TEDESCHI ED IMPERO OTTOMANO
Otto Liman von Sanders
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Otto Liman von Sanders
February 17, 1855 - August 22, 1929
Generalleutnant Otto Liman von Sanders
Place of birth
Place of death
Allegiance
Service/branch
Rank
Battles/wars
Stolp, Pomerania
Munich
German Empire
Army
General
World War I
Otto Liman von Sanders, Hans-Joachim Buddecke, and Oswald Boelcke in Turkey, 1916
Generalleutnant Otto Liman von Sanders (February 17, 1855 - August 22, 1929) was a German
general who served as adviser and military commander for the Ottoman Empire during World War
I.
He was born in Stolp in Pomerania. His father was a Prussian nobleman.[1] Like many other
Prussians from aristocratic families, he joined the military and rose through the ranks to Lieutenant
General. Like several Prussian generals before him (e.g., Von Moltke and Baron von der Goltz), he
was appointed the head of a German military mission to the Ottoman Empire in 1913. For nearly
eighty years, the Ottoman Empire had been trying to modernize their army along European lines.
Liman von Sanders would be the last German to attempt this task.
Initially Liman formed a very low opinion of the Ottoman army and its political leadership. In July
1914 (with the war about to start), Enver Pasha offered an alliance, of a sort, with Germany. The
German ambassador in Istanbul, Hans von Wangenheim, after consulting with Liman von Sanders,
refused Enver's offer. The analysis was that the Ottoman army was weak, the government had little
money to spend, and the leadership was incompetent. However, on 1 August 1914 the Germans and
the Ottoman government did sign a secret treaty of alliance; included in the provisions of the treaty
was that the German military mission would wield "effective influence" over the military operations
of the Ottoman armies. [2] At first, this influence was nearly zero. But when Enver Pasha and
Djemal Pasha both suffered defeats, the German military mission took increasing control over the
Ottoman armies.
When the Ottoman forces finally entered the war (after trying to avoid open conflict with the
Alliance for two months), Enver Pasha showed Liman his grand scheme to destroy the Russian
army defending Kars. Liman tried to dissuade Enver from implementing the plan, but his advice
was ignored and Enver Pasha personally led the Ottoman army into its worst defeat of World War I
at the Battle of Sarikamis. Cemal Pasha was given the task of attacking the Suez Canal; his personal
military advisor was the German Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein. The attack on the Suez
also failed, although without enormous losses.
A shaken Enver Pasha returned to Istanbul and took command of the Ottoman army in the area
around the capital. However immediately after a huge British and French fleet destroyed the
Ottoman forts along the Dardanelles (18 March 1915), Enver turned over command to Liman von
Sanders. Defending the Ottoman government was now in the hands of the German general.
Main article: Naval operations in the Dardanelles Campaign
Main article: Battle of Gallipoli
Liman had little time to organize the defences, but he had two things in his favor. First, the Ottoman
5th Army was the best army they had, some 84,000 well-equipped soldiers in six divisions. Second,
he was helped by poor Allied leadership. Instead of using their massive fleet to force a passage
through the straits to Istanbul, the British and French admirals called for ground troops to capture
the Dardanelles peninsula so their battleships could sail on into the Sea of Marmara unmolested.
Liman had just over a month to prepare. Then, on 23 April 1915, the British landed a major force at
Cape Helles. One of Liman's best decisions during this time was to promote Mustafa Kemal (later
known as Atatürk) to commander of the 19th division. Kemal's division literally saved the day for
the Ottomans. His troops marched up on the day of the invasion and occupied the ridge line above
the ANZAC landing site, just as the ANZAC troops were moving up the slope themselves. Kemal
recognized the danger and personally made sure his troops held the ridge line. They were never
forced off despite constant attacks for the next five months.
From April to November 1915 (when the decision to evacuate was made), Liman had to fight off
numerous attacks against his defensive positions. The British tried another landing at Suvla Bay,
but this also was halted by the Ottoman defenders. The only bright spot for the British in this entire
operation was that they managed to evacuate their positions without much loss. However, this battle
was a major victory for the Ottoman army and some of the credit is given to the generalship of
Liman von Sanders.
Early in 1915, the previous head of the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire, Baron von
der Goltz arrived in Istanbul as military advisor to the (essentially powerless) Sultan, Mehmed V.
The old Baron did not get along with Liman von Sanders and did not like the three Pashas (Enver
Pasha, Cemal Pasha and Talat) who ran the Ottoman Empire during the war. The Baron proposed
some major offensives against the British, but these proposals came to nothing in the face of Allied
offensives against the Ottomans on three fronts (the Dardanelles, the Caucusus Front, and the newly
opened Mesopotamian Front). Liman was rid of the old Baron when Enver Pasha sent him to fight
the British in Mesopotamia in October 1915. (Goltz died there six months later just before the
British army at Kut surrendered).
In 1918, the last year of the war, Liman von Sanders took over command of the Ottoman army in
Palestine, replacing the German General Erich von Falkenhayn who had been defeated by British
General Allenby at the end of 1917.
Main article: Sinai and Palestine Campaign
Liman was hampered by the significant decline in power of the Ottoman army. His forces were
unable to do anything more than occupy defensive positions and wait for the British attack. The
attack was a long time in coming, but when General Allenby finally unleashed his army, the entire
Ottoman army was destroyed in a week of fighting (see the Battle of Megiddo). In the rout, Liman
was nearly captured by British soldiers.
After the war ended he was arrested in Malta in February 1919 on charges of having committed war
crimes, but he was released six months later. He retired from the German army that year.
In 1927 he published a book he had written in captivity in Malta about his experiences before and
during the war (there is an English translation[3]). Two years later Otto Liman von Sanders died in
Munich at the age of seventy-four.
References
1. ^ Bernt Engelmann,"Germany without Jews". Translated from German by D.J. Beer, New York:
Bantam Books, 1984, p. 132
2. ^ A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern
Middle East David Fromkin. Owl Books. 636 pages. 2001. ISBN 0-8050-6884-8

^ Five years in Turkey Otto Viktor Karl Liman von Sanders. 326 pages. United States Naval
Gallipoli Campaign
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Battle of Gallipoli)
Campaign
Part of the Middle Eastern Theatre (First World
War)
Gallipoli Campaign, April 1915.
Date
Location
Result
25 April 1915 – 6 January 1916
Gallipoli peninsula, Turkey
Decisive Ottoman victory
Belligerents
British Empire





Australia
British India
Newfoundland
New Zealand
United
Kingdom
Ottoman Empire
Germany[2]
Austria-Hungary[3]
[nb 1]
France

French West
Africa
Commanders
Otto Liman von
Sanders
Mustafa Kemal
Esat Paşa
Strength
5 divisions (initial)
6 divisions (initial)
16 divisions (final)[citation 15 divisions (final)[citation
Sir Ian Hamilton
Lord Kitchener
John de Robeck
needed]
needed]
Casualties and losses
220,000, 59% casualty
300,000 60% Casualty
rate[4]
rate[5]
[show]
v•d•e
Gallipoli Campaign
[show]
v•d•e
Theatres of World War I
The Gallipoli Campaign took place at Gallipoli peninsula in Turkey from 25 April 1915 to 9
January 1916, during the First World War. A joint British Empire and French operation was
mounted to capture the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, and secure a sea route to Russia. The attempt
failed, with heavy casualties on both sides.
In Turkey, the campaign is known as the Çanakkale Savaşları, after the province of Çanakkale. In
the United Kingdom, it is called the Dardanelles Campaign or Gallipoli. In France it is called Les
Dardanelles. In Australia,[6] New Zealand[7] and Newfoundland,[8] it is known as the Gallipoli
Campaign or simply as Gallipoli. It is also known as the Battle of Gallipoli.
The Gallipoli campaign resonated profoundly among all nations involved. In Turkey, the battle is
perceived as a defining moment in the history of the Turkish people—a final surge in the defence of
the motherland as the centuries-old Ottoman Empire was crumbling. The struggle laid the grounds
for the Turkish War of Independence and the foundation of the Turkish Republic eight years later
under Atatürk, himself a commander at Gallipoli.
In Australia and New Zealand, the campaign was the first major battle undertaken by a joint
military formation, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), and is often considered
to mark the birth of national consciousness in both of these countries. Anzac Day (25 April)
remains the most significant commemoration of military casualties and veterans in Australia and
New Zealand, surpassing Armistice Day/Remembrance Day.
Contents
[hide]



