SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
REMEDIAL LAW
JURISDICTION; It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon or some of the claim asserted
therein.
FACTS: Petitioner is a tenant in the disputed land. In an action to recover possession filed by the private
respondents as purchasers of the aforesaid property before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner was
ordered to vacate the premises and to demolish all the improvements he constructed thereon. On appeal,
petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the RIO on ground that the action filed should have been unlawful
detainer or forcible entry of which the municipal trial court has exclusive jurisdiction. This is predicated
on the fact that the final demand was made on November 20,1990 and the action was filed on December
13, 1990, thus, the one-year period has not yet elapsed. The Court of Appeals deciding in favor of the
private respondents, petitioner instituted this action.
ISSUE: Whether the action to recover possession filed by private respondents is accion publiciana
cognizable by the RIO or, unlawful detainer or forcible entry cognizable by the MTC.
HELD: The allegations in the complaint are of the nature of accion publiciana of which the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction. The averments of the complaint clearly show that private respondents clearly
set up title to themselves, as being the absolute owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their Transfer
Certificates of Title and pray that petitioner be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint
alleging any of the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry, nor is there any assertion
of petitioner’s possession which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right
to possess. It does not allege whether the entry is legal or illegal. The action therefore is neither one of
forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative to ownership of land
allegedly encroached upon by petitioner. It is immaterial whether or not the complaint was instituted one
month from the date of last demand or a year thereafter. [Serdoncillo vs. Court of Appeals, GA. No.
118328, October 8, 1998 SECOND DIVISION Martinez, .J.]
-
CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; Notice of us pendens may be
cancelled after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered.
FACTS: After his mother’s death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father
Lee Tek Sheng to partition conjugal properties of his parents. Respondent father answered with
counterclaim that there were four (4) parcels of land registered in petitioner’s name only as a trustee and
are thus part of their conjugal properties. Accordingly, the father prayed for dismissal of the partition óase
and reconveyance of the rots to the conjugal regime.To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during
the pendency of the case, the respondent caused the annotation of notice of lis pendens on the transfer
certificate of title covering said parcels of land. Petitioner moved for cancellation of the annotation on
ground that it amounts to a collateral attack of his title. The court denied petitioner’s action. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of lis pendens should be cancelled.
HELD: Cancellation of the notice of lis pendens can not be justified. Title refers to ownership while
Certificate of Title refers to the best evidence of ownership. Collateral attack can not be done with regard
to the Certificate of Title. However, the annotation is only for the purpose of protecting the ownership or
title to the property and not as a collateral attack to the Certificate of Title or evidence of ownership. A
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds: (1) when the annotation is for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of
the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither was shown to be present in this case. Thus, petition is
denied. [Leoncio Lee Te kSheng vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Antonio J. Fineza, and Lee Tek Sheng
G.R..No. 115402, July 15, 1998 SECOND DIVISION; RegaIado,J.]
---
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; The failure of a party to answer another’s request for
admission of facts works as an admission of all the material facts necessary for summary
judgment.
FACTS: A complaint was filed by respondent Cherry Valley for collection of sum of money against the
petitioner Allied Agri-Business for its failure to pay for the value of orders made and received by the
latter. Cherry Valley served a Request for Admission of Facts to Agri-Business. The latter failed to
submit a sworn answer to the request for admission within the allowed period. Thus, summary judgment
ensued. Agri-Business alleged that Cherry Valley had the burden to prove through its own witness
during the trial the matters for which admissions were requested, and subsequently questioned the
summary judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s failure to answer the Request for Admission shall mean admission of
the mailers stated in the request which can be the basis for summary judgment.
HELD: The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents
is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial
and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather
than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when Agri-Business failed to reply to a request to
admit, it may not argue that the adverse ,party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted.
Agri-Business’ silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request. This now becomes the basis of a
summary judgment. [Allied AgriBusiness vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 118438, December 4, 1998, First
Division~ Bellosillo, J.]
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISION OF NLRC; After a reexamination of the functional
validity and systematic practicability of the mode of judicial review with respect to
decisions of the NLRC, the rule now is that the petition for certiorari made upon the said
decisions should be tiled with the Court of Appeals in strict compliance of the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts rather than directly to the Supreme Court.
FACTS: Private respondent Aricayos claimed that he is an employee of the petitioner St. Martin Funeral
Home and that he was illegally dismissed from his services. The petitioner on the other hand claimed that
private respondent was not its employee but that he is only the uncle of the owner of the said funeral
home. It was further claimed that the private respondent voluntarily helped in overseeing the business as
an indication of gratitude.
A complaint was filed charging the petitioner with illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that there was
no employer-employee relationship, thus, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the
private respondent appealed to the NLRC whereby the latter issued a resolution setting aside the decision
of the labor arbiter. The case was remanded for immediate appropriate proceedings. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner before the NLRC but it was denied, hence, a petition for certiorari
was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC was properly filed before the Supreme Court.
HELD: The petition for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals in strict compliance of the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts rather than directly to the Supreme Court. This is now the rule after a
reexamination of the functional validity and systematic practicability of the mode of judicial review with
respect to decisions of the NLRC.
Prior to the enactment of RA 7902 which took effect’on March 18,1995, BP 129 provides that the Court
of Appeals has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders
or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of BP 129 and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Further, the last paragraph of Sec 9 of BP 129
provides that the provisions thereof shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
By the birth of RA 7902, amendments were effected to the abovementioned provisions of BP1 29, viz, (1)
the last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code and the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to
conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction; (2) the reference to the Labor Code in that last
paragraph was transposed to par. 3 of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code under PD 442 and the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
However, after an examination of the exception clause of the said Sec. 9 (3) particularly that which states
that except those cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Labor Code under PD 442, the Court held that it was illogical and impracticable, and Congress could
not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any
other court for that matter.
Therefore, all references in the amended Sec 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. [St.
Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, GB. No 130866, Sept. 16, 1998---EN BANC; RegaIado, J.]
APPEALS; Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.
FACTS: The petitioner, Pacific Life Assurance Corp. was ordered by the trial court to pay the
respondents damages amounting to Php 171,828.00 in its decision dated April 24,1992. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal to this original decision while the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. The
motion for reconsideration was decided in favor of said respondents. In the trial court’s modified decision
of March 11, 1993, the award •of damages was increased to Php 457,154.00. Not satisfied, respondents
appealed from the modified decision while Petitioner Pacific did not.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its appellant’s brief which was filed with respect to the original decision.
