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BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
FALL 2015
MR. ART
POLITICS 174B
SEMINAR: NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
This course deals with the today’s uses of military power and covers basic
theories about using force, case studies exemplifying the theories, and the application of
these theories to selected contemporary issues in U. S. national security policy.
Requirements and Grading. The course is run as a seminar. Students are
therefore expected to have read the material before each class meeting and to take an
active part in class discussions. The course requirements are: (1) one 8-page paper based
on a case study that uses theories and methods developed in the course (30% of the
course grade); (2) a 12-14 page policy prescription paper dealing with a contemporary
issue (40% of the course grade); and (3) participation in weekly class discussions based
on the reading (30% of the grade). Late papers with no valid excuse will be penalized.
(Due dates for assignments are on page 2.)
Success in this 4 credit hour course is based on the expectation that students will
spend a minimum of 9 hours of study time per week in preparation for class (readings,
papers, discussion sections, preparation for exams, and so forth).
If you are a student who needs academic accommodations because of a
documented disability, please contact me and present your letter of accommodation as
soon as possible.
Learning Goals: learn how to think critically about arguments; learn how to
present arguments clearly and convincingly both orally and in writing; appreciate how
difficult well-reasoned and carefully-researched policy analysis and policy prescription
are; understand the main concepts, constraints, and ethical dilemmas in the use of force.
All required books for purchase below are reserve, but if you can afford it, I
suggest you purchase all or most of them (all are in paper).
Michael Walzer
Just and Unjust Wars (Basic)
Barry Posen
The Sources of Military Doctrine (Cornell)
Michael Barnhart
Japan Prepares for Total War (Cornell)
Dale Copeland
The Origins of Major War (Cornell)
Patrick Morgan
Deterrence Now
(Cambridge)
Robert Pape
Bombing to Win
(Cornell)
Michael Brown, et al
Going Nuclear (MIT)
Joshua Rovner
Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of
Intelligence (Cornell)
Audrey Cronin
How Terrorism Ends (Princeton)
Thomas Christensen
The China Challenge (Norton)
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COURSE OUTLINE AND SCHEDULE
September 1
Introductory Session – Course Overview
September 8
The Use of Force: Ethics, Fungibility, Limits (Waltzer)
September 15
No Class (Holiday)
September 21
First Paper Prospectus due in Politics Office by Noon
September 22
Sources of Grand Strategy (Posen)
September 22
First Paper Prospectus Handed Back in Class
September 29
No Class (Brandeis Monday)
October 6
Misperception and Grand Strategy (Barnhart)
October 13
Causes of War – Preventive War (Copeland)
Offense/Defense Theory, Politics
October 20
Deterrence Theory (Morgan)
October 23
First Paper Due
October 27
Compellence Theory (Pape)
October 30
Second Paper Prospectus Due in My Mailbox by 2:00PM
November 3
Intelligence Failures and Strategic Surprise (Rovner)
November 3
Second Paper Prospectus Returned in Class
November 10
Nuclear Proliferation: Bio and Chem Warfare (Brown)
November 17
Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Cronin)
November 24
Cyber War: Offense, Defense, Deterrence
December 1
China’s Rise, America’s Maritime Hegemony, and East Asian
Stability (Christensen)
December 8
Second Paper Due
December 8
Student Presentations of Policy Paper Prescriptions
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ASSIGNED READINGS
IMPORTANT NOTE ON THE ASSIGNED READINGS: Nearly all asterisked
articles below are on the course LATTE website. Those that are not are either articles that
you can access electronically yourself or other resources available online. Books I asked
you to purchase are also on hard copy reserve. I will tell you each week which asterisked
readings you are to do.
PLEASE NOTE: There are many, many more asterisked readings than you are
required to read. Additional ones are there for further reading or for use in your papers.
