2ND BRAZILIAN WORKSHOP OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY
in honor of John Nash, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Nash equilibrium.
WEDNESDAY – 07/28
14:00 – 17:00
LATE REGISTRATION PAYMENT
THURSDAY – 07/29
8:30– 9:15
MINI-COURSE
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
Shmuel Zamir (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
9:15 – 10:00
MINI-COURSE
AUCTIONS
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
COFFEE BREAK
10:00 – 10:30
MINI-COURSE
NETWORKS
Matthew Jackson (Stanford University)
MINI-COURSE
STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS
T.E.S. Raghavan (University of Illinois at Chicago)
MINI-COURSE
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
John Wooders (University of Arizona)
MINI-COURSE
GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY
Steven Brams (New York University)
10:30 – 11:15
11:25 – 12:10
12:10 – 13:30
LUNCH
THURSDAY – 07/29
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
APPLICATIONS 1
13:30 – 13:55
Alvaro Riascos
(Universidad de los
Andes)
Strategic behaviour,
resource valuation
and competition in
electricity markets
13:55 – 14:20
Emilson Caputo
Delfino
(Georgia Institute of
Technology)
Interregional
redistribution,
spillovers and the
soft budget
syndrome in
federations
Min Kim
(University of
Southern California)
Rational bias and
herding in analysts'
recommendations
14:20 – 14:45
session’s chair
COOPERATIVE
GAMES 1
Helga Habis
(Maastricht
University)
Cooperation under
incomplete
contracting
MECHANISM
DESIGN 1
Rahmil Ilkilic
(Maastricht
University)
Clearing supply and
demand under
bilateral constraints
COMPUTATION 1
Gianfranco
Gambarelli
(University of
Bergamo)
Some open
problems in
cooperative games
Rann Smorodinsky
(Technion)
Approximate
implementation in
large societies
Luis G. Quintas
(Universidad
Nacional de San
Luis)
Constructing q-cyclic
games with unique
prefixed equilibrium
Gabriel Turbay
(FCI-Universidad del
Rosario)
N-person
cooperative game
strategic equilibrium
Leandro Arozamena
(Universidad
Torcuato Di Tella)
Fixed points of
choice-improving
correspondences on
the space of direct
mechanisms and
implementability
Sam Ganzfried
(Carnegie Mellon
University)
Computing
equilibria by
incorporating
qualitative models
Christos Ioannou
(University of
Cyprus)
Algorithmic
bounded rationality,
optimality and noise
LEARNING AND
EVOLUTION 1
Elvio Accinelli
(Facultad de
Economia de la
UASLP)
On the notion of
evolutionarily stable
strategies in twopopulation
Edgar Sanchez
(University of Siena)
The evolutionary
game of poverty
traps
MISCELLANEOUS 1
Hiroshi Uno
(CORE, Université
Catholique de
Louvain)
Hierarchic
adaptations
Eran Shmaya
(Kellogg School of
Management)
Pure equilibria in
non-anonymous
large games
Markus Kinateder
(Universidad de
Navarra)
The repeated
prisoner's dilemma
in a network
Paulo Roberto
Santos
(Cedeplar/UFMG)
Event dependence
of ambiguity
attitudes
THURSDAY – 07/29
14:50 – 15:50
COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 1: FAPESP Students Session
16:20 – 16:50
OPENING CEREMONY
16:55 – 17:40
Chair: Robert Aumann
IMPORTANCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Roger Myerson (University of Chicago)
17:40 – 18:25
Chair: Roger Myerson
WHERE NASH BARGAINING HAS LED
Robert Aumann (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & SUNY at Stony Brook)
18:30 – 19:15
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
CONVERSATION WITH JOHN NASH
19:15 – 19:45
PRESENTATION OF USP CHORUS
20:15 – 23:00
WELCOME RECEPTION
FRIDAY- 07/30
8:30– 10:00
MINI-COURSE
10:00 – 10:30
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
Shmuel Zamir
COFFEE BREAK
MINI-COURSE
NETWORKS
Matthew Jackson
MINI-COURSE
STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS
T.E.S. Raghavan
10:30 – 12:00
12:00 – 13:30
LUNCH
Chair: Alvaro Sandroni
THE ROBUSTNESS OF INCOMPLETE CODES OF LAW
Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
13:30 – 14:05
14:05 – 14:40
SEMI-PLENARY
Chair: Marina Núñez
ENDOGENOUS NETWORK DYNAMICS
Frank Page (University of Alabama)
Chair: Olivier Gossner
RATIONALIZATION
Alvaro Sandroni (University of Pennsylvania)
SEMI-PLENARY
Chair: Frank Page
VON NEUMANN–MORGENSTERN SOLUTIONS IN THE ASSIGNMENT MARKET
Marina Núñez (Universitat de Barcelona)
FRIDAY- 07/30
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
14:40 – 15:05
15:05 – 15:30
session’s chair
EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 1
Dorothea Herreiner,
(Loyola Marymount
University)
Can we be nice and
strategic?
