Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
The Parliamentary Bottleneck: External Audits in Malawi, Tanzania
and Uganda
Lise Rakner and Vibeke Wang
Draft prepared for the Norwegian Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting,
Trondheim 3-5 Jan. 2007.
The combined process of economic and political reforms that have influenced the ‘good
governance agenda’ of the international donor community since the early 1990s has strongly
emphasised economic accountability. As a result, sub-Saharan African countries have been
grappling with economic accountability to make sure that allocations from the public purse go
where they are supposed to and that spending complies with policy objectives. Central
institutions in this regard are the supreme audit institution (SAI) and parliament.1 The SAI is
the national body responsible for scrutinising public expenditure. Parliament is tasked with ex
post scrutiny of the SAIs audit findings to ensure that the national budget is implemented
fully, efficiently and effectively. The bulk of this work takes place in the parliamentary
committees. In countries modelled on the Westminster tradition of external auditing, the
legislature is the primary audience of the SAI. Legislatures become part of the audit cycle at
the oversight stage of the budget process and it is at this stage legislature-SAI interaction
occurs. Notwithstanding the fact that economic accountability demands a well-functioning
legislature-SAI relationship, the nexus between the two institutions in newly democratising
states has not been subject to extensive research. A central problem, in our view, is that the
literature on parliament and SAIs is largely separate and there is little focus on the interaction
between the two institutions. The ongoing national level poverty policy processes with a high
level of influence by international development partners have only enhanced the importance
of the interdependence of the legislature and SAI in many sub-Saharan African countries.
Still, aid assessments made only rarely take into account the relations between the SAI and
parliament, but instead focus on the individual institution in isolation. The result is two
literatures and two aid streams which by and large are disconnected.
This article lifts the veil on an important feature of today’s emerging democracies,
namely economic accountability and the linkages between the SAI and parliament by
undertaking an empirical analysis and comparison of the interplay between the SAIs and the
legislatures in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi.
1
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
The countries display a high degree of donor dependency and there are ongoing
poverty reduction strategy processes in all three countries. These processes provide the basis
for assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, debt relief under
Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative, and also largely guide the aid provided by the other
members of the international aid community (both multilaterals and bilaterals). The poverty
reduction strategy paper (PRSP) is intended to be a steering document for poverty reduction
and constitutes a point of departure for developing countries’ dialogue with development
partners. With a ‘home grown’ PRSP Uganda is the first African country to embark on a third
PRSP while Tanzania developed its second generation PRSP in 2005. Malawi, being a
relative latecomer, is still in the process of implementing its first PRSP. Much due to the
international trend towards a shift in aid modalities from project aid to various forms of
programme aid, and recently also general budget support economic accountability is high on
the three countries agenda. This entails a greater amount of aid being ‘on budget’ and thus
allocated in the national budget process.
Their system of governance also sets them apart. Uganda stands out with its no-party
National Resistance Movement (NRM) system which was formally transformed into a
multiparty system before the Feb. 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections. Both
Tanzania and Malawi introduced multiparty systems in the early 1990s, but so far no major
political shifts have taken place in Tanzania. The top-down transition was guided by the
ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the CCM has enjoyed an overwhelming
majority in parliament since the first multiparty elections in 1995. In contrast, the three
democratic elections in Malawi (1994, 1999, 2004) have not resulted in a dominant party
system. The United Democratic Front (UDF) defeated ‘president for life’ Hastings Banda and
the Malawian Congress Party in the first multiparty elections in 1994. While UDF retained
power in the two subsequent elections, the party has had to rely on support from the
opposition through various coalitions. This has necessitated negotiations with sections of the
opposition to facilitate the passing of legislation.
In our analysis of the legislature-SAI relationship in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda we
find that all of the countries struggle with basic issues of economic accountability that are
accentuated by weaknesses in the institutional bonds between the two institutions. 2 The
countries may be placed on a continuum according to their degree of institutionalisation of the
legislature-SAI relationship.
Malawi which is marked by institutional instability and
unwarranted donor influence is found in one end of the scale. Tanzania is in a middle
position. Relations are relatively well institutionalised, but mechanisms of accountability are
2
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
contested by the well entrenched hegemony of the ruling party CCM. Of the three countries
Uganda displays the most institutionalised system of economic accountability. However, in
the wake of the introduction of a multiparty system there are indications that the room for
dissenting views gradually has been curbed by the Museveni led NRM/NRM-O3 that has been
eager to confirm its position at the top of the political system.
In the first part of this article we succinctly review the literature available on African
parliaments and SAIs before outlining a conceptual framework for an analysis of the interplay
between the legislature and the SAI in the audit process. The article proceeds in the second
and main part to analyse this relationship in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi. Variables looked
into to assess this relationship are the support to the committee system, party discipline and
follow up of audit findings. The mandate, capacity and autonomy of the SAIs are also briefly
considered to illustrate the limitations placed on their operations.
Institutional Interdependence under the Westminster Model
The SAIs in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi are modelled on the Westminster system of
external auditing,4 which is cyclic in nature. The audit stages may be seen as interdependent
and for the audit to be successful each stage must function satisfactorily. First the government
accounts for the previous financial year are prepared by all government departments and
public bodies and made available on a prearranged time for the SAI to audit. The SAI audits
the accounts and produces its report(s) to parliament. The Westminster model is typically
marked by SAIs interactions with parliament. The SAI is a core element of parliamentary
oversight, and there are close relations between the SAI and the parliamentary committees. In
parliament the audit report is referred to the relevant parliamentary committees and they
examine and debate the SAI report and normally conduct public hearings. When finalised, a
report with recommendations and comments is handed over to the plenary, where it is debated
and voted on. In the event of approval the parliamentary report is conveyed to the executive.
In Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda the executive is required to respond to the parliamentary
report in the form of a treasury memorandum. If the executive decides not to address and act
upon a certain issue raised in the report this should be accounted for in the treasury
memorandum as well the measures taken to implement other committee recommendations.
Throughout, the process is to take place within certain timeframes. When delays or
complications occur at one stage, this will impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the
work at the remaining stages.
3
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
Part I: Auditing in Theory: The Role of Parliament and SAI
On the whole little research exists on parliament and SAIs in African countries, and
particularly there is a void with respect to the nexus between parliament and SAI. This can in
part be attributed to lack of interdisciplinary dialogue as the work relating to the two
institutions is dominated by scholars from different ‘camps’. Political scientists have
traditionally focused their attention on parliaments while economists, auditors and
accountants have been occupied with SAIs. This has reinforced an artificial divide and
contributed to largely separate bodies of literature. This dissuades perspectives explicitly
linking the work of the two institutions.
Supreme Audit Institutions
No large body of literature on SAIs exists and the approach to studying SAIs has generally
been very technical in nature and dominated by professionals in the field of audit. Current
debates encompass for instance trends within auditing and different auditing techniques. A
great deal of the literature originates from the International Organisation of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI) and international professional accountancy bodies and is westernbased. It should be noted, however, that there is an emerging literature on SAIs in Eastern and
Central European countries,5 and a few attempts have been made to study SAIs in developing
countries. The latter generally comes as a result of donor funded programmes and typically is
part of larger assessments of fiduciary risk.6
Only few authors draw on an institutional approach when studying SAIs and only
some of these specifically deal with relations between SAIs and parliamentary committees.7
What these institutionally centred authors have in common is the focus on independence as a
cornerstone to a successful audit institution.8 Independence relates to the constitutional and
legal status as well as the appointment and removal procedures. Dewar 9 also points to the
relationship to parliament (SAI should not be subject to parliamentary control on operational
matters); freedom from staffing controls and autonomy in budget and financial matters;
operational independence (access to necessary information); and finally, reporting freedoms.
