The Midi, the Métropole and the Marshall Plan. To what extent did
concepts of post-war recovery affect regional institutions and
identity? A study of the Midi vignerons in the French Fourth
Republic.
Andrew W. M. Smith
Supervisor: Dr. S. Tyre
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of M.A. Honours in the
Department of Modern History, School of History, University of St Andrews
2007
I, Andrew William Macrae Smith, attest that this dissertation, for
submission to the Department of Modern History, St Andrews
University, is entirely my own work.
2
Contents
Preface
4
List of Abbreviations
5
Introduction
6
Chapter 1
8
The Government, State Intervention and Attempts to Alter the Status Quo
Chapter 2
Local Power Structures and the Rise of the Cooperative
26
Chapter 3
Tending Vines and Picket Lines: The People of the Midi
41
Conclusion
61
Appendix
63
Bibliography
65
3
Preface
Both the Monnet Plan and the Marshall Plan had pivotal roles to play in the
redevelopment of the post-war French economy, but exacted what can be described as the
wages of modernisation from areas like the Midi, centred on agricultural production and
mired in retrograde methods. Recovery necessitated heavy regulation and stringent
planning which rendered the wine industry structurally dependent on the government, as
the solution to increasing market instability was seen in more exacting controls. The
traditional left-wing slant on Southern politics was exemplified in the stand made by
Southern political organisations against the impositions of central government, which
struggled to find the balance of intervention set against the political instability of the
Fourth Republic. Governmental instability exacerbated a situation in which producers
became politicised, as rural protest became a combatative assertion of regional identity in
a world which was rapidly expanding in terms of European integration and globalisation.
By focussing on the nature of French regional identity in response to external pressure, it
becomes important to gauge both the nature of the reaction as well as the nature of the
pressure and to this end this study will encompass: interviews conducted in the region;
American state documents detailing the thought behind the Marshall Plan and French
state documents regarding the interaction of Paris and the Midi. Today, the French wine
industry bears the scars of structural dependence, fractured regionalism and excessive
regulation, phenomena which have direct roots in the post-war period, resulting in the
qualitative retardation and quantitative superfluity of the industry which has plagued it
since. The study of the period remains a juxtaposition of stark economic realities and fin
de siècle sentimentality, wherein poetry, the civilisation of the vine and the traditional
4
solidarity of the agricultural proletariat jar with an unapologetically modern global
market.
Table of Abbreviations
A.O.C.
Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée
C.G.V.
Confédération Générale des Vignerons
C.R.A.V.
Comité régional d'action viticole
E.E.C.
European Economic Community
HL
Hectolitre (100 litres)
HA
Hectare (10,000 square metres)
P.C.F.
Parti Communiste Française
5
Introduction
In the post war period the Languedoc Roussillon faced the challenges of economic
recovery whilst undergoing a crisis of identity. The traditional decline of agricultural
communities against the backdrop of “la permanence de la crise viticole”1 intensified and
articulated the crisis. The complex nature of this identity crisis renders it largely
unquantifiable, but what this study intends in part to illustrate is the intrinsic interrelationship of political association and traditional cultural ties in informing twentieth
century identity in rural France. This was shaped in the post-war period, representing the
start of the transition towards a recognisably modern mindset as the Midi vignerons faced
the upheavals of modernisation and a national identity forcefully revised by post-war
international relations. In this study I intend to pursue a ‘top-down’ analysis of the
period: examining relevant reforms and parliamentary debate at governmental level
before exploring the effect of implementation on the regional level and culminating in an
analysis of events at an interpersonal level. My study will focus around the LanguedocRoussillon region in the South of the country - the largest wine-producing area in France.
This area has generally been the source of much of France’s vin de table, contributing
39% of total French wine production in 1957 alone2, and has thus played a vital role in
the national economy by supplying much of the ‘drinking wine’ to the North. The largescale nature of monocultural investment has meant that it has tended to act as a lens,
magnifying issues affecting the wider viticultural sector, augmented by the notional
southern predilection to protest. As such, the study of this area helps to develop a greater
O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, Journée d’études AFSP/Groupe
Local et politique, IEP de Rennes – 8 février 2002 p6
2
A. Girard, ‘Région Languedoc-Roussillon. Economie et Population’, Population (French Edition), vol. 12
no. 3 (July - September 1957) p513
1
6
understanding of the health of the national economy and wider agricultural sector, as well
as attempting to explore predicators of the perceived distinct Southern identity. Indeed,
the period plays witness to a wholesale decline in the relevance of regional identity,
eroded by the collapse of traditional communities as a result of the modernisation of the
economy and progressive demographic trends. These factors become increasingly
important when studying periods of significant change in French life, such as the period
after the Liberation and spanning the lifetime of the Fourth Republic, on which this study
will centre. Thematically there are four key concepts which permeate the investigation:
reactions to modernisation; reluctance to embrace extra-local pressures for change; the
importance of left wing politics; and a regional tradition of resistance. In observation of
these themes, I intend to trace their development through the three levels of my study, in
a negotiation designed to highlight the controversy involved in manipulating traditional
concepts of identity. Whether within global, national or local political frameworks the
relevance of these concepts was challenged by the increasingly global context of post-war
recovery plans.
7
Chapter 1: The Government, State Intervention and Attempts
to Alter the Status Quo
When considering the economic performance of the Fourth Republic, it is
important to dissociate notions of political instability from the larger truth of economic
progress. The political climate at the start of the Fourth Republic all but governed its
future, with a hasty conglomeration of Gaullists and the left producing a political
stalemate which represented a “fertile field”3 for the flourishing of small interest groups.
It is an historical irony that in the midst of the instability and political infighting of the
Fourth Republic, France’s economy evolved with a large degree of economic planning
and involved reform. The war, and poor pre war economic situation, can be seen to have
forced reform in certain key areas. This was a result of developing social trends such as
migration away from agriculture, described as ‘the hidden hand’ of economic processes.4
There is likewise a debate regarding the, possibly accidental, positive influence of the
Vichy regime on post-war modernization, as its corporatist policy eventually meshed
with the large-scale program of industrial amalgamations, for example in the coal and
steel industries, which took place under the Fourth Republic. However, France’s recovery
is not merely attributable to such incidental historical phenomena, as both agriculture and
industry witnessed incisive, effective and deliberate political intervention to encourage
modernisation.
3
I. M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France (Cambridge, 2002) p36
H. Schmiegelow; M. Schmiegelow, ‘The New Mercantilism in International Relations: The Case of
France's External Monetary Policy’, International Organization, 29 (Spring 1975) p368
4
8
Stability was made possible by the relative continuity in ministerial positions set
against the background of larger cabinet instability in the Fourth Republic, which was a
result of the parliamentary system and the fluid nature of the cabinet majority. This left a
situation whereby the frequent collapses of prime ministers failed to bring about
significant change in many ministerial posts (with the average ministerial continuation
throughout the first 8 cabinet reshuffles of the Fourth Republic being 50%5). Such
background stability lent a greater degree of authority to government bureaucrats usually
reined in by strong political leadership, which in turn influenced the tone and execution
of reform. Representative of this empowerment of bureaucrats was Jean Monnet, at no
point elected to ministerial position but regarded, due to his exceptional financial
background, as one of the primary reformers within the Republic. Horrified by the
violence of two world wars, Monnet sought to preclude the reoccurrence of such conflict
by diminishing nationalist sentiment through a program of wider European integration.
Monnet himself recognised the strange political situation, highlighting that “in the twenty
years that followed [World War Two], three planning commissioners outlived twenty
eight governments.”6 The keen influence of conservative individuals such as Monnet on
post-war reform is perhaps best evidenced by the respective high profile plans unveiled
by the British and French government after the war. The post-war British Labour
government ushered in the liberal welfare state in response to the Beveridge Report
whereas France undertook a decidedly more conservative program of industrial and fiscal
reform as part of the Monnet Plan. This individualistic influence on policy was directly
5
6
R.C. Macridis, ‘Cabinet Instability in the Fourth Republic’, The Journal of Politics, 14 (1952) p647-8
J. Monnet, Memoirs (Glasgow, 1976) p261
9
derivative of Monnet’s personal role in securing American aid and his heightened
importance in the political climate.7
As such, it is important to look at the economic measures promulgated from Paris
with a sense of their development over the chronology of the Fourth Republic, whilst
remembering that the period witnessed an empowered bureaucratic civil service often
acting in place of direct political influence.
Planning and State Intervention
Important in the rejuvenation of the post-war agricultural climate was the
influence of structures and governance upon the fertile areas of France “where the
physical environment has not been a handicap, but the influence of man has been decisive
in the eventual success of viticulture and its economic consequence.”8 Indeed, external
governance has often been seen by growers themselves as an impediment to the success
of the industry, with the observation that it is the land which has enabled the industry “to
live and die and live again.”9 As such, the government’s role in viticulture has largely
been one of regulation, although it is similarly important to consider the significance of
subsidies, taxation, price fixing and rationing, as these constituted the principal
governmental tools for managing the viticultural economy. Part of the dynamism of the
interchange, however, consists of the inter-relationship of traditional local elites with
external influences such as the government. This interplay in turn helped shape the nature
of the institutions that interpreted and implemented extra-local policy directives.
F.M.B. Lynch, ‘Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in French
Reconstruction’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 37, No. 2. (May, 1984), p232
8
G.G. Weigend, ‘The basis and significance of viticulture in Southwest France’, Annals of the Association
of American Geographers, vol.44 no.1 (Mar., 1954) p75
9
R. Scruton, ‘Peasants’ Revolt’, New Statesman, 17/07/06 p48
7
10
The interaction of enterprise, regional elites and national government shaped the
nature of the economic planning which by and large steered France towards post-war
recovery. The Plans orchestrated by the Planning Commissariat were, by definition,
indicative and not authoritarian, as dialogue was enshrined in the process of their
inception, which saw “economic, social and political considerations… inextricably
linked”10. This interaction was essential, due to the fact that over 50% of capital
investment could be influenced by state decisions11, placing an enormous amount of
pressure on the government as a central body of prescriptive investment. This dynamic
stance, coupled with the consultant nature of the relationship, helped ensure the accuracy
of forecasts included in the Plan, with both the First and Second Plans exceeding
targets.12 Indeed, forecasting only represented part of the function of the Plans as they
were constantly modified in attempts to ensure the continued dynamic operation of the
national economy. In this sense Economic Planning did not represent the outright control
of the economy by the government but increased and involved intervention during a
period in which the prospect of economic disaster was very real. The Planning
Commissariat thus served the role of post-war training wheels for the national economy
of the new Republic, allowing space for development whilst maintaining supervisory
control. The main tools of the government in pursuing the aims of the planning
commissariat were of subsidy, taxation and price fixing.
Governmental use of subsidy was designed to alleviate strains on winemakers
whilst helping to encourage greater fiscal responsibility in the means of their delivery.
The immediate post-war period saw the creation of the “viticultural nest-egg”, which
10
G.M. Holmes; P.D. Fawcett, The Contemporary French Economy (London, 1983) p31
P. Coffey, The Social Economy of France (London, 1973) p72
12
Holmes; Fawcett, The Contemporary French Economy, pp.30-31
11
11
constituted the delivery of surcharges on the fixed price of wine at production level.13
The subsidy was granted with the express aim of reconstituting vineyards after wartime
destruction, but carried within it the subtext of modernisation, with its usage limited to
replanting vines and the purchase of modern equipment. In an attempt to show the
growers the way to the bank, the subsidy was paid directly into the regional Crédit
Agricole.14 This move eventually failed due to the limitations placed on the usage of the
first ‘nest-egg’, but the subsidy remained in place, delivered thereafter in currency to
allay the immediate needs of vignerons. Dynamism was achieved through the focus on
indirect taxation pursued in the planning structure, allowing for a relatively immediate
effect on the economy and avoiding difficulties in collection.15 Taxation has represented
a long-time problem in the Midi, where regional agricultural organisations frequently
advised members to withhold tax as a means of protest.16 Wines were evaluated for tax
by their degree of alcohol, with higher taxes attempting to ward off high yield and highly
alcoholic wines, generally of poor quality. As the government’s least popular economic
tool, taxation strained the relationship between vignerons and government, with the
suddenness of imposition frequently causing difficulties for smaller producers.17 The
directness of taxation frequently gave way to more indirect means of attempting to guide
the viticultural economy, ceding to protest from local vignerons about the limits placed
on their activity.