1. THE USE OF FORCE: ETHICS, FUNGIBILITY, LIMITS
*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chaps. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 (pp. 127-133), 9 (144147), 151-154), 11 (176-188), 12 (197-206), 16, and 19.
*Robert Art, "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," Security
Studies, Summer 1996, pp. 7-42.
*Charles Krauthammer, “The Truth about Torture,” The Weekly Standard, 5
December 2005, and Andrew Sullivan, “The Abolition of Torture,” The New Republic,
19 December, 2005, html text LATTE.
*Robert Jervis, “The Torture Blame Game,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2015, pp.
120-128.
*Executive Summary” (pp. 172-204 and 216)”; “Findings and Conclusions” (all); and
“Chairman Feinstein’s Foreword” (all); Committee Study of the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 2014; on line at:
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/committee-releases-study-cias-detention-andinterrogation-program
*Bell, Jeannine, "One Thousand Shades of Gray: The Effectiveness of Torture"
(August 15, 2005). IU Law-Bloomington Research Paper No. 37 Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=820467
*Jerome Slater, “Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism: Should We Try to Regulate
and Control Torture?”, Political Science Quarterly (Summer 2006), pp. 191-217.
*Jerome Slater, “Just War Moral Philosophy and the 2008-09 Israeli Campaign in
Gaza,” International Security, Fall 2012, pp. 44-81.
*Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work”; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail”;
both in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, pp. 32-55; and President Obama’s Speech at
the National Defense University on 23 May 2013 online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-nationaldefense-university.
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*Intelligence Science Board, Phase 1 Report, Educing Information: Interrogation –
Science and Art, http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf.
*Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction, chap. 2.
*Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, chapter 7.
*Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle,
chaps. 3, 4, and 10.
Seyom Brown, The Illusion of Control, chap. 5.
Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention.
Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, chap. 10.
Security Studies, Summer 1999, the exchange between Robert Art and David Baldwin.
Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," International Security, Spring 1980, pp.
3-35.
Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War, chapter 11.
David Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power.
2. GRAND STRATEGY: SOURCES AND MISPERCEPTION
*Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, entire.
*Rosecrance & Stein, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, Chapter 6.
*Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” Vol. 30, World Politics (April 1968).
*Michael Barnhardt, Japan Prepares for Total War, entire.
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire.
Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire.
Edward Lutwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.
Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II.
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations.
James Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy.
3. THE CAUSES OF WAR
*Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War, tba.
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*Keir Lieber, War the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, tba.
*Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International
Security, Vol. 22 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43/.
*Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, “Knowing the Unknowns: Misplaced
Certainty and the Onset of War,” Security Studies, January-March 2011, pp. 2-36.
Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War, entire.
*Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the OffenseDefense-Deterrence Balance,” International Security, Winter 2003/04, pp. 45-84.
*John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 9.
*D. Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth," International Security, Fall 1995, pp.
5-35.
*Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense/Defense Balance and Can
We Measure It?" International Security, Spring 1998, pp. 44-83.
T. Christensen and J. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance
Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Spring 1990, pp. 137-169.
“Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Winter 1998/99,
pp. 179-206.
4. DETERRENCE AND REPUTATION
*Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now, chaps. 1-5 and 7.
*Robert Art, “Review of Greenhill’s Weapons of Mass Migration,” H-Diplo
Roundtable, May 2013.
*Robert Art and Kelly Greenhill, “Coercion – An Analytical Overview,” in Kelly
Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds. The Power to Hurt in Theory and Practice
(forthcoming), mimeo.
Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, entire.
*Dale C. Copeland, "Do Reputations Matter?"; Paul K. Huth, "Reputations and
Deterrence"; and Jonathan Mercer, "Reputation and Rational Deterrence Theory"; all in
Security Studies, Autumn 1977, pp. 33-114.
*Keren Yarhi-Milo and Alex Weisiger, “Revisiting Reputation: How Pat Actions
Matter in International Politics,” forthcoming in International Organization.
