LEXSTAT FRCP R11
UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
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FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11 (2004)
Review expert commentary from The National Institute for Trial Advocacy
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule.
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper
shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless
omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has
been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys,
law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests
and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period
as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable
expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law
firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
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(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that
appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient
to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay
a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause
before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to
be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this
rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery
requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
HISTORY:
(Amended Aug. 1, 1983; Aug. 1, 1987; Dec. 1, 1993.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Other provisions:
Notes of Advisory Committee. This is substantially the content of former Equity Rules 24 (Signature of Counsel)
and 21 (Scandal and Impertinence) consolidated and unified. Compare former Equity Rule 36 (Officers Before Whom
Pleadings Verified). Compare to similar purposes, English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937)
O. 19, r 4, and Great Australian Gold Mining Co. v. Martin, L. R., 5 Ch. Div. 1, 10 (1877). Subscription of pleadings is
required in many codes. 2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9265; N.Y.R.C.P. (1937) Rule 91; 2 N.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) § 7455.
This rule expressly continues any statute which requires a pleading to be verified or accompanied by an affidavit,
such as:
U.S.C., Title 28 former:
§ 381 (Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders).
§ 762 (Suit against the United States).
U.S.C., Title 28, former § 829 (now § 1927) (Costs; attorney liable for, when) is unaffected by this rule.
For complaints which must be verified under these rules, see Rules 23(b) (Secondary Action by Shareholders) and 65
(Injunctions).
For abolition of the rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of
two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances, see Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931) see 12 P.S.
Pa., § 1222; for the rule in equity itself, see Greenfield v. Blumenthal, 69 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1934).
Notes of Advisory Committee on 1983 amendments. Since its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the
striking of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in the signing of pleadings. Its
provisions have always applied to motions and other papers by virtue of incorporation by reference in Rule 7(b)(2). The
amendment and the addition of Rule 7(b)(3) expressly confirms this applicability.
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses. See 6 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1971). There has been considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances that
should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of
attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions. See Rodes, Ripple
& Mooney, Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 64-65, Federal Judicial Center
(1981). The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions, see Moore, Federal
Practice P 7.05, at 1547, by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the
imposition of sanctions.
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine
permitting the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in
instituting or conducting litigation. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 [65 L. Ed. 2d 488] (1980);
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 [36 L. Ed. 2d 702] (1973). Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.
The expanded nature of the lawyer's certification in the fifth sentence of amended Rule 11 recognizes that the
litigation process may be abused for purposes other than delay. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v.
DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
The words "good ground to support" the pleading in the original rule were interpreted to have both factual and legal
elements. See, e.g., Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1517, 1519
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). They have been replaced by a standard of conduct that is more focused.
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the
affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. See Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F.Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This standard is more stringent than the
original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation. See
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories. The court
is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was
reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable
inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to
rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading,
motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or
another member of the bar.
The rule does not require a party or an attorney to disclose privileged communications or work product in order to
show that the signing of the pleading, motion, or other paper is substantially justified. The provisions of Rule 26(c),
including appropriate orders after in camera inspection by the court, remain available to protect a party claiming
privilege or work product protection.
Amended Rule 11 continues to apply to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper. Although the standard
is the same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient
discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 [30 L. Ed. 2d 652] (1972).
The provision in the original rule for striking pleadings and motions as sham and false has been deleted. The passage
has rarely been utilized, and decisions thereunder have tended to confuse the issue of attorney honesty with the merits of
the action. See generally Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976). Motions under this provision generally present issues better dealt with under
Rules 8, 12, or 56. See Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969).
The former reference to the inclusion of scandalous or indecent matter, which is itself strong indication that an
improper purpose underlies the pleading, motion, or other paper, also has been deleted as unnecessary. Such matter may
be stricken under Rule 12(f) as well as dealt with under the more general language of amended Rule 11.
The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that efforts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by
insuring that the rule will be applied when properly invoked. The word "sanctions" in the caption, for example, stresses
a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper pleadings, motions or other papers. This corresponds to the approach in
imposing sanctions for discovery abuses. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 [49
L. Ed. 2d 747] (1976) (per curiam). And the words "shall impose" in the last sentence focus the court's attention on the
need to impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses. The court, however, retains the necessary flexibility to deal
appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with
which it should be well acquainted.
The reference in the former text to wilfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted. However, in
considering the nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should take account of the state of the
attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or other paper was signed. Thus, for example,
when a party is not represented by counsel, the absence of legal advice is an appropriate factor to be considered.
Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their own motion. See North American Trading
Corp. v. Zale Corp., 73 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Authority to do so has been made explicit in order to overcome the
traditional reluctance of courts to intervene unless requested by one of the parties. The detection and punishment of a
violation of the signing requirement, encouraged by the amended rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing
the system's effective operation.
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If the duty imposed by the rule is violated, the court should have the discretion to impose sanctions on either the
attorney, the party the signing attorney represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party who signed the pleading, and
the new rule so provides. Although Rule 11 has been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power to impose
sanctions on an attorney personally, either by imposing costs or employing the contempt technique. See 5 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969); 2A Moore, Federal Practice P 11.02, at 2104 n.8. This
power has been used infrequently. The amended rule should eliminate any doubt as to the propriety of assessing
sanctions against the attorney.
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may be appropriate under the circumstances of the
case to impose a sanction on the client. See Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., supra. This
modification brings Rule 11 in line with practice under Rule 37, which allows sanctions for abuses during discovery to
be imposed upon the party, the attorney, or both.
A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the offending party promptly upon discovering a basis
for doing so. The time when sanctions are to be imposed rests in the discretion of the trial judge. However, it is
anticipated that in the case of pleadings the sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the end of the
litigation, and in the case of motions at the time when the motion is decided or shortly thereafter. The procedure
obviously must comport with due process requirements. The particular format to be followed should depend on the
circumstances of the situation and the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many situations the judge's
participation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry will be
necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset
by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of
sanction proceedings to the record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in
extraordinary circumstances.
Although the encompassing reference to "other papers" in new Rule 11 literally includes discovery papers, the
certification requirement in that context is governed by proposed new Rule 26(g). Discovery motions, however, fall
within the ambit of Rule 11.
Notes of Advisory Committee on 1987 amendments. The amendments are technical. No substantive change is
intended.
Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 amendments. Purpose of revision. This revision is intended to remedy
problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule. For empirical
examination of experience under the 1983 rule, see, e.g., New York State Bar Committee on Federal Courts, Sanctions
and Attorneys' Fees (1987); T. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process (1989); American Judicature Society, Report
of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (S. Burbank ed., 1989); E. Wiggins, T. Willging,
and D. Stienstra, Report on Rule 11 (Federal Judicial Center 1991). For book-length analyses of the case law, see G.
Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse (1989); G. Solovy, The Federal Law of Sanctions (1991); G.
Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventative Measures (1991).
The rule retains the principle that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to the court to refrain from
conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1. The revision broadens the scope of this obligation, but places greater
constraints on the imposition of sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court.
New subdivision (d) removes from the ambit of this rule all discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions
subject to the provisions of Rule 26 through 37.
Note to Subdivision (a). Retained in this subdivision are the provisions requiring signatures on pleadings, written
motions, and other papers. Unsigned papers are to be received by the Clerk, but then are to be stricken if the omission of
the signature is not corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or pro se litigant. Correction can
be made by signing the paper on file or by submitting a duplicate that contains the signature. A court may require by
local rule that papers contain additional identifying information regarding the parties or attorneys, such as telephone
numbers to facilitate facsimile transmissions, though, as for omission of a signature, the paper should not be rejected for
failure to provide such information.
The sentence in the former rule relating to the effect of answers under oath is no longer needed and has been
eliminated. The provision in the former rule that signing a paper constitutes a certificate that it has been read by the
signer also has been eliminated as unnecessary. The obligations imposed under subdivision (b) obviously require that a
pleading, written motion, or other paper be read before it is filed or submitted to the court.
Note to Subdivisions (b) and (c). The subdivisions restate the provisions requiring attorneys and pro se litigants to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and
mandating sanctions for violation of these obligations. The revision in part expands the responsibilities of litigants to
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the court, while providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule continues
to require litigants to "stop-and-think" before initially making legal or factual contentions. It also, however,
emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is no
longer tenable and by generally providing protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a
potential violation is called to their attention.
The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It does not cover matters
arising for the first time during oral presentations to the court, when counsel may make statements that would not have
been made if there had been more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's obligations with respect to the
contents of these papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include
reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease
to have any merit. For example, an attorney who during a pretrial conference insists on a claim or defense should be
viewed as "presenting to the court" that contention and would be subject to the obligations of subdivision (b) measured
as of that time. Similarly, if after a notice of removal is filed, a party urges in federal court the allegations of a pleading
filed in state court (whether as claims, defenses, or in disputes regarding removal or remand), it would be viewed as
"presenting"--and hence certifying to the district court under Rule 11--those allegations.
The certification with respect to allegations and other factual contentions is revised in recognition that sometimes a
litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from
opposing parties or third persons to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation. Tolerance of factual
contentions in initial pleadings by plaintiffs or defendants when specifically identified as made on information and
belief does not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into the facts that is
reasonable under the circumstances; it is not a license to join parties, make claims, or present defenses without any
factual basis or justification. Moreover, if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery, the party has a duty under the rule not to persist with that contention. Subdivision (b) does
not require a formal amendment to pleadings for which evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather calls upon a
litigant not thereafter to advocate such claims or defenses.
The certification is that there is (or likely will be) "evidentiary support" for the allegation, not that the party will
prevail with respect to its contention regarding the fact. That summary judgment is rendered against a party does not
necessarily mean, for purposes of this certification, that it had no evidentiary support for its position. On the other
hand, if a party has evidence with respect to a contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment
based thereon, it would have sufficient "evidentiary support" for purposes of Rule 11.
Denials of factual contentions involve somewhat different considerations. Often, of course, a denial is premised
upon the existence of evidence contradicting the alleged fact. At other times a denial is permissible because, after an
appropriate investigation, a party has no information concerning the matter or, indeed, has a reasonable basis for
doubting the credibility of the only evidence relevant to the matter. A party should not deny an allegation it knows to
be true; but it is not required, simply because it lacks contradictory evidence, to admit an allegation that it believes is not
true.
The changes is subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) will serve to equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs and
defendants, who under Rule 8(b) are in effect allowed to deny allegations by stating that from their initial investigation
they lack sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation. If, after further investigation or
discovery, a denial is no longer warranted, the defendant should not continue to insist on that denial. While sometimes
helpful, formal amendment of the pleadings to withdraw an allegation or denial is not required by subdivision (b).
Arguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of existing law or for creation of new law do not violate
subdivision (b)(2) provided they are "nonfrivolous." This establishes an objective standard, intended to eliminate any
"empty-head pure-heart" justification for patently frivolous arguments. However, the extent to which a litigant has
researched the issues and found some support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or
through consultation with other attorneys should certainly be taken into account in determining whether paragraph (2)
has been violated. Although arguments for a change of law are not required to be specifically so identified, a
contention that is so identified should be viewed with greater tolerance under the rule.
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper;
issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs;
ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government
attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc. See Manual for Complex Litigation,
Second, § 42.3. The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in deciding whether to
impose a sanction or what sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances; but, for emphasis, it does specifically
note that a sanction may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent;
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whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one
particular count or defense; whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether it was
intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; whether the responsible person is
trained in the law; what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person
from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants: all of these may in a
particular case be proper considerations. The court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any,
should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not be more severe than reasonably
necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly situated
persons.
Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary
sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty. However, under unusual circumstances,
particularly for (b)(1) violations, deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating
the rule to make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those injured by the
violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the court, if requested in a motion and if so warranted, to award attorney's
fees to another party. Any such award to another party, however, should not exceed the expenses and attorneys' fees
for the services directly and unavoidably caused by the violation of the certification requirement. If, for example, a
wholly unsupportable count were included in a multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose of needlessly
increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious adversary, any award of expenses should be limited to those directly
caused by inclusion of the improper count, and not those resulting from the filing of the complaint or answer itself.
The award should not provide compensation for services that could have been avoided by an earlier disclosure of
evidence or an earlier challenge to the groundless claims or defenses. Moreover, partial reimbursement of fees may
constitute a sufficient deterrent with respect to violations by persons having modest financial resources. In cases
brought under statutes providing for fees to be awarded to prevailing parties, the court should not employ cost-shifting
under this rule in a manner that would be inconsistent with the standards that govern the statutory award of fees, such as
stated in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 [54 L. Ed. 2d 648] (1978).