Price-fixing and rationing allowed the government to attempt to control the
market for wine, rather than the productive sector itself. By artificially propping up
13
C.K. Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government since 1875, (New York, 1960) p165
Ibid, p165
15
P. Coffey, The Social Economy of France (London, 1973) p64
16
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p166
17
ibid p166
14
12
prices, as done immediately after the War, the government attempted to encourage
growers to avoid the active black market and stay legitimate despite rising costs and
small yields.18 In the face of these problems price-fixing proved to be rather toothless in
isolation, and the policy required revision in the late 1940s with the associated
introduction of a two-tiered market, consisting of a free sector for a small proportion of a
producer’s wine and a price controlled sector for the majority.19 Although paying lipservice to market reform, tiering the sale of wine did little to encourage change in the
region due to the small amount of wine saleable within the free sector, itself largely a
concession to the greed of producers. The government’s tools in attempting to regulate
the market and the productive sector were, therefore, fairly limited. Any ability to effect
significant change in the market was resultantly lost in the largely palliative and indirect
measures which the government had available, perpetuating the cycle of market
fluctuations from which the Midi wine industry suffered.
Intervention in Action
The nature of the Midi’s dependence on a monocultural agricultural industry
renders it largely susceptible to unfavourable market conditions which can devastate the
regional economy and have done so cyclically from the outbreak of Phylloxera in 1863
until today. After the Liberation, many growers felt that the Midi was the worst affected
by the wartime productive slump, and hoped for increased government support beyond
traditional credit structures.20 Immediate measures to stimulate production were
undertaken by the government in the provision of equipment such as fertiliser and horses,
18
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p166
ibid p167
20
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p162
19
13
coupled with the promise of subsidies,21 as mentioned previously. Heavy involvement
persisted until 1947, whereupon the government decided to ease regulation in favour of
greater market liberty.22 This situation prevailed at the start of the Fourth Republic
period, much to the chagrin of the Midi vignerons, who sought heavy regulation as a
shield against the crises brought about by market fluctuation. These crises are generally
referred to in the region as crises de mévente23, and occurred during the Fourth Republic
in the years of 1953 and 1956. The severity of these market fluctuations is demonstrated
by the fact that the real value of wine dropped 20% between the periods 1949-1950 and
1953-1954 as a result of the first crisis of the period.24 The abundant harvest of 1953 led
to a drop in prices which the government sought to tackle initially by issuing a decree in
December of that year reclassifying viticultural territories in an effort to reduce expected
volume.25 The crisis set the government reeling, with inaccurate assessment having
estimated the drop in the value of wine over the preceding four years as 50%26 and
barricades being erected all over the Midi as vignerons took to the street.27 A period of
furious protest, coinciding with a general strike, saw the government eventually arrive at
a legislative review in the form of the new Code du vin. Little advance was made with
this review however, as, despite superficial changes, 1953 saw a return to the measures
21
ibid p164
ibid p168
23
J. Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique et Syndicale dans les Campagnes Viticoles du Midi’, La Diffusion des
Idées Progressistes dans le Monde Rural de la Révolution au XX e Siècle. Actes du colloque de Châteauroux
1998 (Châteauroux, 2000) p7
24
J. Dubos, ‘Les Mutations de la Viticulture Française Contemporaine’ in J. Sagnès (ed.), La Viticulture
Française aux XIXe et XXe Siècles (Béziers, 1993) p85
25
L. Loubère, The Vine Remembers, (New York, 1985) p172
26
Journal officiel de la république française. Documents parlementaires de l’Assemblée nationale, 1953,
p980 (annex 6399)
27
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p183
22
14
introduced in the Statut Viticole in 1931, increasing the use of sales blockage and
compulsory distillation.28
The falling price index of wine in the years running up to the “grande crise de
1953”29 had, however, seen preliminary measures introduced in an attempt to stave off
further crisis. Efforts were made to reduce yields across the board, with the uprooting of
vines intended to decrease the regional output and stabilise market value. These measures
largely failed due to their voluntary nature, with distillation merely a palliative and the
uprooting (or ‘grubbing up’) of vineyards, effectively eroding the future productive
potential of vignerons and offering them only short-term financial remuneration. A
program of voluntary distillation was instituted by central government, at which wine
was bought at the going rate to be distilled into industrial spirit. Between 1948 and 1952
distillation of surplus wines cost the state 9694 million Francs per year30, with minimal
long term benefit, whilst creating a new form of overproduction in the distilled alcohol
sector.31 Likewise, attempts to encourage voluntary uprooting of vineyards by the decree
of November 1954 failed, with an outcome of only 4% of vines uprooted by 1957.32
The later crisis can be attributed to a variety of factors, notably the very harsh
frost in 195633, which combined with a period of declining consumption (from 139 litres
per head per annum in 195434 to 124 litres per head per annum in 196335). 1954 actually
represented the point from which consumption never recovered in France, facing regular
28
G. Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon (Montpellier, 1960), vol.2, p319
O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, Journée d’études AFSP/Groupe
Local et politique, IEP de Rennes – 8 février 2002p7
30
Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon, vol.2, p320
31
Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique…’, pp.9-10
32
Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon, vol.2, p322
33
J.M. Jeanneney, Forces et Faiblesses de l’Économie Française, (Paris, 1959) p66
34
Dubos, ‘Les Mutations de la Viticulture Française Contemporaine’, p85
35
ibid p87
29
15
diminishment thereafter.36 Galtier labelled this crisis as “above all else a crisis of under
consumption”, highlighting the fact that in 1955 sales of mineral water reached 920
million bottles, compared to 198 million in 1938.37 Likewise, the crisis of 1956 can be
seen to have been one of the contributory factors in the rapid decline of agricultural
workers, dropping from 5 million to 1.5 million 1955-1988.38 The government’s methods
in tackling the crisis focussed initially on traditional methods, such as blocking surplus
wine from sale (8.5 million HL)39 and the distillation of surplus wine into industrial spirit
(6 million HL) 40, but going beyond earlier palliative measures by enforcing these as
obligatory. Innovative methods were also introduced in an attempt to break the cyclical
pattern of these market crashes, with 1.8 million Francs set aside in the 1955 budget to
help encourage the exportation of Languedoc-Roussillon wines by granting massive
subsidies to exporters.41 The recovery of the market was gradual but, as government
initiatives took effect, prices returned to 1949 levels by the end of June 1957, having
dropped as low as 74% in February 195642 (see figure 3). The ability of the government
to solve market crises was demonstrable, therefore, although it encountered difficulty in
trying to address the structural causes of the crises.
INRA, ‘La consommation de vin dans les pays traditionnellement viticoles’, 2emeSymposium
International sur la Production et la Consommation du Vin dans le Monde, (Ljubljana, 1979) p24
37
Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon, vol.2, p304
38
G. Gavignaud-Fontaine, La révolution rurale dans la France contemporaine : XVIIIe-XXe siècle (Paris,
1996) p167n2
39
Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon, vol.2, p319
40
ibid vol.2, p320
41
Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon, vol.2, p320
42
ibid, vol.2, p335
36
16
Attempts to Tackle Structural Problems
Overproduction has been a constant structural frailty in the Midi, and the focus
has been increasingly placed on programs of ‘grubbing up’ vineyards, compulsory
distillation and reducing yields across the board. As early as 1946, the government
attempted to implement uprooting programs, calling for reductions in the area under vine
in both France and Algeria, however, the “clamour of thirsty consumers” dictated that
this reduction was curtailed by the necessity of substantive recovery.43 Warner considers
that the lesson provided by this too-rapid recovery was ignored in the long-term, as
further reductions were not pursued aggressively enough in the legislative review of
1953.44 Between 1955 and 1956, the government increased their drive to reduce vine
coverage in the Languedoc-Roussillon and, indeed, one witnesses a reduction in vine
coverage in France from 1,391 million HA in 1954 to 1,173 million HA in 1958, a 15.7%
decrease.45 What Dubos fails to incorporate in his citation of these figures is the reason
behind the 1956 crisis, the extreme frost which caused widespread devastation, and
actually led to the lifting of regulations regarding the planting of vines, allowing growers
to plant new vines without uprooting old stock.46 Thus, whilst it is clear that the
government pursued attempts to encourage reductions in the area of vines throughout the
post-war period, it was seldom tackled courageously. The political instability of the
Fourth Republic did not allow for such an overt challenge to a lobby group like the
vignerons, for whom reducing output has perennially represented an unpalatable
medicine, with the long term benefits of increasing prices obscured by the immediate
43
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p189
ibid p189
45
Dubos, ‘Les Mutations de la Viticulture Française Contemporaine’, p85
46
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p213
44
17
shock delivered to income. Even foreign appraisals of the French wine industry’s health
focussed on the strength of “local resistance” to structural change and terming the
frailties all but intractable.47
However, the economic imperatives of reducing output and increasing quality
seemed the surest and most stable paths for the health of the industry, and have seen
continued service at a national and supra-national level. However, these efforts have
largely failed due to the vocal opposition presented to such plans. Criticism still can be
heard from purists accusing the commission of bowing to “health fascists” and
prescribing the cure for overproduction as increased consumption.48 The government,
they say, is completing the work of Phylloxera.49 This attitude seems short-sighted at best
and highlights the extent to which opposition to political measures can be seen to
correlate with self interest in the Midi, muddying the praxis of protest otherwise informed
by broader ideological concepts, as will be further explored in Chapter 3.
Not only the opposition but the impetus behind reform was shaped by the broader
ideological concerns writ large over the period. Attempts to tackle the innate problems of
the Languedoc-Roussillon region were multi-faceted, but took on a new tone in the
technocratic atmosphere of the Marshall Plan, determined to dispel the “drudgery of
bygone times.”50 Schemes to irrigate the Rhone Valley were conceived of, broadly based
on the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority which had prospered in America in the
1930s. Recently returned Marshall Plan exchange workers brought new perspectives to
old problems, conceiving of a series of hydroelectric plants spanning newly irrigated
47
W. Meiklereid, Economic and Commercial Conditions in France, (London, 1953) p22
Scruton, ‘Peasants’ Revolt’, p48
49
ibid p48
50
‘Europe – Ruins to Recovery’, Archive Hour, BBC Radio 4 23/09/06
48
18
canals, and allowing increased production of food crops as well as energy provision (See
Figure 1 for route of canal). In addressing two of Monnet’s core problem industries,
French engineers attempted to tackle the problem in a firmly Marshall Plan tone, but with
a European flavour, highlighting that the progress of electrification took place in the
landscapes of the “paintings of Paul Cézanne.”51 The Bas-Rhône-Languedoc scheme to
irrigate large sections of the Midi region came into fruition under the second plan,
building on the research done during the early years of post-war recovery.52 The project,
however, was blighted by the inability of the government to suggest a “remunerative
substitute crop”53 to growers eager to produce traditional products in an area where the
vine flourished. The tone of these technocratic developments only served to galvanise
opposition to what was seen as a “crash programme for reconstruction”54 which had
already failed to address agricultural frailties during the first economic plan. Such
attempts characterised the Fourth Republic period as, despite attempts at regional
consultation, economic planning led to a situation which relied on the success of “basic
sectors” rather than focussing on the “basic actions” needed to alter the problems of these
sectors.55 The translation of the technocratic ideals proposed by the economic planners
into reality fostered increasing local resentment of external pressures.
