ANNEX 15
SOME NOTES ON CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS
Institute For Popular Democracy (IPD)
I.
1987 Senatorial and Congressional Elections
Salient Features:

Marked the organized electoral debut of “new politics” as the politics of programs
and principles, in contrast to “old politics” as the politics of “guns, goons and gold”

“New politics” found expression in several vehicles. There was Partido ng Bayan
(PnB), the political party organized by the then dominant national democratic Left.
PnB fielded 7 candidates for the senate and a few for congressional seats.

Other vehicles were the Alliance for New Politics (ANP) and the Movement for New
Politics (MNP). Both campaigned for “new politics” candidates and conducted
political education campaigns. ANP was an alliance primarily of ideological groups
and sectoral organizations from the national democratic Left, while MNP was much
broader in scope. The MNP, in particular, sought to mobilize the support of middle
class groups and other unaffiliated citizens politicized by People Power 1.
Goals:

Within the Left, there were different approaches to the 1987 elections. Some saw the
elections as an opportunity to further expand the democratic gains of People Power I.
From this vantage point, an electoral victory for “new politics” candidates would carve
a space for bringing in more progressive input to policy-making. It would also provide
greater legitimacy to the Left specially since much of the public believed in elections
as a means for deciding competing visions of governance. Others saw the elections
primarily as an opportunity to educate the public and propagate their analyses and
alternatives on a number of issues.
Electoral Results:

None of the “Magnificent Seven” candidates running under PnB/ANP banner
succeeded in securing a senate seat.

Out of the 36 congressional candidates fielded and/or supported by PnB/ANP, only
two candidates (Venancio Garduce of Western Samar’s sole district and Gregorio
Andolana of North Cotabato’s first congressional district) won
Lessons and Issues:

The national democratic Left found itself unable to substantially translate support
from organized communities and sectoral groupings into votes for “new politics”
candidates.
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
Externally, problems of harassment and red-baiting in the context of Aquino’s
counter-insurgency policy, in addition to the usual election-related violence, limited
the ability of PnB-ANP other allied progressive groups to campaign more effectively
and in a more sustained manner, specially in rural areas.

Internally, differences in approach to elections prevented the PnB and other Left
groups from developing a more coherent and effective electoral strategy. Activists
never resolved whether the (PnB/ANP) campaign should primarily be aimed at
seriously contesting electoral positions, and therefore necessitated a more flexible
yet coherent electoral strategy, or using elections mainly for political education.
II. 1992 National and Local Elections
Salient Features

This period saw the participation of a much broader range of civil society groups,
including other sections of the broad Left, in elections and election-related activities
(e.g. voters education, poll watching, etc.) even as they continued to focus public
debate on questions of substantive electoral reform and programmatic party politics

For some sections of civil society, participation in elections was anchored on a more
long-term view of elections and democratization. That is, they participated in the
1992 elections to “gain experience, reach out to as many people as possible and
prepare the ground for further engagement in future elections”
Electoral Strategies:
A. Direct participation and contestation

Formation of electoral movements and coalitions which endorsed candidates running
under established national political parties and entered into various alliances with
local politicians and party formations.
Examples:
1) AKBAYAN, an electoral movement founded by BISIG, Pandayan and the
Movement for Popular Democracy. AKBAYAN eventually became part of the liberal
electoral coalition, Koalisyong Pambansa, which supported the candidacies of Jovito
Salonga and Aquilino Pimentel for president and vice-president respectively, and a
number of senatorial candidates (ex. Bobby Tañada and Florencio Abad). Koalisyong
Pambansa brought together established parties like LP and PDP-LABAN and civil
society and left groups. Civil society further contributed to the Salonga-Pimentel
campaign by organizing voters’ education seminars, launching local “SalongaPimentel movements,” supplying sample ballots and training poll watchers.
2) “Tañada Para sa Tao” (TAPAT) – mobilized the PnB-BAYAN network to
campaign for Bobby Tañada.

Building of local electoral coalitions around pre-existing community groups and
NGOs with ties to regional or national NGOs and political groups .
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Example: in Bataan: formation of the local electoral coalition (Kabalikatan),
spearheaded by an already existing development NGO (Balikatan) that was linked to
the Movement of Popular Democracy (MPD).

