TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction. ........................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1.Sources. .............................................................................................................. 6
1) Sources about the battle. ............................................................................................. 6
3) The “Historia” of Nicetas Choniates. ....................................................................... 10
4) The Letter of Manuel Komnenos to Henry II Plantagenet. ...................................... 12
5) The only source of the “other side”.The Chronicle of Michael the Great ................ 14
6) The sources: Summary. ............................................................................................ 18
Chapter 2. The Battle ........................................................................................................ 19
1) Historical background............................................................................................... 19
2) Objectives, preparations, and the battle-plan............................................................ 22
a. The Byzantines ...................................................................................................... 22
b. The Seljuks............................................................................................................ 31
3) The Battle ................................................................................................................. 36
a. The Byzantines ...................................................................................................... 36
b) The Seljuks ........................................................................................................... 43
4) After the fight. .......................................................................................................... 45
a. The Negotiations. .................................................................................................. 45
b. Concluding the peace ............................................................................................ 47
c. Conditions and Results of the Peace. .................................................................... 49
5) Relations in the wake of the battle and the propaganda war. ................................... 51
a. The Byzantines: A long way home ....................................................................... 51
b. The Seljuks: All the sultan’s men ........................................................................ 53
6) Summary................................................................................................................... 55
Chapter 3. Representation and Images.............................................................................. 56
1) Introduction to the question ...................................................................................... 56
2) The Byzantines ......................................................................................................... 57
a. The case of John Kinnamos .................................................................................. 57
b. The Letter of Manuel Komnenos .......................................................................... 60
c. The case of Nicetas Choniates .............................................................................. 62
3) The case of Michael the Syrian ................................................................................ 74
4) Enemies at Myriokephalon: Representations and images ...................................... 79
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 81
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 85
Appendix 1. Maps ............................................................................................................. 92
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the Department of Medieval Studies at the Central European
University for a research grant to Vienna. I would also like to thank Cristian Nicolae
Gaspar, instructor at the department, who helped me a lot at all the stages of my work on
the thesis. Last but not the least, the person I would like to acknowledge here is my
external supervisor Dr. Rustam Shukurov who suggested me the very idea of coming to
the CEU.
ii
List of illustrations:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The beginning of the battle at Myriokephalon…………………….39
The apex of the battle at Myriokephalon…………………………..40
The end of the battle ………………………………………………41
The position of the Byzantine Empire in Eastern Mediterranean….90
The way to Myriokephalon………………………………………...91
The probable place of the battle at Myriokephalon………………..92
iii
Abbreviations:
BZ =Byzantinische Zeitschrift
DOP = Dumbarton Oaks Papers
MGH SS = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Seria Scriptores (in Folio)
REB =Revue des études byzantines
RHC = Recueil des historiens des croisades
VV = Vizantiyskiy vremennik
iv
Introduction.
On the 17th of August, 1176, a long defile east of Ikonion was awakened by the sounds
of thousands horse hooves, which raised a cloud of dust on the old Roman road. A long
column of armor-clad warriors under the banners of the Byzantine Empire began to enter
the narrow pass from the west. To them it seemed empty, but it was not – on the slopes of
the meadows and up on the heights thousands of men from the army of Kilic Arslan II
prepared their famous bows and were awaiting the signal of the commander to shoot at
the heads of the enemy. This was the beginning of the battle which is considered to be
one of the most fascinating events of the whole Byzantino-Seljuk military conflict -- a
conflict which began one century before at the battle of Mantzikert (1071) and finished
thirty years later with the fall of Constantinople (1204). This was the beginning of the
battle “of the thousand heads” – the battle at Myriokephalon.
****
This battle is probably one of the best known and most studied events in the whole
conflict, for many reasons. The main reason is that this event is described in many
sources and in some of them – in great detail. Another important reason is that the person
who wrote the most about Myriokephalon was none other than Nicetas Choniates, the
famous Byzantine historian. European scholars of the era of positivism were fascinated
by the “objective” description by this talented bureaucrat and gave credit to him up to the
last word. The other sources – the narrative of Michael the Syrian, the Gesta of William
1
of Tyre – were also used for the reconstruction of the battle, but the account of Choniates
was considered the primary guide.1
The situation began to change when Alexander Vasilyev widened the circle of
possible sources and established the exact date of the battle.2 The works of Claude Cahen
and Speros Vryonis created a good base for further studying the topic.3 The next step was
taken in 1976, when Ralph-Johannes Lilie published his article in which he carefully
discussed consequences of the battle of Myriokephalon.4 The following years saw the
beginning of a discussion between N. Mersich and M.F. Hendy about the actual place of
the battle.5 Later on Paul Magdalino and Ralph-Johannes Lilie created important pieces,
which changed very much the viewpoint on the reign of Manuel Komnenos in general
and on his relations with the Crusaders States in particular. Both works were
revolutionary in a way, because they clearly presented Myriokephalon as a failed
Crusade.6
At the same time an important contribution to the development of the studies on
the topic was made by A. Kazhdan, who introduced a new approach towards the
F. Chalandon, Les Comnène. Etudes sur l’empire Byzantin au XI e et au XIIe siècles, vol. 2 , Jean II
Comnène (1118-1143) et Manuel I Comnène (1143-1180), Paris: Picard,1912), 504-514 ( hereafter;
Chalandon, Les Comnène).
2
. See A. Vasilyev, “Das Genaue Datum der Sclacht von Myriokephalon (1176), ” BZ 27 (1927): 288-290
(hereafter: Vasilyev, “Das Genaue Datum;” A.Vasilyev, “Manuel Comnenus and Henry Plantagenet,” BZ
28 (1929-1930): 233-244 (hereafter: Vasilyev, “Manuel Comnenus”).
3
C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A Ggeneral Ssurvey of the Mmaterial and Sspiritual Cculture and
Hhistory c. 1071-1330, tr. J. Jones-Williams, (New York: Taplinger, 1968) (hereafter: C. Cahen, PreOttoman Turkey); S. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of
iIslamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth century,(Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1971) (hereafter: Vryonis, The Decline).
4
R.-J. Lilie, “Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176): Auswirkungen auf das byzantinische Reich im
ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert,“ REB, 35 (1977): 257-75 (hereafter: Lilie, “Die Schlacht”).
5
See N. Mersich“Tzibritze. Zum Austragungsort der Schlacht von Myriokephalon,” in Byzantios.
Festschrift für Herbert Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. W. Hörander, J. Koder, O. Kresten, and E. Trapp,
(Vienna: Ernst Becvar, 1970) : 241-247; Michael F. Hendy, Studies in Byzantine Monetary Economy,
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 146-157. (Hereafter: Hendy, Studies.)
2
1
Byzantine historical writing of the twelfth century.7 Another Russian Byzantinist, J.
Lyubarskij on the basis of this approach argued that some parts of Nicetas description of
the battle of Myriokephalon are not to be believed.8 The article was published just before
Ljubarskij’s death so, unfortunately, he did not have enough time to formulate his
argument more precisely.
In this work I will be something of a dwarf on the shoulders of a giant. My
primary idea is to reconstruct the battle from both sides, paying close attention to the
details which have not been thoroughly studied yet. Such are the plans and aims of the
Seljuks and the Byzantines before the battle, their behavior during the event, and the
negotiations after it. My second idea is, in a way, a borrowing from Lyubarskij, who used
new approaches and new topics in his study of traditional sources. For my part I will
study “images and representations” in the narratives devoted to the battlefield. By the
word “image” I understand the depiction of the enemy as offered by different authors and
sources. Conversely, the term “representation ” implies something more specific. It refers
to the language of symbols and metaphors, which allows the author to assign extra
connotations to the text. It is one thing when one writes “he was a mean person” and
totally different when he/she writes “he was a mean person He bertrayed his teacher in
the same way as Judas ”. The former is just a description, while the latter seems to me as
a kind of representation. . For me, the main criterion to make the distinction between the
two is simplicity and elaboration: if a description is simply a description and obviously
do not imply any further connotations – it is an image rather than a representation.
6
See. P. Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180), (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993) (hereafter: Magdalino, The Empire); R.-J. Lilie, Byzantium and Crusader States, tr. .C. Morris
J. C and J.E. Ridings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) (hereafter: Lilie, Byzantium).
7
See [A. Kazhdan] А.Каждан. Никита Хониат и его время (Nicetas Choniates and his time) (Saint
Petersburg: Dimitriy Bulanin, 2005) (hereafter: Kazhdan, Nicetas Choniates).
3
This topic is interesting because for the battle at Myriokephalon there is one piece
of evidence from a contemporary who seems to have received the information about it
from Seljuk side. His work may have saved some elements of the Seljuk image or even
representation of the enemy .
The methodology here, as always, depends on the research question and the
character of the available sources. The latter will be analyzed in chapter 1, which, will be
rather traditional in a methodological sense. The second chapter will be based on a
comparison of the data from different authors and sources. The third chapter will be the
most interdisciplinary among them all, because it will address the images/representations
of the enemy” and thus deal partly with “the image of the Other.”9 The methodology here
is to search for the different epithets and metaphors by which the representation of the
enemy was created and to find out the connections between them. At the end of this part I
will make a short summary of the “image of the enemy” in Byzantine sources and
compare it with the one built into the only narrative of “the other side,” namely that of
Michael the Syrian.
I hope that this study will add a small but valuable quantity of knowledge that will
enrich the military history of Byzantium and the history of the “the Other” in Byzantine
literature at the same time. This apparent duality is a danger; in Russian one says:
“Whoever follows two hares at the same time will lose both.” But here this is not the case
– the image of the enemy cannot be reconstructed without a reconstruction of the battle
and the battle cannot be reconstructed without an elementary knowledge of the image of
J. Ljubarskij, “Мануил I глазами Киннама и Хониата.” (Manuel I as viewed by Kinnamos and
Choniates), VV 64(2005): 99-110 (hereafter: Ljubarskij, “Manuel I”).
9
The latter is understood here as a special methodological approach applicable in many social sciences,
but primarily in history and social anthropology. A good example of the introduction of the concept to
history is given by Francois Hartog. See F. Hartog , in The Mmirror of Herodotus: The Representation of
4
8
the enemy from both sides. Speaking in the terms of this proverb, here one hare will be
caught. The hunting has just started.
the Other in the Writing of History, tr. J. Lloyd (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)
(hereafter: F. Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus).
5
Chapter 1.Sources.
1) Sources about the battle.
The number of sources which a scholar can use in the reconstruction of the events of the
battle of Myriokephalon is relatively large. Direct references to this historical event are
present in different narratives, which originate from different areas of medieval world.
The largest group of sources is that represented by Latin contemporaries of the event. Of
these, one of the depictions of the battle originates from Sicily (the Annales Romoaldi),10
three from Germany (Annales Stadenses,11 the Chronicle of Robert de Monte,12 and the
Letter of Frederick Barbarossa to Manuel Komnenos13) and three from England.14 The
second group of sources is that of Byzantine origin. The detailed depiction of the battle is
present in the widely known and no less widely used History of Nicetas Choniates.15
Some references to the event can be found in the historical work of John Kinnamos;16
finally, a brief, yet important mention of the battle is present in the contemporary
10
Romoald of Salerno, Annales Romoaldi, ed. W. Arndt, in MGH SS Scriptores, vol. 19, ed. W. Arndt
(Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani, 1866), 387-461 (hereafter: Romoald of Salerno, Annales
Romoaldi).
11
.M. Albert, Annales Stadenses, in MGH SS Scriptores, vol. 16, ed. I. Lappenberg (Hannover: Impensis
Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani, 1858), 442 .
12
Robert de Mont (of Torigny), Cronica , ed. D. L. C. Bethmann, in MGH SS Scriptores, vol. 6, ed. D. L.
C. Bethmann (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani, 1844), 527.
13
Otto Kresten, “Der ‘Anredestreit’ zwischen Manuel I Komnenos und Friedrich I. Barbarossa nach der
Schlacht von Myriokephalon,” Römische Historische Mitteilungen 34-35 (1992-1993): 107-110.
14
The most important of these is the evidence of Roger of Howeden, see Epistola Manuelis
Constantinopolitani imperatoris in Roger of his Howeden, Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs, vol. 2 (London:
Longman, 1868), 102-104, translation A. Vasilyev, “Manuel Comnenus and Henry Plantagenet,” BZ 29
(1929-1930): 237-244 . The same text was reworked in the work of Benedict of Petersborough. Benedict of
Pitersborough,in Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, ed. W. Stubbs, vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1867), 128-30.
Vasilyev states that the information about Myriokephalon is also present in the work of Radulf of Diceto,
see Vasilyev, “Manuel I Comnenus,” 237 .
15
Nicetas Choniates, Historia, ed. I. A. Van Dieten (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 178 (hereafter: Choniates,
Historia); ibid., tr. H. J. Magoulias, O City of Byzantium. Annales of Nicetas Choniates (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1984) (henceforth: Magoulias).
16
Joannes Cinnamus, Epitoma rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis Gestarum, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn:
Impensis ed. Weberi, 1836) (Henceforthward Kinnamos, Epitoma); ibid, trans. C. M. Brand, Deeds of John
and Manuel Komnenus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976) (hereafter: Kinnamos, The Deeds).
6
chronicle of Pseudo-Codinus.17 The next two groups comprise two sources each: the first,
of Syriac origin, includes the mention of the battle in the Chronicle of Michael the
Syrian,18 and in the bulky historical compilation of Bar Hebraeus19. The second, of
Armenian origin, consist of description of the event in the work of Smbat Sparapet 20 and
a short remark in the “Chronological table” of Hetoum. 21 The last but not the least
important source is the monumental work of William, bishop of Tyre, who incorporated
in his work a narrative about the battle, presenting it from the Crusaders’ point of view. 22
This list is, of course not complete: as far as I know, there are at least three more
sources,23 which probably can add some information about the battle to the common
knowledge, although probably not much.
Thus, for the solution of the first research question – reconstruction of the battle itself--I
will use these sources. The second research question is much more problematic. In the
following pages I will examine the lengthiest sources and determine which of them are
suitable for the research on the images and representations of the enemy of Byzantines
“The chronicle of Pseudo-Kodine,” in Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, vol. 1, ed. P. Schreiner
(Vienna: Verlag der Österreichen Akademie der Wissenchaften, 1975), 121-155.
18
Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle, tr. J. P. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5 (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1905), 370-372
(hereafter: Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle, ed. Chabot,).
19
Bar Hebraeus, The Chronicle of Gregory Abû'l Faraj, 1225–1286, the Son of Aaron, the Hebrew
Physcian, Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus; Being the First Part of His Political History of the World,
Translated from Syriac, tr. A. Wallis-Budge (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), 306.
20
Smbat Sparapet, Chronique du royaume de la Petite Arménie avec la continuation par un anonyme, in
RHC, Documents arméniens 1, ed. E. Delaurier (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1869), 626. I am aware of the
existence of a modern translation of the same work by Jean Dedeyan, see La Chronique attribuée au
connétable Smbat, tr. J. Dedeyan, (Dijon: Imprimerie Darantière, 1980).
21
Hetoum, Count of Gor’igos, Tables Chronologiques, in RHC, Documents arméniens 1, ed. E. Delaurier
(Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1869), 477.
22
William of Tyre, Willemi Tyrensis Archiepiscopi Chronicon, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, 21.11, (Turnholt:
Brepols, 1986), lines 1-21(hereafter William of Tyre, Chronicon). I am aware of the English translation,
but unfortunately I do not have it at my disposal. See William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done Beyond
the Sea, tr. E. A. Babcock and A.C. Krey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).
23
The retelling of the Byzantine report of the battle is present in the art of the Liber Pontificalis decicated
to the Alexander III. Another source, which I still did not reach , is mentioned in the main book of Vryonis.
The battle is also mentioned in the Life of St. Neophyte the Recluse, see L. Duchesne, Le liber pontificalis.
Texte Introduction et commentaire (Paris : 1981), 435-436 quoted in Kresten “Anredestreit,” 79, footnote
58; Histoire des Seldoukides des Asie Mineure par un anonyme, Turkish tr. F. N. Uzluk (Ankara, 1925)
7
17
and Seljuks/ in both Byzantine and apparently Seljuk-influenced sources. From the very
beginning I will exclude the largest group--i.e., reports of Western Chroniclers--partly
because they clearly represent images of the battle constructed by their authors, who were
neither Byzantines nor Seljuks, and partly because the information contained in them
offers very little relevant material for studying the process that I propose to call the
construction of the enemy. The same is true for the Armenian sources, which represent
the special position of this ethnic group at the time. Thus, my attention will be focused on
the Byzantine sources and on other sources, which, for historical reasons, can be
interpreted as representing the Seljuk perspective, namely, the Syrian Chronicle of
Michael the Great, patriarch of the Orthodox Syrian Church (1166-1199). 2) The Deeds
of John and Manuel Komnenos by John Kinnamos. John Kinnamos (b. before 1143-d.
after 1185) spent most of his life in the corps of imperial secretaries, and, as a member of
this body of the court, personally knew at least two Byzantine emperors–Manuel and
Andronicus. Despite this fact, he did not receive a high rank during his lifetime. His main
work, The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus , was probably written during the short
reign of Alexios II and Maria-Xena (1183-1185). It narrates events from the death of
Alexios I (1118) until Manuel’s campaign against the Turks in 1176. The end of the
whole story is missing, although its existence can be inferred from references in several
places in the surviving part of the book.
The main sources of Kinnamos were probably, as Brand notes, oral
communications and his own observations.24 The text of the Deeds is embroidered with
Thucydidian letters which were probably invented by the author himself. In general, the
quoted in Vryonis, Decline, 125, footnote 234 ; C. Galatariotou, The Making of a Saint: The Life, Times
and Sanctification of Neophytos the Recluse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214-215.
8
influence of classics is clearly noticeable in the text. Besides Thucydides, Kinnamos used
Procopius as a model for the “military narrative.” It is important to note, however, that
his usage of the classics is not as elaborate and artistic as in the work of the writers of the
previous and next generations, namely, Anna Komnene and Choniates. This makes it
easier to understand, but only when there is something to be understood. It all depends on
the information which the author had received. The treatment of different events varies;
in some cases they are described in colorful detail, while in other cases the author
produces only a brief summary of the events. 25 The main interest of the author, as shown
in the title, were the emperors, whose deeds are described in a panegyric way.26 In some
cases Kinnamos was not afraid of making an excursus. He tells the reader about
ceremonies, intrigues, plots and even landscapes, yet battles and the heroic conduct of the
rulers still occupy a large place in his work.27
Unfortunately, the only extant manuscript breaks off exactly at the point where the battle
at Myriokephalon should be narrated. Nevertheless this is not a reason to reject Kinnamos
as a source for my work. In the middle of his book he gives two summaries of his
understanding of the battle, which, even though short, provide relevant material for
studying the image/representation of the enemy in the work of this Komnenian author.
It is important to note the commentary of Brand about the description of Manuel’s march against Ikonion
He states that possibly Kinnamos did not participate in expedition himself, but used written or oral
evidence from one of the participants, see Kinnamos, The Deeds, 6.
25
An interesting discussion about Kinnamos’ treatment of some events can be found in two articles of
Ljubarskij and Kazhdan. See [A.P. Kazhdan] А.П. Каждан, “Еще раз о Киннаме и Хониате” (Once again
about Kinnamos and Choniates) in Kazhdan, Nicetas Choniates,: 327-357; [J.Ljubarskij] Я.Любарский
“И вновь о Хониате и Киннаме” (Again about Kinnamos and Choniates) in Античная древность и
средние века (Antiquity and the Middle Ages), 33 (1992) : 124-127.