Implementing the
cooperativecompetitive (coco)
value in experiments
John Wooders
(University of
Arizona)
An experimental
study of auctions
with a buy price
under private and
common values
INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1
Rafael Pinho Senra
(Fundação Getulio
Vargas)
Regulation of
pharmaceuticals
after generics entry
MATCHING GAMES
1
Dinko Dimitrov
(Saarland
University)
Coalitional
matchings
MECHANISM
DESIGN 2
Sergei Severinov,
(University of British
Columbia)
Ex-post individually
rational, budgetbalanced
mechanisms and
allocation of surplus
Felipe Zurita
(Pontificia
Universidad Católica
de Chile)
On reputational
rents as an incentive
mechanism in
competitive markets
Jorge Oviedo
(Instituto de
Matemática
Aplicada San Luis)
On the invariance of
the set of core
matchings with
respect to
preference profiles
Guilherme Freitas
(Caltech)
Combinatorial
assignment under
dichotomous
preferences
NETWORKS 1
Pritha Dev
( ITAM)
Choosing ‘me’ and
‘my friends’: Identity
in a non-cooperative
network formation
game with cost
sharing
Matthew Jackson
(Stanford
University)
Network patterns of
favor exchange
COOPERATIVE
GAMES 2
Gabriel Turbay
(Universidad del
Rosario)
The stronger player
paradox
Carles Rafels
(Pallarola,
University of
Barcelona)
Assignment markets
with the same core
FRIDAY- 07/30
15:30 – 16:00
COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 2
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
KNOWLEDGE AND
EXPECTATIONS 1
BARGAINING 1
SOLUTION
CONCEPTS 1
INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION 1
LEARNING AND
EVOLUTION 2
16:00 – 16:25
Pedro Daniel Jara
(Universidad de
Santiago de Chile)
Rationalizability in
games with a
continuum of
players
Ching-jen Sun
(Deakin University)
Distributive justice
and bargaining
solutions
Noah Stein
(Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology)
Exchangeable
equilibria of
symmetric bimatrix
games
Fernando Louge
(Bielefeld
University)
On the stability of
CSS under the
replicator dynamic
with strategic
complements
16:25 – 16:50
Pinghan Liang
(Universitat
Autonoma de
Barcelona)
Transfer of
authority within
hierarchy
João Montez
(London Business
School)
Bargaining with a
principal: Contracts
vs. agreements
William Geller
(Indiana University)
Robust equilibria
and epsilondominance
Ming Yang
(Princeton
University)
Global games with
endogenous
information
structure A
rational inattention
approach
Bruno Ferreira
(Universidade
Federal de
