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INTRODUCTION
The underlying contention within this essay is that the limits of a guilty secret can only be defined by an
overriding duty to the court. Notions of honesty and trust are not sufficient. In considering this broad
contention, this essay shall explore the manner in which confidentiality issues have arisen in Australian
history, focusing particularly on the Dean’s Controversy. The current approach to confidentiality in
Victorian law will also be explored before being applied to the Dean’s Controversy. In doing so, the
strengths and weaknesses of the underlying reasons for our current position shall also be discussed.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The Nature of a Confession…
It is impossible to equate a client’s confession of guilt with a legally binding declaration of guilt or
innocence. There are numerous factors that affect the apparent truth and validity of a client’s
confession. For example, they might be under duress, there might be a language barrier, they might
make the confession under compulsion or undue influence, might have been tricked (Meagher tricked
Dean), might be a confession based on a misunderstanding of the charges or it might be to protect a
third party. The accused must have their day in court. There is no superior method of determining guilt
or innocence. The prosecution might not have enough evidence to convict the accused, in which case
the defendant shall be declared innocent regardless of any secret guilty confessions. It is paramount
that a confession of guilt is not ultimately determinative of a verdict of guilty in order to preserve the
sanctity of the judicial system.
Privileged or Merely Confidential: does it matter?
Legal professional privilege entitles a client to demand that all communications between themselves
and their lawyers are kept confidential. Some documents are further protected under privileged
information legislation and do not have to be disclosed except in certain circumstances. For the
purposes of discussing whether or not lawyers have an obligation or a duty to keep a guilty secret there
is no significant difference between merely confidential information and privileged information. A
confession of guilt may exist in document form, but is far more likely to occur during the course of a
spoken discussion between client and lawyer (see Dean’s Controversy or Tuckiar’s Case).
Certain circumstances will preclude the right to privilege; for example, the crime or fraud exception.
There is no right to privilege if the communication is for the “furtherance of an improper purpose such
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as the commission of a crime”.1 This includes intended civil fraud and intended crime.2 Brennan CJ
described this illegal or improper purpose as one that is “contrary to the public interest”.3 In keeping
such a secret, the lawyer will be aiding and abetting the future crime. In these circumstances, there is an
obligation to disclose the information because of a higher duty to the administration of justice.4 Privilege
is also lost if the communication ceases to be confidential or if the client agrees to waiver the privilege.
Ultimately, privilege is a balancing act between the State’s power to compel disclosure and the
individual’s rights to privacy and freedom from interference by the State.5
CONFLICT OF DUTIES
The debate about confidentiality revolves around conflicting perspectives and legal duties. Clients
usually disclose information to their lawyers because they have a secret that they want kept. They are
looking for advice and support in maintaining their story. Lawyers, on the other hand, have numerous
duties that are potentially conflicting; to the client and their secret and to the court that arise because
they are officers of the court. The court has a duty to administer justice fairly and with regard to all of
the available evidence whilst the wider public seeks reassurance that the law is just, applied justly and
protective of the wider community against the actions of individuals.6
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS: EARLY AUSTRALIA
There is no doubt that Meagher was acting unprofessionally when he continued to advocate for Dean’s
innocence with the knowledge that Dean had purchased poison for the purpose of poisoning his wife.
Meagher induced his colleague, Crick, to instigate a parliamentary committee for the sole purpose of
1
Lindsay, Geoff. “A Question of Conscience, A Question of Trust: Honesty, Legal Ethics and the Limits of a Guilty Secret”, (2008)
The Francis Forbes Society for Australian Legal History, 1-36.
2
Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382 per O’Conner J & Griffith CJ. See also Attorney General (Northern
Territory) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500, [8] per Dawson J; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Ltd
(1997) 188 CLR 501.
3
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 per Brennan CJ.
4
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) rr 3.1.2 & 3.1.3.
5
Lindsay, Geoff. “A Question of Conscience, A Question of Trust: Honesty, Legal Ethics and the Limits of a Guilty Secret”, (2008)
The Francis Forbes Society for Australian Legal History, 1-36, [58].
6
Ibid [23].
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making sure the “prisoner gets the fairest of fair play”7 by instituting “a thorough and impartial
investigation, so that the truth may be ascertained”.8 It appears that the members of parliament
debating this issue were already convinced of Dean’s innocence. They justified a parliamentary
committee on the basis that the government should “afford a helping hand to those who are
oppressed”9 because the parliament is “peculiarly the champions of the people’s liberties”.10 Crick also
said, “… if I think a man has had an improper trial, or has been brutally treated by the judge and
improperly convicted, I will use every means in my power to see that that man gains his liberty”11 [own
emphasis]. Undoubtedly, his choice to support Dean would be measurably different had he known of
Dean’s confession. Dean’s confession of guilt occurred after his conviction and supported the verdict. It
has to be presumed therefore, that the course of justice was not hindered by Judge Windeyer’s
apparent bias, nor did Dean’s conviction rest upon the false medical evidence tendered by the AttorneyGeneral. However, as Sleath notes in the parliamentary debates, “it is a fundamental principle of British
justice that a prisoner should have the benefit of a doubt, if any doubt exists”.12 Despite the possibility
of the trial being prejudiced and biased, none of the key players would have acted as they did if they
thought Dean was guilty and therefore correctly convicted.
It is the sole purpose of debates such as these, and the main rationale of lawyer-client confidentiality, to
preserve the integrity of the justice system. Every citizen must be able to trust the process of factfinding, of procuring evidence, of weighing up the probative value of this evidence and then proclaiming
a finding of guilt or innocence. Therefore, wealthy and legally powerful (lawyers and parliamentarians)
must protect this ‘right’ to a fair trial. Indeed, “What chance would a poor unfortunate devil have who
had no friends, and who had the misfortune to come undefended” before the court?13 Crick is acting on
the presumption that Dean is innocent because if lawyers do not defend their clients to the full capacity
7
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 April 1895, 5349 (Reid).
8
Ibid 5357 (Sleath).
9
Ibid 5352 (Black).
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid 5360 (Crick).
12
Ibid 5357 (Sleath).
13
Ibid 5361 (Crick).
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of the law, there is the possibility (no matter how slight) that lawyers would place themselves in the
positions of judges. If this happens, justice tends to be perverted.
COMPARISON OF COUNSEL: TUCKIAR AND DEAN
The uncontroversial position of the law during the time of the Dean’s Controversy is that “the
employment of counsel places him in a confidential position, and imposes on him the duty not to
communicate to any third person the information which has been confided to him as counsel”.14 The
General Council of the English Bar in 1915 confirmed that a lawyer may “not throw suspicion on a
person who is known to be innocent”.15 Salomon justifies his disclosure on the basis that keeping silent
would leave an “innocent woman under a gross imputation”,16 which is a continuing crime. The court
supported his view. Alternatively, Dean had already been pardoned and Salomon’s discussion with
Meagher was a confidential communication about a past crime. When characterised like this, Salomons
was not a “co-conspirator in a felonious silence.”17 Salomons would have been merely carrying out the
functions and duties of a lawyer. Fortunately for Salomons, the court agreed with his understanding of
the ethical obligations involved, and also accused Meagher of “charging Dean’s wife and her mother
with a crime equally atrocious as that committed by Dean”.18 This appears to be enough to discharge
Salomons of his duty of confidentiality.
In contrast, counsel in Tuckiar was “sharply censured by the Court of Appeal” for trying to “rehabilitate
the reputation of a dead constable”.19 Although the Trial Judge supported counsel’s approach, advising
the jury that a “grave miscarriage of justice may occur and a serious slander may be affixed to the name
of the dead man”20 should Tuckiar be acquitted, the Court of Appeal held that “openly disclosing the
14
Blackwell, Leslie. Death cell at Darlinghurst. Richmond: Hutchinson, 1970. 111.
15
Ibid 118.
16
Ibid 114.
17
Ibid 112.
18
In re Meagher (1896) 17 NSWLR (law) 157, 165. See also New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17
April 1895, 5343 (Crick).
19
Above n 14, 116.
20
Tuckiar v The King (1934) 52 CLR 335, 343.
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privileged communication of his client… is wholly indefensible”21 and that any such disclosure was a
“grave breach of the confidence reposed in him by the prisoner”.22 The Court of Appeal in Tuckiar made
it quite clear that breaching client confidentiality for the sole purpose of correcting the implications of a
past crime is unacceptable.
The Court of Appeal approaches are perhaps explained by the other actions of counsel. In Tuckiar’s case,
counsel had a “plain duty… to press such rational considerations as the evidence fairly gave rise”,23
which they failed to discharge. There was no objection to inadmissible evidence, no new evidence was
called,24 and there was no substantive attempt to defend Tuckiar by requiring the prosecution to prove
their case beyond reasonable doubt. This lack of adequate defence is a subversion of the due process of
law. The accused is “entitled to acquittal from any charge which the evidence fails to establish that he
committed”,25 regardless of counsel’s personal opinion. Furthermore, counsel chose to make obscure
but prejudicial comments in court26 and then disclosed the ‘guilty secret’ before a sentence was given. In
the Dean’s Controversy, Meagher acted against a just finding conducted in accordance with the law by
concealing knowledge in order to aggressively procure a false pardon. In Tuckiar’s case, counsel failed to
act in accordance with the law because personal opinion was allowed to forsake the place of a just trial.
What should be done if the confession takes place not after a conviction (as in Deans Controversy) but
during the trial (Tuckiar’s Case)? The General Council of the English Bar 1915 differentiated between
these two circumstances advising that in the first case, the lawyer should withdraw, whereas in the
second case, the lawyer should continue to represent the client because any other action “might harm
his client”.27 Counsel is forbidden from placing “suspicion on a person who is known to be innocent.”28
21
Ibid 346.
22
Ibid 354 per Starke J.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid 342.
25
Ibid 346.
26
Ibid 345.
27
Above n 14, 117.
28
Ibid.
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It is interesting to note the highly dramatic manner in which Crick presents his case to parliament. He
bases his fight for Dean on the highest moral grounds, arguing that “an innocent man has been
convicted on utterly unreliable evidence”.29 He also invoked professional pride by insisting that “any
wrong impression which may exist in the public mind”30 in regards to the profession must be removed.
Crick believed the jury to be “bullied into a verdict”31 despite other parliamentary members pointing out
that the jury is comprised of “presumably intelligent and respectable citizens of this country” who have
unanimously reached “a certain conclusion”.32 Crick was essentially attacking the foundation of the
judicial system and raising doubts as to the correctness of the jury function. Although the facts in this
case do not describe a situation where “silence might have resulted in sending an innocent man to the
gallows”,33 it is essential that the entire legal system is NEVER used to “put guilt on the innocent”.34 It is
arguable that Crick was only acting and speaking out of a desire to preserve the sanctity of the legal
system. If this is true, then should Meagher be justified in pressing for a Parliamentary Commission if he
believed Dean had not had a fair trial? Regardless, this would not justify the manner in which Meagher
pursued Dean’s pardon. Ultimately, concerns in relation to the validity of court proceedings need to be
treated carefully so that one does not undermine the entire system in the name of preserving justice.
NOW: PROFESSIONAL MODEL RULES
The Professional Conduct and Practice Rules in Victoria state that a “practitioner must never
disclose to any person… any information which is confidential to a client and acquired by the
practitioner's firm during the client's engagement”.35 There are five circumstances in which a
practitioner is able to disclose the confidential information. The most relevant to the Dean’s
Controversy are where “the practitioner is compelled by law to disclose”,36 where “the practitioner
29
Above n 7, 5342 (Crick).
30
Ibid 5341 (Crick).
31
Ibid 5346 (Crick).
32
Ibid 5347 (Reid).
33
Pearl, Cyril. Wild Men of Sydney. London: W H Allen, 1958, 109.
34
Above n 32, 3555 (Crick).
35
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC).
36
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 3.1.2.
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discloses information in circumstances in which the law would probably compel its disclosure, and
for the sole purpose of avoiding the probable commission or concealment of a serious criminal
offence”.37 Whether or not lawyers should be under an obligation to disclose a guilt secret depends
on whether or not keeping this knowledge confidential involves the commission or concealment of
a serious criminal offence.
One of the fundamental rights within our legal system is that any person accused of an offence is
able to avail themselves of all possible legal defences through the due process of a fair trial. There is
an underlying assumption that the defence is able to put the prosecution to proof on any matter of
evidence. Fortunately, the provisions in the Professional Conduct and Practice Rules sufficiently
cover this conflict of ethical responsibilities. A lawyer may choose to cease to act, 38 but may also
choose to continue to defend their client albeit on a limited basis. The lawyer may not “falsely
suggest that some other person committed the acts”39 and must not present an “affirmative case
inconsistent with the confession”.40 The only legally justified arguments are that the evidence is not
conclusive of guilt41 or that for a separate reason of law there should not be a finding of guilt.42
The current legislative position in Victoria, when applied to the factual situation in the Dean’s
Controversy is interesting. When Crick asked for a parliamentary committee, he impugned upon the
character of Dean’s mother-in-law and wife in order to further his case for Dean’s innocence. This
would not be allowed in Victoria today. Likewise, Meagher’s failure to inform Crick of Dean’s
confession caused Crick to break Rule 15.2.2 (a) & (b) albeit unknowingly.
37
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 3.1.3.
38
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 15.2.1.
39
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 15.2.2 (a).
40
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 15.2.2 (b).
41
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 15.2.2 (c).
42
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC) r 15.2.2 (d).
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PURPOSE OF PRIVILEGE: TRUST, HONESTY & JUSTICE
Why is privileged information and confidentiality so important? In essence, the notion of confidentiality
is lauded as a “bulwark of the profession”.43 The entire community needs to be able to trust their legal
advisers – to provide the best possible advice by keeping information confidential. Clients who are
unaware of the “legal significance of the facts cannot know whether it will be more harmful than helpful
to reveal the truth to their lawyer”.44 The duty of confidentiality allows the client to use their lawyer’s
legal knowledge but to remain morally in control. Knowing that any communication to a lawyer shall be
kept confidential unless the client otherwise wishes tends to promote openness and candour between
lawyers and clients. It is argued that this allows for a more effective and just system.
Encouraging full and frank disclosure between client and lawyer is the strongest rationale that the
Australian Legal Reform Commission provides in support of a doctrine of privilege.45 Confidentiality is
also an aspect of a number of other legal policies, for example, the policy against self-incrimination, the
protection of privacy, basic human rights and the promotion of the adversarial system. Other proconfidentiality rationale that is increasingly weak includes the idea of encouraging compliance with the
law, and the notion of discouraging litigation whilst encouraging settlement.
The main reasons for opposing a confidentiality requirement revolve around the relationship between
private rights and public rights.46 This conflict of interest is particularly evident in a case such as the
Deans Controversy. Justice may be perverted if the interests of an individual (Dean) are held more
sacrosanct than the public interest (suitably punishing those who break the law).
Full and Frank Disclosure
Although the “fostering of trust and candour” is typically a fundamental and very strong argument for
confidentiality, its application in the Deans Controversy did not lead to the “furtherance of the
administration of justice”.47 Rather, Dean was allowed to contest his conviction through unusual
43
Above n 14, 113.
44
Pepper, Stephen. “Why Confidentiality?” (1998) 23 Law & Social Inquiry, 331-337, 335.
45
Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, Issues Paper 33, April 2007.
46
Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, Issues Paper 33, April 2007. See,
eg, public interest v private rights, public interest v public interests, accountable government and third parties.
47
Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 487 per Mason & Brennan JJ.
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methods (a parliamentary committee) despite the fact that the process of administering justice had
found a true verdict - he was guilty. However, as the court in Greenough v Gaskell points out, “if a
privilege did not exist at all, everyone would be thrown on his own legal resources” which would be
clearly against the “interests of justice”.48
Encouraging Compliance
Apparently, an increased knowledge of the law and its sanctions will increase the likelihood of obeying
the law because the law is a “public good” that “must be known by those it is intended to regulate or
enable”.49 Protecting all communications between lawyer and client provides the client with knowledge
of the law. Wilson J in Baker v Campbell argues that confidentiality adds to the “general level of respect
for an observance of the law within the community”.50 However, lawyers are unlikely to be able to
encourage their clients to observe the law if the client seeks legal advice with no intention of disclosing
to the court their questionable actions. Dean had no intention of revealing that he purchased poison for
the purpose of poisoning his wife. Likewise, if the legal sanctions are minimal (diminished fine) or
extreme (death penalty) it is possible that “knowledge of the law makes a client more inclined to violate
it”.51 There is a clear legal principle that allows any defendant to require the prosecution to prove their
case. However, Dean had already been given this chance, and the jury had already given their verdict.
Meagher did not encourage further compliance with the law (accepting the guilty verdict) because he
believed his “loyalty to Dean on a breach of confidence… [meant he] was justified in fighting with any
weapons”.52 Not once did he try to encourage compliance. In fact, his actions were a clear abuse of the
confidentiality principle.
Human Rights
The High Court of Australia has recognised that preserving confidentiality is a “fundamental and general
principle of the common law,53 that is of “fundamental importance to the protection and preservation of
48
Greenough v Gaskill (1833) 39 ER 618, 621.
49
Above n 44, 334.
50
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 95.
51
Simon, William H. “The Confidentiality Fetish”, (2004) The Atlantic Monthly, 113-116, 115.
52
In re Meagher (1896) 17 NSWLR (law) 157, 165.
53
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 117 per Deane J.
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the rights, dignity and equality of the ordinary citizen”.54 More recently, confidentiality has been called a
“fundamental human right long established in the common law”.55 Given such a long tradition in
Australian law to view communications between lawyers and clients as confidential, it would be
improper to abandon or diminish this duty. However, to what extent does this right extend? Dean had
been convicted when Meagher received his confession. Does a right to confidentiality apply in these
circumstances? Undoubtedly, yes. However, this right does not extend to a positive endorsement of
Dean’s innocence. Meagher should not have revealed Dean’s confession, but was under no obligation
and in fact had no legal right to pursue, through all avenues available, Dean’s pardon.
Another right that should be afforded to the public is the right to know the law. In order to expect
compliance with the law, it is a right to be able to “learn the law which governs one’s conduct, past or
future, without having to purchase that knowledge by putting oneself at risk of serious harm”.56 The
importance of rights is never to be underestimated, and it is evident that a duty of confidentiality aids
the protection of these rights.
Individual Rights and Public Rights
However, there will occasionally be a conflict between the rights of an individual (to privacy and
confidentiality), and other public rights. The Deans Controversy is the perfect example. The public has a
right to know that the justice system is free from bias and is effective in procuring findings of innocence
and guilt. Meagher’s actions undermine these public rights. It would not be unreasonable to place
Meagher under a higher duty to the court in these particular circumstances. In Baker v Campbell, Gibbs
CJ noted that the “public interest in discovering the truth prevails over the private duty to respect
confidence”.57 This also provides justification for Salomon’s actions. He chose to reveal his confidential
knowledge of Dean’s confession in light of preserving a just court finding. However, the circumstances in
which a lawyer would be obliged to disclose a confidential secret requires further consideration.
Although another public policy is that “all relevant evidence should be adduced to the court when it
54
Ibid 118 per Deane J.
55
R (Morgan Grenfell) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563, [7]. See also, Daniels Corporation International
Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 429, [85].
56
Above n 44, 336.
57
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 66 per Gibbs CJ.
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makes its decision”58 this is clearly at odds with well established principles of privacy, the right to remain
silent and the presumption of innocence unless proven guilty when talking specifically in regards to a
confession of guilt.
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS
The court in Grant v Downs alludes to the conflict between specialised public rights (access to the law,
representation by legal advisers and full and frank communications in order to further the
administration of justice) and a more general public interest (providing the court with all the relevant
information). They recommend that the “privilege should be confined within strict limits”.59 Instead of
confining the extent of legal privilege, I believe it would be more effective to introduce an overriding
duty upon lawyers. This would exist in relation to their role as officers of the court. Alternatively,
strengthening their existing duty to the court would have the same effect. An overriding duty would only
apply in given situations; for example, where it is transparently obvious that the administration of justice
had been effected. There would still be a clear and necessary duty to keep client confidentiality.
However, because this often leads to the “covering up [of] a multitude of questionable and often
dangerous practices”60 and because “professionals grant their clients secrecy even when they would
otherwise have reason to speak out”,61 public acknowledgement of an overriding principle or duty is
necessary.
The validity of this approach is evident in the Deans Controversy. Meagher was not obliged to inform
Crick about the confession, but was under a higher duty to advise Crick against the Parliamentary
Commission. In Tuckiar’s Case, counsel was bound by a higher duty as an officer of the court to defend
Tuckiar in an adversarial manner in order to enable the client to avail himself of his legal rights. It is
necessary whilst defending a client, whether you believe them to be guilty or not, to require the
prosecution to bring evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Withdrawing during a trial even without
disclosing the reason for withdrawal is a clear disadvantage for the defendant, particularly before a
58
Ibid.
59
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 685.
60
Bok, Sissela. “The Limits of Confidentiality”, (1983) 13 The Hastings Centre Report, 24-31,30.
61
Ibid, 26.
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jury.62 Counsel was advised against doing this for the sole purpose of ensuring that an Aboriginal
defendant did not appear to be “abandoned and left without any proper defence”.63 I would argue that
maintaining the appearance of a fair legal defence is not enough without substantive effect.
CONCLUSION
There are consequences for the public when lawyers act unprofessionally in relation to confidentiality.
The general public seeks reassurance that the legal system is able to protect their rights and that
everyone is able to present a defence. Without confidentiality, there is a possibility that a confession of
guilt might override the processes and procedures of the judicial system and therefore deny an
individual the ability to access their rights.
Obviously, professional support networks particularly in regards to ethics such as the Victorian Ethics
Committee provides lawyers with the tools to make difficult ethical decisions. It’s no longer about
keeping a guilty secret along with a guilty conscience. Rather, the Ethics Committee or other similar
organisations provide an avenue through which to talk about these sorts of issues and collectively come
to agreement on a course of action that successfully balances the interests of the individual with
broader public interests.
62
Above n 51, 114.
63
Tuckiar v The King (1934) 52 CLR 335, 344.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES/BOOKS/REPORTS
Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, Issues Paper
33, April 2007
Blackwell, Leslie. Death cell at Darlinghurst. Richmond: Hutchinson, 1970
Bok, Sissela. “The Limits of Confidentiality”, (1983) 13 The Hastings Centre Report, 24-31
Lindsay, Geoff. “A Question of Conscience, A Question of Trust: Honesty, Legal Ethics and the Limits of a
Guilty Secret”, (2008) The Francis Forbes Society for Australian Legal History, 1-36
Mahoney, Richard. “A Public Safety Exception to Solicitor-Client Privilege”, (2005) 34 Common Law
World Review, 295-315
Radin, Max. “The Privilege of Confidential Communication between Lawyer and Client”, (1928) 16
California Law Review, 487-497
Reichstein, Kenneth. “The Criminal Law Practitioner’s Dilema: What should the Lawyer Do When His
Client Intends to Testify Falsely?”, (1970) 61 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 110
Pearl, Cyril. Wild Men of Sydney. London: W H Allen, 1958
Pepper, Stephen. “Why Confidentiality?” (1998) 23 Law & Social Inquiry, 331-337
Simon, William H. “The Confidentiality Fetish”, (2004) The Atlantic Monthly, 113-116
CASE LAW
Attorney General (Northern Territory) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002]
HCA 429
Grant v Downs (1976)135 CLR 674, 685
Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 39 ER 618, 621.
In re Meagher (1896) 17 NSWLR (law) 157
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Tuckiar v The King (1934) 52 CLR 335
R (Morgan Grenfell) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563
Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382
LEGISLATION
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 April 1895
Professional Practice and Conduct Rules 2005 (VIC)
OTHER SOURCES
Law Institute of Victoria, Legal Ethics (2008)<http://www.liv.asn.au/regulation/ethics/about/ethicsCommon.html#Heading23> at 11 May 2008.
Steve Mark. ‘Looking Behind Client Instructions: Ethical Issues’ (Speech delivered by NSW Legal Services
Commissioner at LAAMS CLE Seminar, Sydney, 6 March 2001).
14