The sanction should be imposed on the persons--whether attorneys, law firms, or parties--who have violated the rule
or who may be determined to be responsible for the violation. The person signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a
document has a nondelegable responsibility to the court, and in most situations should be sanctioned for a violation.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm is to be held also responsible when, as a result of a motion under
subdivision (c)(1)(A), one of its partners, associates, or employees is determined to have violated the rule. Since such a
motion may be filed only if the offending paper is not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service of the
motion, it is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible under established principles of
agency. This provision is designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule. Cf. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 [107 L. Ed. 2d 438] (1989) (1983 version of Rule 11 does not permit sanctions
against law firm of attorney signing groundless complaint).
The revision permits the court to consider whether other attorneys in the firm, co-counsel, other law firms, or the
party itself should be held accountable for their part in causing a violation. When appropriate, the court can make an
additional inquiry in order to determine whether the sanctions should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties
either in addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the presentation to the court.
For example, such an inquiry may be appropriate in cases involving governmental agencies or other institutional parties
that frequently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it.
Sanctions that involve monetary awards (such as a fine or an award of attorney's fees) may not be imposed on a
represented party for violations of subdivision (b)(2), involving frivolous contentions of law. Monetary responsibility
for such violations is more properly placed solely on the party's attorneys. With this limitation, the rule should not be
subject to attack under the Rules Enabling Act. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 [117 L. Ed. 2d 280] (1992);
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter. Inc., 498 U.S. 533 [112 L. Ed. 2d 1140] (1991). This
restriction does not limit the court's power to impose sanctions or remedial orders may have collateral financial
consequences upon a party, such as dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense, or preparation of amended pleadings.
Explicit provision is made for litigants to be provided notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity to respond
before sanctions are imposed. Whether the matter should be decided solely on the basis of written submissions or
should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed, for evidentiary presentation) will depend on the circumstances. If
the court imposes a sanction, it must, unless waived, indicate its reasons in a written order or on the record; the court
should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for sanctions. Whether a violation has occurred and what
sanctions, if any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the discretion of the trial court; accordingly, as
under current law, the standard for appellate review of these decisions will be for abuse of discretion. See Cooter &
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Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 [110 L. Ed. 2d 359] (1990) (noting, however, that an abuse would be established
if the court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence).
The revision leaves for resolution on a case-by-case basis, considering the particular circumstances involved, the
question as to when a motion for violation of Rule 11 should be served and when, if filed, it should be decided.
Ordinarily the motion should be served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, may be
viewed as untimely. In other circumstances, it should not be served until the other party has had a reasonable
opportunity for discovery. Given the "safe harbor" provisions discussed below, a party cannot delay serving its Rule
11 motion until conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the offending contention).
Rule 11 motions should not be made or threatened for minor, inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed
by subdivision (b). They should not be employed as a discovery device or to test the legal sufficiency or efficacy of
allegations in the pleadings; other motions are available for those purposes. Nor should Rule 11 motions be prepared to
emphasize the merits of a party's position, to exact an unjust settlement, to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing
contentions that are fairly debatable, to increase the costs of litigation, to create a conflict of interest between attorney
and client, or to seek disclosure of matters otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product
doctrine. As under the prior rule, the court may defer its ruling (or its decision as to the identity of the persons to be
sanctioned) until final resolution of the case in order to avoid immediate conflicts of interest and to reduce the
disruption created if a disclosure of attorney-client communications is needed to determine whether a violation occurred
or to identify the person responsible for the violation.
The rule provides that requests for sanctions must be made as a separate motion, i.e., not simply included as an
additional prayer for relief contained in another motion. The motion for sanctions is not, however, to be filed until at
least 21 days (or such other period as the court may set) after being served. If, during this period, the alleged violation
is corrected, as by withdrawing (whether formally or informally) some allegations or contention, the motion should not
be filed with the court. These provisions are intended to provide a type of "safe harbor" against motions under Rule 11
in that a party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving the motion, it
refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a
specified allegation. Under the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest
that be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the timely withdrawal of a contention will
protect a party against a motion for sanctions.
To stress the seriousness of a motion for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the rule, the
revision provides that the "safe harbor" period begins to run only upon service of the motion. In most cases, however,
counsel should be expected to give informal notice to the other party, whether in person or by a telephone call or letter,
of a potential violation before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion.
As under former Rule 11, the filing of a motion for sanctions is itself subject to the requirements of the rule and can
lead to sanctions. However, service of a cross motion under Rule 11 should rarely be needed since under the revision
the court may award to the person who prevails on a motion under Rule 11--whether the movant or the target of the
motion--reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with the condition that this be done through a show
cause order. This procedure provides the person with notice and an opportunity to respond. The revision provides that
a monetary sanction imposed after a court-initiated show cause order be limited to a penalty payable to the court and
that it be imposed only if the show cause order is issued before any voluntary dismissal or an agreement of the parties to
settle the claims made by or against the litigant. Parties settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an
unexpected order from the court leading the monetary sanctions that might have affected their willingness to settle or
voluntarily dismiss a case. Since show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a
contempt of court, the rule does not provide a "safe harbor" to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a
show cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative. Such corrective action, however, should be taken into
account in deciding what sanction to impose if, after consideration of the litigant's response, the court concludes that a
violation has occurred.
Note to Subdivision (d). Rules 26(g) and 37 establish certification standards and sanctions that apply to discovery
disclosures, requests, responses, objections, and motions. It is appropriate that Rules 26 through 37, which are
specially designed for the discovery process, govern such documents and conduct rather than the more general
provisions of Rule 11. Subdivision (d) has been added to accomplish this result.
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper presentations of claims, defenses, or contentions. It does
not supplant statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties or alter the principles governing such
awards. It does not inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent powers, or in imposing
sanctions, awarding expenses, or directing remedial action authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See
Page 8
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32 [115 L. Ed. 2d 27] (1991). Chambers cautions, however, against reliance upon
inherent powers if appropriate sanctions can be imposed under provisions such as Rule 11, and the procedures specified
in Rule 11--notice, opportunity to respond, and findings--should ordinarily be employed when imposing a sanction
under the court's inherent powers. Finally, it should be noted that Rule 11 does not preclude a party from initiating an
independent action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
NOTES:
CROSS REFERENCES
Notary public and other persons authorized to administer oaths required by laws of the United States, 5 USCS §
2903.
Signing of motions and other papers, USCS Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure:
MFEDPR1.04USCSTREAT-,MFEDPR1.06USCSTREAT, MFEDPR1.20USCSTREAT, MFEDPR1.21USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR5.04USCSTREAT, MFEDPR5.31USCSTREAT, MFEDPR5.32USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR7.02USCSTREAT-,MFEDPR7.04USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR8.02USCSTREAT, MFEDPR8.04USCSTREAT, MFEDPR8.06USCSTREAT, MFEDPR8.09USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR9.03USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR10.02USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR11.02USCSTREAT, MFEDPR11.03USCSTREAT, MFEDPR11.10USCSTREAT,
MFEDPR11.11USCSTREAT, MFEDPR11.21USCSTREAT-,MFEDPR11.25USCSTREAT,
MFEDPR11.27USCSTREAT-,MFEDPR11.29USCSTREAT,
MFEDPR11.40USCSTREAT-,MFEDPR11.42USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR16.90USCSTREAT, MFEDPR16.94USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR18.02USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR19.07USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR20.03USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR23.103USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR24.03USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR26.02USCSTREAT, MFEDPR26.22USCSTREAT, MFEDPR26.46USCSTREAT,
MFEDPR26.151USCSTREAT, MFEDPR26.152USCSTREAT, MFEDPR26.154USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR30.05USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR37.23USCSTREAT, MFEDPR37.51USCSTREAT, MFEDPR37.60USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR37A.30USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR40.02USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR41.13USCSTREAT, MFEDPR41.33USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR52.11USCSTREAT, MFEDPR52.16USCSTREAT, MFEDPR52.31USCSTREAT,
MFEDPR52.34USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR54.102USCSTREAT, MFEDPR54.151USCSTREAT, MFEDPR54.171USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR56.10USCSTREAT, MFEDPR56.13USCSTREAT, MFEDPR56.30USCSTREAT,
MFEDPR56.33USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR60.25USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR71A.04USCSTREAT, MFEDPR71A.08USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR72.09USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR81.04USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR82.10USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR103.41USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR107.14USCSTREAT, MFEDPR107.30USCSTREAT, MFEDPR107.41USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR120.20USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR124.04USCSTREAT, MFEDPR124.07USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR303.21USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR338.10USCSTREAT, MFEDPR338.21USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR346.12USCSTREAT.
MFEDPR408.16USCSTREAT.
Page 9
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
CIPES671.03USCSTREAT.
CIPES672.03USCSTREAT.
WEUSR408.10USCSTREAT.
WEUSR1102.02USCSTREAT.
1 Fed Proc L Ed, Access to District Courts § § 1:245, 357, 378.
1A Fed Proc L Ed, Access to District Courts § § 1:502, 882.
2 Fed Proc L Ed, Administrative Procedure § § 3:145, 193.
2A Fed Proc L Ed, Appeal, Certiorari, and Review § § 3:259, 619, 621, 988, 989, 996.
4A Fed Proc L Ed, Banking and Financing § § 8:114, 341, 688, 1043.
4B Fed Proc L Ed, Banking and Financing § 8:1296.
5B Fed Proc L Ed, Bankruptcy § § 9:1842, 1890.
5B Fed Proc L Ed, Bonds, Civil Fines, and Forfeitures § 10:262.
6 Fed Proc L Ed, Civil Rights § 11:122.
7 Fed Proc L Ed, Condemnation of Property § 14:22.
7A Fed Proc L Ed, Copyrights § 18:203.
7A Fed Proc L Ed, Court of Claims § 19:105.
7A Fed Proc L Ed, Courts and Judicial System § 20:200.
8 Fed Proc L Ed, Courts and Judicial System § § 20:407, 439, 512.
10 Fed Proc L Ed, Declaratory Judgments § 23:52.
10 Fed Proc L Ed, Deposits in Court § 24:22.
10 Fed Proc L Ed, Derivative Actions by Shareholders § 25:144.
10 Fed Proc L Ed, Discovery and Depositions § § 26:29, 43, 170, 244, 248, 421, 425.
10A Fed Proc L Ed, Discovery and Depositions § § 26:571, 689-691.
11 Fed Proc L Ed, Employees' Compensation Acts § 29:318.
11A Fed Proc L Ed, Environmental Protection § 32:988.
15 Fed Proc L Ed, Freedom of Information § 38:526.
16 Fed Proc L Ed, Habeas Corpus § 41:64.
17A Fed Proc L Ed, Health, Education, and Welfare § 42:2731.
21A Fed Proc L Ed, Judgments and Orders § 51:99.
24A Fed Proc L Ed, Natural and Marine Resources § 56:1763.
27 Fed Proc L Ed, Pleadings and Motions § § 62:17, 25, 32, 37, 68, 115-120, 134.
27A Fed Proc L Ed, Pleadings and Motions § § 62:382, 391, 392, 705, 845-879, 881, 883, 902.
28 Fed Proc L Ed, Pretrial Procedure § 64:38.
29A Fed Proc L Ed, Removal of Actions § § 69:72, 74, 109.
29A Fed Proc L Ed, Securities Regulation § 70:440.
Am Jur:
Appellate_Review339, Appellate_Review949.
Bankruptcy3521.
Compromise_Settlement17.
Constitutional_Law943.
Corporations2108, Corporations2224.
DEPO_DISC200, DEPO_DISC201.
Federal_Courts185, Federal_Courts201, Federal_Courts226, Federal_Courts277, Federal_Courts349,
Federal_Courts533, Federal_Courts647, Federal_Courts656.
Federal_Courts914, Federal_Courts1031, Federal_Courts1051, Federal_Courts1666, Federal_Courts1678,
Federal_Courts1690.
FREE_INFO_ACT588.
Job_Discrimination2282, Job_Discrimination2283, Job_Discrimination2712.
Labor_Labor_Relations3338, Labor_Labor_Relations4557, Labor_Labor_Relations4705.
Parties308.
Pleading50, Pleading68, Pleading171, Pleading433, Pleading442, Pleading443, Pleading488, Pleading494,
Pleading623-Pleading656, Pleading659, Pleading661.
Pleading881, Pleading883, Pleading884, Pleading887, Pleading890.
Pollution_Control925.
Page 10
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
PRIV_FRANCH838, PRIV_FRANCH844.
Products_Liability1710.
Am Jur Trials:
77 Am Jur Trials, Copyright Infringement Litigation, p. 449.
82 Am Jur Trials, Handling Aviation Disaster Cases, p. 243.
86 Am Jur Trials, Arbitration Highways to the Courthouse--A Litigator's Roadmap, p. 111.
89 Am Jur Trials, Arbitrating Securities Industry Disputes, p. 55.
Am Jur Proof of Facts:
33 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d, Civil Discovery Sanctions in the Federal Courts, p. 459.
