Political Science 639
Professor Danzer
3-14-03
The Causes and Processes of Democratization in the Philippines and Indonesia
The transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies took very different paths in the
case of Indonesia and the Philippines. This essay will look at the causes and the processes for
democratic transition in Indonesia and the Philippines. The first part of the essay will examine
the causes for the transition. More specifically, the first part will attempt to explain the fall of
the authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and the Philippines from a deterministic or structural point
of view. The second part of the essay will examine both countries processes of democratization
with an emphasis on the dynamics of the transition once democracy had been established. The
character of the transitions to democracy follow the historical paths of each country; in
Indonesia, a relatively smooth transfer of power occurs which followed the “Javanese conception
of power,” whereby silence and passivity express power, and in the Philippines where the landed
oligarchy regained control of the patronage resources and the state.1
The fall of Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, after fourteen years of authoritarian rule, can be
primarily attributed to the landed oligarchy’s insatiable desire to reclaim control of the state.
When Marcos declared martial law in 1972, after serving two terms as President of the
Philippines, he immediately demobilized any opposition to himself. Philippine politics is a
constant battle for “vote blocs” which are a collection of votes for a person in government in
return for resources for that localities bloc of votes. These resources could be money for schools,
roads, etc. There is constant competition for these votes by politicians, which can flow from
candidate to candidate depending on who is willing to pay the highest price. The effect of this
competition during the pre-martial law years was a constant change in the leadership of the
country. When martial law was introduced, and Marcos demobilized his opposition—the landed
oligarchy, this assured himself permanent rule. The demobilization of the oligarchy was carried
1
Anderson, Benedict, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture.”
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Political Science 639
Professor Danzer
3-14-03
out through arrests, shutting down of newspapers, and purging the government of opposition
leaders.2 With the declaration of martial law, and no opposition, Marcos was at the apex of the
patronage resources.
The money Marcos received from having complete control over the Philippine economy
began to slowly retard the Philippine economy. Marcos and his closest friends and family owned
various segments of the economy; this gave him complete control over the economy, state, and
military. Marcos was truly commanding the Philippines during his tenure. However rich
Marcos and his cronies were becoming, the economy began to slow through the late 1970s and
early 1980s as these numbers show: Real GNP growth: 1975-1979: 6.4% 1980: 5.0% 1981:
3.4% 1982: 1.9% 1983: 1.1%.3 The result of the increasing economic downturn coupled with
the oligarchy’s inability to remove Marcos from power, were the cataclysmic events of the
“people power” revolution of 1986. Before exploring the dynamics of the “people power”
revolution, a theoretical analysis of why the Marcos regime fell is needed.
Barrington Moore’s comparative work on development and political form, has led to his
identification of three paths to political modernity: parliamentary democracy, fascist
dictatorship, and communist dictatorship.4 For this example, his analysis of parliamentary
democracy will be examined to see if his model fits with the Philippine transition to democracy
in 1986. There are essentially four main prerequisites needed for a democratic transition
according to Moore, they are: conflict, even balance of power between elites and ruler, strong
bourgeoisie, and a revolutionary or violent break with the past.5 Understanding Moore’s points it
becomes obvious that the Philippine transition to democracy was unique. The only point that the
Lecture notes, “Overview of the Philippine’s Post-Independence History.”
Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle, p. 119.
4
Rueschemeyer, Capitalist Development and Democracy, p. 23.
5
Rueschemeyer, Capitalist Development and Democracy, p. 24.
2
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Political Science 639
Professor Danzer
3-14-03
Philippines suffice is that of the conflict, which is brought about because of the popular support
for a member of the oligarchy, Corazon Aquino. Fortunately, during the transition there was
very little bloodshed between the opposition and Marcos regime. The other three points are not
apparent in the Philippine case. First, Marcos is the clear hegemon of the Philippines, not only in
terms of wealth, but also in his ability to control the state and coercive apparatuses. Second, the
Philippines economy had been steadily declining since the mid-1970s, which decreased the size
of the middle class. Third, there was no violent break with the past, rather the landed oligarchy,
which had been in power since the days of Spanish colonial rule, reasserted its dominance.