51
ibid
M.C. Maclennan, ‘Regional Planning in France’, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.13 (1965) p64
53
Meiklereid, Economic and Commercial Conditions in France, p22
54
J. Hackett; A. Hackett, Economic Planning in France, (London, 1963) p26
55
Hackett; Hackett, Economic Planning in France, p27
52
19
Difficulties of Imports
To the producers of the Midi, imports of foreign table wines have always
represented a visible and alacritous danger, menacing them with “prix competitifs.”56
This is especially so due to the high percentage of regional vinous production which fell
under the Vin de Table classification, and, despite efforts to the contrary, the near total
monoculture of the region which engenders total reliance on sales of basic wine.57 Other
viticultural regions, such as Burgundy or the Loire, face a much lesser threat from
imports, owing to their largely higher quality output and widespread polyculture.58 As
such any similar low quality wine, imported from countries such as Italy, claimed a
noticeable share of an already precarious market, and was highly visible as a grievance
for regional agitators. The climate of tariff relaxation which accompanied the immediate
postwar aid agreements therefore raised particular problems for the wine industry.59
Precedents exist that make plain the positive effect that imported wines can have on the
national economy, as demonstrated in 1927, when the government temporarily lifted
import duty to compensate for the poor harvest which had failed to yield enough wine to
satisfy the market.60 Increased demand upon the enfeebled supply created a situation
wherein wine that had been selling previously for 70F p/HL rocketed to 230F p/HL in
February 1927 and continued rising to a high of 270F p/HL by the 15th of April.61 The
controversial solution to the problem was accepted on the premise that the situation was
temporary, and the promise that the imports (from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece)
56
Interview with Alain Trille, Château des Batilles, 04/08/06
Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, p3
58
Loubère, The Vine Remembers, p21
59
Lynch, ‘Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan’, p231
60
Commission des Douanes, ‘Levée temporaire des droits de douane sur les vins étrangers en vue de la
baisse du prix du vin de consommation courante en France’, Chambre des Députés, no. 4000 (Paris, 23
avril 1927)
61
ibid
57
20
would sate but not flood the market – merely reducing a market shortfall of 10 million HL
to 8 million HL.62 This scenario helps to illustrate the positive nature of the manipulation
of import tariffs as an economic tool, but also demonstrates plainly the impact that
imports could have even as early as 1927, with a less developed international trade
network in place. Indeed, the situation helps to elucidate the standpoint of the Midi
vignerons in their opposition to further European integration in 1957, promising as it did
the permanent relaxation of trading tariffs as a spur to burgeoning continental economic
prosperity.
Attempts made to counter this negative perception of increased European
integration largely failed, mainly due to the inconsistent manner in which they were
pursued. The formation of what can be termed as a ‘regional’ trade federation, the
European Economic Community (E.E.C.), in the wake of the Second World War elicited
an inconsistent portrayal in American produced propaganda of the period and the
attitudes expressed privately by statesmen. The multilateralism created by a federation of
united European states offered an attractive trading partner for America, as well as
obvious political stability in the face of a perceived developing Eastern threat. As such,
the prospect was widely represented as a positive step in the American media; with Gene
Kelly taking a break from dancing to condescendingly report on the progress made in
Geneva, fast becoming “the most important city in Europe”, as talks of union
progressed.63 National borders became a thing of resentment for the economic wizards of
the Marshall Plan, representing the last bastion of petty nationalism against the broad
unity which Europe so desired in the late 1940s. Yet by the 1950s the focus had shifted to
62
63
ibid
‘Europe – Ruins to Recovery’, Archive Hour, BBC Radio 4 23/09/06
21
the celebration of economic and cultural individualism in response to the increasingly
depersonalised political unity of the Eastern bloc.64 During discussion of the Marshall
Plan, American government papers warned about the danger of the oversimplification of
Europe resulting in a “renunciation… of the values of individual responsibility and
political restraint”65. E.E.C. integration in the latter half of the twentieth century altered
the tack of interrelationships. The post-war focus on multilateralism was largely replaced
by the increasing solidarity within regional federations as a genuine response to the
creeping influence of globalisation, allowing greater management of regional
economies.66 Indeed, trading blocs such as the European Union have represented a
continuously controversial notion in market economics, as they can be seen as
contributory to the greater liberalisation of world trade or, indeed, as a threat to the spirit
of multilateral trade liberalization.67
The dark realities which haunted Monnet’s dream of unity thus manifested
themselves in the larger simplification of the E.E.C.’s diversity in its infancy. This
simplification affected almost all constituent member states as the traditional geopolitical axis became realigned by the opening of markets and scaling down of
protectionism and economic nationalism which resulted from increased inter-penetration.
Traditional agricultural areas in France, for example, lying in the South of the country,
were shifted effectively northwards by the incorporation of more southerly territories, for
example Italy, stripping the areas of much of their economic relevance.68 The
64
ibid
“Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem”, July, 1947; ERP [folder 2]; Subject File, 1916
1960; Clark Clifford Papers.
66
W. Michalak; R. Gibb, ‘Trading Blocs and Multilateralism in the World Economy’, Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, vol.87, no.2 (1997) p265
67
ibid p265
68
Interview with Edouard Raymond, Domaines Lacassagne, 03/08/06
65
22
aforementioned vulnerability of the Midi vignerons to cheap imported wine was therefore
brought to the fore by the establishment of the E.E.C., and helps to explain their
resistance to the introduction of wine into the Common Market, propounded principally
by syndicalist agitators, leaving France exempt from E.E.C. winemaking laws until
1970.69
Erstwhile saviour and oft cited strain on the industry, Maghrebin wines played a
largely ancillary role in French winemaking. The wines of the South can, amongst lower
quality releases, have a tendency towards a certain thinness and low alcohol content,
making for a largely unpalatable and even more unmarketable wine. The traditional
solution to this problem was for vignerons to blend their wine with Algerian stock, often
“riches en alcool”70 and extremely full in body (though lacking the complexity lent by
the Midi wines in blending), which led to a degree of symbiosis between the respective
markets. In the post-war period, this practice was largely in decline, influenced by the
move towards better quality wines by independent producers seeking the higher price
bracket guaranteed by Appellation d’Origine Controlée (A.O.C.) status.71 Indeed,
Communist analyses of the viticultural situation rested upon the negative impact of the
import of Algerian wines for the smallest producers of the Midi. It was with this in mind
that workers’ representatives called for an end to Algerian imports in the 1930s, as they
became less relevant to the health of the industry.72 Indeed, the existence of “the Algerian
problem” throughout the late 1950s led to speculation that an increasing mobilisation of
viticultural capital would precede a large-scale abandonment of Algerian vineyards in the
J. Martin, ‘Winegrower’s Syndicalism in the Languedoc: Continuity and Change’, Sociologia Ruralis,
vol.36, no. 3, p335
70
H. Isnard, La Vigne en Algérie (Paris, 1947) p231
71
Dubos, ‘Les Mutations de la Viticulture Française Contemporaine’, p84
72
Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique et Syndicale…’, p11
69
23
long term.73 Independence was largely seen as freeing France from the obligation to
purchase almost all of Algerian production, allowing for a greater equilibrium in the
market.74 This outcome represented one of the few structural problems in which the Midi
saw any resolution, as the drastic severing of ties was clearly forced upon policy-makers
outwith concerns for regional reaction.
Due to the inability of the government to push through meaningful structural
reform on a regional level, the Monnet Plan is widely judged not to have properly
addressed agriculture as an activité de base.75 The difficulties in reducing output due to
political resistance derailed many of the efforts to reduce the area under vine in France as
a whole, with Warner stressing the importance of the ‘alcohol lobby’ and its “immense”
influence over the press.76 This lobby intensified traditional attitudes, wherein an
ambiguous attitude to the state was prevalent, and thereby welcoming state promotion of
economic or social progress but offering bitter criticism of its failures.77 Recognition of
this attitude seemed to tie the government to constant recapitulation of palliative
regulatory measures, frequently missing the opportunity for decisive change in regional
structural problems. This climate of regulatory control necessitated constant investment
by the government to maintain unviable agricultural ventures, as they struggled to
modernise their methods to meet changing market demands. The climate of European
integration offered many boons to the French government in the postwar period,78 but
gains for the industrial sector did little to quell the problems created for vignerons by the
73
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p193
Dubos, ‘Les Mutations de la Viticulture Française Contemporaine’, p86
75
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p214
76
ibid p215
77
Holmes; Fawcett, The Contemporary French Economy, p33
78
Lynch, ‘Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan’, p242
74
24
opening up of markets across Europe. This was concurrent with the Monnet Plan’s
objective of managing the relation of the French economy to the international system, but
was not effective for stimulating regional reform. As such, the structural problems of the
Midi wine industry faced “une durable stagnation”79 during the period of the Fourth
Republic, despite tangible efforts for reform. These challenges only served to further mire
the region in its cyclical boom and bust economy and increase the structural dependence
of the industry on government intervention.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the local power structures which constituted the
strongest conglomeration of viticultural interests designed to protect the monocultural
regional economy. The failure of the government to exact meaningful development in the
world of the winegrower was, in part, due to their conception of the path to postwar
recovery. By focussing on economic planning and state intervention, the government’s
ability to alter regional issues was diminished by planning on a national level, alienating
regional political elites without fully including them in the modernisation drive. The
influence of local elites was to be central in the postwar regional viticultural economy,
wherein regional successes could have become the building blocks of national prosperity.
79
R. Pech, Enterprise Viticole et Capitalisme en Languedoc-Roussillon: du Phylloxera aux crises de
mévente (Toulouse, 1975) p411
25
Chapter 2: Local Power Structures and the Rise of the
Cooperative
Within a region as obstinately autonomous as the Midi, local power structures
exert a large degree of influence over resident political structure. The centrality of the
vine to life in the region empowered the voice of viticultural elites within these local
power structures, mandating a focus on issues affecting the value of and market for wine.
The importance of the cooperative movement as the regional economy’s main productive
force is hard to exaggerate. As the birthplace of the cooperative venture, the Midi shares
a special bond with its structure, as well as a preponderance of their occurrence. By
articulating notions of regional autonomy, left-wing ideology and militarism the
cooperative structure can be seen to act as a conceptual locus within which it is possible
to examine the politics and power structures of the Midi.
Structures Affecting Value
The economic performance of the wine industry has been perennially tied to the concept
of a strong product/area bond80, and this was enforced in a regulatory manner with the
introduction of the A.O.C. system in the 1920s and 30s. The flaws of the A.O.C. system
lie largely in its development, whilst originally seen to strengthen the industry, there is
growing recognition that there must be changes “au système dirigeant viticole.”81 In a
modern sense, the A.O.C. system is widely criticised as it has grown to become
80
81
G. Robinson, Geographies of Agriculture, (London, 2004) p87
Interview with Alain Trille, Château des Batilles, 04/08/06
26
restrictively complex and is seen to hamper export82, although in the period of the Fourth
Republic there were substantially few classifications. The need for the existence of the
system stems partially from the concerns of the growers themselves. Fraud, or the
perception of it, constitutes one of the principal triggers of agricultural protest, as shown
in the 1907 wine crisis83, and the struggle against it remains a maxim of protest
organisations today. The complexity and the appeal of the A.O.C. system lie in the fact
that the qualities it controls “cross time and space and are anchored in a specific place
and history.”84
In this sense, Von Thüren’s classical rent theory allies itself to an analysis of
France’s post-war agricultural climate, explaining the link between terroire and brand.