These criteria are also included in Dye and Stapenhurst’s10 outline of conditions. They are
categorised into: supportive environment, clear mandate, independence, adequate funding,
facilities and staff, and sharing of knowledge and experience. Others use INTOSAI’s 1977
Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts as a point of departure. This has become
an internationally accepted standard which SAIs generally employ as it contains a
4
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
comprehensive list of all goals and issues relating to government auditing. Franz Fiedler,11
secretary general of INTOSAI distinguishes organisational independence (relates to
Constitutional mandate, removal and appointment procedures, human resources), functional
independence (freedom from constraints and/or third party conditions in its activity) and,
financial independence. Wojciechowski12 applies the same categorisation but adds operational
independence (the SAI should enjoy a high degree of autonomy and freedom of initiative) to
the list. Although the wording and categories used may be different, the literature largely
highlights the same factors as conducive for successful audit institutions.
Parliament
A substantial volume of literature exists on the role of legislatures in established Western
democracies and the US13 but there are comparatively fewer studies on African parliaments,
this pertains to both theoretical and in-depth empirical studies. There are, however, a few
notable exceptions. The literature on African parliaments may roughly be divided into
independence, post-independence and ‘third wave’ literature. 14 The independence literature
was mostly concentrated on the weaknesses of the legislatures in policy and lawmaking. A
few of the studies, however, also referred to alternative functions of the legislature. 15 In the
post-independence period generally little attention was paid to the role of legislatures 16 partly
reflecting the 1970s ‘modernisation school of development’ thesis claiming that a government
unrestrained by a strong legislature is necessary for development in developing countries,17
and/or the view that parliament operating within the confines of a single-party state plays a
largely insignificant role. As the third wave of democratisation swept the African continent in
the 1990s scholars drew attention to the conceptual framework of accountability 18 and a
revitalised interest in African parliaments emerged. There was a gradual acceptance of the
role of the legislature in holding the executive to account, also in the South. One of the
outcomes was a growing focus on African parliaments by academia as well as development
partners. Due to the latter an increasing number of commissioned studies in which the role of
the legislatures also is assessed as part of the overall framework of governance has
materialised in addition to a small body of scholarly literature.19
It has been observed that the most common comparative statements about legislatures
have been made in relation to the importance of the legislature in the policy-making process,20
relative to the importance of the executive. 21 Consistent with our focus on the interaction
between SAIs and parliament, considerable scholarly attention has more recently been paid to
parliamentary committees and a growth of the centrality of committees as a global
5
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
phenomenon has been noted.22 Strong committees must be valued to be at least a necessary
condition for effective parliamentary influence in the policy-making process. However
whether they are sufficient is not as evident.23 The implication is that the more specialised a
legislature is, i.e. the more elaborate its committee system, the greater viscosity it has.24 This
also will impact on its ability to fulfil its role in the audit cycle. There is a strong link between
committees and political parties.25 The prevailing assumption is that the more important the
parties are, the less important the committees and vice versa.26 The same logic applies to the
degree of party discipline imposed and the frequency with which the legislature constrains the
government. This is irrespective of how large majority the governing party has in the
legislature.27
A common denominator cutting across the different theoretical strands outlined above
is a predominant focus on the West. As SAIs and parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa to a large
extent are faced with context specific challenges it is necessary to review the theoretical
perspectives in light of this and avoid uncritically applying them in a developing country
context. We find that this particularly has proven to be a challenge with regard to the
standards against which SAIs are evaluated. Moreover these are two rather separate traditions
dominated by scholars largely originating from different disciplines. This in turn may partly
explain the lack of interdisciplinary collaboration and inadequate focus on legislature-SAI
interaction.
Why and When Do Audits Succeed?
The interplay between the SAIs and parliaments in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda in the audit
cycle will be analysed on the basis of what may be termed the SAIs relational resources.
Partakers playing into the audit cycle are parliament, development partners, civil society
organisations, other special institutions of constraint, and the media. Notwithstanding the
importance of these actors the SAI particularly relies on parliament to be its primary audience.
While our main focus is the relational and dynamic aspects affecting the performance of the
SAI and parliament, the general conditions under which the SAIs operate will first be
illustrated by briefly looking at their mandate, capacity, and autonomy. 28 This is to display
the basic limitations influencing their institutional capabilities. A SAI’s mandate refers to its
formal independence as laid down in the legal framework such as the constitution, laws, and
regulations. The nature of the SAI mandate involves who it itself is accountable to and reports
to. It is also composed of other aspects e.g. scope of responsibilities. The capacity of a SAI
depends on its financial and operational independence. Of relevance in this regard are the
6
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
organisational resources (human resources and organisational structure), finance (resources at
its disposal/overall scale of funding), and infrastructure (access to computers, offices, training
etc.). A SAI’s autonomy points to the extent to which it is able to carry out its mandate
without any interference. Critical factors include appointment, tenure, independent sources of
funding, and access to information.
There is no definite ‘best practice’ with respect to all of the factors listed. Tenure
arrangements, for instance inevitably face a trade-off between independence, continuity, and
the need to ‘guard the guardians’. In principle appointments ‘for life’ provides the best
security of tenure. However, a problem may occur if the person in office turns out not to be of
a high moral standard and integrity. Serving on contracts may act as a safeguard against this.
But this model may create a window of opportunity for the executive to exert undue
influence, especially at the time of renewal of the contract. In this perspective a single, nonrenewable term is favourable.
The Capability of Supreme Audit Institutions to Check Public Finance
Overall, it may be argued that there are weaknesses in the SAIs’ mandate in Tanzania and
Uganda. Executive dominance is a particular threat in the reporting procedures in Tanzania as
it reports to parliament through the ministry of finance whilst the Uganda and Malawi SAI
reports directly to parliament. In Malawi and Tanzania the de jure framework allows for
comprehensive audits. New legislation has increased the scope of auditing and reduced the
level of expenditure outside the mandate of the SAIs in all three countries. However, the large
amount of expenditure labelled ‘classified’ and kept outside the jurisdiction of the SAI is a
concern in Uganda. Audits have until recently not covered state house, the president’s office
and the ministry of defence which traditionally receive a significant amount of supplementary
funds throughout the year.29
For all three countries, the scale of funding is inadequate and serves as a constraint on
their capacity. 30 Furthermore infrastructure and human resources are a problem. On a
comparative scale, Malawi has made less progress in ensuring that the staff receives formal
training in accountancy than in neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda.31 The challenges facing
the SAIs are exacerbated by the introduction of an integrated financial management system
(IFMS) in government, a multiplication of auditees and performance audits in all three
countries. IFMS capacity building has been centred on government ministries and SAIs have
been sidelined, illustrating that some of the initiative within the general framework of poverty
reduction strategy programmes have largely ignored the SAIs and thus contributed to
7
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
marginalise them. Overall, however, the Uganda SAI has better basic facilities than the
Malawi and Tanzania SAIs. 32 Significantly also, the SAIs’ workload has been steadily
augmented in the wake of local government reforms and a restructuring of the financial
framework. This has added the responsibility of auditing statutory corporations and local
authorities. In accordance with the international trend in auditing, a new type of audit,
performance audit, was included in the offices’ responsibility in 2003 (Malawi), 2001
(Tanzania) and as early as in 1995 (Uganda). Development partners generally have endorsed
this development as it is in agreement with international standards of auditing. Performance
audits represent quite a different approach to audit than the traditional types such as financial
and compliance audits and are cost demanding since time and resources must be invested in
training and building of competence. Performance audits were not taken into account when
the institutional structure was established in any of the countries. At the moment the three
countries’ audit systems do neither have the necessary expertise nor the financial resources to
carry out adequate performance audits. This leads us to question the rationale behind
introducing performance audits in countries struggling to carry out the basic types of audit.
