (Feb., 2005): 999-1029.
243
Caruson, Kiki and Susan A. MacManus. "Mandates and Management Challenges
in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security." Public
Administration Review 66, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006): 522-536.
Scholars and practitioners agree that homeland security policy implementation is
contingent on a strong system of intergovernmental relations. The responsibilities
associated with the homeland security mission, often mandated, cut across federal, state,
and local boundaries. Local-level stakeholders are especially important players in the
implementation process. This article presents a local perspective on the way
intergovernmental relations have changed-and the reasons for those changes-since 9/11.
Results of a survey of county and city officials in Florida provide evidence that
intergovernmental cooperation has improved as a result of federal and state mandates.
These results are refined by an analysis of the effects of specific local characteristics and
the quality and quantity of vertical and horizontal networks on intergovernmental
cooperation and local preparedness. Homeland security appears to be a policy area in
which mandated cooperation and coordination-in a time and place of urgency-have
actually strengthened the intergovernmental system.
Cohen, Dara Kay, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast. "Crisis
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates."
Stanford Law Review 59, no. 3 (Dec., 2006): 673-759.
Policymakers fight over bureaucratic structure because it helps shape the legal
interpretations and regulatory decisions of agencies through which modern governments
operate. The authors update positive political theories of bureaucratic structure to
encompass two new issues with important implications for lawyers and political
scientists: the significance of legislative responses to a crisis and the uncertainty
surrounding major bureaucratic reorganizations. The resulting perspective affords a better
understanding of how agencies interpret their legal mandates and deploy their
administrative discretion. They apply the theory to the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security. Two principal questions surrounding this creation are (1) why the
President changed from opposing the creation of a new department to supporting it and
(2) why his plan for such a department was far beyond the scope of any other existing
proposal. The authors posit that the President changed his mind in part because he did not
want to be on the losing side of a major legislative battle. But more significantly, the
President supported the massive new Department in part to further domestic policy
priorities unrelated to homeland security. By moving a large set of agencies within the
Department and instilling them with new homeland security responsibilities without
additional budgets, the President forced these agencies to move resources out of their
legacy mandates. Perversely, these goals appear to have been accomplished at the
expense of homeland security. Finally, the authors briefly discuss more general
implications of their perspective: first, previous reorganizations (such as FDR's creation
of a Federal Security Agency and Carter's creation of an Energy Department) also seem
to reflect politicians' efforts to enhance their control of administrative functions by
making bureaucratic changes, and particularly by mixing domestic and national security
functions; and, second, their analysis raises questions about some of the most often
asserted justifications for judicial deference to agency legal interpretations.
244
Cooling, B. Franklin. "U. S. Army Support of Civil Defense: The Formative
Years." Military Affairs 35, no. 1 (Feb., 1971): 7-11.
Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler. "Behind America's Front Lines: Organizing to
Protect the Homeland." The Brookings Review 20, no. 3 (Summer, 2002): 17-19
Discusses the strategies used by the federal government to protect the U.S. against
terrorist attacks. Importance of coordination among consolidated homeland securityrelated government agencies; Information on the role of the U.S. Office of Homeland
Security (OHS); Responsibilities of Governor Tom Ridge in the OHS.
Derthick, Martha. "Where Federalism Didn't Fail." Public Administration
Review 67, no. , Special Issue on Administrative Failure in the Wake of Hurricane
Katrina (Dec., 2007): 36-47.
The governmental response to Hurricane Katrina was not the unalloyed failure that is
often portrayed. The response was a mixture of success and failure. Successes occurred
when a foundation had been laid for intergovernmental cooperation, as with the largely
successful pre-landfall evacuation of Greater New Orleans, the multistate mobilization of
the National Guard, and the search and rescue operations of the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Postmortems should draw lessons from
such successes rather than concentrate entirely on the numerous failures.
Eisinger, Peter. "Imperfect Federalism: The Intergovernmental Partnership for
Homeland Security." Public Administration Review 66, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006): 537545.