On the other hand, respondents withdrew their appeal to the modified decision and moved to dismiss
petitioner’s appeal on ground that the latter did not appeal from the modified decision. This motion was
granted by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents need to file another appeal as regards the modified decision.
HELD: The petitioner did not have to file another notice of appeal, having given notice of its intention to
appeal the original decision. Petitioner’s failure to appeal from the amended order did not render its prior
appeal from the original decision ineffective. The modified decision more than doubled petitioner’s
liability, and there is no reason to believe that petitioner’s failure to appeal therefrom in any way indicated
its acceptance thereof. Since the decision as modified substantially increased petitioner’s liability, the
logical inference is that petitioner would all the more want to appeal from the decision modified. To deny
petitioner’s appeal on the order to signify its objection to the modified decision would be to put premium
on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very
aims. [Pacific Life Assurance Corporation vs Concordia et al, G.R.. No. 122838, November 20, 1998,
SECOND DIVISION; Mendoza, J.]
SERVICE OF SUMMONS; In an action in personam, summons should be served
personally for the court to acquire jurisdiction.
FACTS: The case takes its roots from an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale of a barge. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Jose Dela Riva. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision, the respondent filed a motion for the execution of judgment which was granted by said court.
However, respondents failed to enforce the judgment despite the writ of execution.
After five years from the time of entry of judgment, private respondent filed a complaint for revival of
judgment. The summons was unserved due to absence of petitioner Arcenas. Thereafter, on motion of the
respondent Dela Riva, the sheriff effected the service of summons by substituted service to petitioner’s
mother who refused to receive and acknowledge the same. The petitioner was declared in default for his
failure to file his answer. Thereafter, private respondent was allowed to adduce his evidence ex parte. The
lower court rendered a decision against petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court is correct.
HELD: Having failed to serve the summons to the petitioner personally, the lower court did not
validly~acquire jurisdiction over him. Consequently, the proceedings held was null and void. Service of
summons upon the herein petitioner is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
Petitioner is no longer residing and found in the Philippines. As he left for the United States. Hence,
summons may be served on him either personally or by publication. However, since the complaint filed
against him is one in personam (a personal action) and does not involve the personal status of the private
respondent, nor any property in the Philippines in which petitioner has a claim, or an interest, or which
the private respondent has attached, summons should be served on him personally. The deputy sheriff can
not serve the summons by substituted service. [Arcenas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130401,
December 4, 1998, SECOND DIVISION; Martinez,J.]
DEED OF TRANSFER; A judgment liability against the transferor could be enforced
against its successor if the deed of transfer states that the successor shall be solely liable for
any liability owing to any person.
FACTS: On August 17 1984, a case was decided ordering Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC) to reinstate illegally dismissed equipment operator Cecilio Saludar. Said decision
was not executed as all assets of MMIC were foreclosed and were subsequently acquired by petitioner
Maricalum Mining Corporation. Thereafter, MMIC ceased its operations.
Years later, Saludar sought to enforce the said judgment against Maricalum being the successor of his
employer MMIC. Maricalum denied liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment liability of MMIC could be enforced against Maricalum.
HELD: The records show that Maricalum voluntarily absorbed MMIC’s obligatins to its employees. The
Deed of Transfer executed during the petitioner’s acquisition of MMIC’s assets provides that “from and
after the effectivity date, Maricalum shall be solely liable for any liability due or owing to any other
person (natural or corporate)”. MMIC’s liability to Saludar for unpaid backwages adjudicated way back
in 1984 became final as no appeal was interposed by it. This final judgment then formed part of the
liabilities of MMIC which Maricalum assumed in the Deed of Transfer. Thus, it is futile for Maricalum to
deny liability it had voluntarily assumed. [Maricalum Mining Corporation vs. NLRC, G.1~ No. 124711,
November 3, 1998-- SECOND DIVISION; Puno, J.]
REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT; An action for Revival of Judgment is an original action, and
not a mere incident to an original action. It is a new and independent action based on a
judgment or what is known as action upon a judgment and must be brought either in the
same court where said judgment was rendered or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction.
FACTS: A favorable judgment issued by a Labor Arbiter was obtained by Cecilio Saludar against his
employer Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). The latter however, ceased operations
and all its assets were acquired by Maricalum as its successor.
Eight (8) years later, Saludar filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce such
judgment against Maricalum as successor of his employer. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion.
Maricalum appealed to the NLRC denying any obligation to reinstate Saludar. The NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiter. Nonetheless, The NLRC held that since more than five (5) years have elapsed, the
judgment could be enforced against Maricalum not by mere motion but by an Action for Revival of
Judgment. Thus, Saludar filed an Action for Revival of Judgment before the NLRC. Maricalum again
moved for the dismissal of the action on the contention that the said action is cognizable by regular courts
and not by the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the NLRC or the RTC has jurisdiction over an Action for Revival of Judgment in a labor
case.
HELD: The NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for Revival of Judgment. As previously held by the
Supreme Court, an action for Revival of Judgment is an original action, and not a mere incident or a mere
auxiliary and supplementary remedy. It is a new and independent action. In other words, it is an action
based on a judgment or what is known as action upon a judgment. An action upon a judgment must be
brought either in the same
court where said judgment was rendered or in any other court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore,
Saludar properly instituted his action for revival of judgment in the NLRC as the agency which rendered
the judgment sought to be revived. [Maricalum Mining Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124711,
November 3, 1998-- SECOND DIVISION; Puno, J.]
PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES; Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory and failure to do so constitutes a valid ground for dismissal of appeal.
FACTS: As a result of a complaint for recovery of possession and damages, the Regional Trial Court
ordered the petitioner Gegare to turn over the possession of the leased premises and to pay reasonable
compensation for its use and attorney’s fees.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. Despite due
notice, petitioner failed to pay docket fees within the given reglementary period of fifteen (15) days.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal holding that for failure to pay docket fees, the
said appeal was deemed abandoned, hence, dismissal is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal for failure to pay docket fees is proper.