SAI autonomy is compromised in all three countries by appointment procedures,
insecurity of tenure, insufficient budgets, and access to relevant and timely information. The
president appoints the AG posing a challenge to his independence. Grounds for removal of the
AG also leave ample room for exercise of presidential discretion.33 In Malawi and Uganda the
AG serves on 5 year contracts which can be renewed once,34 while in Tanzania the AG serves
until reaching retirement age. In all countries we note that an insufficient budget forces the
AG to spend time lobbying donors and the ministry of finance for money. 35 This also makes
them susceptible to the informal sphere of politics, putting at risk the independence of the
office as well as the AGs personal integrity. The autonomy of the SAI is further indicated by
whether it has access to the relevant information—and on time. The quality of internal audit
within spending units is, however, weak in all three countries. It adds to the workload of the
SAIs and diminishes the effect of external audits. Despite improvements, especially in
Uganda and Tanzania, the statutory national financial reporting deadline is repeatedly not met
by a number of units, further constraining and delaying the work of the SAIs. This diminishes
the practical relevance of the audit report in the budget and financial management process.
While Uganda 36 is nearly up to date with most of its reports, and Tanzania 37 has made
significant progress, the Malawi SAI was a year behind in reporting to parliament in 2003.38
This short sketch of the institutional capabilities of the SAIs in Malawi, Tanzania and
Uganda indicates that there are significant shortcomings both in terms of the mandate,
8
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
capacity and autonomy of the audit institutions. The Malawi SAI lags behind both Uganda
and Tanzania in terms of ensuring that its’ staff receives formal training enabling them to
complete the audit plan, while the Uganda SAI has better basic facilities than the Malawi and
Tanzania SAIs. Overall the capacity problems appear far grater in Malawi than in Tanzania
and Uganda. The Uganda SAI have come the furthest in terms of sticking to the critical
deadlines. Context specific issues such as the external presence of donors play into and
complicate the situation in all countries. Adding the responsibility of conducting performance
audits to the SAIs responsibilities could be seen as overly ambitious. At the moment it just
seems to widen the gap between the de jure and de facto framework of audits in all three
countries.
Against this backdrop of limited institutional capabilities the inter-linkages between
the SAI and parliament will be explored.
Part II: The Impact of SAIs: Interactions with Parliament
Economic accountability under the Westminster model of auditing ultimately relies on a good
working relationship between the SAI and the legislature. The legislature should hold
government agencies accountable and take appropriate action when presented with the SAIs
findings – unless audit findings are followed up and acted upon the problems will persist.
Accordingly the legislature must be diligent in its effort to ensure that the government
implements its recommendations or at least explains why changes have not taken place. An
actively engaged and knowledgeable national assembly is thus required for the system to
function properly. Parliamentary scrutiny of audit opinions and reports takes place in the
committees. Each of the case study countries has a public accounts committee (PAC) to
scrutinise audit reports on government ministries and departments and separate committees
have been assigned the task of dealing with the audit reports on local government accounts.
Uganda is the only country in which a special committee examines the audited accounts of
publicly owned companies. All of the committees are according to the legal framework
empowered to summon officials to stand before them (conduct hearings) and all of them
exercise their right to do so. Nonetheless there are considerable differences in the way they
are functioning. In the following we will assess the legislature-SAI relationship by looking at
the support to the committee system, party discipline and follow up of audit findings.
9
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
The relative strength of the legislatures in acting upon SAI reports
The PAC of the Uganda parliament is renown for its vigorousness. It has summoned various
departmental accounting officers and ministers to stand before it and has on occasions even
locked accounting officers up in the parliamentary cell for showing contempt of the
committee. 39 The local authorities’ accounts committee (LAAC) 40 and the committee on
parastatals have been less effective and visible in their work. This is partly explained by the
fact that these are recent establishments being formed when the 7th parliament (2001-2006)
was inaugurated.
In parallel to the Uganda PAC the Tanzania PAC has been complimented for its will
to act, perhaps increasingly so under the leadership of Hamad Rashid Mohamed (Civic United
Front). The LAAC is less high profile than the PAC but both committees commonly call
people to stand before them. The committees have gained a modicum of strength in matters of
oversight 41 On a more negative note there are several mechanisms constraining the
committees’ oversight function. The director of a parliamentary technical support program
comments that, ‘Due to the strong history of one-party rule and the strong one-party
system…….. MPs are not sure of their own role and are not sure of how far they can push.
They are aware but not of the scope and breath of oversight’.42
The Malawi PAC is not as highly profiled as its Tanzania and Uganda counterparts. It
meets infrequently and on an irregular basis, limiting its activity. Its lack of vigour is also
related to the fact that five years ago there was no functioning committee system in the
Malawi national assembly, in practice meaning that the legislature was unable to perform any
oversight function on the executive. Despite unfavourable working conditions, the Malawi
PAC has examined cases of top-level corruption. However, indicating the level of executive
dominance, the committee chair (from the opposition party Malawi Congress Party) was fired,
allegedly because of ‘treading on sensitive ground’.43 This particular case clearly points to
diffusion rather than separation of the branches of power of government in Malawi.
Comparing the support to the committee system
Without the necessary technical backing, funding and human resources parliament’s oversight
function is diminished. This negatively affects their ability to work with the SAI and their
impact on the audit cycle. The technical assistance provided to the Uganda committees has
recently been improved as a parliamentary budget office was established in 2001 to provide
assistance to the MPs in budget related work and there is also a research department. Still
there is a considerable backlog in the three committees dealing with the SAI reports. 44 In July
10
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
2004 the PAC examined the 2001/2002 report and the LAAC was still working on the report
for 2000/2001.45 The committee on parastatals was looking at the SAI reports on the Uganda
Revenue Authority from 1998/1999/2000.
46
This delay considerably constrains the
effectiveness of external audit. Some of the ineffectiveness in the handling of reports is still
due to lack of research assistance and other necessary facilities such as office space. 47
Committee members may constitute informed members by virtue of their parliamentary
experience and/or their professional background. The turnover of MPs was high from the 6th
to the 7th Parliament and has limited the building of institutional memory and thus expertise.48
PAC members have received some training while members of the parastatals committee have
not. Its workload is considerable and few of the committee members have relevant
backgrounds. 49 On the other hand it is a strength that the membership of the standing
committees lasts for the entire tenure of parliament. All the same few MPs examine the SAI
report. A PAC member avers that ‘When the report is debated most have lost or forgotten it if
you know what I am saying’.50
In Tanzania the relevant committees like the PAC and the LAAC seem to do less well
than the oversight committees in Uganda, particularly in terms of technical assistance. The
Tanzanian committees also have inadequate human and financial resources 51 to the extent that
they are unable to carry out proper oversight.52 The auditor general has on several occasions
referred to this as a problem. 53 Few of the MPs serving on the committees have the
professional backgrounds and skills required to scrutinise the SAI reports and their expertise
is further weakened by the arrangement whereby committee membership only lasts for 2 1/2
years.54 The parliamentarians also suffer from a basic lack of researched information. The
MPs do not have adequate working tools – they lack clerks, offices and access to computers.