Von Thüren’s equation calculates the value of land, and thereby distinguishes its rent
value by considering environmental variables, notably: land rent; yield per unit of land;
production expenses per unit of land; market price per unit of commodity; freight rate;
and distance to market.85 This theory was originally applied to nineteenth century
German property, but its analytical approach remains valid in the context of determining
the spatial importance of vineyards in France, especially during a period of difficulty for
the economy which rendered analysis largely analogous to that of earlier markets. In the
post-war period of rebuilding, in which many free-market tendencies were sacrificed in
favour of stability (with the introduction of such measures as price-fixing and rationing),
the proto-capitalist rent model is strongly evident in the system of appellations, which
82
Interview with Edouard Raymond, Domaines Lacassagne, 03/08/06
W. Lem, Cultivating Dissent (New York, 1999) p57
84
L. Bérard; P. Marchenay, ‘A Market Culture’ in S. Blowen et al. (ed.), Recollections of France, (Oxford,
2000) p154
85
W. Moran, ‘The Wine Appellation as territory in France and California’, Annals of the association of
American Geographers, vol.83 no.4 (1993) p695
83
27
saw a further upgrading in the Languedoc region during the post-war period, dominated
by the creation of A.C. Fitou in 1948.86 Terroire distinctions, made plain with the
institution of hierarchical appellation systems, became a major force in differentiating the
“isotropic space”87 of Von Thüren’s model, influencing all factors of his economic
equation. This wide-ranging influence was made possible by the fact that A.O.C.’s
superseded mere sectorial territoriality, moving beyond the basic “rent-distance
relationships”88 which dominated “crude and unarticulated”89 agricultural models, and
encompassed non-territorial restrictions governing production methods, thus affecting
almost every aspect of its market performance.
Best placed to manipulate the restrictions of the AOC system, the ‘artisan spirit’
of the vignerons is fiercely declaimed as exclusive by independent producers
themselves.90 Indeed, independents are often characterised as the romantic stereotype of
the vignerons by outsiders, perpetuating the belief that “le vin n’est pas une boisson
industrielle.”91 Although possessing a “shared occupational identity”92, the distinction
between the independent grower and the cooperative is significant. As a rule of thumb
cooperative endeavours represent a collectivised agrico-industrial process, whereas
independent producers represent the AOC system in action, developing and building
individual brands within the wine world. As such, the status of an independent cultivator
served as an aspirational position, representing the goal for many cultivators involved in
86
H. Johnson; J. Robinson, The World Atlas of Wine, (London, 2005) p140
W. Moran, ‘The Wine Appellation as territory in France and California’, Annals of the association of
American Geographers, vol.83 no.4 (1993) p695
88
W.L. Garrison; D.F. Marble, ‘The Spatial structure of agricultural activities’, Annals of the association of
American Geographers, vol. 47, no.2 (Jun, 1957) p138
89
ibid p138
90
Interview with Edouard Raymond, Domaines Lacassagne, 03/08/06
91
R. Badouin, ‘L’Économie Viticole au temps des incertitudes’, Revue D’Économie Méridionale, Vol.42,
No.168 (April, 1994) p11
92
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p33
87
28
other collective structures. The number of independent growers is accordingly vastly
smaller than those involved in collective ventures, representing a higher echelon of status
which Lem estimates to represent a mere 7% of Midi growers.93 In this sense, it is
possible to view some independent producers as a minority of successful individuals,
many of whom have a past in the largely preponderate cooperative production.94 The
political voice of the independent small-holder, therefore, tended to be dominated by the
concerns of the cooperatives, which represented a unity of expression from a significant
amount of regional workers.
Importance of the Cooperatives to the Regional Economy
The unity provided by cooperative organisations of vignerons offers a largely
chequered significance. They are widely acknowledged to have failed to enrich the
solidarity of the communities within which they operate, whilst promoting stagnation in
terms of quality.95 Nevertheless, they serve an important function in allowing smallholders, otherwise unable to afford the means of production, to operate in a financially
viable manner.96 Modern vignerons tend to acknowledge the rationale behind the long
standing cooperative tradition although they are cognizant of the fact that, in terms of
over-production and poor quality, they represent part of the problem rather than part of
the solution.97 The rise to prominence of cooperative structures informs much of what has
become negative about the movement, with its roots a major factor in colouring the
viewpoint of adherents.
93
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p114
ibid p210
95
Interview with Edouard Raymond, Domaines Lacassagne, 03/08/06
96
ibid
97
Interview with Edouard Raymond, Domaines Lacassagne, 03/08/06
94
29
Cooperatives enjoyed a rapid growth in popularity throughout the early half of the
twentieth century, especially in the period between the two later crises de mévente in
1936 and 1951. The rise was purported to have been fuelled by a combination of the
Popular Front’s encouragement of collectivist endeavours (1936 – 1938) and a parochial
sense of one-upmanship which set the foundation of cooperatives on a similar footing to
the frenzied erection of churches witnessed in the thirteenth century, as rural villages
sought to heighten their regional importance.98 Indeed, Sagnès highlights the degree to
which competition between villages in the South has been a perpetual bone of contention,
referring to them as “maison serrées”, and the extent to which “le développement de la
vigne a accentué des tendences fort anciennes”99 These cyclical instances of communal
self assertion are built into the structure of rural society, with local elites playing “un rôle
clef”100 in encouraging regional mobilisation. From a governmental perspective, the
encouragement of cooperative enterprise, especially within the framework of the A.O.C.
system, constituted an effective means of mobilising cross sections of the countryside in a
cohesive fashion.101 Concurrently, the rise of cooperatives was augmented by the trend of
land reparcelling which accompanied the breaking up of large estates, as many
agricultural labourers began to inherit small pieces of land attributable to the “decline of
former bourgeois proprietors.”102 This created a new class of small-holder who
increasingly looked to cooperative ventures to enable the viable economic operation of
L. Temple, J. Touzard, F. Jarrige, ‘La Restructuration des coopératives vinicoles en LanguedocRoussillon : du modèle communal à la diversité des adaptions actuelles’, REM vol.44 no.176 (4/1996) p76
99
J. Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique et Syndicale dans les Campagnes Viticoles du Midi’, La Diffusion des
Idées Progressistes dans le Monde Rural de la Révolution au XX e Siècle. Actes du colloque de Châteauroux
1998 (Châteauroux, 2000) p1
100
O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, Journée d’études AFSP/Groupe
Local et politique, IEP de Rennes – 8 février 2002 p3
101
M. Demossier, ‘Culinary Heritage and Produits de Terroir in France’ in S. Blowen et al. (ed.),
Recollections of France, (Oxford, 2000) p148
102
L. Loubère, The Vine Remembers, (New York, 1985) p34
98
30
their land. Strangely, this trend took place against the tide in other countries, which saw
smaller land units being reparcelled into larger estates, as with the German
flubereinigung in the 1950s103. This difference can be largely attributed to the distortive
level of monoculture in the Languedoc-Roussillon, and the umbrella structure of
cooperatives which drew small-holders towards collectivisation. The fragility of the
agricultural market in an area dominated by monoculture had been demonstrated clearly
by the cyclical wine crises, shepherding many towards the greater security offered by
cooperatives which, by virtue of their independent marketing, could shelter adherents
from market forces with collective capital, stabilizing inter-annual price fluctuation.104 As
the industry crept towards a glut of concentrated modernisation in the post-war period,
the network of cooperative structures played an important supplementary role to the
Crédit Agricole initiative in providing funds for mechanisation, allowing pooled purchase
of new materials such as tractors and cuvéries.105 The availability of credit fed into the
dominant cooperative structure and allowed for a degree of mechanisation to occur
stemming from local impetus rather than outside pressure and further galvanising
regional solidarity. Indeed, cooperatives represented not only an opportunity for
collective purchasing power but also “constituent la base d‘un lobby régional capable de
négocier une politique favorable à la stabilisation du marché national de vin de table.”106
Importantly, the emphasis of this analysis is on the stability of the market rather than
development, highlighting the extent to which the organisations were geared towards the
perpetuation of influence as opposed to genuinely adding value to the market.
103
C. Fielden, Exploring Wines & Spirits (W.S.E.T Advanced. Textbook), (London, 2001) p158
Temple, Touzard, Jarrige, ‘La Restructuration des coopératives vinicoles…’ p77
105
ibid p77
106
Y. Chiffoleau et al., ‘Qualité et Solidarité dans les Coopératives Viticoles’ in J. Touzard (ed.), Les
coopératives entre territoires et mondialisation, (Paris, 2003) p293
104
31
Cooperatives and Regional Politics
The dualistic and contentious role served by Cooperatives in the development of
the identity of the industry can be thematically linked to the ideological development of
“l’agrarisme viticole de gauche.”107 The cooperative enthusiasm exhibited in the
Langudeoc-Roussillon region rooted itself in the traditional anti-clericalism extant
amongst the “true rural proletariat”108, constituted by the mass of agricultural labourers
centred around this traditional area of monoculture. What these links suggest, and indeed
confirm, is the collectivist and socialist mindset which conceived of the first cooperative
institutions at the turn of the century.109 Cooperatives have enjoyed almost unchecked
development throughout the twentieth century, surviving sanction even during the reign
of the Vichy regime, whose quasi-fanatical rural values saw peasant organisation as
entirely “compatible with the corporatist state.”110 This example serves to highlight the
fickle ideological underpinning of the collectivist initiative as it was taken to support
often contradictory ideological goals by diametrically opposed governments such as the
Popular Front and Vichy. The Cooperative trend developed, in the period leading up to
the Fourth Republic, alongside the transformation of the Southern leftist movement into a
tri-partite ‘rouge’ wing pursuing distinct goals by various means, constituted by and large
by the Confédération Générale des Vignerons (CGV), the Parti Communiste Française
(PCF) and the dynamic syndicalist movement. All three threads can be traced back to the
J. Sagnès, ‘Viticulture et Politique dans la 1ere moitié du XXe siècle : aux origines du Statut de la
Viticulture’ in J. Sagnès (ed.), La Viticulture Française aux XIXe et XXe siècles, (Béziers, 1993) p51
108
L. Loubère, The Vine Remembers, (New York, 1985) p54
109
Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique…’. p7
110
L. Loubère, The Wine Revolution in France (Princeton, 1990) p146
107
32
1907 ‘crise du vin’, with largely parallel lines of development, in which one can see
social radicalism, labour unionism and “a nucleus of anarcho-syndicalism”111.
Phrases like ‘anarcho-syndicalism’ can present lazy monikers for disparate
movements, but in this instant it is intended to denote a vein of syndical particularism.
Specifically, this was rooted in the strongly perceived notion of independence from
national agricultural organisations, representing a “distinction plus marquée”112 from the
cooperative movement by its autonomy and its militancy. This regional distinction
suggests another principal reason behind the success of the cooperative structure, as it fed
notions of regionalism in the South, devolving power towards increasingly local bases
whilst fostering Midi solidarity. The ‘particularism’ of the syndicates is found, according
to Sagnès, in the 1890s and the birth of truly leftist politics in the region, wherein
socialism appealed to the peasantry in general whilst syndicalism spoke to “journaliers
agricoles.”113 It was with these agricultural labourers and campaigns in the countryside
that syndicalists made their best gains at the start of the twentieth century, more so than
in urban centres.114 This factor preserved the independence of the Midi syndicalists, as
their early successes in the South amongst principally agricultural workers characterised
the movement as one which owed its roots to the vine. The “puissants syndicats”115
therefore represented a regional base of strength for national left wing organisations,
whose importance grew in the postwar period.
111
L. Loubère, The Vine Remembers, (New York, 1985) pp43-44
R. Mauget; S. Koulytchizky, ‘Un siècle de développement des coopératives agricoles en France’ in J.
Touzard (ed.), Les coopératives entre territoires et mondialisation, (Paris, 2003) p58
113
Sagnès, ‘La Gauche, p5
114
ibid p6
115
P. Gachon, Histoire de Languedoc, (Paris, 1926) p271
112
33
The Second World War had, in turn, galvanised the structure of many militant
leftist parties whilst imbuing in many people a genuine desire for change. Worries that
France might turn “communistic”116 seemed well-founded in the immediate aftermath of
the Liberation, as the men of the Resistance found themselves increasingly incorporated
in the political sphere, especially in the South. This desire for change was represented in
a fervour which gripped the region as immediately as 1944, with government advisory
bodies warning of “a surge of violent opinion in the Midi.”117 To a large extent, the
integration of leftist parties into the political sphere meant a greater representation for the
working class population of the region, which in the Midi saw viticultural demands well
represented amongst this surge of opinion. Indeed, political organisations, even as far
back as the 1907 revolt, can be seen to have represented the social unity of the
independent growers and the agricultural labourers.118 The expansion of these
representative political organs was indicative of the interminable slide towards economic
marginality faced by the precariously monocultural local economy in a century of rapid
modernisation. Traditions of rural protest thus developed as the wine industry struggled
to keep pace with an increasingly capitalist market, the distinction between industrial
worker and vine worker being that whereas “workers go on strike… farmers demonstrate
and protest.”119 This can be exemplified by the non payment of taxes in 1946 in response
to government measures, the political unrest of 1951 as leftist Deputies protested
government policy and the violent mass protests which took place after the wine crisis of
J.F. Bell, ‘Problems of Economic Reconstruction in France’, Economic Geography, Vol.22, No. 1
(January, 1946) p54
117
C.K. Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government since 1875, (New York, 1960) p164
118
J.H. Smith, ‘Agricultural Workers and the French Wine-Growers' Revolt of 1907’, Past and Present,
no.79 (1978) p103
119
Lem, Cultivating Dissent p90
116
34
1953. This normalisation of protest informed a process wherein the determinants of
future struggle were commonly located in the political inferences of historical
demonstrations, creating a positive feedback loop in which protest became a selfsustaining aspect of regional political currency, celebrating the distinction of local
identity from national or Parisian identity. This phenomenon was fostered by the
institutionalisation of vested interests which occurred via the enshrinement of local elites
in the process of communicating local grievances.
There is a popular recognition of this incorporation of viticultural actors into local
politics, with a realisation that “by institutional thickness, [one] really means the wine
cooperative system.”120 As such there was a degree of regime building, consisting of a
nexus of local interests as viticultural elites “articulated, prioritized and formalized local
responses to global (including supranational) regulatory pressures.”121 In this context,
local power bases largely took their character from constituent members, creating “new
power constellations”122 by virtue of the alignment of common interests. These power
bases in the Midi, informed by the preponderance of viticultural interests, meant that the
character of ‘rural regimes’ reflected the repeatable cultural characteristics of the region.
Concrete institutional bases sprang up with the progressive and dynamic development of
grass-roots level administration in the post-war period. This enshrinement of the “élus du
vin” in the political setup was resultant of the confluence of interests which governs the
A. Jones; J. Clark, ‘Of Vines and Policy Vignettes: Sectoral Evolution and Institutional Thickness in the
Languedoc’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, vol.25, no.3 (2000) p335
121
Jones; Clark, ‘Of Vines and Policy Vignettes’, p335
122
ibid p333
120
35
monocultural area and perpetuated by “la posture tribunicienne” adopted by
establishment members during times of viticultural crisis.123
These structural factors meant that concrete local political institutions became
bridged by a cultural consensus, as the character of the institutions outlived individual
actors. There was, therefore, a situation of continuity in the regional level of political
power as “long established political elites” associated their authority “with emergent
economic and cultural forces… to ensure the continued hegemony… in the face of
relatively turbulent socio-economic environments.”124 This dynamic self-preservation
adapted well to a situation of regional self-assertion, as it controlled the mechanism of
authority with which to strengthen and refocus local consensus institutions, in direct
response to extra-local concrete institutions.125
However, the situation became problematic during the postwar period as the
restructuring of agriculture required by the Monnet plan implied distinct changes in levels
of production and the organisation of productive forces. ‘Rural regimes’ responded
poorly to efforts to restructure local institutions from outwith, as the important role of
consensus institutions within local power structures meant that any drastic change would
have to result from a reconfiguration of the viticultural constituency. The mutually
compatible objectives of the viticultural elite and their constituency (regarding price,
production levels, taxes and regulation) meant that external pressure for change was
unlikely to alter regional core concerns. Vignerons offered a mutual resistance to the
terms imposed by the national plan for modernisation, and using consensus cultural
O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, Journée d’études AFSP/Groupe
Local et politique, IEP de Rennes – 8 février 2002 p1
124
Jones; Clark, ‘Of Vines and Policy Vignettes’, p336
125
Jones; Clark, ‘Of Vines and Policy Vignettes’, p336
123
36
dominance equated this modernisation with a challenge to their culture and identity. As
such, the government failed to significantly alter the status quo within the Midi during the
period of the Fourth Republic as it failed to engage adequately with ‘rural regimes’.
Whilst the government pursued national economic development on the road to recovery,
the Midi vignerons were reaffirming a cycle of self interest which was incompatible with
national goals, their interests focussed on a rejection of modernisation.
The persistence of the representation of vignerons in the local elite is part of a
cycle which affirms both their product and their culture: wine, as a product, offers an
identifier of specific regional identity whilst seeing reciprocal administrative protection
from those who seek to preserve this identity. This heritage is one which evolved in thrall
to local elites intent on “emblematising” their culture.126 By singling the Midi out
culturally as an area reliant on the poignant collective memories of the vignerons, the
mass movements of 1907 and thereafter became their cultural emblems. As such, the
legacy of political protest became enshrined in cultural values and contributed to a wider
normalisation of protest. Rural society remained governed by “des hiérarchisations
sociale qui articulent les perceptions de chacun”127 , in the interest of exercising their
cultural relevancy. Although the negative interpretation of regional southern
administrative institutions would term them “corporatist hierarchies”128, one can see the
self-preservation of these rural elites as a form of cultural currency. As the most vocal
proponents of regional identity, local elites sustained the importance of regional issues by
M. Demossier, ‘Culinary Heritage and Produits de Terroir in France’ in S. Blowen (et al.)(ed.),
Recollections of France, (Oxford, 2000) p148
127
F. Bort, ‘Du Rouge aux Terroirs’ in J. Touzard (ed.), Les coopératives entre territoires et
mondialisation, (Paris, 2003) p95
128
J. Loughlin, ‘"Europe of the Regions" and the Federalization of Europe’, Publius, vol.26, no.4, (1996)
p141
126
37
maintaining their position, serving as a legitimate mainstream reminder of issues which
persisted outside the realm of political due process.
The Politics of Identity
In terms of post-war recovery, the economic restructuring of the viticultural
industry promised a restatement of one of the nation’s core social identifiers, whilst
simultaneously emphasising the greater importance of wine to regional than national
identity.129 Promotion of this ‘heritage’ was largely propounded by a multitude of social
actors, comprising local viticultural elites, the most vocal and effective of which were the
producers themselves.130 As such, it is important to consider the actions of the Languedoc
vignerons, in their social context, as indicative of a widening dissatisfaction with
governmental influence and a development of the “sense of communal identity”131 which
stemmed from collective action. Indeed, this trend was one which had gathered pace
much earlier, with the social eruption of the 1907 ‘crise du vin’, which served as a point
of reference in the early 1950s for those on the left looking for a rebalancing of the
economic infrastructure. Such a rebalancing was widely seen to be a positive step,
despite the debt that it owed to the old Statut Viticole, focussing on a lowering of the
compulsory blockage and distilling introduced to tackle the troublesome 1951 harvest. In
this vein, Communist representatives serving on the government’s Commission des
Boissons, called for a return to the Statut in the summer of 1952, emphasising the “social
129
Interview with Raymond Laporte, Domaine Laporte, 03/08/06
L. Bérard; P. Marchenay, ‘A Market Culture’ in S. Blowen (et al.)(ed.), Recollections of France,
(Oxford, 2000) p162
131
Jones; Clark, ‘Of Vines and Policy Vignettes’, p341
130
38
character” of the old order with its roots in the “spirit of 1907.”132 Furthermore,
Communists suggested that surplus wines should be distributed to the poor rather than
face distillation, although this idea received little serious support as it involved the
introduction of free wine into an already saturated market, further increasing
consumption whilst doing little for the health of the industry.133 The idea of returning to
such a pre-war institution lent the viticultural industry a veil of continuity, belying the
interruption of the Second World War and highlighting the institutional heritage of the
industry. Such an underpinning of the economy to collective notions of identity is
concurrent with Keynes’ concept of “animal spirits”134, illustrating the shifting of mood
within a country that can so radically alter economic progress. This alteration was not
tied to an upsurge in the wine industry, but arose rather as a result of the developing crisis
that saw wine prices plummet amidst constant over-production. It was this shift in the
‘mood’ of the industry, which saw the 1953 Code du vin usher in a “general sentiment of
relief”135 amongst the vignerons, as it finally seemed that the decline of the industry had
been halted with a restatement of traditionalist values.
The profusion of cooperative structures meant that traditional concepts of
communal cooperation were thoroughly ingrained in the regional system, perpetuating
themselves as the surest means for small producers to operate. The people of the Midi’s
proclivity to congregate led to an explosion of cooperatives, creating repertoires of
capital and influence amongst viticultural elites. These elites became increasingly
important after the Second World War both due to the traditional popularity of the Left in
132
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p179
Journal officiel de la république française. Débats de l’Assemblée nationale, 1952, pp.3569-70
134
J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, (Cambridge, 1936) p161
135
Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p188
133
39
the Midi, and the extent to which radical Leftists had been rehabilitated by their role in
the War. These viticultural elites closed ranks to advance a cultural redefinition in
response to the challenges faced in recovering from collaboration. The invigorated
regional identity they proposed bridged the gaps perceived in local concrete political
institutions by cultivating cultural consensus amongst a region determined to restate its
identity. The centrality of regionalism to this identity led to a fostering of resistance
against perceived outside pressure, in favour of the continuity implied by ‘invented
tradition’. In understanding the structures with which the voice of the Midi became
articulated, it is necessary to analyse the extent to which the local population presented
coherent demands. In the following chapter I will move on to further explore the
processes by which specific challenges to identity resulted in a widespread rejection of
contemporary plans for modernisation.
40
Chapter 3: Tending Vines and Picket Lines: The People of The
Midi
The people of the Midi are, in reality, the most important consideration when
investigating the effects of post-war reconstruction efforts, as it was with them that
efforts for renewal stood or fell. In studying their role in the performance of the postwar
wine industry, there are two clear factors to consider: their reactions to modernisation by
varied forms of resistance and assertions of regional identity; along with the shift from
regional self-assertion to anti-Americanism, placing the question of modernisation in a
wider context. Within these factors I will distinguish several thematic threads which help
delineate a greater understanding of events and their legacy to the contemporary industry.