HELD: The dismissal is proper. It has consistently been held that payment in full of docket fees within
the prescribed period is mandatory for such payment is an essential requirement before the court could
acquire jurisdiction over a case. Under Section 1(c) of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, among the
grounds for dismissal of appeal by the Court of Appeals is the failure of the appellant to pay the docket
and other lawful fees as provided in Section 5 of Rule 40 and Section 4 of Rule 41 thereof. [Gegare vs.
CA, G.R. No. 132264, October 8, 1998 FIRST DIVISION; Quisumbing, J.]
—
RIGHT TO APPEAL; The filing by the auction vendee of pleadings incidental to the
execution process, does not, ipso jure, make her a party in interest in the main case.
FACTS: Petitioner is the auction vendee of the property, subject of the writ of execution, issued against
spouses Tibajia, private respondents herein. She acquired the property for an amount of P 448, 989. 50.
Before the expiration of one year from the date of the auction sale, private respondent
deposited with
the court the amount of P457,415.65 as redemption price. Subsequently however, he filed a motion for
the refund of the amount of P35,319.00 on ground that it was unlawfully included by the assignee of the
property in her bill of expenses given to the Deputy Sheriff The lower court ordered the refund but only
in the amount of P15,61 7.89 thereby reducing the redemption price to P441,797.76 which is lower than
the auction price paid by the petitioner. From this order, petitioner filed her appeal. This was denied by
the Court of Appeals for lack of locus standi. Hence, this petition.
.
ISSUE: Whether or not an auction vendee has the right to appeal.
HELD: It is a well- settled rule that only parties in interest may appeal from the judgment of the lower
court. In relation to this, a motion to intervene with leave of court is necessary. No such motion for
intervention having been filed by the petitioner, she was thereby never recognized as an intervenor. In the
case at bar, the petitioner’s participation at the trial court was confined to an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for
an Order of New Title,” followed by “Supplementary Motion for Issuance of New Titles.” Such pleadings
are merely incidental to the execution process, the filing of which did not, ipso lure, give her the legal
standing of a party in interest in the main case. [Ortega vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125302,November 16,1998 FIRST DIVISION; Vitug, J.]
-
CAUSE OF ACTION; The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an
action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the
present causes of action.
FACTS: Petitioner is the tenant in a disputed land. As such, she is paying rentals therefor. The collection
of such rentals was stopped by UCRTC (owner thereof) on the ground that the premises were already sold
to the private respondents. This incident prompted petitioner to file a petition for consignation of rentals
before the Metropolitan Trial Court wherein she obtained a favorable judgment. Sometime thereafter,
private respondent, after repeated demands directed to the petitioner to vacate the premises, filed an
action for recovery of possession of the said property. The petitioner sets up the doctrine of res judicata as
her defense claiming that the MTC decision settled her leasehold right as a tenant and that she cannot be
ejected therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for consignation of rentals decided in favor of the petitioner is a bar to
the present action for recovery of possession filed by private respondents.
HELD: For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
(1) former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the
first and second actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity C ubjoct matter, and (c) identity of cause of
action. The resolution of the issue boils down on whether between the action for consignation of rentals
and action for recovery of possession there is identity of parties and identity of causes of action.
There is identity of parties. Private respondent acquired the property from UCRTC, the defendant in the
former case. Private respondent therefore, are the successors-in-interest, who merely stepped into the
shoes of UCRTC and acquired whatever capacity and title the former had over the same property or
subject matter of the action.
There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. The test of the identity of causes of action
lies not in the form of an action but whether the same evidence would support and establish the former
and the present causes of action. The former case is an action for the consignation of rentals while the
present case is an action for the recovery of possession. The latter action requires the parties to present
evidence of their claims or title to the subject premises and their right to possess the same. The former is
an issue of possession while the latter is an issue of ownership which includes possession as its element.
They are entirely different from each other. The decision for consignation of rental does not bar the action
for the recovery of possession. [Serdoncillo vs. Court of Appeals, GA. No. 118328, October 8, 1998;
SECOND DIVISION Martinez, J.]
-
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
FACTS: As per decision of the Supreme Court, mining claims over the mining areas located at Tuba and
ltogon, Benguet were granted to the herein petitioners Macawiwili and Omico over the claims of Philex,
private respondent herein. Notwithstanding said decision, private respondent filed a complaint for
expropriation of the same area before RTC invoking the provisions of Sec. 59, P.D. 463 which allegedly
grants it such right to expropriate. The lower court decided in favor of Macawiwili on ground that the
grant of mining claims to the latter’s favor made the land of public character hence not subject to
expropriation. When Philex perfected its appeal before the respondent court, Macawiwili filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that only questions of law were involved and, therefore the appeal
should be to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue raised by Philex Mining is a question of law hence appeal should be to
the Supreme Court and not to the Court of Appeals.
HELD: In all cases decided by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, as in
the case at bar, appeal must be made to the Supreme Court where the appellant solely raises questions of
law.
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve the examination of the probative value of the
pieces of evidence presented by the Litigants. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on the certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the alleged facts.
It is clear that the sole issue raised by Philex is a question of law, that is whether it has, under P.D. 463,
the right to expropriate the 21 .9 hectare mining areas where petitioner’s mining claims are located.
[Macawiwill GoId Mining and Development Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 115104; October
12. 1998; SECOND DIVISION Mendoza, J.]
-
BURDEN OF PROOF; When an accused invokes self-defense, the onus probando to
substantiate such assertion rests on him. He must prove clearly and convincingly its
elements.
FACTS: Fast asleep in his home, Rosendo was awakened by the distressed call of Leosandi, who had a
wound on his head after having been struck by accused-appellant’s son, Renato. Rosendo arose from his
slumber and went outside the house to seek help for the wounded Leosandi. Accused-appellant and his
son, Renato, had, however, followed Leosandi to Rosendo’s house and were waiting outside. Without
warning, accused-appellant shot Rosendo, not only once but twice even as he was already prostrate on the
ground bleeding to death. Accused-appellant invoked self-defense on the ground that the deceased,
Rosendo, was holding a hand grenade, threatening to kill him. He allegedly shouted to Rosendo not to
throw the hand grenade but that the latter did not heed his warning so he ran and grabbed the gun of one
Rodel and fired at Rosendo. Accused-appellant testified that after Rosendo threw the hand grenade, it
rolled but did not explode and was picked by Rosendo’s wife. The hand grenade was never produced in
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant proved the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
HELD: In the case at hand, accused-appellant failed to prove legitimate and complete self-defense. The
allegation that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim cannot be given credence. The
prosecution’s witnesses categorically stated that Rosendo was not equipped with a hand grenade or any
firearm when he was attacked by the accused-appellant. Moreover, not a trace of the so-called hand
grenade was ever produced in the evidence in court.