The research unit is understaffed and at the Bunge office in Dar es Salaam where most of the
MPs do their research there is not even computers with Internet access at the MPs disposal.
This clearly impedes the work of the PAC and the LAAC. The meetings of the committees are
often held in the two weeks before a parliamentary session starts and take place in Dar es
Salaam which situated on the coast. This is where most ministries are found. The sessions,
however, are held at the Bunge building in Dodoma, located at the centre of mainland
Tanzania and a six-hour road journey from Dar es Salaam. Due to this the MPs spend much of
their time commuting between Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and their constituencies.
The Malawi PAC suffers from the same shortcomings as the oversight committees in
Uganda and Tanzania, but is even more constrained by resource deficits. Government funding
of parliament only covers plenary work resulting in a situation where the committee system is
11
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
sustained by donor funding. The result is a donor directed committee system where only the
committees receiving funding meet. 55 The speaker of parliament lamented that ‘most
parliamentary committees are failing to meet. Donors cherry pick which ones to fund and they
all pick the same ones.’56 PAC is one of the privileged committees and is reported to meet
every month. While this benefits the oversight function of parliament in the audit cycle it at
the same time confuses the patterns of accountability. Who is the PAC really accountable to?
The tenure of MPs on committees does not necessarily last for the entire term of the
legislature as political parties want to maintain tight control over their members and therefore
is not willing to grant the parliamentarians this security and confidence. Despite a certain
upgrading of parliamentary facilities and support functions since 1999, the 17 committees
only have two researchers and four clerks to assist them and no computer or internet facilities.
They also lack meeting rooms.57 In practice this means that the research assistance available is
provided by donors. Coupled with weak capacity of MPs to understand the SAI reports, the
oversight function of the PAC is significantly hampered.
The effects of party discipline on the accountability function of parliament
The mechanisms of sanction at the committees’ disposal are of prime importance for
parliament’s ability to follow up on audit findings and monitor the implementation of
committee recommendations. The ‘party’ groups of the ruling ‘parties’ in Uganda, Tanzania
and Malawi exercise considerable control over their respective parliamentarians.
Uganda’s ‘no-party system’ of politics meant that there were no official party groups
in parliament in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments but there were a number
of caucuses such as the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum, the Young Parliamentarians
Association, and the Acholi, Teso and Lango parliamentary groups that have voiced criticism
against the government.58 Not least there was a very active Movement caucus which at times
was hard to distinguish from a parliamentary party caucus59 as it was active and successful in
disciplining and gathering support when important and prestigious legislation is about to be
voted over in parliament.60 Irrespective of the coalition formation and lobbying going on in
parliament, there was in general little suspense attached to the outcome of issues considered
important to the executive since the Movementists largely outnumbered the opposition in
parliament. One of the members of the LAAC asserts, ‘You are perhaps open minded in the
caucus, but when an issue has been decided here you have to abide.’61 An effective way of
silencing critical MPs has been to co-opt them into the government. 62 The Movement is
known to be selective in its sponsoring of candidates and expects loyalty in return for
12
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
electoral support.63 These are all factors that constrained the Uganda oversight committees in
their work and induced strong Movement discipline. The following statement made by a
Ugandan MP is revealing of the state of affairs, ‘In relation to voting there is a lot of
manipulation going on. You vote to show that you belong and that you support. People
compete to be recognised in the system so most people are not independent minded’. This
obviously impacts negatively on the oversight function of parliament. There is a noticeable
difference between the 6th and 7th Parliaments in this regard. The latter made fewer efforts to
curb the executive.64 Suggested explanations of are that the MPs were protecting access to
future patronage and also a general change in the atmosphere in parliament as the 2006
elections drew near.65
In Tanzania the parliamentary standing orders stipulate that the chairs of the PAC and
the LAAC should be from the opposition. Ensuring a sufficient number of opposition
members within these committees have proved difficult and in July 2004 only the PAC was
chaired by an opposition MP. 66 The CCM party group organisation is considerably more
institutionalised and advanced than that of the opposition. The whip system and the CCM
party caucus have become forceful organs of making the CCM MPs toe the party line. A
senior CCM MP sums up the quandary the MPs face in a nice way:
Toeing the party line is very important. You would not go against it because
you are also serving the party. This is very detrimental to parliamentary
oversight. You can see that this is wrong but what can you do?67
The president has on several occasions made it clear in meetings of the CCM party caucus
that MPs opposing particular pieces of legislation in parliament will not be able to stand for
re-election and according to Tanzanian electoral law you cannot cross the floor in
parliament.68 This provides the parties with an effective disciplinary mechanism. Expulsion
from the party in practice means that you have to resign your parliamentary seat. Since there
is a lot at stake for an MP in such a situation, the incentive for acting according to party
discipline is strong. Illustrative of the situation, a former PAC member simply states ‘In
Tanzania you have separation of powers when it seems to serve the government’s powers and
only then’.69 The MPs from the ruling party is not expected to query party policy, at least not
when it has been introduced in the plenary. The speaker of parliament Pius Msekwa 70 when
discussing the party discipline in the Tanzanian parliament is crystal clear in his statements,
claiming that ‘It is a moral obligation for them [the majority ruling party members of
parliament] to support the government of their party on the floor of the House.’ In this way he
underscores the lack of checks and balances in a system where the CCM held nearly 88 per
13
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
cent of the seats in parliament after the 2000 general elections, and about 85% after the 2005
elections.71
In contrast to Uganda and Tanzania there are shifting coalitions in Malawi and no
dominant party. This has, however, proved to be a strong breeding ground for executive
dominance as every vote counts for the government – in fact one vote could be decisive for its
ability to rule. This has reinforced a system of patronage and a number of the MPs claim that
they are unable to deliberate freely in the House and they perceive the party caucuses as a
means for the parties to enforce their views on them.72 This is confirmed by our interviews
with Malawian MPs who felt precluded from articulating national interests due to party
loyalty. The Public Affairs Committee, a Malawi NGO focused on civic affairs, in relation to
this comments that:
The UDF and Aford continue to harass and intimidate MPs who are not in
favour of third term Constitutional Amendment. …we are convinced that one
major strategy the ruling party has embarked on is to perpetuate harassment
and intimidation among those people who wisely reject the third term bid….73
It is reasonable to believe that not abiding by the party line could have severe
consequences.74 The MPs refer to extreme reactions such as party expulsion or demotion to
insignificant positions. 75 The coalitions between the United Democratic Front and the
opposition have also strengthened the hand of the executive. Interviews with MPs revealed
that both for MPs from the government party and the opposition there were repercussions for
speaking up against the government as they risked reductions in developing funds to
constituencies with ‘critical MPs’.
Follow up of audit findings
In Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda lack of follow up of audit findings poses a serious problem
and threatens the integrity of the audit cycle. The Uganda oversight committees face many of
the same problems identified in Malawi and Tanzania but possibly to a lesser extent.