Formation of coalitions and movements mainly composed of civil society
organizations to campaign for specific progressive candidates and educate voters on
issues
Examples: KAPATIRAN (Kilusan ng Alternatibong Pulitika para sa Inang Bayan), a
network of about 40 organizations, mainly aligned with BAYAN; PROJECT 2001
which brought together progressive NGOs to engage in “partisan” political education
B. Indirect Participation

The Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER) and KAPATIRAN, Projects
1992 and 2001, COMPEL (Citizens for Meaningful and Peaceful Elections) and
other civil society actors undertook a “plethora of initiatives – ranging from
“immediate measures such as candidate / platform evaluation seminars to long term
demands for proportional representation-aimed at reforming the legal provisions,
administrative procedures and political culture underpinning Philippine electoral
democracy.”

Another area of electoral reform, which saw the intervention of civil society
concerned COMELEC’s decision to exempt CAFGU paramilitary forces from the gun
ban. After petitions from the Partido ng Bayan and pressure from other progressive
elements, COMELEC eventually reversed its decision less than a week before
election day.

Elections results monitoring and poll watching by NAMFREL, Parish Pastoral Council
for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), church groups and many others were intensified. In
addition, hundreds of NGOs individually or cooperatively, were involved in urging
people to get out and vote, or in other ways to improve the climate of politics.
Electoral Results:

Salonga placed 6th among a total of 7 presidential candidates. Like Imelda Marcos,
Salonga won 10% of the nation’ s votes although a small difference of 36,000 votes
placed him slightly behind Marcos. However, Wigberto Tanada, who was strongly
identified with civil society and progressive advocacies, was reelected to the Senate

At the local level, candidates identified with NGOs and progressive advocacies
reportedly performed “credibly” in Angeles City, Cebu City, Pasig, Quezon City,
(district 2 & 4) and Davao City, and won seats in two municipalities in Bataan, San.
Luis, Aurora, Oriental Mindoro, Irosin, Sorsogon, and North Cotabato.
Lessons and Issues:

Unlike the 1987 elections, in 1992, civil society actors showed greater flexibility and
pragmatism in its electoral tactics and strategies. Still, the performance of candidates
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supported by civil society formations, again fell short of expectations. Aligning with
established political parties via electoral vehicles like the Koalisyong Pambansa
likewise produced its own set of internal problems usually involving the need for
delicate negotiations. There was also the perennial problem of funds drying up in the
course of the campaign, which induced LP-PDP-LABAN local candidates to abandon
Salonga and shift their support to other presidential standard-bearers. Civil society,
once again, had to take stock and assess what went wrong with the vaunted “NGOPO and social movement votes.”

For some sections of civil society, the 1992 elections showed that it was not enough
to have “temporary electoral alliances” with established political parties. Pouring their
efforts on campaigns aimed at the national level may not also be the most viable
route for progressive intervention in elections. Those who felt this way argued that
progressives need to build their own political parties that would bid for, and gradually
accumulate political power where it was more feasible – at the local level.

The need to develop a coherent electoral strategy at the local level was said to be
made more urgent by the Local Government Code of 1991, which would devolve
more powers and resources to local officials. Accordingly, civil society efforts to
contest, engage in and transform local politics, could produce a greater impact on the
lives of ordinary citizens, since municipalities would undertake greater responsibilities
for the delivery of basic services. The human and financial resources required for
fielding candidates at the local level would likewise be less than that at the national
level, giving progressives a better chance at winning public office.
.
III. 1995 – 1998 period
Salient Features
IV.

Focus of civil society efforts was to achieve a more level playing field by pushing for
specific politico-electoral reforms, foremost of which was the passage of the enabling
law for the party-list system. Civil society groups also fielded candidates and took
part in local alliances for the 1995 local elections, and began much of the
organizational and conceptual spadework for party-building

The Kilusang Mamamayan para sa Repormang Elektoral (Kumare-Kumpare) was
one of the many groups which conducted a massive and intense campaign for the
modernization of the country’s electoral system in 1995. Together with other civil
society actors, the organization fought for and won the enactment of the “Party-List
System Law”, “General Registration of Voters” and “Election Automation”.

This period also saw realignments among progressive forces in their preparations for
electoral engagements. AKBAYAN, which was launched as an alternative political
party in 1998 brought together a number of political blocs, development NGOs and
individuals for more serious party building and electoral work. Other political forces
and sectors likewise began preparations for their own electoral engagements at
about this time
1998 Elections
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Salient Features

more intensified civil society electoral effort at the local (municipal and provincial)
levels

The Party-List system (made possible by an enabling law, RA 7941) opened
another arena for increased civil society participation in politics and governance.

146 groups contested the party-list election. Over 27 million voted in the 1998
elections. But because of limited understanding of the party-list system, only 33.5%
of this total number of voters (or about 9.2 million) cast votes for the party-list. Only
13 party list groups were able to get the necessary 2% of total party-list votes cast
and thus clinched at least one seat in Congress.

Of the 13 party-list groups who won a seat in Congress, two were organized as
political parties while the rest were party list groups of cooperatives (2), sectors
(peasants, workers, urban poor, etc.) and organizations.
Table 1: Breakdown of Party-list groups
Category
Total no. of parties
1. Political parties
14
2. Sectoral Parties
a. Labor
b. Peasant
c. fisher folk
d. urban poor
e. indigenous-cultural communities
f. handicapped
g. elderly
h. women
i. youth
j. veterans
k. overseas workers
l. professionals
14
9
3
8
6
2
2
6
7
3
6
5
3. Organizations
TOTAL
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146
No. of parties which
acquired at least 2% of
party list votes cast
2
0
4
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
3
13
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Table 2: Winning party-list groups
REPRESENTATIVE
PARTY
1. Calderon, Emerito
Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL)
Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC)
SANLAKAS
Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang-Bukid
at Mangingisda (A.B.A)
Partido ng Maralitang Lungsod (Alagad)
Cooperative NATTCO
Network Party (CoopNATTCO)
Sectoral Party of the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines (VFP)
Aksyon ng Bayan –
Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN)
Abanse Pinay
APEC
National Federation of Small
Coconut Farmers Organization, Inc.
(SCFO)
Progressive Movement for
Devolution of Initiatives (PROMDI)
Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (A.K.O)
2. Cruz, Benjamin
3. Eballe, Melvyn
4. Magtubo, Renato
5.Montemayor, Leonardo
6. Osabel, Diogenes
7. Paez, Cresente
8. Pilapil, Eduardo
9. Rosales, Loretta Ann
10. Sarenas, Patricia
11. Silos, Rene
12. Unde, Gregorio
13. Young, Joy A. G.
14. Zartiga, Ariel
% of votes
(Party)
2%
Classification*
2%
5.53%
Sectoral
Organization
2.14%
3.54%
Sectoral
Sectoral
2%
2.08%
Sectoral
Sectoral
2%
Sectoral
2.45%
Political Party
2.59%
5.53%
2%
Sectoral
Organization
Sectoral
2%
Political Party
2%
Sectoral
Sectoral
*Classification is according to COMELEC
Sources: Alpha List, Bills and Index Division, House of Representatives
Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms
Problems and Issues:

The predecessors of party-list representatives – the sectoral representatives were
effectively crippled in the House because they were relegated to a second-class
status. One of the main reasons cited was the need for their appointments to be
confirmed by their territorial counterparts (i.e. district representatives in Congress).
Thus, when the party-list system, which provides for the election, rather than
appointment of party-list representatives, was enacted, it was hoped that this would
erase such stigma. However, the law has created widespread confusion among the
electorate and even among those tasked with its implementation.

COMELEC contributed to the confusion by not conducting enough public information
on the party list system. The criteria and procedures it observed for granting
accreditation to those running for the party list were likewise shoddy. Party-list
groups had to fill the void left by the COMELEC, specially in terms of informing the
public about the importance and mechanics of the party list system.
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
V.
Party-list groups had a hard time mobilizing command votes. Though the parties
often had mass bases, they had difficulty in translating such support into electoral
machineries or constituencies. Had more party list groups united, they would have
likely been able to win more votes and gain more seats in Congress.
2001 Elections
Salient Features:



Intensive “anti-trapo “and anti-Erap campaign
Results of elections were seen as a test of the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
Second Party-List election, which again, was marked by a lot of confusion and poor
implementation of the substance of the law. Party list groups such as MAD, which
could hardly be considered as representing the “marginalized” were accredited by
the COMELEC, only to be disqualified after the elections, by the Supreme Court.
Table 3: Party-List election results, 2001
Party-List Groups
No. of Votes
Bayan Muna
1,708,252
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD)
1,515,682
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC) 801,921
Veterans Federation Party
580,771
Abag Promdi
422,430
Nationalist People's Coalition
385,151
Akbayan! Citizens' Action Party
377,850
Luzon Farmers Party
330,282
Lakas NUCD-UMDP
329,093
Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
323,810
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
290,460
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
288,337
Anak Mindanao
252,035
Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka,
Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda
242,199
Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
229,137
% of party-list
votes cast
11.32
10.04
5.31
3.85
2.80
2.55
2.50
2.19
2.18
2.15
1.92
1.91
1.67
1.60
1.52
Source: COMELEC
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