District Level parties within a federation: testing some
institutionalist hypothesis in Brazil1
Roberta Clemente
Political parties solve problems that are specific to democracies, particularly
collective action and social choice problems. Parties also transform social
power into political power and fulfill and the political ambition of politicians.
A by-product of the political ambition of office-seekers is the accountability
of the public polices implemented: they must be responsive to the voters, in
order to win elections, given that the voters can reward or punish unresponsive
politicians through elections. But the political accountability through elections
is very difficult if the parties are not institutionalized in society, if they appear
and disappear instantly, if parties’ labels have no meaning because there’s no
party discipline and politicians can switch parties at will.
Brazil has a history of weakly institutionalized party systems in comparative
standards, with high electoral volatility, parties with poor roots on society and
parties that quickly appear and disappear. Also, the Brazilian 1988
Constitution has the ability combine plebiscitary presidentialism, permissive
electoral laws that favor personalistic appeals of candidates over parties, a
weak and fragmented party system, a strong federalism that, according to
1
Final Paper presented for the course Comparative Party Systems - Professor Dr. Kenneth Greene –
Stepan
(1997)
is
the
most
“demos-constraining”
in
the
world,
malapportionment, and several points of vetoes.
In sum, the Brazilian institutions have the effect of joining together the worst
of two worlds: Executive predominance given by the plebiscitary
presidentialism, which is usually coupled with bipartism in majoritarian
systems, but in Brazil, it is coupled with federalism and proportional
representation, which leads to multipartism, typical of consociative systems.
The result could only be stalemate and democratic instability. Nevertheless,
after 15 years of the constitution promulgation, Brazilian democracy persists;
its first test was the impeachment of the first directly elected president after
redemocratization for blatant corruption, by Congress, within the rules of the
democratic game. Also, major structural economic and constitutional (the
constitution is also criticized by its length and for being exhaustive detailed)
reforms were undertaken, some of them very unpopular (like the social
security reform, the break of state monopolies, the Fiscal Stabilization Fund
and the Fiscal Responsibility Law) not by decree, but approved by Congress,
within the democratic and prevailing constitutional rules.
This is very impressive, considering that the State in Brazil, due to colonial
legacies preceded the nation and throughout its history, the role of the state
University of Texas at Austin, fall 2003
surpassed the role of civil society and all changes, until 1982 were top-down
(independency,
republic,
Estado
Novo,
extension
of
suffrage,
redemocratization in 1945, the military coup in 1964, and the deterioration of
the military regime in the late 1970’s). Not surprisingly, the social cleavages
in Brazilian’s society never had the chance to be crystallized and become
political issues; therefore the social cleavages approach proposed by Lipset
and Rokkan (1967) is inadequate for understanding Brazilian party system.
But, given the incongruous set of institutions provided by the 1988
Constitution, Brazil is a very interesting case for studies of parties using an
institutionalist approach.
The first set of rules that should be looked at for this study is the electoral
institutions. Brazil has an open-list proportional representation system, in
which the legislative candidates must belong to a party in order to appear in
the ballot, the district matches the state and its size varies from a minimum of
8 and a maximum of 70 (since 1994, before it varied from 4 to 60). The
number of candidates each list can present equals to 1.5 the total number of
seats and if there’s an electoral coalition with two or more parties, the
maximum number of candidates for the coalition list is twice the number of
seats. After the election, the total of valid votes is divided by the total number
of seats, which generates the electoral quotient. Then, each list’s total of votes
is computed and divided by the electoral quotient, which gives the number of
seats each list secured. The occupants of these seats will be the candidates
with larger total of votes in every list, that’s why is called open-list, the
ranking of the list is decided by the voter, not by the party.
The defendants of this system argue that this system grants that every voter
will be represented, contrary to the majoritarian system, in which only the
electors of the winner are represented. The critics to this system claim that this
systems causes serious distortions and the voter loses control of his or her
vote, that might benefit another candidate of the same party that he or she
wouldn’t want to elect, and also that a candidate that received 70 thousands
votes not be elected whilst a candidate from another list that received only 15
thousands votes gets the seat. Also, it creates a perverse situation for party
leaders that have to chase candidates that attracts several votes even though he
or she has no ideological attachments to the party. Besides, this system entices
competition within candidates of the same party, which leads to the
personalization of electoral campaigns and weakens the party cohesion.
The large district magnitude coupled with the proportional representation
system promotes multipartism. Also, multipartism is reinforced by law: no
party can be registered at the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior
Eleitoral) if in its statutes it does not respect the multipartism2.