Pernambuco)
The Brazilian
industry and the
credit rationing
session’s chair
16:55 – 17:40
17:40–18:25
Pedro Ribeiro
(INPE)
Games on cellular
spaces
PLENARY
Chair: Aloísio Araújo
THE ALLOCATION OF A PRIZE
Pradeep Dubey (SUNY at Stony Brook & Yale University)
PLENARY
Chair: Pradeep Dubey
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, WARINESS AND BUBBLES
Aloísio Araújo (EPGE/FGV-RJ & IMPA)
SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL MODELS
1
Cristiano Aguiar
(UFRGS)
Gun control, crime
and information
Micael Ehn
(Stockholm
University and
Malardalen
University)
Temporal
discounting leads to
social stratification
SATURDAY – 07/31
8:30– 10:00
MINI-COURSE
10:00 – 10:30
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
Shmuel Zamir
COFFEE BREAK
MINI-COURSE
NETWORKS
Matthew Jackson
MINI-COURSE
STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS
T.E.S. Raghavan
10:30 – 12:00
12:00 – 13:30
LUNCH
Chair: Paulo Klinger
EGALITARIANISM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Geoffrey De Clippel (Brown University)
13:30 – 14:05
14:05 – 14:40
SEMI-PLENARY
Chair: Federico Valenciano
INTEREST RATE IN TRADE CREDIT MARKETS
Humberto Moreira (EPGE/FGV-RJ)
SEMI-PLENARY
Chair: Geoffrey De Clippel
A NEW APPROACH TO RENY'S NASH EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE PROBLEM WITH
DISCONTINUOUS PAYOFFS
Paulo Klinger (EPGE/FGV-RJ)
Chair: Humberto Moreira
QUATERNARY DICHOTOMOUS VOTING RULES
Federico Valenciano (Universidad del País Vasco)
SATURDAY – 07/31
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
MATCHING GAME 2
14:40 – 15:05
Chiu Yu Ko
(Boston College)
Profit-maximizing
matchmaker
15:05 – 15:30
Aytek Erdil
(Oxford University)
Stochastic
assignment
session’s chair
MECHANISM
DESIGN 3
Ilan Lobel
(New York
University)
An optimal dynamic
mechanism for
multi-armed bandit
processes
Silvio Micali
(MIT)
Exact
rationalizability and
safe mechanism
design
MISCELLANEOUS 2
NETWORKS 2
Isabel Mendes de
Faria
(UCB)
A dynamic model of
education level
choice: Application
to Brazilian states
Oscar Volij
(Ben Gurion
University)
An axiomatic
characterization of
the Theil inequality
ordering
Sunghoon Hong
(Vanderbilt
University)
Strategic network
interdiction
Norma Olaizola
(University of the
Basque Country )
Information,
stability and
dynamics in
networks under
institutional
constraints
POLITICAL
ECONOMY 1
Matteo Triossi
(Universidad de
Chile)
Costly information
acquisition. Is it
better to toss a
coin?
