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The case of Pram (p) v. Martini (d) addresses the assignment of property rights and
incompatible land uses. The plaintiff seeks a temporary injunction to restrain and enjoin
construction of the defendant’s home pending an adjustment in its grade and distance to the
property line to protect the plaintiff’s entitlement to “unrestricted use of the sun and its solar
panels.” Fundamentally, our final decision came down to deciding between the public and
private benefit. A decision in the plaintiff’s favor would promote the use of alternative energy
sources, such as solar panels, which could yield positive effects on the environment in the long
run. Ruling to the defendant’s benefit would make it more difficult for the public to utilize
alternative energy which could contribute to additional environmental problems in the future.
However, despite the implications of such a decision, we, the panel of judges, have decided to
rule in favor of the defendant due to the weak claim that the defendant is causing a nuisance,
previous precedence set, and the lack of preemptive measures taken by the plaintiff to ensure that
his solar panels would have unimpeded access to sunlight.
In this case, the complaints on behalf of the plaintiff deem the defendant’s actions a
nuisance. This is an application of the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own so
as not to injure another),
which was translated in Reaver v. Martin Theatres, Fla. to being that “a
property owner may put his own property to any reasonable and lawful use, so long as he does
not thereby deprive the adjoining landowner of any right of enjoyment of his property which is
recognized and protected by law, and so long as his use is not such a one as the law will
pronounce a nuisance.”1
Before further analysis of the nature of the nuisance is performed, it is important to draw
a distinction between a private and a public nuisance. A public nuisance is “one affecting the
rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public,” 2 while a private nuisance is “a nontrespassory
invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”3 By the aforementioned
1
Reaver v. Martin Theatres, Fla.
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.
3
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/prop/prop29.htm
2
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definitions, Martini is mainly causing a private nuisance, since the shadow cast on his property
prohibits only him from enjoying his alternative energy source. This is in contrast to previous
cases of public nuisance, such as Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., where a
cattle feedlot was accused of hampering sales of homes in a nearby populous residential area.4
While the defendant is indeed invading the plaintiff’s “private use and enjoyment of
land,” several other key factors make this claim a frivolous one. The nature and behavior of light
makes it difficult to operate under first possession: an approach that would be in the plaintiff’s
favor. Light is a natural resource that is extremely difficult to assign initial rights to, which is
why it is logical to view this as a case of tied ownership. In a similar vein, the plaintiff is
claiming rights to light, which is an English common law known as “ancient lights:” a law that
has been “rightfully”5 rejected and “unanimously repudiated” in the United States.6 Changing
this universal rule will not only go against set precedent but encourage similar cases in the future.
Precedent set by a previous case helps support the judges’ claim of the frivolous nature of
the alleged nuisance. In Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., the
Fontainebleau Hotel is being constructed twenty feet from its property line: a location that casts a
shadow upon the neighboring hotel, the Eden Roc, and its beaches during a substantial portion of
the day. It was stated that “no American decision has been cited…in which…a landowner has a
legal right to the free flow of light and air across the adjoining land of his neighbor.”7 The ruling
was ultimately in favor of the defendant, which exemplifies the frivolousness of claiming rights
to light and air. This case is analogous to that of Pram v. Martini, and provides a compelling
argument to rule in favor of the defendant.
The judges also believe that the plaintiff demonstrated poor planning for the use of solar
panels in the lot. He chose not to build his house in the middle of his lot: a choice that indicates
a considerable lack of foresight. If the plaintiff greatly valued his solar panels and chose to use
4
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.
Posner, 53
6
Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc.
7
Hotel Corporation v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc.
5
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an alternative energy source with distinct limitations and risks, then he should have demonstrated
good prescience in placing the solar panels in such a way that would ensure unimpeded access to
natural sunlight. We believe this demonstrates a level of negligence on the plaintiff’s part that is
difficult to overlook. Therefore, we feel our decision encourages favorable urban and residential
planning when it comes to the use of alternative energy resources, such as solar panels.
Further analysis of our decision requires the application of the Coase Theorem. The
Coase Theorem, which states that “if the transactions are costless, the initial assignment of
property rights will not affect the ultimate use of the property,”8 speaks both to the reasons for
and future implications of our decision.
While the judges recognize and value the use of alternative energy, ruling in favor of the
plaintiff, and therefore environmentally-friendly energy sources, would set a significant
precedent for future cases focused on the ownership of light and air which would, in turn,
generate significant transaction costs. First, the probable increase in implementation of solar
panels that would result would necessitate more ordinances and controls on public and private
property to make sure they work effectively. The costs associated with enacting and enforcing
these controls will be significant. Also, the public would incur further judicial and legislation
costs of making sure that people have right to light, which will go against the previously rejected
English common law of “ancient lights.” Second, one must consider other future litigation costs
spurred by a decision in the plaintiff’s favor. For example, a case in which a growing tree begins
to cast a shadow on a valued part of a neighbor’s property could lead to a case with considerable
transaction costs, such as hiring lawyers and drafting paperwork.