64 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d, Topic: Proof of Objections to Discharge of Individual Debtor Under 11 U.S.C.A. §
727(A) [11 USCS § 727(A)] and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001 in a Liquidation Bankruptcy Case Under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code [11 USCS § § 701 et seq.], p. 113.
Forms:
1 Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Actions in District Court § § 1:260-266.
1A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Actions in District Court § § 1:865-875, 880, 882, 889, 900, 904, 905, 1006.
3B Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Banking and Financing (2001) § 8:229.
14 Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Removal of Actions (2004) § 58:81.
14A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Securities Regulation (2004) § 59:427.
1C Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (2003), Alternative Dispute Resolution, § 37.
11 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (1998), Federal Practice and Procedure, § § 14-23, 441-443, 447, 452.
23B Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (2002), Trial, § § 11, 46.
Immigration:
IMMLAW4.03USCSTREAT.
Annotations:
Comment Note--General principles regarding imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 95 ALR Fed 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to signing and verification of
pleadings, in actions for defamation. 95 ALR Fed 181.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to signing and verification of
pleadings, in action for wrongful discharge from employment. 96 ALR Fed 13.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to signing and verification of
pleadings, in actions for securities fraud. 97 ALR Fed 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to signing and verification of
pleadings, in actions for infliction of emotional distress. 98 ALR Fed 442.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to signing and verification of
pleadings, in antitrust actions. 99 ALR Fed 573.
Comment Note--Procedural requirements for imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 100 ALR Fed 556.
Texts:
Schweitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice (2d ed).
Law Review Articles:
Jones; Solomons; Blum. Application of Rule 11 to administrative proceedings. 6 Admin LJ Am U 1, Spring 1992.
Bloomenstein. Developing Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 21 Akron L Rev 289, Winter 1988.
Weinstein. Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11: How Much Is Enough? Boone v. Superior Court. 27 Ariz L Rev 871,
1985.
Joseph. Now that the Federal Rule Has Broken the Ground, Judges Have Found Plenty of Other Ways to Sanction
Abusive Lawyers. 4 ABA J 62, May 1988.
Page 11
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Has a "Kafkaesque Dream" Come True? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Time For Another Amendment? 67
BU L Rev 1019, November 1987.
Federal courts sanctioning represented parties using Rule 11 and their inherent power: you can run but you cannot
hide. 21 Cap U L Rev 225, Winter 1992.
LCJ supports Rule 11, but it's failed to live up to its potential. 58 Def Couns J 105, January 1991.
Harkins. Sanctions for failure to disclose. 59 Def Couns J 161, April 1992.
Pope; Benkoczy. A Comprehensive Guide to Sanctions Under Rule 11. 55 Def Counsel J 389, October 1988.
Stein. Rule 11 in the real world: how the dynamics of litigation defeat the purpose of imposing attorney fee sanctions
for the assertion of frivolous legal arguments. 132 F.R.D. 309, December 1990.
Luck. Rule 11--A 1991 perspective. 65 Fla B J 16, May 1991.
Jenkins. Rule 11 does not apply in the state courts. 65 Fla B J 87, January 1991.
Carter; Cannon. The History and Purposes of Rule 11. 54 Fordham L Rev 4 and 10, October 1985.
Chrein; Duffy. The Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11. 54 Fordham L Rev 13 and 20, October 1985.
Weiss. A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11. 54 Fordham L Rev 23, October 1985.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Duty to Withdraw a Baseless Pleading. 56 Fordham L Rev
697, March 1988.
Stempel. Sanctions, symmetry, and safe harbors: limiting misapplication of Rule 11 by harmonizing it with
pre-verdict dismissal devices. 60 Fordham L Rev 257, November 1991.
Vairo. Rule 11 and the profession. 67 Fordham L Rev 589, November 1998.
Eastwood. Rule 11: is the cure justified by the disease? 28 Ga St B J 228, May 1992.
Nelken. Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11--Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between
Compensation and Punishment. 74 Geo L J 1313, June 1986.
The immediate appealability of Rule 11 sanctions. 59 Geo Wash L Rev 683, March 1991.
Rule 11 sanctions revisited: Townsend v Holman Consulting Corporation [929 F2d 1358]. 22 Golden Gate U L Rev
45, Spring 1992.
Sanctioning clients under rule 11: Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
922. 14 Harv JL & Pub Pol'y 913, Summer 1991.
A petition clause analysis of suits against the government: implications for Rule 11 sanctions. 106 Harv L Rev
1111, March 1993.
Cavanagh. Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 14 Hofstra L Rev
499, Spring 1986.
Ward. One bad apple: narrowing the scope of federal Rule 11. 80 Ill B J 342, July 1992.
Nelken. The impact of Federal Rule 11 on lawyers and judges in the Northern District of California. 74 Judicature
147, October/November 1990.
Cole. Rule 11 now. 17 Litigation 10, Spring 1991.
Mazurczak. Critical Analysis of Rule 11 Sanctions in the Seventh Circuit. 72 Marq L Rev 91, Fall 1988.
Risinger. Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11. 61 Minn L Rev 1.
Brittingham. Business Guides v Chromatic Communications Enterprises [111 S Ct 922 (1991)]: where does the
client stand under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11? 19 N Ky L Rev 573, Spring 1992.
Lynch. Rule 11 in the First Circuit: a look at the past and into the future. 33 NH BJ 56, December 1992.
The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation By Demanding Professional Responsibility. 61 NYUL
Rev 300, May 1986.
Comments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and related rules. 46 Rec A B City NY 267, April 1991.
Morse. Federal Rule 11: guidelines for the (Seventh Circuit) litigator. 34 Res Gestae 224, November 1990.
Stein. Of impure hearts and empty heads: a hierarchy of Rule 11 violations. 31 Santa Clara L Rev 393, 1991.
The civil RICO racket: fighting back with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 64 St John's L Rev 931, Fall 1990.
Symposium: the 20th anniversary of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (1970-1990.). 64 St.
John's L Rev 701, Fall 1990.
Federal civil procedure--rule 11--rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal does not bar sanctions. 58 Tenn L Rev 313, Winter
1991.
Zager. Rule 11 and settlement agreements in state court civil litigation: "It ain't over til it's over". 55 Tex B J 678,
July 1992.
Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11 Sanctions. 67 Tex L Rev 351, December 1988.
A symposium on the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 Tort & Ins LJ 467, Spring 1994.
Page 12
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Significant Cases and Developments: Rule 11 Sanctions. 32 Trial Law Guide 54, Spring 1988.
Burger-Smith. Avoiding sanctions under Federal Rule 11: a lawyer's guide to the "new" rule. 34 Trial Law Guide
549, Winter 1991.
"Good faith" of lawyer does not preclude sanction. 34 Trial Law Guide 596, Winter 1991.
Galasso. Civil procedure--Rule 11--clients should be held to an objective standard of reasonable inquiry when
signing pleadings, motions, or other papers. Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 111
S Ct 922 (1991). 69 U Det Mercy L Rev 417, Spring 1992.
Yamamoto; Hart. Rule 11 and state courts: panacea or Pandora's box?. 13 U Haw L Rev 57, Summer 1991.
Attorney Sanctions--Rule 11--Deterring Unethical Motion and Pleading Practice--Golden Eagle Distributing Corp.
V. Burroughs Corp. 36 U Kan L Rev 173, Fall 1987.
DuBosar; Perez. Ask Questions First and Shoot Later: Constraining Frivolity in Litigation Under Rule 11. 40 U
Miami L Rev 1267, September 1986.
Tausend; Johnsen. Current status of Rule 11 in the Ninth Circuit and Washington State. 14 U Puget Sound L Rev
419, Winter 1991.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. [496 U.S. 384, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359]: caveat advocatus, the growing impact of Rule
11 sanctions. 25 Val U L Rev 311, Winter 1991.
Rule 11 Statements Concerning Voluntariness of Guilty Plea Not Conclusive Against Contradictory Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief Under 28 USCS § 2255. 29 Vand L Rev 1449.
Wilson. The Intended Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An End to the "Empty Head, Pure Heart"
Defense and a Reinforcement of Ethical Standards. 41 Vand L Rev 343, March 1988.
Bergsten; Pauli. Rule 11 and professionalism. 46 Wash St B News 23, May 1992.
The seven year itch: is it time to reamend Rule 11?. 40 Wash U J Urb & Contemp L 227, 1991.
Tobias. Environmental litigation and Rule 11. 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 429, Winter 1992.
Civil procedure--towards consistent application of Rule 11 sanctions--Uselman v Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn.).
18 Wm Mitchell L Rev 157, Winter 1992.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
I. IN GENERAL
1. Generally
2. Constitutionality
3. Purpose
4. Relationship to other laws
5. --28 USCS § 1927
6. --State procedural rules
7. Applicability of amendments
8. Private right of action
9. Inherent power of court
10. Verification of pleadings
11. --Effect
12. Miscellaneous
II. PERSONS AND ENTITIES SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS
13. Generally
14. Person who did not sign pleading
15. --Attorney
16. Person whose typewritten name appears on pleading
17. Attorney without knowledge
18. Neophyte attorney
19. Substituted counsel
20. Law firm (pre-1993 amendment cases)
21. Pro se litigant
22. Substituted plaintiff
23. United States
24. Miscellaneous
Page 13
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
III. PERSONS AND ENTITIES ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS
25. Particular cases
IV. APPLICABILITY TO PARTICULAR TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS
26. Actions removed to federal court
27. --Pleading or paper filed in federal court
28. Administrative proceedings
29. Appellate proceedings
30. Bankruptcy proceedings
31. Criminal proceedings
32. Habeas corpus proceedings
33. Proceeding over which court has no jurisdiction
34. Proceeding transferred to other District Court
35. State court proceedings
V. APPLICABILITY TO PARTICULAR PLEADINGS, PAPERS AND CONDUCT
36. Generally
37. Affidavit
38. Conduct and arguments
39. Counterclaim and answer
40. Discovery motion (pre-1993 amendment cases)
41. Notice of appearance
42. Papers not submitted to court
43. Papers filed in state court
44. Response to request for admission
45. Miscellaneous
VI. REQUIREMENT OF SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS ON PLEADING
46. Signature requirement, generally
47. --Amendment of pleadings
48. --Copies of pleadings
49. Sufficiency and propriety of signature
50. --Attorney's signature
51. --Non-attorney's signature
52. Statement of address
VII. GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS
A. In General
53. Generally
54. Reasonableness standard
55. Discretion of court
56. Effect of good faith or bad faith
57. Standard applicable to out-of-state attorney
58. Reliance on co-counsel
59. Reference to inadmissible evidence
60. Misstatement, concealment or omission as to facts
61. --Negligent or intentional omission
62. Misstatement or omission as to law
63. Failure to acknowledge or distinguish controlling precedent
64. Failure to disclose contrary expert opinion
65. Repeated filing of same claim or motion
66. --Sanctions denied
67. Violation of order against further lawsuits
Page 14
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
68. Effect of settlement
69. Miscellaneous
B. Adequacy of Inquiry
1. In General
70. Generally
71. Objective or subjective standard
72. --Effect of good faith or bad faith
73. Standard applicable to client or pro se litigant
74. Reliance on co-counsel
75. Reliance on client's assurances or information
76. --Time pressure or exigent circumstances
77. Reliance on news articles or public records
78. Events occurring many years ago
79. Effect of defendant's uncooperativeness
80. Recent change in law
81. Miscellaneous
2. Particular Issues, Claims or Circumstances
82. Accusations against opposing party or attorney
83. Admission to bar
84. Antitrust
85. Bankruptcy
86. Civil or constitutional rights
87. Class actions
88. Conflict of interest
89. Contracts
90. Conversion
91. Copyrights
92. Defamation
93. Discovery (pre-1993 amendment cases)
94. Endangered species
95. Environmental law
96. Expert witnesses
97. Fraud
98. Fraud on court
99. Immunity
100. Injunctive relief
101. Jurisdiction
102. Labor relations
103. Malicious prosecution
104. Medical staff privileges
105. Parties
106. Patents
107. Personal injury or death
108. Punitive or liquidated damages
109. Recusal of judge
110. Removal of action to federal court
111. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
112. RICO
113. Seizure or forfeiture of property
114. Securities
115. Service of process
116. Standing
Page 15
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
117. Statute of limitations
118. Taxation
119. Unjust enrichment
120. Miscellaneous
C. Facts, Existing Law or Argument Warranting Pleading