26
About the image of the emperors see [J. Ljubarskij], Я. Любарский “Мануил I Комнин глазами
Киннама и Хониата,” VV, 64 (2005) 99-110 .
27
Morávcsik was probably the only one, who believed the “total truth” of the military descriptions of this
author, see Gy. Morávcsik, Byzantinoturcica. Die Byzantinische Quellen der Geschichte der Turkvolker
(Budapest: Kir. M. Pazmany Peter Tudomanyegyetemi Gorog Filologiag Intezeti, 1942), vol. 1, 181.
(Henceforth: Morávcsik, Byzantinoturcica)
9
24
2) The “Historia” of Nicetas Choniates.
The future writer, bureaucrat, and dogmatist was born in the city of Chonae
around 1155. He received his education in Constantinople, a very good one, as his later
life and work would show.28 Choniates started his service probably around 1182 as a
minor tax collector. Later, Nicetas was able to enter the corps of imperial secretaries,
where he served during the reign of Alexios II (1180-1182). His real rise to power began
in 1191, when he was promoted to judge of the velum. The highest point in Choniates’
career was reached in 1195, when he became the grand logothete--the highest civil office
in the state. All came to an end, though, with the fall of Constantinople (13 April 1204),
when Nicetas, after taking refuge in the house of a Venetian friend, had to flee with his
wife (sister of his schoolmate Belissariotes) and children to Nicaea. There his family
lived in sad conditions. Finally in 1217, the former head of imperial bureaucracy died,
leaving to the coming generations a small corpus of letters, several orations, one
dogmatic treatise, and his main historical work which is known under the name Historia29
This bulky historical narrative is divided into nineteen large books. It covers the
period from the death of Alexios Komnenos in 1118 to the expedition of the Latin
emperor of Constantinople against the Bulgars in 1206.30 The first book is dedicated to
the reign of John I Komnenos and based on written sources, probably the same as
28
The biography of Choniates is reconstructed on the basis of three works on the topic, see [F.I. Uspenskij]
Ф.И. Успенский, Византийский писатель Никита Акоминат из Хон (Byzantine writer Nicetas
Acominatus from Chonae) (Saint-Petersburg: S. Balashov Printing House, 1874) (hereafter: Uspenskiy,
“Byzantine writer Nicetas Acominatus”); [A.Kazhdan] А. Каждан, “Никита Хониат в византийской
литературе” (Nicetas Choniates in Byzantine literature) in [A. Kazhdan] А.Каждан, Никита Хониат и
его время (Nicetas Choniates and his time) (Saint Petersburg: Dimitriy Bulanin, 2005), 284-288,
(hereafter: [A.Kazhdan], “Никита Хониат в византийской литературе” (“Nicetas Choniates in Byzantine
literature”), and Magoulias “Preface” in Choniates, O City of Byzantium!, X- XIII.
29
It would be more correct to call it the “Chronicle,” because the author’s title is “Xronikn dihghsis,” A.
Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates in Byzantine literature,” 287. Traditionally, however, it is called Historia.
30
Probably the best short description of the distribution of information in Choniates’ books is given by the
first and the last monograph dedicated to the writer by F. Uspenskiy, “Byzantine writer Nicetas
Acominatus,” 131-135
10
Kinnamos also used.31 In the later books, the author used oral evidence from participants
in the events described, written sources, to which he probably had access as a member of
the court, as well as personal remarks and observations. Some of the pieces of the work
are based on literary evidence.32 The creation of the work took a long time. It was
probably begun in the reign of Emperor Angelos and not finished until after the fall of
Constantinople.
The style of Nicetas is magnificent. His language is elaborated to the highest
possible degree. This is a result of Choniates’ rhetorical, biblical and Classical
education.In his work he interlaces metaphors, epithets, and images from the Byzantine
historians, ancient Greek writers and books of Old Testament. The bulk of the narrative,
which is, in a way, a grand explanation of the fall of Constantinople, is the history of
emperors and all the people around them. Choniates’ attitudes towards the rulers of the
empire have been the subject of long and continuing debates.33 At the same time
Choniates is a rare master of detail–so rare that one can hardly find any similar writer in
all of Middle Byzantine literature. His methods of image-building, which are complex
and varied, will be discussed in the chapter on the construction of images: but in advance,
I will say that Choniates is using bits and pieces of Bible, Aeschylus, and Theophanes the
Confessor taken out of the primary context. He inserted them in the narrative with the
conscious aim of creating new meanings; he plays with them as a child with “Lego”
blocks, expressing his ideas and himself.
31
For a discussion about common sources of Kinnamos and Choniates see above, footnote 26.
The account of the siege and sacking of Thessaloniki was probably written as an artistic retelling of the
work of Eusthathios of Thessalonica, one of Nicetas’ teachers, A. Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates in
Byzantine literature,” 288.
33
See one around Choniates’ “objectivität:” pro: Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der
Byzantiner (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1978), 434; contra: Morávchik, Byzantinoturcica, 272.
11
32
The battle at Myriokephalon occupies nearly all of book six. The author did not
take part in the battle himself, but he incorporated information from real participants in
his literary account.34 Hence, his work can be also used for the research topic investigated
here. More interesting is the fact that Nicetas’ description was partly based on an account
similar to that of next item in the list of the sources.
3) The Letter of Manuel Komnenos to Henry II Plantagenet.35
The battle of Myriokephalon produced a great number of epistolary reports.
Choniates mentions two different types; first Manuel (and his secretaries) sent texts in
which the battle was depicted as a disaster, while later the emperor sent letters in which it
was considered a victory.36 Messages of the latter type were sent to imperial provinces
and foreign lands.37
One such letter seems to have survived in the work of the English chronicler
Roger of Howeden . He inserted in his narrative a text which he states is a letter of the
Emperor of Constantinople concerning the battle of Myriokephalon. All the scholars who
have worked with this document automatically considered it to be the actual Letter of
Manuel, but I think that it is not meaningless to ask a very simple question: Is the text of
The main points of his narrative clearly coincide with those of the “Letter of Manuel.” Moreover,
Choniates himself mentions letters with information about the battle: “Messengers were sent on ahead by
the emperor to relate the events that had taken place to Constantinopolitans describing the emperor as the
one who had suffered the same fate as Romanos Diogenes…” Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten; ibid.,
Manuel 6, 191, lines 23-30, (tr. Magoulias), 108
35
See above, footnote 16.
36
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van. Dieten, Manuel 6,191 lines 23-30 (Magoulias, 108).
37
One was probably received by St. Neophyte the Recluse, who mentioned the battle several times in his
still unpublished writings; see C. Galatariotou, The Making of a Saint: The Life, Times and Sanctification
of Neophytos the Recluse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214-215. Another letter of the
same type was sent to Frederick Barbarossa, and another one to the pope. For the first, see Albert M.,
Annales Stadenses s.a. 1179, MGH SS Scriptores, vol.16, ed. G.H. Pertz (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii
Avlici Hahniani, 1858, 349).
12
34
Roger of Howeden really the Letter of Manuel and, if so, to what extent was the original
imperial letter been re-worked by the chronicler?
As far as the format is concerned, this letter is a typical Auslandbriefe. The
standard of such texts remained mostly the same for a very long time; they began with the
full title of the Byzantine emperor and the title of the receiver (Anrede), continued with
the essence of the letter (Narratio) and finished with the purpose of the letter
(Dispositio).38 In the end there was often a date, which could be formulated in various
chronological systems. The letter itself, as one can easily guess, did not come straight
from the pen of the emperor himself, but was probably composed by his scribes and
translators, who had special offices in the court.39 The first language of such a letter was
always Greek and a “vernacular” variant accompanied it – that is probably Roger of
Hoveden’s source.40 The letter itself was written on papyrus with golden/silver/purple
inks and authenticated by a seal, which could be also made of different
materials.41Unfortunately, Roger of Hoveden does not provide information about the
material or the seal on the Letter of Manuel, but all the other elements are present; the
datum points to November 1176. The content of the text preserved in the book of Roger
points to the events at Myriokephalon; thus, on the basis of the form and content, I
believe that one can accept the Letter of Manuel as preserved in the Chronica as, quite
likely, the letter of the emperor in Constantinople, or, more precisely, its Latin version.
38
The structure and technology of the creation of the Auslandsbriefe are described according to F. Dölger,
J. Karayannopulos, Byzantinische Urkundenlehre (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1968), 90-93 (hereafter:
.Dölger and Karayannopulos, Byzantinische Urkundenlehre).
40
In 938 Caliph Al-Radi received a letter from the emperor which was written first in Greek, in golden
lettering, and later translated into Arabic in silver lettering, see ibid.
41
Another letter sent by Manuel to Friedrich Barbarossa after the battle was for sure written within golden
letters as well as other similar documents from the twelfth century. This question is carefully discussed in
O. Kresten “Der “Anredestreit“ zwischen Manuel I Komnenos und Friedrich I. Barbarossa nach der
13
According to Vasilyev, the Greek original reached England in 1177 carried
by English knights who had participated in the battle on the side of Manuel. The letter
itself survived in full in the chronicle of Roger of Hoveden. The language is a mediocre
medieval Latin, with relatively short and clear sentences. The text is rather free of
allusions and topoi; The pace of the narrative is relatively uniform: the action develops
steadily and consciously, step by step, with equal pauses. The threats to main hero are
real and dangerous, the description of the surrounding is vivid and fascinates the reader.
Against this background Manuel is depicted here as an ideal European knight.
The letter from the emperor to the English king is the letter of a participant in the
event. The fact that Manuel participated in Myriokephalon is supported by all the
sources; the fact that he was the sender of the letter is not disputed by anyone. Thus, the
letter of Manuel Komnenos to Henry Plantagenet can be considered a source suitable for
both the main questions of this thesis.
4) The only source of the “other side”.The Chronicle of Michael
the Great
The main problem of the Seljuk historiography of twelfth century Anatolia is simply an
absence of such historiography. There were some Seljuk writers in the Near East, but
none of them dedicate a word to the Seljuks of Rum.42 As Carolle Hildebrand pointed out
they were interested primarily in Crusades, and even the battle of Manzikert was
considered by one of them as the beginning of djihad of his own days.43 The first official
Schlacht von Myriokephalon,” Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 34/35 (1992/1993): 75-77.
(Henceforthward: Kretsen, Anredestreit.)
42
See C. Cahen. “The historiography of the Seljuqid period” in Historians of the Middle East, ed. B.
Lewis, P. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 59-79; C. Hilldebrand “Some Reflections on
Seljuq Historiography, ” in Eastern Approaches to Byzantium, ed. A. Eastmond (Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd, 2001), 87. (Henceforth: Hilldebrand, “Some Reflections.”)
43
Ibid., 82.
14
chronicler of the Seljukides of Rum, Ibn-Bibi wrote his work nearly a century after the
battle of Myriokephalon.44 The epos of the Anatolian Turcomans, Danishmend-name was
at once considered a reliable source for the twelfth –century, but nowadays is highly
debated.45
The picture seems to be cheerless. But it is not so. There are some sources which,
despite their ambiguity, could preserve some bits and pieces of Seljuk information. The
leading one is the chronicle of Michael the Syrian, who was one of the important persons
in the whole Anatolia at the time of Myriokephalon.
Michael the Syrian (or Michael the Great) was born in 1126 in the city of
Melitene.46 According to the tradition of the Kindazi [Qindasi] family, to which he
belonged, he became a priest, and later a monk, in the monastery of Bar Sauma, which
was situated near his native city. His rise to power was fast; in 1166 Michel was elected
patriarch of the whole Syrian Orthodox Church in eastern Asia Minor, a territory was
contested by Crusaders, Byzantines, and local Seljuk dynasties. He communicated, in
person or by letters, with all the prominent rulers of the time. At the beginning of the
1170s he exchanged several messages with Manuel I Komnenos; Kilic Arslan exempted
all his churches from taxes and visited him personally in Melitene in 1177. Michael the
Syrian ruled his flock for another three years, and died peacefully in 1196 in his beloved
monastery of Bar-Sauma, where he was buried.
44
Ibn Bibi, Die Seltschukengeshichte des Ibn-Bibi, tr. H. Duda, (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1959).
See C. Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of Ottoman State (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995), 66-68.
46
The biography of Michael the Great is reconstructed here according to [R. A. Gusseynov] Р.А.
Гуссейнов, “Михаил Сириец и его хроника” (Michael the Great and his chronicle) in Сирийские
источники XII-XIII в. об Азербайджане (Syrian sources of the twelfth-thirteenth century about
Azerbaijan) (Baku: Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, 1960), available online at http://vostlit.info/
Texts/rus4/Mychel_Syr/framepred1.htm (last accessed: 21.03.2007).
15
45
His main work, the Chronicle, was written during the time of his patriarchate.47 It
tells the reader about the events from the creation of the world to the year of the death of
the author (1196).48 Later, Michael’s brother added a small piece of information, thus
prolonging the time interval encompassed up to 1199. The work is divided into 21 books
and is completed by 6 appendices. The books, in their turn, are divided into chapters,
each of which has three parts, each corresponding with the columns of the source
manuscript: the first is dedicated to church history, the second to secular history, and in
the third the author describes notable and strange events which happened in the time
described.49
The question of Michael the Syrian’s sources is at least partly solved by the
author himself. In the preface he gives a long list of the works which he used for his
Chronicle, and moreover he even indicates the quotations from the other works in the text
itself.50 The narrative describes primarily the history of Asia Minor and the neighboring
Near East.51 When it reaches the eleventh century, the area described becomes narrower;
a great deal of information is clearly centered on the city of Melitene and its surroundings
as well as the city of Antioch. The main object of description are the people in power in
47
About the history of the text itself and the studies dedicated to it, see the excellent article of Dorothea
Weltecke, “The World Chronicle by Patriarch Michael the Great: Some Reflections,” Journal of Assyrian
Studies 11 (1997): 6-39. I am aware of the presence of the modern monograph dedicated to Michael the
Syrian, but unfortunately do not have it at my disposal. See Dorothea Weltecke, Die "Beschreibung der
Zeiten" von Mor Michael dem Grossen (1126-1199): eine Studie zu ihrem historischen und
historiographiegeschichtlichen Kontext (Corpus scriptorum Christianorum orientalium 594; Subsidia 110)
(Louvain: Peeters, 2003) quoted in Biographiche–Bibliographisches Kirchenlehikon, available at
http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/m/michael_syr.shtml (last accessed 24.05.2007).
48
For the genre of the work and its connection with the early Byzantine chroniclers see D. Weltecke, “The
Originality and Function of Formal Structures in the Chronicle of Michael the Great,” in Hugoye: Journal
of Syriac Studies 3.2 (2000), available online at http://syrcom.cua.edu/HugoyeVol3No2/HV3N2Weltecke
.html#S004 (last accessed 24.05.2007).
49
See, for example, Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 18.1, 309-31.
50
See, for example, the quotation from the book of “venerable Dionysios,” Michael the Syrian, Chronicle,
ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 17.13, 301-302.
51
In the modern historiography it was used mostly for the study of factual history. In recent years, the
Chronicle has also been regarded as a potential source for economic history, see, M.G. Morony, “Michael
16
the region: the Danishmend and Iconian rulers, the heads of the Crusader States and,
later, their opponents–Nur-ad-Din Shirkuch and Salah-ed-Din. The most interesting and
important parts for the Byzantinist are probably the careful description of the internal
situation in the Seljuk states of Asia Minor, which can provide a good background for the
study of the Byzantino-Seljuk relations of the twelfth century.
His evidence about Myriokephalon is valuable. During the composition the author
certainly used information from an eyewitness who took part in the events connected
with the battle on the Seljuk side. By comparing of the text of Michael with the
description of Nicetas Choniates one can even speculate at which exact position in the
defile Michael the Syrian’s informer stood. The battle itself is described in very exact
details, so the account is invaluable for the reconstruction of the event itself. Using it as a
source for reconstructing a certain “representation” is, however, problematic. Can one
count Michael the Syrian as a representative of the Seljuk viewpoint?
Not really. The author himself was a patriarch of the Syrian Orthodox Church, an
educated clergyman who, as far as we know was not a Seljuk by birth. Thus, from one
point of view, the representation of the enemy he constructs is not identical, perhaps not
even representative to the one that the Seljuks might have had at the time. Nevertheless,
the dislike this author felt towards Orthodox Byzantium and his sympathy towards the
Seljuks of Ikonion and personally towards Kilic Arslan II can be inferred from the
evidence contained in the latter part of the Chronicle. In addition to this, the description
of the “Seljuk observer” which is clearly present in the text introduces a chance of
finding in it something Seljuk–if, indeed, very little. I think that the above-mentioned
situation of silent multitude allows us to use later Seljuk epos and literature, which can
the Syrian as a Source for Economic History,” Hugoye: Journal of Syriac Studies 3. 2 (2000) available at
http://syrcom.cua.edu/ Hugoye/Vol3No2/HV3N2Morony.html (last accessed 24.05.2007).
17
provide material for useful comparisons. Thus, the message of Michael the Syrian can be
considered as a source for the given topic with the provision that one should distinguish
between the personal viewpoint of Syrian patriarch and some elements of the
representation of Seljuks in it-- if there are any.
5) The sources: Summary.
To sum up, there are nearly twenty sources which can be used as evidence for the
battle itself. The number of the sources where one can trace the construction of the image
of the enemy is much smaller. In the following two chapters I will reconstruct the events
of the battle and then attempt to describe/analyze how the image of the enemy on the
battlefield was reflected in the narrative sources described here.
18
Chapter 2. The Battle
1) Historical background
19
1161 was a year of triumph for Constantinople. For the first time in the history of
the Eastern Empire the sultan of Ikonion came to pay homage to the Byzantine
emperor.52 This event is one of the crucial points in the Byzantino-Seljuk relation in the
twelfth century, which pointed to a change in the relations between the empire and the
state of the Seldjukids of Rum. Now it was an open peace and union: Kilic Arslan II
became one of the “sons” of Byzantine emperor and the recognized suzerain of the
Seljuk part of Asia Minor. The sultan understood this literally and began to widen his
domain, to which he added the principalities of the Danishmendids (1168).53 The latter
tried to defend themselves by forming an alliance with Constantinople and with the
powerful atabeg of Aleppo, Nur-ad-Din, whose land bordered the Sultanate of Ikonion on
the east. The armies of this talented warlord prevented Kilic Arslan II from any serious
actions, but only until 1174. In this year the master of Aleppo died. His followers were
much more interested in seizing power than in the defense of the small principalities of
Paflagonia. This was a chance for Kilic Arslan II, who initiated aggressive actions against
them.54 One of the scions of Danishmend ran to Constantinople.
52
On the peace of 1161 see Magdalino, The Empire, 70; Vryonis, Decline, 123, Chalandon, Les Comnène,
499-500; C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 101. (Henceforthward: Cahen, Pre-ottoman Turkey) ; M. Balivet
“Entre Byzance et Konya: l’intercirculation des idées et des homes au temps des Seldjoukides,” in
Mélanges Byzantines, Seldjoukides et Ottomans (Istanbul: Isis, 2005), 57 (hereafter: Balivet, “Entre
Byzance et Konya”). The father-son relationship between Manuel and Kilic Arslan II is attested by
Choniates (see Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 4, 124, line 20 (tr. Magoulias, 70). A good
account of the usage of symbolic family relations as an instrument of foreign policy can be found in Franz
Dölger, “Die Bulgarenherrscher als geistlicher Son des byzantinische Kaisers,” in Recueil dédié à la
mémoire du prof. Peter Nikov (Sofia: 1940), 224-225 (hereafter: Dölger, “Die Bulgarenherrscher”).
