WILSON V. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MFG. CO., INC.
NO. 06-1818, 2008 WL 186154
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JANUARY 23, 2008
FACTS OF THE CASE: Plaintiff Jimmy Wilson worked as a shipping supervisor at Phoenix
Specialty Manufacturing Company, Inc. (“Phoenix”). After experiencing a major panic attack
during a work meeting, on May 16, 2001, Wilson immediately went to see Dr. Dwight, both the
company physician and Wilson’s personal physician. Dr. Dwight referred him to neurologist Dr.
Bergmann who examined Wilson on May 24, 2001 for symptoms associated with Parkinson’s
disease—anxiety and loss of motor control in his right hand—with which he previously had been
diagnosed. After adjusting Wilson’s medications, Dr. Bergmann approved him to return to work.
Phoenix, however, would not allow Wilson to return until he obtained a release from Dr. Dwight.
Dr. Dwight provided Wilson with a work release without examining him on or about June 4,
2001, that allowed him to work half days for two weeks. Then, without consulting Dr. Dwight,
Phoenix allowed Wilson to work full time after the two weeks lapsed.
After every doctor visit, Phoenix president Robert Hurst required Wilson to report the
progression of his Parkinson’s disease. Although Hurst emailed the company’s human resources
assistant, stating that Wilson “qualifies for ADA designation and we will have to consider
accommodations”; Phoenix denied his accommodation request for a 21-inch computer screen
instead of the standard 17-inch screen. Wilson was provided with assistance in writing employee
evaluations, but was not provided with assistance in all other writing tasks. When the company
installed a new, “complex” computer system, senior management believed, without providing
Wilson training on the new system, that he was unable to accurately input data into the computer
due to his disability. Fearing that he would make errors, senior management barred Wilson from
keying information into the computer.
In an effort to downsize, Phoenix eliminated Wilson’s position and the press room manager
position. Although they allowed the press room manager to remain as an hourly employee,
Phoenix stated that a position was not available for Wilson. Subsequently, Wilson filed a
discrimination complaint with the EEOC.
After finding that Phoenix regarded Wilson as having a disability, and nonetheless failed to
accommodate and fired him, the district court granted Wilson $177,783 in back-pay (from
August 2002—August 2005, the period Wilson was not employed due to Parkinson’s disease).
The court awarded him $10,000 in compensatory damages due to the depression and humiliation
he suffered as a result of Phoenix’s behavior. Additionally, he was awarded $10,000 in punitive
damages because Phoenix fired him “with reckless indifference” to his rights under the ADA.
ISSUES OF THE CASE: Phoenix appealed and argued that the district court erred in finding: (1)
Phoenix fired Wilson on the basis of regarding him as disabled by Parkinson’s disease; (2)
Phoenix’s stated reasons for terminating Wilson were pretextual; and (3) Wilson was entitled to
reasonable accommodations. (4) Wilson cross-appealed (i.e., also appealed the district court
decision) arguing the court erred in not granting him “front pay” (i.e., money awarded for
continuing to be unemployed after the district court made its final ruling).
Prepared by the legal research staff of the Burton Blatt Institute (BBI): Centers of Innovation on Disability
at Syracuse University (http://bbi.syr.edu/) for the DBTAC: Southeast ADA Center (Southeast DBTAC)
(http://www.sedbtac.org/). This document does not provide legal advice. If you have further questions
about the issues of this case that relate to you, please consult an attorney licensed in your state.
ARGUMENTS & ANALYSIS:
(1) Regarded As Claim. The Appellate Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Phoenix
believed Wilson (a) was unable to key information into the computer and (b) could not
“adequately utiliz[e] the information on the computer screen.” The Court held that Phoenix
perceived Wilson to have a disability because the company ignored neurologist Dr. Bergmann’s
medical opinion that Wilson was capable of returning to work without restrictions, and would
not allow Wilson to return to work without Dr. Dwight’s consent.
(2) Pretext for Termination. When determining whether Wilson’s discharge was
discriminatory, the Appellate Court evaluated the district court’s holding that Phoenix’s six
excuses for firing Wilson were pretextual:
(a) Workforce reduction. With respect to Phoenix’s claim that it engaged in a workforce
reduction, the district court held it could not be considered a reduction since only two
employees were involved.
(b) Financial difficulties. Phoenix’s excuse that financial difficulties were the reason for
the workforce reduction was rejected because the company had paid bonuses to most of
its employees in 2002 (after the company fired Wilson in August 2002).
(c) Essential job functions. Phoenix argued they chose to eliminate Wilson’s position
because he delegated many of his managerial positions to other employees and refused to
master the new computer system. The district court held that both were false claims as
Wilson attempted to master the computer system, but was instructed by his supervisors
not to input information.