1. In General
121. Generally
122. Continuing duty
123. Pleading containing frivolous and nonfrivolous claims
124. Intervening change in law
125. Law unclear or unsettled
126. Effect of evidence produced during discovery
127. Argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law
128. Merits of claim
129. --Grant or denial of summary judgment
130. Effect of granting motion for reconsideration
131. Effect of grant or denial of directed verdict
132. Miscellaneous
2. Particular Issues, Claims or Circumstances
133. Amendment of complaint
134. Antitrust
135. Appeal and review
136. Arbitration
137. Attorneys fees
138. Bankruptcy
139. Civil or constitutional rights
140. --Education
141. --Employment discrimination
142. --Misconduct by law enforcement official
143. --Prisoners
144. Continuance
145. Contracts
146. --Tortious interference
147. Contribution and indemnity
148. Copyrights
149. Corporate takeovers
150. Costs of suit
151. Damages
152. Defamation
153. Disability benefits
154. Discovery (pre-1993 amendment cases)
155. Employment
156. Fraud or mistake
157. Immunity
158. Injunctive relief
159. Insurance
160. Judicial bias and recusal
161. Jurisdiction
162. --Diversity of citizenship
163. Labor relations
164. Land patent
165. Malicious prosecution
Page 16
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
166. Mortgages
167. Motion to strike
168. Motion to withdraw
169. Offer of judgment
170. Parties
171. Personal injury, death and property damage
172. Professional malpractice
173. Removal of action to federal court
174. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
175. RICO
176. Sanctions
177. Securities
178. Service of process
179. Standing
180. Statute of limitations
181. Supersedeas bond
182. Taxation
183. Trade secrets
184. Trademarks and trade dress
185. Venue; convenience and propriety of forum
186. Miscellaneous
D. Improper Purpose
1. In General
187. Generally
188. Avoidance of settlement agreement
189. Multiplication of litigation
190. Miscellaneous
2. Harassment, Intimidation and Coercion
191. Baseless claim or motion
192. Inconvenient forum
193. Number of witnesses
194. Prayer for relief; damages
195. Successive complaints or other filings
196. Miscellaneous
3. Unnecessary delay or expense
197. Baseless claim
198. Discovery
199. Excessively long brief
200. Misleading documents
201. Motion to disqualify opposition counsel
202. Motion to vacate default
203. Recusal motion
204. Removal petition
205. Service of process
206. Summary judgment motion
207. Miscellaneous
VIII. PARTICULAR SANCTIONS
A. In General
208. Generally
Page 17
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
209. Discretion of court
210. Factors determining appropriate sanction
211. Miscellaneous
B. Monetary Sanctions
1. In General
212. Generally
213. Liability between attorney and client
214. Liability between parties
215. Miscellaneous
2. Propriety of Monetary Sanctions
a. Costs and Expenses of Litigation
216. Generally
217. Award sought against plaintiff or attorney
218. --Pro se plaintiff, generally
219. --Frivolous motion
220. Award sought against defendant or attorney
221. --Counterclaim
222. --Motion to dismiss
223. --Motion to vacate default
224. Miscellaneous
b. Attorneys' Fees
225. Generally
226. Award sought against plaintiff or attorney
227. --Pro se plaintiff, generally
228. --Frivolous or harassing motion
229. --Frivolous or harassing claim or suit
230. Award sought against defendant or attorney
231. Miscellaneous
c. Other
232. Fine
233. --As penalty or punishment (pre-1993 amendment cases)
234. Interest
235. Further monetary sanctions
236. Other particular claims or awards
3. Amount of Award
a. In General
237. Generally
238. Factors determining amount
239. --Ability to pay
b. Costs and Expenses of Litigation
240. Generally
241. Failure to mitigate
242. Doubled amount
243. Other awards against plaintiff
244. Other awards against defendant
245. Miscellaneous
Page 18
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
c. Attorneys' Fees
246. Generally
247. Factors considered
248. Duty to mitigate
249. Hourly rate
250. Awards against plaintiff
251. --Pro se plaintiff
252. Awards against defendant
253. Miscellaneous
d. Other Particular Awards or Claims
254. Fine
255. --Against defendant or attorney
256. Other particular awards or claims
257. --Against pro se plaintiff
258. --Against defendant or attorney
C. Other Sanctions
259. Dismissal
260. --False document or testimony
261. --For failure to state address
262. Professional discipline of attorney
263. Public reprimand or admonishment
264. Restrictions on discovery
265. Restriction on further lawsuits
266. Striking of pleading
267. --Particular applications
268. Miscellaneous
IX. DEFENSES
269. Laches
270. Mistake
271. Motion to withdraw
272. Need for discovery
273. Neophyte attorney
274. Prompt dismissal
275. Time pressure
276. Miscellaneous
X. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. In General
277. Generally
278. Jurisdiction
279. --After dismissal or final judgment
280. --After notice of appeal
281. Standing
282. Notice (pre-1993 amendment cases)
283. Notice (post-1993 amendment cases)
284. Timeliness of motion
285. --Particular applications
286. Discovery
287. Hearing and argument (pre-1993 amendment cases)
288. Hearing and argument (post-1993 amendment cases)
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
289. Burden of proof
290. Findings and conclusions (pre-1993 amendment cases)
291. Settlement
292. Miscellaneous
B. Appeal and Review
293. Generally
294. Appealability
295. --Particular applications
296. Standard of review
297. Remand
298. Miscellaneous
I. IN GENERAL
1. Generally
Rule 11 motion cannot be used as substitute for appropriate discovery by movant or to prevent discovery of movant.
Chipanno v Champion International Corp. (1983, CA9 Or) 702 F2d 827, 1983-1 CCH Trade Cases P 65296, 36 FR
Serv 2d 931.
Denial of defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions following his voluntary dismissal from suit does not preclude
defendant from later bringing malicious prosecution action. Amwest Mortg. Corp. v Grady (1991, CA9 Cal) 925 F2d
1162, 91 CDOS 1093, 91 Daily Journal DAR 1768, 18 FR Serv 3d 1331.
Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in earlier action which was based on unmeritorious allegations does not have res
judicata effect of barring subsequent actions for malicious prosecution since Rule 11 and tort of malicious prosecution
differ in their nature, elements of claims, and potential remedies. Cohen v Lupo (1991, CA8 Mo) 927 F2d 363, CCH
Fed Secur L Rep P 95813, 18 FR Serv 3d 1225, cert den (1991) 502 US 861, 116 L Ed 2d 142, 112 S Ct 180.
Rule 11 applies only to litigation in district court, and sanctions for frivolous appeals are outside of its scope. Rickels
v City of South Bend (1994, CA7 Ind) 33 F3d 785, 29 FR Serv 3d 1336.
Fed. R.Civ. P. 11 forbids parties and their counsel from alleging factual contentions that lack evidentiary support.
Top Entm't Inc. v Ortega (2002, CA1 Puerto Rico) 285 F3d 115.
Rule 11 is addressed to duplicative litigation of potentially meritorious claims, as well as to litigation of meritless
claims. Sanders v Ft. Wayne (1985, ND Ind) 616 F Supp 467.
Court has no jurisdiction to render advisory opinions to plaintiff as to whether her complaint satisfies Rule 11, and
there is no due process right to proceed with litigation which violates Rule 11. Schaffer v Chicago Police Officers
(1988, ND Ill) 120 FRD 514, 11 FR Serv 3d 481.
In legal malpractice lawsuit, defendant attorney's motion for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions was both premature and
untimely where attorney did not, as required by Rule 11's safe harbor provision, serve motion on opposing counsel at
least 21 days before filing it with court; and rather than moving for sanctions promptly after suit was commenced,
attorney waited until attorney obtained summary judgment. McKenzie v Berggren, P.C. (2003, ED Mich) 212 FRD 512.
2. Constitutionality
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit disbarment of attorney upon whom Rule 11 sanctions have been imposed,
since attorney discipline is not "punishment" for purposes of Clause. In re Caranchini (1998, CA8 Mo) 160 F3d 420.
Rule 11 is not unconstitutional since there is no constitutional right to file lawsuit that is not well-grounded in fact.
Brandt v Schal Assoc., Inc. (1988, ND Ill) 121 FRD 368.
Rule 11 is constitutional from every perspective. Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co. (1989, ND Ill) 127 FRD
135.
3. Purpose
Purpose of Rule 11 is to insure that attorney makes investigation to insure case has some merit, and to insure that
damages sought appear to bear reasonable relation to injuries sustained. Rhinehart v Stauffer (1979, CA9 Cal) 638 F2d
1169, 28 FR Serv 2d 233.
1983 amendment of Rule 11 was intended to emphasize representation implicit in lawyer's signature that, after
appropriate investigation and inquiry, he reasonably believes that proper legal claim or defense is stated, and to facilitate
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon lawyers who violate rule. Chu v Griffith (1985, CA4 Va) 771 F2d 79.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rule is intended to deter frivolous suits, not to deter novel legal arguments or cases of first impression. Laborers
Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v B.R. Starnes Co. (1987, CA11 Fla) 827 F2d 1454 (criticized in Lenon v
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1998, CA10 Colo) 136 F3d 1365, 21 EBC 2601, 1998 Colo J C A R 1123, 40 FR Serv 3d
152).
Rule 11 sanctions may not be imposed on basis that plaintiffs failed to instruct United States marshal regarding writs
of attachment, since such conduct is not proscribed by rule, and since rule is not intended to remedy all manner of
attorney misconduct. United Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v United States Energy Management Systems, Inc. (1988,
CA9 Cal) 837 F2d 356, 10 FR Serv 3d 253.
Rule 11 sanctions should not be assessed as substitute for tort damages since primary purpose of rule is to deter
groundless proceedings and not necessarily to compensate wronged parties. Elliott v The M/V Lois B (1993, CA5 Tex)
980 F2d 1001, 24 FR Serv 3d 1071.
Rule 11 is aimed at lawyers who put their names on pleadings without first making proper inquiry into relevant law
and facts. Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 596 F Supp 13, 40 FR Serv 2d 703, affd (1985, CA7
Ill) 771 F2d 194, 2 FR Serv 3d 1414 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Parmelee v True (1995, ND Ill) 1995
US Dist LEXIS 17314) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Marliere v Village of Woodridge (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US
Dist LEXIS 4379).
Spirit and intent of Rule 11 is requirement that attorney make reasonable inquiry before signing any pleading, paper
or motion. Florida Monument Builders v All Faiths Memorial Gardens (1984, SD Fla) 605 F Supp 1324.
Rule 11 is designed to insure that allegations in complaint are supported by sufficient factual predicate at time that
claims are asserted; thus, it is no answer to motion for Rule 11 sanctions for plaintiffs to suggest that they needed
discovery to ascertain whether claim they asserted was well founded. Yonkers v Otis Elevator Co. (1985, SD NY) 106
FRD 524.
Rule 11 sanctions are not intended to chill attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories and
court should avoid using wisdom of hindsight in examining attorney's conduct at time of pleading. Marco Holding Co.
v Lear Siegler, Inc. (1985, ND Ill) 606 F Supp 204, 1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66446, 3 FR Serv 3d 394.
Sanctions may be imposed under Rule 11 only for necessary response to frivolous pleading or paper, and Rule was
not intended to provide mechanism for imposing sanctions for any and all improper conduct of party or counsel during
litigation. Associated Indem. Corp. v Fairchild Industries, Inc. (1991, SD NY) 138 FRD 384, revd on other grounds
(1992, CA2 NY) 961 F2d 32, 22 FR Serv 3d 570, 22 ELR 20811.
Main purpose of FRCP 11 is to deter frivolous claims and curb abuses of legal system, thereby speeding up and
reducing costs of litigation. Binghamton Masonic Temple v Bares (1996, ND NY) 168 FRD 121.
Discouraging frivolous litigation, not punishing litigants, is purpose of FRCP 11. Brown v Pierce Mfg. (1996, ED
Wis) 169 FRD 118, 19 ADD 1236, 35 FR Serv 3d 1209.
FRCivP 11 should not be used to raise issues of legal sufficiency that more properly can be disposed of by motion to
dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or motion for summary judgment. Dome Patent L.P. v Permeable Techs.,
Inc. (1999, WD NY) 190 FRD 88.
Sanctions pursuant to FRCivP 11 serve dual purpose of deterring frivolous lawsuits and compensating those parties
forced to defend such suits. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc. v Slavin (1999, ED Tenn) 190 FRD 449.
Deterrence is purpose of sanctions under FRCP 11. Selvy v HUD (2000, ED Mich) 198 FRD 485, 48 FR Serv 3d
1245.
4. Relationship to other laws
Imposing sanctions against represented party that did not act in bad faith does not violate Rules Enabling Act (28
USCS § 2072) since Rule 11 is reasonably necessary to maintain integrity of federal practice and procedure system,
any effect on substantive rights is incidental, sanctions do not constitute fee shifting, and Rule 11 does not create federal
common law of malicious prosecution. Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc. (1991) 498
US 533, 112 L Ed 2d 1140, 111 S Ct 922, 91 CDOS 1588, 91 Daily Journal DAR 2366, 55 BNA FEP Cas 279, 18 FR
Serv 3d 1153.