The revolt against change pursued by the vignerons can be viewed as a form of political
populism, but one which stemmed from the rather more complex origins of the mythical
‘Midi Rouge’; a myth which one sees repeated confirmation of, in terms of a
concentration of left-wing support amongst wide tracts of people. Indeed, this left-wing
prominence and the important legacy of Second World War resistance strengthened the
voice of the productive class, itself preponderant in the vastly agricultural area. As such,
cultural tendencies and traditions which relied on mass intransigence were party to
intensification during a period of uncertainty in the Midi, especially with the visible
involvement of outside actors. America’s role in French plans for postwar recovery filled
many Frenchmen with suspicion, especially in the Midi, where the new Coca-cola
bottling plant in Marseilles seemed like an American outpost in the heart of the wine
lands. These factors were set against a decline in the bonds between traditional
41
communities, influenced by the modernisation drive, and creating a need for greater
regional self-assertion both politically and culturally.
Identity Collapse and Attempts to Reprise the Community
The post-war period was harried by the “Devil of Declining Growth”, as the
population yet again fell after decades of repetitive stagnation, albeit with the Second
World War occasioning a smaller loss than the First.136 The decline of communities
presented one of the most profound and damaging blows to the regional population137, as
the decline of traditional regional identity (centered around community, religion and
agriculture) left many people isolated in the wake of attempts to modernise. An
increasing standard of living, denoted in the age of American economic dominance by the
increasing possession of televisions, refrigerators and cars, eroded traditional
communities by removing the necessity for interaction. The average person in France
became increasingly exposed to these luxury goods through the press, radio and cinema
as expectations were subtly aligned with a more consumptive culture associated with the
American capitalist model.138 However, a seeming decline in traditional communal
identity was met with the emergence of “invented tradition.”139 This constituted a
restatement of perceived traditional communal values, for example the neighbourliness of
villages. This facilitated the creation of an underground labour market amongst
viticultural labours at village level focussing on neighbourly interaction. Increasingly,
this informal economy flourished during periods like the harvest as villagers exchanged
J.J. Spengler, ‘Population: Notes on France’s Response to her Declining Rate of Growth’, Journal of
Economic History, Vol.11, No.4 (Autumn, 1951) p403
137
Interview with Alain Trille, Château des Batilles, 04/08/06
138
G.M. Holmes; P.D. Fawcett, The Contemporary French Economy (London, 1983) p25
139
W. Lem, Cultivating Dissent (New York, 1999) p166
136
42
labour in a casual sense in an effort to avoid state taxation.140 This informal labour market
depicts the extent to which ‘invented tradition’ became the means of operating within, but
latently resisting, a modern capitalist economy. The reinvigoration of traditional values
became part of a political and economic strategy designed to enact resistance to the
dominance of the regional market by outside forces.141 Thus, by presenting an air of
continuity, it was possible to reconstitute regional identity centred on a new purpose.
In this way, political identity became a crutch for the increasingly enfeebled
traditional cultural identity of the South, augmenting traditional myths of the ‘Midi
Rouge’. However, these positive assertions of regional identity constituted manifestations
of opposition to supra-regional pressure and described by Lem as resisting the terms of
the national “modernity project.”142 Thus, new cultural touchstones were mired in the
necessity of perpetual opposition as a key factor of self-definition. Accordingly, Keiger
asserts that “in the twentieth century the Anglo-Saxons enabled the French nation to
continue to define itself and added further cement to its nation building.”143 However, in
the South, with the decline of regional identity at a peak, negative self definition moved
beyond what can be considered the ideal, miring the reactionary concept of identity in the
realm of fractious regionalism rather than the “sense of nationhood”144 admired by Jules
Michelet. Specifically, cultural identity became inextricably tied to the “spirit of
1907”145, which increasingly represented the episode in which “the energy of a whole
generation… [had come]… to a head in a long fine flash.”146 To the militant vignerons
140
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p181
ibid p195
142
ibid p11
143
J.F.V. Keiger, 'France and the World' (London 2001) p161
144
ibid p160
145
C.K. Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government since 1875, (New York, 1960) p179
146
H. S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, (London, 1993) p 67
141
43
“1907 then is our own history, our collective memory, a piece of the map of identity of
each winegrower.”147 Indeed, one can imagine that atop the mountains around Tuchan,
“with the right kind of eyes you can almost see the high water-mark – that place where
the wave finally broke and rolled back”148 colouring the expectations of what could be
extracted from the government, and demonstrating the underlying regional solidarity
which could be found therein. Attempts to use the memory of 1907 accordingly took on
many forms, passing into the cultural vocabulary of the Midi, most blatantly in the songs
of protest sung from barricades at every crise with calls of “To arms, wine growers!”149
Identity became refocused on sustainable concepts as the twentieth century
progressed, and moved away from declining features such as local festivals and regional
dialect. A need to attach dwindling regional dialects to a restatement of cultural values
meant that their practice became a sign of resistance to societal change in itself.150 In
turn, regional festivals which survived, such as the Carnaval in Broussan, largely served
to highlight local solidarity in the face of external pressure, embodied in the burning of
effigies of political figures at these festivals.151 Such festivals were rooted in the
centrality of the vine to the Midi, embodying not only the way of life but the spirit of the
region.152 These acts of resistance constituted a concerted effort by sectors of society
within the Midi, anxious to protect their communities from the effects of modernisation.
Increasingly it was seen that “the new technology of entertainment has fragmented the
community”, whilst the draw of urban centres lured the young away from rural
‘Comité Régionale d’Action Viticole Manifesto’ quoted by W. Lem, Cultivating Dissent (New York,
1999) p77
148
Thompson, Fear and Loathing, p68
149
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p45
150
L. Loubère, The Vine Remembers, (New York, 1985) pp.39-40
151
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p94
152
Interview with Alain Trille, Château des Batilles, 04/08/06
147
44
villages.153 Additionally, mechanisation meant that work in the fields became less labour
intensive, displacing agricultural labourers from traditional communities. Between 1948
and 1963 French agriculture as a whole witnessed its greatest increase in the use of
tractors.154 Etienne Hirsch, a colleague of Monnet in the Planning Commissariat, is
quoted as commenting that “a farmer driving a tractor will no longer think like a farmer
following a horse.”155 Although this approach can be held to largely symbolise the
government’s hopes for the success of its modernisation drive, it is not necessarily true.
Hirsch’s mistake lay in failing to recognise that, at times, farmers followed horses by
choice. For many the choice was not “modernisation or decadence”156 but simply the
means of survival. Modernisations as a concept involved moving away from the past, and
those left behind seldom welcomed their redundancy. As ever, the post-war
modernisation drive produced its own share of ‘losers’, amongst those unwilling or
unable to keep up with the march of progress who, in turn, vocally equated this with the
“sacrificing of individual independence to progress.”157 The downturn which had mired
the agricultural (and especially viticultural) industry in such dire straits forced many to
reduce expenditure in an increasingly demanding marketplace. Such reductions fostered a
fondness for concepts of “primordiality”158 and traditional values, as the capitalist
marketplace eroded traditional rural bonds and set some vignerons to the task of restoring
the old order.
153
Loubère, The Vine Remembers, p77
G.M. Holmes; P.D. Fawcett, The Contemporary French Economy (London, 1983) p73
155
J. Monnet, Memoirs (Glasgow, 1976) p259
156
ibid p259
157
S. Fitzgerald, ‘The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade’, Review of Politics, vol.32, no.2
(1970) p190
158
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p166
154
45
Two factors here presented the greatest obstacles to the true development of the
post-war wine industry: the inability of producers to finance modernisation and the
unwillingness of many to sacrifice regional identity upon the altar of modernisation. A
similarity may be drawn here between the protest organisations created by wine
producers, such as the Comité régional d'action viticole (C.R.A.V.), and the later
‘Poujadist’ movement of small shopkeepers which arose in 1956, headed by the Union de
Défense des Commerçants et Artisans. Both movements share similar themes in their
opposition to the marginalisation of regional economies in the seeming progressive
inevitability of Parisian economic dominance as well as the long term transformation of
the market towards a more Anglo-American capitalist model. Both movements have
likewise become synonymous with an aversion to change and propagation of rural
sentimentality. The ‘Poujadist’ movement, however, gained greater prominence by its
diversification of relevance, whereas viticultural movements remained largely esoteric;
thus, the survival of the Poujadist movement as a political force into the Fifth Republic
became eased as they encompassed a rural value-set, whereas the viticultural
organisations remained a firmly single-issue group, limiting their potency outwith the
political instability of the Fourth Republic.159
Trends of Modernisation
The traditional development model of ‘Paris and the French Desert’, originally
propounded by M.J.F Gravier in 1947, is largely unhelpful in studying both the post-war
period and the Languedoc-Roussillon region, as a result of the fluid nature of reform
which was sweeping the country. The timing of the report renders it largely irrelevant due
159
Fitzgerald, ‘The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade’, p167
46
to governmental initiatives taken in the following years, which sought to tackle the
problem of unequal development which constituted a symptom of rapid post-war
recovery, as resources were focussed on specific problem industries.160 Whilst Paris
represented the most distinct pole of growth, the distortive influence of its economic
power affected industry rather more so than agriculture, although there did develop a
trend for young people to “monter à Paris.”161 Such economic models rely largely on the
notion of agricultural communities as the domain of a backwards peasantry, mired in
structural frailty.
However, vignerons conform poorly to the simplistic definitions of peasantry,
integrated as they are into the market and forced to fulfil multiple roles, especially in the
Languedoc-Roussillon with the proximity of Marseille and Toulouse to agricultural
centres.162 What this argument moves to dispel is not the existence of a shift away from
the countryside as a general trend, but the simplicity of the town-country model in
diagnosing this trend. The vignerons themselves represented a group “fort liée aux villes
et menant de plus en plus une vie de type urbain.”163 In itself, it is likewise inadequate to
equate a trend of modernisation with a trend of urbanisation, concurrent though they may
be at times.164 The traditional model of the rural exodus is not a permanent one, and what
we can discern is that population shift marks not merely an interminable slide towards
city life but a cyclical pattern of migration that is dictated as much by economic and
social factors as by broader demographic trends. Indeed, 1954 does represent the
M.C. Maclennan, ‘Regional Planning in France’, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.13 (1965) p62
J. Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique et Syndicale dans les Campagnes Viticoles du Midi (1848-1939)’, La
Diffusion des Idées Progressistes dans le Monde Rural de la Révolution au XX e Siècle. Actes du Colloque
de Châteauroux, (Châteauroux, 2000) p14n24
162
E. Font, ‘Un Schéma d’Evolution Démographique pour les Communes Rurales’, REM, vol.42, no.165166 ( January & February 1994) p47
163
G. Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon (Montpellier, 1960) vol.2 p132
164
Font, ‘Un Schéma d’Evolution Démographique pour les Communes Rurales’, p46
160
161
47
beginning of a rural exodus which, however, stabilised from 1962 to 1975 and triggered a
repopulation from that point.165 This presents a somewhat confusing trend, agricultural
employment having fallen 32.4% between 1962 to 1975166, but one which highlights the
extent to which those in the Midi developed their long history of pluriactivity (engaging
in non-agricultural income sources), with the number of households involved rising from
15% in 1956 to 42% in 1988.167 Increased reliance on pluriactivity, combined with
government initiatives to encourage polyculture with irrigation programs, created a
situation which defied traditional notions of an agricultural peasantry, inherent in the
maintenance of simplistic models of a dialectic shift towards urbanisation.