When an accused invokes self-defense, the onus probandi to substantiate such assertion rests on him. The
facts and the evidence on record clearly show that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Rosendo. Absent the same, accused-appellants claim of self-defense and defense of strangers must fail.
[People of the Philippines vs. Honorato Navarro, G.R.No. 125538, September 3, 1998; Melo, J.]
BURDEN OF PROOF; In termination cases, the burden of proving the just cause of
dismissing an employee rests on the employer, and his failure to do so would result in a
finding that the dismissal is not justified.
FACTS: For allegedly uttering indecent and obscene remarks against a member of administration,
Melody Lopez was placed under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. She later found out that
employment file contained several unsavory reports without her being given the chance to defend her
side. Thereafter, she was dismissed from her employment based on that incident and other past
misconducts appearing in employment file. She filed a case for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is warranted based on the evidence presented.
HELD: The dismissal was illegal. The past infractions cannot be collectively taken as a justification for
her dismissal from the service. The petitioner is not required to prove her innocence on the charges
leveled against her but the burden rests upon the respondent to establish the valid cause of termination.
Where there is absence of clear, valid and legal cause of termination, the law considers it a case of illegal
dismissal. In termination cases, the burden of proving the just cause of dismissing an employee rests on
the employer, and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is not justified. Having
failed to establish by concrete and direct evidence, no substantial basis exists for petitioner’s dismissal.
[Melody Paulino Lopez vs. NLRC, G.R.No. 124548, October 8, 1999; Martinez, J.]
EXCEPTION TO HIERARCHY OF COURTS; For special and important reasons or for
exceptional and compelling circumstances, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House may be heard by the Supreme Court even if they fall under
the concurrent jurisdiction of a lower tribunal.
FACTS: Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto before the
Supreme Court against Senator Teofisto Guingona alleging that the latter had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad by virtue of his loss to Senator Marcelo Fernan in the race for senate
president.
It is contended that it must be the regional trial courts and not the Supreme Court which should take
cognizance of the petition for quo warranto in deference to the hierarchy of courts because both are
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a case within its concurrent
jurisdiction without breach of hierarchy of courts.
HELD: In the regular course, the RTC and the Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for quo warranto and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petition in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and
compelling circumstances, like original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto
assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, they have
been recognized as exceptions to the rule. [Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad vs. Senators
Teofisto Guingona and Marcelo Fernan, G.R.No. 134577, November 18, 1998-- En Banc; Panganiban,
J.]
BINDING EFFECT OF THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT; Factual
findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon the Supreme Court because it is not
a trier of facts, but it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the
lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.
FACTS: Herbert and Anna Marie Gang were husband and wife who have three children. Later, the
spouses were legally separated and the court awarded the custody of the children to Anna Marie. Herbert,
on the other hand, went to the United States and got naturalized as an American citizen but continuously
supported his children as required by the court.
Later on, Anna Marie entrusted the custody of the children to her childless brother and sister-in-law. The
latter filed a special proceedings for the adoption of the children. Only Anna Marie’s consent was
attached to the petition without including Herbert’s consent. She submits that his consent is not necessary
because the latter has abandoned the children. Upon learning such fact, Herbert immediately sent a
telegram manifesting his opposition to the adoption proceedings. He presented as evidence the letters of
the children to him showing their love and affection and the certification of US banks showing that even
prior to the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of the children.
Notwithstanding the opposition, the lower court issued the decree of adoption in favor of Anna Marie’s
brother and ruled that Herbert’s written consent is not necessary based on the findings that he had
abandoned the children. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court may review the factual findings of the lower court.
HELD: As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding and the Supreme Court is not
expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
However, although the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record. In the
case at bar, the letters of the children and the certification of bank deposits negate the allegation that there
is physical, financial and moral desertion or abandonment on the part of Herbert.
The exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. [Herbert Cang vs CA, G.R. No. 105308, September25, 1998; Romero, J.]
QUO WARRANTO; The person suing in a quo warranto proceeding must show that he or
she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by another.
FACTS: Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto against Senator
Teofisto Guingona alleging that the latter had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad
by virtue of his loss to Senator Marcelo Fernan in the race for senate president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to bring the quo warranto proceeding.
HELD: In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or
she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by Senator Guingona. In the first place, Senator Santiago has no standing to
bring the petition for she does not claim to be rightfully entitled to the position of Senate minority leader.
However, any question on standing has been rendered moot by the inclusion of Senator Tatad who claims
to have the right to the contested office. Nevertheless, both of them present no sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. [Santiago vs. Guingona, G.R. No.
134577, November 18, 1998-- En Banc; Panganiban, J.]
DUAL CONCEPT OF RES JUDICATA; Res judicata may be either a bar by prior
judgment or conclusiveness of judgment. Although the latter does not have the same effect
as res judicata which bars subsequent actions, it operates as estoppel with respect to
matters in issue or points controverted, on the determination of which the finding or
judgment was anchored.
FACTS: Spouses Zulueta executed a contract of absolute sale in favor of the spouses Camara. After the
execution of the deed of sale, Gamara noticed that two separate mortgages are annotated on the title. The
first mortgage is in favor of China Bank which was eventually settled while the second one is in favor of
Lacson who eventually assigned the mortgage to Hernaez. Camara demanded from Zulueta the removal
of the annotation by bringing an action for specific performance and damages before the Manila RTC.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering Zulueta to cancel or release the mortgages or in the
alternative, return the purchase price of P15,000.00. Thereafter, Zulueta executed in favor of Hernaez an
amendment to the mortgage assigned to her by Lacson. Meanwhile, Camara availed of the alternative
remedy in the action for specific performance and was granted partial execution of P10,000 in the
intestate estate of Zulueta. Upon Zulueta’s death, Hernaez brought an action for judicial foreclosure of the
amended contract of mortgage against the former’s heirs before the Pasig RTC. The trial court ruled in
favor of Hernaez. The property involved was sold in a public auction and a corresponding certificate of
sale was awarded to Hernaez as the highest bidder and a judicial confirmation of ownership was issued.