Equal Access to Justice Act (28 USCS § 2412) waives sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions, including
attorney's fees, against United States. Adamson v Bowen (1988, CA10 Colo) 855 F2d 668, CCH Unemployment Ins
Rep P 14107A, 11 FR Serv 3d 606.
Provision of § 706(k) of Title VII (42 USCS § 2000e) that permits court to allow prevailing party, other than
United States, to recover reasonable attorney fees does not preclude all awards of sanctions to government where
plaintiff violates Rule 11. Blue v United States Dep't of Army (1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 525, 54 CCH EPD P 40260,
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
17 FR Serv 3d 737, cert den (1991) 499 US 959, 113 L Ed 2d 645, 111 S Ct 1580, 56 CCH EPD P 40798 and (criticized
in In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. (1997, CA3 VI) 37 VI 398, 120 F3d 368, 27 ELR 21494).
Rule 11 does not apply to action brought under Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 USCS § §
901-950) since imposition of attorney's fees and sanctions for instituting or continuing proceeding without reasonable
grounds is area provided for or controlled by Act. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v Rihner (1995, CA5) 41 F3d 997, 31 FR
Serv 3d 1069.
Rule 11 does not preempt claims for abuse of process and similar torts that provide relief for misconduct in federal
litigation; therefore, in appropriate circumstances, victims of such misconduct may bring suit to recover damages under
state causes of action. U.S. Express Lines, LTD. v Higgins (2002, CA3 Pa) 281 F3d 383.
Rule 11 requires reasonable inquiry into facts underlying allegations; it does not increase requirements of Rule 8.
Computer Place, Inc. v Hewlett-Packard Co. (1984, ND Cal) 607 F Supp 822, 1984-2 CCH Trade Cases P 66254, affd
without op (1985, CA9 Cal) 779 F2d 56.
Sanctions may be imposed for assertion of frivolous counterclaim in violation of Rule 11 in circumstances which
might not justify award of attorneys' fees to plaintiff under 42 USCS § 1988. Smith v New York (1985, SD NY) 611 F
Supp 1080, 3 FR Serv 3d 414.
Standards to which government attorneys are held under Equal Access to Justice Act must be higher than minimum
standard of revised Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mager v Heckler (1985, DC Colo) 621 F Supp 1009.
Analysis applied to claimed violation of Rule 11 is also used when violation of Rule 45 is asserted. Dravo Corp. v
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1995, DC Neb) 160 FRD 123.
Ultimate and practical effect of 15 USCS § 78u-4(c)(1) of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which requires
court, upon final adjudication of action, to include in record specific findings regarding compliance by parties with
requirements of FRCP 11(b), and which requires court to impose sanctions if court finds violation of FRCP 11, is that
21-day safe harbor of FRCP 11 does not apply to federal securities actions brought under Act. Smith v Smith (1998, SD
Fla) 184 FRD 420, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9674, 42 FR Serv 3d 1274.
Fact that plaintiff's case, brought under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, is dismissed voluntarily, without
prejudice and in accordance with FRCP 41(a)(1)(i), does not bar court from imposing FRCP 11 sanctions against
plaintiff, because 15 USCS § 78u-4(c)(1) of Act, which requires court, upon final adjudication of action, to include in
record specific findings regarding compliance by parties with requirements of FRCP 11(b), and which requires court to
impose sanctions if court finds violation of FRCP 11, eliminates 21-day safe harbor of FRCP 11 with respect to federal
securities actions brought under Act. Smith v Smith (1998, SD Fla) 184 FRD 420, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9674,
42 FR Serv 3d 1274.
Patent owners were improperly attempting to fit what was discovery dispute into Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; if alleged
infringer deliberately withheld book, then owners' remedy was discovery sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, which
were already found to be unwarranted. Epcon Gas Sys. v Bauer Compressors, Inc. (2003, ED Mich) 243 F Supp 2d 729.
Where court construed former employee's previously denied motion for sanctions as request under Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a), rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, court found it appropriate to impose sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(B)
against employee's counsel. Sokos v Hilton Hotels Corp. (2003, DC Dist Col) 283 F Supp 2d 42, 173 BNA LRRM 2712.
FRCP 27 is not vehicle for compliance with FRCP 11, since FRCP 27 authorizes perpetuation of evidence, not
discovery or uncovering of it. In re Ford (1997, MD Ala) 170 FRD 504, 37 FR Serv 3d 1349.
Legal malpractice claimant cannot get around state "Affidavit of Merit" statute by claiming that it overrides FRCP
11, which requires only that plaintiff's attorney conduct investigation and make assessment that there exists reasonable
probability that negligence took place, where statute requires that plaintiff consult with "appropriate licensed person,"
basically expert, at some point within 60 days of filing of answer to any claim of negligence by professional, because
statute and rule operate in substantially different fashions, such that it cannot reasonably be said that there is conflict
between them. RTC Mortg. Trust 1994 N-1 v Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. (1997, DC NJ) 981 F Supp 334.
5. --28 USCS § 1927
Decision whether to use 28 USCS § 1927 or Rule 11 or both in deciding issue of sanctions is within discretion of
court, and nothing mandates that court must consider Rule 11 before § 1927. Travelers Ins. Co. v St. Jude Hosp. (1994,
CA5 La) 38 F3d 1414.
District court's denial of sanctions under Rule 11 did not foreclose imposition of sanctions under 28 USCS § 1927.
Salstrom v Citicorp Credit Servs. (1996, CA9 Or) 74 F3d 183, 96 CDOS 356, 96 Daily Journal DAR 565, 33 FR Serv
3d 1351, cert den (1996) 519 US 813, 136 L Ed 2d 23, 117 S Ct 60.
Even if state rigidly enforces American Rule, state rule does not supersede provisions of 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule
11 where Federal District Court sits in diversity. Tedeschi v Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. (1984, SD NY) 579 F
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Supp 657, 38 FR Serv 2d 1081, affd (1985, CA2 NY) 757 F2d 465, cert den (1985) 474 US 850, 88 L Ed 2d 122, 106 S
Ct 147.
6. --State procedural rules
There is no "direct collision" between Rule 11 and Colorado rule which requires attorney bringing claim against
certain licensed professionals to affirm with another professional in field that claim has substantial justification,
although rules are similar, since each rule has its own sphere of coverage, and state law protects interests not covered by
Rule 11. Trierweiler v Croxton & Trench Holding Corp. (1996, CA10 Colo) 90 F3d 1523.
Even if state rigidly enforces American Rule, state rule does not supersede provisions of 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule
11 where Federal District Court sits in diversity. Tedeschi v Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. (1984, SD NY) 579 F
Supp 657, 38 FR Serv 2d 1081, affd (1985, CA2 NY) 757 F2d 465, cert den (1985) 474 US 850, 88 L Ed 2d 122, 106 S
Ct 147.
7. Applicability of amendments
Where case was pending on appeal on December 1, 1993, when amended version of Rule 11 went into effect,
amended rule will not be applied since it would be unjust and impracticable to do so because application of amended
version would require that case be remanded, causing inordinate delay and expense to innocent parties. Silva v
Witschen (1994, CA1 RI) 19 F3d 725, 28 FR Serv 3d 420.
Applying amended version of Rule 11 to pending cases is not "just and practicable" where conduct, motions, and
decision of district court occurred before December 1, 1993, effective date of amendment, and same version of Rule 11
used by district court should be applied on appeal of district court's decision regarding imposition of sanctions. In re
Generes (1995, CA7 Ill) 69 F3d 821, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 76689, 33 FR Serv 3d 1082, on remand, magistrate's
recommendation (1996, ND Ill) 1996 US Dist LEXIS 11666 and cert den (1996) 519 US 823, 136 L Ed 2d 39, 117 S Ct
81.
Although action was commenced before amendment to Rule 11 became effective on December 1, 1993, it was both
just and practicable to apply amended version of rule to defendant's motion for sanctions where motion was filed after
date of amendment, parties were aware of amendment, and plaintiff's counsel continued to assert frivolous claims
beyond effective date. Ridder v City of Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288, 1997 FED App
94P, cert den (1998) 522 US 1046, 139 L Ed 2d 634, 118 S Ct 687 and (criticized in Powell v Squire, Sanders &
Dempsey (1999, CA6 Ohio) 1999 US App LEXIS 16854).
Version of Rule 11 predating 1983 amendment governs, where most of conduct complained of occurred before
amendment. Re Olympia Brewing Co. Secur. In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litigation (1985, ND Ill) 613 F Supp
1286.
Amendments to Rule 11 which became effective August 1, 1983, apply at least to amended complaints filed after
that date, even if original complaint was filed before effective date of amendments. Bannon v Joyce Beverages, Inc.
(1987, ND Ill) 113 FRD 669.
In determining whether plaintiff's filing of complaint was sanctionable, plaintiff's actions should be judged under rule
that prevailed at time of allegedly offensive conduct and at time motion was filed, and since each of these events
occurred prior to December 1, 1993, Rule 11 as it existed prior to that date must be applied, without regard to more
recent amendments; further, where amendment to rule became effective after date of allegedly sanctionable filing but
before motion for sanctions was filed, rule applicable to party's conduct at time of filing should take precedence over
rule in effect at time of motion for sanctions. Homer v Halbritter (1994, ND NY) 158 FRD 236.
In determining whether to impose sanctions on defendant, where majority of motions considered had been filed and
ruled on prior to effective date of amendment to Rule 11, amended version of rule will not be applied, particularly as
case has long and complex procedural history so that it would not be just and practicable to consider motion for
sanctions under new Rule 11. Ware v United States (1994, MD Fla) 154 FRD 291, 8 FLW Fed D 103, summary
judgment den, in part, count dismd sub nom Ware v Barr (1995, MD Fla) 883 F Supp 654, 9 FLW Fed D 28, vacated, in
part, revd, in part, without op (1996, CA11 Fla) 82 F3d 429.
8. Private right of action
Construction of Rule 11 does not present federal question for purposes of conferring jurisdiction under 28 USCS §
1331 and does not grant private cause of action to company which alleged that previous improper wrongful death suit
brought by employee against chemical manufacturers caused loss of business to company since company was not party
in previous suit and rule contemplates that relief be awarded to another party to same suit and since rule is to be utilized
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
during pendency of initial suit in which asserted violation occurred. Port Drum Co. v Umphrey (1988, CA5 Tex) 852
F2d 148, 12 FR Serv 3d 114.
Rule 11 does not create independent cause of action, but rather creates remedial tool available to court where clear
showing is made of improper conduct on part of person signing and filing pleading; government is entitled to summary
judgment on counterclaim for sanctions based on contention that government counsel filed complaint for seizure of
counterfeit drugs without first making reasonable inquiry as to whether it was well grounded in fact and warranted by
law. United States v Articles of Drug (1984, DC Neb) 601 F Supp 392.
Defendants' request for sanctions under Rule 11 is dismissed, where corporation and individual sued for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract and fraud counterclaimed for Rule 11 sanctions and defamation, because (1) Rule 11
procedurally permits attorney to raise claim for sanctions only through motion, normally at end of litigation, and (2)
Rule 11 was not adopted as basis for hybrid of bad faith tort. Lenoir v Tannehill (1986, SD Miss) 660 F Supp 42.
Rule 11 does not grant subject matter jurisdiction to District Court over complaint which alleges that defendants'
previous frivolous suit against third party damaged plaintiff. Port Drum Co. v Umphrey (1988, ED Tex) 119 FRD 26,
affd (1988, CA5 Tex) 852 F2d 148, 12 FR Serv 3d 114.
FRCP 11 does not provide independent basis for bringing suit seeking sanctions. Hochen v Bobst Group (2000, DC
Mass) 198 FRD 11.
9. Inherent power of court
Rule 11 does not repeal or modify existing authority of federal courts to deal with abuses under court's inherent
power; further, reliance on inherent power does not thwart purposes of sanctioning mechanisms of Rule 11 which are
cast in mandatory terms where much of bad faith conduct by party is beyond reach of Rule. Chambers v NASCO
(1991) 501 US 32, 115 L Ed 2d 27, 111 S Ct 2123, 91 CDOS 4222, 91 Daily Journal DAR 6585, 19 FR Serv 3d 817, reh
den (1991) 501 US 1269, 115 L Ed 2d 1097, 112 S Ct 12.
Rule 11 does not bar District Court from assessing fees against party under its inherent power when party's conduct
is not within reach of rule. Nasco, Inc. v Calcasieu Tel. & Radio (1990, CA5 La) 894 F2d 696, 18 FR Serv 3d 1357,
affd (1991) 501 US 32, 115 L Ed 2d 27, 111 S Ct 2123, 91 CDOS 4222, 91 Daily Journal DAR 6585, 19 FR Serv 3d
817, reh den (1991) 501 US 1269, 115 L Ed 2d 1097, 112 S Ct 12.
