CHAPTER 29: AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1)
KEY POINTS
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The political legacy of colonial rule
Artificial boundaries and authoritarian rule
One-party states
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The economic legacy of underdevelopment and
dependence
Raw material exports
Neglect of food production
Limited transport
Restrictive policies
 The early drive for economic development
Industrialisation for import substitution
Indebtedness
French neo-colonialism through the franc zone
Ambitious projects - the Zambian example
Collapse in commodity prices
 The role of the military in African politics
The military inheritance
The early coups
Nigeria and Ghana
Military downfalls
 Socialism and self-reliance: the Tanzanian course
Origins of Nyerere’s ‘African socialism’
Ujama villages – implementation and failure
Other experiences of socialism
The political legacy of colonial rule
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The roots of many of Africa’s recurrent problems are to be found in
her colonial legacy
Representative, parliamentary democracy was only ever established
on the eve of independence
The real political legacy of colonial rule was dictatorship –
authoritarian rule, established and maintained by force
Artificial ‘nation states’ – arbitrary external boundaries cut across
pre-colonial identities
Each state (except Lesotho and Swaziland) was an amalgam of
ethnic identities:
Differences emphasised by imperial ‘divide and rule’
Maintaining the integrity of the state was thus a major problem
Desire to maintain these new ‘nation states’: to be large and
powerful enough to gain international recognition and respect
Achievement: almost all state boundaries have been maintained;
vast majority of countries have remained united and avoided civil
war.
One-party states
 Political parties at independence mostly ethnically-based
 One-party state therefore a practical alternative to strengthen
national unity
 Some one-party leaders with integrity (e.g. Kaunda of Zambia,
Nyerere of Tanzania) have allowed some democratic choice within
one-party system
 Most: Nkrumah of Ghana, Banda of Malawi, + most from former
French colonies abused power to suppress criticism
 Most of these succumbed to military takeover – the only way to
change government
The economic legacy of underdevelopment and
dependency
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Legacy: export of unprocessed raw materials, import of
manufactured consumer goods
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Prices of both controlled by industrialised world
Widening gap between export and import prices (‘adverse terms of
trade’)
Cash-crop priority over food production = progressive poverty,
decline in self-sufficiency
Africa: net importer of food by 1950s
Transport infrastructure geared towards exports of raw materials –
from source to port
Very poor internal transport or telecommunications infrastructure
Poll tax: inherited and maintained in some countries for a while
Marketing boards: used to tax small farmers by suppressing prices
and destroying incentives
Lack of education: 10% of tropical Africans literate at independence
The early drive for economic development
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Temporary boom in Africa’s commodities disguised depth of
problem
Development modelled on perception of Western urban-centred
industrialisation (advised by Western ‘experts’)
Industrialise for import substitution: provide urban employment,
replace imports with own manufactures, overcome ‘adverse terms
of trade’
But: much industrialisation too ambitious, need to import materials,
machinery and expertise –
+ expenditure to reach Western standards of health, education and
transport –
Rise in indebtedness = need to increase raw material exports to
service debts
‘Adverse terms of trade’ got worse
Western investment only in things that suited the industrial world,
e.g. Ghana’s bauxite processing plant, American company used
Ghanian subsidised electricity to process Jamaican bauxite
Nkruma: ‘neo-colonialism’ – Western control of African economies
Former French colonies – tied to France by French franc zone –
financial stability for French investment, but kept African
economies tied to France and her needs (in raw materials)
French troops intervened to support their chosen regimes – Zaïre,
Gabon, Chad, Central African Republic
Prestigious investments, often on ‘expert advice’ –
E.g. Ghana’ Akosombo hydroelectric dam (long term, but shortterm neglect of cocoa industry, former mainstay) –
Urban elite dominate policy at expense of rural small-scale farmers
Zambia: ‘copper spoon in its mouth’ – relied on dominance of
copper production
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No attempt to diversify economy + (1970) nationalised copper
mines, to avoid neo-colonialism
Mines bought with foreign exchange reserves
1973 copper price collapse + international oil prices doubled twice
that year
Zambia in spiral of decline
Late-colonial commodity-price boom ended mid-1960s
Falling price of exports, as import prices rise – food shortages,
political instability
Authoritarian politicians lose credibility – military coups
The role of the military in African politics
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1960s: military takeover in most Francophone states (exc. Guinea,
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire) + Ghana and Nigeria (1966)
By 1970s regarded as normal political option
Military role, colonial period – (1) conquest; (2) internal use to
enforce taxation, suppress rebellion
Not needed for external role (except WW I)
Coup d’état therefore = continuity
Reaction against ineffective/unpopular/corrupt civilian regimes
Military initially welcomed, to clear up civilian mess
Nigeria exceptional: 1966: 2 coups amid ethnic distrust and
massacres led to ‘Biafra’ secession and civil war (1967-70)
After more coups, return to civilian government, 1979-83,
But corruption – excuse for return of military (1983) – until 1998.
Ghana: Nkrumah’s authoritarianism and economic problems –
coup 1966
Purge of Nkrumah’s party and supporters
Return to civilian rule 1969 – chronic economic problems: military
return 1972
Corruption and incompetence, Rawlings coup to purge the military
of corruption
Civilian rule 1979-81
31 Dec. 1981: Return of Rawlings – ‘people’s revolution’
Used authoritarianism to impose harsh economic restructuring, in
line with IMF demands
1979: overthrow of three brutal dictators: Amin of Uganda, Bokassa
of Central African Republic, and civilian Nguéma of Equatorial
Guinea
Socialism and self-reliance: the Tanzanian course
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Nyerere (‘Arusha Declaration’- 1967) pledged to chart new
direction, away from capitalist industrialisation
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To end ‘fattening of the elite’
Aim: self-reliant classless society: ‘African socialism’
Pre-colonial Africans practised ‘communalism’ in rural villages –
needed no lessons from Marx
Ujamaa ‘self-help’ villages set up for more effective co-operation
and provision of services
1970s to early 1980s: people persuaded and then forced to move
into villages – without proper consultation
Ill-judged imposition from above (1) provoked opposition and
resentment, (2) contradicted ‘self-help’ principle of ujamaa
Ultimately failed because Africans were not innate communalists as
Nyerere supposed
1980s: policy abandoned: Tanzania one of poorest countries,
But: national unity, high rates of literacy and basic public health –
More stable than prosperous neighbour Kenya
Those that achieved independence through armed struggle promised
‘socialism’
Algeria, state used oil wealth to build steel mill and provide
industrial base
Angola and Mozambique – attempts to build socialism undermined
by South African promotion of civil war
Zimbabwe: rhetoric different from reality
© Kevin Shillington, 2012