Camara filed motions for clarificatory order and leave to intervene. Both were denied but Camara did not
appeal. Camara then instituted a case for quieting of title against Hernaez before the Makati RTC which
dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and ruled that the decision in the action
for judicial foreclosure constitutes res judicata in the action for quieting of title. Camara contended that
the decision in the quieting of title did not constitute res judicata because there is no identity of parties
and causes of action as he was not impleaded in action for judicial foreclosure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of res judicata applies as to bar the action for quieting of title.
HELD: Res judicata has two concepts under Rule 39, Section 47 of the New Rules of Civil Procedure.
The first is bar by prior judgment under paragraph (b) thereof and the Second is conclusiveness of
judgment under paragraph (c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel an] are based on the
public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
In the case at bar, res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies. There is
conclusiveness of judgment when there is identity of parties and subject matter but not causes of action
between the first case where judgment was rendered and the second case where s~ich judgment is
invoked. Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata which bars subsequent actions, still,
conclusiveness of judgment operates as estoppel with respect to matters in issue or points controverted, on
the determination of which the finding or judgment was anchored.
The judgment in the action for judicial foreclosure brought by Hernaez is conclusive on Camara’s action
for quieting of title because there is identity of parties and subject matter but not of causes of action. Even
if the first action for judicial foreclosure was brought against the heirs of Zulueta and the action for
quieting of title is against Hernaez, the former and the latter can be considered as substantially the same
parties since Hernaez is a successor in interest of the late Zulueta. There is identity of parties not only
where the parties are the same but also those in privity with them, as between successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in tIe same capacity, or where there is substantial identity of parties. As to subject matter, the prior
action for judicial foreclosure and the action for quieting of title involve the same lot. [Augusto and
Fe/iciana Camara vs.CA, G.R. No. 100789, July20, 1999; Purisima, J.]
CAUSE OF ACTION; A cause of action has three elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of the defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the defendant to the plaintiff.
FACTS: Zulueta sold a parcel of land in favor of Camara. After the execution of the deed of sale, the
latter found out that the title was burdened with two encumbrances. He then filed an action for specific
performance against Zulueta to remove the encumbrances. The trial court ordered Zulueta to cancel the
mortgages or return the purchase price of P15,000. When Zulueta died, Camara availed of the alternative
remedy by presenting a money claim as creditor in the intestate estate of the former. He was granted
partial execution of P10,000.
Hernaez, the mortgagee of the lot appearing on the title, filed an action for judicial foreclosure of the
contract of mortgage against the former’s heirs. The trial court ruled in favor of Hernaez. The property
involved was sold in a public auction and a corresponding certificate of sale was awarded to Hernaez as
the highest bidder and a judicial confirmation of ownership was issued.
Camara then instituted a case for quieting of title against Hernaez before the Makati RTC which
dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and ruled that Camara has no cause of
action against Hernaez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for quieting of title should be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause
of action.
HELD: A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
Camara’s cause of action arose from the contract of sale executed by Zulueta in his favor. The act of the
vendor Zulueta of selling a property burdened with encumbrances, in violation of the warranty that it was
free from liens and encumbrances, was already atoned when Camara obtained a decision in the action for
specific performance where Camara opted to present a money claim against the estate of Zulueta and was
granted partial execution. Consequently, Camara cannot again rely on the same violation of warranty as a
cause of action for quieting of title. [Augusto and Fe/iciana Camara, vs CA, GB. No. 100789, July 20,
1999; Purissima, J.]
PRESUMPTION; It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing
evidence to the contrary is adduced. It Is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to
sufficiently prove such allegation.
FACTS: Spouses Tan are registered owners of a parcel of land which was previously owned by Severa
Gregorio. Sometime in 1965, Shell Company leased the lot from Severa for a period of twenty years, after
the expiration of which, Buenconsejo Vivar, one of Severa’s heirs, tried to sell the same to one Federico
Ng. Pertinent documents from the Registry of Deeds, however, show previous sale of 2/3 portion of the
lot executed by Severa in favor of Santos who in turn sold the same to spouses Tan evidenced by deeds of
absolute sale. It further appears, that the remaining 1/3 portion has been acquired by the Palomos, as the
highest bidder in an execution sale subsequent to an action for a sum of money against Jesusa Galang, one
of Severa’s heirs. Thereafter, the Palomos assigned that 1/3 portion to Spouses Tan. The. heirs of Severa
filed a complaint against spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging
that the deeds of conveyance were forged and are therefore void. The trial, court declared the forged Deed
of Sale purportedly signed and executed by Severa in favor of Santos conveying the subject property null
and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant spouses Tan are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
HELD: It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is
adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent
enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. In the case at bar, the burden of proving bad
faith therefore lies with petitioners but they failed to discharge such onus probandi. Without a clear and
persuasive substantiation of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of respondents stands.
[Heirs of Severa Gregorio vs Court of Appeals, et al, G. R. No. 117609, December 19, 1998; Purisima,
J.]
APPEAL; The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law.
FACTS: Respondents Rodriguezes obtained a favorable judgment in an action for ejectment filed against
the Ortizes before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The Ortizes appealed to the RTC which affirmed the
MeTC’s judgment. The respondents moved for the issuance of the writ of execution. The petitioners
subsequently filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which was denied. The
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which dismissed on ground, among others, that the
certification for non-forum shopping was signed by the counsel and not by the petitioners themselves in
violation of the mandate of the Rules of Court. Petitioners alleged that their counsel, who certified, has
personal knowledge that they had not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
parties and causes of action. They assert that their lawyer’s signature must be accepted as substantial
compliance with the requirements of the circular.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of counsel and not the litigant in a certification for non- forum
shopping is substantial compliance with the Rules.
HELD: The Rules must be strictly applied. For the failure of the party to sign the certification on
non-forum shopping, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance for
the certification requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. The strict application
of the Rules was proper as there was no showing of any highly justifiable compelling reason for the court
to make a disposition in the interest of justice. Rules of procedure are required to be followed, except only
when, for the most pervasive of reasons, they maybe relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
[Spouses Va/entine and Camille Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 127393, December 4,1998;
Quisumbing, J.]