Courts retain inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct during litigation, and this power exists independent of
Rule 11. Western Sys. v Ulloa (1992, CA9 Guam) 958 F2d 864, 92 CDOS 1870, 92 Daily Journal DAR 2921, amd
(1992, CA9 Guam) 92 CDOS 5389, 92 Daily Journal DAR 8538 and cert den (1993) 506 US 1050, 122 L Ed 2d 125,
113 S Ct 970.
Court may sua sponte impose sanctions against plaintiff's second attorney, even though defendant had requested only
that court sanction plaintiff's first attorney, and when imposing sanctions sua sponte, court is not limited by time
requirements controlling party's request for sanctions. Burda v M. Ecker Co. (1993, CA7 Ill) 2 F3d 769, 26 FR Serv 3d
1071 (criticized in Reed-Union Corp. v Turtle Wax (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 3777).
Signer of state court pleading is not subject to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore federal court may not
impose Rule 11 sanctions against signer of that pleading based solely on its frivolousness, even though case was later
removed to federal court; moreover, there is no continuing obligation on signer to update previously filed pleadings.
Griffen v City of Oklahoma City (1993, CA10 Okla) 3 F3d 336, 26 FR Serv 3d 551.
Rule 11 may limit amount of attorney's fees recoverable as sanctions for violations of rule, but Rule 11 does not
repeal or modify existing authority of federal courts to deal with abuses under court's inherent power. Mark Indus. v Sea
Captain's Choice (1995, CA9 Wash) 50 F3d 730, 95 CDOS 2056, 95 Daily Journal DAR 3516, 31 FR Serv 3d 823.
District court did not have authority under Rule 11 to award attorney fees sua sponte. Nuwesra v Merrill Lynch,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1999, CA2 NY) 174 F3d 87, 9 AD Cas 537, 43 FR Serv 3d 1208.
District court may, in its informed discretion, rely on its inherent power to impose sanctions, rather than relying on
Rule 11. Fink v Gomez (2001, CA9 Cal) 239 F3d 989, 2001 CDOS 1159, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 1513.
10. Verification of pleadings
Under Federal Rules, verification is exception rather than rule, and Rule 11 only requires signing of all pleadings.
Hummel v Wells Petroleum Co. (1940, CA7 Ill) 111 F2d 883; Franzen v E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. (1941, DC
NJ) 36 F Supp 375.
Facts alleged in motion need not be sworn to or contained in affidavit, since use of affidavits under such
circumstances is discretionary; in absence of specific rule to contrary, exhibits accompanying motion to dismiss need
not be under oath. Victory v Manning (1942, CA3 NJ) 128 F2d 415, 29 AFTR 518.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
In order for party opposing summary judgment to establish that there are genuine issues of fact, it is not necessary in
every case for party to verify his pleadings, and it is not mandatory that he file affidavits or other supporting documents.
Hiern v St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. (1959, CA5 La) 262 F2d 526, 1 FR Serv 2d 871.
Requirement of Rule 11 that attorney certify by his signature to complaint that it rests on sound basis does not
supersede requirement of Rule 23(b) that complaint in secondary action by stockholders be verified. Surowitz v Hilton
Hotels Corp. (1965, CA7 Ill) 342 F2d 596, 9 FR Serv 2d 23B.5, Case 1, revd on other grounds (1966) 383 US 363, 15 L
Ed 2d 807, 86 S Ct 845, 10 FR Serv 2d 678, reh den (1966) 384 US 915, 16 L Ed 2d 367, 86 S Ct 1333.
Although Rule 11 provides that, unless specifically required by rule or statute, pleadings "need not be verified," such
verification is not forbidden. Khan v Garanzini (1969, CA6 Mich) 411 F2d 210, 13 FR Serv 2d 1247.
Where reasonable investigation would have shown that facts did not justify claim and that case law upon which
plaintiff's attorney relied did not support his theory, district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing $ 500 fine for
violation of Rule 11. Monterey Dev. Corp. v Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. (1993, CA8 Mo) 4 F3d 605 (criticized in
Rissetto v Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343 (1996, CA9 Cal) 94 F3d 597, 61 Cal Comp Cas 833, 96 CDOS 6439, 96
Daily Journal DAR 10597, 71 BNA FEP Cas 1057, 153 BNA LRRM 2111, 69 CCH EPD P 44460).
Although parties' actions were overzealous and annoying to court, filing of motion in question was not objectively
unreasonable, and therefore it was not abuse of discretion for district court to deny sanctions. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. v Local Union 998, United Rubber, etc. (1993, CA10 Okla) 4 F3d 918, 144 BNA LRRM 2220, 126 CCH LC P
10859, 26 FR Serv 3d 1061.
Answer in action for injunction need not be verified. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v Railroad Com. of California
(1941, DC Cal) 36 F Supp 269.
If verification of complaint is required, any deficiency in that respect may be supplied by way of amendment and is
not ground for dismissal. Franzen v E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. (1941, DC NJ) 36 F Supp 375.
Defendant is not required to sign or make affidavit to his answer when it is signed by his attorney. Neth v Kaylor
(1941, DC Pa) 37 F Supp 24.
Under Federal Rules application for order requiring production of books and records need not be verified. Walling v
W. G. Golebiewski, Inc. (1942, DC NY) 47 F Supp 448.
So long as petition for removal of case to federal court is verified and contains short and plain statement of facts
which entitle defendant to remove [28 USCS § 1446(a)], it is sufficient pleading, and under Rule 11, petition for
removal may be verified by oath or affirmation of attorney. Rock v Manthei (1955, DC Mo) 129 F Supp 769.
Lack of verification or defective verification should not be, and is not, fatal to complaint merely because temporary
restraining order is sought in conjunction with other forms of relief. Tracy v Robbins (1966, DC SC) 40 FRD 108, 10
FR Serv 2d 588, app dismd (1967, CA4 SC) 373 F2d 13.
In dealing with motion of defendants for order striking complaint alleging violations of Investment Company Act,
Investment Advisor's Act, and Securities Acts, on ground that complaint was sham and false for improper verification,
court would order hearing upon matter rather than dismissing, since, although deposition of one of plaintiffs in action
indicated that plaintiff did not authorize action and was unaware of its existence for four years after its commencement,
paper supplementing deposition raised factual assertions which had to be considered. Rogosin v Steadman (1974, SD
NY) 65 FRD 365.
Petition for habeas corpus would be deemed to substantially meet requirements of Rule 11, notwithstanding that it
was not signed by petitioner, but by co-defendant who was assisting petitioner in drafting petition, and notwithstanding
that co-defendant failed to swear to truth of allegations or to procure signature of notary public on petition, since lack of
formal verification should not be allowed to defeat prisoners' constitutional claims. Morris v United States (1975, ED
Va) 399 F Supp 720.
Rule 11, which provides that pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, does not preclude state procedural rules from being applied in action brought in
Federal District Court. United States v Miller (1975, SD NY) 400 F Supp 1080.
Where plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has not submitted affidavits, court may construe his signing of complaint as
verification of authenticity of facts alleged therein. Antonelli v FBI (1982, ND Ill) 536 F Supp 568, revd on other
grounds (1983, CA7 Ill) 721 F2d 615, cert den (1984) 467 US 1210, 81 L Ed 2d 355, 104 S Ct 2399.
In action by United States on promissory note executed by defendant and assigned by original payee, defendant is
not entitled to summary judgment on his claim of setoff against note based upon his affirmative defense since
affirmative defense is not verified. United States v Gray (1982, ND Ill) 552 F Supp 943, 35 UCCRS 543.
Third-party complaint of blanket bond issuer subrogated to plaintiff insurance company's rights against third-party
defendants satisfies both letter and spirit of Rule 11, notwithstanding third-party defendants' contention that third-party
plaintiff is unwilling to adopt allegations in insurance company's complaint as its own and apparently has no basis
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
outside of insurance company's complaint for its claim against third-party defendants, where third-party complaint
states that allegations contained therein are result of review of original complaint and attachments thereto as well as
series of discussions with officials of plaintiff, and where third-party plaintiff was constrained by local court rules which
prescribe that third-party complaint be filed within 90 days of filing of third-party plaintiff's answer to original
complaint. General Acci. Ins. Co. v Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1984, ED Pa) 598 F Supp 1223, 40 UCCRS 566.
11. --Effect
Allegations in verified complaint may be considered as in nature of counteraffidavit upon defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Albert Dickinson Co. v Mellos Peanut Co. (1950, CA7 Ill) 179 F2d 265, 84 USPQ 172.
On motion for summary judgment by defendants in civil rights action against city and city police officers, verified
complaint should be considered as affidavit traversing affidavits opposing complaint. Khan v Garanzini (1969, CA6
Mich) 411 F2d 210, 13 FR Serv 2d 1247.
12. Miscellaneous
Denial of Rule 11 motion does not foreclose assertion of subsequent malicious prosecution suit, nor does it
automatically prevent award of punitive damages predicated on conduct complained of in Rule 11 motion. Lightning
Lube v Witco Corp. (1993, CA3 NJ) 4 F3d 1153, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8379, 38 Fed Rules Evid Serv 902, 26
FR Serv 3d 1468, subsequent app (1994, CA3 NJ) 39 F3d 1170 and (criticized in Schudel v GE (1997, CA9 Wash) 120
F3d 991, 97 CDOS 5803, 97 Daily Journal DAR 9348, CCH Prod Liab Rep P 15020, 47 Fed Rules Evid Serv 757, 38
FR Serv 3d 632, 27 ELR 21506) and (criticized in Bell Atl. Network Servs. v P.M. Video Corp. (1999, App Div) 322 NJ
Super 74, 730 A2d 406).
District court erred in imposing monetary sanctions on represented party where motion filed on party's behalf
contained legal contention that court believed was not warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for
change in existing law, since revised Rule 11 specifically prohibits such sanction. Hadges v Yonkers Racing Corp.
(1995, CA2 NY) 48 F3d 1320, 30 FR Serv 3d 1165.
Where attorney was accused of attempted bribery, Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate remedy for such alleged
misconduct since Rule 11 is applicable only to papers filed with court, not attorney misconduct. Trulis v Barton (1995,
CA9 Cal) 67 F3d 779, 95 CDOS 7528, 95 Daily Journal DAR 12915, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 76674, reprinted as amd,
remanded (1995, CA9 Cal) 107 F3d 685, 97 CDOS 1296, 97 Daily Journal DAR 1915, 36 FR Serv 3d 1422.
Where client insisted that attorney violate Rule 11 by pursuing meritless claims, some of which had already been
dismissed, and conducting lawsuit in manner intended to harass defendants, attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel
must be granted. Whiting v Lacara (1999, CA2 NY) 187 F3d 317.
Dismissal of action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) does not preclude defendants from bringing Rule 11
motion against plaintiffs. Robeson Defense Committee v Britt (1989, ED NC) 132 FRD 650, affd in part and vacated in
part on other grounds, remanded (1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in
part, motion gr, in part (1990, CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111
S Ct 1607.
FRCP 11(b)(2) does not require express statement that defense is being asserted to change law. Hart v Baca (2001,
CD Cal) 204 FRD 456.
Magistrate judge's order allowing owners' motion for sanctions was reversed where magistrate judge's award of
sanctions was contrary to law because procedures necessary to issue Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions were not followed, so
defendants were not legally liable for Rule 11 sanctions. Tyson v Equity Title & Escrow Co. of Memphis, LLC (2003,
WD Tenn) 282 F Supp 2d 825, 56 FR Serv 3d 1265.
Contractor's argument that it satisfied unanimity requirement by stating in removal petition that other defendant
consented to removal failed because Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 did not authorize one party to make representations or file
pleadings on behalf of another. Local Union No. 172 v P.J. Dick, Inc. (2003, SD Ohio) 253 F Supp 2d 1022.
II. PERSONS AND ENTITIES SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS
13. Generally
Rule 11 guidelines apply to any attorney or party who signs document, whether or not that individual was required to
sign, and voluntary signature of represented party is capable of violating rule. Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic
Communications Enters., Inc. (1991) 498 US 533, 112 L Ed 2d 1140, 111 S Ct 922, 91 CDOS 1588, 91 Daily Journal
DAR 2366, 55 BNA FEP Cas 279, 18 FR Serv 3d 1153.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions may be imposed only on attorney who actually signs document or on clients he represents. Robinson v
National Cash Register Co. (1987, CA5 Tex) 808 F2d 1119, 6 FR Serv 3d 1202 (ovrld in part on other grounds by
Thomas v Capital Sec. Servs. (1988, CA5 Miss) 836 F2d 866, 45 CCH EPD P 37770, 10 FR Serv 3d 329) and (ovrld in
part on other grounds as stated in Childs v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1994, CA5 La) 29 F3d 1018, 29 FR Serv 3d
1032) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Monroe v Grider (1994, Tex App Dallas) 884 SW2d 811).
Plaintiff should not be sanctioned for choice of legal arguments advanced on his behalf, and therefore attorney and
not client should bear sanction for filing papers which are unsupported by existing law or by attempt to modify
well-settled law. Borowski v De Puy, Inc., Div. of Boehringer Mannheim Co. (1988, CA7 Ill) 850 F2d 297, 11 FR Serv
3d 823.
In absence of unusual circumstances, Rule 11 does not authorized imposition of sanctions on represented party,
without sanctioning his counsel. Goldin v Bartholow (1999, CA5 Tex) 166 F3d 710.
Rule 11 sanction will be imposed against attorney rather than client where motion is unsupported by existing law,
rather than unsupported by facts. Blake v National Casualty Co. (1984, CD Cal) 607 F Supp 189.
14. Person who did not sign pleading
Rule 11 clearly allows district courts discretion in appropriate cases to impose sanctions against non-signing
represented parties for violations of rule by their attorneys. Topalian v Ehrman (1993, CA5 Tex) 3 F3d 931, 26 FR
Serv 3d 1136, reh den (1993, CA5) 1993 US App LEXIS 30440.
Although plaintiff misrepresented facts to his attorney and thereby caused frivolous complaint to be filed on his
behalf, plaintiff himself cannot be held liable under Rule 11 since he did not sign pleading. Albrecht v Stranczek
(1991, ND Ill) 136 FRD 155.
Neither District Court nor magistrate judge was required to consider attorney's past sanction-free record in
determining appropriateness of sanctions under FRCP 11 for attorney's conduct. Holling v United States (1996, ED
Mich) 934 F Supp 251, 78 AFTR 2d 5096.
15. --Attorney
Rule 11 cannot be used as basis for sanctions against attorney who did not sign pleadings. In re Ruben (1987, CA6
Ohio) 825 F2d 977, 43 CCH EPD P 37302, cert den (1988) 485 US 934, 99 L Ed 2d 269, 108 S Ct 1108, 45 CCH EPD
P 37793 and (criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-76, RIA TC Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM
1916, 95 TNT 33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577,
70 CCH TCM 1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Where sanction is to be imposed on attorney for violation of rule, co-counsel who did not sign pleading cannot be
held liable under Rule 11 for its contents. Pony Express Courier Corp. v Pony Express Delivery Service (1989, CA9
Cal) 872 F2d 317, 10 USPQ2d 1475, 13 FR Serv 3d 423.
Where only one of party's 2 attorneys signed frivolous motion, District Court's sanctioning of both was abuse of its
discretion. Veillon v Exploration Services, Inc. (1989, CA5 La) 876 F2d 1197, 14 FR Serv 3d 233.
Where only one attorney signed sanctionable document, sanctions should have been imposed only on individual
attorney and not on firm or other attorney of record. United States v International Bhd. of Teamsters (1991, CA2 NY)
948 F2d 1338, 138 BNA LRRM 2839, 120 CCH LC P 11014, 21 FR Serv 3d 304.
Where named plaintiff was only nominal party, and real party in interest was attorney who had represented plaintiff
in state court but who had not signed any pleading in federal court, attorney whose interests are furthered by frivolous
lawsuit may be sanctioned as represented party. Burda v M. Ecker Co. (1993, CA7 Ill) 2 F3d 769, 26 FR Serv 3d 1071
(criticized in Reed-Union Corp. v Turtle Wax (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 3777).
Attorney who did not sign document may not be sanctioned under Rule 11 simply because he played substantial role
in preparation of document. Kale v Obuchowski (1993, CA7 Ill) 985 F2d 360, 24 FR Serv 3d 1442.
Attorneys who were actively involved in case but did not sign misleading document could not be sanctioned under
Rule 11, since under version of Rule 11 which was applicable at time, only individual attorney who actually signed
court paper could be sanctioned because of its contents. Triad Sys. Corp. v Southeastern Express Co. (1995, CA9 Cal)
64 F3d 1330, 95 CDOS 6889, 95 Daily Journal DAR 11821, 36 USPQ2d 1028, 33 FR Serv 3d 468, cert den (1996) 516
US 1145, 134 L Ed 2d 96, 116 S Ct 1015.
Rule 11 is aimed at lawyers who put their names on pleadings without first making proper inquiry into relevant law
and facts; thus, where one of plaintiff's 3 lawyers filed appearance but did not attach her name to defective pleading, she
did not technically breach Rule's signing requirement and is not subject to monetary sanction. Rodgers v Lincoln
Towing Service, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 596 F Supp 13, 40 FR Serv 2d 703, affd (1985, CA7 Ill) 771 F2d 194, 2 FR Serv 3d
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
1414 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Parmelee v True (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 17314) and (ovrld
on other grounds as stated in Marliere v Village of Woodridge (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 4379).
On government's motion for assessment of attorneys' fees against taxpayer's attorney, on ground that he asserted
arguments in opposition to enforcement of IRS summons which were not supportable by existing case law and were
frivolous, Rule 11 does not provide basis for granting government's request, since taxpayer's attorney did not sign those
portions of taxpayer's pleadings in which taxpayer asserted various constitutional infirmities in summons specifically
and income tax laws generally; however, attorneys' fees may be assessed against taxpayer's attorney pursuant to court's
inherent power. United States v Grable (1985, WD Mich) 622 F Supp 454, 85-2 USTC P 9727, 56 AFTR 2d 6041.
Only attorney who signed specious motion will be subject to sanctions, and party's other attorneys will not be
charged. Ricci v Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc. (1986, DC Me) 111 FRD 369.
Sanctions will not be imposed on counsel who did not represent defendant at time defective answer was filed since
rule only applies to one who signed pleading in question and does not impose continuing obligation. Lagermax
Lagerhaus UND Speditions-Aktiengesellschaft v Boroff (1987, SD NY) 115 FRD 278.
Where plaintiff retained succession of 3 attorneys before his frivolous suit was dismissed, sanctions should not be
imposed on second attorney who represented plaintiff briefly and in limited manner after first attorney moved out of
state and who never signed any pleading or motion on behalf of plaintiff. Bynum v Michigan State University (1987,
WD Mich) 117 FRD 94, 59 BNA FEP Cas 983.
Plaintiff's present counsel is not subject to mandate of Rule 11 for reason that he did not sign allegedly offensive
pleading. Ezell v Lincoln Electric Co. (1988, SD Miss) 119 FRD 645, affd without op (1988, CA5 Miss) 863 F2d 880.
Where counsel whose name appears on pleading fails to sign pleading, but later comes into court and ratifies and
adopts signature of co-counsel as his own, requirements of Rule 11 have been satisfied. Blossom v Blackhawk Datsun,
Inc. (1988, SD Ind) 120 FRD 91, 11 FR Serv 3d 196.
Attorney who was retained immediately prior to trial and who represented plaintiff at trial but who did not file
frivolous pleadings cannot be sanctioned under Rule 11. Mars v Anderman (1989, ED NY) 136 FRD 351.
Although defendant's out-of-state counsel did not sign motion in question, they are liable for sanctions under Rule 11
where it appears that they prepared documents and were acting as lead counsel; however, local counsel must share
liability for propounding in motion certain representations and arguments which plaintiff's investigation had shown to
be false. Coburn Optical Industries, Inc. v Cilco, Inc. (1985, MD NC) 610 F Supp 656, 226 USPQ 1018.
16. Person whose typewritten name appears on pleading
Where plaintiff signed filed papers, but attorney's name appeared on papers only in typewritten form, sanctions
cannot be imposed on attorney since Rule 11 focuses only on individual who signed document in question. White v
American Airlines, Inc. (1990, CA10 Okla) 915 F2d 1414, 6 BNA IER Cas 1086, 116 CCH LC P 56400, 17 FR Serv 3d
1199.
Typewritten name is not signature for purpose of Rule 11, and therefore senior partner of law firm which represented
defendants and whose name was typed on pleadings but who did not personally sign them is not subject to Rule 11
sanctions. Giebelhaus v Spindrift Yachts (1991, CA9 Cal) 938 F2d 962, 91 CDOS 5352, 91 Daily Journal DAR 8248,
19 FR Serv 3d 1364.
17. Attorney without knowledge
In deciding whether to sanction plaintiff and its 2 attorneys, knowledge of plaintiff and its primary attorney may not
be imputed to attorney who was hired as local counsel less than 24 hours before filing was necessary. CTC Imports &
Exports v Nigerian Petroleum Corp. (1991, CA3 Pa) 951 F2d 573, 1992 AMC 1243, 21 FR Serv 3d 931, reh, en banc,
den (1992, CA3) 1992 US App LEXIS 545 and cert den (1992) 504 US 914, 118 L Ed 2d 554, 112 S Ct 1950 and cert
den (1992) 506 US 917, 121 L Ed 2d 246, 113 S Ct 328.
18. Neophyte attorney
Although attorney was only new associate with firm and necessarily relied on other lawyers senior to her at firm
when it came to questions of litigation procedure, strategy, and tactics, fundamental motions of professional
responsibility, ethical behavior, and fairness to all litigants demand that she be held personally responsible for her
violations of Rule 11, although as general rule there is rebuttable presumption against allocation among partners and
associates for purposes of sanctions. Harris v Marsh (1988, ED NC) 123 FRD 204.
Construction bond company ("company") is subject to Rule 11 sanctions where it filed motion to disqualify general
contractor's counsel ("counsel") on grounds that counsel also represented company in other continuing case, other case
involved only filing of writ of summons, counsel's last bill to company was 2 years prior to instant case, and counsel
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
sought and received written permission of company to represent general contractor in instant case, because company
submitted false information in connection with motion, and company's attorneys failed to fulfill duty to certify truth and
reasonableness of papers they filed. Turner Constr. Co. v First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co. (1993, ED Pa) 829 F Supp 752,
affd without op (1994, CA3 Pa) 22 F3d 303 and affd without op (1994, CA3 Pa) 22 F3d 303.
FRCP 11 sanctions, in form of requiring pro se plaintiffs to pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs of all current and
former defendants in civil rights action, were appropriate, where plaintiffs, despite admonition from court that sanctions
might be appropriate for abusing federal process, had continued to prosecute their altogether frivolous action, filing no
less than 8 additional documents in District Court, none of which provided any realistic basis upon which District Court
could grant any relief. Lerch v Boyer (1996, ND Ind) 929 F Supp 319, 35 FR Serv 3d 714, magistrate's recommendation
(1997, ND Ind) 79 AFTR 2d 2195.
Fine of $ 250 was appropriate sanction under FRCP 11(b) against business partner proceeding pro se, where partner
brought § 1983 action against governor and Attorney General, alleging denial of equal protection and procedural due
process, and suit was continuation of feckless and frivolous litigation connected to electric utility's decision not to
extend electrical service for partner. Jemzura v PSC (1997, ND NY) 961 F Supp 406.
Alleged copyright infringer's motion for sanctions is granted, where copyright holder sought to enjoin infringer from
use of contested computer program, infringer claims to be part owner of program, 2 contested programs appear to be
original and clone, so that ownership of one is effectively ownership of both, owner is former employee of infringer,
owner left program on alleged infringer's computer when owner left job, and owner sat on his rights for almost 7 years,
because injunction action is frivolous, and was filed to obtain advantage in parallel litigation in another state.
Devereaux v Colvin (1994, MD Fla) 844 F Supp 1508, 28 FR Serv 3d 1220, 7 FLW Fed D 747.
19. Substituted counsel
Substitute counsel cannot be sanctioned on basis of pleading signed by predecessor counsel, although Rule 11
imposes upon substitute duty to investigate legal and factual sufficiency of claims, but until substitute counsel files
some paper indicating intention to continue prosecution, such decision will not be presumed by looking to complaint
itself. Bakker v Grutman (1991, CA4 SC) 942 F2d 236, 20 FR Serv 3d 779.
Although district court did not impose sanctions on plaintiff's original counsel, who had signed and submitted
complaint but withdrew after he learned that claim was meritless, court still had discretion to impose sanctions on
substitute counsel who knew from moment he began representing plaintiff that his claim was meritless, but continued to
pursue it. Turner v Sungard Bus. Sys. (1996, CA11 Ala) 91 F3d 1418, 69 CCH EPD P 44342, 35 FR Serv 3d 880, 10
FLW Fed C 267, reh, en banc, den (1996, CA11 Ala) 103 F3d 150.
Amended complaint need not be stricken but plaintiff must sign verbatim copy signed by current attorney of record
within 10 days, where new defendant points out that amended complaint was signed only by plaintiff's original
attorneys in this matter, because this FRCP 11(a) technical defect will not cause motion to be stricken unless adverse
party has been severely prejudiced or misled by failure to sign. Guess?, Inc. v Chang (1995, ND Ill) 912 F Supp 372.