53
Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 102.
54
The situation on the border is one question is still to be described. Vryonis stated that the reign of Manuel
was a period of decline of the defense system and a period of the rise of nomadic pressure. Later on he even
suggested a religious background for the supposed Seljuk domination in Anatolia, namely the gaza theory.
The situation in fact is not that simple; the main sources are more or less silent on the situation on the east
between 1161 and 1173, but this does not mean a “Seljuk advance.” The “twelfth-century gaza theory”
meets an even greater problem in the absence of sources – as far as I know there only one forced
conversion to Islam mentioned by Kinnamos and Choniates. There are even more points of the views in
Vryonis which need to be discussed – I hope to do it at a later date in a separate work, see Vryonis,
Decline, 120-126; S. Vryonis, “Nomadization and Islamization in the Asia Minor,” DOP 29 (1975): 41-71.
20
He came in time: Emperor Manuel was preparing a huge expedition to the east.
The idea of it was present already at the time of Alexios Komnenos. His son John made
an expedition to northern Syria, where he secured Byzantine suzerainty over Antiochia.
Manuel himself visited Antioch and supported good relations with the kings of Jerusalem
. The balance of forces in Palestine was not good for the Crusader States; at the times of
Moslem advance they needed help. The Byzantine emperor was one of the few persons
who could provide the needed support. More than that, he wanted to do it. A successful
expedition would have raised his prestige in the eyes of the Western leaders and thus
helped in the hard geopolitical game which Manuel was waging against Frederick
Barbarossa in Italy. During the conflict he supported friendly relations with Alexander
III, who was (by the very character of his status) an active supporter of the Crusades.
The main problem was that emperor could not simply start a war in the Near East.
First he needed to establish a balance between two centers of Seljuk power – that of the
Danishmendids and that of the Sultanate of Ikonion. Such balances allowed him to play
on the rivalry between them and by this secure the Byzantine provinces of Asia Minor,
which were left without the main imperial forces. In the beginning of the 1170s the
balance was obviously shaken: Kilic Arslan captured most of the lands of the scions of
Danishmend.
This is more or less the historical background; what follows is an attempt to
reconstruct the events of the battle of Myriokephalon. In the research process I will try to
avoid common points; the question of the results of the battle will not be discussed in
great detail. I also dedicate relatively short parts to the military analysis of the event – the
latter deserves a special work, which I hope to write in the near future. I have tried to
avoid references to general books on the history of Byzantium.
21
2) Objectives, preparations, and the battle-plan.
a. The Byzantines
The actual date of the emergence of the project of the 1176 expedition is once
again under debate. The preparation for the main expedition began not earlier than the
spring of 1175, when both the Byzantine55 and the non-Byzantine sources place the
gathering of the army, the intense recruitment of new warriors, the calling of the most
distant allies, such as the Latins of Antiocheia, Hungarians, 56 Serbians and Seljuks,57 the
recruiting of Cumans,58 and the assembling of a huge siege-train in the military camp on
the Asian side of the Bosporus.59 Some scholars have argued that this was clearly an antiSeljuk project, the only aim of which was the occupation of Ikonion. 60 I think, however,
that this is only partly true.
First, all of Byzantine politics of the twelfth century was never aimed at the total
annihilation of the Seljuk states. Komnenian emperors sometimes supported the
Danishmendides
against
Ikonion,
sometime
allied
with
Ikonion
against
the
Danishmendides, and regularly captured strategic points on the border. They were slowly
55
Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 7.3, 299, lines 15-20 (tr. Brand, 224); Nicetas Choniates, Historia, ed.
Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 178, lines 1-8 (tr. Magoulias, 100).
56
See F. Makk, The Arpads and the Comneni. Political Realtions between Hungary and Byzantium in the
12th century (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 113.
57
Their presence in the army was later remarked on by Choniates. For the position of Seljuks in the
Byzantine army and in society in general see M. Brand “The Turkish element in Byzantium, EleventhTwelfth centuries,” DOP 43(1989): 1-25.
58
P. Lamma supposed that the Cumans were Russians. See Nicetas Choniates, Historia, ed. I. A. Van
Dieten, Manuel 6, 178 , lines 1-5 (tr. Magoulias, 100 ); P. Lamma ,Comneni e Staufer.Ricerche sui
rapporti fra Bisanzio e l'Occidente nel sec. XII, vol. 2 (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il
Medioevo,1957), 276. (Henceforth: Lamma, Comneni e Staufer.)
59
Magdalino, Empire, 212; [F.I. Uspenskiy] Ф.И. Успенский, История Византийской Империи
(History of the Byzantine empire), vol.3 [ (Moscow: AN USSR 1948), 279. (Henceforth: Uspenskiy,
History.)
60
See, for example, J. Haldon, The Byzantine Wars (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), 140. (Henceforth: Haldon,
Byzantine Wars).
22
moving into the peninsula – but in reality never seriously tried to annihilate the nomads.
The idea here was probably the same which American forces use in the modern Iraq – it
is easier to deal with two or three rival chieftains, than with one strong leader. Manuel
was an exception; he believed that Kilic Arslan will be a good vassal. As the events
proved, this was a mistake.
Second, none of the contemporary Byzantine sources states that the aim of
Manuel was the taking of Ikonion itself. Rather the opposite; Epistola clearly states that
emperor decided to make war on all the Persians (not only on Ikonion). Kinnamos gives
rather ambiguous information about fear of the sultan, and, at the same time, speaks
about ships which were sent to Egypt.61 In this context, the hypothesis of R.J. Lilie, who
clearly states that the whole expedition was a crusade, is not baseless.62
In my opinion, even stronger support can be found in Kinnamos’ account of the
embassy of a certain eunuch, Thomas,63 who went to the sultan with a mission, but was
not successful.64 I think that this can be interpreted as follows: Manuel tried to ask for a
“safe conduct” for his troops on their way to the Armenian lands and probably further, to
Palestine. The sultan refused him because he was truly afraid that the Byzantine army
would turn against his own land.
Another reason to believe Lilie is the fact that the machines and the army gathered
for the expedition were disproportionately large for a mediocre city with stone walls such
61
See Epistola, ed. W. Stubbs,102, line 20 ( Vasilyev, 237 ); Kinnamos, Epitoma, 7.3,300, lines 15,(Brand, 244).
62
This hypothesis was present already in the work of P. Lammo, but Ralph-Johannes is Lilie is the first
who followed it thoroughly based it. Following him , P. Magdalino openly states that the whole expedition
was a Crusade,see Lamma, Comneni e Staufer, 279; Lilie, Byzantium, 211
63
See Lamma, Comneni e Staufer, 275
64
Lilie, Byzantium, 211.
23
as Ikonion. The very formulation of the letter of Manuel also suggests rather a war
against “all Muslim people of the east” than against the Seljuks of Asia Minor.65
Thus, the initial aim of the whole campaign is not as clear as the pretext for the
war itself. This is well described by Michael the Syrian. According to him, the reasons
for the beginning of the campaign were a raid by Kilic Arslan II, which was caused by
the rumors of Manuel’s death and by an appeal of Dhu l-Nun Danishmendid to Manuel
Komnenos as the recognized supreme sovereign of the Seljuk land. The scion of
Danishmend made an appeal in connection with the domain of his recently deceased
brother, which had fallen into the hands of the master of Ikonion. 66 Another problem
were bordering towns, which were supposed to be handed over to Byzantines, but were
not. An embassy to Kilic Arslan headed by Thomas did not yield any clear result. From
this time (d.p.q. 20 July), the high officers of the imperial army began to make concrete
plans for the war against the Seljuks. The emperor was already on the border; he erected
two fortresses: Dorylaion and Soublaion. Some scholars have interpreted the rebuilding
as part of a general campaign of refortification, while others have interpreted it as it as
part of a larger crusade project which was ended at Myriokephalon. 67 One fact does not
In the given context (a letter from the emperor to a European king) the word “Persians” could be used in
its “Crusading function,” to refer to “all the Muslim peoples of the East,” see [S.Louchityskaya] С.
Лучицкая; Образ Другого. Мусульмане в хрониках крестовых походов (The image of the other.
Muslims in the Chronicles of the Crusades) (Saint Petersburg: Aleteia, 2001), 59 (henceforth:
Louchitskaya, The Iimage of the Other).
66
About the Danismendids in general and their relations with Ikonion and Constantinople see Vryonis, The
Decline, 119,122; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 82-86; N. Oikonomides “Les Danishmendides entre
Byzance, Bagdad et le Sultanat d’ Ikonion,” Revue Numismatique, 6e ser., 25 (1983): 190-205.
67
For the first version see F. Chalandon, Les Comnène, 503-504; P. Wirth “Kaiser Manuel I Komnenos und
die Ostgrenze. Rückeroberung und Wiederaufbau der Festung Dorzlaion,” BZ 55 (1962): 28.
(Hencseforth : Wirth, Manuel); H. Ahrweiler, “Les fortresses construites en Asie Mineure face a l’invasion
Seldjoucide,” Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistkongresses, (Munich: 1960), 182-189; the second
version is represented by no less significant scholars, see Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 103; P. Magdalino,
The Empire, 91-92 (hereafter: Magdalino, Empire). A general survey of the historiography of the rebuilding
of fortresses can be found in A. F. Stone, “Dorylaion revisited.Manuel I Komnenos and the refortification
of Dorylaion and Soublaion in 1175,” Revue des Etudes Byzantines 63 (2003): 183-201
24
65
totally exclude the other, but, for the reasons mentioned above, the version of a Crusade
seems preferable to me.
The sultan tried to play similar politics. The official embassy met Manuel at
Dorylaion, rebuilding the fortress, which he refused to leave. This was answered
immediately: Turcoman tribes of the borderland carried out great devastating raids on
the southern Byzantine provinces, which had been left unguarded.68 From this moment
war became unavoidable: Manuel had to answer the offences by the sultan. The latter
realized his unfavorable position, but the embassy, probably led by the vizier of the
sultan, Hiyas-ed-din Ibn Gabras, which arrived in Constantinople in the winter of 11751176 was in vain.69
In the spring the war started again. A large regiment of Byzantine forces led by
the above-mentioned Dhu l-Nun Danishmendide and by a nephew of the emperor,
Andronicus Vatatzes, tried to attack Neokaisarea, but were turned away thanks to the
cunning of the local population. Their representatives first advised the Byzantines not to
believe the Danishmendid and later attacked the camp of the imperial soldiers, sent the
warriors into flight, and killed the nephew of the emperor, who was one of his favorites.70
The reaction of the Byzantine emperor was predictable. Choniates draws a
beautiful picture of Manuel’s wrath: “Making his army so great, he prepared to the war in
the way, as if he wanted to destroy Persian nation, level Ikonion with its walls, make the
Sultan submit and put his foot on his neck.”71 This image finds support in Michael the
68
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot., vol. 3, 20.5, 370-371.
Kinnamos, Epitoma,ed. Meineke, 7.3, 299, lines 7-13, (tr. Brand, 224) .
70
Chalandon, Les Comnène,507; Vryonis, Decline,123; Lilie, “Die Schlacht,” 259. Strangely enough, the
whole episode was omitted in the only recent book about Komnenian warfare, and even from the
magnificent work of Magdalino; see J. W. Birkenmeyer, The Development of the Komnenian Army: 10811180 (Cologne: Brill, 2002), 127 (hereafter: Birkenmeyer, Komnenian Army); Magdalino, The Empire, 99
71
Nicetas Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, ibid. Manuel 6, 178, lines 5-7 (tr. Magoulias, 100)
(hereafter: Choniates, Historia); Jacob Ljubarskij considered this piece to be a literary invention because of
25
69
Syrian: “Quand l’empereur des Grecs Manuel apprit que son neveu avait été à la porte de
Néocésarée, il partit en colère pour venir tirer vengeance des Turks.”72 The Syrian
chronicler, thus, gives a short description, while his Byzantine colleague draws a more
detailed (and partly ironic) picture.
The possible interpretation of the whole group of events seems to me to be the
following. The emperor was preparing an expedition against his enemies, not only the
sultan, with whom he had tried to reach an agreement about the passage of his troops
(this was probably the aim of the embassy of Thomas). He was already having a border
conflict with the sultan; the death of an important relative and friend at the hands of the
Seljuks made the revenge unavoidable. Nevertheless, it started later than was planned.
The “official version” of Kinnamos states that at first the whole enterprise was designed
for the spring, but was delayed because of the low speed of some auxiliary troops and
problems with Pannonian horsemen.73 Another problem for the army may have been the
solar eclipse which occurred in the spring of 1176. It might have instilled some fear into
the emperor, who, being a great admirer of astrology, postponed the whole enterprise for
a more suitable time.74 When the war began in the summer without great success for the
Byzantines and the expedition to Neokaisarea failed, he led the army to the south while a
large naval force set sail to Palestine.75
its rhetorical repetitions. From my point of view, the literary device here is rather a method of decorating a
real event, see Ljubarskij, “Manuel I Komnenos through the eyes of Kinnamos and Choniates,” 108
72
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 370-371.
73
Kinnamos, Epitoma,ed. Meineke, 7.3, 299, line 19 (Brand, 224).
74
Clear information about the solar eclipse in the spring of 1176 is present in Armenian chronicle of Smbat
Sparapet, see Connetable Sembat, Chronique, sub anno 1176, 625, RHC 1: 626.
75
This is another argument for the Crusader version of Myriokephalon. About this fleet see H. Ahrweiler,
Byzance et la mer, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), 266-267 (henceforth: Ahrweiler,
Byzance). About the situation in the Byzantine fleet at the end of Manuel’s reign, see again Ahrweiler,
Byzance, 267-271. About the role of this fleet and it’s further destiny see Lilie, Byzantium, 215; Lamma,
Comneni e Staufer, 276.
26
The route taken by the Byzantine army, according to Choniates, was the
following: from the camp of Lopadion, where the whole mass of horses and people was
gathered, the army took the road to Chonae, then through the plains of middle Anatolia to
the newly-built Laodicea of Pisidia (see map 1).76 This was one of the possible solutions
for this trip; another route, repeating the path of the first crusade, went through
Dorylaeum-Philomelion and then by the road which goes on the northern side of the
modern Sultan Daglari to the valley of Ikonion, and from there further to any other
possible aim of this expedition.77 Why did the emperor’s strategists select this road?
Kinnamos does not offer a clear justification for the route chosen, while Choniates, as a
good writer, spared his readers a long description of the way. Michel the Syrian also
offers no clue, but from his account it can be inferred that this was the expedition of a
huge army over a devastated land, where the enemy had destroyed and poisoned all the
resources that could have been used by the imperial troops.78 I think that the selection of
the route was an attempt to kill two hares with a single bullet; on one hand, by moving
southwards the Byzantine army prevented the enemy from attacking the flourishing cities
on the Meander, as other enemies had done some time before, while the northern corner
76
See Chalandon, Les Comnène, Uspenskiy, History, 280; Vryonis, Decline, 123; Birkenmeyer,
Komnenian Army, 128. The way itself was discussed well in W. M. Ramsay, “Notes and Inscriptions from
Asia Minor,” American Journal of Archaeology and of the History of fine Arts2, No.2 (1886): 123-131.
(Henceforth: Ramsay, Notes.)
78
As far as I know, the only calculation of the troops (25,000 Byzantines) is given by J. Haldon, who
unfortunately does not give any reference to the method of his calculation. J. Haldon , Byzantine Wars, 142.
The “international character” is underlined in many sources. Choniates , Historia, ibid.; Kinnamos, The
Deeds, ibid.;Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, 20.4 (ed. Chabot, vol.3, 368) “avec une armeé …des divers
peuples ;” Romoald of Salerno, Annales Romoaldi, in MGH SS Scriptores,vol.19, (Hannover: Impensis
Bibliopolii Avlici Hahniani, 1866) 442.
27
of border was defended by Dorylaion.79 At the same time, the imperial troops from the
southern provinces could easily join the army on its way to the enemy borders.
Sometime in August the army began to move in the designated direction, but the
way proved to be not so easy. Warfare in the dry steppe lands of the border zone 80 has
extensive logistical requirements, such as water and grazing land. There were problems
with water (which was probably stored for the springtime expedition) and food for the
horses (which was destroyed by enemy raiders).81 In addition to this, the road was not
safe because a short time before hostile nomads had devastated this land and no akritai or
border guards are mentioned in any source.82 Probably these are the problems to which
Manuel refers in his letter to Henry Plantagenet: “…although much of our preparations
79
An extensive raid of the Seljuks not long before is attested by Michael the Syrian. Michael the Syrian,
The Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.4 , 369.
80
There is no exact information about the actual border in the period. J.C. Cheynet speaks about the
conservativeness of the border line during whole Komnenian Era. I would not agree with that. The very
character of the landscape suggests that one should speak of a border zone rather than a borderline. In the
establishment of its actual size in specific regions, archaeology can be of great help see P. Armstrong
“Seljuqs before the Seljuqs : Nomads and Frontiers inside Byzantium” in Eastern Approaches to
Byzantium, ed. A. Eastmond, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001): 277-286; J.C. Cheynet “La conception militaire
de la frontière orientale (IXe-XIII e siecles)” in Eastern Approaches to Byzantium, ed. A. Eastmond,
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2001): 66.
81
The crossing of the Anatolian Plateau was one of the most difficult parts of the way to Kilikia and/or
Holy Land. The worst part of the way was a dry steppe between valleys of rivers of the Aegean basin and
the narrow, but fertile, valleys of the Cilician rivers. Ikonion was one of the few places where a large army
could stop for the rest to continue it’s way further. This, as John France tries to prove, was true at least for
the first Crusade, John France, A Victory in the East A Military History of the First Crusade (Cambridge:
Cambridge University press, 1994), 187. About the March itself see Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 102, lines 26-31,
103 (Vasilyev, 237-238).
82
The place of the battle was the subject of a long discussion. The first person who made an interesting
guess was W. M. Ramsay, who in 1886 (sic!) basing his work only on the evidence of Choniates, proposed
that it happened near the village of Kizil-Oren, which lies some 50 km to the west of Ikonion (modern
Konya). A century later, N. Mersich argued that the battle took place in completely different region , to the
north of Lake Pousgousa. The Ramsay’s version was clarified by Michael Hendy, who, using the important
evidence of Michael the Syrian and a detailed description of the place in a nineteenth century English
itinerary, proposed that the battle happened near Kizil-Oren. I incline to agree with the latter: Michael the
Syrian clearly states where the battle happened “Les Grecs arriverent dans le voisinage de Iconium, a une
journée de marche (de cette ville).” The proposed place to the north of the Lake Pousgousa is on the distcne
of more than one hundred kilometeres distant from Ikonion – and thus can not be the site. Among modern
scholars opinions are still divided – Magdalino supports the version of Hendy, while Lilie supports
Mersich, see Michael The Syrian, Chron.icle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5 , 371; W. M. Ramsay “Notes and
inscriptions from Asia Minor,”, American Journal of Archaeology and of the History of the Fine Arts 2
(1886): 123-131; N. Mersich, “Tzibritze. Zum Austragungsort der Schlacht von Myriokephalon” in
Byzantios. Festschrift für Herbert Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. W. Hörander, J. Koder, O. Kresten, E.
28
were made, not as we should have wished, nor as appeared best suited to our object…”83
Despite these problems, the first clashes with small groups of Turcomans were
successful. After leaving behind its last base, the city of Laodicea, on the 16th of
September,84 the huge multinational force reached the mountain pass where it was
destined to meet its doom.
According to Choniates, before the battle Manuel summoned a military council.