1 Prelude
2 Naval attacks
3 Invasion
o 3.1 Ottoman preparations
o













3.2 Landings
4 The early battles
5 August offensive
6 Evacuation
7 Aftermath
8 Political repercussions
9 Conditions
10 Casualties
11 Popular influence
12 See also
13 Notes
14 References
15 Further reading
16 External links
Prelude
The Allies were keen to open an effective supply route to Russia: efforts on the Eastern Front
relieved pressure on the Western Front. Germany and Austria-Hungary blocked Russia's land trade
routes to Europe, while no easy sea route existed. The White Sea in the north and the Sea of
Okhotsk in the Far East were distant from the Eastern Front and often icebound. The Baltic Sea was
blocked by Germany's formidable Kaiserliche Marine. The Black Sea's only entrance was through
the Bosporus, which was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottoman Empire joined the
Central Powers in October 1914, Russia could no longer be supplied from the Mediterranean Sea.
By late 1914, the Western Front, in France and Belgium, had effectively become a stalemate. A new
front was desperately needed. Also, the Allies hoped that an attack on the Ottomans would draw
Bulgaria and Greece into the war on the Allied side. However, an early proposal to use Greek
troops to invade the Gallipoli peninsula was vetoed by Russia as its South Slavic allies would feel
threatened by an expansion of Greek power and influence.
A first proposal to attack Turkey had already been suggested by French Minister of Justice Aristide
Briand in November 1914, but it was not supported. A suggestion by British Naval Intelligence
(Room 39) to bribe the Turks over to the Allied side was not taken up.
Later in November 1914, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill put forward his first plans
for a naval attack on the Dardanelles, based at least in part on what turned out to be erroneous
reports regarding Turkish troop strength, as prepared by Lieut. T. E. Lawrence. He reasoned that the
Royal Navy had a large number of obsolete battleships which could not be used against the German
High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, but which might well be made useful in another theatre. Initially,
the attack was to be made by the Royal Navy alone, with only token forces from the army being
required for routine occupation tasks.
Panoramic view of the Dardanelles fleet
Naval attacks
Main article: Naval operations in the Dardanelles Campaign
Turkish battery at Gallipoli
On 19 February, the first attack on the Dardanelles began when a strong Anglo-French task force,
including the British battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, bombarded Turkish artillery along the coast.
Many believed victory to be inevitable. Admiral Carden sent a cable to Churchill on 4 March,
stating that the fleet could expect to arrive in Istanbul within fourteen days.[9] A sense of impending
victory was heightened by the interception of a German wireless message which revealed the
Ottoman Dardanelle forts were close to running out of ammunition.[9] When the message was
relayed to Carden, it was agreed a main attack would be launched on or around 17 March. It
transpired that Carden, suffering from stress, was placed on the sick list by the medical officer,
meaning the fleet was now placed in command of Admiral de Robeck.
On 18 March the main attack was launched. The fleet, comprising 18 battleships as well as an array
of cruisers and destroyers, sought to target the narrowest point of the Dardanelles where the straits
are just a mile wide. Despite some damage sustained by ships engaging the Ottoman forts,
minesweepers were ordered to proceed along the straits. According to an account by the Turkish
General Staff, by 2pm "All telephone wires were cut, all communications with the forts were
interrupted, some of the guns had been knocked out... in consequence the artillery fire of the
defense had slackened considerably"[10]. The French ship Bouvet was sunk by a mine, causing it to
capsize with its entire crew aboard. Minesweepers, manned by civilians and under constant fire of
Ottoman shells, retreated leaving the minefields largely intact. HMS Irresistible and HMS Inflexible
both sustained critical damage from mines, although there was confusion during the battle whether
torpedoes were to blame. HMS Ocean, sent to rescue the Irresistible, was itself struck by an
explosion and both ships eventually sank.[11] The French battleships Suffren and Gaulois were also
badly damaged. All the ships had sailed through a new line of mines placed secretly by the
defenders 10 days before.
The losses prompted the Allies to cease any further attempts to force the straits by naval power
alone. Losses had been anticipated during the planning of the campaign, so mainly obsolete
battleships had been sent which were unfit to face the German fleet, but many naval officers
including de Robeck and Fisher did not consider the losses acceptable. The defeat of the British
fleet had also given the Turks a morale boost, although their gunners had almost run out of
ammunition before the British fleet retreated. The reasons for the decision to turn back are
unclear— if the British had pushed forward with the naval attack, as Churchill demanded, then
Gallipoli might not have been a defeat. On the other hand, it is possible that they would simply have
trapped themselves in the Sea of Marmara, with insufficient force to take Istanbul and a minefield
between themselves and the Mediterranean Sea.
Invasion
After the failure of the naval attacks, it was decided that ground forces were necessary to eliminate
the Turkish mobile artillery. This would allow minesweepers to clear the waters for the larger
vessels. The British Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, appointed General Sir Ian Hamilton
to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force that was to carry out the mission.
In early 1915, Australian and New Zealand volunteer soldiers were encamped in Egypt, undergoing
training prior to being sent to France. The infantry were formed into the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), which comprised the Australian 1st Division and the New Zealand
and Australian Division. General Hamilton also had the regular British 29th Division, the Royal
Naval Division (RND) (Royal Marines and hastily drafted naval recruits) and the French Oriental
Expeditionary Corps (including four Senegalese battalions) under his command.
Ottoman preparations
Disposition of Turkish 5th Army
Heavy artillery from the German armoured cruiser Roon, 1915
There was a delay of over six weeks before many of the troops arrived from Britain, allowing
Turkish forces time to prepare for a land assault. Ottoman commanders began to debate the best
means of defending the peninsula. All agreed that the most effective form of defence was to hold
the highground on the ridges of the peninsula, there was disagreement however as to where they
believed the enemy would land, and hence where to concentrate their own forces. Mustafa Kemal, a
34 year old Lt.-Col., familiar with the Gallipoli peninsula from his operations against Bulgaria in
the Balkan War,[12] believed Cape Helles, the southern tip of the peninsula, and Gaba Tepe would
be the two most likely areas for landing. In the case of the former, Kemal perceived the British
would use their navy to command the land from every side which the tip of the peninsula would
allow. In Gaba Tepe, the short distance to the eastern coast meant forces could easily reach the
Narrows.
Ultimately, Otto Liman von Sanders disagreed. In his view, the greatest danger posed was in Besika
Bay on the Asiatic coast, where Sanders believed British forces would benefit from more accessible
terrain and target the most important Ottoman batteries guarding the straits.[13] As such, Sanders
placed two divisions, a third of the total force of the fifth army, in this area.[13] Two more divisions
were concentrated at Bulair at the northern isthmus of the peninsula, where he believed that should
the area be captured, vital supply and communications lines would be cut.[14] Finally, at Cape
Helles, on the tip of the peninsula, and along the Aegean coast, two more divisions were placed in
the form of the Ninth and Nineteenth division, the latter of which was placed under the command of
Mustafa Kemal. For von Sanders, the bulk of the forces were to be held inland with minor coastal
defences spread across the peninsula. The strategy drew complaints from Turkish commanders,
including Mustafa Kemal, who believed Turkish forces were too widely dispersed and not in a
position to drive the attackers immediately into the sea as soon as their invasion commenced.[15]
The delay in landings by the British allowed Turkish officers to prepare defenses. Von Sanders
notes "The British allowed us four good weeks of respite for all this work before their great
disembarkation...This respite just sufficed for the most indispensable measures to be taken."[16]
Roads were constructed, small boats assembled to carry troops and equipment across the narrows,
beaches were wired and makeshift mines constructed from torpedo-heads. Trenches and gun
emplacements were dug along the beaches whilst troops were regularly taken on long marches to
avoid lethargy.[16] Mustafa Kemal, whose Nineteenth division would become pivotal in the battle,
observed the beaches and awaited signs of an invasion from his post at Boghali, near Maidos.
Landings
Main articles: Landing at Anzac Cove – Landing at Cape Helles
The invasion plan of 25 April 1915 was for the 29th Division to land at Helles on the tip of the
peninsula and then advance upon the forts at Kilitbahir. The Anzacs were to land north of Gaba
Tepe on the Aegean coast from where they could advance across the peninsula and prevent retreat
from or reinforcement of Kilitbahir. The small cove around and in which they landed became
known as Anzac Cove. This sector of the Gallipoli Peninsula became known as 'Anzac'; the area
held by the British and French became known as the 'Helles sector' or simply 'Helles'. The French
made a diversionary landing at Kum Kale on the Asian shore before re-embarking to hold the
eastern area of the Helles sector. There was also a diversion by the Royal Naval Division, including
a one-man diversion by Bernard Freyberg, a three-star General in WW2, at Bulair.
Cape Helles landing beaches.
The Helles landing was made by the 29th Division under the command of Major-General Aylmer
Hunter-Weston, on five beaches in an arc about the tip of the peninsula, designated from east to
west as S, V, W, X and Y beach. The Jewish Legion also landed at Helles on the 25th, as well as a
regiment of British Gurkhas, specifically the 6th Gurkha Rifles, the latter of which took and secured
Sari Bair above the landing beaches.[17]
The commander of the Y Beach landing was able to walk unopposed to within 500 metres of
Krithia village, which was deserted. The British never got so close again. Y Beach was eventually
evacuated the following day as Turkish reinforcements arrived.
The main landings were made at V Beach, beneath the old Seddülbahir fortress, and at W Beach, a
short distance to the west on the other side of the Helles headland.
At V Beach the covering force from the Royal Munster Fusiliers and Royal Hampshires was landed
from a converted collier, SS River Clyde, which was run aground beneath the fortress so that the
troops could disembark directly via ramps to the shore. The Royal Dublin Fusiliers would land at V
Beach from open boats. At W Beach the Lancashire Fusiliers also landed in open boats on a small
beach overlooked by dunes and obstructed with barbed wire. On both beaches the Turkish
defenders were in a position to inflict appalling casualties on the landing infantry. The troops
emerging one by one from the sally ports on the River Clyde presented perfect targets to the
machine guns in the Seddülbahir fort. Out of the first 200 soldiers to disembark, only 21 men made
it onto the beach.[18]
As at Anzac, the Turkish defenders were too few to force the British off the beach. At W Beach,
thereafter known as Lancashire Landing, the Lancashires were able to overwhelm the defences
despite their dreadful losses, 600 killed or wounded out of a total strength of 1,000. The battalions
that landed at V Beach suffered about 70% casualties. Six awards of the Victoria Cross were made
amongst the Lancashires at W Beach. Six Victoria Crosses were also awarded amongst the infantry
and sailors at the V Beach landing and a further three were awarded the following day as they
finally fought their way off the beach. During the fighting in this sector, Sergeant Yahya with five
squads of infantry particularly distinguished themselves. The Turkish platoon beat back several
determined attacks on their hilltop position, until the defiant defenders disengaged under the cover
of darkness. [19]After the landings, there were so few of the Dublin Fusiliers and Munster Fusiliers
left that they were amalgamated into one unit, "The Dubsters". Only one Dubliner officer survived
the landing; overall, of the 1,012 Dubliners who landed, only 11 would survive the entire Gallipoli
campaign unscathed.
The early battles
Anzac, the landing 1915 by George Lambert, 1922 shows the landing at Anzac Cove, 25 April 1915
On the afternoon of 27 April Kemal launched a concerted attack to drive the Anzacs back to the
beach. With the support of naval gunfire, the Turks were held off throughout the night.
On 28 April, the British, now supported by the French on the right of the line, intended to capture
Krithia in what became known as the First Battle of Krithia. The plan of attack was overly complex
and poorly communicated to the commanders in the field. The troops of the 29th Division were still
exhausted and unnerved by the battle for the beaches and for Seddülbahir village, captured after
heavy fighting on 26 April. The attack ground to a halt around 6 pm with a gain of some ground but
the objective of Krithia village was not reached. After the battle, the Allied trenches lay about
halfway between the Helles headland and Krithia village. With Turkish opposition stiffening by the
day, the opportunity for the anticipated swift victory on the peninsula was disappearing. Helles, like
Anzac, became a siege. Strong Turkish counter-attacks on the nights of 1 May and 3 May were
repulsed despite breaking through the French defences.
The first attempt at an offensive at Anzac took place on the evening of 2 May when New Zealand
and Australian Division commander, General Godley, ordered the Australian 4th Infantry Brigade,
commanded by General John Monash, and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, to attack from
Russell's Top and Quinn's Post towards Baby 700. The troops advanced a short distance during the
night and tried to dig in to hold their gains but were forced to retreat by the night of 3 May, having
suffered about 1,000 casualties.
Believing Anzac to be secure, Hamilton moved two brigades, the Australian Second Infantry
Brigade and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, to the Helles front as reserves for the Second Battle
of Krithia starting on 6 May. This was the first major assault at Helles and gained about a quarter of
a mile on a wide front at the now customary enormous cost in casualties.
The Turks launched a major assault at Anzac on 19 May—42,000 Turks attacked 17,000
Australians and New Zealanders—but the attack miscarried. Lacking sufficient artillery and
ammunition, the Turks relied on surprise and weight of numbers for success but their preparations
were detected and the defenders were ready. When it was over the Turks had suffered about 13,000
casualties, of which 3,000 were killed.[20]In comparison, the Australian casualties were 160 killed
and 468 wounded. The Turkish losses were so severe that a truce was organized by Aubrey Herbert
and others on 24 May in order to bury the large numbers of dead lying in no man's land. This
momentary contact led to a strange camaraderie between the armies much like the Christmas truce
of 1914. It was not repeated formally.
The Sphinx, one of the battlefield's most distinctive physical landmarks
In May the British naval artillery advantage was diminished following the torpedoing of the
battleship HMS Goliath on 13 May by Turkish torpedo boat Muavenet-i Milliye. Shortly after
German submarine SM U-21 sank HMS Triumph on 25 May and HMS Majestic on 27 May.
Following these losses much of the battleship support was withdrawn and those remaining would
fire while under way, reducing their accuracy and effectiveness.
The Turkish forces in the meantime found themselves in an unenviable position, with not enough
artillery ammunition stocks to allow them to soften the Allied defenders thoroughly prior to
launching counterattacks aimed at breaking their defenses. Turkish field batteries were only able to
fire approximately 18,000 artillery rounds between early May and first week of June.[21]
By the end of the Third Battle of Krithia on 4 June, all thought of a decisive breakthrough was gone
and the plans for battle had reverted to trench warfare with objectives being measured in hundreds
of metres. Casualties ran to around 25% for both sides; the British suffering 4,500 from an attacking
force of 20,000.
In June, a fresh division, the 52nd Division, began to land at Helles in time to participate in the last
of the major Helles battles, the Battle of Gully Ravine which was launched on 28 June. This battle
advanced the British line along the left (Aegean) flank of the battlefield which resulted in a rare but
limited victory for the Allies. However, Major-General Liman von Sanders has asserted that the
British attack was repelled. He credited the successful defence to two Turkish officers, Faik Pasa
and Albay Refet.[21] Between 1 July and 5 July the Turks launched a series of desperate counterattacks against the new British line but failed to regain the lost ground. Their casualties for the
period were horrendous, estimated at in excess of 14,000.
One final British action was made at Helles on 12 July before the Allied main effort was shifted
north to Anzac. Two fresh brigades from the 52nd Division were thrown into an attack in the centre
of the line along Achi Baba Nullah (known as Bloody Valley) and sustained 30% casualties without
making any significant progress.
August offensive
Main article: Battle of Sari Bair
A trench at Lone Pine after the battle, showing Australian and Turkish dead on the parapet
The repeated failure of the Allies to capture Krithia or make any progress on the Helles front led
Hamilton to pursue a new plan for the campaign which resulted in what is now called the Battle of
Sari Bair. On the night of 6 August a fresh landing of two infantry divisions was to be made at
Suvla, five miles (8 km) north of Anzac. Meanwhile at Anzac a strong assault would be made on