APPEAL; A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that
does not toll the period to appeal.
FACTS: An information for violation of Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines was filed by the state
prosecutor against private respondents. The accused filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the information.
The lower court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case. A copy of the decision was received
by the prosecution on June 3. Seven (7) days from receipt of the order, the DOJ filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal without containing the appropriate notice of hearing. The court
issued an order that it cannot act on the motion because no date is set for its hearing. It was only on July 1
that petitioner asked for leave of court that hearing be set for July 8. The Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for extension of thirty days to file a petition for review
on certiorari which was granted. The case was referred by the SC to the Court of Appeals. The CA
dismissed the petition on a technicality. It ruled that although the motion for reconsideration was filed
within the seventh day of the 15-day reglementary period, the same did not toll the running of the period
to appeal as the motion did not contain a notice of hearing to the respondent’s counsel. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of notice of hearing is fatal to a motion for reconsideration.
HELD: A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the
period to appeal, and upon expiration of the 15-day period, th~ questioned order or decision becomes
final and executory. Although the motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period
(i.e. on the 7 day), it did not toll the running of the period to appeal as the motion did not contain a notice
of hearing addressed to private respondents’ counsel. The supplemental motion did not cure the defect as
the same was filed only on July 1 or after the order of dismissal had attained finality on June 18,1993.
[People vs CA, G.R.. No. 125164; September25, 1998; Davide, Jr., J.]
FORUM-SHOPPING; There is no forum-shopping when a party files a case in the
Supreme Court and applies for a similar relief in the Regional Trial Court if the party had
first sought the withdrawal of the case before the Supreme Court in order to seek recourse
before the lower court.
FACTS: Due to respondent Gordon’s apprehension that he would be removed and replaced as chairman
of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) upon the change of administration from President
Ramos to President Estrada, he filed a petition before the Supreme Court for prohibition to prevent his
ouster as chairman of the SBMA on the ground that he had a fixed term of office of six years which
would not expire until February 10, 2004.
As respondent Gordon apprehended, upon assuming office on June 30, 1998, President Estrada issued
Administrative Order No.1, recalling, withdrawing, and canceling the appointment of Gordon as chairman
of SBMA for a term of six years, dated February 10, 1998, by former President Fidel V. Ramos.
On July 1, 1998, instead of pressing his motion for a temporary restraining order, respondent Gordon filed
a notice of withdrawal of his petition. This was done at 9:21 in the morning. At 11.30 A.M. of that same
day, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The
filing of this case in the Olongapo court gave rise to the present petition to declare respondents in
contempt of court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the respondents in filing two (2) petitions involving the same issues
before the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Court at Olongapo City constitutes forum- shopping and
contempt of court.
HELD: Although respondent Gordon filed a petition for prohibition before this Court and, after two days,
filed substantially the same petition before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, there was no
forum-shopping because the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the Olongapo court he first
filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition which the Supreme Cc’urt later granted and that (2) he
withdrew his petition in the Supreme Court because of the present policy of the Court requiring the
parties and their counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy of courts and in order to obviate any technical
objection on this ground, petitioner has deemed it fit to withdraw the petition so that it may be filed in the
proper court where i~ can be ventilated on its merits. The purpose of contempt is preservative rather than
punitive and the Supreme Court has chosen to overlook respondents’ lapse. [Lomibao vs Gordon, GB.
No. 134171, November 18, 1998--EN BANC, Mendoza, J.]
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or
even the rules of the Senate has been clearly violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.
FACTS: Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto against Senator
Teofisto Guingona alleging that the latter had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad
by virtue of his loss to Senator Marcelo Fernan in the race for senate president. They also maintain that
Senator Fernan committed grave abuse of discretion when he recognized Senator Guingona as the Senate
minority leader notwithstanding his claim to the office on the ground that only the two of them belonged
to the minority.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sen. Fernan committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. By that standard, respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Sen. Guingona as minority leader. Such formal recognition came only after at
least two sessions and a caucus wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority. [Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad vs. Senators
Teofisto Guingona and MarceIo Fernan, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998-- En Banc; Panganiban,
J.]
INJUNCTION BOND; The posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction
does not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility
for the damages that the writ may thereby cause. It gives additional security to the party
against whom the injunction is directed.
FACTS: McAdore Finance and Investment, Inc. (McADORE) was the owner and operator of a hotel in
Dagupan City. Private respondent Dagupan Electric Corp. (DECORP), was the grantee of a franchise to
operate and maintain electric services in the province of Pangasinan, including Dagupan City.
McADORE and DECORP entered into a contract whereby DECORP shall provide electric power to
McADORE’s hotel. During the term of their contract, DECORP noticed discrepancies between the actual
monthly billings and the estimated monthly billings of McADORE. Upon inspection, it was discovered
that the terminal in the transformers connected to the meter had been interchanged resulting in the slow
rotation of the meter. Consequently, DECORP issued a corrected bill but McADORE refused to pay. As a
result of such failure and continued refusal to pay the corrected electric bills, DECORP disconnected
power supply to the hotel.
Aggrieved, McADORE commenced a suit against DECORP for damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. McADORE posted injunction bonds from several sureties, one of which was
herein petitioner PARAMOUNT, which issued an injunction bond. Accordingly, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued wherein DECORP was ordered to continue supplying electric power to the hotel
and to refrain from further disconnecting it.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of DECORP ordering McADORE to pay the
former moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. The trial court further hold the
bonding companies jointly and severally liable with McADORE to the extent of the value of their bonds,
to pay the damages. McADORE did not appeal. PARAMOUNT, however, appealed arguing that since no
hearing was held for the purpose of establishing its liability on the injunction bond, it is released from its
obligation as surety. Further, it contended that assuming that it is liable, its liability should be limited only
to the amount of damages accruing from the time the injunction bond was issued until the termination of
the case and not from the time the suit was commenced, and that it is liable to pay actual damages only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PARAMOUNT is liable on its injunction bond.
HELD: The PARAMOUNT is liable. Its contentions are without merit.