The ambassador of the sultan arrived in the camp with the final suggestion for peace. 85
This time conditions seem to have been regarded as at least possible by the Byzantine
side, because they were discussed by the council. “Experienced men” in the council,
probably thinking about an army greatly harmed/afflicted by dysentery and lack of food,
advised the emperor to agree with these conditions, but because of some unnamed
youngsters, who were very influential, the ambassador left without success. 86 Manuel
wanted war and was ready for it. The next question was practical, how to pass a long
defile and the mountain plateau that came after it before taking the straight road that led
to Ikonion (map 2). The question was well-known in the Byzantine theoretical military
tradition. Unfortunately there is no direct evidence to tell whether Manuel ever read any
of these treatises, each of which clearly advised against the course of action that he
Trapp (WienVienna: Ernst Becvar, 1970): 241-247 ; Hendy, Studies, ibid.; Magdalino, The Empire, 98;
Lilie, Byzantium, map 1.
83
Epistola, ibid .
84
See A. Vasilyev, “Das Genaue Datum der Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176),” BZ 27 (1927): 288-290
85
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6, [ed. Van Dieten, 179, line 26]: “Ὁ δὲ σουλτὰν οὐκ ἀνῆκεν αὖθις τὰ πρὸς
εἰρήνην διαλεγόμενος.” (tr. Magoulias, 101).
86
Choniates, Historia., ibid. The suggestion about the probable reasons for the advice of the elder generals
was made by Birknemeyer in Komnenian Army, 129. Still, other scholars inclined to repeat the advice of
experienced generals in the form given by Choniates. See John Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, 142. At the
same time, the tradition of depicting emperor as the one who does not listen to advice is typical for the
Kaiserkritik and was probably taken over by Choniates, at least in part, from Psellos. On this, see chapter 3,
62-63.
29
eventually took.87 This earned him some blame from Choniates, who states that the
emperor moved his army without any measures of reconnaissance, clear knowledge of
the enemy, or an exact plan.88 All these things were repeated by different authors in the
secondary literature.89 One of the few exceptions in this respect is John Haldon, who
suggests that Manuel probably had an idea that he would be attacked at Myriokephalon
by the Seljuks, which, as the events of the next day show, was what actually happened.
He just did not manage to predict the direction of the attack.90
In 1147, the young Emperor Manuel Komnenos had led an expedition against the
Sultan of Ikonion, Mas’ud I (1118-1152). It was nearly successful: the Seljuk forces were
destroyed in two battles in central Anatolia, the Byzantine forces captured Philomelion
and, for a significant time, Byzantine regiments even besieged Ikonion, which had not
seen warriors from Constantinople in such large numbers since the time of Mantzikert
(1071). The sultan retreated to the north, where he asked for the help of the
Danishmendids. Finally, after long maneuvers of near Ikonion, Manuel decided to retreat
through a mountain pass which lay to the west of the city and was called Cyblicymani by
the Seljuks. The Byzantine army built a camp on the eastern end of the defile, while the
emperor, moved by his bravery, tried to find a good opportunity for a show of valor to
impress his Latin wife. This nearly led to disaster, and if the help of his brave entourage
had not come just in time, the reign of the emperor would have been much shorter.
Manuel was almost surrounded, but managed to escape and counterattack the forces of
87
See, for example, the description of the same stratagem in two tenth-century works, De velitatione
bellica and De castrametatione. De velitatione bellica [О боевом сопровождении], tr. V. Kuchma in Два
византийских военных трактата 10 века (Two Byzantine military treatises of the tenth century) (St.
Petersburg: Aleteia, 2002), 126; De castrametatione, [О построении лагеря] tr. V. Kuchma in Два
византийских военных трактата 10 века (Two Byzantine military treatises of the tenth century) (St.
Petersburg: Aleteia, 2002), 363.
88
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 180, 10-15 (tr. Magoulias, 102).
89
Birkenmeyer, Komnenian Army, 129; Uspenskiy, History, 280; Vryonis, Decline, 124 ; S. Runciman, A
History of the Crusades, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 412; Hendy, Studies, 150.
30
the sultanate and the Danishmendids, who, at that time were allied with Ikonion. After a
hard battle, the imperial forces put the enemy to flight and began their march through the
mountains. The main Seljuk forces, after several fruitless attacks, went back to their
capital, while Manuel, trailed at some distance by enemy scouts, successfully reached the
plain of Lake Pousgusa.91
I think it possible to elaborate on the statement of John Haldon. The experience of
1146 was probably one that Manuel (and his generals) used in planning the battle.92 From
their point of view, the most vulnerable point of the defile, as in 1146,was the exit to the
east. The unfortunate experience acquired during another expedition to Sarapata
Miloniensis, when the Byzantine regiments were attacked by archers who occupied the
peaks of low mountains, was not taken into consideration.93 The messages of the
reconnaissance forces (if there were any) did not reach the ears of the emperor. 94 As a
result, the next morning, a vanguard of the Byzantine army led by a most experienced
commander, John Doukas Vatatzes, I infer, received an order to go quickly and occupy
the exits of the valley.95 The emperor and/or his advisors expected trouble to come from
the east. Reality was a bit different. They were attacked from above.
b. The Seljuks.
90
J. Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, 142.
This whole paragraph is a summary of the long and colorful story of Kinnamos, who probably saw the
events with his own eyes, see Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 2.6-2.9, 43-60 (tr. Brand, 41-53).
92
The existence of such planning is supported by Choniates himself, when he states that the emperor knew
that he would be attacked at Myriokephalon. Choniates, Historia, 180.
93
The expedition to Sarapata Miloniensis is described by Kinnamos. in Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 4.23, 197198, (tr. Brand,149-151).
94
If they were, their work was extremely difficult. As Michael the Syrian puts it, the Turcomans killed
everyone, who was going out of the Byzantine camp. Michael the Syrian, Chron.icle, 20.5, (ed. Chabot,
vol. 3, 371): “Les Turcomans…massacraient ceux qu’ils trouvaient en dehors du camp des Grecs.”
31
91
The text above is meant to give an idea of the Byzantines before the battle. What
was on the other side? Did the sultan want the war? Probably he did not. A full-scale war
with the empire, whose army was much bigger than all the possible forces of the
sultanate, was not at all his main aim. He knew the empire well: his mother was an
Orthodox princess, probably of Russian origin.96 From the very beginning of his reign,
his ways and methods were aggressive, but quite cunning and sophisticated. In his
politics he had an experienced ally; during one of his wars, a scion of the Byzantine
family of Gabrades changed sides and joined the sultan’s court, where he probably
converted to Islam and, probably some time later, became a vizier of the country under
the name of Hasan Ibn Gabras.97 He was at least the head of the diplomacy of the
sultanate and an important ambassador before, during, and after battle. His connections
were great; one of his relatives had been killed by imperial troops in the first battle at
Myriokephalon in 1146, and another one was imprisoned in Constantinople just before
On John Doucas Batatzes and his curriculum vitae see A. F. Stone, “The Grand Hetaireiarch John
Doukas: the Career of a Twelfth-Century Soldier and Diplomat,” Byzantion 69 (1999):145-164.
96
This proposition is profoundly argued in the article of the prominent Russian Slavist, Alexander
Nazarenko. I incline to agree with it; several strange episodes in the life of Kilidjc Arslan II can be
interpreted as support for Christian origins. The first is the visit in 1161, when Manuel wanted Kilic Arslan
to participate in thea procession with icons. He was aware of his Muslim faith, but still something forced
him to permit the “infidel” to participate in procession. The second episode is the description of the Battle
of Myriokephalon by Michael the Syrian, wherether Turcomans, offending Kilic Arslan II for making
peace with Manuel, call him “infidel”, which can also be also a pointer to his Christian background. The
third and final argument is that during the procedure of 1161 Manuel made Kilic Arslan II his symbolic son
–according to Dölger this title was reserved only for Christian rulers. See Dölger, “Die Bulgarenherrscher,”
224; [R. A. Gusseynov, R. A.] Р. А Гуссейнов, Р.А.”Из истории отношений Византии с сельджуками”
(From the history of the relations between Byzantium and Seljuks), in Palestinskiy sbornik, 23 (1971):165
(hereafter: Gusseynov “From the history of the relations”); [A. V. Nazarenko] А.В. Назаренко.
“Правнучка Ярослава Мудрого – мать иконийского султана Килидж-Арслана II”
(Grandgranddaughter of Jaroslav the Wise – mother of the sultan of Ikonion, Kilic Arslan II)
Florilegium.Сборник трудов к 60-летию Б.Н. Флори (Florilegium: A Collection of Works Dedicated to
the 60th Birthday of B. N. Florya) (Moscow: Yaziki russkoy kulturi, 2004), 255-264;; Kinnamos, Epitoma,
ed. Meineke, 5.3, 206-207, (tr. Brand , 157); Michael the Syrian, Chron.icle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 372.
97
Jean-Claude Cheynet calls the whole family “collaborateurs des Seldjoukides.” For Bryer the situation is
different. Based on his prospography I will treat Gabras #9 and Gabras # 10 as the same person – Hasan Ibn
Gabras, see J.-C. Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations a Byzance, 963-1210, (Paris: Publications de la
Sorbonne, 1990), 237 (Henceforth : Cheynet, Pouvoir); A. Bryer, “A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades,”
University of Birmingham Historical Journal 12 (1971):180; M. Balivet “Entre Byzance et Konya:
32
95
the second battle at the same place.98 Not much is known about how this person affected
the decisions of his sovereign, but one thing that is clear is that his relation with
Byzantium was, to put it mildly, not very friendly.
The aim of this alliance of a Seljuk prince and a Byzantine aristocrat during the
war of 1176 was to secure the results of recent conquests, namely, Mardin, which was
captured at the end of the July of 1175, and to avoid a large-scale war with the empire.99
At first they tried to negotiate terms for peace, but Manuel was angry; the embassy of
Gabras to Constantinople did not yield any results. At the same time, the border war
seemed to be successful. The only mistake was probably the spilling of the blood of
young John Vatatzes, which seems to have provoked the anger of the Byzantine emperor
and led him to start the expedition.
The sultan answered with a whole complex of actions. Kavus-name, a source from
the end of the eleventh century which was most probably read by the Seljuk sultans100
and their entourage, gives a leader the following advice:
You should be informed about the kings of neighboring lands; it is
necessary that in all the countries your friend and you enemy should not
drink a sip of water without their people notifying you about it. About
their kingdom you should be informed in the same way as about the
kingdom of your king.101
This was probably the way Kilic Arslan II and his advisers went about the
business of war. Their preparations are described by Michael the Syrian; he states that the
sultan ordered his troops to go in front the army of the emperor in small groups and to
L’intercirculation des ideés et des Hommes au Temps des Seldjoukides,” in M. Balivet, Mélanges
Byzantines, Seldjoukides et Ottomans (Istanbul: Isis, 2005) 70
98
About the first see Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 2.8, 56, line 14, (tr. Brand , 57), about the second
see Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 7.3, line 3, (trans. Brand, 223).
99
Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.4, 368.
100
Rustam Shukurov, professor, Moscow State University, personal communication, 2007.
101
Kai-Kabus ibn Isnadar, Кабус-Намэ (Kabus-name) in Энциклопедия персидско-таджискской прозы
(Encyclopedia of Persian-Tadjik prose) (Dushanbe: Ifron,1983).The Russian translation is taken from
http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus6/Kabus-name/text1.phtml?id=599 (last accessed 24.05.2007).
33
destroy all possible crops. Special attention was dedicated to poisoning the wells with the
bodies of the dead oxen and dogs.102 Another order was dedicated to fortresses; the
Seljuks were supposed to defend them for a short time and then to retreat, setting the forts
on fire.
On the basis of these orders one can draw several conclusions. At first, Kilic
Arslan II’s estimation of the enemy seems to have been much clearer than his opponent’s.
From the beginning of the expedition he knew the strong and the weak points of the
enemy army. He knew well the possible problems with food and water and ordered these
resources to be destroyed, but at the same time he realized that the enormous siege
machinery which was carried by Manuel’s warriors could easily destroy any of his
fortresses. There is no indication from which direction he awaited the attack, but
Byzantine sources clearly show that Turks destroyed crops and poisoned wells along the
whole route of the army--and this means that they knew it very well. The chosen strategy
was quite traditional Seljuk hit-and-run--in the same way the army of Alexius Komnenos
near Philomelion was accompanied by small groups of scouts under the Emir
Monolikos.103 In some parts the description of Michael the Syrian is reminiscent of
Byzantine military treatises, especially one of them, De velitatione bellica, which
recommends a similar way of supporting constant contact with an enemy army, which
enables the general to know many things about the enemy and to control him at the same
time.104 This was the case here as well; Kilic Arslan II was well-aware of the size of the
enemy army and called for help from eastern lands.105
102
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3,20.5 , 371.
Anna Comnena, Alexiade 15.6, tr. E. A. Davis, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/AnnaComnenaAlexiad00.html#BOOK%20XV (last accessed 21.01.2007).
104
De velitatione bellica, [О боевом сопровождении] tr. V. Kuchma (St. Petersburg, Aleteia, 2002), 126.
105
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6, (ed. Van Dieten, 179 lines 8-10): “Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐμέλησε μὲν τῷ
σουλτὰν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ ξυμμαχικὸν συνεπορίσατο ἱκανὸν ἀπό τε τῆς Μέσης τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῶν
34
103
Was there a moment of fear for the sultan? It certainly seems so. He tried to start
negotiations three times. Despite all his military talents, Kilic Arslan II clearly
understood that the army which was led by the Byzantine emperor was formidable. The
battle plan suggested by the Seljuks was for them probably the only solution: to block the
heavy Byzantine cavalry and the many wagons in a narrow place, attack them with a few
gulyams [heavily armored elite horsemen] and a multitude of less well-protected
Turcomans, while the archers would shower them with a rain of arrows.106 The same
stratagem had already been used when mobile regiments, headed by the emperor himself,
were attacked in a narrow defile near Sarapata Miloniensis, but there the Byzantine
cavalry managed to regroup and smash through the enemy which blocked the way.107
Despite the absence of direct evidence about the battle plan and the method of
coordination between the different Seljuk regiments on the next day, it seems clear to me
that there was a plan of some sort.
As the next day proved, the Seljuks seemed to know nearly everything about the
enemy: the quality and number of its warriors, the ranks of the leaders, and, it seems,
even the order in which the Byzantine army was going to enter the defile. The sources of
their information could have been many: the Turcomans, who harassed Manuel’s army
on its way, the survivors of the minor battles which had taken place on the borders of the
sultanate, and probably even spies, who could have been present in the large and loosely
ἄνω συμφύλων βαρβάρων,” (tr. Magoulias 101) .
106
Raif Gusseynov supposes that they were “borrowed” from Byzantium. A. Matveev clearly shows that
the institution could have been taken over from the Arabs of the Near East, see S. Vryonis, “Seljuk
Gulyams and Ottoman Devshirmes,” Der Islam 16 (1965): 226-227; [R. A. Gusseynov] Р.А. Гуссейнов,
“Сельджукская военная организация” (The military organization of the Seljuks), Palestinskiy Sbornik 17
(1967): 135-136; [A.S. Matveev ] А.С. Матвеев. Военное дело арабов в X-XI вв. (The Military Tradition
of Arabs in the tenth and eleventh centuries) in [Nicephoros Phocas] Никифор Фока, Стратегика
(Strategikon) (St. Petersburg: Aleteya, 2005), 243-244.
107
Kinnamos, Epitoma, 149-151.
35
organized mass of imperial warriors.108 From the very beginning of the campaign and
well before the battle Kilic Arslan II had a much clearer idea of the enemy than Manuel-and this led him to a victory that, it seems to me, he did not expect.
3) The Battle109
a. The Byzantines
On the morning of 17 September 1176, the imperial army began to enter the long
defile of Myriokephalon. The marching order, according to Choniates, was the following:
the first regiment of the army, headed by John and Andronicus Angelos, then the second
headed by Constantine Macroducas110 and Andronicus La(m)parda,111 which probably
consisted of experienced eastern border guards. The right wing was headed by the
brother of the emperor’s wife, and the left wing by Theodor Mavrosomes.112 They were
followed by the wagons, the supplementary units, then by the emperor with his personal
guards, and, finally, the Byzantine order was completed by the forces of the rearguard
108
Manuel himself seems to admit that the Turks had good knowledge about his army, which was received
during first skirmishes, in the beginning of his letter to Henry II Plantagenet. Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 103,
lines 16-20: ”Quoniam igitur Turcorum agmina ex jam factia praelia cognoverant, non conferre sibi a
fronte nobis repugnare, loci angustiam bonum subventorem cum invenissent, posteriora statuerent invadere
agmina: quod utique ut fecerunt” (Vasilyev , 238).
109
For the descriptions of the battle itself see Chalandon, Les Comnène, 508-512; Uspenskiy, Historia,
280-282; Lilie, “Die Schlacht,” 268-269; Vryonis, Decline, 124-125; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 103;
Hendy, Studies, 149-152; J. Haldon, Byzantine Wars, 141-143; Birkenmeyer, Komnenian Army, 131-133;
Lamma, Comneni e Staufer, 278-279.
110
The biography of this person is more or less unknown. He was a nephew of Manuel, fought at
Myriokephalon, and later supported Andronicus Komnenos but was impaled by the latter on an accusation
of treachery, Cheynet, Pouvoir, 281.
111
Andronicos Lamparda, as can be seen from his name, from the beginning had strong connections with
the famous Byzantine fortress region of Lampe and, if we are to believe Eusthatios of Thessaloniki, was so
respected by Kilic Arslan II that he received from him the honorable nickname of “Falcon,” Eusthathios of
Thessaloniki, The Capture of Thessaloniki, tr. J. Jones (Canberra: Australian Association for Byzantine
Studies, 1988), 3.
112
Mavrosomos is mentioned in the sources only once before, when he is said to be one of the
supplementary commanders of the Egyptian expedition in 1175. Magdalino showed that he was
“mesadzon” (prime minister) of the empire at the time of Myriokephalon. Magdalino, The Empire, 257.
36
under the command of Andronicus Condostephanos113 (figure1) The first two regiments
successfully passed through the difficult places, and, according to the special order,
which I think was given to them by Manuel, moved forward at high speed, to occupy
positions at the end of the defile.114 They were attacked by the Seljuks. Nevertheless, the
imperial archers defeated the enemy who “withdrew” back to their first positions. The
next unit of the Byzantine army was attacked immediately after its passage; its
inexperienced commander, Baldouin of Antioch, exhibited miracles of bravery, but
without great success. According to Choniates, this was a key moment in the battle; the
next phase was actually a catastrophe. The Turks attacked the core of the Byzantine
army, namely, the left and right wings, the baggage, and personal guards of the emperor
from the left, right, and above. The arrows poured down from the skies like rain, killing
horses, people, and, what was more important, and the oxen that drew the wagons with
siege weaponry.115 The situation was extremely dangerous; the enemy seemed to be
everywhere and this provoked some understandable fear. At the same time, the way was
also blocked from behind. Byzantine sources are silent concerning the moves Andronicus
Condostephanos made, but from the chronicle of Michael the Syrian it can clearly be
seen that the rearguard of the army was also attacked by a great multitude of Turcomans,
who can be expected to have paid special attention to the carriages with food and
water.116 The Byzantine army was blocked from all sides (figure 2).
113
Along with John Doucas Vatatzes he was one of the most experienced commanders of the army;
Andronicos started his career as a messenger of Manuel to Antioch. Later he successfully participated in
the military campaigns against the Hungarians. In the Egyptian maritime expedition (1175) he was
appointed as the commander of the whole enterprise. As far as I know there is still no article about
Condostephanos.