Particularly the Uganda PAC has been able to better exploit the opportunities the committee
has to hold the executive accountable. An explanation is that there is considerable openness of
committee proceedings as opposed to in Tanzania. In Uganda PAC sessions are open to the
press and officials from the SAI, the accountant generals office, and the criminal investigation
department. The latter is invited because, in the words of the committee chair ‘we would like
to include prima facie cases in the event of embezzlement of funds to ensure prosecution’.76
This has ensured a quick response and that action is taken in cases of outright fraud. While the
14
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
PAC has been reasonably effective in this regard the LAAC has a less impressive track
record. The committee has held some hearings and chief administrative officers have been
taken to court as a result, but the committee had by mid-2004 not presented a single report in
the plenary. Allegedly because the speaker had been unable to allocate time to discuss it.77
The PAC does not have the same backlog of accounts as the LAAC and the committee on
parastatals, but insufficient time has been allocated to discuss its reports in parliament,
seriously weakening its scrutiny work.78
The available disciplinary measures are inadequate. The treasury memorandums are
not on time and cannot be when the committee reports are delayed. As a rule they are not
made use of by any of the committees. The LAAC had not yet received a treasury
memorandum in July 2004 due to the fact that it had not presented a report to parliament. The
committee on parastatals does not pay much attention to them (if it receives them at all) – as a
prominent member of the committee reveals ‘I do not think we receive the treasury
memorandums. To me I do not see the way we follow up. This one is missing’. 79 The PAC at
least receives the treasury memorandums but does not have the time to examine them.80
The Tanzania PAC is hampered in its work by lack a lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms and disciplinary measures for non-compliance. 81 The committees have the
possibility to go deeper into issues in the audit reports by means of establishing select or
probe committees to conduct inquiries. However, this entails a rather elaborate procedure. A
private member motion has to be moved and the motions are frequently turned down. Part of
the reason is lack of funding but the interests of the ruling party are also of relevance, ‘the
party has to agree to the private member motion to establish such a committee. You must
think about whether it will be detrimental to the government. The ruling party will often not
accept…For the opposition there is no point in introducing private member motions – it will
not go through anyway’. 82 There are few incentives on the executive to act in accordance
with PAC recommendations.83 The committee meetings takes place ‘in camera’ which is in
contravention of internationally acceptable standards since it diminishes transparency and
possibly also the effect of audit findings.
In conformity with the committees in Uganda there is also a substantial problem on the
follow up side in Tanzania. Already in 2002 it was pointed out that the Paymaster General
lacks authority.84 He is at the same level as other Ministries’ chief accounting officers, and
has not been adequately empowered to ensure that they implement the changes recommended
by the PAC and the LAAC.85 Changes are now underway to rectify this problem.86 With the
finalisation of the penalties and surcharges regulations towards the end of 2005 new
15
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
regulations for the sanctioning of civil servants for financial mismanagement will be in
place.87 The executive’s reporting back to parliament in the form of treasury memoranda is
another weak area.88 Most of the MPs referred to the scrutiny of the SAI report as practically
the only way to check on the implementation of committee recommendations. It is also a
considerable concern that five PAC reports, including two special reports from 2004 have not
been debated by parliament. Accordingly the reports cannot be acted upon.89 The audit cycle
is in this way stalled and financial accountability is undermined.
The story is by and large repeated in Malawi. Controlling officers are reported to
‘rarely bother to provide replies to the findings of the auditor general’s office’ and PAC
recommendations. 90 Overall the auditees’ effort to comply with recommendations and
required action is at best unreliable. According to members of the PAC, the main weakness is
that the system provides few openings for sanctioning controlling officers. So far instances of
disciplinary measures taken on permanent secretaries (controlling officers) are non-existent.
Habitually, defaulting officers are moved to other ministries with no other legal actions. Since
the committee does not itself effect sanctions, its recommendations can easily be ignored by
those empowered to take such action. The MPs incentive to pressure and follow up on
government action or inaction is also limited. Committee members interviewed complained
that increased committee activity (resulting from donor finances) kept them away from their
constituencies and that the oversight function of the office was in direct conflict with the
direct (vertical) accountability function vis-à-vis the constituencies.91 Treasury memorandums
are rarely received by the committee and even if these had been produced lack of capacity,
time and incentives on the part of the MPs to examine them would most likely render them
unimportant. At the moment what exist of follow up on enforcement of PAC advice takes
place when a new audit report is scrutinised.
Although non-compliance to SAI recommendations may be included in the coming
SAI report waiting a whole year contributes to considerable delays and less effective follow
up in all three countries. The outcome is that enforcement ultimately depends on the will of
the executive to take action which is hardly a recipe for success.
In sum we have found that particularly the Uganda PAC but also the Tanzania PAC
has gained a modicum of strength in acting upon the SAI reports. The Malawi PAC is less
active than its Tanzania and Uganda counterparts. The committee performance is in part
explained by the support to the committee system. The Malawi committees’ are more
constrained by resource deficits than the committees in the other two countries and is marked
by exceedingly undue donor influence. The relevant Ugandan committees seem to do the best
16
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
in terms of technical assistance and funding while the Tanzanian committees take a middle
position. While we find that the parliaments increasingly show commitment to the oversight
process serious problems exist on the follow up side. Despite their different systems of
governance a common denominator is that executive dominance, party discipline and weak
opposition parties to various degrees constrain the accountability function of parliament in all
three countries and thus its ability to effectively work together with the SAI and fulfil its role
in the audit cycle. There are numerous instances of audit findings that never have been acted
upon in the three countries. As one of the directors of audit in Uganda readily admitted ‘I
would say that about 30-40 per cent of the process is cosmetic. The net cannot catch the big
fish because of the positions they are in’.92
Concluding Remarks
Overall, our analysis shows that the nexus between the SAI and parliament play into and
hamper the economic accountability performance in all three countries. Our findings suggest
an informal ‘ranking’, in which the Uganda SAI and parliament, in tandem, performs slightly
better than its Tanzanian counterparts, with Malawi lagging behind.
When assessing the interaction between the SAI and the legislature we find that
although the Uganda PAC and to some extent the Tanzania PAC have displayed some degree
of independence in the scrutiny of audit reports, the real weakness in the audit cycle is to be
found in the area of follow up. The same problems are repeated in the audit reports year after
year underscoring the limits of enforcement mechanisms and lack of incentives to impose
sanctions, partly rendering the audit process a cosmetic exercise. This is reflective of the
general tenor of legislature-executive relations in the three countries. The Malawi system of
governance displays lack of institutionalisation and is largely donor driven. The national
assembly has been seen as a rubber stamp of the executive’s decisions and there is little
distinction between the government and the incumbent party UDF. 93 Weak party identities
and lack of ideological differences between parties have only increased executive
dominance.94 In Tanzania relative institutional stability is challenged by the long standing
CCM reign which permeates all branches of the political system from top to bottom. The
Tanzanian executive is commonly held to experience little pressure from parliament. 95 The
party discipline is so strong that it negatively affects parliament’s ability to hold the executive
accountable. 96 Of the three countries Uganda has commonly been held to have the most
institutionalised system of checks and balances. Our findings to some extent confirm this
17
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
view. In the 6th parliament there was accept for dissent. A vocal parliament flexed its muscles
on several occasions – even in relation to a few controversial cases. Since 2001, however, a
shift towards a more executive driven system has been witnessed. With the change to a
multiparty system there is growing uncertainty as to how the system will develop in the
future. The 7th parliament was more subdued than its predecessor. In light of this development
and the recent 2006 parliamentary and presidential elections, it seems reasonable to expect the
8th parliament to carry on the trends of the 7th parliament. The Ugandan oversight institutions
and functions were established within the Movement system, where presumably ‘everyone
agreed on the basic principles’. Now moving to a competitive and more conflictual political
situation the government commitment to the oversight institutions is clearly challenged.
1
Representative assemblies are designated by various names. Here the concepts of parliament, legislature and
national assembly will be used interchangeably and as synonyms with the legislative branch of government.