*Gregory Miller, The Shadow of the Past, chaps. 2 & 7.
*Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, chaps. 1 & 2.
*Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, chap. 7 (RAND study,
available at www.rand.org.)
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*Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work: Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World
Politics, July 1984, pp. 496-526.
*R.N. Lebow & J. G. Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World
Politics, April 1990, 336-369.
*Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World
Politics, July 1990, pp. 466-501.
*James Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, June 1994, pp. 236-269.
*Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Themes for the 21st Century).
*Patrick Morgan, “Taking the Long View of Deterrence”; Richard Ned
Lebow,”Deterrence: Then and Now”;and Lawrence Freedman, “Deterrence: A Reply.”
All in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 5 (October 2005), pp. 751-775 and
789-803.
Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence and American Foreign Policy,
chapters 17 & 18.
Patrick Morgan, Deterrence -- A Conceptual Analysis.
5. COMPELLENCE
*Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 68-91, and 166-176..
*Robert Pape, Bombing to Win, chaps. 1-5, 8-9.
*Todd Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats,” Conflict Management and Peace
Science, Vol. 28 No. 4.
*Ward Thomas, “Victory by Duress: Civilian Infrastructure as a Target in Air
Campaigns,” Security Studies, Vol. 15 (January-March 2006), pp. 1-34.
*Daniel Lake, “The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO’s Victory in Kosovo
Revisited,” International Security, Summer 2009, pp. 83-113.
*Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and
Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp.
1-31.
S. T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (RAND, 2001), on line.
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, chapter 4.
Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or
Impossible Task?” International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 147-180.
Kelly Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration.
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6. INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE
*Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence,
entire.
*Keren Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence
Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” International Security, Summer
2013, pp. 7-52.
Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, entire.
Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, entire. Chapters tba.
*Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are
Inevitable,” World Politics, October 1978, pp. 61-90.
*Jim Wirtz, “A Theory of Surprise,” in Betts and Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic
Intelligence, chap. 4.
*Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,”
Journal of Strategic Studies,
*Richard K. Betts, “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s
Missing WMD,” Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2007-08, pp. 585-607.
*Kenneth Pollack, “Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong,” The Atlantic
Monthly, January-February 2004, pp. 78-93.
*The 9/11 Commission Report, chaps. 1, 2, 7-11 on line at http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
*Richard K. Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reform Work This Time?”
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.
*Amy B. Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence
Agencies,” International Security, Vo. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 75-111.
*Richard K. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” in Richard K.
Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, chap. 2
*Kevin Woods et al., “Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 85 (May/June 2006), pp. 2-28.
*Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies, chap. 10.
*Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, chap. 7.
*Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack, chap. 10.
*John MacGaffin, “Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert
Action, in Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence,
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*Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (The
Duelfer Report), 30 September 2004, Vol. 1 (Regime Strategic Intent, pp. 1-68; available
online at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/duelfer.html.
*Material on intelligence reorganization at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/index.htm.
Report of the Joint Inquiry in the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 -- Joint
House and Senate Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, pp. 3-127.
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations.
James Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War
Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of
Intelligence
Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.
7. NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS SPREAD:
THREATS AND RESPONSE
Nuclear
* Michael Brown, et al, Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International
Security in the 21st Century (MIT).
*Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan, “A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats:
Lessons from Past Mistakes,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2014, available
online at http://www.amacad.org/gnf.
*Nicholas Miller, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?” Security Studies,
January-March 2014, pp. 33-74
*Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,”
International Security, Summer 2013, pp. 80-105.
*R. Scott Kemp, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes,” International
Security, Spring 2014, pp. 39-79.
*Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, July/August
2012, pp. 2-5.
*Barry R. Posen, “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult But Not Impossible Policy
Problem,” The Century Foundation (online at www.tcf.org).
*Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining
Nuclear Crisis Outcomes”; and Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis
Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” both in International Organization, Winter 2013, pp.
141-173 and 173-197.