114
This phenomenon can easily be explained if one takes into consideration the hypothesis about the battle
plan of Manuel, which was proposed in a chapter above, Choniates, ibid.
115
Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 103, lines 22-23: “…et tela quasi imbres super nos interimebant,” (Vasilyev, 238).
116
Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol.3, 20.5, 371.
37
Even so, I do not believe that this was a moment of general panic. The emperor
finally got a clear idea of the situation and tried to organize some kind of opposition to
the attacks of the Seljuk cavalry. When re-formed heavy regiments removed Seljuk
blocking groups, the experience of Sarapata Milonienses was tried, but the carriages
blocked the place which was needed for the heavily-armed knights to attack. This was
the moment of truth for the whole army, and panic began to rule the mass of people
which only some hours ago had been the army of the Only Emperor in the world. He was
later brave enough to describe its state in very dramatic sentences. The situation became
even worse when the army was shown thee head of Andronicus Vatatzes, who was killed
near the gates of Neokaisareia.117 Even at this disastrous moment, the emperor, who did
not lose hope, attacked some Seljuks on the slopes of the mountains, but unsuccessfully.
The head of the Byzantine army and his bodyguards were stranded on a hill surrounded
by deep ravines; a sandstorm blinded the warriors of both sides, who fell into the
chasms.118 Finally, realizing that his situation was hopeless, the emperor gathered some
soldiers and tried to break through the enemy regiments. 119 The rest of the battle was
rather a massacre than a defeat. In darkness and dust the Byzantines and Seljuks filled
gullies, ravines, and hills with the dead bodies of their friends and enemies. Everyone
was thinking about the safety of his own life.120
117
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 182, lines 10-14 (tr. Magoulias, 102)
Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 103, lines 37-43 : “Multo autem eleveare pulvere ac perturbante oculos, et
neminem permittente videre quae circa pedes errant, in praecipitium, quod aderat, profundissimae vallis,
alius super alium, hominess et equi sic incontinenter portati corruerunt, quod alii alioc cobcultantes ad
invicem interemerunt non ex gregariis tantum sed ex clarissimis et ex intimis nostris consanguineis,”
(Vasilyev, 238-239); Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 184, lines 1-5 (tr. Magoulias, 104
119
Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 104, lines 1-5, (Vasilyev, 238).
120
Choniates, Historia, ibid.
38
118
The problem here lies in the next episodes of Choniates. Magdalino calls them
“anecdotes” and speaks accurately about “indirect criticism” of Nicetas. 121 Jakov
Ljubarskij is much more radical; he clearly states that pieces were invented by the author
for the sake of his ideological structures.122 I incline to agree with the latter. Both
episodes (with the bloody river and with the rude warrior) are built in the basis of the
traditional motifs of Byzantine Kaisekritik, which will be addressed in chapter 3. Thus, in
these episodes one should not believe Choniates as much as many scholars have in the
past.
Manuel, who managed to break through a group of Gulyam guards (I think that
these were the troopes he confronted), was not alone.123 Several groups of Byzantine
warriors somehow managed to save themselves from the massacre (figure 3). 124 These
groups (which seem not to have been small) joined the emperor. He organized them into
some likeness of order and, after several clashes with the Seljuks, who tried to capture
him, reached the camp at the end of the defile, where fresh new units of the Angeloi
brothers and Andronicus Lampardas waited for their emperor.125 By the evening of 17
September several other important people, including the opysthophylax Andronicus
Condostephanos, managed to reach Manuel’s camp. Seljuk control over the whole defile
was complete and the Turcomans began to rob the bodies. On the fortified hill, however,
the situation was different; despite the panic and destruction of the main army, the
121
Magdalino, The Empire, 8-9. The connection of the episodes with the concept of Kaisekritik was clearly
present in the work of P. Lamma, see Lamma, Comneni e Staufer, 280.
122
J. Ljubarskij, “Мануил I,”108-109.
123
Choniates’ description of the emperor’s shield states that he was attacked with swords and maces,
which were characteristic weapons of the elite forces of the sultans. See [A.S. Matveev ] А.С. Матвеев.
Военное дело арабов в X-XI вв. (The military tradition of Arabs in the tenth and eleventh centuries), in
[Nicephoros Phocas] Никифор Фока, Стратегика (Strategikon) (St. Petersburg, Aleteia, 2005), 173-272.
124
Steven Runciman states that at that moment Manuel “was the first to panic and fled back out of the
pass;” Brand agrees with him. I wonder from which source they got their information, see S. Runciman, A
History of the Crusades., vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 413; C. Brand ,
Byzantium Confronts the West (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1968), 16.
39
Byzantine emperor still saved a notable force, which enabled him to speak from a
position of dignity, if not power. Strangely enough, the position of Kilic Arslan at that
time was not much better.126
Figure 1. The beginning of the battle at Myriokephalon.127
4
2
.
3
.
1
.
.
Legend:
1. The divisions of avant-garde headed by Angeloi, Makroducas and Lampardas are
passing defile on a high speed.
2. The rest of Byzantine army (corps of Balduin of Antioch and Mavrozomes, huge
siege train ) are entering the defile.
125
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 186, lines 23-25, (tr. Magoulias, 105).
M.F. Hendy, Studies, 150-151.
127
Note: the following schemes are not following the “real landscape”. They even do not represent all
moments of the battle. The aim of putting them in is to give a reader a general idea about main stages of the
event.
40
126
3. The column is covered from behind by forces of Manuel and a regiment of
Andronicos Condostephanos.
4. The Seljuk on the tops and slopes of the hills are preparing to start their attack.
Figure 2. The apex of the battle at Myriokephalon.
2
.
4
3
.
Legend
1.
2.
3.
4.
Avantgarde of Byzantine forces fortifies on the hill on the eastern end .
Regiments of Mavrozomes and Balsuin of Antioch are destroyed.
Siege train is under attack and blocks the movement of Manuel’s guards.
Turcomans attack the division of Andronicos Condostephanos.
41
1
.
.
Figure 3. The flight of the emperor.
1
.
.
2
.
Legend
1.Manuel is trying to escape.
2. Small groups of Byzantines are trying to find a road to the eastern end of the defile.
42
b) The Seljuks
The position of Kilic Arslan II and his warriors differed from that of Manuel in
many ways. First, the sultan was not directly on the battlefield. Choniates states that the
Seljuk sultan was always cautious and never put his head in danger by engaging in direct
combat with the enemy.128 A friend of the sultan, Michael the Syrian, also states clearly
that at the beginning of the day the Byzantine army was in view of Ikonion or at a
distance of three hours from the headquarters of the sultan.129 Second, Kilic Arslan
clearly knew what the enemy was doing and which part of the army should be attacked,
and this was noted especially by Choniates.130 The forces of the sultanate were probably
positioned thus: The main heavy cavalry forces were situated on the slopes of the hills
and in the ravines between them. This was a typical Seljuk stratagem of sequential
ambushes – if the enemy could manage to defend itself from the strike of the group in
one ravine, the latter retreated and attacked the enemy again from the next ravine. 131 The
archers and stone-throwers on top of these and the whole enormous mass of Turcomans
was ready to block the imperial army from the back. The whole plan worked quite well;
the first regiments, headed by experienced commanders, were let pass, while the second
part of the army, which was under the command of less experienced leaders, was
attacked, probably by the light cavalry. A counter-attack of the Byzantine forces was
stopped, not without some losses, while the main archers (probably mounted in the
traditional Seljuk way) poured a rain of arrows on the horses and oxen (figure 2). At
another location, where the “observer of Michael the Syrian” (this person probably was
the source of information which was used by Michael the Syrian) was observing the
128
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6 ,175, lines 18-23 (tr. Magoulias, 99 ).
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 371.
130
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6,182, lines 24-30 (tr. Magoulias, 103).
43
129
fight, huge stones were thrown down on the enemy.132 All these actions, especially the
shots aimed at the wagons, indicate a high degree of coordination between the different
parts of the Seljuk forces and, once more, a clear appreciation of the most vulnerable
points of the imperial army. Despite this, the Byzantines managed to crush some of the
Seljuk battle groups.133 Finally, after the destruction of the divisions of Maurozomes and
Balduin of Antioch (which cost the Seljuks many lives), gulyam guards faced the
remnants of the Manuel’s personal warriors, who had fortified themselves on a hill. This
moment, perhaps, was crucial for the battle: a sandstorm saved the emperor of
Constantinople. The chasm became chaos.
The picture painted by Choniates gives the clear idea that from that moment on
the battle became rather a series of clashes in which, it seems to me, the Seljuks were
given the order not to kill the emperor. This hypothesis is based on several pieces of
information: a) the fact that the emperor passed through the Gulyam regiment nearly
alone, but was not killed; b) the fact that in one of the anecdotes told by Choniates a
Seljuk warrior does not try to kill the emperor, but rather to capture him with his horse.
This fits well into Seljuk ideology, which did not advise a clever ruler to kill the enemy.
This attitude perhaps derived from the double position of the Seljuks of Asia Minor, who
considered themselves as subjects of both the caliph of Bagdad and of the emperor of
Byzantium at the same time.134 The person of the supreme ruler was almost holy, and
moreover, despite the war, the relations of the Seljuk sultan with the Byzantine emperor
on a symbolic level were still the relations between father and son.
“Seven deadly ravines” are mentioned by Choniates. The same stratagem, according to Gusseynov , was
typical for the Seljuks of Asia Minor and was used by them even in the time of Alexios I Komnenos, see
[R.A. Gusseynov] Р.А. Гуссейнов, “The military organization of the Seljuks,” 138.
132
Michael the Syrian, ibid.
133
Choniates, ibid.
44
131
While the Byzantine emperor was assembling his forces on one side of the defile,
the whole territory seems to have become the ground for Turcoman plunder, examples of
which can be seen in the story of Choniates.135 Were these Turkmen behaving as the
loyal subjects of their sultan at this moment? I think not, and if this were so, the situation
of Kilic Arslan II was no less dangerous than on the morning of that day; a horde of
marauding Turcomans was probably even more dangerous for him than the remnants of
the Byzantine army. Seljuk leaders, however, succeeded in organizing at least part of
these forces at the eastern end of the defile. The Byzantine camp was blocked. The
remnants of the army in the mountain pass were either slaughtered or taken into captivity.
This was the end of the military actions at Myriokephalon in a strict sense, but merely the
beginning of the armed diplomatic bargaining about the conditions of peace which took
place in the next few hours.
4) After the fight.
a. The Negotiations.
It seems logical that the Byzantine emperor would be the one to start the peace
negotiations. His army was destroyed; the siege machines and his main assault forces lay
in tatters in the cage of the defile. Any hope of conquering Ikonion seemed lost; the
emperor, if we are to believe Choniates, was ready to abandon the army and run away
alone, and only the clever advice of an unknown warrior saved the remnants of the
imperial forces from total disaster.136 This whole episode was probably invented; the
O. Turan “The Ideal of World Domination among the Medieval Turks,” Studia Islamica 4 (1955): 82.
(Henceforth: Turan, “The Ideal.”)
135
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 185, lines 8-12 (tr. Magoulias, 104).
136
In one of his later articles, J. Ljubarskij considered this scene to be a part of the “Byzantine irony” of
Nicetas Choniates. I think that it’s rather a part of Kaiserkritik, see J. N. Ljubarskij, “Byzantine Irony. The
Example of Nicetas Choniates,” in Byzantium Matures. Choices, Sensitivities, and Modes of Expression
45
134
“simple soldier,” who comes to speak against the emperor in the military council (!) is
clearly expressing the point of view of Choniates himself.137 All these things would
naturally have turned the generals’ thoughts to the idea of negotiations, but Kilic Arslan
also had a number of reasons to conclude peace as quickly as possible. The main problem
was the Turcomans, who, although invited to fight on his side, were well-known as a
chaotic force able to attack the sultan without a problem--his own forces, namely archers
and gulyams--took part not only in the victorious beginning of the battle, but also in the
slaughter which followed, and may have had many casualties.138 Another danger was the
Byzantine regiments which had passed Myriokephalon at the beginning of the battle and
were preserved in good condition until the evening. Both these factors would have been
understood well by the experienced sultan, and he would have tried to conclude a peace.
Another factor may have been the Seljuk nobles, whose influence Manuel had been
known to buy even in times of peace.139
This is supported by Choniates, who, with all his ambiguous feelings towards
Manuel, clearly states that Kilic Arslan was the first to send messengers.140 He writes
that the emperor probably had a similar idea, but the Seljuks beat him to it. The same
information is given in the letter of Manuel Komnenos.141 In contrast with this
information stands the clear evidence of Michael the Syrian, who writes that Manuel was
the initiator of the process, and that “messengers with torches were traveling all the
(Eleventh to the Fifteenth Centuries), ed. Christine Angelidi (Athens: Institute for the Byzantine Research,
2004), 287-298 .
137
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 187 (tr. Magoulias, 106). Unfortunately, on this topic,
many scholars, beginning with Ferdinand Chalandon and finishing with John Haldon, believed Choniates
without any reservation, Chalandon, Les Comnène, 512; J. Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, 143.
138
The idea about the “Turcoman danger” threatening the sultan was first expressed by Uspenskiy, but
somehow remained unnoticed by the following generations of scholars. Uspenskiy, History, 281.
139
Nicetas , using complex Bible quotations states, that organizer of peace was Hasan Ibn Gabras,
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel, 6, 188, lines 10-15, (tr. Magoulias, 106).
140
Choniates, Historia, ibid.
141
Epistola, (ed. Stubbs, 104, lines 25: “…suscepit Soltani deprecationem…” (Vasilyev, 239).
46
night.”142 This message (seems more important to me than the question of who actually
started the negotiations. They were initiated and supported by an armistice, which seems
to have been in place during the night of 17 to 18 of September.143 Nothing is known
about the conditions of these negotiations, but the result was negative. The reason, it
seems to me, was simple; the Byzantine emperor still did not believe that he had been
defeated, while Kilic Arslan was not so sure he had won such a victory. The Turcoman
riders, riding around the Byzantine fortified camp, tried to force the Seljuks in the
imperial army to leave the camp; I suppose they were not doing this at the order of Kilic
Arslan, but rather against it.144
b. Concluding the peace
The next morning began with a Seljuk attack on the Byzantine camp. The
response to this was simple. Regiments of Constantine Angelos went against the Seljuks,
but without success. Constantine Macroducas with his army, “composed of eastern
divisions,”145 also tried to fight the enemy, but achieved nothing. Now the situation was
clear even for the emperor, who was unwilling to contemplate defeat. He was trapped on
a waterless mountain completely encircled by his enemies. Then a new character
appeared on the stage, not the sultan himself, but his vizier, Hasan Ibn Gabras, who,
when the attacks stopped, came to see the emperor. Did Manuel ask him to come or did
142
Michael the Syrian, Chron.icle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 371; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer, 279 .
Choniates, Historia,Manuel 6 (ed. Van Dieten, 186, lines 27-28): “Ἐπεὶ δὲ νὺξ ἐπῆλθε καὶ σκότος
ἡμέρας διάδοχον τὸν πόλεμον ἔπαυσεν” (tr. Magoulias, 105)
143
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6 (ed. Van Dieten, 189, lines 3-5): “ἐκ δὲ τούτου ὁ Μακροδούκας
Κωνσταντῖνος τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ἐξάγει στρατιὰν ἐκ τῶν ἑῴων στρατολογουμένην ταγμάτων.”
47
145
he come without an invitation? There is no answer to this question to be gleaned from the
sources, but the interesting thing is that this episode is present only in Choniates’ account,
while the message of Manuel’s letter is quite brief about this aspect and thus raises the
suspicion that Manuel wanted to hide something.146
The ambassador came to the king, bowed, and gave him ritual presents, which
consisted of a special horse and a long, double-edged sword. This gesture was
reciprocated from the Byzantine side in the form of a purple imperial cloak, after which
the conditions of peace were written down and the emperor signed them. The exact
meaning of this gift exchange is not easy to establish, but the present of the emperor has
some similar counterparts in the debated description of Alexius Komnenos’ expedition to
Philomelium, where the Shainshah, after surrendering to the emperor, received a cloak as
a symbolic present.147 The situation of the Seljuk presents after Myriokephalon is much
more complex. From the point of Arabic culture, they were ambiguous; a sword and a
horse were part of a set of “investiture presents” and symbolized rather equality than the
former unequal “father and son” relation.148 At the same time, the presents are not clearly
Arabic; the description of an investiture ceremony in Michael the Syrian’s Chronicle has
almost no similarities with the situation at Myriokephalon. 149 Probably the horse and
sword had some symbolic meaning in the Seljuk symbolic system about which I cannot
say much. In any case, the sultan probably had a good sense of humour--to present a
146
Manuel describes the treaty in one sentence, while Michael the Syrian completely omits the whole
episode, making the final document a result of the night negotiations. A. Vasilyev, “Manuel Comnenus,”
237-244; Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 371-372.
147
Anna Comnena, Alexiade 15.6, tr. by E.A. Dawis as available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/
AnnaComnena-Alexiad00.html#BOOK%20XV (last accessed 21.01.2007).
148
D. Sourdel, “Robes of Honor in Abbasid Baghdad during the Eighth to Eleventh centuries,” tr. D. M.
Sa’adah, in Robes of Honor. The Medieval World of Investiture, ed. Stewart Gordon (New York: Palgrave,
2001), 138-143.
149
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 16.6, 237.
48
hardy horse to a Manuel, famous for his love of heavy armor, after the defeat does not
strike one as the action of a subordinate.
The conditions of the peace, which are quoted by several authors, can be
construed to confirm this version. Along with the destruction of Dorylaion and
Soublaion, which is probably the best-known result of the battle, there were other rather
formal formulations such as “to serve against enemies” and “to return the captives.” 150 I
can even infer that the words said by Gabras to the emperor “from ear to ear” were also a
sign of friendship. In a letter written a year after the battle of Myriokephalon, Manuel
accused his Western “best friend,” Frederick Barbarossa, of a conspiracy with Kilic
Arslan II and the German emperor had to explain this conspiracy, which, it seems, had
only recently been revealed to Manuel.151
c. Conditions and Results of the Peace.
The Byzantine emperor agreed to the peace. A special condition was probably
dedicated to the return of the rich baggage of the emperor, especially the holy relics,
among which was a piece of the Holy Cross.
152
The conditions imposed on the
aggressive emperor were not that hard; he only had to destroy two newly fortified
strongholds on the borderlands.
150
Michael the Syrian speaks only about the conditions accepted by the Byzantines, see Michael the Syrian,
Chronicle, 20.5 (ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 372): “L’empereur abandonna au sultan les villes qu’il avait rebâties”.
151
Kresten, “Anredestreit“, 107-110. This was not the end of the relations between Kilic Arslan and
Barbarossa; at least two embassies were exchanged, in 1177 and 1180, see M. Albert, Annales Stadenses
s.a. 1179, ed. MGH SS Scriptores, vol. 16, G. H. Pert ed. (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Avlici Hahniani,
1858), 349.
152
This was noted in many sources, including two European annals, see Romolad of Salerno, Annales
Romoaldi, s.a. 1175 [a mistake of the editor –it is 1176] MGH SS Scriptores, vol.19, ed. W. Arndt
(Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Avlici Hahniani, 1866), 442; Roberti de Monte Cronica, s.a. 1178. MGH
SS Scriptores, vol. 6, ed. D. L. C. Bethmann (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Avlici Hahniani, 1844), 527.