2
The analysis utilises a comparative, qualitative case study approach and its findings are based on four different
sources: Key informant interviews, government documents, reports and academic literature. Fieldwork for this
article was conducted in Tanzania and Uganda in June/July 2004 and in Malawi during the first half of 2004.
Key informant interviews were carried out with policy makers, representatives from the private sector, the
Government, civil society, and the donor community. In Tanzania 31 interviews were carried out while the
number was 34 and 35 in Uganda and Malawi respectively. In Malawi the number also includes focus group
discussions. Numerous people helped us during these visits. Deserving of special mention are Donna BugbySmith, Martin Wilcox and Carl Åke Gerdén.
3
‘NRM-O’ refers to the political party National Resistance Movement Organisation which was formally
registered on 31 Sept. 2003. It was the first party to register in front of the Feb. 2006 parliamentary and
presidential elections.
4
Public external audits are commonly divided into three main types: the Judicial, the Board and the
Westminster. For a more detailed outline of these models, see, DFID, ‘Characteristics of different external audit
systems’, DFID Briefing Paper. Policy Division Info Series (2004).
5
Most of this literature is a result of the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central
and Eastern European Countries (SIGMA) which is a joint initiative of the EU and OECD. See, for instance, J.
Mazur and B. Vella ‘Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees’, report
prepared by SAIs of the Central and Eastern European Countries, Cyprus, Malta and the European Court of
Auditors (Limassol: SIGMA, 2001); SIGMA ‘Achieving High Quality in the Work of Supreme Audit
Institutions’, Sigma paper no. 34 (OECD and the EU, 2004).
6
With the growth of direct budget support assessments of the effectiveness of the central government systems
and systems of accountability outside the executive such as those of the SAI and parliament have become
common. See, for instance the DFID practice on this, DFID ‘Managing Fiduciary Risk when providing Poverty
Reduction Budget Support’, DFID How to note, Policy Division Info Series (2004).
7
See, J. Mazur and B. Vella ‘Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees’,
report prepared by SAIs of the Central and Eastern European Countries, Cyprus, Malta and the European Court
of Auditors (Limassol: SIGMA, 2001); J. Whener ‘Best Practice of Public Accounts Committees’ paper for the
Handbook for Public Accounts Committees commissioned by the Association of Public Accounts Committees
(APAC) in South Africa (2002), www.internationalbudget.org/auditorgeneral.htm; SIGMA ‘Relations Between
Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees’, SIGMA paper no. 33 (OECD and the European
Union, 2002);D.G. McGee, The Overseers: Public Accounts Committees and Public Spending. (London:
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and Pluto Press, 2002); W. Krafchik, ‘What Role can Civil Society
and Parliament Play in Strengthening the External Auditing Function?’, paper presented at the World Bank
Institute workshop, Towards Auditing Effectiveness, Ethiopia (12-15 May 2003),
www.internationalbudget.org/auditorgeneral.htm; V. Wang and L. Rakner, ‘The Accountability Function of
Supreme Audit Institutions in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania’, CMI Report No. 4 (Bergen: CMI, 2005).
8
See, for instance, D. Dewar, ‘Independence of State Audit’, International Journal of Government Auditing,
15/3 (1998), 10-12, 20; R. Stapenhurst and J. Titsworth. ‘Features and functions of supreme audit institutions’,
PREMnotes 59 (The World Bank 2001); K. M. Dye and R. Stapenhurst, Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of
18
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption, (The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank,
1998).
9
Dewar, ‘Independence of State Audit’.
10
Dye and Stapenhurst, Pillars of Integrity.
11
F. Fiedler, The Independence of the Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI, 2003).
12
Janusz Wojciechowski, Recommendations concerning the Functioning of Supreme Audit Institutions in the
Context of European Integration (The Polish Supreme Chamber of Control, 1999).
13
Note, however, the growing literature on Eastern and Central Europe. See, for instance, A. Ágh (ed.), The
Emergence of East Central European Parliaments: The First Steps (Budapest: Hungarian Centre of Democracy
Studies Foundation, 1994); T. F. Remington, Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the
Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Canada: Harper Collins, 1995); D. M. Olson and P. Norton (eds.), The New
Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass 1996); A. Ágh and G .Ilonszki, Parliaments
and Organised Interests: The Second Steps (Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 1996); J. M.
Ostrow, Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures. A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 2000); D. M. Olson and W. E. Crowther (eds.), Committees in Post-Communist
Democratic Parliaments. Comparative Institutionalization (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2003).
14
This division draws on an article by L. Nijzink, S. Mozaffar and E. Azevedo, ‘Parliaments and the
Enhancement of Democracy on the African Continent: An Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Public
perceptions’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 12/3-4 (2006), pp. 311-335.
15
This literature includes the work of e.g. R. A. Packenham ‘Legislatures and political development’, in A.
Kornberg and L. Musolf (eds.) Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham: Duke University Press
1970) pp. 521-82; M. Mezey, ‘The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World’ in G. Loewenberg, S. C.
Patterson and M. E. Jewell (eds.) Handbook of Legislative Research (England: Harvard University Press) pp.
733-772.
16
See, however, R. F. Hopkins, ‘The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania’, American Political Science Review LXIV
(1970) pp. 754-771; R. F. Hopkins, ‘Political Roles in a New State’, (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1971), J. Barkan, ‘Bringing Home the Pork: Legislator Behavior. Rural Development, and Political
Change in East Africa’, in J. Smith and L. D. Musolf (eds.), Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change
in New and Old States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979) pp. 125-54; H. Kjekshus, ‘The Question Hour in
Tanzania’s Bunge’, The African Review 2/3 (1972) pp. 351-79; H. Kjekshus, ‘Perspectives on the Second
Parliament, 1965-70’, in The Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania
Publishing House, 1974) pp.60-95; H. Kjekshus, ‘Parliament in a One-Party State – The Bunge of Tanzania,
1965-70’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 12/1 (1974), pp. 19-43.
17
See, R. A. Packenham ‘Legislatures and political development’, p. 82. In short the essence of this thesis is that
a vigorous executive not held back by a relatively strong parliament will act on behalf of the wider community
and make decisions favourable to economic development while an influential parliament is seen as a potential
obstacle for executive decision-making and, hence, development.
18
G. O’Donnell ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 5/1 (1994), pp. 55-69; R. Sklar
‘Developmental Democracy’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29/4 (1987), pp. 686-714; G.
O’Donnell ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner
(eds.), The Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne Rienner), pp.
29-51; R. Sklar ‘Democracy and Constitutionalism’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.), The
Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne Rienner), pp. 53-58; P.
C. Schmitter ‘The Limits of Horizontal Accountability’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.),
The Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne Rienner), pp. 59-62;
A. Schedler ‘Conceptualising Accountability’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.), The SelfRestraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne Rienner) pp.13-28; M. F.
Plattner ‘Traditions of Accountability’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.), The SelfRestraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne Rienner) pp. 63-67.
19
A selection of this literature is: M. A. M. Salih (ed.) African Parliaments. Between Governance and
Government (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); P. Burnell ‘Financial Indiscipline in Zambia’s Third
Republic: The Role of Parliamentary Scrutiny’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 7/3 (2001), pp. 34-64; P.
Burnell ‘Parliamentary Committees in Zambia’s Third Republic: Partial Reforms; Unfinished Agenda’ Journal
of Southern African Studies, 28/2 (2002), pp. 291-313; P. Burnell ‘Legislative-Executive Relations in Zambia:
Parliamentary Reform on the Agenda’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21/1 (2003), pp. 47-68; N.
Kasfir and S. H. Twebaze ‘The Limits of Institutionalization of a Legislature without Parties: The Ugandan
Parliament’, Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington D.C., 2005; R.