*Philip C. Bleek, “Why Do States Proliferate?” in William C. Potter and Gaukhar
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Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Proliferation in the 21st Century, chap. 8.
*Steven Miller et al, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform, and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (online), 2012.
*William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions – A
Review Essay,” International Security, Summer 2008, pp. 139-169.
John Mueller, Atomic Obsession, chaps. 7 & 8.
Moeed Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation: A History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons,”
Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Papers Series, No. 11, January 2009 online at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/1/nuclear%20proliferation
%20yusuf/01_nuclear_proliferation_yusuf.pdf).
*Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, chaps. 7 & 8.
*John Mueller, ”The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” unpublished ms.,
pdf file.
*Steven Miller and Scott Sagan, eds., On the Global Nuclear Future, Daedalus, Fall
2009 and Winter 2010 issues.
*Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons, pp. 151-190.
*George Perkovich, et. al. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security,
chapters 1-4, on line at http://www.carnegieendowment.org.
*Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the “Success” at
Osiraq,” pdf file.
*John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” The Washington
Quarterly, Autumn 2003, pp. 37-50.
*George Bunn,”The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,”
Arms Control Today, Vol. 33 (December 2003), pp. 4-10.
*Ephraim Asculai, Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, Memorandum
#70, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, June 2004.
*Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Fall 2004, pp. 5-50.
*Matthew Bunn, Security the Bomb 2010, available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18672/securing_the_bomb_2008.
*Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed,
chapter 3.
*Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” and S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of
Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” both in International Security, Fall 2008, pp. 45-95.
Kurt Campbell, et. al., eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their
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Nuclear Choice.
Biological
*Gregory Koblenz, Living Weapons, entire.
*Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to
Proliferation,” International Security, Spring 2012, pp. 80-115.
*Gregory Koblenz, “From Biodefense to Biosecurity: The Obama Administration’s
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,” International Affairs, 2012, pp. 131-148.
*Gregory Koblenz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and
Responses,” International Security, Vol. 34, #4 (March 2010), pp. 96-132.
*Kathleen Vogel, “Framing Biosecurity: An Alternative to the Biotech Revolution
Model?” Science and Public Policy, February 2008, pp. 45-54.
*Alexander Kelle, K. Nixdorff, Malcolm Dando, Preventing a Biochemical Arms
Race,.
*Congressional Research Service, Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and
Biological Agents, May 20, 2004, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32391.pdf.
*John Steinburner et.al, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective
Oversight System September 1, 2005, on line at
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/documents/pathogensmonograph.pdf.
*Gregory Koblenz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of
Biological Warfare,” International Security, Winter 2003/04, pp. 84-123.
*CSIS, Resuscitating the Bioweapons Ban: U. S. Industry Experts’ Plans for Treaty
Monitoring, November 2004, on line at http://www.csis.org/isp/041117_Bioweapons.pdf.
*Gregory Koblenz and Jonathan Tucker, “Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls
of Microbial Forensics,” Survival, February-March 2010, pp. 159-186.
*Jonathan Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, chaps. 11, 12, & 14.
* Amy Smithson, “Recharging the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Arms Control
Today, Vol. 34 (March 2004), pp. 6-12.
Daniel M. Gerstein, National Security and Arms Control in the Age of Biotechnology.
*Jonathan B. Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need For Global
Biosecurity Standards,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 33 (June 2003), pp. 3-11.
Joseph Cirincione et. al., Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction,
chaps. 2-4.
Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear
Order.
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Joshua Lederberg, Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, chapters 2 and 17.
Chemical
*Scott Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use
Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International
Security, Vo. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-116.
*Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda.
*Richard Price, “How Chemical Weapons Became Taboo,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot,
January 22, 2013.
*Jonathan Tucker, “The Future of Chemical Weapons,” Fall 2009/Winter 2010, at
www.TheNewAtlantis.com, pp. 3-29.