The requisites in order for the injunction bond to become answerable are:
(1) the application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued; (2) such
application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and (3) after hearing with notice to
the surety. As regards the last requisite, it is neither mandatory nor fatal that there should be a separate
hearing in order that damages upon the bond can be claimed, ascertained and awarded, as can be gleaned
from the provisions of Rule 57, Sec. 20. What is necessary only is for the attaching party and his surety or
sureties to be duly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. In the case at bench, it was shown that
PARAMOUNT was present and represented by its counsel. With regard to the question of extent of
liability, Rule 58, Sec.4(6) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. Its Principal purpose is te protect the enjoined
party against loss or damage by reason of an injunction. Thus, PARAMOUNT is liable, jointly and
severally for actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit, to the extent of the
amount of the bond. [PARAMOUNT Insurance Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 110086, Ju/y 19,1999—Ynares-Santiago, J.]
JURISDICTION; In an action in personam, personal service of summons is essential to the
acquisition of juris~dlction over the person of a non-resident defendant who does not
volLlntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.
FACTS: In an action for a specific amount of money, petitioner Asiavest Limited obtained a favorable
judgment from the Hong Kong Court against private respondent, Antonio Heras. In view of ~he fact that
the private respondent is now residing in the Philippines, an action was filed in order to seek enforcement
of the said judgment. Private respondent. in his answer, admitted the existence of the foreign judgment
but opposed its enforcement on the ground of foreign court’s lack of jurisdiction over his person. It
appears that summons issued by the Hong Kong Court was served through defendant’s law office while
he was already in the Philippines. He contended that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is
unavailing to give jurisdiction in a personal action against him for recovery of money.
The RTC held that the Hong Kong Court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this
jurisdiction for failure of Heras to overcome the legal presumption in favor of foreign judgment. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Hong Kong Court acquired jurisdiction.
HELD: The Hong Kong Court did not acquire jurisdiction hence judgment is not enforceable. Although a
foreign judgment is a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties within the Philippines, it may
be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction. Since the expert witness failed to testify on the law of
Hong Kong concerning service of summons, it will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the
matter is similar to Philippine law.
In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non- resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction, If he is not present therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person
and therefor cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
Accordingly, since Heras was not a residenl: of Hong Kong and the action against him was one in
personam, summons should have been personally served on him while in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial
service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong Court jurisdiction
over his person. [Asiavest Limited vs. CA, G.R. No. 128803. September 25, 1998; Davide, Jr., J.]
JURISDICTION; Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted.
FACTS: Senator Marcelo Fernan was elected senate president over Senator Francisco Tatad by a vote of
20 to 2, respectively during the first regular session of the Eleventh Congress. The president pro tempore
and the majority leader were also elected. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago that he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who voted
for Senator Femnan comprised the majority while only those who voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. The seven Lakas senators manifested that they had chosen Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. No consensus was arrived at until even the Senate met in caucus in the third session
day. The majority leader received a letter from the seven Lakas senators that they had elected Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo
warranto against Guingona and Fernan alleging that Sen. Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Petitioners contend that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful
minority leader. They submit that the definition of “majority” and “minority” involve an interpretation of
the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1) of Article VI.
The respondents maintain that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter
pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Supreme Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case..
HELD: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of petitioners, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
[Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad vs. Senators Teofisto Guingona and Marcelo Fernan,
GB. No. 134577, November 18, 1996-- En Banc; Panganiban, J.]
HEARSAY; Unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments
in their affidavits, the affidavits acquired the character of hearsay which must be excluded
from the judicial proceeding.
FACTS: Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide for the killing of his father. The
prosecution presented in evidence affidavits containing the extra-judicial confessions of co-accused Eddie
and Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers were, however not presented on the witness stand. The trial court
convicted Quidato on the basis of their affidavits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavits were admissible as evidence against the accused-appellant.
HELD: The affidavits are inadmissible. The two were not presented in the witness stand. The failure to
present the two gives the affidavits the character of hearsay. It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the
affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must
be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admission of an
accused made extra-judicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had
not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross examine him. [People of the Philippines vs.
Bernardo Quidato Jr., GB. No. 117401, October 1, 1998; RomeroJ.]
BEST EVIDENCE; When forgery is the issue in a case, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document.
FACTS: Spouses Tan are registered owners of a parcel of land which was previously owned by Severa
Gregorio. After Severas death, one of her heirs tried to sell the land but pertinent documents from the
Registry of Deeds as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale showed previous sale of 2/3 portion of the lot
executed by Severa and Tan. The remaining 1/3 portion has been acquired by the Palomos in an execution
sale, who thereafter assigned the same to the spouses Tan. Severa’s heirs filed a complaint against
spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging that the deed of
conveyance were forged and are therefore void. Thereafter, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall building
destroying the entire records of the case. Pending an order of reconstitution, Severa’s heirs filed a
supplemental complaint assailing the genuiness of the signature of Severa affixed to the deed of sale.
They presented an NBI handwriting expert who examined the original copy of the subject deed of sale,
but during his testimony in court, presented a mere photostat thereof. The trial court declared the forged
deed of sale null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the photostat copy of the document was enough to prove forgery.
HELD: Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. Without the original document
containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish
forgery. A comparison based on a mere photocopy or reproduction of the document under controversy
cannot produce reliable results. [Heirs of Severa Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, eLaL, G. R. No. 117609,
December 19, 1998; Purisima, J.]
ARREST; In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the
permissible area within his reach, that is, that point which is within the effective control of
the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence
or of escaping.
FACTS: After the conduct of surveillance operations, a group of police officers reported the result of the
same to their commanding officer who instructed them to apply for a search warrant. The police officers
applied for and were issued a search warrant after they hatched a plan that a buy-bust operation be first
conducted on the accused Ferdinand Cuenco. As planned, the police officer conducted the operation by
acting as a poseur-buyer of marijuana. Florida Fajardo, the wife of the accused, got the marijuana and
handed the same to the poseur-buyer. After sale has been consummated, they arrested Cuenco and
proceeded with the search, in the course of which, Sarmiento found a box which contained dried
flowering tops of marijuana. The corresponding criminal complaints were filed against the accused
Ferdinand Cuenco and Florida Fajardo for the sale and possession of a prohibited drug. The trial court
convicted both accused. Cuenco appealed questioning his conviction because of the illegality of the
search made in his house. Appellant insinuates a frame-up.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the house consequent to a lawful arrest is valid.