the Sari Bair range by breaking out into the rough and thinly defended terrain north of the Anzac
perimeter.
The landing at Suvla Bay was only lightly opposed but the British commander, Lieutenant-General
Sir Frederick Stopford, had so diluted his early objectives that little more than the beach was seized.
Once again the Turks were able to win the race for the high ground of the Anafarta Hills thereby
rendering the Suvla front another case of static trench warfare.
The offensive was preceded on the evening of 6 August by diversionary assaults at Helles and
Anzac. At Helles, the diversion at Krithia Vineyard became another futile battle with no gains and
heavy casualties for both sides. At Anzac, an attack on the Turkish trenches at Lone Pine by the
infantry brigades of the Australian 1st Division was a rare victory for the ANZACs. However, the
main assault aimed at the peaks of Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 was less successful.
The force striking for the nearer peak of Chunuk Bair comprised the New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
It came within 500 metres of the peak by dawn on 7 August but was not able to seize the summit
until the following morning. This delay had fatal consequences for another supporting attack on the
morning of 7 August; that of the Australian 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek which was to
coincide with the New Zealanders attacking back down from Chunuk Bair against the rear of the
Turkish defences. The New Zealanders held out on Chunuk Bair for two days before relief was
provided by two New Army battalions from the Wiltshire and Loyal North Lancashire Regiments.
A massive Turkish counter-attack, led in person by Mustafa Kemal, swept these two battalions from
the heights.
Of the 760 men of the New Zealanders' Wellington Battalion who reached the summit, 711 were
casualties.
Another planned attack on Hill 971 never took place. The attacking force of the Australian 4th
Infantry Brigade (General J. Monash) and an Indian brigade was defeated by the terrain and became
lost during the night. All subsequent attempts to resume the attack were easily repulsed by the
Turkish defenders at great cost to the Allies.
The Suvla landing was reinforced by the arrival of the British 53rd and 54th Divisions along with
the British 10th Division from Kitchener's New Army Divisions plus the dismounted yeomanry of
the 2nd Mounted Division. The unfortunate 29th Division was also shifted from Helles to Suvla for
one more push. The final British attempt to resuscitate the offensive came on 21 August with
attacks at Scimitar Hill and Hill 60. Control of these hills would have united the Anzac and Suvla
fronts but neither battle achieved success. When fighting at Hill 60 ceased on 29 August, the battle
for the Sari Bair heights, and indeed the battle for the peninsula, was effectively over.
Inertia set in. Alan Moorehead records that one old Turkish batman was regularly permitted to hang
his platoon's washing on the barbed wire without attracting fire, and that there was a "constant
traffic" of gifts being thrown across no-man's land: dates and sweets from the Turkish side, and
cans of beef and cigarettes from the ANZAC side.
See Also: Battle of Krithia Vineyard – Battle of Lone Pine – Battle of Chunuk Bair – Battle of the
Nek – Battle of Scimitar Hill – Battle of Hill 60
Evacuation
W Beach, Helles, on 7 January, 1916 just prior to the final evacuation
Following the failure of the August Offensive, the Gallipoli campaign entered a hiatus while the
future direction was debated. The persistent lack of progress was finally making an impression in
the United Kingdom as contrasting news of the true nature of the campaign was smuggled out by
journalists like Keith Murdoch and Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett discrediting Hamilton's performance.
Disaffected senior officers such as General Stopford also contributed to the general air of gloom.
The prospect of evacuation was raised on 11 October 1915 but Hamilton resisted the suggestion,
fearing the damage to British prestige. He was dismissed as commander shortly afterwards and
replaced by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Monro.
The situation was complicated by the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central
Powers. On 5 October 1915 the British opened a second Mediterranean front at Salonika which
would compete for reinforcements with Gallipoli. Also Germany would now have a direct land
route to Turkey, enabling it to supply heavy siege artillery which would devastate the Allied trench
network, especially on the confined front at Anzac.
Having reviewed the state of his command, Monro recommended evacuation. Kitchener disliked the
notion of evacuating the peninsula and made a personal visit to consult with the commanders of the
three corps; VIII Corps at Helles, IX Corps at Suvla and Anzac. The decision to evacuate was made.
Evacuation of 14 divisions in winter in proximity to the enemy would be difficult and heavy losses
were expected. The untenable nature of the Allied position was made apparent when a heavy rainstorm struck on 27 November 1915 and lasted for three days, followed by a blizzard at Suvla in
early December. The rain flooded trenches, drowning soldiers and washing unburied corpses into
the lines. The following snow killed yet more men from exposure.
Ironically the evacuation was the greatest Allied success of the campaign. Suvla and Anzac were to
be evacuated in late December, the last troops leaving before dawn on 20 December 1915. Troop
numbers had been progressively reduced since 7 December 1915 and cunning ruses, such as
William Scurry's self-firing rifle (described below), were used to fool the Turks and prevent them
discovering that the Allies were departing. At Anzac, the troops would maintain utter silence for an
hour or more until the curious Turks would venture out to inspect the trenches, whereupon the
Anzacs would open fire. As the numbers in the trenches were thinned, rifles were rigged to fire by
water dripped into a pan attached to the trigger. The entire Allied force was evacuated, but large
quanties of supplies and stores fell into Turkish hands. [22] Helles was retained in case the British
wanted to resume the offensive. However, a decision to evacuate there also was made on 27
December. The Turks were now warned of the likelihood of evacuation and mounted an attack on 6
January 1916 but were repulsed. The last British troops departed from Lancashire Landing on 9
January 1916. Amazingly, only two troops were lost during the evacuation despite the prior
warnings of 50% casualties from Sir Ian Hamilton.
Aftermath
Memorial of Anzac Cove, commemorating the loss of thousands of Turkish and Anzac soldiers in
Gallipoli.
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives… you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country.
Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets where they lie side by
side here in this country of ours… You the mothers who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away
your tears. Your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. Having lost their lives on this land they
have become our sons as well.
—Atatürk 1934
The Ottoman victory over the Allies at Gallipoli renewed Turkey's visions for the empire. In
Mesopotamia the Turks surrounded a British expedition at Kut Al Amara, forcing their surrender in
1916. From southern Palestine the Turks pushed into the Sinai with the aim of capturing the Suez
Canal and driving the British from Egypt. Defeat at the Battle of Romani marked the end of that
ambition and for the remainder of the war the British were on the offensive in the Middle East.
After the evacuation, Allied troops reformed and regrouped in Egypt. The Anzacs underwent a
major reorganization; the infantry were expanded and bound for the Western Front, the light horse
were reunited with their horses and formed into mounted divisions for operations in the Sinai and
Palestine. At the Battle of Beersheba they would finally achieve the decisive break-through victory
that had eluded the Allies on Gallipoli.
Amongst the generals, Gallipoli marked the end for Hamilton and Stopford but Hunter-Weston was
granted another opportunity to lead the VIII Corps on the first day of the Battle of the Somme. The
competence of Australian brigade commanders, John Monash and Henry Chauvel, would be
recognized with promotion to the command of divisions and ultimately corps. Lord Kitchener was
too popular to be punished, but he never recovered his old reputation for invincibility and was
increasingly sidelined by his colleagues until his death the following year.
On the Turkish side, the meteoric rise of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) began at Gallipoli.
Political repercussions
The failure of the landings had significant repercussions in the UK, which began even as the battle
was still in progress. The First Sea Lord, John Fisher resigned in May after bitter conflict with
Winston Churchill over the campaign. The crisis that followed forced the Prime Minister, Herbert
Asquith to end his single-party Liberal Government and form a Coalition Government with the
Conservative Party.
Churchill was demoted from First Lord of the Admiralty as a prerequisite for Conservative entry to
the coalition; although retained in the Cabinet, he was given the sinecure job of Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, from which he resigned at the end of 1915, departing for the Western Front
where he commanded an infantry battalion early in 1916. Asquith was partly blamed for Gallipoli
and other disasters, and was overthrown in December 1916 when David Lloyd George successfully
split the Liberal Party in two. Lloyd George formed a new government, in which Churchill, active
in the House of Commons again in late 1916, was not offered a place; he was eventually appointed
Minister of Munitions in the middle of 1917, although he was not a member of the small War
Cabinet and no longer had the influence over war strategy which he had earlier enjoyed.
The Dardanelles Commission was established in 1916 to investigate the failure of the expedition. Its
final report was issued in 1919, concluding that the adventure had been badly planned and
difficulties underestimated, and that government had exacerbated problems through its
procrastination. However its censures did not damage careers measurably, further than they already
had been.[23]
Some people, such as Winston Churchill, have also argued that the landings may have helped
accelerate the genocide of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire during 1915.[24][25]
Conditions
The conditions at Gallipoli, on both sides, have become notorious. In the Summer, the heat was
atrocious, and in conjunction with bad sanitation, led to so many flies that eating became extremely
difficult. Corpses, left in the open, became bloated and stank. The precarious Allied bases were
poorly situated and caused supply and shelter problems. A dysentery epidemic spread through the
Allied trenches in both Anzac and Helles. Autumn and Winter brought relief from the heat, but also
led to gales, flooding and frostbite.[26]
Casualties
There were nearly half a million
casualties during the campaign,
according to the Australian
Department of Veterans' Affairs.[27] In
addition to these casualties, many
soldiers became sick due to the
unsanitary conditions, especially from
enteric fever, dysentery and diarrhea.
It is estimated that 145,000 more
British soldiers became ill during the
campaign.
Amongst the dead of the battle was
the brilliant young physicist Henry
Moseley. Also the poet Rupert
Brooke, serving with the Royal Naval
Gallipoli casualties
Source: Australian Department of Veterans' Affairs[27]
Died
Wounded Total
Total Allies 44,092
96,937 141,029
- United Kingdom 21,255
52,230 73,485
- France (estimated) 10,000
17,000 27,000
- Australia[4]
8,709
- New Zealand[4]
2,721
4,752
7,473
- India
1,358
3,421
4,779
- Newfoundland
49
93
142
19,441 28,150
Ottoman empire (estimated) 86,692
164,617 251,309
Total (both sides) 130,784
237,290 336,048
Division, died shortly before the invasion from a septic mosquito bite.
No chemical weapons were used at Gallipoli,[28] although they were used against Turkish troops in
the Middle Eastern theatre two years later during the second and third battles of Gaza in 1917.[29][30]
There were allegations that Allied forces had attacked or bombarded Turkish hospitals and hospital
ships on several occasions between the start of the campaign and September 1915. By July 1915,
there were 25 Ottoman hospitals with a total of 10,700 beds, and three hospital ships in the area.
The French Government disputed these complaints (made through the Red Cross during the war),
and the British response was that if it happened then it was accidental. Russia in turn claimed that
the Turks had attacked two of their hospital ships, Portugal and Vperiod, and the Ottoman
Government responded that the vessels had been the victims of naval mines.[31]
The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) is responsible for developing and
maintaining permanent cemeteries for all Commonwealth forces—United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, India, Newfoundland and others. There are 31 CWGC cemeteries on the Gallipoli
peninsula: six at Helles (plus the only solitary grave), four at Suvla and 21 at Anzac. For many of
those killed, and those who died on hospital ships and were buried at sea, there is no known grave.
These men's names are each recorded on one of five "memorials to the missing"; the Lone Pine
Memorial commemorates Australians killed in the Anzac sector; whilst the Lone Pine, Hill 60, and
Chunuk Bair Memorials commemorate New Zealanders killed at Anzac. The Twelve Tree Copse
Memorial commemorates the New Zealanders killed in the Helles sector, and British and other
troops (including Indian and Australian) who died in the Helles sector are commemorated on the
memorial at Cape Helles. British naval casualties who were lost at sea, or buried at sea, are not
recorded on these memorials, instead they are listed on memorials in the United Kingdom.[32]
There is only one French cemetery on the Gallipoli peninsula, located near Soroz Beach, which was
the French base for the duration of the campaign.
There are two more CWGC cemeteries on the Greek island of Limnos, the first in the town of
Moudros and the second in the village of Portianou. Limnos was the hospital base for the Allied
forces and most of the buried were among the wounded who didn't survive. In the Portianou village
CWGC cemetery lies a grave with the name R.J.M. Mosley on it but it's rather unlikely to be the
known physicist Henry Moseley.
Typical Gallipoli campaign epitaph at Lone Pine Cemetery
There are no large Turkish military cemeteries on the peninsula, but there are numerous memorials,
the main ones being the Çanakkale Martyrs' Memorial at Morto Bay, Cape Helles (near S Beach),
the Turkish Soldier's Memorial on Chunuk Bair and the memorial and open-air mosque for the 57th
Regiment near Quinn's Post (Bomba Sirt). There are a number of Turkish memorials and cemeteries
on the Asian shore of the Dardanelles, demonstrating the greater emphasis Turkish history places on
the victory of March 18 over the subsequent fighting on the peninsula.
See also: List of war cemeteries and memorials on the Gallipoli Peninsula
Popular influence
The significance of the Gallipoli Campaign is perhaps most strongly felt in Australia where it was
the first great conflict experienced by that nation.[33] Before Gallipoli the citizens of Australia were
confident of the superiority of the British Empire and were proud and eager to offer their service.
Gallipoli shook that confidence, and the next three years on the Western Front would damage it
further. The ANZACs are revered as heroes and, in Australia are stereotyped as typical tough
Australians betrayed by incompetent and callous British superiors, impressions re-affirmed by films
such as Peter Weir's Gallipoli, even though, according to Australian historian Les Carlyon, "the
scale of the tragedy of the Nek was mostly the work of two Australian incompetents, Hughes and
Antill."[34].
The battle also holds strong significance in New Zealand, although the common perception is not as
negative nor anti-British as that held in Australia. Nor is the battle seen as New Zealand's 'baptism
of fire' considering the contribution of New Zealand soldiers to the Boer war that was well
publicised prior to 1914. Also it must be remembered that New Zealand itself was the scene of
many fierce battles in the New Zealand land wars which had simmered on and off between the mid
1840s and the mid 1870s.
Popular Australian history asserts that while the Federation of Australia was born in 1901, the
country's true psychological independence was only achieved at Gallipoli. ANZAC Day is
commemorated every year on the landings' anniversary, 25 April, and is a national holiday in both
Australia and New Zealand.
Increasingly, Australians treat the ANZAC legend as their own, unwittingly excluding their transtasman counterparts. John Howard, former Prime Minister of Australia, famously shunned[35]the
New Zealand ANZAC service at Gallipoli in 2005, preferring instead to spend his morning at a
barbecue on the beach with Australian soldiers. In 2009, New Zealand historians noted that some
Australian children were unaware that New Zealand was a part of ANZAC.[36]
In Turkey the battle, known after the port of Çanakkale where the Royal Navy was repulsed in
March 1915, become part of the heroic story of the nation's revered founder, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk. More widely, the ill-fated campaign is regarded as a symbol of military incompetence and
catastrophe.
There are also a couple of musical works which describe some of these events. The anti-war song
And The Band Played Waltzing Matilda, written by Eric Bogle, is about the campaign. The
bestselling novel Tell England, first published in 1922, describes the Gallipoli Campaign from the
point of view of a British junior subaltern, who saw many of his friends, including his best friend,
perish at Gallipoli.
On his 1983 album "I Haven't Changed A Bit", Slim Dusty, one of the notable Australian country
singers, published "Australia Is His Name", which occupies itself thoroughly with the incident, and
the war in particular - from an Australian point of view.
All the King's Men, a 1999 BBC film depicts the campaign. Specifically the loss of the
Sandringham company in 1915.
In 2008, the Swedish power metal/heavy metal band Sabaton released a song titled Cliffs of
Gallipoli from their album Art of War in reference to the campaign.
See also
World War I portal