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, posed a set of security challenges for the
nation’s cities that the increasingly decentralized federal system was poorly prepared to
meet. Although it was generally agreed that domestic security required a close
intergovernmental partnership, strong national leadership and support were lacking in
creating and guiding this partnership. To make matters more difficult, political
considerations in Congress generally trumped the assessment of security risks in the
distribution of federal fiscal aid. This article explores the strains in the intergovernmental
homeland security partnership, their causes, and efforts to adapt and reform. Despite
some progress toward a more rational public administration of homeland security, the
partnership still reflects the deficiencies of imperfect federalism.
Gibson, John. "A Model for Homeland Defense? the Policing of Alterglobalist
Protests and the Contingency of Power Relations."Alternatives: Global, Local,
Political 33, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec, 2008): 435-460.
This article analyzes the policing of the protest against the Free Trade Area of the
Americas agreement in Miami in November 2003. Specifically, it uses the case to
develop a theoretical understanding of the contingencies, weaknesses, and unpredictable
consequences of ostensibly repressive applications of power in transnational summit
spaces. It then evaluates participants' modes of resistance to critique ongoing assertion
among academic and activist circles concerning the unity of activists in alterglobalist
space, in favor of a view of power relations as constitutive of complex forms of social
245
identity, and which require greater reflection on the part of activist circles in order to
translate the experience of repression into a source of activist commonality.
Gotham, Kevin Fox. "Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in
New Orleans." Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 3 (September, 2012): 633-646.
This paper examines the problems and limitations of the privatization of federal and local
disaster recovery policies and services following the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The
paper discusses the significance of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in accelerating
efforts to devolve and privatize emergency management functions; the reorganization of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a service purchaser and
arranger; and the efforts by the New Orleans city government to contract out disaster
recovery activities to private firms. I situate and explain these three developments in the
context of recent trends toward the neoliberalization of state activities, including the
privatization and devolution of policy implementation to private firms and nongovernmental organizations. On both the federal and local levels, inadequate contract
oversight and lack of cost controls provided opportunities for private contractors to
siphon public resources and exploit government agencies to further their profiteering
interests and accumulation agendas. This article demonstrates how the privatization of
emergency management services and policy constitutes a new regulatory project in which
the state's role has shifted away from providing aid to disaster victims and toward the
management and coordination of services delivered by private contractors.
Hendell, Garri Benjamin. "Domestic use of the Armed Forces to Maintain Law and
Order—posse Comitatus Pitfalls at the Inauguration of the 44th
President." Publius 41, no. 2 (Spring, 2011): 336-348.
Jacobs, James B. "The Role of Military Forces in Public Sector Labor
Relations." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 35, no. 2 (Jan., 1982): 163-180.
This article examines the use of military forces as replacements in public sector strikes, a
practice employed in over forty cases since President Nixon established the modem-day
precedent by deploying troops in the 1970 postal strike. The author shows that, despite
the dubious legality of Nixon's action, legal constraints on the President and particularly
on the governors in this context are very weak. He argues that political and philosophical
qualms about breaking strikes with military replacements may have more vitality as
constraints, but they are subject to erosion if the appropriate role of military forces in
public sector labor relations does not become a subject of public debate. Following an
appraisal of the major policy options, the author concludes that the use of troops as strike
replacements is primarily a political rather than legal problem.
Jon C. Blue. "High Noon Revisited: Commands of Assistance by Peace Officers in
the Age of the Fourth Amendment." The Yale Law Journal 101, no. 7 (May, 1992):
1475-1490.
Kealy, Sean J. "Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law
Enforcement." Yale Law & Policy Review 21, no. 2 (Spring, 2003): 383-442.
246
Kohn, Sivan, Daniel J. Barnett, Alex Leventhal, Shmuel Reznikovich, Meir Oren,
Danny Laor, Itamar Grotto, and Ran D. Balicer. "Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response in Israel: A Unique Model of Civilian-Defense
Collaboration." Journal of Public Health Policy 31, no. 2 (July, 2010): 256-269.
In April 2009, the World health Organization announced the emergence of a novel
influenza A (HiNi-09) virus. In June 2009. WHO declared the outbreak a pandemic. The
value of military structures in responding to pandemic influenza has become widely
acknowledged in recent years. In 2005, the Israeli government appointed the Ministry of
Defense to be in charge of national preparedness and response for a severe pandemic
influenza scenario. The Israeli case offers a unique example of civilian-defense
partnership where the interface between the governmental, civilian, and military spheres
has formed a distinctive structure. The Israeli pandemic preparedness protocols represent
an example of a collaboration in which aspects of an inherently medical problem can be
managed by t he defense sector. Although distinctive concepts of the model are not
applicable for all countries, it offers a unique forum for governments and international
agencies to evaluate this interface within the context of pandemic influenza.
Kreps, Sarah and John Kaag. "The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Contemporary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis."Polity 44, no. 2, Morality
and Exclusion (April, 2012): 260-285.
The increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in contemporary conflict has
stirred debate among politicians, government officials, and scholars. Spokespeople for
the U.S. government often highlight the precision of UAVs and argue that this quality
enables military action to comply with the international humanitarian law principles of
distinction and proportionality. This article criticizes the technologically advanced
weapons on the same ground on which the U.S. government has defended them: meeting
international standards of distinction and proportionality. The article opens with a
discussion of the legal implications of Just War theory. It then offers a critique of the
politico-military discourse surrounding UAVs and presents a philosophical framework
that might lessen the confusion surrounding the ethics of modern warfare. The article
closes with a discussion of the various ways that defenders of the UAVs overstate the
ability of technology to answer difficult legal and political questions that the principles of
distinction and proportionality pose.
Lobb, Albert J. "Civil Authority Versus Military." The Virginia Law Register 4, no.
12 (Apr., 1919): 897-915.
Maestas, Cherie D., Lonna Rae Atkeson, Thomas Croom, and Lisa A. Bryant.
"Shifting the Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following
Hurricane Katrina." Publius 38, no. 4, Attribution of Governmental Blame in Times
of Disaster (Fall, 2008): 609-632.
Morris, John C., Elizabeth D. Morris, and Dale M. Jones. "Reaching for the
Philosopher's Stone: Contingent Coordination and the Military's Response to
Hurricane Katrina." Public Administration Review 67, no. , Special Issue on
Administrative Failure in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina (Dec., 2007): 94-106.
247
Relyea, Harold C. "National Emergency Powers: A Brief Overview of Presidential
Suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Privilege and Invocations of Martial
Law." Presidential Studies Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Fall, 1977): 238-243.
Roberts, Patrick S. "Dispersed Federalism as a New Regional Governance for
Homeland Security." Publius 38, no. 3, The State of American Federalism 20072008 (Summer, 2008): 416-443.
Salter, Mark B. and Geneviève Piché. "The Securitization of the US-Canada Border
in American Political Discourse." Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue
Canadienne De Science Politique 44, no. 4 (December, 2011): 929-951.
The authors analyze the empirical process of securitization of the US-Canada border and
then reflect on the model proposed by the Copenhagen School, arguing that securitization
theory oversimplifies the political process of securitizing moves and public acceptance.
Rather than attributing securitization to a singular speaker addressing a specific audience,
we present overlapping and ongoing language security games performed by varying
relevant actors during the key period between the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004 and the signing of the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) in June 2005, showing how multiple
speakers participate in the continuing construction of a context in which this issue is
increasingly treated as a matter of security. The authors also explore the language
adopted by participants in the field, focusing on an expert panel convened by the
Homeland Security Institute. They conclude that in the securitization of the US-Canada
border there are inconsistencies between truth and discourse, as well as significant
distinctions between official and bureaucratic discourses, further emphasizing the
importance of a comprehensive model of securitization
Scavo, Carmine, Richard C. Kearney, and Richard J. Kilroy Jr. "Challenges to
Federalism: Homeland Security and Disaster Response." Publius 38, no. 1 (Winter,
2008): 81-110.
This article examines the state of federalism in the Bush Administration from the
perspective of the policy area of homeland security and disaster response. The article uses
the International City and County Management Association homeland security survey
completed in the spring and summer of 2005 as a source of data. The article argues that
while it is tempting to look for one single agency to control homeland security and
disaster response, a networked model is better supported by the survey data and by recent
experience in terrorist and natural disaster response.
Sloan, Elinor. "Continental and Homeland Security: From Bush to
Obama." International Journal 64, no. 1, Electoral Politics and Policy: Annual John
W. Holmes Issue on Canadian Foreign Policy (Winter, 2008): 191-200.
248
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