The steps to create a new party are: collect signatures of 101 Brazilian citizens
supporting the future party’s statutes, with electoral residence in one-third of
the states of the federation (nine states), register the future party’s program,
statute and provisory director board. After that, the future party has one year
to publish its statutes in the federal official paper (Diário Oficial da União),
legally register its foundation in the Federal Capital and collect support of as
many voters as 0.5% of the valid votes for the Lower Chamber in the previous
elections. The voters must have electoral residency in at least nine states and
at list 0.1% of the total electorate in each state.
After that, the future party must register all its local, municipal, state and
national organs with the Electoral Superior Court and if it has fulfilled all the
requirements, it becomes a party and is entitled to the parties fund (Fundo
Partidário), time on television broadcast and within a year, in the elections.
Party organization, requisites for party affiliation and party discipline
enforcements must be stated in the party’s statutes.
2
LEI Nº 9.096, 1995 (which disposes about political parties in Brazil) article 2 o.
Until 2003, in Congress, all parties were entitled to a leadership office and
aides (even if it had only one member) the committees assignments were
proportionally distributed among the parties existing in the legislature and
every leader had the right to join the Leaders College (Colégio de Líderes,
organ who decides about the agenda of the legislature). Since February 2003,
to be entitled to all this, a party must have acquired at least 5% of the votes for
the Lower Chamber and at least 2% of the votes in nine states.
The incentives were for the creation of parties, at least until 2003 to gain
access to intralegislature benefits. And the high district magnitude coupled
with the proportional representation system, gave little incentive for elite
coordination and parties could sprout for whatever reason, given that could
coordinate in at least nine different states.
Mainwaring
(1999)
argues
that
a
federal
polity
promotes
party
decentralization and party heterogeneity and in Brazil parties are federations
of state parties.
Brazil is a federation of 26 states plus the federal district, more than 5,500
municipalities and the central government. The leitmotif of the Brazilian
federalism is the accommodation for the demands of conflicting elites and
coping with great regional inequalities (C. Souza, 1998). Brazil has huge
socio-economic disparities that are adjusted by malapportionment: the least
populated and poorer states hold proportionally more seats in the Chamber of
Deputies than bigger constituencies. This was introduced in the 1930’s (along
with proportional representation) to diminish the power of the states of São
Paulo and Minas Gerais in the federation and the defenders of the
malapportionment argue that the over representation of poorer units of the
federation forces the federal government to incorporate the problems of
Brazil's regional inequalities into the political agenda.
The Brazilian federation has suffered several modifications since its first
implementation in 1889, with the First Republic (Primeira República 18891930). During this period, the federal government was weak comparing to the
states and was controlled by two oligarchies (from the States of São Paulo and
Minas Gerais). Every state had only one party, with the exception of Rio
Grande do Sul that had two parties. The votes had little significance, electoral
fraud was the rule and the legislatures had the power to verify the legality of
its elected members before installation. The ruling oligarchies during the
Republic were already powerful during the Empire (1822-1889). In 1930,
there was a revolution and Getulio Vargas came to power. Parties were
suppressed3 and the State apparatus was expanded. For the States, Vargas
nominated delegates (interventores) and the federalism was also suppressed.
In 1946, the new constitution reestablished the federalism with a new member
besides the states and the union, the municipalities. Some of the Central power
was decentralized to the States and municipalities, but the Union was stronger
comparing to the First Republic and the States much weaker (some of their
powers present in the First Republic were transferred to the Union and some
to the municipalities). The centralization of power occurred once more during
the military regime (1964-1985) and the struggle for democratization was
confounded with demands for fiscal and administrative decentralization. The
1988 Constitution granted the municipalities an unprecedented autonomy
fiscal and administrative, established mandatory transfers from the federal
government to the municipalities and states without corresponding
responsibilities.
In comparison with other federations, the revenue share among levels of
government in Brazil is:
3
with the exception of the period 1934-1937, when suffrage was extended, and several parties were created,
and there were two kinds of representatives: the ones linked to parties and the “class representatives”
(deputados classistas, elected indirectly according to the union they represented).
Table 1
Total expenditure by level of government in some federal countries
Country
Canada
USA
Austria
Australia
Brazil
Brazil
Year
1992
1992
1992
1992
1987
1992
Federal
41.3
60.3
70.4
52.9
65.8
56.0
State
40.3
17.3
13.7
40.4
24.5
28.0
Local
18.4
22.4
16.9
6.8
9.6
16.0
Source: Spink et al (1998 p. 3)
The graph bellow shows the variation of expenditure within governments level
in Brazil across time:
80
70
60
50
FEDERAL
40
STATE
30
LOCAL
20
10
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1960
0
Source: Rezende and Afonso (2001)
Since 1982, the federal government resources have been decentralized to
states and municipalities. And in 1982, were held the first direct elections for
governor since the military coup, in 1964, along with elections for state and
federal legislatives.