49
But the main result was not in the peace conditions. The Byzantine crusade had
failed. The siege weaponry, its main source of power, was destroyed and many brave and
noble warriors lay dead in the field.153 At the same time, one can not speak about “the
fundamental weakness” of the military policies of Manuel Komnenos, nor about “a
turning point as great as the battle of Mantzikert.” The force of the empire were neither
annihilated completely nor was their organization destroyed. In next few years they
proved to be quite effective.154 To say it another way, from a military point of view the
battle at Myriokephalon did not mark the end of the epoch or the end of the system. It
was just the defeat of a large army – and probably nothing more.
The indirect consequences were quite important; at the peak of its power, the
empire proved unable to help its allies in Palestine, defend its power in Cilicia, strengthen
its international prestige,155 and strike back against its aggressive eastern neighbor.156
None of these three objectives was ever reached; in the year following Myriokephalon
the battle of Hattin was the beginning of the end of the Crusader States of the Outremer.
In the year 1197 the Armenian Prince Leo (Levon) proclaimed himself king of Armenia
and was recognized with this title even by the empire. The situation with the Seljuks was,
in a short term perspective, better. As was already noted above, Manuel’s generals
achievedgreat success in the Valley of the Maiandros, where considerable Seljuk forces (I
think that they were the Seljuks from the East invited by Kilic Arslan before the battle)
153
About the direct losses in battle, see Chalandon, Les Comnène, 513; John Haldon, however, has a
different opinion about the numbers and considers them “insignificant,” John Haldon, The Byzantine Wars,
143. For a balanced opinion about the influence of the results of the battle on the short perspective of the
confrontation see Birknemyer, Komnenian Army, 134.
154
M. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 6; Brand, Byzantium, 16.
155
Lamma, Comneni e Staufer, 281; Lilie, Byzantium, 214;
156
The indirect consequences are one of the main points of attention for R.-J. Lilie; see “Die Schlacht,”
272-274.
50
were destroyed at the river crossing.157 Several years afterwards the emperor himself
successfully defended Claudiopolis against the enemy.158 The division of the sultanate
among Kilic Arslan II’s sons in 1192 decreased its power for a long time. In Byzantium
the situation also worsened, and Kinnamos, writing some time after the death of Manuel,
stated that the imperial hunt in Syria was something one could no longer dream about “in
our days.” Myriokephalon, thus, was the end of the imperial ambitions in Eastern
Mediterranean. Byzantium, having turned from its eastern neighbours was building up its
relations with the West.
5) Relations in the wake of the battle and the propaganda
war.
a. The Byzantines: A long way home
The things which happened immediately after the battle in the Byzantine camp are
clear. According to Choniates, Manuel tried to select another return route (possibly
Kaballa-Philomelium-Dorylaeum-Nicea-Lopadion), but his guides, which this time seem
to have been agents of the sultan, said that the army should go by the same road, where
they could observe the results of the massacre, especially the bodies without testicles and
scalps. Later historians have left a dramatic description of this sight. The valleys were
filled with dead bodies and the forests were full of dead. This was not all, however; after
passing through the defile Manuel was attacked by hordes of Turcomans. According to
Michael the Syrian, the defeated emperor asked officials of the sultanate about the
Choniates,Historia, ed. 193-195 (Magoulias 109-110); A .F. Stone “Manuel I Komnenos, the Maiandros
Campaigns of 1177-8 and Thessaloniki,” Balkan Studies 38 (1997): 21-29 (hereafter: A. F. Stone, “Manuel
I Komnenos”).
158
For the Claudiopolis campaign see P. Wirth “Die Chronologie der Schlacht um Claudiopolis im Lichte
bischer unbeachteter Quellen,” BZ 50 (1957): 68-74.
51
157
attackers, and they answered that these were not subjects of their master. 159 The emperor
later described his condition in his letter to Henry II. Manuel; his heart was full of grief;
he turned back to Constantinople carrying the hard weight of remorse for those who had
died because of his fault. The battle at Myriokephalon ruined his personality; according
to a person who observed him before and after the battle, the emperor was never the
same.160
Despite the difficult state of mind of its leader, the Byzantine army, even after the
massacre, was still able to defend itself. The emperor attacked the nomads and, despite
heavy losses among the injured, defeated them; small raids on the long army column on
the march continued until the army entered more or less safe territory, probably near
Soublaion. This fortress was destroyed; the destiny of garrison is not known, but
probably it left with the retreating imperial forces. A large mass of soldiers, covered by
rearguard forces, finally arrived in Chonae; here Manuel gave a silver stater to every
injured man and went to Lopadion through the valley of Dorylaion, where he left this city
untouched. The later chronicler blames the emperor for this, but for me this step is quite
understandable. The conditions of the peace he had signed also stipulated that the sultan
would serve the emperor with all his might; just the next day, the Turcomans, who were
the core of the Seljuk army at Myriokephalon, attacked the remnants of the Byzantine
regiments. This rendered the peace partly invalid, and in a gesture of reciprocation, the
emperor refused to destroy one of the fortresses as had been agreed. Here the idea seems
to be simple: If the enemy did not want to meet the conditions, why should the emperor?
Some time after his arrival, Manuel received an embassy from Kilic Arslan II, which
probably brought him back the captured relics and his baggage, all for a significant
159
160
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5,372.
William of Tyre, History, 21: 11, lines 15-21.
52
ransom. In addition, the ambassadors, whose names are not known, asked Manuel to
destroy Dorylaion and were refused.161 This was the beginning of the last, but not the
least, campaign of Manuel Komnenos, which, despite the interest of scholars, will not be
pursued here any further.162
The moment of the return was the beginning of another battle--a battle of letters.
The change in the relations between the two states was important, but no less was the
perception of this change in the eyes of friends and enemies. An informative “official
version” was probably received at that time by some imperial officials and later historians
used it as a basis for their works. A full and informative account with a proclamation of
victory over the Seljuks was sent to Henry II and probably to the other Western monarchs
and church leaders as well.163 The enemies were also informed about the battle; in 1177,
a Byzantine embassy arrived at the court of the most “beloved brother” of Manuel,
FrederickBarbarossa, who received it on the same day as the embassy of the Seljuk
sultan. This situation was known to the author of Annales Stadenses, who seems to have
had some fun in describing the meeting of the two “victors.”164
b. The Seljuks: All the sultan’s men
What happened in the sultans’ camp immediately after the proclamation of the
peace with the Byzantines clearly shows the limits of Kilic Arslan’s power over his
victorious army. As is stated by Michael the Syrian, the Turcomans shouted at the sultan,
calling him no more, no less than a “traitor,” and cursing him for restoring the peace. In
161
Choniates, Historia , ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 193, lines 2-4, (tr. Magoulias,108).
See A. F. Stone, “Manuel I Komnenos.”
163
Following Kapp-Herr, Kresten argued that the one phrase in the part of Liber Pontificalis dedicated to
Alexander III may be direct evidence of the presence of such information letter, see Kresten,
“Anredestreit,” 79 footnote 58.
53
162
that moment, and for this group of people, their master of yesterday was clearly perceived
as the same enemy as the Byzantines. The army was no longer under control, and, as a
result, the Byzantine column was attacked on its way back, despite all the conditions of
peace. The poor hostages which were given to Manuel could only tell the truth, namely,
that their master was no longer the lord over a huge mass of armed nomads, which
probably stopped being his army on the evening of 17 September and was gathered near
the Byzantine camp only with the promise of a huge amount of booty, which, as is
known, was never captured. The pursuit of the retreating enemy, which was de facto
allowed by Kilic Arslan, solved two main problems of the sultan: harassing the army of
the enemy without an open disavowal of the armistice and getting rid of a huge group of
armed soldiers which had become openly hostile to him. What happened next is not
known. The only thing that is known, mainly from Choniates, is that the greater part of
the Seljuk army was sent home by the sultan.
The diplomatic side of the victory was also important. Messages, prisoners, and
spoils of war, including scalps of fallen enemies, were sent, according to Michael the
Syrian, to the “sultan of Khorasan and the caliph of Baghdad,” while another group of
scalps, with the hair of the enemy, became part of a special ritual when they were carried
on the ends of the lances and trampled under the hooves of the horses of the victorious
army.165 The symbolic meaning here is ambivalent: on the one hand, cut-off heads are a
traditional proof of triumph in the Moslem East, while the scalps and severed testicles of
the enemy are more characteristic for the tribes of the steppes, where a similar thing has
been attested among the Huns. Letters of information were written for the Western kings-one arrived at the court of Frederick Barbarossa together with the Byzantine embassy,
164
M. Albert, Annales Stadenses, in MGH SS Scriptores, vol. 16, ed. I. Lappenberg (Hannover: Impensis
Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani, 1858), 442.
54
while another one seems to have reached Sicily, where it was used as a source of
information by the famous chronicler, Romoald of Salerno. As can clearly be seen, the
battle of swords led to a battle of letters, which, happily was much less bloody.166
6) Summary
Both sides were prepared for the war and had a long experience of confrontation
behind them. They carefully gathered and analyzed all possible information about each
other and tried to use it in their battle-plans as well as during the battle itself. Victory was
destined to fall into the hands of the one who did the analysis better that the other: in
1176 this was the Seljuks, while the following year it was the Byzantines.
In any case, both sides clearly had sophisticated procedures of estimating the
enemy. How can this “idea of the real enemy” be reconciled with the
representations/images of the same enemy in the main contemporary sources? To find
out, one should first analyze the mechanism of the construction of the enemy in each
source. This is the main task of the next chapter.
165
166
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 372.
see Kresten, “Anredestreit.”
55
Chapter 3. Representation and Images
1) Introduction to the question
The depiction of the enemy in narratives about the battle differs greatly from his
real behavior on the real battlefield. Even in the times of the “father of history,” the very
depiction, as Hartog has shown, was already a literary construct, to a certain degree
independent from reality.167 The Byzantine literature of the Middle Ages developed a
synthesis of the heritage of Classical epoch and Christian culture. Were the components
of the representation of the enemy in the sources for the battle at Myriokephalon
167
See F.Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus.
56
traditional? If they were, to what degree? What were the relations between the image of
the enemy drawn by Byzantine authors and that drawn by the single source which has
probably some elements of the representation constructed by “other side”? Can one speak
at all about “Seljuk representation” of Byzantines in Chronicle of Michael the Syrian? To
find answers to these questions one must analyze each contemporary source that speaks
of the battle of Myriokephalon separately. This analysis will reveal common points and
differences and will produce a basis for more general comparisons, which will be
presented in the conclusion of this chapter. The sources are divided into two groups-Byzantine and Syrian (limited to one single source).
2) The Byzantines
a. The case of John Kinnamos
As was said above, the only manuscript containing the work of this imperial
secretary breaks off exactly at the moment of the beginning of the expedition of 1176.
The narrative about the battle itself was clearly present in the Deeds, but has not
survived. Its absence forces one to use only the surviving part of the work, which deals
with the events before 1176. Luckily enough, in the narrative of Kinnamos one can find
two small phrases, which, according to Brand, refer to the battle at Myriokephalon. The
first is introduced in one of the descriptions of the personal bravery of Manuel:
For it is beyond the belief that entire thousands should be defeated by one
man and numerous fully armored men overcome by a single lance. Such
things I used to leave to be spun out ….by those in high office, until the
facts of the matter came to my attention, as I was thus by chance
encompassed amidst the foe and observed from close at hand that emperor
resisting entire Turkish regiments. 168
168
Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 4.22, 192, lines 12-22, (tr. Brand, 146-147).
57
The second is part of the description of the visit of Kilic Arslan II to
Constantinople in 1161:
Glorying in magnitude of his successes , the emperor made preparation for
a triumphal procession from the citadel itself to the famed church of Hagia
Sophia, so as to march in procession with him [Kilic Arslan II]; yet he did
not accomplish what he had intended. For [the patriarch] Loukas who was
the in charge of ecclesiastical matters was opposed to the action…When it
was late at night an immense upheaval suddenly shook the earth. The
Byzantines, deeming that Loukas’ counsels had been transgressed,
declared that the undertaking was contrary to God’s will…The conclusion
of the affair, however, clearly produced an explanation of what had
happened. For when, after many years had passed, Kilic Arslan became
careless of his engagements towards the emperor, he caused the Romans
to attack the Turks in full forse. By some chance the army fell into
difficult terrain, lost many of aristocracy, and came near a great disaster,
save that in warfare the emperor was there seen to surpass the bounds of
human excellence.169
At first sight, in this version there is no mention whatsoever of the Seljuks’ role in
the battle. The focus of narrative is limited to the Byzantine army, while the name of the
enemy at Myriokephalon is somehow missing. Why does the author, who was one of the
participants in the battle, refuse to identify the enemy in this small passage ?
The answer lies, I think, at least partly in the very aims of the imperial secretary.
Kinnamos is clearly writing his Deeds to glorify two emperors--John and Manuel
Komnenus. He draws attention to the personal actions of the emperors in various
situations, usually in combat, where their conduct is described with an abundance of
detail, which are used to create a “real background” for the heroes. At the same time,
Kinnamos is not a simple writer, as he is described in some scholarly literature. The
heroes of his Deeds remain human, and the author at some points even criticizes them.170
169
Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed. Meineke, 5.3, 206-207, (tr. Brand, 157)
See his characterization of the Manuel during the Ikonian expedition of 1146. Kinnamos, Epitoma, ed.
Meineke, 2.7, 51-52, (tr. Brand, 48).
58
170
Nevertheless, I think that the other persons, objects, and events appearing in his
work are just complex decorations, a background against which Kinnamos’ emperor
fulfills his duties. A reading of the whole chronicle shows that the Seljuks (called
“Persians” by Kinnamos in the Classicizing tradition) are among the most important
decorations of the show.171 The scene is organized in the traditional Byzantine way,
which goes back to Herodotus; the main dichotomy is that between the Greeks and the
barbarians.172 For Kinnamos, the Seljuks were enemies par excellence, the main object
on which John, and later Manuel, exercised their strategic and tactical talents. They
occupied Roman lands and provinces, which were to be returned. The land of the Seljuks
was the dangerous territory of Chaos, filled with mountains and dangerous passes, which
was to be changed by the activity of the emperor. The example of such activity is given at
the very end of the book in the description of the rebuilding of Dorylaion. The terms used
for the description of the Seljuk nobles underline their Otherness; Kinnamos calls them,
in a classicizing way, “satraps” and “phylarchs.”173
Thus, all the complexity and “Otherness” of the Seljuks are just proof of the
might of Manuel and John, who won many victories over them. This is probably the key
to the research question; despite the fact that the battle of Myriokephalon, in which John
probably participated himself, was not a clear victory, panegyric has its own laws. The
hero must be a hero. Even a failure should be represented as a heroic deed and mistakes
of military planning treated as a natural disaster. The role of the enemy in such a case is
171
About naming the Other in twelfth-century historical literature, see A. Kazhdan and A. W. Epstein,
Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1992), 168.
172
H. Ahrweiler, “Byzantine Concepts of the Foreigner: The Case of the Nomads” in Studies of the
International Diaspora of the Byzantine Empire, ed. H. Ahrweiler and A. E. Laiou (Washington:
Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1998), 11 (hereafter: Ahrweiler, “Concepts of the
Foreigner”).
59
the same. By introducing a danger, caused by the Seljuks (“the army fell into difficult
terrain, lost many of aristocracy, and came near a great disaster”), Kinnamos enhances
Manuel’s stature, who managed to save the situation (“emperor was there seen to surpass
the bounds of human excellence ”).174 The description of the exact details is not
important here--it could (and probably was) given later in the lost part of the work.
To sum up, one can surely speak about representation of the enemy in the two
pieces of evidence about the battle at Myriokephalon in the work of John Kinnamos is
based on the genre of the panegyric. The role of the enemy is limited and clear--they are a
threat, which, being overwhelmed by the main hero--constitutes a basis for the following
laudatio which the author dedicates to him. The imperial secretary probably took part in
the battle himself, but at the time of writing The Deeds literary elements were much more
important for him than the actual facts which he had seen with his own eyes. Still, his
evidence is not that complex because of the length of the surviving passages and because
of the character of the source itself. The situation is different when the source is written
with different purpose--such as in the case of the Letter of Manuel Komnenos to Henry II
Plantagenet.
b. The Letter of Manuel Komnenos
As was argued in chapter 1, the Letter of Manuel is an Auslandsbriefe, a
“Diplomatic letter.” Diplomatic letters make up a special genre. The composer of such a
document was required take into consideration many important things: The names and
titles of the sender and of the addressee, their status and the relation between them, the
173
The latter term is present in Procopius of Kaisareia, whose work Kinnamos probably used as a model.
See for example Procopius, History of the Wars, vol.1, tr. H. B. Delwig (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992 ) 150-151.
60
information which should be mentioned, the information which should be avoided, the
courtesy formulas of politeness,175 etc. At the same time, the writer obviously had to keep
in mind the audience for which the letter was written and represent all the details so as to
make it understandable to them. The case of the letter sent from Byzantium to England is
a good illustration of all features of this tricky genre. 176 The image of the enemy is
introduced already in the third sentence of the letter:
Thus, from the beginning [of our reign] our imperial majesty had
nourished hatred in his heart against the Persians, the enemies of God,
when we have beheld them vaunting over the Christians, triumphing over
the name of God, and holding sway over the lands of Christians.
Wherefore, at another time, without delay, we made an attack upon them,
and, as God granted it, even so we did … But before we begin battle with
the barbarians… 177
The Seljuks, thus, are characterized by their religion, and later by their language
and culture. They are “the enemies of the God,” barbarians who are opposed by the
people of the Lord, the Byzantines. The naming of the enemy and their religious
characteristics are thus continued by the introduction of the enemy space and where they
recruit their forces. The place which the author of letter of Manuel is describing can be
interpreted as a reference to another important geographical term of the time, that of
“Khurasan,” the fatherland and the bastion of the Saracens in the chroniclers of the First
Crusade.178 A short piece of information about the military organization of the enemy is
also present. The Seljuk warriors of the Epistola are armed with bows and are divided
into infantry and cavalry. After this the text is dedicated to the description of the deeds of
Manuel, where the Seljuks play a decorative role. The only thing which can be learnt
174
Kinnamos, Epitoma, see above p. 53
Dölger and Karayannopulos, Byzantinische Urkundenlehre, 90-93.
176
I have to add a reminder here that the text was found in the work of an English chronicler. I argued in
chapter 1 that the text saved by Roger was probably a Latin translation of the Greek letter.
177
Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 102, lines 10-16, 29 (Vasilyev, 237,238).
178
S. Louuchitskaya, The Image of Other, 179-180.
61
175
about them from the text is that they were shocked by the bravery of the emperor. This
feature of the Byzantine leader led to the peace treaty with Kilic Arslan II (who appears
here for the first time in the text): the latter had to beg Manuel to be so good as to grant
him peace.179
The enemy is thus depicted with the help of the traditional vocabulary: the Seljuks
are adversus Dei and at the same time they are “barbarians.” This is the tradition of
depicting the nomadic Other; the same definition of the “barbarians” and “enemies of
God” of northern Scythians has been identified by H. Ahrweiler in the work of
Constantine Porphyrogenitus.180 This is nearly all; other features of enemy--its multitude,
its respect for Manuel’s bravery, and even the submission of their leader, seem to be part
of a panegyric construction similar to that found in Kinnamos. I doubt whether one can
speak here about conscious representation – what is present is rather an image of the
enemy which is simple and much less complex than that drawn by other contemporary
writer--Nicetas Choniates.
c. The case of Nicetas Choniates
Nicetas Choniates is considered to have been one of the most prominent writers of
the time. His main work, Historia, is innovative in many ways. First, it is characterized
by the presence of a special method of developing the image of a hero, which Kazhdan
called Byzantine psychologism.181 Second, it is laced with a cunning network of
associations which is built up with elaborate and complex metaphors. The third feature is
the “wonderfully rich” vocabulary of the author, which enables him to include charming
Epistola, ed. Stubbs, 104, lines 25-26 : “…suscepit Soldani deprecationem et foedera et juramneta
peracta sub vexillis nostris, et pacem suam ei dedit”.