Timeline of the Battle of Gallipoli
Turkish War of Independence
Gallipoli — 1981 movie
Gallipoli — 2005 documentary film
And The Band Played Waltzing Matilda — 1972 song
Gallipoli Star — Ottoman medal for gallantry
Chunuk Bair — 1991 film
Redemption by Leon Uris
Alec Campbell, the last living ANZAC at Gallipoli[37]
Notes
Footnotes
1. ^ According to historian Peter Mansfield, the British Empire troops were supported by an "Egyptian
auxiliary labour corps" of 3,000 men who performed duties such as trench digging[1]
Citations
1. ^ Mansfield, Peter (1991) A History of the Middle East, London: Penguin, p. 151.
2. ^ Dale, C. (2003-2008). "German and Austro-Hungarian Forces on Ottoman Fronts 1914-18
(follow link)". German Colonial Uniforms website.
http://www.germancolonialuniforms.co.uk/. Retrieved on 2008-12-07.
3. ^ Jung Peter, Austro-Hungarian Forces in World War 1 (Part 1),(Osprey, 2003), p.47
4. ^ a b c Dennis, Peter. "Gallipoli Campaign." Microsoft Student 2006 [DVD]. Microsoft
Corporation, 2005. Microsoft Encarta 2006. © 1993–2005 Microsoft Corporation. All rights
reserved.
5. ^ "ÇANAKKALE SAVAÞINDA 57000 ASKERÝMÝZ ÞEHÝT DÜÞTÜ" (in Turkish).
www.canakkale1915.com website. http://www.canakkale1915.com/sehitsayisi.htm.
6. ^ Bean, C.E.W. (1941) [1921]. Official Histories – First World War. Volume I – The Story
of ANZAC from the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign,
May 4, 1915 (11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. Cover page.
http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/chapter.asp?volume=2.
7. ^ "The Gallipoli Campaign". New Zealand History online website. Wellington: History
Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage. updated 22 March 2008.
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/the-gallipoli-campaign/introduction. Retrieved on 2008-1207.
8. ^ Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Web Project. "Newfoundland Regiment: Gallipoli".
Canada’s Digital Collections, Industry Canada.
http://www.heritage.nf.ca/greatwar/articles/gallipoli.html.
9. ^ a b Fromkin, 135.
10. ^ Rhodes James, 61.
11. ^ Fromkin, 151.
12. ^ Kinross, 73.
13. ^ a b Rhodes James, 74.
14. ^ Rhode James, 75.
15. ^ Rhodes James, 76
16. ^ a b Rhodes James, 77.
17. ^ "6th Gurkha Rifles". britishempire.co.uk. Luscombe, S & C.
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armyunits/gurkha/6thgurkhas.htm. Retrieved on
2009-06-19.
18. ^ "Irish battalions - major battles (Part III of XI) Helles Landings, Gallipoli, April 1915".
Royal Dublin Fusiliers: Remembering the Great War website. 2005.
http://www.greatwar.ie/mb-hel.html.
19. ^ Erickson, p. 84
20. ^ Erickson (2001), p. 87
21. ^ a b Erickson (2001), p. 89
22. ^ Erickson, p.93
23. ^ First World War.com - Encyclopedia - The Dardanelles Commission
24. ^ Robert Fisk, The Great War For Civilisation; The Conquest of the Middle East (Fourth
Estate, 2005), p. 394.
25. ^ Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath(London:Thornton Butterworth,
1927), p. 405.
26. ^ Les Carlyon, Gallipoli (Pan Macmillan, 2001), pp. 314, 515.
27. ^ a b ANZAC Day 2008 - The Gallipoli Campaign, Australian Department of Veterans'
Affairs. Accessed 24 March 2009.
28. ^ "Gallipoli Part V : Evacuation and the End of the Campaign". Turkey in the First World
War. http://www.turkeyswar.com/campaigns/gallipoli_cont4.htm. Retrieved on 2006-12-03.
29. ^ "Chemical warfare and the Palestine campaign in World War I". First World War.com.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/gaza2.htm. Retrieved on 2006-12-03.
30. ^ "Australian Military Units — Battles of Gaza". Australian War Memorial.
http://www.awm.gov.au/units/event_136.asp. Retrieved on 2006-12-03.
31. ^ Cemalettin Taskiran (18 March 2005). "Allied Attacks On Turkish Patients & Wounded".
The Journal of the Turkish Weekly. http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=52.
Retrieved on 2006-12-02.
32. ^ "Cape Helles Memorial to the Missing". Commonwealth War Graves Commission.
http://www.cwgc.org/search/cemetery_details.aspx?cemetery=76100&mode=1. Retrieved
on 2006-12-03.
33. ^ "'ANZAC Day' in London; King, Queen, and General Birdwood at Services in Abbey,"
New York Times. April 26, 1916.
34. ^ Les Carlyon, "Gallipoli", p.410, 2001.
35. ^ "Australian PM snubs NZ at Gallipoli", NZ Herald, 24th April 2005.
36. ^ "Aussies forget the NZ in ANZAC", AAP.com.au
37. ^ Shaw, John. "Alec Campbell, Last Anzac at Gallipoli, Dies at 103," New York Times; 20
May 2002
References


Carlyon, Les (2001). Gallipoli. Doubleday / Pan Macmillan divisions of Random house.
ISBN 0385 604750.
Cowan, James (1926). The Maoris in the Great War (including Gallipoli).
http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-CowMaor.html.







Erickson, Edward J. (2001) [2000]. Ordered to die: a history of the Ottoman army in the
First World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing. ISBN 0313315167.
Gilbert, Martin (2004). The First World War: a complete history. New York: Henry Holt
and Co.. ISBN 0-8050-7617-4.
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. (1991). Gallipoli 1915, Frontal Assault on Turkey. Campaign
Series #8. Osprey.
James, Robert Rhodes (1995). Gallipoli: a British historian's view. Parkville, Vic.: Dept. of
History, University of Melbourne. ISBN 0-7325-1219-0.
Tyquin, M. (1993). Gallipoli: the Medical War. Sydney: University of New South Wales
Press.
Waite, Colonel Fred (1919). The New Zealanders at Gallipoli.
http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WaiNewZ.html.
"Gallipoli". Despatches from Gallipoli website. National Library of Australia.
http://www.nla.gov.au/gallipolidespatches/1-gallipoli.html.
Further reading


Kyle, Roy, (2003) "An Anzac's Story". Camberwell, Penguin, ISBN 0-143-00187-6.
Ralph, May, (2003)"Glory Is No Compensation". Silver Link Publishing ISBN 1-85794214-0 or visit http://www.kingsownbordermuseum.btik.com/p_Books.ikml
External links
















Gallipoli Original reports from The Times
ÇANAKKALE Martyrs Memorial And The National Park
Scanned PDF volumes from the Australian War Memorial of the Official History of
Australia in the War of 1914-1918:
o Bean, C.E.W. (1941) [1921]. Official Histories – First World War. Volume I – The
Story of ANZAC from 4 May, 1915, to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula
(11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/chapter.asp?volume=2.
o Bean, C.E.W. (1941) [1924]. Official Histories – First World War. Volume II – The
Story of ANZAC from the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the
Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915 (11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/chapter.asp?volume=3.
Turkish site about the Battle of Gallipoli
Visit Gallipoli: Australian site about Gallipoli and the Anzacs, includes previously
unpublished photographs, artworks and documents from Government archives. A site by the
Australian Department of Veterans' Affairs.
…in bidding 'Au revoir' to our honourable foes …
Dardanelles Campaign rare photos
Gallipoli Despatches
Gallipoli pages of 'Turkey in WW1' web site
Allied Disaster
Illustrated account of a visit to the Gallipoli battlefields at 'Battlefields Europe'.
New Zealanders at Gallipoli
Guide to Gallipoli on www.anzac.govt.nz. Includes interactive panoramas.
Five Months at Anzac, by Joseph Lievesley Beeston
Memoirs & Diaries: The Evacuation of Suvla Bay
Poems from Anzac Cove by Gunner F.E. Westbrook 1915




Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and the Gallipoli Expedition (1915–16)
Enver Pasha
Carlyon, Les (11 November 2004). "Australian War Memorial Anniversary Oration:
Gallipoli in a Nation's Remembrance (soundtrack and text)". Australian government War
Memorial. http://www.awm.gov.au/events/talks/oration2004.asp. Retrieved on 2008-12-07.
Address by Les Carlyon about the effects of Gallipoli
[1] For Information On 1st Battalion Border Regiment at Gallipoli 1915
http://www.kingsownbordermuseum.btik.com/p_Home.ikml
Naval operations in the Dardanelles Campaign
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Naval Operations in the Dardanelles Campaign
Part of Gallipoli Campaign in WWI
The last moments of the French battleship Bouvet, 18
March 1915
Date
Location
Result
19 February 1915 – 9 January
1916
Dardanelles, Turkey
Decisive Turkish victory
Belligerents
British Empire
France
Australia
Russia
Ottoman Empire
Germany
Commanders
Fuad Paşa
Sackville Carden
Cevat Bey
John de Robeck
Otto Liman von
Émile Guépratte
Sanders
Strength
31 battleships
Various mines and forts;
3 battlecruisers
24 cruisers
25 destroyers
8 monitors
14 submarines
50+ transports
otherwise Unknown
Casualties and losses
6 battleships sunk
3 battleships damaged
2 battleships
1 battlecruiser damaged
1 minelayer
1 destroyer sunk
Casualties:
8 submarines lost
253,000
Casualties:
252,000
[hide]
v•d•e
Gallipoli Campaign
Naval operations – Anzac Cove – Helles – 1st Krithia – 2nd Krithia – 3rd Krithia – Gully Ravine –
Sari Bair – Krithia Vineyard – Lone Pine – Suvla – The Nek – Chunuk Bair – Scimitar Hill –
Hill 60
The naval operations in the Dardanelles Campaign of the First World War were mainly carried
out by the Royal Navy with substantial support from the French and minor contributions from
Russia and Australia. The Dardanelles Campaign began as a purely naval operation. When that
failed to overcome Turkish defences, an invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula was launched in which
naval forces were heavily involved. Throughout the campaign, attempts were made by submarines
to pass through the Dardanelles and disrupt Ottoman Empire shipping in the Sea of Marmara.
Contents








1 Prelude
o 1.1 Closure of the Dardanelles
o 1.2 Divided responsibilities
2 Forcing the straits
3 The Battle of March 18
o 3.1 Aftermath
o 3.2 Further Attempts
4 Submarine operations
5 Supporting the army
6 See also
7 References
o 7.1 Notes
8 External links
Prelude
At the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was an unaligned power. While Britain had a
long history of interest in the region, Germany had been most active in cultivating a relationship
with the Ottomans. At the outbreak of war, the British seized two battleships constructed for the
Ottoman Empire which were still in British shipyards.[1] In response, Germany made a gift of two
ships, the battlecruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, as replacements. While still operated
by their German crews, these ships, renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli respectively, became
the backbone of the Ottoman navy. Through possession of the Goeben, the Ottoman Empire
controlled the most powerful ship in the Black Sea in 1914.[2]
Closure of the Dardanelles
In October 1914, the Ottomans closed the Dardanelles to Allied shipping. This followed an incident
on September 27 when the British Dardanelles squadron had seized a Turkish torpedo boat. The
actual decision to close the strait seems to have been taken by German military advisors stationed in
the Dardanelles without reference to the Turkish government.[3] On October 28, the Turkish fleet,
led by the Goeben, began raiding Russian assets in the Black Sea. Odessa and Sevastopol were
bombarded, a minelayer and gunboat were sunk. The real aim of the attack—putting the Russian
Black Sea fleet out of commission—was not accomplished. Russia declared war on the Ottoman
Empire on November 2, and the British followed suit on November 6. An unsuccessful Ottoman
attack on Russia through the Caucasus Mountains was launched in December (Battle of Sarıkamış),
leading the Russians to call for aid from Britain in January 1915.[4]
Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had entertained plans of capturing the
Dardanelles as early as September 1914. In a new year review submitted to the prime minister,
Herbert Asquith, he had outlined two possible new fronts against the Germans, intended to break
the stalemate and accompanying enormous loss of life which had rapidly set in on the western front.
The first possibility, which was then his favoured option, was an invasion of Schleswig-Holstein by
sea, allowing Denmark to join the allies and give Russia a supply route via the Baltic sea. The other
was an attack on the Dardanelles, which again would give Russia a supply route and might
encourage Bulgaria and Romania to join the allied side. The Russian plea for assistance, coupled
with a perception of the Ottoman Empire as a weak enemy ("the Sick man of Europe"), made the
prospect of a campaign in the Dardanelles seem appealing.[5]
Divided responsibilities
First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and First Sea Lord Fisher, 1914
Matters were complicated for Churchill by the choice of First Sea Lord, who was the most senior
admiral in charge of running the navy. Churchill had appointed Prince Louis of Battenberg in 1912.
He was obliged to replace Battenberg because of public feeling against Germans — Battenberg had
become a British citizen when he joined the navy at the age of 14, but he spoke with a German
accent.[6] His choice was to recall the 73 year old Admiral Fisher, who had retired as First Sea Lord
in 1910. Fisher was regarded as brilliant, but somewhat in decline from advancing age. More
immediately a problem for Churchill, he was a forceful personality accustomed to directing the
Admiralty himself, and being supported in his decisions by the political First Lord rather than
taking orders from him.[7]
Fisher was appointed at the end of October 1914 and favoured a new campaign in northern Europe,
which perhaps reflected the navy's traditional concern of controlling Channel waters.[8] He
reluctantly agreed to advance the plan for a naval action in the Dardanelles, but afterwards
maintained that he had never supported it,[9] and had always believed a naval action would have to
be accompanied by a land force. Churchill and Fisher continually quarreled throughout the
campaign, and Fisher finally resigned on 15 May 1915 after repeated threats to do so. Fisher wrote
about Churchill that: He is always convincing me.[10] Fisher's relationship with Churchill had always
been complex and his abrupt resignation was no exception. Fisher's resignation, on top of poor
progress in the campaign, precipitated the fall of the government and Churchill's replacement as
First Lord, so neither man gained control of the Admiralty. Ironically, although they could not
agree, both respected the other and would not have wished that outcome.[citation needed]
On January 11, at Churchill's request, the commander of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Squadron,
Vice Admiral S.H. Carden proposed a plan for forcing the Dardanelles using battleships,
submarines and minesweepers. On January 13, the British War Council approved the plan, and
Carden was supplied with additional pre-Dreadnought battleships, the battleship HMS Queen
Elizabeth and the battlecruiser HMS Inflexible. France supplied a squadron which included four
pre-Dreadnought battleships, while Russia provided a single light cruiser, the Askold.
The operation was originally intended to be purely naval due to a lack of available troops but, by
early February, it was decided that more regular infantry was needed. Contingents of Royal Marines
were to be supplemented by the last unallocated regular division, the British 29th Division. It was
dispatched to Egypt, to join Australian and New Zealand troops which were already undergoing
training. At the outset of the operation, the expected role of the infantry was to be the occupation of
Istanbul; the taking of the straits was to be accomplished by the Entente naval forces.
Forcing the straits
On November 3, 1914, Churchill ordered the first British attack on the Dardanelles following the
opening of hostilities between Turkey and Russia. The British attack was carried out by
battlecruisers of Carden's Mediterranean Squadron, Indomitable and Indefatigable, as well as the
obsolete French battleships Suffren and Vérité. This attack actually took place before a formal
declaration of war had been made by Britain against the Ottoman Empire.
The intention of the attack was to test the fortifications and measure the Turkish response. The
results were deceptively encouraging. In a twenty minute bombardment, a single shell struck the
magazine of the fort at Sedd el Bahr at the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, displacing (but not
destroying) 10 guns and killing 86 Turkish soldiers. Total casualties during the attack were 150, of
which 40 were German. The most significant consequence was that the attention of the Turks was
drawn to strengthening their defences, and they set about expanding the mine field.[11]
The Dardanelles defences in February/March 1915, showing minefields, anti-submarine nets and
major gun batteries.
The Dardanelles were defended by a system of fortified and mobile artillery arranged as the
"Outer", "Intermediate" and "Inner" defences. While the outer defences lay at the entrance to the
straits and would prove vulnerable to bombardment and raiding, the inner defences covered the
Narrows, the narrowest point of the straits near Çanakkale. Beyond the inner defences, the straits
were virtually undefended. However, the foundation of the straits defences were a series of 10
minefields, laid across the straits near the Narrows and containing a total of 370 mines.
What was to become the Battle of Gallipoli, a 10-month battle of attrition, began at 7.30am on
February 19, 1915. Two destroyers were sent in to probe the straits. The first shot was fired from
Kumkale by the Orhaniye Tepe battery's 24 cm Krupp guns at 7.58am. The battleships Cornwallis
and Vengeance moved in to engage the forts and the first British shot of the campaign proper was
fired at 9.51am by Cornwallis. The day's bombardment lacked the spectacular results of the
November 3 test.
HMS Canopus fires a salvo from her 12-inch (30.5 cm) guns against Turkish forts in the
Dardanelles.
Another attempt was made on February 25. This time the Turks evacuated the outer defences and
the fleet entered the straits to engage the intermediate defences. Demolition parties of Royal
Marines raided the Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale forts, meeting little opposition. On March 1, four
battleships bombarded the intermediate defences.
Little progress was made clearing the minefields. The minesweepers, commanded by Carden's chief
of staff, Roger Keyes, were merely un-armoured trawlers manned by their civilian crews who were
unwilling to work while under fire. The strong current in the straits further hampered the sweeping
process. This lack of progress by the fleet strengthened the Turkish resolve which had wavered at
the start of the offensive. On March 4, raids on the outer defences were resisted, leaving 23 British
marines dead.
The Queen Elizabeth was called on to engage the inner defences, at first from the Aegean coast near
Gaba Tepe, firing across the peninsula, and later from within the straits. On the night of March 13,
the cruiser HMS Amethyst led six minesweepers in an attempt to clear the mines. Four of the
trawlers were hit and the Amethyst was badly damaged with 19 stokers killed from a single hit.
On March 15, the admiralty informed Carden that they agreed to his plan for a further all out attack
by daylight, with the minesweepers operating under the direct protection of the entire fleet. Carden
was taken ill the same day, and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral John de Robeck. A gunnery
officer noted in his diary that de Robeck had already expressed misgivings with the likelihood of
being able to silence the Turkish guns by bombardment, and that this view was widely held on
board the ship.[12]
The Battle of March 18
The event that decided the battle took place on the night of March 8 when the Turkish minelayer
Nusret laid a line of mines in Eren Köy Bay, a wide bay along the Asian shore just inside the
entrance to the straits. The Turks had noticed the British ships turned to starboard into the bay when
withdrawing. The new line of between 20 and 26 mines ran parallel to the shore, were moored at
2.5 fathoms (4.5 m) and spaced about 100 yards (91 m) apart. The clear water meant that the mines
could have been seen through the water by spotter planes.[13]
The British plan for March 18 was to silence the defences guarding the first five lines of mines
which would be cleared overnight by the minesweepers. The next day the remaining defences
around the Narrows would be defeated and the last five minefields would be cleared.
The battleships were arranged in three lines, two British and one French, with supporting ships on
the flanks and two ships in reserve.
Battle lines of March 18
Grey background: Severe damage, Red background: Sunk
Line A
HMS Queen
Elizabeth
HMS Agamemnon
HMS Lord
Nelson
HMS
Inflexible
French Line B
Gaulois
Charlemagne
Bouvet
Suffren
British Line B
HMS Vengeance
HMS Irresistible
HMS Albion
HMS Ocean
Supporting
ships
HMS Majestic
HMS Prince
George
HMS Swiftsure
HMS Triumph
Reserve
HMS Canopus
HMS Cornwallis
The first British line opened fire from Eren Köy Bay around 11am. Shortly after noon, de Robeck
ordered the French line to pass through and close on the Narrows forts. The Turkish fire began to
take its toll with Gaulois, Suffren, Agamemnon and Inflexible all suffering hits. While the naval fire
had not destroyed the Turkish batteries, it had succeeded in temporarily reducing their fire. By
1.25pm the Turkish defences were mostly silent so de Robeck decided to withdraw the French line
and bring forward the second British line as well as Swiftsure and Majestic.
At 1.54pm Bouvet, having made a turn to starboard into Erenköy Bay, struck a mine, capsized and
sank within a couple of minutes, killing 600 men. The initial British reaction was that a shell had
struck her magazine or she had been torpedoed. Most reports state that they remained unaware of
the minefield, however mines in the string had been spotted earlier that morning, and their sighting
relayed to Admiral de Robeck.[citation needed] Civilian trawlers acting as minesweepers in front of line
'A' discovered and destroyed three mines in an area thought to be clear, before the civilian crews
withdrew under fire. This information was not passed on to de Robeck.[14]
Irresistible abandoned and sinking.
The British pressed on with the attack. Around 4pm Inflexible began to withdraw and struck a mine
near where Bouvet went down, killing 30 men. The battlecruiser remained afloat and eventually
beached on the island of Bozcaada (Tenedos).
Irresistible was the next to be mined. As she began to drift helplessly, the crew were taken off. De
Robeck told Ocean to take Irresistible under tow but the water was deemed too shallow to make an
approach. Finally at 6.05pm Ocean struck a mine which jammed the steering gear leaving her
likewise helpless. The abandoned battleships were still floating when the British withdrew. A
destroyer commanded by Commodore Roger Keyes returned later to attempt either to tow away or
sink the stricken vessels but despite searching for four hours, there was no sign of them. Keyes
reported:
The fear of their fire was actually the deciding factor of the fortunes of the day. For five hours the [destroyer]
Wear and picket boats had experienced, quite unperturbed and without any loss, a far more intense fire from
them than the sweepers encountered... the latter could not be induced to face it, and sweep ahead of the ships
in 'B' line.[14] ...I had the almost indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten foe. I thought
he was beaten at 2 pm. I knew he was beaten at 4 PM — and at midnight I knew with still greater clarity that
he was absolutely beaten; and it only remained for us to organise a proper sweeping force and devise some
means of dealing with drifting mines to reap the fruits of our efforts.[15]
By contrast, Commander Isham Worsley Gibson wrote:
This is just what one might expect, & what we really did more or less. Every book on war ever written
always states the fact that politicians interfering with Commanders in the field always lead to disaster but
still they think they are born strategists & know alls & do it again & again.[16]
Aftermath
March 18 was a significant victory for Turkey. Nevertheless, there were calls amongst the British,
particularly from Churchill, to press on with the naval attack. De Robeck advised on 20 March that
he was reorganising his minesweepers, suggesting he intended to resume the attack, and Churchill
responded that he was sending four replacement ships. With the exception of the Inflexible, the
ships that were lost or damaged were old, ill-equipped for modern naval combat and had been
chosen for the expedition precisely because they were expendable. The Turkish forts had nearly
exhausted their ammunition so that if the naval attack had resumed, the Allies would have met little
opposition from the guns. Moreover the crews of the sunken battleships had replaced the civilians
on the trawler minesweepers, making them much more willing to keep sweeping under fire, and the
fleet had several modern destroyers fitted with 1 1/2" minesweeping hawsers that could have
handled the task with ease. The American ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, reported that
Istanbul expected to be attacked and that the Turks felt they could only hold out for a few hours if
the attack had resumed on the 19th.[17] Further, he thought that Turkey itself might well disintegrate
as a state once the capital fell.[18]
It must be noted that the main mine fields at the narrows, over ten layers deep were still fully intact.
Furthermore, they were very well protected by the smaller shore guns that had not seen any action
on March 18th. These and other defenses further in the straight had not exhausted their ammunition
and resources yet. It was not a given that one more push by the fleet would have resulted in passage
to Marmara Sea.
Sir Roger Keyes, Vice-Admiral De Robeck, Sir Ian Hamilton, General Braithwaite
Churchill had anticipated losses and considered them a necessary tactical price. In June 1915, he
discussed the campaign with the war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, who had returned to
London to deliver uncensored reports. Ashmead-Bartlett was incensed at the loss of ships and lives
but Churchill responded: That is not the point! They ought to have gone on. What did it matter if
more ships were lost? The ships were old and useless.[19] To place the losses into perspective, the
Navy ordered 600 new ships during the period Admiral Fisher was First Sea Lord, approximately
corresponding with the length of the Dardanelles campaign.[10]
De Robeck was reported to be distraught from the losses[20]. He wrote on 18 March: After losing so
many ships I shall obviously find myself superseded tomorrow morning.[17] He had been in charge
of a fleet that had suffered the most serious loss to the Royal Navy since Trafalgar and felt that
losing further ships was the worst thing a sailor could do. On 23 March he telegraphed the admiralty
that it would be necessary to have the support of land forces before proceeding. He later told the
Dardanelles Commission investigating the campaign that his main reason for changing his mind
was concern for what might happen in the event of success: that the fleet might find itself at
İstanbul or on the Marmara sea fighting an enemy which did not simply surrender as the plan
presupposed, without any troops available to secure captured territory.[21]
With the failure of the naval assault, the idea that land forces could advance around the backs of the
Dardanelles forts and capture Istanbul gained support as an alternative. On 25 April, the Gallipoli
Campaign was launched. Significant naval forces were devoted to support of that operation.
Further Attempts
Following the unsuccessful results of the land campaign up to May, De Robeck suggested that it
might be desirable to again attempt a naval attack. Churchill supported this idea, at least as far as
restarting attempts to clear mines, but this was opposed by Fisher and other members of the
Admiralty Board. Aside from difficulties in the Dardanelles, they were concerned at the prospect
that more ships might have to be diverted away from the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. This
disagreement contributed to the final resignation of Fisher, followed by the need for Asquith to seek
coalition partners to shore up his government and the consequential dismissal of Churchill also.
Further naval attacks were shelved.[22]
Keyes remained a firm supporter of naval action and on 23 September submitted a further proposal
to pass through the Dardanelles to de Robeck. De Robeck disliked the plan, but nonetheless passed
it to the Admiralty. Risk to ships had increased since March due to the presence of German
submarines in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmara, where the British ships would be inviting
targets if the plan succeeded. On the other hand, minesweeping was now better equipped and some
of the ships had nets or mine bumpers which it was hoped would improve their chances against
mines. Turkey now had better supply routes from Germany whereas demands on the navy for more
ships to support the attempt had to be added to continuing commitments of ships for the land action,
and the ongoing campaign at Salonica attempting to support Serbia. Kitchener made a proposal to
take the Isthmus of Bulair using 40,000 men, thereby allowing British ships in the Marmara Sea to
be resupplied across land from the Gulf of Xeros. Admiralty opinion was that another naval attack
could not be mounted without support of land forces attacking the Dardanelles forts, which was
deemed impractical for lack of troops. Kitchener visited the area to inspect the positions and talk to
the commanders concerned, before reporting back advising a withdrawal. The War Committee,
faced with a choice either of an uncertain new campaign to break the existing stalemate, or
complete withdrawal, recommended on 23 November that all troops should be withdrawn.[23]
The British cabinet as a whole was less keen to abandon the campaign, because of political
repercussions of a failure and damaging consequences for Russia. De Robeck had been temporarily
replaced by Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss in November 1915 for reasons of ill health. In contrast to De
Robeck, Wemyss was a supporter of further action and considerably more optimistic of chances of
success. Whereas de Robeck estimated losses at 12 battleships, Wemyss considered it likely to lose
no more than three. It was suggested that abandoning the action at Salonica, where the troops
involved never managed to aid Serbia and did little fighting, could provide the reinforcements, but
this was vetoed by the French. Wemyss continued a campaign promoting the chances of success.
He had been present when de Robeck assumed command from Carden and was more senior, but
had been commanding the base at Mudros whereas de Robeck was with the fleet. Churchill had
preferentially chosen de Robeck.[24] On 7 December it was decided by Cabinet to abandon the
campaign.[25]
Submarine operations
Turkish battleship Mesudiye
Australian submarine AE2
The British submarine attacks had commenced in 1914, before the campaign proper had started. On
December 13, the British submarine B11 had entered the straits, avoiding five lines of mines, and
torpedoed the antiquated Turkish battleship Mesudiye, built in 1874, which was anchored as a
floating fort in Sari Sighlar Bay, south of Çanakkale. The Mesudiye capsized in 10 minutes,
trapping many of the 673-man crew. However, lying in shoal water, the hull remained above the
surface so most men were rescued by cutting holes in the hull. Thirty-seven men were killed.
The sinking was a triumph for the Royal Navy. The captain of the B11, Lieutenant-Commander
Norman Holbrook, was awarded the Victoria Cross — the first Royal Navy VC of the war — and
all 12 other crew members received awards. Coupled with the naval bombardment of the outer
defences on November 3, this success encouraged the British to pursue the campaign.
The first French submarine operation preceded the start of the campaign as well. On January 15,
1915, the French submarine Saphir negotiated the Narrows, passing all ten lines of mines, before
running aground at Nagara Point. Various accounts claim she was either mined, sunk by shellfire or
scuttled, leaving 14 crew dead and 13 prisoners of war.
On April 17, the British submarine E15 attempted to pass through the straits but, having dived too
deep, was caught in a current and ran aground near Kepez Point, the southern tip of Sarı Sıĝlar Bay,
directly under the guns of the Dardanos battery. Seven of the crew were killed and the remainder
were captured. The beached E15 was a valuable prize for the Turks and the British went to great
lengths to deny it from them, finally managing to sink it after numerous attempts.
The first submarine to succeed in passing through the straits was Australian submarine AE2 which
got through on April 26, one day after the army had begun landing at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove
on the peninsula. The AE2, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Stoker, was thwarted by
defective torpedoes in its several attempts to sink promising targets. On April 29, in Artaki Bay near
Panderma, the AE2 was sighted and hit by the Turkish torpedo boat Sultanhisar. Abandoning ship,
the crew became POWs. There is an effort currently, by the Turkish and Australian governments, to
locate and raise AE2.
The second submarine through the straits had more luck than the AE2. On April 27, the British
submarine E14, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Edward Boyle, entered the Sea of Marmara
and went on a three week rampage that was one of the most successful actions achieved by the
Allies in the entire campaign. While the quantity and value of the shipping sunk was relatively
minor, the effect on Turkish communications and morale was significant. On his return, Boyle was
immediately awarded the Victoria Cross. Boyle and the E14 made a number of tours of the
Marmara. His third tour began on July 21, when he passed through the straits despite the Turks
having installed an anti-submarine net near the Narrows.
The crew of HMS Grampas cheering E11 after a successful operation.
Another British submarine to have a successful cruise of the Marmara was the E11, commanded by
Lieutenant-Commander Martin Nasmith, who was awarded the VC and promoted to Commander
for his achievements. He sank or disabled 11 ships including three on May 24 at the port of Rodosto
on the Thracian shore. On 8 August, during a subsequent tour of the Marmara, the E11 torpedoed
the Turkish battleship Hayreddin Barbarossa.
A number of demolition missions were performed by men or parties landed from submarines. On
September 8, First Lieutenant H.V. Lyon from the British submarine E2, swam ashore near
Küçükçekmece (Thrace) to blow up a railway bridge. The bridge was destroyed but Lyon failed to
return. Attempts were also made to disrupt the railways running close to the water along the Gulf of
İzmit, on the Asian shore of the sea. On the night of August 20, Lieutenant D'Oyly Hughes from the
E11 swam ashore and blew up a section of the railway line, earning the Distinguished Service Order
for his efforts. On July 17, the British submarine E7 bombarded the railway line and then damaged
two trains that were forced to halt.
French attempts to enter the Sea of Marmara continued. Following the success of the AE2 and E14,
the French submarine Joule attempted the passage on May 1 but struck a mine and was lost with all
hands. The next attempt was made by the Mariotte on July 27. However, the Mariotte failed to
negotiate the anti-submarine net that the E14 had eluded and was forced to the surface. After being
shelled from the shore batteries, the Mariotte was scuttled. On September 4, the same net caught the
E7 as it attempted to commence another tour.
The first French submarine to enter the Sea of Marmara was the Turquoise. However, it was forced
to turn back and, on October 30, when attempting to pass back through the straits, ran aground
beneath a fort and was captured intact. The crew of 25 were taken prisoner and documents detailing
planned Allied operations were discovered. This included a scheduled rendezvous with the British
submarine E20 on November 6. The rendezvous was kept by the German U-boat, U-14 which
torpedoed and sunk the E20 killing all but nine of the crew. The Turquoise was salvaged and
incorporated (but not commissioned) into the Turkish Navy as the Onbasi Müstecip, named after
the gunner who had forced the French commander to surrender.
The Allied submarine campaign in the Sea of Marmara was the one significant offensive success of
the Battle of Gallipoli. Between April 1915 and January 1916, nine British submarines sank two
battleships (albeit obsolete) and one destroyer, five gunboats, nine troop transports, seven supply
ships, 35 steamers and 188 assorted smaller vessels at a cost of total of 8 Allied submarines which
were sunk in the straight or in the Sea of Marmara. The Turks were forced to abandon the Marmara
as a transport route.
In 1993, a coal mining operation revealed the wreck of a German submarine UB-46 near the
Kemerburgaz coast. After carrying out missions in Black Sea, on its way back, UB-46 hit a mine
near Karaburun and sank with all hands. It is now on display at Besiktas Naval Museum in
Istanbul.[26]
Supporting the army
The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had been established on March 12 under the command of
General Sir Ian Hamilton and comprised some 70,000 soldiers. At a conference on March 22, four
days after the failed attempt by the navy, it was decided to use the infantry to seize the Gallipoli
peninsula and capture the forts, clearing the way for the navy to pass through into the Sea of
Marmara. Preparations for the landing took a month, giving the Turkish defenders ample time to
reinforce.
The British planners still underestimated the ability of the Turks and, at the outset, it was expected
that the invasion would be over swiftly. A British force, landing at Cape Helles, would advance six
miles (11 km) on the first day and, on the second, would seize the Kilitbahir plateau, overlooking
the Narrows. As it happened, in eight months of fighting, the British would never advance much
more than five miles (9 km) and their first day objectives of Krithia and the hill Achi Baba would
remain out of reach.
The Gallipoli landings were the largest amphibious operation of the war. The initial landings were
made at Cape Helles by the British 29th Division and at Gaba Tepe by the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps. In the latter case, the landing miscarried and the troops went ashore too far
north at a place now known as Anzac Cove. In both landings, the covering force went ashore from
warships with the exception of V Beach at Helles where the SS River Clyde was used as an
improvised landing craft for 2,000 men.
Map of the landing of the covering force from battleships (red) and destroyers (orange) at Anzac
Cove, 25 April 1915.
In the landing at Anzac Cove, the first wave went ashore from the boats of three Formidable-class
battleships; HMS London, Prince of Wales and Queen. The second wave went ashore from seven
destroyers. In support were Triumph, Majestic and the cruiser Bacchante as well as the seaplane
carrier Ark Royal and the kite-balloon ship, Manica from which a tethered balloon was trailed to
provide artillery spotting.
The landing at Cape Helles was spread over five beaches with the main ones being V & W Beaches
at the tip of the peninsula. While the landing at Anzac was planned as a surprise without a
preliminary bombardment, the Helles landing was made after the beaches and forts were bombarded
by the warships. The landing at S Beach inside the straits was made from the battleship Cornwallis
and was virtually unopposed. The W Beach force came from the cruiser HMS Euryalus and the
battleship Implacable which also carried the troops bound for X Beach. The cruiser HMS Dublin
and battleship Goliath supported the X Beach landing as well as a small landing to the north on the
Aegean coast at Y Beach, later abandoned.
The role of the navy was to support the landing, using naval guns instead of field artillery, of which
there was a severe shortage in 1915. However, with a few spectacular exceptions, the performance
of naval guns on land targets was inadequate, particularly against entrenched positions. The guns
lacked elevation and so fired on a flat trajectory which, coupled with the inherently unstable gun
platform, resulted in reduced accuracy.
The battleship's guns did prove effective against exposed lines of troops. On April 27, during the
first Turkish counter-attack at Anzac, the Turkish 57th Regiment attacked down the seaward slope
of Battleship Hill within view of the Queen Elizabeth which fired a salvo of six 15-in shells, halting
the attack completely. On April 28, near the old Y Beach landing, the Queen Elizabeth sighted a
party of about 100 Turks. One 15-in shrapnel shell containing 24,000 pellets was fired at short
range and wiped out the entire party. For the rest of the campaign the Turks were very wary of
moving within view of battleships.
The last moments of Majestic, torpedoed by U-21 on 27 May.
Also on April 27, a kite-balloon ship had spotted a Turkish transport ship moving near the Narrows.
The Queen Elizabeth, stationed off Gaba Tepe, had fired across the peninsula, at a range of over 10
miles (about 20 km), and sank the transport with her third shot. For much of the campaign the Turks
transported troops via rail though other supplies continued to be transported by ship on the Sea of
Marmara and Dardanelles.
It quickly became evident that the battle for Gallipoli would not be a swift or easy operation. At
Helles, which was initially the main battlefield, a series of costly battles only managed to edge the
front line closer to Krithia. Through the early battles the navy continued to provide support via
bombardments. However, in May three battleships were torpedoed; Goliath in Morto Bay on May
12, Triumph off Anzac on May 25 and Majestic off W Beach on May 27. Goliath was sunk by the
Turkish torpedo boat Muavenet while the other two were sunk by the German U-boat U-21.
Following these losses, the permanent battleship support was withdrawn with the valuable Queen
Elizabeth recalled by the Admiralty as soon as the news of the loss of Goliath arrived. In place of
the battleships, naval artillery support was provided by cruisers, destroyers and purpose-built
monitors which were designed for coastal bombardment.
Once the navy became wary of the submarine threat, losses ceased. With the exception of the
continued activity of Allied submarines in the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara, the only significant
naval loss after May was the Laforey-class destroyer HMS Louis which on October 31 ran aground
off Suvla during a gale and was wrecked. The destruction of the stranded ship was accelerated by
Turkish gunfire.
See also


Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau
List of Allied warships that served at Gallipoli
References








Carlyon, Les, Gallipoli, 2001, ISBN 0385 604750, Transworld publishers
Jenkins, Roy, Churchill, 2001 ISBN 0333 782909, Macmillan
Arthur Marder (1961-1970). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Vol II: The War years
to the eve of Jutland. London: Oxford University Press.
IWM Account of the battle from the Imperial War Museum website (accessed Nov 2006)
Morgenthau events as described by the American ambassador, Henry Morgenthau,
expressing his opinion the British could have taken İstanbul by 20 March
Nykiel (1) Minesweeping operations in the Dardanelles Feb 25-March 17 1915, Piotr Nykiel
(First published in 'The Turkish Yearbook of Gallipoli Studies', Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart
Üniversitesi Atatürk ve Çanakkale Savaslari Arastirma Merkezi, Issue: 2, March 2004, p.
81-115 (including summary in Turkish)).
Turgut Ōzakman, Diriliş, Çanakkale 1915, 2008, ISBN 978-975-22-0247-4, Bilgi Yayınevi
Nykiel (2) Was it possible to renew the naval attack on the Dardanelles successfully the day
after the 18th March?, Piotr Nykiel (First published in: The Gallipoli Campaign
International Perspectives 85 Years On, Conference Papers 24-25 April 2000, Çanakkale
2001)
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
^ Carlyon pp. 41–42.
^ Carlyon p.42-44
^ Carlyon p.45
^ Carlyon p.48
^ Jenkins p.254-255
^ Jenkins p.216
^ Jenkins p.258
^ Jenkins p. 256
^ Jenkins p.270
^ a b Jenkins p.260
^ Cerlyon p.47
^ Carlyon p.61-62
^ Carlyon p. 66.
^ a b IWM p. 12.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
^ Carlyon p. 70.
^ IWM p. 15.
^ a b Carlyon p. 72.
^ Morgenthau, Henry (October 1918). "XVIII: The Allied Armada Sails Away, Though on the Brink
of Victory". Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. Garden City, NY, USA: Doubleday, Page &
Company. http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/morgenthau/Morgen18.htm. Retrieved on 200902-25.
^ Carlyon p. 320.
^ Who's Who: Sir John de Robeck, Firstworldwar.com 31 March, 2002.
^ Marder p. 252 quoting Dardanelles commission report
^ Marder p. 275.
^ Marder pp. 314–20.
^ Jenkins p. 265.
^ Marder pp. 320–24.
^ http://www.dzkk.tsk.mil.tr/muze/Turkish/Fsergi_alanlari.htm
Sinai and Palestine Campaign
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sinai and Palestine Campaign
Part of Middle Eastern theatre (World War I)
A model of a typical ANZAC soldier and his horse
during the campaign
Date
Location
Result
Territorial
changes
January 28, 1915 - October 28,
1918
Sinai Peninsula, Palestine, and
Syria
Allied Victory
Partitioning of the Ottoman
Empire
Belligerents
British Empire



United
Kingdom
Australia
New Zealand
France
Kingdom of Italy
Ottoman Empire
German Empire
Commanders
Djemal Pasha
Jadir Bey
Sir John Maxwell
Sir Archibald Murray
Tala Bey
Philip Chetwode
Friedrich Freiherr
Charles Dobell
Kress von Kressenstein
Edmund Allenby
Erich von
Henry George
Falkenhayn
Chauvel
Otto Liman von
Sanders
[show]
v•d•e
Sinai and Palestine Campaign
[show]
v•d•e
Theatres of World War I
The Sinai and Palestine Campaign during the Middle Eastern Theatre of World War I was a series
of battles which took place on the Sinai Peninsula, Palestine, and Syria between January 28, 1915
and October 28, 1918. British, Indian, Australian, and New Zealand forces opposed the German and
Turkish forces.
Contents








1 Ottoman advance towards the Suez Canal
o 1.1 First Suez Offensive
o 1.2 Battle of Romani
2 British advance across the Sinai
3 Palestine campaign
o 3.1 First Battle of Gaza
o 3.2 Second Battle of Gaza
o 3.3 Battle of El Buggar Ridge
o 3.4 Battle of Beersheba
o 3.5 Third Battle of Gaza
4 The final year: Palestine and Syria
o 4.1 Battle of Megiddo
5 In popular media
6 Summary
7 External links
8 Sources
Ottoman advance towards the Suez Canal
Map of north and central Sinai, 1917
The Ottoman Empire, at the urging of their German ally, chose to attack British and Egyptian forces
in Egypt and shut the Suez Canal in the First Suez Offensive. The Ottoman army, under the
command of the Turkish Minister of Marine, Djemal Pasha, was based in Jerusalem. At this time,
the Sinai was an almost empty desert and very hard for an army to cross (no roads, no water). The
chief of staff for Ottoman army was Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, who organized the attack and
managed to get supplies for the army as it crossed the desert.
First Suez Offensive
Main article: First Suez Offensive
The Ottoman Suez Expeditionary Force arrived at the canal on February 2, 1915. The attack failed
to achieve surprise as the British and Egyptians were aware of the Ottoman army's approach. In
fighting that lasted for two days the Ottomans were beaten, losing some 2000 men. Allied losses
were minimal.
Because the Suez Canal was vital to the Allied war effort, this failed attack caused the British to
leave far more soldiers protecting the canal than they had planned on, resulting in a smaller force
for the Gallipoli Campaign. The British forced the colonial Egyptian Army and Egyptian Navy to
be enlarged to help defend Egypt. However, most Egyptians were poorly-armed and poorly-trained.
Battle of Romani
Main article: Battle of Romani
More than a year passed with the British troops content to guard the Suez Canal and the Ottomans
busy fighting the Russians in the Caucusus and the British at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia. Then in
July, the Ottoman army tried another offensive against the Suez. Again, the Ottomans advanced
with an over-sized division. Again they ran into a well prepared Allied force, this time at Romani.
Again, they retreated after two days of fighting August 3 - August 5, 1916.
Following this victory, the Allied forces sought to eject the Turkish Canal Expeditionary Force
from threatening the Suez Canal by removing them from Bir el Abd. On August 9, 1916, the
indecisive action at Bir el Abd was fought leading to the Turkish withdrawal to El Arish while
leaving a rear guard force at Bir el Mazar.
British advance across the Sinai
This attack convinced the British to push their defence of the Canal further out, into the Sinai, and
so starting in October, the British under Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell began operations
into the Sinai desert and on to the border of Palestine. Initial efforts were limited to building a
railway and a waterline across the Sinai. After several months building up supplies and troops, the
British were ready for an attack. The first battle was the capture of Magdhaba on December 23,
1916. This was a success, the fort was captured.
On January 8, 1917, the Anzac Mounted Division attacked the fort-town of Rafa. The attack was
successful and the majority of the Turkish garrison was captured. The British had accomplished
their objective of protecting the Suez Canal from Turkish attacks but the new government of David
Lloyd George wanted more.
Palestine campaign
Turkish trenches at the shores of the Dead Sea, 1917.
The British army in Egypt was ordered to go on the offensive against the Ottoman Turks in
Palestine. In part this was to support the Arab revolt which had started early in 1916, in part this
was to try and accomplish something positive after the years of fruitless battles on the Western
Front. The British commander in Egypt, Sir Archibald Murray, suggested that he needed more
troops and ships, but this request was refused.
Assault on Gaza, 1917
The Ottoman forces were holding a rough line from the fort at Gaza, on the shore of the
Mediterranean Sea, to the town of Beersheba, which was the terminus of the Ottoman railway that
extended north to Damascus. The British commander in the field, Dobell, chose to attack Gaza,
using a short hook move on March 26, 1917.
First Battle of Gaza
Main article: First Battle of Gaza
The British attack was essentially a failure. Due to miscommunication, some units retreated when
they should have held onto their gains and so the fortress was not taken.
The government in London believed the reports from the field which indicated a substantial victory
had been won and ordered General Murray to move on and capture Jerusalem. The British were in
no position to attack Jerusalem as they first needed to break through the Ottoman defensive
positions. These positions were rapidly improved and credit for the Turkish defence is given to the
German chief-of-staff Baron Kress von Kressenstein.
Second Battle of Gaza
Main article: Second Battle of Gaza
A second attack on the fort of Gaza was launched one month later on April 17, 1917. This attack,
supported by naval gunfire, chlorine gas and even a few early tanks was also a failure. It was
essentially a frontal assault on a fortified position, and it didn't work more through inflexibility in
operations rather than plan but it cost of some 6,000 British casualties. As a result both General
Dobell and General Murray were removed from command. The new man put in charge was General
Sir Edmund Allenby and his orders were clear: take Jerusalem by Christmas.
Allenby - after personally reviewing the Ottoman defensive positions - asked for more forces: three
more infantry divisions, aircraft, and artillery. This request was granted and by October, 1917, the
British were ready for their next attack.
The Ottoman army had three active fronts at this time: Mesopotamia, Arabia, and the Gaza front.
They also had substantial forces deployed around Constantinople and in the (now quiet) Caucasus
front. Given all these demands, the army in Gaza was only about 35,000 strong, lead by the
Ottoman General Kustafa and concentrated in three main defensive locations: Gaza, Tell Esh
Sheria, and Beersheba. Allenby's army was now much larger, some 88,000 troops in good condition
and well equipped. Many of the British forces were Anzacs from Australia and New Zealand.
Battle of El Buggar Ridge
Main article: Battle of El Buggar Ridge
The occupation of Karm by the Allies on October 22, 1917 created a major point for supply and
water for the troops in the immediate area. For the Ottoman forces, the placement of the station at
Karm placed under threat the defensive positions known as the Hureira Redoubt and Rushdie
System which formed a powerful bulwark against any Allied action. Karm Station pointed right to
the heart of this system.
To overcome this, General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Commander of the Yildirim Group, proposed
a two phase attack. Firstly the plan called for a reconnaissance in force from Beersheba for October
27 which was to be followed by an all out attack launched by the 8th Army from Hureira, ironically
scheduled to occur on the morning of October 31, 1917, the day when the Battle of Beersheba
began. On the morning of October 27, the battle began.
Battle of Beersheba
Main article: Battle of Beersheba
A key feature to the British attack was to convince the Turks (and their German leaders) that once
again, Gaza was to be attacked. This deception campaign was extremely thorough and convincing.
The Battle of El Buggar Ridge, launched by the Turks, completed the deception. When the Allies
launched their attack on Beersheba, the Turks were taken by surprise. In one of the most remarkable
feats of planning and execution, the Allies were able to move some 40,000 men and a similar
number of horses over hostile and inhospitable terrain without being detected by the Turks. The
climax of the battle was the last successful cavelry charge of modern warfare when two Australian
Light Horse regiments (4th and 12th) charged across open ground just before dusk and captured the
town. The Turkish defeat at Beersheba on October 31 was not a complete rout. The Turks retreated
into the hills and pre-prepared defensive positions to the north of Beersheba. For the Allies, the
following days were spent fighting a difficult and bloody battle at Tel el Khuweilifeh, to the north
east of Beersheba.
Allenby's Offensive, November-December 1917
To break through the Turkish defensive line, the Allied forces attacked the Ottoman positions at Tel
Esh Sheria on November 6 and followed this up with a further attack at Huj the following day,
November 7. With the imminent collapse of Gaza at the same time, the Turks quickly retreated to a
new line of defence.
Third Battle of Gaza
Main article: Third Battle of Gaza
On the 7th, the British attacked Gaza for the 3rd time and this time, the Turks, worried about being
cut off, retreated in the face of the British assault. Gaza had finally been captured.
The Turkish defensive position was shattered, the Ottoman army was retreating in some disarray,
and General Allenby ordered his army to pursue the enemy. The British followed closely on the
heels of the retreating Ottoman forces. An attempt by the Turks to form a defence of a place called
Junction Station (Wadi Sarar) was foiled by a British attack November 13, 1917. General
Falkenhayn next tried to form a new defensive line from Bethlehem to Jerusalem to Jaffa. The first
British attack on Jerusalem failed but with a short rest and the gathering of more infantry divisions,
Allenby tried again and on December 9, 1917, Jerusalem was captured. This was a major political
event for the British government of David Lloyd George, one of the few real successes the British
could point to after three long bloody years of war.
On the Turkish side, this defeat marked the exit of Djemal Pasha back to Istanbul. Djemal had given
real command to German officers like von Kressenstein and von Falkenhayn more than a year
earlier but now, defeated like Enver Pasha was at the Battle of Sarikamis, he gave up even nominal
command and returned to the capital. Less than a year remained before he was forced out of the
government. General Falkenhayn was also replaced, in March 1918.
The final year: Palestine and Syria
Allenby's Final Attack, September 1918
The British government had hopes that the Ottoman Empire could be defeated early in the coming
year with successful campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia but the Spring Offensive by the
Germans on the Western Front delayed the expected attack on Syria for nine full months. General
Allenby's army was largely redeployed to France and he was given brand new divisions recruited
from India. These divisions spent the spring and summer of 1918 training.
Because the British achieved complete control of the air with their new fighter planes, the Turks,
and their new German commander General Liman von Sanders, had no clear idea where the British
were going to attack. Compounding the problems, the Turks, at the direction of their War Minister
Enver Pasha withdrew their best troops during the summer for the creation of Enver's Army of
Islam, leaving behind poor quality, dispirited soldiers. T. E. Lawrence and his Arab fighters were of
significant use during this time. His forces staged many hit-and-run attacks on Turkish supply lines
and tied down thousands of soldiers in garrisons throughout Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.
Battle of Megiddo
Main article: Battle of Megiddo (1918)
General Allenby finally launched his long-delayed attack on September 19, 1918. The campaign
has been called the Battle of Megiddo (which is a transliteration of the Hebrew name of an ancient
town known in the west as Armageddon). Again, the British spent a great deal of effort to deceive
the Turks as to their actual intended target of operations. This effort was, again, successful and the
Turks were taken by surprise when the British attacked Meggido in a sudden storm. The Turkish
troops started a full scale retreat, the British bombed the fleeing columns of men from the air and
within a week, the Turkish army in Palestine had ceased to exist as a military force.
From there it was decided to march off to Damascus. Two separate Allied columns marched
towards Damascus. The first approached from Galilee composed of mainly cavalry, both Indian and
Australian while the other column travelled along the Hejaz Railway northwards composed of
Indian Cavalry and the ad hoc militia following T.E. Lawrence. Australian Light Horse troops
marched unopposed into Damascus on October 1, 1918, despite there being some 12,000 Turkish
soldiers at Baramke Barracks. Major Olden of the Australian 10th Light Horse Regiment received
the Official Surrender of the City at 7 am at the Serai. Later that day, T.E. Lawrence and his ad hoc
Arab militia entered Damascus to claim full credit for its capture. The war in Palestine was over but
in Syria lasted for a further month. The Turkish government was quite prepared to sacrifice these
non-Turkish provinces without surrendering. Indeed, while this battle was raging, the Turks sent an
expeditionary force into Russia to enlarge the ethnic Turkish elements of the empire. It was only
after the surrender of Bulgaria which put Turkey into a vulnerable position for invasion that the
Turkish government compelled to sign an armistice on October 28, 1918 and outright surrendered
two days later. 600 years of Ottoman rule over the Middle East had come to an end.
In popular media
This campaign has been depicted in several films. The most famous by far is Lawrence of Arabia
(1962), though it focused primarily on T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. Other films dealing with
this topic include Forty Thousand Horsemen (1941), and The Lighthorsemen (1987), with Peter
Phelps and Nick Waters, both of which focused on the role of the ANZAC forces during the
campaign.
Summary
The British lost a total of 550,000 casualties: more than 90% of these were not due to battle but
instead due to disease, heat and other secondary causes. Total Turkish losses are unknown but
almost certainly larger. They lost an entire army in the fighting and the Turks poured a vast number
of troops into the front over the three years of combat.
Even so, the historical consequences of this campaign are hard to overestimate. The British
conquest of Palestine led directly to the British mandate over Palestine and Trans-Jordan which, in
turn, paved the way for the creation of the states of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
External links



First World War.com. Defence of the Suez Canal, 1915. Retrieved December 19, 2005.
Australian Light Horse Studies Centre
Palestine pages of 'Turkey in WW1' web site
Sources
World War I portal







Grainger, John D. (2006) The Battle for Palestine: 1917 Boydell Press. ISBN 1 84383 263 1
Bruce, Anthony (2002). The Last Crusade: The Palestinian Campaign in the First World
War. John Murray.
Esposito, Vincent (ed.) (1959). The West Point Atlas of American Wars - Vol. 2. Frederick
Praeger Press.
Fromkin, David (1989). A Peace to End All Peace. Avon Books.
Keegan, John (1998). The First World War. Random House Press.
Woodward, David R (2006). Forgotten Soldiers of the First World War - Lost Voices from
the Middle Eastern Front. Tempus Publishing.
Preston, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Martin (1921) The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account
of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria 1914 to 1918. Houghton Mifflin Company.
[1]