*Alan Pearson, “Incapacitating Biiochemical Weapons: Science, Technology, and
Policy for the 21st Century,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, July 2006, pp. 151-188.
8. TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Terrorism
*John Mueller and Mark Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought
Response to September 11,” International Security, Summer 2012, pp. 81-111.
*Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 97 (August 2003), pp. 1-19.
*Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, entire.
*Seth Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa’ida and Other Salafi
Jihadists, RAND 2014, online at rand.org.
*Gregory Koblenz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of
CBRN Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, pp. 501-520.
*Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership
Decapitation,” Security Studies, Oct-Dec 2009, pp. 719-756.
Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want, entire.
*Bruce Hoffmann, Inside Terrorism, chaps. 4 & 6.
*Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and
Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security, Spring 2008, pp. 78-106.
*Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International
Security,, Vol. 31 (Summer 2006), pp. 49-81.
Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions, chap. 8.
Robert Pape, Dying To Win.
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Counterterrorism
*Audrey Kurth Cronin, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating al-Qaeda, especially
chaps. 2 and 3.
*Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism, concl.
*John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” Foreign Affairs, September/October
2006, pp. 2-9.
*The 9/11 Commission Report, chaps. 12 &13, on line at http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
*Jerry Mark Long and Alex S. Wilner, “Deligitimizing al Qaida: Defating an ‘Army
Whose Men Love Death,’” International Security, Vol 39, #1 (Summer 2014), pp. 126165.
*Martha Crenshaw, ed., The Consequences of Counterterrorism.
*Stephen Van Evera, “Assessing the U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” Annals of the
Academy on Political and Social Science, September 2006, pp. 10-26.
*Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security, Fall 2006,
pp. 42-79.
*Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Groups,” International Security, Vol. 31 (Summer 2006), pp. 7-49.
*Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be
Done,” International Security, Vol. 30 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 87-124.
*Robert Pape, Dying to Win, chap. 12.
*Richard Clarke et. al, Defeating the Jihadists.
Yonah Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries.
Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, chaps. 4 & 8.
Daniel Byman, The Five Front War, entire.
9. CYBER WAR: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND DETERRENCE
*Peter Singer, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, chapters to be assigned.
*Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyber War: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to
Earth,” International Security, Fall 2013, pp. 41-74.
*Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, “Coercion through Cyberspace: The StabilityInstability Paradox Revisited,” in Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., The Power to
Hurt in Theory and Practice (forthcoming), mimeo.
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*Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain,” The Economist, July 3-9, 2010, pp. 25-29.
Richard Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyber War, entire.
*Jon Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies, Vol. 22
(2013, pp. 1-40.
*Mandiant APT1, Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (online).
*Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND, available online at
www.rand.org.
*Joe Nye, Cyber Power,” available at the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Kennedy School, Harvard University at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20162/cyber_power.html.
*Therese Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, chapter 7. (Available online
at www.rand.org).
Greg Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace.
Chris Demchak, Wars of Disruption and Resilience.
Derek Reverson, ed., Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and
Power in a Virtual World.
Jeff Carr, Inside Cyberwarfare.
Frank Kramer, ed., Cyberpower and National Security.
Patrick Morgan, unpublished paper on cyberwar.
10. CHINA’S MILITARY RISE AND EAST ASIAN STABILITY
*Thomas Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,
chaps tba.
*Aaron Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, entire.
*Jonathan Holslag, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise.
*Adam Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military
Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security, Fall
2014, Vol. 39, #2, pp. 52-92.
*Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise
and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security, Vol. 38, #4 (Spring
2014), pp. 115-150.
*Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, #4
(Spring 2015), pp. 49-91.
Sarah Raine and Christain Le Miere, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea
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Disputes.
*Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long
Haul, Political Science Quarterly (Fall 2010), pp. 359-391.
*Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in
U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Spring 2013, pp. 49-90.
*M. Taylor Fravel, “Prepared Statement before House Committee on Foreign Affairs,”
March 28, 2012.