Ayse Mumcu
(Bogazici University)
Informality as a selffulfilling equilibrium
BAYESIAN GAMES 1
Eduardo Faingold
(Yale University)
A characterization
of the strategic
topology in terms of
beliefs
Luciano de Castro
(Northwestern
University)
Equilibria existence
in regular
discontinuous
games
SATURDAY – 07/31
15:30 – 16:00
COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 3
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
AUCTIONS 1
BARGAINING 2
16:00 – 16:25
Fernando Meneguin
(Brazilian Senate)
Auctions for courtordered debt
payments in Brazil
16:25 – 16:50
Sergio Parreiras
(UNC)
A dynamic all-pay
auction
Ekaterina
Demidova
(HHL-Leipzig
Graduate School of
Management)
Group bargaining
with incomplete
information
Selcuk Ozyurt
(Sabanci University)
Searching a bargain:
Play it cool or
haggle
session’s chair
COOPERATIVE
GAMES 3
Ilya Katsev
(S-Pb Institute for
Economics and
Mathematics)
The Shapley value
for games with
restricted
cooperation
Ehud Lehrer
(Tel Aviv University)
On the core of
dynamic
cooperative games
INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION 2
Shrutivandana
Sharma
(Yahoo! Labs)
Resource allocation
in local public good
networks: An
implementation
theory perspective
Telmo José João
(Universidade de
Aveiro)
Hotelling model
with uncertainty on
the production cost
and networks
LEARNING AND
EVOLUTION 3
Nicole Immorlica
(Northwestern
University)
Near-optimal
Pricing for products
with social learning
effects
MARKET GAMES
AND APPLICATIONS
Vladimir Mazalov
(Institute of Applied
Mathematical
Research, Russia)
Hotelling’s duopoly
on the plane with
Manhatten distance
Elena Inarra
(University of the
Basque Country)
Evolutionary stable
strategies in marked
bird societies
Helena I. Ferreira
(Universidade do
Minho)
Bayesian-Nash
equilibria in a
behavior model
SUNDAY – 08/01
8:30– 10:00
MINI-COURSE
10:00 – 10:30
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
Shmuel Zamir
COFFEE BREAK
MINI-COURSE
NETWORKS
Matthew Jackson
MINI-COURSE
STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS
T.E.S. Raghavan
10:30 – 12:00
13:00 – 20:00
BARBECUE AND FORRÓ
MONDAY – 08/02
8:30– 10:00
MINI-COURSE
10:00 – 10:30
COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 8
MINI-COURSE
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
John Wooders
MINI-COURSE
GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY
Steven Brams
10:30 – 12:00
12:00 – 13:30
13:30 – 14:15
AUCTIONS
Paul Milgrom
LUNCH
PLENARY
Chair: Robert Aumann
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Eric Maskin (Princeton University)
MONDAY – 08/02
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
14:20 – 14:45
LEARNING AND
EVOLUTION 4
Lucas Lages Wardil
(Universidade
Federal de Minas
Gerais)
Distinguishing the
opponents: Mutual
cooperation is never
destroyed
APPLICATIONS 2
Min Kim
(University of
Southern California)
Information
asymmetry and
incentives for active
management
14:45 – 15:10
Matthias Hanauske
(Goethe-University,
Frankfurt am Main)
Evolutionary
quantum game
theory and scientific
communication
Daniel Figueiredo
(COPPE/UFRJ)
A simple public good
model for peer-topeer applications
15:10 – 15:35
Ryota Lijima
(Graduate School of
Economics, ,
University of Tokyo)
Impact of matching
uncertainty on
dynamic stability of
equilibria
Wilfredo Leiva
Maldonado
(Catholic University
of Brasilia)
Impacts of the
changes in the
Brazilian mobile
termination rates
session’s chair
INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 2
Antonio Morales
(Universidad de
Málaga and LINEEX)
Branching
deregulation and
merger optimality
SOLUTION
CONCEPTS 2
Spyros Galanis
(University of
Southampton)
Admissibility and
event-rationality
COALITION
FORMATION 1
Haruo Imai
(Kyoto Institute of
Economic Research,
Kyoto University)
Emergence of
nested coalition
structure in a pure
bargaining game
Silvinha Pinto
Vasconcelos
(Federal University
of Juiz de Fora)
The effectiveness of
the Brazilian
leniency program: A
game theoretical
analysis
Fernando de
Almeida Prado
(FFCLRP-USP University of São
Paulo)
Product
differentiation in the
presence of social
Michel Grabisch
(University of Paris
I)