(d) Hourly position. The district court disagreed with Phoenix’s excuses that Wilson
could not have received an hourly position because there were no openings, and that he
was not a good co-worker because he ruled with a “heavy hand.” The court held that the
company needed a shipping clerk because it posted an opening. In fact, Wilson applied
for the position but did not receive a response. Additionally, one of Wilson’s former
subordinates testified that he was a “fair supervisor.”
(e) Shipping supervisor position. The district court rejected Phoenix’s claim that the
new shipping foreman position did not replace Wilson’s former position as shipping
supervisor. The court held that Phoenix had not eliminated Wilson’s position, but rather
changed the name of the position and promoted a new employee with limited experience
to fill it.
(f) False allegations. The court rejected Phoenix’s claim that on Wilson’s final day of
work (after notification of his termination), an independent basis for discharge arose.
Phoenix claimed that Wilson ordered ten years worth of packing supplies. The court held
that he was set up; Wilson ordered enough supplies to get the company through the
Prepared by the legal research staff of the Burton Blatt Institute (BBI): Centers of Innovation on Disability
at Syracuse University (http://bbi.syr.edu/) for the DBTAC: Southeast ADA Center (Southeast DBTAC)
(http://www.sedbtac.org/). This document does not provide legal advice. If you have further questions
about the issues of this case that relate to you, please consult an attorney licensed in your state.
transition period after his departure, but someone wrote over his notes to make it look
like he ordered excess supplies.
(3) Reasonable Accommodations. In response to Phoenix’s final challenge, the Appellate Court
did not affirm or reverse the district court’s holding that Wilson was entitled to accommodations
under the ADA. The Appellate Court stated that there was a circuit split (i.e., a disagreement
among different Courts of Appeals) as to whether there is a duty to accommodate an individual
who is “regarded as” having a disability. The Appellate Court did not decide this issue because
the damages awarded to Wilson were tied to his discriminatory discharge and not to Phoenix’s
failure to accommodate.
(4) Front Pay. The decision to award front pay is up to the discretion of the trial judge. The
Appellate Court affirmed that Wilson was not entitled to front pay because Dr. Bergmann
testified that Wilson was “competitively employable” by the end of 2005 (six months before the
district court entered its judgment).
RULING: The Appellate Court affirmed the district court’s holding that (1) Phoenix fired Wilson
in violation of the ADA because the company regarded him as disabled by Parkinson’s disease
and that (2) Phoenix’s stated reasons for terminating Wilson were pretextual. The Appellate
Court did not make a ruling as to whether (3) Wilson, “regarded as” having a disability, was
entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA. Lastly, (4) the Appellate Court affirmed
the district court’s decision to deny Wilson an award of front pay.
POLICY & PRACTICE:
Reasonable Accommodations and “Regarded as” Plaintiffs. As explained in this Fourth
Circuit decision, there is a circuit split as to whether individuals regarded as having a disability
are entitled to accommodations. The Fifth Circuit in Newberry v. East Texas State University and
the Sixth Circuit in Workman v. Frito-Lay held that employees who are “regarded as” having a
disability are not entitled to reasonable accommodations. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in
D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods held that “regarded as” plaintiffs are entitled to an individualized
inquiry into whether they need an accommodation under the ADA.
Front Pay. Front pay is money awarded for the loss of employment after the date of judgment
until the date of reinstatement. This victim-specific judicial relief provides compensation for
future lost wages and benefits. While job reinstatement is preferred, front pay can be awarded
even when reinstatement is not feasible. In those instances, the court awards an amount sufficient
to make the plaintiff whole.
LINKS:
Fourth Circuit Opinion: http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/061818.P.pdf
Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F. 3d 460 (6th Cir. 1999): http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgibin/getcase.pl?court=6th&navby=case&no=990017p
Prepared by the legal research staff of the Burton Blatt Institute (BBI): Centers of Innovation on Disability
at Syracuse University (http://bbi.syr.edu/) for the DBTAC: Southeast ADA Center (Southeast DBTAC)
(http://www.sedbtac.org/). This document does not provide legal advice. If you have further questions
about the issues of this case that relate to you, please consult an attorney licensed in your state.
Newberry v. East Texas State University, 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998):
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=6th&navby=case&no=990017p
D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005):
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200410629.pdf
Prepared by the legal research staff of the Burton Blatt Institute (BBI): Centers of Innovation on Disability
at Syracuse University (http://bbi.syr.edu/) for the DBTAC: Southeast ADA Center (Southeast DBTAC)
(http://www.sedbtac.org/). This document does not provide legal advice. If you have further questions
about the issues of this case that relate to you, please consult an attorney licensed in your state.