However, despite our ruling, we are not unaware of the negative implications of our
decision. The costs of ruling in favor of the defendant contain both private and public
components. First, the shadow cast on the plaintiff’s solar panels will preclude him from using
them in the future and thus resort to moving his property or using more electricity the
8
Posner, 7
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conventional way. The plaintiff is deprived of his private benefit of enjoying his less costly and
more efficient way of generating electricity, and is therefore forced to pay more for the heat and
hot water he enjoyed before. More significantly on a public scale, our decision puts limitations
on the ability for society to seek alternative energy resources. Denying the plaintiff’s right to
“unrestricted use of the sun and its solar power” may discourage the public to invest in solar
panels with the fear that they might be rendered ineffective. This makes it more difficult for
people to pursue alternative means of generating electricity, which can lead to increased power
consumption and rises in pollution.
The intuition in making a decision in the case of a nuisance involves “comparing the cost
to the polluter of abating the pollution with the lower of the cost to the victim if either tolerating
the pollution or eliminating it himself.”9 In this case, the “pollution” is the shadow that causes
the damage to the plaintiff. It is a question, not of who values the sunlight more, but who values
the area above the solar panels more: a question that has no easily discernable answer. The
construction done to the defendant’s house and the investment in solar panels by the plaintiff are
both sunk costs and should not be factored into any judicial decision.
The case between the defendant and the plaintiff is one of a bilateral monopoly: a
situation that has both a sole provider and a sole supplier of a good.10 Bilateral monopolies
generate large social waste from bargaining costs in an effort to arrive at an agreement. Even
though cases with high transactions costs usually coincide with a large number of parties, the
current case does have high transaction costs ranging from the direct ones to the plaintiff as well
as the more indirect ones to the environment. According to Posner in Economic Analysis of Law,
when transaction costs are low, injunctive relief is best; when they are high, awarding damages is
the best remedy.11
9
Posner, 63
http://www.economyprofessor.com/economictheories/bilateral-monopoly.php
11
Posner, 69
10
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In lieu of an injunction, the panel of judges proposes an alternative remedy for the
plaintiff’s situation to help alleviate the transaction costs of our decision. Due to these high
transaction costs associated with abating the “pollution” brought on by the defendant, we
propose that the defendant pay damages to the plaintiff in a specific amount, partially or fully,
required to move his solar panels to an area that would ensure unrestricted access to sunlight. It
is also important to note that the defendant changed the grade of his home after receiving
approval from the Architectural Control Committee and continued to construct his home illegally.
Even though the plaintiff objected to the grade of his home before the change, this provides the
panel with motivation to penalize the defendant, since he continued to build without prior
approval. The panel realizes that this is not a perfect solution, since it would still reduce the
incentive for the public to use alternative energy resources. Additionally, as stated in Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., our decision supports the claim that,” you may continue to do harm to your
neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it.”12 However, it does balance rights and equities,
making both parties better off than they would be otherwise without any foreseeable decrease in
the relative value of their respective properties.
Our decision in favor of the defendant was based on the preceding assertions of a weak
claim of a nuisance, the precedents set by previous cases, and a demonstrable lack of foresight in
planning that is construed as negligence. While we are also aware of the negative implications
of our decision on the environment, we hope that our ruling, in conjunction with our suggested
alternative remedy, encourages not only the use of alternative energy, but good foresight and
planning when it is chosen as significant generator of power in both private and public arenas to
avoid additional cases of incompatible land uses.
12
Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co.
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Works Cited
1. Reaver v. Martin Theatres, Fla.1951, 52 So.2d 682, 683, 25 A.L.R.2d 1451
2. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 1972 Ariz. LEXIS 274; 4ERC
(BNA) 1052; 52 A.L.R. 3d 861; 2ELR 20390
3. LexisNexis. “Property VII: Owners and Neighbors”, Chapter 29. 24 Sept 2007.
< http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/prop/prop29.htm>
4. Posner, Richard A. Economic Analysis of Law. Aspen Publishers. New York, NY,
2007. pp. 7, 53, 63, 69.
5. Economy Professor.com. “Bilateral Monopoly.” 24 Sept 2007.
< http://www.economyprofessor.com/economictheories/bilateral-monopoly.php>
6. Oscar H. Boomer et al., Appellants, v. Atlantic Cement Company, Inc., Respondent, et
al. 1970 N.Y. LEXIS 1478; 1 ERC (BNA) 1175; 40 A.L.R. 3d 590.