The impact of electoral institutions in the party system of a federal polity has
deserved a close attention by scholars (Chhibber and Kollman 1998,
Desposato 2003, Thorlakson, 2003). Chhibber and Kollman argue that the
more resources are decentralized in a federation; more important will be state
level in shaping the party system. Also, Thorlakson (2003) compared party
systems in six federations (Austria, Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland
and the United States) and concluded that resource and policy decentralization
lead to less vertical integration and more decentralized parties.
Samuels (2000) concluded that gubernatorial race, instead of presidential race,
shape the congressional elections in Brazil, because governor’s can control the
resources needed by the congressional candidates to get in the ballot and be
elected or re-elected.
The state-level has been recognized as important for shaping the federal
legislature, but the elections within states and across states in Brazil haven’t
deserved much attention. The electoral rules are the same but the district
magnitude and the resources controlled by each state vary drastically among
the Brazilian states. So there should be a comparative analysis of party system
in each.
The previous studies give us the following hypothesis:
1- The greater the district magnitude, the more parties will be: Brazil
district magnitude varies from 6 (prior to the 1994 elections in smaller
states) to 70 (São Paulo state after 1994). There should be more parties
competing in the higher magnitude districts than in the lower
(Durverger’s law). The maximum number of parties should range from
7 to 71, according to the district magnitude.
To test this hypothesis we should consider the district magnitude and the
number of parties competing in each district. There are the number of existing
parties presenting candidates in the elections and the number of effective
parties 1/(vj2)-1, an expression given by Laakso and Taagepera (1979 apud
Cox 1997) that tries to account for only the real candidates, where vj is the
vote share of the jth party. It is better to use the number of effective parties
instead of parliamentary parties because to avoid distortions caused by how
votes are translated into seats, particularly in Brazil, where in each state there
might be coalitions for the legislative elections and, as being an open list
system, a party’s vote share can be converted in another party’s seat.
To check the association between district magnitude and the number of parties
as well as the number of effective parties, data from all states (districts) were
collected for the elections 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002. In 1986
elections, the three territories (Amapá, Rondônia and Roraima) and the
Federal District presented candidates for the first time. In 1988 a new state
joined the federation (Tocantins, which was part of Goiás). The measures of
association are:
Measures of Association
R
R Squared
Eta
Eta Squared
number of parties *
District Magnitude
,191
,036
,463
,214
effective parties *
District Magnitude
,405
,164
,567
,321
The Eta squared shows that there’s association between the magnitude of the
district and the number of parties, that district magnitude can explain, in the
case of the number of parties presenting lists, 21.4% of the variation. For the
number of effective parties, the district magnitude can account for 32.1% of
variation. But more than 70% cannot be explained by this model. So, there
must be variation across states concerning the number of parties.
Thorlakson (2003) proposes that if there’s locally defined and developed issue
space and competitive dynamics, there must be a great variation in the parties
that parties that compete, the number of parties in the system and in patterns
of aggregate voter behavior.
She argues that:
“…the relative power of each level of government in a
federation is a key institutional variable capable of influencing party
strategy and political behaviour because it structures the incentives
and opportunities that parties and voters face, and mediates the effect
of social cleavages and broader processes of social transformation.4”
This leads us to another hypothesis:
2- New parties should appear in the state-level after 1988’s Constitution,
because the states have more resources automatically transferred from
the federal government, which gives them more political independence.
Otherwise, state elites should have incentives to align with national
parties (Chhibber and Kollman 1998). Also, the number of parties in
each district shall vary among states.
To test this hypothesis we can check the number of parties in each district
before (1982 and 1986 elections) and after decentralization (1990, 1994, 1998
and 2002):
Measures of Association
R
R Squared
Eta
Eta Squared
number of parties * Year
,869
,755
,898
,807
effective parties * Year
,636
,405
,668
,447
The measures of association confirm a strong relationship between the year of
the election and the parties presenting lists of candidates: the Eta squared for
the number of parties shows that the year of the election can account for 80%
4
Thorlakson (2003) pp. 03-4
of the variation in the number of parties. But for the effective number of
parties, this model can only account for 44.7% of the variation.