Suharto became Sukarno’s successor after the failed coup attempt in 1965, and in doing
so brought order and stability to Indonesia. During the Sukarno period inflation reached as high
as 500%, and a “titanic battle of ideologies” progressed as nationalists, communists, the military
and Islamic separatist movements threatened to tear the country apart.6 Under Suharto,
Indonesia averaged 7% economic growth over the thirty-year period, and the military defeated
the other ideologies and took on a dwifungsi or dual function in protecting and running the state.7
The largest single event that precipitated Suharto’s fall was his mismanagement of the Asian
financial crisis in 1997. Damien Kingsbury explains that the crisis destroyed…
“…the New Order’s political rationalization that authoritarianism was a prerequisite for economic
growth. The economic crisis exposed the structural relationship between political transparency and
accountability and the longer-term health of the economy. If authoritarianism was able to rationalize its
methods on the grounds of instituting economic development, its failure led to a shift in thinking in which
good governance, and hence democracy, was identified as necessary for economic recovery and growth.” 8
Understanding the history again leads to a discussion of the theoretical reasons of Suharto’s fall.
Modernization theory falls under the umbrella of structural theories, and seems to fit well
with the Indonesian case. Modernization theory states that there is a direct correlation between
economic prosperity and democratic development Economic prosperity leads to democracy
Lecture, “Overview of Indonesia’s Post-Independence History”
Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, p. 43.
8
Ibid, p. 236.
6
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Political Science 639
Professor Danzer
3-14-03
“because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes and
weakening the landed upper class.”9 With the 7% economic growth, the middle class expanded,
and became concerned with the financial crisis of 1997, and if the redistribution of Suharto’s
crony’s wealth would occur. As stated earlier, there became a performance legitimacy problem
once the economy slowed.
The next section will explore the transitology of the Philippine and Indonesian
democratizations. These agency oriented theories assert that democratization is the result of
individual decisions among four groups. Within the current regime there is a battle between the
hardliners and softliners and within the opposition there are moderates and radicals. The
moderate opposition actors within the Philippine democratization were: Corazon Aquino, the
Catholic Church, and the middle class which represented “people power.” The softline regime
actors were the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) that was a group
of former Marcos led military personnel, but specifically Fidel Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile.
The hardline actors were Marcos, and Fabian Ver.
The group to make the first move was RAM who attempted to carry out a coup against
Marcos, but could not rally popular support alone. Fidel Ramos, a very well connected and
charismatic man, called Corazon Aquino, the leader of the opposition, to gather as many people
around the RAM forces. The end result was the “people power” revolution. More importantly
for the opposition, since the softline regime actors had to seek out the moderate opposition, the
moderate opposition was able to control the bargaining for the new government. The end result
of this interaction between the moderates and softliners was a pacted transition in which all of
the Marcos institutions were dissolved once Marcos was removed.
9
Rueschemeyer, Capitalist Development and Democracy, p. 7.
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Political Science 639
Professor Danzer
3-14-03
Within Indonesia, the transition would be completely different. The moderates,
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid, were in contact with the softliner, Wiranto
who was also close with Suharto. The hardliners were Suharto and Prabowo Subianto. In the
Indonesian case the military leaders held the upper hand and would determine the character of
the transition. The result was Suharto quietly stepping down, while being able to name a
replacement and keep many of the state structures in place once the New Order regime was
removed. As proof that Suharto’s state structures were still in place after he was removed,
Golkar—formerly the state’s required political party, was able to take 22.4% of the vote in the
1999 elections, which was enough to place second in the voting.
In the case study of democratization in the Philippines and Indonesia there are many
more differences than similarities. In fact, the only major similarity is that both transitioned to
democracies and continue to hold elections. The differences are many. First, the Philippines and
Indonesia had different reasons for transition. The Philippines was a very unique case, which did
not fit exactly into Barrington Moore’s box of paths to modernity. Indonesia’s reason fit nicely
into modernization theory because of the economic prosperity under Suharto which led to a
larger middle class and ultimately to democracy. Second, the dynamics of transition were
different. In the Philippines the moderate opposition was able to bargain for a better deal, while
in Indonesia the outgoing regime retained many of the state’s structures. Third, the structures of
the state after each authoritarian ruler were different. Marcos’ structures were dissolved once he
was removed from office, while in Indonesia, Suharto’s legacy can still be seen.
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