Nakamura and J. Johnson, ‘Rising Legislative Assertiveness in Uganda and Kenya 1996-2002’, Paper prepared
for delivery at the 19th International Political Science Association World Congress, Durban South Africa, 2003;
19
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
N. Patel and A. Tostensen, ‘Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004’, CMI Working Paper WP
10 (Bergen: CMI, 2006); I. Amundsen, C. Abreu and L. Hoygaard, ‘Accountability on the Move: The Parliament
of Angola’, CMI Working Paper WP 11 (Bergen: CMI, 2005); M. A. Thomas and O. Sissokho, ‘Liaison
Legislature: The Role of the National Assembly in Senegal’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43/1 (2005),
pp. 97-117; J. D. Barkan , L. Ademolekun and Y. Zhou, ‘Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of Horizontal
Accountability’, in B. Levy and S. Kpundhe (eds.), Building State Capacity in Africa (Washington: World Bank
Institute, 2004), pp. 211-56. For a more detailed review of the literature available on African legislatures,
particularly in a comparative perspective, see L. Nijzink, S. Mozaffar and E. Azevedo, ‘Parliaments and the
Enhancement of Democracy on the African Continent’.
20
In line with Copeland and Patterson we acknowledge that a functional definition of parliament is problematical
since legislative institutions are very diverse and there is no function or set of functions which are exclusively
parliamentary or universally undertaken by parliaments. Nevertheless, legislatures do engage in recurring
activities that have systematic consequences. While authors like Packenham, Copeland and Patterson, and
Pridham differentiate between different categories of functions the functions outlined generally correspond to
each other, and all point to elements that can be subsumed under the heading decisional/influence. As several
authors have suggested (e.g. D. Judge, R. A. Packenham and D. M. Olson) we find that attention should be
focused more broadly than simply upon the contribution to law-making. Especially this is more productive in a
developing country context. Impacting on the policy/decision making process can be seen as one of parliament’s
main tasks and is arguably the most explicitly decisive and relevant for the legislature’s ability to impose
accountability. See, G. W. Copeland and S. C. Patterson, ‘Parliaments and Legislatures’ in G. T. Kurian (ed.),
World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures vol. I (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
1998) pp. 19-32 ; Packenham ‘Legislatures and political development’ p.95; G. Pridham, ‘Political Parties,
Parliaments and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives’, in U.
Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and Turkey (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 225-48; D. Judge, ‘East
Central European Parliaments: The First Steps’, in Ágh, Attila (ed.), The Emergence of East Central European
Parliaments: The First Steps (Budapest: Hungarian Centre of Democracy Studies Foundation, 1994), pp.22-32,
p.29; D. M. Olson, The Legislative Process: A Comparative Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980) p.12.
21
M. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham: Duke University Press 1979) p. 23. Scholars like Blondel,
Polsby, Weinbaum, and Mezey all fall within this category. They incorporate Third World legislatures into their
theoretical considerations and apply rather broad perspectives on legislative influence and decision-making
authority. In more recent years Philip Norton, together with Nizam Ahmed and David M. Olson have drawn on
Mezey’s schema for classification and on the basis of this hypothesised about the relative importance of different
variables on the legislature’s capacity to affect the policy process. However, these studies do not specifically
target Africa. See, J. Blondel et al., ‘Legislative Behaviour: Some Steps toward a Cross-National Measurement’,
Government and Opposition 5/196 (1969-70), pp. 67-85; J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1973); N. W. Polsby ‘Legislatures’, in F. I. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political
Science: Governmental Institutions and Processes (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 257-319; M.
Weinbaum, ‘Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey and
Afghanistan’, in G. R. Boynton and C. L. Kim (eds.), Legislatures in Developing Countries (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 31-68; P. Norton and N. Ahmed (eds.) Legislatures in Asia
(London: Frank Cass, 1999); P. Norton (ed.) Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe vol. 1 (London:
Frank Cass, 1998); P. Norton and D. M. Olson, The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London:
Frank Cass, 1996).
22
L. D. Longley and R. H. Davidson, ‘The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees’, The Journal of Legislative
Studies 4/1, (1998) pp.1-19, p.2; M. Shaw, ‘Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective’, Journal of
Legislative Studies, 4/1 (1998) pp. 225-51, p 230; I. Mattson and K. Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Committees’ in H.
Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) pp. 249307, p.249; J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, p. 249.
23
K. Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies’, Journal of Legislative Studies 4/1 (1998),
pp. 21-59, p.47, Mattson and Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, p. 250.
24
‘Viscosity’ is characteristic of the degree to which legislatures are ‘compliant’ or ‘free’. It refers to the
capacity of the legislature to resist legislation initiated by the executive. The concept was coined by Blondel and
his associates. See J. Blondel et al. ‘Legislative Behaviour’
25
M. Shaw, ‘Committees in Legislatures’, in P. Norton (ed.) Legislatures (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979), pp. 237-267; M. Shaw, ‘Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective’
20
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
M. Shaw, ‘Conclusions’ in J. D. Lees and M. Shaw (eds.) Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative
Analysis (Oxford: Martin Robertson 1979) pp.; M. Shaw, ‘Committees in Legislatures’; D. M. Olson, The
Legislative Process: A Comparative Approach.
27
M. Mezey, ‘Executive-Legislative Relations’ in G. T. Kurian (ed.) World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and
Legislatures Vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1998) pp.780-86, p.782.
28
For more on this analytical framework see S. Gloppen and L. Rakner, ‘Checking the state: The Role of Special
Institutions of Restraint in Africa’s New Democracies’, CMI Working Paper WP (CMI: Bergen, Forthcoming).
29
With the adoption of the 2003 Public Finance and Accountability Act the Uganda SAI is allowed to audit
classified expenditure under specified conditions. Still, the question of who should decide whether a subject is
confidential or not may be raised. If required, issues relating to national security or other interests will be
exempted after consultation with the secretary to the treasury. What amounts to ‘required’ is unclear and
although exceptions should be consistent with best practice this is problematic as auditees can be expected to
protect their own interests and try to restrain the information.
30
Cowater International ‘Institutional Reform at the NAO. Malawi’, Final report. Financial Restructuring and
Deregulation Programme’. (Canada: Cowater International Inc., 2003) p.40; MEJN ‘Response to the Proposed
National Budget 2004/5’. (Lilongwe: Malawi Economic Justice Network, 2004) p.10; OAG ‘Corporate Plan
2003-2006’ Office of the Auditor General, Republic of Uganda (2003) p.5; L. Rutashobya, ‘Fiduciary Risk
Assessment for the Provision of Direct Budgetary Support in Tanzania’. Summary Focus of Areas of High Risk’,
Report submitted to DFID Tanzania. (Tanzania: DFID, 2004) p. 21.
31
Interview Auditor General, Malawi 17/03/04; SNAO and MNAO, ’Institutional Development Co-operation
between the National Audit Office of Malawi and the Swedish National Audit Office. Project Document’. Phase
II (2003) p 9; S. Tax ‘A Review of Budgetary Processes and Economic Governance in Tanzania’, Report
submitted to SEAPREN (2004) p. 38; L. Rutashobya, ‘Fiduciary Risk Assessment’ p. 21; Interview Auditor
General, Tanzania 06/07/04; Interview Auditor General, Uganda 14/07/04.
32
Rakner and Wang, ‘The Accountability Function of Supreme Audit Institutions’
33
See Article 144 Tanzania Constitution, Article 163 (10) Uganda Constitution, and Article 184 (6) Malawi
Constitution.