On properties of the
k-additive core
related to the
selectope
Marcelo Alves
Pereira
(Universidade de
Sao Paulo)
Continuous
prisoner's dilemma
With rational
players
Paulo Barelli
(University of
Rochester and
Insper)
On the existence of
Nash equilibria in
discontinuous and
qualitative games
Emilson Caputo
Delfino
(Georgia Institute of
Technology)
Correlated
transboundary
pollutants. Free
trade and transfers
NETWORKS 3
Agnieszka
Rusinowska
(CNRS - University of
Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne)
Measuring power
and satisfaction in
societies with
opinion leaders: An
axiomatization
Britta Hoyer
(Utrecht University
School of
Economics)
Strategic network
disruption
Tomas Rodriguez
(Stanford University)
Exploring the lattice
of equilibria in
threshold games of
strategic
complements
interactions of
consumers
MONDAY – 08/02
15:35 – 16:05
COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 4
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
POLITICAL
ECONOMY 2
REPEATED GAMES 1
REPUTATION AND
SIGNALING 1
16:05 – 16:30
Simon Loertscher
(University of
Melbourne)
Information
transmission by
imperfectly
informed parties
Miguel Aramendia
(Universidad del
Pais Vasco)
Long-run forgiving
proof equilibrium in
infinitely repeated
games
In-Uck Park
(University of
Bristol)
Seller reputation
and trust in pretrade
communication
16:30 – 16:55
Galina Zudenkova,
(University Carlos III
of Madrid)
Sincere lobbying
formation
Ichiro Obara
(UCLA)
Belief-based
equilibria
Yukio Koriyama
(Ecole
Polytechnique)
Price competition in
the market for
lemons
session’s chair
EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS AND
REPEATED GAMES
Adam Zylbersztejn,
(University Paris 1,
PSE)
Does information
transmission
contribute to
overcoming
coordination
failure? New
evidence from the
lab
Antonio Miguel
Osório Costa
(Universidad Carlos
III Madrid)
Repeated games at
random moments in
time
MECHANISM
DESIGN 4
MATCHING GAME 3
Aaron Bodoh-Creed
Mustafa Oguz
(Stanford
Afacan
University)
(Stanford University)
The simple behavior
Group robust
of large mechanisms stability in matching
markets
Silvio Micali
(MIT)
The conservative
model of incomplete
information and the
second-knowledge
mechanism
Hanna Halaburda
(Harvard Business
School)
Platforms and limits
to network effects
MONDAY – 08/02
Chair: John F. Nash, Jr.
GAME THEORY SOCIETY PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:
DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIA
Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
17:00 – 17:45
17:45 – 18:30
19:30 – 23:00
Chair: Sergiu Hart
THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING
COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES
John F. Nash, Jr. (Princeton University)
PLENARY
GALA DINNER (SPONSORED BY ORDEM DOS ECONOMISTAS DO BRASIL - OEB)
TUESDAY – 08/03
8:30 – 10:00
MINI-COURSE
10:00 – 10:30
AUCTIONS
Paul Milgrom
COFFEE BREAK
MINI-COURSE
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
John Wooders
MINI-COURSE
GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY
Steven Brams
10:30 – 12:00
12:00 – 13:30
LUNCH
13:30 – 14:15
ROUND TABLE – TBA
TUESDAY – 08/03
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
AUCTIONS 2
INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION 3
Andreas Blume
(University of
Pittsburgh)
Language barriers
14:20 – 14:45
Rodrigo Harrison
(Instituto de
Economia PUC
Chile)
Auctions with resale
market and
asymmetric
information
14:45 – 15:10
Federico
Weinschelbaum
(Universidad de San
Andrés)
On favoritism in
auctions with entry
Rafael Chaves
Santos
(BCB, IBMEC/BSB)
Inflation targeting,
coordination and
confidence crises
15:10 – 15:35
Eric Universo
(IPE-USP)
Informational rents
in the Brazilian oil
and gas auctions
Dirk Leonhard
(Humboldt
University Berlin)
Two-sided
certification: The
market for rating
session’s chair
INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 3
Debdatta Saha
(Indian Statistical
Institute, Delhi
Centre)
Does the market kill
bad ideas? An
institutional
comparison of
committees and
markets in network
industries
Ming Gao
(London Business
School)
When to allow
buyers to sell?
Bundling in mixed
two-sided markets
Pedro Daniel JaraMoroni
(Universidad de
Santiago de Chile)
A two-stage model
of R& D with
VOTING 1
NETWORKS 4
Renata Rizzi
(Universidade de
São Paulo)
Campaign
contributions as a
compulsory toll:
pay-to-play
evidence from Brazil
Tomas Rodriguez
(Stanford
University)
Network structure
and the emergence
of value
Eduardo Perez
(Ecole
Polytechnique)
Choosing choices:
Agenda selection
with uncertain
issues
Juan Escobar
(CEA-DII University
of Chile)
Cooperation and
trust in social
networks of
information
transmission
Pei-yu Melody Lo
(Hong Kong
University)
Why does New
Hampshire matter 
Sequential vs.
Dinko Dimitrov
(Saarland
University)
How to connect
under incomplete
information
agencies
endogeneous timing
in quantity
competition
simultaneous
elections with
multiple candidates
TUESDAY – 08/03
15:35 – 16:05
COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 5
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
FAIRNESS AND
IMPLEMENTATION
MECHANISM
DESIGN 5
16:05 – 16:30
Pelin Pasin Cowley
(Bilkent University)
Strong Nash
implementability via
critical profiles
Vinicius Carrasco
(PUC-Rio)
From equals to
despots: The
dynamics of
repeated decision
taking in
partnerships with
private information
16:30 – 16:55
Steven Brams
(New York
University)
The undercut
procedure: An
algorithm for the
envy-free division of
indivisible items
Marcelo de
Carvalho
(IMPA)
General envelope
theorem for
multidimensional
type spaces
session’s chair
FINANCE
AND DIFFERENTIAL
GAMES
Jaime Orillo
(Catholic University
of Brasilia)
Credit derivatives in
a general
equilibrium model
with incomplete
markets
João José de Farias
Neto
(Instituto de
Estudos Avançados
– CTA)
A 3D missileairplane pursuitevasion differential
game
REPEATED GAMES 2
POLITICAL
ECONOMY 3
INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 4
Antonio Miguel
Osório Costa
(Universidad Carlos
III Madrid)
Repeated
interaction and the
revelation of
player's type: A
principal-monitoragent problem
Matthias Blonsky
(J.W. Goethe
University)
Equilibrium
selection in the
repeated prisoner’s
dilemma: Axiomatic
approach and
experimental
evidence
Galina Zudenkova
(University Carlos III
of Madrid)
Split-ticket voting:
An implicit incentive
approach
Ron Siegel
(Northwestern
University)
Head starts in allpay contests
Cesar Martinelli
(ITAM)
Voting and
incentives in cartels
Eray Cumbul
(University of
Rochester)
An algorithmic
approach to find
iterated Nash
equilibria
TUESDAY – 08/03
17:00 – 17:45
17:45 – 18:30
19:00 – 23:00
PLENARY
Chair: Gabrielle Demange
ON THE VULNERABILITY OF ALLOCATION RULES
TO MANIPULATION OF ENDOWMENTS
William Thomson (University of Rochester)
PLENARY
Chair: William Thomson
COLLECTIVE ATTENTION AND RANKING METHODS
Gabrielle Demange (PSE-EHESS)
CLOSING RECEPTION
WEDNESDAY – 08/04
8:30– 10:00
MINI-COURSE
10:00 – 10:30
COFFEE BREAK
MINI-COURSE
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
John Wooders
MINI-COURSE
GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY
Steven Brams
10:30 – 12:00
12:00 – 13:30
13:30 – 14:05
AUCTIONS
Paul Milgrom
LUNCH
Chair: William H. Sandholm
DYNAMIC POLITICAL AGENCY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD
John Duggan (University of Rochester)
SEMI-PLENARY
Chair: Olivier Hudry
REPEATED GAMES WITH BOUNDED MEMORY
Hamid Sabourian (Cambridge University)
14:05 – 14:40
SEMI-PLENARY
Chair: John Duggan
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY:
OVERVIEW AND RECENT RESULTS
William H. Sandholm (University of Wisconsin)
Chair: Hamid Sabourian
HOW DIFFICULT IS IT TO COMPUTE THE WINNER OF A GAME?
Olivier Hudry (Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications)
WEDNESDAY – 08/04
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
MATCHING GAME 4
INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 5
14:40 – 15:05
Eduardo Azevedo
(Harvard University)
Imperfect
competition in twosided matching
markets
Carlos Cinquetti
(Sao Paulo State
University)
The effects of trade
policy under spatial
monopolistic
competition
15:05 – 15:30
Yosuke Yasuda
(GRIPS )
Understanding
stable matchings: A
non-cooperative
Approach
Romeo Matthew
(Jawaharlal Nehru
University)
Stable commitment
in an intertemporal
collusive trade
session’s chair
STOCHASTIC
GAMES AND
FINANCE
Nagarajan
Krishnamurthy
(Chennai
Mathematical
Institute)
New classes of twoplayer and multiplayer stochastic
games with the
Orderfield property
Jaime Orillo
(Catholic University
of Brasilia)
Dissaving of the
past: the case of the
reverse mortgage
POLITICAL
ECONOMY 4
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY 1
SOCIAL CHOICE 1
Wolfgang Leininger
(University of
Dortmund)
Leveling the
lobbying process:
Effort maximization
in asymmetric nperson contests
Zemin Zhong
(HSBC School of
Business, Peking
University)
Myopia in contest:
accumulating
valuation all-pay
auction model and
experiment
Alejandro Neme
(Instituto de
Matemática
Aplicada San Luis)
The division problem
with voluntary
participation
Jorge Streb
(Universidad del
Cema)
Meaningful
talk
Aaron Bodoh-Creed
(Stanford
University)
Mood, associative
memory, and the
formation and
dynamics of belief
Alan Miller
(University of Haifa)
Rules for
aggregating
information
WEDNESDAY – 08/04
15:30 – 16:00
COFFEE BREAK AND POSTER SESSION 6
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Session
16:00 – 16:25
16:25 – 16:50
session’s chair
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY 2
Uri Weiss
(The Center for The
Study of Rationality,
Hebrew University)
The rationality of
"irrationality"
Daniel Monte
(Simon Fraser
University)
Conscious memory:
An experimental
study
COOPERATIVE
GAMES 5
Rene Levinsky,
(Max Planck
Institute of
Economics)
On the
axiomatisation of
the balanced
solution for
cooperative TUgames
Francisco Sanchez
(CIMAT)
The value of
partners
MATCHING GAME 5
CONTRACTS 1
Jacob Leshno
(Harvard University)
Can we make school
choice more
efficient? An
incentives approach
David Ong
(Peking University
HSBC School of
Business)
Fishy gifts: Bribing
with shame and
guilt
Roland Pongou
(Brown University)
An economic theory
of fidelity in network
formation
Roberta Ribeiro
Fernandes
(Universidade
Federal de
Pernambuco)
Principal-multiagent
model with moral
hazard from a
behavioral
economics
perspective
REFINEMENT AND
SEARCH 1
Leandro Chaves
Rêgo
(Federal University
of Pernambuco)
Collaborative
dominance: When
doing unto others as
you would have
them do unto you is
rational
Dmitrijs Rutko,
(University of Latvia)
Fuzzified algorithm
for game tree
search
AUCTIONS 3
Eiichiro Kazumori
(SUNY)
A strategic theory of
markets
Luciano I. de Castro
(Northwestern
University)
Grid distributions to
study single object
auctions
WEDNESDAY – 08/04
16:55 – 17:40
17:40 – 18:25
PLENARY
Chair: Abraham Neyman
DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH MORAL HAZARD
AND ADVERSE SELECTION
Motty Perry (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & The University of Warwick)
PLENARY
Chair: Motty Perry
A NEW DEFINITION OF DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES
AND STATIONARY PAYOFFS AND EQUILIBRIUM
Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)