180
Ahrweiler, “Concepts of the Foreigner,” 4.
181
[A. Kazhdan] А. Каждан,“Никита Хониат в Византийской литературе” (Nicetas Choniates in
Byzantine literature), 325.
62
179
rhetorical word-plays in the text.182 At the same time, Nicetas is innovative. His approach
to different topics was not always in accordance with the approaches of his
contemporaries, or was even opposed to them. Magdalino studied this approach in the
example of the image of Manuel Komnenos.183 In the following text I will try to make a
similar analysis of the depiction of the Seljuks in the battle at Myriokephalon. and find
out the main features of the image/representation of the enemy underlined by Choniates.
The first thing to begin with is the role of the description of the battle as a whole.
Manuel’s expedition to Ikonion and his war with the “Eastern enemy” occupy the
largest part of the sixth book of Nicetas’ narrative. Such a detailed description is a rare
thing; the siege of Constantinople, which is the central event of the whole work, occupies
much less space in the physical sense. What are the reasons for such a great and detailed
description of the battle? Why is it so important to show it in this narrative? To answer
these two questions one must first find the relations between the account in the Historia
and other contemporary sources about the battle
The first more or less critical approach towards this part of Nicetas’s work was
that of Ferdinand Chalandon, who basically suggested that Nicetas’ account was based on
some unknown source.184 The study of Choniates’ sources for Myriokephalon stopped at
this point for the next fifty years. Kazhdan was the one to open a door for critics by
introducing his new approach towards Byzantine historical writing in general, and to the
work of Choniates in particular. The main barrier in the way of the researchers was thus
removed.
In 1995 a radical attack on the quality of the information provided by
Choniates was made by a prominent Russian Byzantinist, Jakob Ljubarskij. In one of his
last articles he clearly stated that Nicetas probably invented some episodes of the fight for
182
183
Kazhdan, ibid.,
Magdalino, The Empire, 13-15.
63
the sake of the Kaiserkritik.185 At the same time, a similar, but less radical, attempt was
made by Paul Magdalino, who claimed that the account of Choniates (who was aged
nineteen at the time of the battle) is not to be believed.186
These two positions are important. The attack of Ljubarskij pointed out that at
least some parts of book six can be considered literary fiction, while Magdalino
documented the ambiguous attitude of Choniates towards his main hero. Thus, Nicetas’
account is not just a tale of the events “as they happened,” as was taken for granted by the
Chalandon-style historiographers. His description, which is a mixture of reality and
fantasy, occupies a place in the conception of the whole work. To find out what this place
is one should analyze the story of the writing of Historia.
Nobody knows exactly when Nicetas began his work. Kazhdan says only that it
was finished after the fall of Constantinople, while Magoulias is totally silent on this
question.187 Kazhdan’s idea is a good starting point. If the Historia was begun before the
fall of Constantinople, its central idea could not be the fall of188 Constantinople itself. But
what could it be then? The main object of Nicetas’ narrative is clearly to show the slow
decline of the state, which becomes more and more obvious towards the end of the
work.189 The reason for this decline is, from one point of view, the reigns of the Angeloi
emperors and, from another, the Komnenoi, who were at the head of every revolt.190 This
entire situation was possible because of the dictatorship of Andronicus, which, in turn,
was possible because of the weak reign of Alexios II. The latter was a consequence of the
184
Chalandon, Les Comnène, 508.
Ljubarskij,” Manuel I,”108-109.
186
In his short account of the battle Magdalino does not give Choniates even a footnote, Magdalino, The
Empire, 96-97.
187
Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates in Byzantine literature,” 389; Choniates, O city of Byzantium, xvi-xvii.
185
189
190
Kazhdan, “Choniates in Byzantine Literature,” 304.
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Alexios Ang. 2, 529, (tr. Magoulias 290).
64
early death of Manuel. The latter two events, I think, are tightly connected to the single
Classical quotation present in the description of battle of Myriokephalon. The emperor,
returning home from the battlefield, refused to destroy Dorylaion and thus broke the oath
he had given to Kilic Arslan II on the battlefield. Choniates notes this with a quotation
from Herodotus:
Ye hath the Oath-God a son who is nameless, footless and handless
Mighty in strength he approaches vengeance, and overwhelms in
destruction
All who belong to the race, or the house of the man who is perjured
But oath-keeping men leave behind them flourishing offspring.191
Thus, the battle of Myriokephalon, which was followed by an oath not kept, can
be counted as a reason for all the future troubles of the ruling family (“house of the man”)
and even the whole empire (“race”). This is one explanation for the space the description
of the event occupies in the structure of the work. The second explanation, which does
not exclude the first, is that battle at Myriokephalon was the apex of Choniates’
Kaiserkritik.192
The tradition of “depicting a bad emperor in disaster” goes back at least to
Theophanes the Confessor, who carefully describes the ill-fated expedition of Emperor
Nicephoros against the Bulgarians.193 A similar episode is present in the later
Chronographia of Michael Psellos, where the author criticizes Roman IV Diogenes
harshly for refusing to listen to the advice of wiser people (among them Psellos, as he
191
Choniates, Historia, ed.Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 192, lines 7-11 ( Magoulias,108). This is a direct
quotation from Herodotus, see Herodotus, Historia, tr. G. Rawlinson (New York: 1945), 6.86 at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Herodotus/Herodotus6.html (last accessed 30.04.2007).
192
About Kaiserkritik in Choniates in general see Paul Magdalino, “Aspects of twelfth-century Byzantine
Kaiserkritik,” Speculum 58, No. 2 (1983): 326-346 (henceforth: Magdalino, Kaiserkritik).
193
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor:Byzantine and Near Eastern
History, A.D. 284-813, tr. C. Mango and R. Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 672-675.
35
Michael Psellus, Fourteen Byzantine Rulers: The Chronographia of Michael Psellus, tr. E.R.A. Sewter
(London: Penguin Books, 1966), 354-356. For a more detailed comparison of the image systems of
Choniates and Psellos see Ljubarskij, “Manuel I,” 105-106.
65
was eager to mention).194 In both cases the motivations of the critics were based on one
special feature of the ruler; Theophanes attacked the greed of Nicephoros, whose main
aim in the campaign was the treasury of the enemy, while Psellos attacked the pride of
the pompous warrior who did not want to hear advice from a prominent courtier. The
narrative about Myriokephalon is a combination of both these accusations; the criticism
of Choniates is aimed precisely at Manuel’s pride and at his greed. The night before the
battle, at the military council in the Byzantine camp, he “did not pay any heed
whatsoever to the words of the old men, but instead gave ear to his blood relations.”195
Manuel’s wish for money comes into focus in another episode between Manuel and an
unnamed warrior, who accuses him when he drinks water with blood from a small spring:
“often in the past you have drunk a bowl of Christian blood, stripping and cleaning your
subjects…”196 The love for external effect is mocked by Choniates, who, following the
Classical tradition, puts a joke about the color of the robes into the mouth of the Seljuk
Ambassador, Gabras. Another point of connection between Theophanes, Psellos, and
Nicetas is that all three point out the great abilities of the enemy leaders. In the case of
Theophanes it is Bulgarian khan Crum, in the case of Michael Psellos, the sultan of the
Seljuks, Alp-Arslan, and in the case of Choniates it is Kilic Arslan II. All three are direct
oppositions of the Byzantine emperors who they are opposing. Nicephoros is greedy,
Crum is not, Alp-Arslan can create a victorious stratagem, while Romanus Diogenos
can’t. In Kilic Arslan, opposition is emphasized; he and Manuel are different in all
possible ways. The Seljuk leader is weak in body, but clever in mind. He never goes
195
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 179, line 19-21, (tr. Magoulias, 101).
This is the first and the last time Choniates speaks about Manuel’s greed. Ljubarskij was the first to
point out that this is a topos. I might add that this is not a simple topos, but probably a borrowing from
Theophanes the Confessor, Ljubarskij, “Manuel I,” 108 .
66
196
personally to the battlefield, but prefers to manage the battle with the help of his generals,
while Manuel always leads his troops in person.197
Thus, I think that the description of the battle at Myriokephalon is one of the
culminations of Nicetas’ Kaiserkritik. At the same time, it would be too much to say that
the battle of Myriokephalon was seen by Choniates simply as a moment of punishment. It
was a catastrophe ordained by God, whose decisions are not known to humans. For
Choniates, it was clear that Myriokephalon was destined to happen--this is emphasized
by abundant Biblical quotations which, “destroying the individualization of the given
event,”198 connect the battle with episodes of Holy History. The Seljuks, as participants,
are analogized to Biblical actors.
An apocalyptic connotation is present in the description of the battle from the
moment of the destruction of the regiment led by Baldwin. ”The horse and rider were cast
down together”--says Choniates in an allusion to the prayer of Moses in the book of
Exodus.199 In the original context, the horse and rider meant the forces of the Egyptian
Pharaoh, who tried to return the Jews to Egypt.200 The colorful description of a local
Armageddon is continued by Choniates’ most frequently cited battle quotation:
The hollows were filled with bodies. The groves were glutted with the
fallen. The babbling, rushing streams flowed red with blood. Blood
commingled with blood, human blood with the blood of pack animals. The
horrors that took place there defy all description.201
For a while, the description is left unfinished, but then Choniates continues:
“Then a strong wind blew, whipping the sandy soil into a violent sandstorm that
enveloped both armies. They fell upon one another, attacking their adversaries as though
197
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 175,lines 18-20 (tr. Magoulias, 99).
Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates in Byzantine literature,” 312.
199
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6, ed. Van Dieten, 181, line 29: “ἵππος καὶ ἀναβάτης ὁμοῦ κατεβέβληντο”
(tr. Magoulias, 102).
200
The Bible quotations are given from the King James Bible, Exod. 15:1.
67
198
they were fighting in the night and in the darkness that can be felt.” 202 The last part of the
phrase sends the reader to the book of Exodus, where “darkness which may be felt” is
one of seven curses of Egypt.203 The final statement about the character of the whole
battle can be found in the speech of one of the unknown soldiers (who, as was stated in
chapter 1, could have been invented), who asks the emperor rhetorically: “Are you not
the one who squeezed us into these desolate and narrow paths, exposing us to utter ruin,
the one who has ground us as though in a mortar between these cliffs falling upon us and
the mountains pressing down upon us?”204
The end of the question, which can also be found in the Gospel of Luke, is a
direct reference to the Apocalypse in the original context. The battle is thus understood
not only as a punishment for the bad emperor, but as an outright apocalypse which was
caused by Manuel’s mistakes. Using this example, Choniates shows that an emperor can
be a cause of such a catastrophe.205 From another point of view, it may be that Nicetas is
demonstrating here the force of the Almighty, whose decisions and ways are unknown to
people.206
Thus, the battle is depicted on the three different layers. First, it is an indirect
reason for the fall of the house of Komnenoi. Second, it is an arena of Kaiserkritik, where
Choniates blames emperor for his mistakes in politics. Third, it is a catastrophe in the
Biblical sense.
All these layers define the representation of the Seljuks which is built up in this
part of Chonaites Narrative. The first thing to note here is the relative unwillingness of
201
Choniates, O City, ibid.
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 183, lines 25-30, (tr. Magoulias, 103).
203
Exod. 10:2.
204
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 187, lines 20-29, (tr. Magoulias, 106).
205
Magdalino states that Choniates depicts a “typical emperor” in the face of Manuel, see Magdalino,
“Kaiserkritik,” 327.
68
202
the author to note such components of the image of the other as linguistic differences and
military organization. The enemy language remains vague; in the only scene when the
“silent multitude” of Seljuks has a word, the language spoken is not specified and only its
characteristic (“piercing”) gives one a chance to suppose that it was not Greek .207 The
military organization is also not clear; the term “Turkish phalanx” is often used, but
without a clear description of this formation. Still, the warriors are differentiated; among
the warriors of Kilic Arslan II Nicetas lists archers (without specifying whether they were
footmen or horsemen) and some heavily-armed cavalrymen, whose “phalanx” Manuel
had to fight through.208 Moreover, the author also describes some “special forces” of the
Seljuks, who attacked the emperor and his companions.
I have two explanations for such unwillingness to talk about these elements; the
first is that Choniates did not need to explain to his readers what the Seljuk military and
language were and second is that the military and linguistic side here was not important.
What was more important was the tradition, the heritage of Classical antiquity with its
specific relations to barbarians, which plays a considerable role in the formation of the
image of the enemy on the battlefield itself.
Some features of Seljuks as barbarians are clearly underlined by Choniates in his
narrative of the battle, first of all, their inclination towards money and plunder. Seljuk
leaders persuaded Kilic Arslan II to make peace because of the wish for gold, while
during the battle Manuel and his warriors saw their money stolen. Another “barbaric”
feature is their delight in cruelty; the most spectacular episode of the whole description is
probably the depiction of the fallen warriors with their members cut off. Another feature
206
207
Still, in most cases the Will of the Lord is the Will for Punishment Kazhdan, Nicetas Choniates, 237.
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6, ed. Van Dieten, 186, lines 2-3: “διαπρυσίοις φωναῖς” (Magoulias, 105).
69
of the Seljuks, according to Choniates, was their fickleness; they did not obey the treaties
and were not people whom one should believe. Even after concluding the peace the
Byzantine army was attacked by their cavalry. Their dress and weaponry were strange
and exotic; the author seems to be fascinated by the Seljuk elite warriors and depicts
them carefully:
All were mounted on Arab stallions, and in appearance they stood out
from the many; they carried elegant weapons, and their horses were
bedecked with splendid ornaments, in particular with adornments of
tinkling bells suspended from horsehair that reached far down the neck.209
I think that here Choniates is not simply introducing the reader to a spectacular
detail. One can note rather his attention towards the Other’s exotic outlook, which was
already present in Herodotus.210 The Classical comparison of the Seljuks with water was
already discussed above. Another Classical element is the depiction of the “fickleness” of
Other, which connects the Seljuks with Herodotus’ Scythians and makes the image even
more complex (Seljuks= Persians+Scythians=Barbarians?). Some features of Choniates’
Seljuks are common to the “barbarians” of the Byzantine historical literature of the
twelfth century. They are greedy neighbors (in most cases of the Latins), always inclined
to rob and pillage.211 The depiction of bloody scenes is also a “trademark” of Choniates,
who is attentive to food, sex, and blood in the pages of the Historia.212 Thus, the Seljuks
as barbarians do not appear in the description of the battle in full Classical robes, but
wear some remnants of them.
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6, ed. Van Dieten, 183, lines 3: “διειληφυίαςἐξώλισθε φάλαγγος.”
Magoulias speaks here about an “iron grip,” but I did not find the word “iron” in the phrase. See
Magoulias, 103.
209
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 185, lines 16-20, (tr. Magoulias, 104).
210
Hartog, The Mirror of the Other,230-237.
211
Greed is the main negative feature of Choniates’ Latins. See Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates in Byzantine
literature,” 303.
212
About food and sex see Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates and his time,” 135-141.
70
208
Choniates’ “barbarians” also imply religious Otherness.213 In the description of
the night after the battle, Nicetas, giving notice of the change in the situation, he states
that the Lord “who does not allow the rod of sinners to be upon the lot of the righteous,
had compassion for the holy nation, not wishing to cast them off forever.”214 This points
out another feature of the enemy. They are “sinners.” This is already a religious
definition, which, from my point of view, can be seen as an indication of the religion of
the enemy. Strangely enough, these are nearly all the mentions of the enemy religion in
the description of the battle at Myriokephalon. The only exception is his explanation of
the atrocities committed on the fallen warriors: “It was said that the Turks took those
measures so that the circumcised could not be distinguished from the uncircumcised.”215
Even if the religion of the enemy and the relations towards it are not well defined here,
the fact of the Seljuks belonging to Islam is deliberately stated by the author.
These images of the victory of the Infidels return one to the about the role of the
battle in general. As I said above, it is the apex of Kaiserkritik and a mini-Apocalypse at
the same time. Choniates, above all, is a Christian – and the Seljuks are for him the
“Hand of the Lord.”216 The Turkish archers shoot down Byzantine cavalrymen and in this
context Choniates places a quotation from the prayer of Moses, where the Lord “cast
down horse and rider.” The Seljuks are seen here as the ones through whom the Lord is
fulfilling his will. This quotation from book of Moses has another connotation as well.
The instrument which had cast down horse and rider in the book of Exodus was the Red
Sea. The Seljuks are, in a way, similar to a wave of water, which, for Choniates, is nearly
H. Ahrweiler, “The Concept of the Foreigner,” 11.
Choniates, Historia, Manuel 6, ed. Van Dieten ,188, line 4: “ὁ μὴ τὴν ῥάβδον τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν ἐπὶ τὸν
κλῆρον τῶν δικαίων ἐῶν,” (tr. Magoulias, 106).
215
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 190, lines 9-12, (tr. Magoulias, 107)
216
Kazhdan, “Nicetas Choniates,” 293-294.
71
213
214
always a bad thing.217 In the context of the Seljuk situation, however, things are even
more complicated; Nicetas is probably alluding to the imagery used by Aeschylus, who,
in his Persians, also compared the army of Xerxes with a “huge flood” or “mighty
stream.”218 The same image (of on-rushing water) appears again in the description of the
“general context” of the Byzantino-Seljuk military conflict at the very end of book 3:
“The sultan like a swollen torrent, deluged and swept away everything before him...”219 A
similar metaphor can be found in the post-battle description of the dream of Manuel,
where the emperor saw himself on a ship which was suddenly crushed by mountains and
he barely reached land.220
This image is amplified by another set of allusions, which are triggered by a
group of biblical quotations associated with the figure of David They are present in
abundance especially in the description of the latter part of the battle. The first one clearly
connects Manuel to King David: “But beyond all expectation he escaped the clutches of
barbarians, protected by God who long ago had screened David’s head on the day of
battle.”221 Afterwards the same image of David is repeated several times. The Seljuk
leaders are associated not with Goliath but with Chusi and Achitophel. When the sultan
decides to make peace with the emperor, Nicetas notes: “Thus He who sets as naught the
counsel of Achitophel by way of Chusi and changes Absalom’s mind by promising ever
[A. Kazhdan] А. Каждан. “Корабль в бурном море.” К вопросу о соотношении образной системы
и исторических взглядов двух византийских писателей. (“The ship in the rough sea.” On the question
of correlating the systems of images and historical views of two Byzantine authors) in [A. Kazhdan]
А.Каждан. Никита Хониат и его время (Nicetas Choniates and his time (Saint Petersburg: Dimitriy
Bulanin, 2005), 365.
218
Aeschylus, Persians, tr. H. W. Smyth, (Harvard University Press, 1926): 87-92 at http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0012:line=87 (last Accessed 21.04.2007). The latter
variant is taken from the work of B. Isaac, who used a different translation but does not give the exact data
of the source, see Isaac, The Invention, 275.
219
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 3, 123, lines 22-23 (tr. Magoulias, 70). This expression is a
clear allusion to the above-mentioned passage of Aeschylus.
220
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 190, lines 19-25, (tr. Magoulias, 107).