34
NOTE this has possibly changed with the enactment of the 2005 Constitutional Amendment Act (section 33).
The AG can now serve until the age of 60. The former AG John Muwanga resigned in May 2006.
35
Interview Auditor General, Malawi 17/03/04; Interview Auditor General Tanzania 06/07/04; Interview
Auditor General; Interview Auditor General 14/07/04.
36
UNAO, ‘The Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on the Public Accounts of the Republic of Uganda
for the Year Ended 30th June’, (The Republic of Uganda, 2003).
37
PRBS/PRBC Review, ‘Tanzania. Joint PRBS and PRBC Review’. Review Report, 2004, p. 52.
38
SNAO and MNAO, ’Institutional Development Co-operation between the National Audit Office of Malawi
and the Swedish National Audit Office,’ p. 5; L. Rakner et al. ‘The Political Economy of the Budget in Malawi.
The Budget as a Theatre – the Formal and Informal Institutional Makings of the Budget Process in Malawi’,
Report submitted to DFID Malawi (2004) p.18; N. Khembo ‘National Integrity Systems’ TI Country Study
Report Malawi. (Transparency International, 2003) pp. 41-42.
39
H. Muloopa, ‘National Integrity Systems. TI Country Study Report Uganda’ (Transparency International,
2003) p. 41.
40
In Uganda the official name is the committee on local government accounts, but the committee will here be
referred to as the local authorities’ accounts committee.
41
L. Rutashobya, ‘Fiduciary Risk Assessment’
42
Interview donor representative, Tanzania 06/07/04.
43
Khembo, ‘National Integrity Systems’, p. 23.
44
WB, ‘Republic of Uganda’, p. 49.
45
Interview MP, Uganda 26/07/04.
46
Interview MP, Uganda 20/07/04.
47
Interview MP, Uganda 26/07/04; Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04. .
48
Laure-Hélén Piron and Andy Norton. ‘Politics and the PRSP Approach: Uganda Case Study’. Working Paper
240. (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004) p. 27; Joy Moncrieffe. ‘Uganda's Political Economy: A
Synthesis of Major Thought. Report prepared for DFID Uganda’. (London: Overseas Development Institute,
2004) p. 21.
49
WB, ‘Republic of Uganda’, p. 49.
50
Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04.
51
PER, ‘Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review 2005. Review of Fiscal Developments, Public
Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Issues 2003/04 – 2004/05’, Joint Evaluation Report (Dar
es Salaam, 2005), p. 26.
26
21
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
L. Rutashobya, ‘Fiduciary Risk Assessment’, p. 28.
J. Titsworth, L. Rutashobya, and R. Mushi. ‘Public Expenditure Review External Evaluation. The Budget
Process and the Role of the Legislature’. (Dar es Salaam, 2004), p. 15.
54
The rotation of committee membership is about to change. The Speaker has recently accepted that committee
members should serve five years on a committee. See, DAIMA, and ODI, ‘Joint Evaluation of General Budget
Support: Tanzania 1995-2004’, Report to the Government of Tanzania and to the Poverty Reduction Budget
Support Development Partners (Dar es Salaam, 2004).
55
Patel and Tostensen ‘Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004’
56
Interview Speaker, Malawi 15/03/04.
57
Patel and Tostensen ‘Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004’
58
Moncrieffe, ‘Uganda's Political Economy’, p. 22.
59
Piron and Norton, ‘Politics and the PRSP Approach’, p. 26.
60
Interview MP, Uganda 13/07/04; Interview MP, Uganda 14/07/04; Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04.
61
Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04.
62
Piron and Norton, ‘Politics and the PRSP Approach’, pp. 26-27.
63
Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04. See also N. Kasfir and S. H. Twebaze ‘The Limits of Institutionalization of a
Legislature without Parties’.
64
Kasfir and Twebaze ‘The Limits of Institutionalization of a Legislature without Parties’.
65
Kasfir and Twebaze ‘The Limits of Institutionalization of a Legislature without Parties’.
66
DAIMA and ODI, ‘Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support’ p. 94.
67
Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04.
68
Vibeke Wang, ‘Parliament as Machinery for Political System Control: The Inner Workings of Bunge,
Tanzania’, in M. A. M. Salih (ed.), African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) pp. 183-200.
69
Interview MP, Tanzania 08/07/04.
70
Pius Msekwa. Reflections on Tanzania's First Multi-Party Parliament: 1995-2000 (Dar es Salaam:
DUP(1996)LTD, 2000), p.76.
71
Numbers based on data from www.africanelectionsdatabase.tripod.com/tz
72
Patel and Tostensen, ‘Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004’.
73
PAC statement, October 22, 2002, cited in Dulani and van Donge ‘A Decade of Legislature-Executive
Squabble in Malawi’, p.24.
74
See also B. Dulani and J. K. van Donge, ‘A Decade of Legislature-Executive Squabble in Malawi, 19942004’, in M. A. M. Salih (ed.), African Parliaments. Between Government and Governance (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 201-24, p. 24
75
Patel and Tostensen ‘Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004’p.16-17; Khembo ‘National
Integrity Systems’ p. 35.
76
Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04.
77
Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04.
78
WB, ‘Republic of Uganda’, p. 48. In 2004 neither the 1998/99, 1999/00 reports, nor the 2000/01 report on
central government accounts, had yet been presented to parliament.
79
Interview MP, Uganda, 20/07/04.
80
Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04.
81
F. Naschold and A. Fozzard, ‘How, When and Why Does Poverty Get Budget Priority? Poverty Reduction
Strategy and Public Spending in Tanzania’, Working Paper 165 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002)
p. 46; Rutashobya, ‘Fiduciary Risk Assessment for the Provision of Direct Budgetary Support in Tanzania’,
p.30.
82
Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04.
83
Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04; Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04; Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04;
Interview 08/07/04.
84
Naschold and Fozzard. ‘How, When and Why’, p. 37.
85
Handouts from seminar on ‘The Swedish NAO Project’ by Martin Wilcox and Carl Åke Gerdén 05/07/2004 at
the Royal Swedish Embassy, Dar es Salaam.
86
DAIMA and ODI, ‘Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support’, p. 94.
87
PRBS/PRSC MYR, ‘Tanzania. PRBS/PRSC Mid Year Review’, (2005), p. 31.
88
Rutashobya, ‘Fiduciary Risk Assessment’.
89
PER, ‘Public Expenditure’, pp.24-25.
90
Khembo, ‘National Integrity Systems’, p. 47.
91
Focus group interview with members of the public accounts committee and the budget and finance committee
of the Malawi parliament 18/03/04.
52
53
22
Rakner/Wang Draft December 2006
92
Interview SAI official, Uganda 14/07/04.
Patel and Tostensen, ‘Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004’; Rakner et al. ‘The Political
Economy of the Budget in Malawi’.
94
L. Rakner, L. Svåsand and N. Khembo, ‘Fissions and Fusions, Foes and Friends: Party System Restructuring
in Malawi in the 2004 General Elections’, CMI Working Paper WP 6 (Bergen: CMI, 2005).
95
Wang, ‘Parliament as Machinery for Political System Control’; A. Lawson and L. Rakner, ‘Understanding
Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania’, Synthesis Report. (Bergen/Oxford/Dar es Salaam: CMI, OPM REPOA,
2005); B. Frantz, ‘General Budget Support in Tanzania. A Snapshot of its Effectiveness’ (Dar es Salaam:
USAID: 2004) p. 14.
96
Wang, ‘Parliament as Machinery for Political System Control’.
93
23