*Aaron Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” The National Interest,
July/August 2011, pp. 18-27.
*Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China,” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2011, pp. 54-67.
*Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Asia Pivot,” Foreign Affairs,
November/December 2012, pp. 70-83.
*Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013 (online at www.defenselink.gov).
Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities – Background Issues for Congress, August 26, 2011, Congressional
Research Service, online at www.crs.gov.
Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International
Security, Spring 2013, pp. 7-49.
Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century.
11. INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, INTERVENTION, AND NATION
BUILDING (not covered this year)
*Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare,
chaps. tba.
*Christopher Paul, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, Vols. 1 and 2, chaps tba.
(available online at rand.org.)
*Ben Connalbe and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End, RAND, (available online at
rand.org).
*Monica Duffey Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” International
Security, Spring 2010, pp. 7-37.
*Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free: Why Foreign-Imposed
Regime Chance Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security, Spring 2013,
pp. 90-132.
15
*Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, Winter 2009, pp. 67-106.
*The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, University of
Chicago edition, foreward by John Nagl, introduction by Sarah Sewall, and chapter 1.
*Alexander B. Downes, “Introduction: Modern Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in
Comparative Perspective,” Civil Wars, Vol. 9, (December 2007), pp. 313-323.
*David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla.
* Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, entire.
*Angel Rabasa et al, Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past COIN
Operations, RAND, entire.
*James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 97 (February 2003), pp. 75-90.
*Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” World Politics, Vol. 27
(January 1975), pp. 175-200.
Edward Lutwak, “Dead End – Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,”
Haper’s Magazine, February 2007, pp. 33-42.
*T. E. Lawrence, “Guerilla,” entry in 1929 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, at
http://www.britannica.com/original/print?content_id=1365.
*Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,”
International Security, Vol. 26 (Summer 2001), pp. 93-28.
*David Edelstein, “Occupational Hazard: Why Military Occupations Succeed for
Fail,” International Security,
*James Dobbins, et.al, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,
chaps. tba. (available online from www.rand.org).
*James Dobbins, et. al., The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, chaps. tba (available
online from www.rand.org).
*Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 19451993,” American Political Science Review, Vo. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681690.
*Chaim Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions
in the Twentieth Century,” International Security, Vol. 23 (Fall 1998), pp. 120-157.
*Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International
Organization, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 335-364.
Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.
16
Alan Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1
(January/February 2000), pp. 94-119.
John A. Nagi, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from
Malaya and Vietnam.
Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms – The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy.
James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters (Winter
1995-96), pp. 59-69.
Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Rand, 2004, pdf file.
Andrew Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam.
Charles wolf, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities,”
RAND, July 1965, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3132-1/.
Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality and Insurgency,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 81 (June 1987), pp. 426-451.
Stathis Kalvyvas, “`New’ and `Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” World Politics,
Vol 54 (October 2001), pp. 99-118.
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (1964),
excerpts at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp.
U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Wahsington DC USMC, 1940), at
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/index.htm.
Ralph Peters, “In Praise of Attrition,” Parameters (Summer 2004), pp. 24-32, at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04summer/peters.htm.
Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army.
Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failure of
France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam.
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (Brahimi Report), online at
www.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/docs/part1.htm.
13. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (not covered this year)
*Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,
introduction, conclusion, and selected case studies.
*Bruce Jentlesen and Christopher Whytock, “Who ‘Won” Libya? The ForceDiplomacy Debate and Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security,
(Winter 2005-06).
*Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North
Korean Nuclear Crisis, chap. 12.
17
*Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in Crocker, Hampson, and
Aall, eds., Leashing the Dogs of War, pp. 299-319.
*Sumit Ganguly and Michael Kraig, “The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing
the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies, Vol. 14 (April-June 2005), pp. 290325.
Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers.
Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly..
Alexander George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, chapters 1-8 and pp. 267-294.
Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion.