How valid is it to describe Italy in the 1930s as a totalitarian state?
The development and consolidation of Mussolini’s dictatorship was an ongoing
process spanning his appointment as Prime Minister in 1922 until the advent of WWII.
His emphasis on personal power and control over all aspects of government begs the
question of how solid this control really was. Totalitarianism is a somewhat vague
concept, empirically difficult to distinguish between related models of government such
as authoritarianism and dictatorship. However, there are some analogous characteristics
which historians have generally ascribed to a theoretical totalitarian state. The leadership
of such a state claims exclusive right to govern the country, on behalf of a party or an
ideology. This leadership attempts, and ideally achieves, to permeate all aspects of daily
life through the establishment of controlling and restrictive mechanisms over social,
political, industrial, military, and economic matters. The decision-making process is
highly centralized, as so is political control. Opposition to the state is suppressed through
the use of violence, and the underlying basis for the state’s control is the subservience of
the individual to the state; this usually leads to and justifies the curtailing of fundamental
liberal freedoms. Totalitarianism also implies, however, that the will, needs, and desires
of the state and the individual are one and the same, that there exists a certain level of
popular support for not merely tolerance of, the state. Perhaps the formation of a “fully
totalitarian” state is an unrealistic concept; the relevant question here is how totalitarian
Mussolini’s government was. Ascertaining this requires the historian to examine the
reach of the Fascist regime over the lives of the Italian people, and to determine the
extent of the concentration of power in the hands of the state.
One of the threats to a totalitarian regime is the existence of alternative bodies that
claim the loyalty of its citizens. Autonomous institutions and sources of power did exist
in Fascist Italy, the most notable of these being the Catholic Church, the military, the
King, and the incumbent administrative apparatus left behind by previous Liberal
governments. Mussolini’s relationship with these bodies was characterized by a
conciliatory, often half-hearted, approach. According to historian Mark Robson,
Mussolini wanted to subjugate them “without provoking the head-on clash with these
institutions that the radicals in the Fascist Party desired”, perhaps explaining Mussolini’s
often ambivalent attitude.
The Lateran Pact, while achieving significant ideological gains, such as the
official recognition of the Fascist government by the Catholic Church, is considered by
many to reflect a Mussolini all too ready to make unnecessary concessions in order to
achieve superficial political gains. While Mussolini maximized any propaganda benefits
that the Pact provided, the image of a subjugated Church was just that: a façade. The
Catholic Church was not hesitant about voicing opposition to controversial policies,
especially the implementation of racial policies in the late 1930s. The Church’s influence
is not be underestimated; it was deeply embedded in Italian society, and for many it
constituted a significant part of their life – the pulpit was not just a medium of religious
instruction, but also of political guidance. Martin Clark goes as far as to say that the
Church was the “biggest obstacle to a ‘totalitarian’ regime in Italy”.
The King was less of a problem for Mussolini, yet nevertheless could pose a
threat if driven to decisive action. He had constitutional powers that would allow him to
dismiss Mussolini, yet his indecisiveness during the March on Rome and the Matteotti
crisis showed that he was not prepared to stand up to Mussolini. While the King did
remain removed from the daily political scene, Mussolini did visit him twice a week,
paying him the necessary lip-service to placate the monarch. In many other areas of the
government, such as the civil service and the police force, non-Fascists were strongly
represented; it was in these high-level administrative position that real power was held,
and the fact that, for example, the police chief was not a member of the Fascist party,
suggests that real Fascist influence in the state apparatus was limited in some areas. Only
in the judiciary did genuine purges occur; elsewhere, non-Fascists who maintained their
positions from the time of the Liberal governments before Mussolini were largely
unaffected by any sweeping changes. The military, too, was not a Fascist entity. The
armed forces until 1940 pledged their allegiance to the monarchy and not immediately to
the Duce. Mussolini was forced to pursue policies that were acceptable to military
leaders, and was fortunate that, until defeat in war became inevitable, their interests and
ambitions usually coincided. It can be seen that Mussolini was not the sole retainer or
executor of political power in Italy. External institutions were not subordinated, and when
times of crisis manifested during the war, they quickly dropped their support of the
regime. Mussolini’s definition of totalitarianism as “no individuals or groups outside the
state” was unrealized.
Mussolini did, however, greatly centralize all policy decisions. Local mayors
were replaced with podestas, and alongside prefects, who were the chief agent of the
government in each province, Mussolini place a local party-secretary or federale, to
supervise him. This overlapping of powers resulted in a system of checks and balances
which left no one but Mussolini to decide on controversial matters, which is exactly what
he wanted. While there was no great purge of the Fascist party, independent or dissenting
Fascists were constantly being expelled. Mussolini had little further use for the ras, now
that he had succeeded in seizing power and eliminating his opponents. He became head
of several departments of his Cabinet, and all appointments in the Fascist party were
made by party headquarters, conveniently controlled by Mussolini. Parliament was
practically emasculated of all power, and became a voice box for the Fascist party,
consisting of what Robson calls “sycophantic Fascist deputies who did not even bother to
vote formally on Mussolini’s legislation: they simply shouted their assent.” Moreover,
the government completely dominated the economy, exercising control over key aspects
such as prices, wages, investment, and production levels. Following the Depression, the
government had ownership of large parts of several industry giants, as a result the
financial aid offered in an attempt to stave off the worst effects of the global recession.
These traits of Mussolini’s Italy, however, do not necessarily constitute a totalitarian
state. All dictatorships are highly centralized and most have planned economies or
government intervention in markets. A more revealing criterion is the government’s
influence of, and control over, the daily lives of ordinary Italians
The extent of popular support for the regime is very difficult for historians to
determine. While Mussolini and the Fascist party claimed that the vast majority of
Italians actively backed the regime, in the absence of free press, it is impossible to
ascertain the degree of criticism or hostility. Robson claims that “Italy possessed…no
tradition of popular obedience to a strong government”. Indeed the consensus among
contemporary historians is that the majority of Italians simply tolerated Mussolini and his
regime, and were willing enough to pay the lip-service required for them to get on with
their lives. The personality cult of the Duce was continually propagated and developed by
the Fascists, yet seldom embraced among the populace. The Dopolavoro and the ONB,
attempting to control more of the ordinary Italian’s leisure time, prepared several
activities and holidays for Italians. Yet the high participation levels in these organizations
had little to do with the fact that they were Fascists; rather, they were simply a statesponsored way of escaping the drudgery of everyday life. The weak hold that the Fascists
had on Italian way of life is clearly demonstrated by the lack of popular enthusiasm and
conformity to controversial policies during the radicalization of the regime, such as the
Reform of Customs and the racial policies.
Opposition was suppressed, although torture and execution were uncommon;
Mussolini preferred either exiling dissidents to remote villages in the backward
countryside or transporting them to prisoner camps. While there were some incidents of
individual acts of verbal opposition from intellectuals and elites, general opposition was
disorganized and ineffective. This was a result of the strength of the repression, but
perhaps had more to do with Mussolini knowing how to manipulate his subjects. Overall,
as Robson says, “Italian fascism preferred to cajole its subjects into outward conformity,
rather than act ruthlessly to root out potential dissenters”.
The ultimate test of the strength of the Italian totalitarian state, that of the Allied
invasion proved that Mussolini never really had true control of the state or the people;
this may go to explain why the government met such an abrupt end. World War II
revealed the shortcoming and deficiencies of the Fascist state. Public discontent grew
during Mussolini’s most critical time as a ruler. Dennis Mack Smith suggests that “on the
rare occasions when an alternative presented itself-as in June 1924 after Matteotti’s
murder and in July 1943…the whole machinery of totalitarian consent disintegrated in a
moment.” To Mussolini what mattered most was what the Fascists were perceived as
rather than the reality of the situation. He declared himself a totalitarian several times
over, yet in seldom cases does he meet the criteria laid down. There existed autonomous
forces of political power and influence that sometimes quite clearly disagreed with
government policy. While the government centralized and consolidated its power,
popular support was not really support at all, just a thinly veiled tolerance of a regime
that made few sweeping changes until the late 1930s – just when discontent was on the
rise. An even more indicting charge is Cassels’ claim that “Italy only underwent a mild
dose of defascistizzazione”, suggesting that Fascism never did penetrate to the roots of
Italian society. It suffices to say that while Italy perhaps gave the appearance of being
totalitarian, and maybe Mussolini himself believed that it was, the reality exposed by the
strenuousness of wartime was much different.