The Table bellow shows the means and standard deviation in the number of
parties as well as in the number of effective parties according to the year5:
Year
1
Mean
N
23
23
,487
11,58
2,38
26
26
Std. Deviation
5,247
,698
Mean
17,96
4,07
27
27
Std. Deviation
4,146
1,519
Mean
17,85
4,61
Mean
N
3
N
4
N
5
27
27
Std. Deviation
1,955
1,784
Mean
23,04
4,66
N
6
27
27
Std. Deviation
4,407
1,393
Mean
26,15
5,36
N
Total
effective parties
2,04
,757
Std. Deviation
2
number of parties
3,87
27
27
Std. Deviation
2,507
1,652
Mean
17,10
3,91
157
157
7,979
1,805
N
Std. Deviation
The following graph confirms the evolution both in the mean of number of
parties and in the mean number of effective parties per election year.
5
1=1982, 2=1986, 3=1990, 4=1994, 5=1998 and 6=2002.
30
25
parties
20
number of
parties
15
effective parties
10
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Year
One question that arises is: which states had the appearance of more parties:
the wealthier or the more dependent of federal transfers, that after 1988 are
more independent financially, since the transfers became mandatory instead of
politically negotiated?
To answer this question, we must first check if there’s any relationship
between transfer dependency and the state’s wealth. There’s no data available
prior to 1985 concerning wealth or transfer dependency of the States,
therefore, only one election year prior to the 1988 Constitution is present in
this study: 1988. Until 1994, Brazil’s economy was under hyperinflation and
the change of currency was the rule. The data collected prior to 1994 (in
several different currencies of different magnitudes) was already converted to
Real in values of 1995. Despite the fact that there’s still 10 to 15% inflation a
year in Brazil, the values collected for 1998 and 2002 were not converted to
values of 19956.
As shown in the following graph, the relationship between wealth and transfer
dependency is not inversely proportional:
Year
1,00
2
3
4
5
Mean Transfer Dependency
0,80
6
0,60
0,40
0,20
0,00
19949247046
6625990179
3810397085
2136477961
916546631,1
29488105,78
13633727,29
8437119,76
5669073,48
4825123,91
4099676,05
2986350,18
2429036,95
1810930,76
1600655,94
1296964,87
1022288,44
821840,38
693542,58
595601,63
503678,20
405882,33
160462,08
Wealth*Receita Corrente Liquida
Measures of Association
R
Transfer Dependency *
Wealth (Receita Corrente
Liquida)
6
-,393
R Squared
,154
Eta
,636
Eta Squared
,404
By law all official records must be stated in Real and the use of monetary indexes is forbidden in an attempt
to fade away the “inflationary memory” and automatic indexation of the economy. It is possible to convert the
currency to values of 1995, but an official distortion of the data was preferred to an informal distortion, which
is also beyond the purpose of this work. But the reader must be aware that there is a distortion.
The Eta squared of the association, is 0.251, which means that only a quarter
of the transfer dependency can be accounted for the wealth of the state. The
wealth of the state is measured by the Receita Corrente Líquida, which means
all the net resources of the states, excluding mandatory transfers for the
municipalities. There was no available data to further investigate the percent
of mandatory and voluntary transfers received by each state in those election
years, so the relationship between the sort of transfer received and its effects
on the parties in the states could not be measured, in order to test the if states
that received more “negotiated” transfers from the federal government have
less parties than states that received more mandatory transfers.
ANOVA Table
Sum of
Squares
effective parties
*
Wealth*Receita
Corrente Liquida
number of
parties *
Wealth*Receita
Corrente Liquida
Between Groups
Mean
Square
df
F
Sig.
(Combined)
169,363
20
8,468
3,984
,000
Linearity
100,421
1
100,421
47,247
,000
68,942
19
3,629
1,707
,045
Within Groups
240,174
113
2,125
Total
409,536
133
(Combined)
2656,203
20
132,810
5,897
,000
Linearity
2268,738
1
2268,738
100,728
,000
387,465
19
20,393
,905
,577
Within Groups
2545,140
113
22,523
Total
5201,343
133
Deviation from
Linearity
Between Groups
Deviation from
Linearity
Measures of Association
R
R Squared
Eta
Eta Squared
effective parties *
Wealth*Receita Corrente
Liquida
,495
,245
,643
,414
number of parties *
Wealth*Receita Corrente
Liquida
,660
,436
,715
,511
The relationship between number of effective parties and wealth has the Eta
squared equal to 0.414. This means that 41.4% of the number of effective
parties can be accounted for by the wealth of the state. As for the number of
parties, the association is even stronger: the Eta squared is 0.511.