HELD: The search of the house is valid as the latter is still within the permissible area of search. In
lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach, that is, that
point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. When the operation took place, it becomes
advisable, for the peace officers to forthwith undertake a search of the house as being within the
permissible area. The arrest was made in the course of an entrapment, following a surveillance operation,
normally performed by police officers in the apprehension of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the
absence of proof of any odious intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute a serious
crime, the court will not allow their testimony to be overcome by the self-serving and uncorroborated
claim of ‘frame-up.’ [People of the Philippines vs Ferdinand Cuenco, G.R.. No. 128277 November 16,
1998; Vitug, J.]
ILLEGAL ARREST; Alleged violation of the rights against illegal arrest is deemed waived
by the appellant’s failure to assert them prior to the arraignment.
FACTS: Noel Navarro is charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
Upon conviction, he appealed assailing the legality of his arrest. He claimed that he is denied due process
by virtue of his illegal arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can validly assail the legality of his arrest.
HELD: Alleged violation of the rights against illegal arrest is deemed waived by the appellant’s failure to
assert prior to arraignment. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion that he was denied due process by virtue
of his alleged illegal arrest, such claim is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by
his active participation in the trial thereafter. [People of the Philippines vs Noel Navarro, G.R. NO.
129566, October 7, 1998; Panganiban, J.]
DATE, WHEN RELEVANT; The exact date of the commission of the rape is relevant in
the proper determination of penalty.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Tirona was the family driver of the Gil family. His daily work routine would
find him driving to and from St. John Academy in San Juan, Manila, six-year old Vanessa Gil where she
was a kinder pupil. Sometime in November 1993, the nursemaid of the Gils told Vanessa’s mother, that
Vanessa’s underwear appeared to be unexplainably dirty and yellowish in color, It was followed by
Vanessa’s complaint of vaginal pains in March 1994. Convinced that there was something wrong, the
child was brought for medical check-up. When Vanessa was asked, she pointed Tirona as having inserted
his penis and fingers into her vagina. The information states that the crime occurred between June 1993 to
May 1994. The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused and he was meted with death
penalty. The accused contended that RA 7659 cannot be applied to him because of the absence of a clear
indication of the exact date of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is proper.
HELD: The conviction is proper. The prosecution has been able to prove that on at least one occasion,
accused-appellant has had carnal knowledge of the six-year old complaining witness. Although the
evidence was sufficient to establish the fact of rape committed between the months of June 1993 and May
1994, the information has failed to account for the exact date of its commission. The information filed is
not definite on the exact date of the actual commission of the crime as it only stated that the offense was
committed “sometime between June 1993 to May 1994. Thus, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
accused-appellant. The proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua. [People of the Philippines vs Tirona,
GA. No. 128907; December22, 1998--En Banc~- Vitug, J.]
BAIL; Bail is a matter of right before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
FACTS: Herein petitioners Yousef Al-Ghoul and others are detention pris3ners who were arrested and
charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under Sections 1 and 3 of P.D.
No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, as a consequence of the search conducted
pursuant to the search warrants issued by the RTC of Kaloocan City.
Petitioners filed a motion for bail but the resolution of the same was held in abeyance by the trial court
pending the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to determine whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order denying petitioners’ motion
for bail on the ground that the law under which petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of reclusion
perpetua and that the evidence of guilt is strong.
On October 30,1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation alleging that with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 8294, amending PD. 1866, the penalty for the offenses under which petitioners are being charged has
been reduced from the penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the penalty
ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal, hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless of
the strength of evidence against them.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to bail.
HELD: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866
for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has
now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prisiorr mayor in its maximum peñod to
reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to
their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
[Al-Ghoul, et al vs CA and People, GB. No. 126859, November24, 1998, Quisumbing, J.]
BAIL HEARING; In resolving a motion for admission to bail, a bail hearing is mandatory
to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose the application by showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong.
FACTS: Several accused were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom in an information filed in
the sala of Judge Bongolan. One of the accused filed a “Motion for the Amendment of the Information
and for the Fixing of the Bail” alleging that the evidence presented did not show that the kidnapping was
for ransom. He asked the prosecution to amend the information from kidnapping for ransom to simple
kidnapping to bring it within the ambit of bailable offenses and enable him to post bail as a matter of
right. On June 2,1998, the prosecution in its “Opposition to Motion to Bail” maintained that it has
established that the accused committed kidnapping for ransom and that the motion to bail is prematurely
filed since they are still in the process of presenting further evidence to prove that the crime had been
committed by the accused. The next day, however, Judge Bongolan issued his order granting the
application for bail, holding that the prosecution did not show that the evidence of guilt is strong.
An administrative case was filed against Judge Bongolan for having rendered an unjust order and
ignorance of the law in granting bail without setting the hearing for the bail application.
Judge Bongolan argued that no further hearing is necessary because in one of the hearings of the case, he
asked the prosecution on whether they could offer additional evidence to support its opposition and the
prosecution answered in the negative. Further, he contended that it is not necessary for the prosecution to
present all its witnesses before he could resolve the motion for bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of bail is proper.
HELD: The grant of bail is improper for failure to compiy with the procedure in resolving a motion for
admission to bail. A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose
the application by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. If the prosecution is denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process. A bail application does not only
involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the
people and the peace of the community from dangerous element. These two rights must be balanced by a
magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of discretion.
[Eusebio Go, et al vs Judge Benjamin Bongolan, AM. No. RTJ-99-1464, July 26,1999; Puno, J.]
SUFFICIENCY OF ALLEGATION; The failure to allege accurately the relationship
between the appellant and his victim in the information bars his conviction in the qualified
form that is punishable by death.
FACTS: Reynaldo Ponado is charged with three counts of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by R.A. 7659. It appears that private complainant, 13 year old Mariner Bombales, is a
stepdaughter of the accused. This fact however, was not accurately alleged in the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to the penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of qualified rape.
HELD: The accused should not be convicted of qualified rape. In qualified rape, both the fact of minority
of the victim and the actual relationship between the parties must be alleged in the information. Unlike a
generic aggravating circumstance, a qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the
information.
In the case at bar, the failure to allege accurately the relationship between the appellant and his victim
bars his conviction in the qualified form that is punishable by death. The technical flaw is a matter that
cannot be ignored. It constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to that
of reclusion perpetua. [People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Ponado, G.R.. No. 131334, July28, 1999
En Banc Vitug, J.]
-