72
217
greater destruction against his enemies, deflected the Turkish ruler from his duty.”222 This
comparison is not accidental here. A long time before the description of the battle
Choniates states that Kilic Arslan II and Manuel were, on the symbolic level, father and
son.223 According to the article of Antony La Bruyer, Hasan Ibn Gabras, who, according
to Choniates was a main advisor of Kildj Arslan, could also have been a renegade who
defected to the Seljuk side. The the whole comparison with the biblical characters
appears to be quite exact. David/Manuel is pursued by his bad son Absalom/Kilic Arslan
II, and is given advice by a former general of David--Chusi/Gabras. Thus, in this
complex image one can observe a clear statement of the relations between the rulers of
two states, who are “father and son,” but what is more important is the emphasis on the
fact that it was God’s protection that saved Manuel’s life, not his personal courage
To sum up, the in the case of Nicetas Choniates one should speak about the
representation of the enemy. This representation is very complex. Its complexity is
closely related to the different roles which the description of the battle plays on the
different levels of the narrative of Choniates. First, the “eastern enemy” is one of the
sides who took the oath, the violation of which is one of the unspoken explanations for
the fall of the house of Komnenus. Their second role is, however, even more important.
In Choniates’ theology of history they are weapons in the hand of the Lord, barbarians
who punish the “chosen nation” and its rulers for their sins. By the introduction of a
single but complex Bible quotation, Nicetas seems to be alluding to the special relations
of symbolic kinship which united Manuel Komnenos and Kilic Arslan II. Nicetas seems
reluctant to use more basic categories of Otherness; the Muslim nature of the enemy is
221
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 183, lines 14-16 (tr. Magoulias, 103). Kazhdan argues
that this quotation is a good example of Byzantine irony in Nicetas Choniates, ibid.. Jakob Ljubarskij also
speaks of Byzantine irony, but did not discuss this case, see Ljubarskij,” Manuel I,”108-109.
222
Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 6, 188, lines 8-10, (tr. Magoulias, 106) .
73
pointed out only twice and the language they speak is not clearly identified. The military
organization was not interesting to author at all, but he describes the general “Turkish”
style of warfare and some special warriors quite well. One may note here a Herodotian
feeling of ethnological interest towards the Other. The perception of the enemy leader is
based on the concept of the mirror: Kilic Arslan II is the complete opposite of Manuel in
all possible ways. The most interesting element is the depiction of the converted
Christian, Hasan Ibn Gabras, who was even able to produce an example of deep irony.
Thus, the depiction of the Seljuks is no simpler than any other depictions
produced by Choniates. It is innovative and complex; barbarians are no
just
“decorations” of a panegyric as with Kinnamos or the enemies par excellence from the
official diplomatic letter. Their image is complex and versatile. In its construction the
author used complex schemes of Classical and Christian associations, allusions, and
indirect quotations, which has made his work of interest for scholars.
3) The case of Michael the Syrian
The theology of history of Choniates connects him with the fourth source for the “image
of the enemy”--the work of Michael the Syrian. But if Nicetas was a subject of Manuel
Komnenos, the Syrian patriarch was a subject and probably even a friend of the enemy
of the latter – Kilic Arslan II. As Choniates he was a contemporary of the battle at
Myriokephalon and inserted a lengthy account of it in his chronicle.224
This account, framed by two additional chapters (one following and the preceding
it) form a clear block in the larger narrative of the Chronicle. They present a small story
223
.Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten, Manuel 3, 123, lines 15-20, (tr. Magoulias, 70).
74
which explains how Melitene happened to fall into the hands of Kilic Arslan II. This
story is characterized by particular attention to events which occurred far from the main
centers of the narrative--in the monastery of Bar Sauma and in northern Palestine.
Moreover, it consists of some very strange information which suggests that one of the
sources for the whole piece may have been a participant in the events on the Seljuk side.
The pages of the Syrian patriarch, thus, can contain an echo of the voice of the Seljuk
“silent multitude.”
My task here is to catch this echo – if there is any. To do this one must first limit
the area of the search and cut off the elements which are clearly not Seljuk. The most
apparent is the theological statement at the end of the account: “Et qui ne confesserait,
que rien n’arrive sur la terre sans le consentement d’en haute, selon des ses seins
impénétrables.”225 This statement is clearly neutral: nothing can happen without the will
of God. The battle is perceived as a strange event which can be explained by the wish of
the Supreme Being. At this point, as one can clearly see, Nicetas Choniates and Michael
the Syrian are in total agreement. But this is the only common point, later Choniates
develops his argument and clearly takes sides in the conflict, while Michael the Syrian
gives a shorter description and does not openly take sides. Maybe it would be more
correct to say that he in fact takes sides–with himself.
If in the story of Choniates one can still find good heroes, in the story of Michael
the Syrian it is the other way round. For him everybody is bad. Turcomans are bad
because they offend the sultan and do not obey his orders. They are numerous and
dangerous like locusts.226 Byzantines are slightly better. Manuel Komnenos is an
224
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol.3, 20.5, 370-372.
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 20.5, 272
226
Michael The Syrian, Chronicle, 20.5, ed. Chabot, 270: “les Turcomans…innombrables comme la
sauterelle.”
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225
impetuous avenger, who, blinded by personal tragedy, is leading his army with all its
baggage into dangerous places.227 The warriors of the empire are for Michael a Grey
Mass – all that is known about them is that when they realized that their food and water
was cut off, they panicked.228 The Seljuks are probably the best of all. Kilic Arslan II is a
coward, but nevertheless is able to plan the campaign and achieve victory over a
dangerous enemy. Another compliment to the Seljuk leader lies in a hidden hint to his
Christian origins. When the Turcomans offend him, according to Chabot, they call him
“traitre,” “betrayer.” The situation, however, is much more interesting: Raif Guseynov
stated that the exact translation could be “infidel.”229 This may be a way of pointing out
the origins of Kildj Arslan II – as I argued in chapter 2, his mother was probably a
Christian.
Are there here any components of “Seljuk representation”? . I’m not sure
.Nevertheless in the story of Michel the Syrian there are two points which can be
connected with the later Seljuk “representations of the enemy” In epos and
historiography. The main problem is that they could equally be simply the parts of the
image or even topoi of Michael himself. Nevertheless, in the following part I will try to
build up a hypothesis that they are not. The first of them is the motif of food and eating –
as was said above, the Byzantine army panicked when the soldiers realized that their food
was lost.
This motif can also be found in the work of the first chronographer of the Seljuks
of Asia Minor, Ibn-Bibi, who incorporated a story about a visit of the future sultan KayKhusraw to Constantinople into his narrative. The actual event happened some ten years
Michael The Syrian, Chronicle, 20.5, ed. Chabot, 270: “Quand l’empereur des Grecs Manuel, apprit que
son neveu avait été tué a la porte de Neocesaree, il partit en colère pour venir tirer vengeance des Turcs. ”
228
Michael The Syrian, Chronicle, 20.5, ed. Chabot, 271: “Quand l’empereur et son armée apprirent que
leur richesses étaient perdues et que la nourriture… avait été enlevée, ils firent saisis d’une grand terreur ”
76
227
after Myriokephalon. Ibn Bibi was writing in the second half of the thirteenth century and
probably dealt with oral tradition. The story itself is simple: a young prince, KayKhusraw, comes to Constantinople, is received well by the emperor, but later has a
problem with a Frankish mercenary, whom he finally meets in a melee fight and wins.230
The important thing here is that Constantinople is depicted as a city of eating: this was
the main occupation of the Seljuk prince and emperor there. They ate every day before
the conflict with the Frank and even after; the victory of Kay-Khusraw is just a pretext
for another feast.
The special attention of Byzantines to the food is also described in one of the
earliest work of Seljuk poetry – the Danishmend-name. This is a Moslem epic of
Anatolia which tells the life story of a Seljuk ghazi, whose historical prototype was
probably Emir Danishmend – founder of the dynasty of Danishmendides -- which held
several territories in northern Anatolia until their fall, which was described in the preface
to chapter 2. The whole “canon” of the oral story was formed in thirteenth century and
written down in the fifteenth. The value of it as a historical source is much debated, but I
think it still possible to use it for comparing general concepts of the Other The
description of the reception of the main antagonist, Nestor, goes as follows:
On dressa sur les tables des viandes des porc.
Oignions, ail, fromages, caviar,
Poireaux prépares avec toutes sortes d’herbes, insectes a carapaces, rôtis de rats
Et ce vin rouge du pays des francs231
Gusseynov, R. A “From the history of the relations between Byzantium and Seljuks,” 165.
A short version of the story can be found in the abridged version of the work of Ibn-Bibi, translated into
German by Herbert Duda. Luckily enough, a Russian Byzantinist and Orientalist of the nineteenth century,
Platon Melioranskij, translated the part of the Ottoman translation of the full chronicle dedicated to the
visit of Kay-Khusraw into Constantinople, see Die Seltschuckengeschichte des Ibn Bibi, tr. H. Duda
(Copenhagen Muksgaard, 1959), 29; [P. Melioranskij] П. Мелиоранский, “Сельджук-наме как источник
для истории Византии в XII-XIII вв.” (The Seljuk-name as a source for the history of twelfth-thirteenth
century Byzantium), VV 1 (1894): 617,620 (hereafter: Melioranski, “Seljuk-name”).
231
Danishmend-Name, tr. E. Melikoff, (Paris: Masoneufe, 1966), 277 (hereafter: Danishmend-Name, tr. E.
Melikoff).
77
229
230
The object of judgment here is not just the love for food, but the exaggeration of
it. In the story of Michael the Syrian the loss of reserve rations turned the Byzantine army
into chaos, while in the Danishmend-name the reception is a feast for the stomach for the
“Mecreyants.” It seems to me that these two opinions are the two sides of one coin. The
phrase about food in the Chronicle of the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch may be connected
with the “Seljuq side.”
Another phrase with such connections is that about the wealth of the imperial
army, which carried in its baggage: “L’or, les eglises, les croix et les objets de tout
nature.”232 The gold is mentioned a second time at the very end of the story – and is again
clearly associated with the Byzantines. Similar things are present in the narrative of IbnBibi. After the victory of a future sultan, the emperor presented him with robes, horses,
wallets full of golden coins, slaves, silver, and golden goblets.233 The same motif of
Byzantine wealth is present later; after a long series of feasts the emperor ordered his
servants to carry all the golden and silver vessels to the house of the sultan.234 The
Byzantines in this story are weak, but rich; the same is true for similar images found in
Danishmend-name, where the Seljuks always capture great quantities of booty. For
example, after the capture of Derbendpes Melik Ghazi Danishmend sent the caliph of
Baghdad “dix ballots de tresors.”235 As in the previous cases, all have a common point –
the underlining of the large quantity of gold in the hands of the enemy.
Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, 20.5, ed. Chabot, vol. 3, 372:”L empereur de retour à Constantinople
envoya beaucoup d’or au sultan et recupera la croix dans laquelle était le bois de la crucifixition.”
233
Melioranski, “Seljuk-name,”620.
234
This episode is probably a distant echo of the real event. In 1161 Manuel Komnenos presented to Kilic
Arslan II a huge number of silver beakers and golden vessels, see Choniates, Historia, ed. Van Dieten,
Manuel 3, 120, 31 (tr. Magoulias, 68) .
235
Danishmend-Name, tr. E. Melikoff, 253.
78
232
This is, to reiterate again, just a hypothesis. The elements of the representation of
the enemy in the story of Michael the Syrian may be just markers of facts. As I argued in
chapter 2 the Byzantine army probably had problems with reserves of food before the
battle. Nevertheless, the comparison between the chapter about the battle at
Myriokephalon in the work of Michael the Syrian from one side and the Danishmendname and work of Ibn-Bibi from the other, allows me to say that the possibility of
connecting the images of the Byzantines in all three pieces can not be totally accepted.
4) Enemies at Myriokephalon: Representations and
images
All Byzantine depicitons of the enemy analyzed so far have a common basis, the
traditional conception of an “impious, nomadic-barbarian Other“236. Nevertheless they
are very different: if in case of John Kinnamos and Nicetas Choniates one can surely
speak about representations, the depiction of the Seljuks in Epistola is much more direct
and can be hardly called as such This is defined by the very aim of each piece.
Kinnamos wrote a panegyric history. For him the most important feature of the
Seljuks was that they were barbarians -- a natural object for the deeds of the emperor.
The author of the Epistola was much more interested in the very message than in the
elaborated details. He draws rather an image that n a conscious representation. The case
of Choniates is completely opposite. In his description of the battle prominent bureaucrat
created the most complex representation
236
Ahrweiler, “Concept of the foreigner”, ibid.
79
building a whole network of elaborate
comparisons and metaphors. He made the Seljuks no more and no less than a weapon of
the Lord which was used to crush the emperor.
The same idea is present in the narrative of Michael the Syrian. Nevertheless, the
difference between him and Choniates is huge; Nicetas takes sides, while Michel does
not. For him, all the participants are bad; he only seems to make an exception for the
Seljuks (not the Turcomans!) who were slightly better than the rest. Seljuk evidence is
present in the text, and it seems to me that some traces of the Seljuk representation of the
Byzantines can also be found there. A comparison with later sources allows selection of
two components of such representation – one of the “Greeks as food-lovers” and another
one of “rich Byzantines.”; In the same time one can not except the possibility that both
point can be just the elements of the image or topoi introduced not by the Seljuks but by
the Micheal the Syrian himself.
80
Conclusions
This study of the factual side of the battle at Myriokephalon has allowed me to
reveal several major points. The first is that the battle was partly accidental; I think that in
1175 Manuel Komnenos wanted to reach an agreement with Kilic Arslan II about his
army crossing through the land of the latter, but did not succeed. The important thing is
that in the beginning the campaign was not directed towards Ikonion, but later on,
because of the chain of events described in the beginning of the chapter 2, the Byzantine
emperor started a war against the Seljuk sultan, whose state had swallowed the remnants
of the lands of Danishmendids. I think that this war did not aim at destroying the
sultanate or conquering the Anatolian Plateau. Manuel was probably interested in
seriously weakening Kilic Arslan II and in returning the land of the Danishmendids to its
former owners – but no more than that. His real aim lay in the lands of Palestine, where
he was going to help the Crusader States in their fight against Saladin. The Seljuks were
just an obstacle on the road which had to be overcome or circumvented.
The second point is that the Byzantine emperor did his best to avoid this obstacle.
On the day before the battle he probably not only remembered the situation of 1147,
when his army was attacked on the eastern end of the same defile, but especially ordered
the experienced units of his army to occupy a hill there. Somehow the Byzantine
commanders did not know about the Seljuks who occupied the heights of Myriokephalon.
Perhaps the Turcomans killed everybody leaving the Byzantine camp, thus cutting off the
possibility of any reconnaissance.
The third point is that I find no reason to state that the emperor behaved like a
coward. The only basis for this accusation is three episodes in the Historia of Nicetas
81
Choniates, which should be considered as an element of Kaisekritik, in other words,
fictional episodes which were used by the Byzantine writer to create an ideological
construction in his literary work.
The fourth point is that during the night after the battle at Myriokephalon, Kilic
Arslan II may have been afraid for his life in the same way that Manuel Komnenos was.
His army, a considerable part of which consisted of “invited” Seljuks from Eastern lands,
was occupied primarily with robbing the bodies of the fallen, while his gulyam guards
probably had serious losses and were few in number. The situation was even worse
because of a sandstorm, which caused panic in both formations. Thus, Kilic Arslan II had
no less of a basis for an immediate peace agreement than Manuel himself.
The fifth point is that one can speak about two rounds of negotiations between
Kilic Arslan II and Manuel Komnenos. One took place in the night from the 17th to the
18th of September and did not yield any result, while the second began on the day of the
18th of September, when both sides realized the situation. The peace agreement, the
conditions of which are well-known, was followed by an exchange of gifts which, I think,
marked a change in the symbolic relationship between Manuel and the sultan of Ikonion.
Before this treaty they had considered themselves as father and son, while the character
of the presents here suggests an equality, which was noted in one of the later sources.
The sixth (and final) point is that the destruction of Soublaion and the saving of
Dorylaion can be explained by the Turcoman attacks on the retreating Byzantine column
after the battle. Michael the Syrian clearly states that Manuel was offended by this
aggression, which occurred only a short time after the peace agreement, and, taking this
as a violation of the treaty, he decided to violate it himself. Nevertheless, later both sides
82
came to an agreement, which was signified by the return of Manuel’s treasures for
ransom.
These are the moments which I think were the most important in the first part of
the work. The second part allowed me to find out a number of additional things. The first
is that the Byzantine system of description of the enemy was based on the traditional
genesis of the cultures of Christendom and Classical antiquity. The complexity and depth
of this synthesis depended greatly on the character of the work, its audience, and the
person of the writer. John Kinnamos wrote a glorifying history of John and Manuel
Komnenos; for him Seljuks were just part of the panegyric construction. The situation
with the letter of Manuel Komnenos was, however, different; here the task of the author
was rather to pass information than to provoke symbolic associations and one should
speak rather about the image of the enemy than about its representation. The situation
changes in the narrative of Nicetas Choniates, who gives a good example of the complex
multilayered representation of the enemy. Being the lengthiest among the Byzantine
sources it is at the same time the most complex. The problem here is that the battle of
Myriokephalon occupies a considerable place in the whole structure of Nicetas’ work. It
was an arena for Kaiserkirtik and a place of apocalypse at the same time. Seljuks were
the barbarians. At the same time they were the hand of the God, by which the Almighty
punished his chosen people – the Byzantines.
A similar point is also present in the work of the Michael the Syrian. His
depiction of the enemy is not that of a Seljuk; he combines negative relations towards all
the participants of the battle – Byzantines, Turcomans, Seljuks -- with a slightly more
positive approach towards the latter. At the same time, two points of his narrative may
have some connection with the Seljuq representations of Byzantines. The first is the
83
relation of the Byzantines to food and the second is their wealth. The main problem here
is that both may be simply topoi, or an elements of the image so here the result is still on
the border of a hypothesis. Thus one can say that the Seljuk image of the enemy is almost
imperceptibly presented in the story of Michael the Syrian – if it is presented at all.
These are the main results of this study. I believe that the two research questions
that I posed in the beginning – the one about the battle and the one about the construction
of the enemy in the sources of both sides -- answered. I also think that each of them is a
path to wider horizons of study.
The reconstruction of the battle at Myriokephalon can lead to a wider discussion
about the Byzantino-Seljuk conflict of the twelfth century in general or form the basis for
a smaller work dedicated to the influence of military theory on the actual stratagems of
the Byzantine and Seljuk armies. A special study can be and should be dedicated to all
the sources about the battle and the interconnections among them. At the same time, the
chapter on the images and representations of the enemy can generate further studies on
the image of the Seljuks in the Byzantine historiography of the twelfth century. It could
also become the starting point for a comparison of the system of images and
representations of the Other, in Michael the Syrian and the systems of images and
representations of his Byzantine contemporaries.
84
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Appendix 1. Maps
Map 1. The position of Byzantine Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean (after P.
Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180), map 1)
92
Map 2. The way to Myriokephalon. After P. Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I
Komnenos (1143-1180), map 2.
Legend:
-
the original way of the Army of Manuel according to Kinnamos and
Choniates.
Alternative way of Byzantine army to Ikonion.
- The fortresses of Dorylaion and Soublaion rebuilt by Manuel in 1175 .
93
Map 3. The probable place of the battle of Myriokephalon in the neighborhood of the
village of Kizil Ören. After Tabula Imperii Byzantini , vol. 7, Phrygien und Pisidien
(Vienna: 1990).
N
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