Indeed, resistance to external policies, focussed largely on simplistic models of
Parisian economic dominance, saw markedly reduced success compared to those
focussed on specific regional issues espoused by, or in partnership with, local institutions
such as the Rhone Valley Irrigation Project. In presenting resistance to centralised
modernisation programs, vignerons were not pursuing retrograde notions of the pastoral
idyll but seeking a different path from the generally accepted notions of liberal capitalism
which informed economic policy. This “counter-tendency to urbanisation”168 was linked
to the land, and a celebration of customary traditions and character in the face of the
economic and social future promulgated from above. Such resistance became important
in the restatement of regional identity, as it represented a pole of growth for the identity
of the Midi vignerons, drawing together a traditionally left wing populace and those eager
to affirm their independence from Paris.
165
ibid p35
Ministère de l’Agriculture, L’Emploi et les Activités en Milieu Rural (Paris, 1981) p38
167
G. Robinson, Geographies of Agriculture, (London, 2004) p137
168
M. Demossier, ‘Culinary Heritage and Produits de Terroir in France’ in S. Blowen (et al.)(ed.),
Recollections of France, (Oxford, 2000) p144
166
48
The Politicisation of a Culture of Protest
Thus, sustainable and repeatable regional characteristics became a desirable
touchstone for a fading historical identity. Opposition to centralisation and Parisian
influence presented those of the Midi with a chance to restate regional identity by virtue
of its distinctness from Paris. With this desire, instances of communal self assertion
became the cultural currency of the regional population, as they looked to examples of
combatative self-assertion to provide historical rallying points. Indeed, it is in the nature
of protest that regionalism largely exists as a cultural construct, for example in the
Languedoc with the profusion of Occitan symbolism and historical references during
mass protests. The C.R.A.V. represents a militant group of winemakers which is largely
covert in nature; it has existed in some form or another since the riots of 1907 and is seen
as strongly representing the interests of the vignerons of the Midi, often with what could
be termed terrorist attacks. Support for the C.R.A.V. is diffuse and often tacit due to their
means, but graffiti still lines many bridges and walls around Béziers in support of the
group. The C.R.A.V. frequently fly the red banner of Occitania when protesting169, as a
means of mobilising distinct local dissatisfaction with external government. Demossier
points out the extent to which this is a natural situation, casting producers of regional
“produits de terroir” as the natural guardians and exponents of “their provincial roots.”170
Expressions of Occitan identity have thus become “politically charged with the
sentiments of opposition, resistance, and challenge to exploitation and domination by the
169
170
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p91
Demossier, ‘Culinary Heritage and Produits de Terroir in France’, p144
49
state”.171 Sagnès points to a Revolutionary heritage as one of the principal determinants
of a culture of popular politics which so often resorted to protest.172 In this vein, the
relevance of the 1907 crisis in informing contemporary struggle is made plain in the 1947
Parti Communiste Française (P.C.F.) commemoration of the revolt, celebrating “l’esprit
de lutte paysanne.”173 After all, in the eyes of those most intent on maintaining Midi
culture, it was “le pays de révoltes, de Montmorency des hommes de 1848, des hommes
de 1851, des hommes de 1871, des révoltes de 1907, des maquisards de 40-45... "174 By
focusing on traditional notions of protest, it became possible to emblematize local culture
and inherently politicize subscribers whilst focusing on continuity. Protest against
modernization, therefore, became a way of fighting for the past.
The violence and ferocity of protest can be explained by the corrosion of
character brought about by a shift towards insecure, non-tenured labour.175 This trend,
exacerbated by the difficulties in the post-war agricultural economy, represented
traditional friction between small-producers in the regional peripheries of France and the
state. The Midi vignerons were cast as the victims of modernisation as the government
pursued what seemed to be a Malthusian and teleological set of structural reforms
designed to offer the brightest future to those in tune with the institutional vision.176 As
such, protest became characterised by the refusal of these actors to integrate fully with a
system which they railed against, promoting a vein of collective action which occurred
171
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p91
Sagnès, ‘La Gauche Politique’, p2
173
ibid p13 n19
174
O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, Journée d’études AFSP/Groupe
Local et politique, IEP de Rennes – 8 février 2002 p1
175
‘Violent Night’, Thinking Allowed, BBC Radio 4 19/07/06
176
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p49
172
50
outside of political due process.177 This political externalism fed into the creation and
sustenance of organisations like the C.R.A.V., as actions outwith the political spectrum
took on increasingly surreptitious characteristics and an increasingly guerrilla structure.
Violent acts could be used to express the feelings of these organisations during periods of
pressure, when dialogue seemed at its most fruitless. This was demonstrated in the 1953
bombing of the local prefecture in Carcassonne by militant vignerons, who subsequently
occupied the major highways of the Midi in protest to government reactions to the 1953
crisis.178 The same round of demonstrations led to the use of tear gas by police, as a
response to being stoned by gangs of vignerons.179 This violence represents a continuing
trend, as even in 2005 riots involving the CRAV resulted in €500,000 worth of
damage.180 What this indicates is a normalised culture of protest within which the
violence of groups motivated by a desire to represent regional will saw maintenance and
tacit support.
Traditional fears about the nature and direction of government policy were largely
augmented by the role of American aid in the post-war restructuring of France. To
traditional antagonist forces, the spectre of American involvement served to confirm the
direction of government policy as France moved towards a rather more Anglo-Saxon
model of haut capitalism. Instances of rural protest thus seem to share two concurrent
themes: a rejection of a shift towards increasingly insecure employment and an outcry
against the social alienation inflicted upon the vulnerable classes by economic stagnation.
In this context, the Midi vignerons were not protesting against a single ministry or the
177
ibid p48
L. Loubère, The Wine Revolution in France (Princeton, 1990) p234
179
‘Protest by Growers of Surplus Wine’, The Times 29/07/1953 p5
180
J. Anson, ‘Fruit Bombs’, Wine & Spirit, August 2006, p36
178
51
government in general, but “taking action as a highly motivated and sophisticated
pressure group”181 in trying to force an institutional response to their specific grievances.
Loubère describes this process as “demonstration democracy”182 and goes on to highlight
the extent to which it represented a particular weapon of those in the Midi, an area with
ten times more Trade Union activity than Bordeaux or the Champagne region since
1900.183 These themes see a marked recurrence and refocusing in the post-war Marshall
Plan climate, as even some American observers feared the Plan was “an absurd attempt to
graft our [American] type of free enterprise… onto a different business structure”184,
resulting in the marginalisation of those already on the fringes of the post-war economy.
For many Frenchmen, America offered little cultural worth whilst seeking to gain
much in a material sense, its culture having been “massacred by the engineers and
inventors.”185 Although Coca-cola and Hollywood represented vestiges of a crass
consumerist society, American machines, machine-tools and industrial methods played
an important role in rebuilding Europe. By adopting a technocratic structure, proponents
of the Marshall Plan made modernisation throughout European industry and agriculture
the ultimate goal of policy. However, there was a massive difference in terms of the
application of these methods, and a quantifiable difference between a uniform 1,000 HA
grain farm in Tennessee and a small parcel of vines in the Midi.186 This remoteness
coloured the perceptions of Europeans by emphasising the differences in situation,
whereas it only served to heighten the already lofty American conception of their own
181
Loubère, The Wine Revolution in France, p239
ibid p239
183
ibid p255
184
Galbraith to Kindleberger, October 25, 1946; Memoranda, 1946; State Department File; Charles P.
Kindleberger Papers. p2
185
B. Grantham, Some Big Bourgeois Brothel, (Luton, 2000) p13
186
‘Europe – Ruins to Recovery’, Archive Hour, BBC Radio 4, 23/09/06
182
52
actions. Republican solidarity was the watchword of America’s idealists, convinced that
the Marshall Plan could represent repayment for early French intervention in the
American Revolution with cries of: “Lafayette we are here!”187 In this sense, America’s
self-professed magnanimity struck Frenchmen as patronising, as they recognised that
France’s weakness transformed any integration with a greater power into domination.
Differences in perception between nations heightened the difficulties of rebuilding states,
as rapprochement between France and America proved forced at best.
American sources fairly accurately surmised the challenges facing Europe in its
post-war recovery as being multifaceted and largely long-term. With such a fresco of
malaise, America was considered to have had a duty to help European powers recover
their position, and yet it became apparent that such a climate of supra-national
intervention could overshadow and jeopardise unifying local initiatives. The extent to
which these societal rallying points began to focus on opposition to supra-regional
pressures is critical, as it founded new conceptions of identity in the essentially negative
definition of regionalism as a rival to national identity.
The Resistance and the Rehabilitation of the Left
The timing of this study is important as profound shocks were delivered to the
French political system due to the immediate post-war reconstitution of administrative
bodies which occurred in tandem with l’épuration. In the South, where the Maquis were
especially active, the legacy of the Resistance had rehabilitated many left-wing militants
187
M. Hopkins, ‘For European Recovery’, URL= http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/970623/marshall.html
53
who had previously been stranded in the “socio-political ghetto”188 of extremism. The
operations of these groups during the Occupation had similarly reinforced the
revolutionary structures of organisations such as the C.R.A.V, which had existed as a sort
of ad hoc chimera throughout the first half of the century. Communist activists, whatever
their individual merits, emerged from the Second World War as “men who had not been
sullied by collaboration with the national enemy.”189 The election of deportees in their
absence, which occurred in the first municipal elections of 1945,190 meant that those
Resistance fighters, arrested and deported for actions against the Vichy government,
returned to a situation where they held political sway. ‘The Return’ was an event quickly
effaced from the popular memory, as it was incompatible with the official myth of the
Liberation. Returning deportees “subverted the myth’s assertion of equal victimhood”191,
creating a rift between the official stance and the impression amongst regional
populations of the role of the internal resistance, spearheaded by the political left. Thus,
we see a greater sympathy, especially in traditional leftist strongholds such as the Midi,
for Leftist causes after the Liberation, largely representing the rehabilitation of erstwhile
political radicals. Protesters against central government policy in reaction to the crisis of
1953 were accordingly led “by their mayors, their district councillors and in some cases
by their Members of Parliament”.192 This demonstrates the extent of “le passage de la
résistance à la haute fonction publique.”193 As well as local government structures,
leftists were incumbent in many regional institutions, such as l’Institut d’Études
I.M. Wall, ‘The French Communists and the Algerian War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 12
(1977) p.524
189
G.M. Holmes; P.D. Fawcett, The Contemporary French Economy (London, 1983) p214
190
M. Koreman, ‘A Hero’s Homecoming: The Return of the Deportees to France’, Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol.32, No.1 (January, 1997) p14
191
ibid p21
192
‘Protest by Growers of Surplus Wine’, The Times 29/07/1953 p5
193
Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’, p14 n61
188
54
Occitanes formed in 1945.194 By attaching themselves to the last vestiges of positive
regional identity, the Communists were able to garner support as the champions of
regionalism, as defined in opposition to the State, and defending the interests of the
largely working class regional population. Lem diagnoses the broad and poorly defined
nature of Occitan nationalism as a means of expressing “historical grievances and
articulating the parameters of injustice”195, and indeed the movement seems largely
intended to serve as cultural currency in the battle against perceived central government
attempts to homogenize French identity. This led to an enrichment of this reactionary
concept of identity in opposition to supra-regional pressures by virtue of the
institutionalisation of radical elements in local government and organisations in the
immediate post-war period.
By examining the particular concept of identity espoused by the Midi vignerons
as a form of cultural currency (i.e. in direct competition to vying regional concepts of
identity), we can analyse its development not only abstractly and in isolation, but in
relation to broader concepts of national identity and their development in corresponding
periods. As such, the conflict between the Midi vignerons and the government can be
broadly juxtaposed with the conflict which began to develop between the French people
and the particular notion of teleological modernisation which came to be identified with
America. The correlatory trends apparent are a culture of dependence and a reliance on
regulation which had fostered resentment in the dependent. Thus we can diagnose these
symptoms not only in the ‘regional – Parisian’ conflict but also in a broader ‘Gallic Anglo-Saxon’ conflict. This is represented on a grand scale by the resentment generated
194
195
J. Sagnès, Le Midi Rouge: mythe et réalité, (Paris, 1982) pp.301-2
Lem, Cultivating Dissent, p230
55
by France’s economic dependence on the United States due to the limits it put on French
foreign policy. The Blum-Byrnes negotiations in 1946 absolved French lend-lease war
debt and offset low-interest loans against the post-war financial crisis conditional on the
reduction of French trade tariffs. The resultant accord saw the French thwarted in their
desires to pursue both an independent policy regarding Germany and to continue
accepting American aid; the message was startlingly clear: dependence could not equate
with independence.196 Indeed, directly after the Liberation, as De Gaulle jealously sought
to assert French independence, it fell to Monnet to set down the “basis of French
economic dependence.”197 I will shortly move on to analyse the debate surrounding
Coca-cola, but it is relevant at this point as an illustration of the sentiment regarding the
United States. For some, De Gaulle’s ‘third way’ was still a viable option in the delicate
international power balance, and this was embodied by French resistance to economic
dominance by either super power. As one journalist in the Témoignage Chrétien
summated, “the wine of France will do. Neither Coca-cola, nor vodka.”198 Such a desire
to subscribe to whatever form of independence was available highlights the flashpoints
which occurred when there was a simultaneous threat to both regional and Gallic identity.
External Pressures
The reliance of French modernisation upon external aid, by way of the Marshall
Plan, produced a largely negative popular response. Already troubled by a continued
corrosion of character and the need for a post-war restatement of national identity, the
encroachment of the Anglo-Saxon capitalist powers by economic means was viewed with
196
I. M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France (Cambridge, 2002) p35
ibid p36
198
R. Kuisel, Seducing the French, (Berkeley, 1996) p69
197
56
suspicion and resentment. Across France as a whole, public opinion linked the Marshall
Plan and American products, strengthening communist led fears of imperialism.199
Indeed, it seems understandable that overtures made by the American government were
seen as patronising, with even Kindelberger himself referring to Marshall Aid recipients
as “step-children.”200 The program was sold to a “recalcitrant American Congress”201 as
a way of setting up a bulwark against the advance of communism, yet for many it
simultaneously represented an act of “enlightened self interest”202, as a nation convinced
of its own virtue sought to liberate Europe from themselves. Marshall Plan propaganda
presented an image of progress to its European audience, grounded in a vocabulary of
technocratic market liberalism, albeit generally presented in cartoon form, with
shoemakers and hatters acting as ciphers for industrialists and agriculturalists.203 The
American government espoused to its public, however, that the Marshall Plan was
essential, with a quantification of the Plan’s aims (achieved by statistically studying
policy speeches made by American politicians key to the Plan) indicating that it was
presented principally as a means to secure stable liberal economies to trade with rather
than as a means to give urgent humanitarian aid.204 (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2) This
demonstrated the extent to which depictions of the aims of the Marshall Plan altered in
relation to their intended audience, as well as suggesting the reason for widespread
suspicion of the motives of American economic intervention.
199
Kuisel, Seducing the French, p38
Kindleberger to de Wilde, March 24, 1947; Memoranda, 1947; State Department File; Charles P.
Kindleberger Papers. p2
201
Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, p73
202
ibid p73
203
‘Europe – Ruins to Recovery’, Archive Hour, BBC Radio 4 23/09/06
204
G.R. Winham, ‘Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making’, Journal of Politics, vol.32, no.1 pp.4950
200
57
Indeed, it seems historically that Coca-cola, as the symbolic vanguard of
American cultural and economic values, has represented the nemesis of traditional Gallic
Republican values. The champions of these virtues in this particular conflict during the
Post-war period were largely represented by the foremost figures of the agricultural
sector. Clearly there were vested interests involved, and the issue grew increasingly
politicised as it became associated not only with French producers but also the
Communist party, opposed as ever to the anticipated ‘coca-colonisation’ which
represented the perceived conclusion of the issue. With the wine industry still mired in its
largely deleterious post-war slump, Coca-cola became a symbol of the success which
could be enjoyed with a relaxation of production controls, as it benefited from the relaxed
trading restrictions originally agreed on in the Blum-Byrne accord. French opposition to
Coca-cola’s ingression largely represented the desire for a level playing field. Indeed,
much of the contention centred on demands for the clear citation of both ingredients and
production methods. The secrecy of the mysterious formula for the soft-drink’s blend,
“7X”205 jarred against the regulation placed on labelling and production methods for
French vignerons. With the Midi targeted as one of the initial zones of focussed
marketing for the Coca-Cola Company, Paris being the other, it was of little surprise that
local interests were compromised. Opponents called for the drink to rightly abide by
French beverage regulations, due to worries about its secret composition cloaking an
addictive substance, seemingly substantiated by the ubiquitous free samples for new
consumers.206 However, this opposition was buttressed and intensified by a degree of
anti-Americanism aroused by the suspicion of an American cultural invasion. The left-
205
206
R. Kuisel, Seducing the French, (Berkeley, 1996) p54
ibid p57
58
wing Catholic newspaper, Témoignage Chrétien, labelled Coca-cola the “avant-garde of
an offensive aimed at economic colonisation”207, and this attitude permeated the press,
especially those traditionally sympathetic to the influence of the ‘alcohol lobby’.
The perceived cultural offensive of the United States was all the more alarming
due to the access granted for American cultural produce to the French market by the
Blum-Byrne accords, in which resurgent postwar French creativity was seen to be
crushed by Hollywood and “US political muscle.”208 Popular opinion saw reinforcement
in its anti-American fears, as the media paired the influx of Coca-cola with the
increasingly predominant Hollywood movies to diagnose the first signs of cultural
imperialism.209 Such a trend of feeling undeniably added to insecurities surrounding
regional culture, as it threatened to undermine the larger umbrella of French culture as a
whole. The vulnerability of “traditional cultures” to the expansion of “American culture”
framed the problem of identity collapse within the vocabulary of modernisation, which
only served to exacerbate concerns.210 As already stated, a climate of regional insecurity
served to create a nexus of resentment fuelled by fundamental challenges to identity. This
phenomenon clearly found its source both within and without the Midi, with international
events such as the Blum-Byrne accords adding to the extra-local pressure felt by the
vignerons.
The “societal earthquakes”211 which occurred by virtue of these nexuses of
resentment were the product of confluences of supra-regional and supra-national
pressures impressing resentment on both a regional and national sense. This combination
207
Kuisel, Seducing the French, p64
Grantham, Some Big Bourgeois Brothel, p60
209
ibid, p16
210
ibid, p18
211
Loubère, The Vine Remembers, p17
208
59
became so potent as a result of the politicisation of culture which can be traced to the
reestablishment of local elites in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The
successful mobilisation of regional culture to political ends greatly increased the voice of
regional elites, as in France there is a recognition of the fact that “culture transcends
political division”, as voiced originally by Gaullist Culture minister Jacques Toubot and
concurred with by his Socialist successor Jack Lang.212 This cultural analysis of the Midi
points to a situation whereby challenges to regional identity elicited a response which
was characterised by the dominance of left-wing sentiment in the area and a prevalent
spirit of autonomy. This became most potent when combined with challenges to national
identity, as extra-local pressures expanded from Paris to include the United States.
Resistance to modernisation formed a major determinant in the nature of the Midi’s
intransigence, as a general reluctance emerged to accept extra-local terms for
modernisation. This reluctance came to be identified with supporting a perceived
continuity of local values, largely consisting of the response formulated by regional elites
as ‘invented tradition’. These factors formed a feedback loop in which regional identity
relied on resistance to outside pressure as a core social identifier, whilst perpetuating the
structural problems inherent in the region and the continued need for outside intervention.
In this way, the identity of the Midi vignerons became significant cultural capital, as it
defied and yet fostered constant national involvement in the region. In much the same
way as De Gaulle sought to maintain French national grandeur by abrasive action in an
international context, the vignerons of the Midi sought to maintain investment and
relevance by acting abrasively in a national context.
D. McMahon, ‘Echoes of a Recent Past: Contemporary French Anti-Americanism in Historical and
Cultural Perspective’ <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mcd01/>
212
60
Conclusion
Attempts by the government to conceive of postwar recovery on a national basis
succeeded in boosting most of Monnet’s activités du bas, but failed to incisively address
the structural problems extant in some regional economies. In failing to tackle the
structural problems of the Midi, the government unswervingly played its role as both
regulator in normal circumstances and saviour during the cyclical crises. The Fourth
Republic constituted a period in which a government, largely unable to impose its will
upon the vocally resistant Midi, ceded substantial ground to articulate local elites who
grew increasingly aloof from the Parisian consensus. The frequent repetition of market
crises within the wine industry engendered a degree of alienation amongst the local elites
of the Midi, increasingly seeing themselves as losing out in the modernity drive being
undertaken by France. This feeling of alienation was exacerbated both due to the
changing nature of society, which saw rural communities undergoing a demographic
downturn, and increased American dominance in the world scene, which convinced many
of a new ideological ‘coca-colonisation’. The regional importance of cooperative
organisations helped mobilise and vocalise regional identity in the face of these external
pressures. In a region famed for its intransigence, alienation bred protest and protest
became a watchword for regional solidarity as elites sought to highlight the Midi’s
historical legacy. By correlating the regional debate (Occitan against Paris) with the
modernisation debate (France against America), the Midi vignerons brought about the
inculcation of politics into culture and a resultant normalisation of protest. This fed into a
restatement of local identity in the face of extra-local pressures, strengthening traditional
resentment to terms imposed by higher authorities. Thus, externally imposed concepts of
61
postwar recovery occasioned a grass roots reaction amongst rural communities which led
to a restatement of regional identity, largely redefined in opposition to these plans for
recovery. The surprising factor in this analysis is that in a period seen to represent the
decline of traditional communities, we witness their rebirth. Focussed on agitating for
specific gains, the anti-modernisation program of the vignerons offered no clear path for
progress, yet maintained a partnership with government which allowed it to extract
significant gains through mass mobilisation. By politicising their culture, viticultural
elites developed a cultural and political currency grounded in the principles of left-wing
politics and regionalism, which bought them an incommensurately significant voice
during the uncertain times of the Fourth Republic and beyond. Whilst perpetuating a
system of qualitative retardation and quantitative superfluity, winegrowers helped shape,
through protest, a system which enabled them to rely on governmental support,
underwriting the industry in the interest of producers. Whilst struggling to earn a living in
an increasingly dynamic market, the Midi vignerons found an identity which had seemed
lost, and moulded it to maintain regional relevance on an international scene, sacrificing
national interest for regional survival.
62
Appendix
63
Index of Prices 1956-57 (100=1948-1949 price p/HL)
120
100
60
40
20
‘5
Au
6
gu
st
Se
‘5
pt
em 6
be
r‘
56
O
ct
ob
er
N
ov
‘5
6
em
be
D
r‘
ec
56
em
be
r‘
56
Ja
nu
ar
y
Fe
‘5
7
br
ua
ry
‘5
7
M
ar
ch
‘5
7
Ap
ri l
‘5
7
M
ay
‘5
7
Ju
ne
‘5
7
‘5
6
Ju
ly
‘5
6
Ju
ne
‘5
6
M
ay
‘5
6
Ap
ri l
M
ar
c
h
‘5
6
0
Fe
br
ua
ry
Indice
80
Month
Source: G. Galtier, Le Vignoble du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon
(Montpellier, 1960), vol.2, p335
64
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