The association between transfer dependency and the number of effective
parties is not so strong: the Eta squared is only 0.231. As for the number of
parties, the Eta squared is 0.208. So a better predictor for the number of
parties is the state wealth, not its transfer dependency, which is calculated as
the percent of federal transfers (mandatory or not) in the states’ Receita
Corrente Líquida.
19949247046
9988203682
5364990867
3810397085
2562885510
1834112456
916546631,1
38215351,22
19529684,84
13633727,29
8876276,82
7517569,37
5669073,48
4928985,30
4693279,83
4099676,05
3205961,07
2848134,77
2429036,95
2077793,39
1745892,26
1600655,94
1384538,57
1163288,20
1022288,44
979874,60
782373,81
693542,58
602280,41
574941,09
503678,20
425443,13
312027,00
160462,08
6
4
Mean effective parties
20
15
Mean number of parties
30
25
10
5
Wealth*Receita Corrente Liquida
10
8
2
0
19949247046
9988203682
5364990867
3810397085
2562885510
1834112456
916546631,1
38215351,22
19529684,84
13633727,29
8876276,82
7517569,37
5669073,48
4928985,30
4693279,83
4099676,05
3205961,07
2848134,77
2429036,95
2077793,39
1745892,26
1600655,94
1384538,57
1163288,20
1022288,44
979874,60
782373,81
693542,58
602280,41
574941,09
503678,20
425443,13
312027,00
160462,08
Wealth*Receita Corrente Liquida
As for Transfer dependency, the following graphs show the distribution:
10
Mean effective parties
8
6
4
2
0
,98
,87
,80
,75
,70
,66
,64
,59
,58
,55
,53
,52
,51
,49
,46
,40
,39
,36
,32
,31
,28
,27
,23
,21
,20
,19
,17
,16
,15
,13
,12
,10
,08
,03
Transfer Dependency
30
Mean number of parties
25
20
15
10
5
,98
,87
,80
,75
,70
,66
,64
,59
,58
,55
,53
,52
,51
,49
,46
,40
,39
,36
,32
,31
,28
,27
,23
,21
,20
,19
,17
,16
,15
,13
,12
,10
,08
,03
Transfer Dependency
A conclusion that can be drawn is that the wealth of the states affects more the
variation in the number of parties and effective parties than their transfer
dependency, if the proportion of mandatory and voluntary transfers from the
federal government can not be disaggregated.
So far, how much of the variation of the number of parties and effective
parties in districts of a federation can the institutionalist theories account for?
For the number of parties, the variables year, district magnitude and wealth
can account for 69.3% of its variation.
For the number of effective parties, these variables can explain 50.2%. This
difference might be caused by the psychological effect: hopeless candidates
and lists are deserted by voters who do not want to waste their votes. The
addition of the transfer dependency variable does not affect the fitness of the
model nor has the variable state. But the addition of the variable after 1989 (a
dummy variable with values 0 for before 1989 and 1 for after), makes the
model account for 55.1% on the variation of the number of effective parties.
The same occurs with the number of parties’ variable: the addition of the
dummy “after 1989” improves the model to account for 70.2%. The variables
state and transfer dependency have little effect on the model.
Thorlakson (2003) studied party systems in six cases: Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, Australia, the United States and Canada – all western
industrialized countries that have been continuously democratic during 1945-
2000, period of her study comparison. Chhibber and Kollman (1998)
compared the United States and India, a western economically developed
country and an eastern emerging country, with great ethnic, linguistic and
religious diversity; but both with single-member simple plurality electoral
system.
This paper tested their hypothesis in a new democracy (as opposed to
consolidated), in a developing country with proportional representation and a
low degree of institutionalization of its party system (Mainwaring 1999) and
the decentralization hypothesis fits.
Deeper analyses are required for Brazil: the programmatic diversity and vote
shares of parties among the different districts, as well as the uniformity of the
coalitions across states and in different years. If ever the data is available,
there should be a comparison on the share of voluntary transfers received from
the federal government and the parties existing in the states. Also, there must
be some further investigation on what variable can be added to improve the
model in predicting the number of effective parties.
Also, this hypothesis should be tested in other federalist countries, with
different party systems and electoral institutions and different levels of
economic
development,
stages
of
democracy
consolidation
and
decentralization.
Roberta Clemente is a Master in Public Administration and Government at
the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil, where she currently is a
PhD candidate. Also, works at São Paulo State Legislature.
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