20. Law firm (pre-1993 amendment cases)
Rule 11 does not authorize imposition of sanction against law firm of individual attorney who signed, because phrase
"person who signed," when read in total context of all provisions of rule dealing with signing of filings, reasonably must
be thought to connote only individual signor, and not person or entity on whose behalf paper was signed. Pavelic &
LeFlore v Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Indus. Corp. (1989) 493 US 120, 107 L Ed 2d 438, 110 S Ct
456, 15 FR Serv 3d 1 (superseded by statute as stated in Religious Technology Ctr. v Gerbode (1994, CD Cal) RICO
Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8595) and (superseded by statute as stated in Triad Sys. Corp. v Southeastern Express Co.
(1995, CA9 Cal) 64 F3d 1330, 95 CDOS 6889, 95 Daily Journal DAR 11821, 36 USPQ2d 1028, 33 FR Serv 3d 468)
and (superseded by statute as stated in Stuart I. Levin & Assocs., P.A. v Rogers (1998, CA11 Fla) 156 F3d 1135, 48
USPQ2d 1442, 41 FR Serv 3d 1294, 12 FLW Fed C 123).
Only individual attorneys who signed frivolous counterclaim may be sanctioned, not their entire firm. Hudson v
Moore Business Forms, Inc. (1990, CA9 Cal) 898 F2d 684, 52 BNA FEP Cas 479, 52 CCH EPD P 39704, 16 FR Serv
3d 205.
Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed only upon individual attorney who signed pleadings and not on law firm on
whose behalf he signed papers. Mann v G & G Mfg., Inc. (1990, CA6 Mich) 900 F2d 953, 16 FR Serv 3d 60, reh den,
en banc (1990, CA6) 1990 US App LEXIS 8940 and cert den (1990) 498 US 959, 112 L Ed 2d 398, 111 S Ct 387.
Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed only on individual attorneys who signed papers at issue; they may not be imposed
on law firm. Mariani v Doctors Assoc., Inc. (1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 983 F2d 5, 24 FR Serv 3d 918.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Lead counsel who formulated and put into motion litigation strategy and tactics, together with law firm which carried
out litigation strategy and willingly participated in litigation tactics, are jointly liable for entire award of sanctions under
Rule 11 since both signed all pleadings. Avirgan v Hull (1989, SD Fla) 125 FRD 189, affd (1991, CA11 Fla) 932 F2d
1572, 20 FR Serv 3d 754, cert den (1992) 502 US 1048, 116 L Ed 2d 813, 112 S Ct 913 and cert den (1992) 506 US 952,
121 L Ed 2d 330, 113 S Ct 405.
Rule 11 does not authorize imposition of sanctions against signing attorney's law firm. Lightning Lube v Witco
Corp. (1992, DC NJ) 144 FRD 662.
21. Pro se litigant
Courts must assure compliance by pro se litigants with requirements of Rule 11: only by such compliance may courts
be assured that parties named as plaintiffs are actually in accord with pleadings filed on their behalf. Ginter v Southern
(1979, CA8 Ark) 611 F2d 1226, 80-1 USTC P 9110, 45 AFTR 2d 524, cert den (1980) 446 US 967, 64 L Ed 2d 827, 100
S Ct 2946.
Plaintiff is not exempt from sanctions simply because he acted pro se. Warren v Guelker (1994, CA9 Wash) 29 F3d
1386, 94 CDOS 5414, 94 Daily Journal DAR 9910, 29 FR Serv 3d 947.
Although district court can properly consider plaintiff's pro se status in assessing sanctions, where violation has
arguably occurred court cannot decline to impose any sanction simply because plaintiff was proceeding pro se. Simpson
v Lear Astronics Corp. (1996, CA9 Cal) 77 F3d 1170, 96 CDOS 1253, 96 Daily Journal DAR 2114, 34 FR Serv 3d 136.
Appropriate sanctions could be imposed under Rule 11 on pro se plaintiff who was lawyer, because he was person
who had signed papers filed with court. Massengale v Ray (2001, CA11 Fla) 267 F3d 1298, 14 FLW Fed C 1354.
Requirements of Rule 11 apply to all litigants, including those acting pro se. Bigalk v Federal Land Bank Asso.
(1985, DC Minn) 107 FRD 210, 1 FR Serv 3d 1579.
With respect to defendants' request that court impose Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff, court may grant plaintiff benefit
of doubt because he is proceeding pro se, but plaintiff is properly notified that court will not hesitate to impose
substantial Rule 11 sanctions against him if he files any more frivolous suits before it. Blume v Leake (1985, DC
Idaho) 618 F Supp 95, 85-2 USTC P 9514, 56 AFTR 2d 5652.
Plaintiff is in no way isolated from Rule 11 sanctions by filing pro se. Schaffer v Chicago Police Officers (1988,
ND Ill) 120 FRD 514, 11 FR Serv 3d 481.
Sanctions are imposed under FRCP 11 on former state employee notwithstanding his pro se status, where complaint's
allegation of conspiracy by several state and municipal agencies and corporations to violate his civil rights was totally
without factual support, since reasonable person would not have brought claim after moderate inquiry and reflection.
Hall v Dworkin (1993, ND NY) 829 F Supp 1403.
Pro se plaintiff who is attorney will be held to same objective standard applied to counsel representing third party.
Segarra v Messina (1994, ND NY) 153 FRD 22, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8515.
Fraud/breach-of-contract case arising from settlement of prior dispute between parties is dismissed with prejudice
but sanctions are denied, where confusing family dispute--dismissed 12 years ago for lack of jurisdiction--still suffers
from lack of basis for federal jurisdiction, because clearly improper complaint, although waste of court's and defendants'
time, will not be sanctioned under FRCP 11 out of deference to pro se status of plaintiffs. Grossbard v President
Container (1994, SD NY) 840 F Supp 296, affd without op (1994, CA2 NY) 41 F3d 1501.
FRCP 11 applies not only to attorneys and represented parties, but also to pro se litigants; however, pro se litigants
are held to more lenient standard than professional counsel, with FRCP 11's application determined on sliding scale
according to litigant's level of sophistication. Horton v TWA (1996, ED NY) 169 FRD 11.
Defendants were entitled to order requiring pro se plaintiff to disclose whether she was attorney or was receiving
assistance of attorney, where plaintiff's pleadings and submissions raised likelihood that either she had legal training or
was receiving assistance from attorney, because plaintiff sought leniency as pro se litigant and legitimate concern
existed that any attorney be identified in case of need to enter appearance as counsel of record and thereby accept
accountability under FRCP 11. Wesley v Don Stein Buick, Inc. (1997, DC Kan) 987 F Supp 884, motions ruled upon,
claim dismissed (1997, DC Kan) 985 F Supp 1288, vacated in part on other grounds, claim dismissed, summary
judgment gr, motion den, in part (1998, DC Kan) 996 F Supp 1299.
Inmate's retaliation claim is stricken and he will be sanctioned further under FRCP 11, where circumstances, content,
and apparently forged signatures on memoranda, purportedly authored by prison official and submitted by inmate with
his brief, convince court that they are fraudulent, because inmate has perpetrated fraud on court. Bout v Bolden (1998,
ED Mich) 22 F Supp 2d 653.
Litigant's pro se status may be considered when determining whether to impose FRCP 11 sanctions. Wesley v Don
Stein Buick, Inc. (1998, DC Kan) 184 FRD 376.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Although pleadings filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers, all litigants, including pro se litigants, have obligation to comply with court orders and with Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Vitale v First Fid. Leasing Group, Inc. (1999, DC Conn) 187 FRD 445.
Where court had warned plaintiff about re-raising claims that court had already rejected, but plaintiff was pro se,
court declined to impose sanctions for conduct about which plaintiff had not been explicitly warned. Commer v
AFSCME (2003, SD NY) 272 F Supp 2d 332.
Hostesses' motions for imposition of sanctions against general manager pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 were denied because sanctions were inappropriate since general manager was pro se litigant, there was no
evidence he filed his motion in bad faith, he had not filed repeated motions lacking in merit, and he had received no
prior warnings from court. Boggs v Die Fliedermaus, LLP. (2003, SD NY) 286 F Supp 2d 291.
Inmate will be required to pay portion of warden's attorney's fees under Rule 11, where pro se inmate is attorney,
because his habeas corpus petition challenging discipline for weapon found in his cell was denied summarily and he
repeatedly insisted on raising frivolous matters, making groundless allegations, and baselessly impugning motives of
government attorneys. Flanagan v Warden, United States Penitentiary (1992, MD Pa) 784 F Supp 178, affd without
op (1993, CA3 Pa) 6 F3d 779, cert den (1994) 510 US 1099, 127 L Ed 2d 229, 114 S Ct 938.
Pro se litigant is subject to Rule 11 sanctions for filing of baseless or frivolous lawsuits. Schramek v Jones (1995,
MD Fla) 161 FRD 119, 9 FLW Fed D 4.
22. Substituted plaintiff
Where state superintendent of insurance was substituted for plaintiff insurance company which had become
insolvent, superintendent could not be sanctioned under either "represented party" or "signing party" clauses of Rule 11.
Homico Constr. & Dev. Co. v Ti-Bert Systems, Inc. (1991, CA6 Ohio) 939 F2d 392, 20 FR Serv 3d 521.
23. United States
Sovereign immunity of United States Government does not exempt it from imposition of sanctions for filing
frivolous suit. United States v Gavilan Joint Community College Dist. (1988, CA9 Cal) 849 F2d 1246, 12 FR Serv 3d
850.
Equal Access to Justice Act (28 USCS § 2412) waives sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions, including
attorney's fees, against United States. Adamson v Bowen (1988, CA10 Colo) 855 F2d 668, CCH Unemployment Ins
Rep P 14107A, 11 FR Serv 3d 606.
When United States comes into court as party in civil suit, it is subject to federal rules of civil procedure as is any
other litigant, and there is no justification for exempting United States government from Rule 11 on ground of sovereign
immunity. Mattingly v United States (1991, CA9 Nev) 939 F2d 816, 91 CDOS 6110, 91 Daily Journal DAR 9113, 91-2
USTC P 50377, 20 FR Serv 3d 27, 68 AFTR 2d 5361.
United States is bound by Rule 11 as are private parties; it also must have reasonable grounds to make allegations
within complaint. United States v R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1976, DC NJ) 416 F Supp 316, 1976-2 CCH Trade
Cases P 61022, dismd (1977, DC NJ) 1977-1 CCH Trade Cases P 61516.
Defendant Veterans Administration, as well as its attorney, may be sanctioned for violation of Rule 11. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v Turnage (1987, ND Cal) 115 FRD 543.
24. Miscellaneous
Fact that attorney associated with plaintiff violated Rule 11 by allowing plaintiff's employees to sign his name to
thousands of court-filed complaints that he had not examined to verify whether they stated legitimate claims does not
compel finding of abuse of process or other unlawfulness on part of plaintiff or real parties in interest. Blanchette v
Cataldo (1984, CA1 Mass) 734 F2d 869.
Plaintiff which filed complaint in violation of rule and then voluntarily dismissed it under Rule 41 will still be
subject to sanctions for violation, although early dismissal reduces amount of sanctions by reducing attorney fees.
Szabo Food Serv. v Canteen Corp. (1987, CA7 Ill) 823 F2d 1073, 8 FR Serv 3d 273, cert dismd (1988) 485 US 901, 99
L Ed 2d 229, 108 S Ct 1101 and (criticized in Sussman by & Through Guilden v Bank of Isr. (1995, CA2 NY) 56 F3d
450, 32 FR Serv 3d 978).
Although sanctions are to be imposed on plaintiff's counsel, where defendant has failed to demonstrate that plaintiff
had actual knowledge of wrongful conduct of her counsel, plaintiff should not share her counsel's liability for sanctions.
Greenberg v Hilton Int'l Co. (1989, CA2 NY) 870 F2d 926, 52 BNA FEP Cas 627, 49 CCH EPD P 38861, 13 FR Serv
3d 262, remanded, on reh (1989, CA2 NY) 875 F2d 39, 52 BNA FEP Cas 638, 50 CCH EPD P 39119.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Where one of defendant's attorneys negligently failed to secure admission to local district before signing pleading,
but there was no showing of bad faith or recklessness or willfulness, and attorney did not argue motion, Rule 11
sanctions are inappropriate. Castillo v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1991, CA7 Ill) 938 F2d 776, 1991-2 CCH
Trade Cases P 69525, 20 FR Serv 3d 295, reh den (1991, CA7) 1991 US App LEXIS 22202.
Although Rule 11 only provides for sanction against individual attorney or party who signs abusive pleading or
motion, court's inherent powers allow it to sanction non-profit legal corporation which controlled and paid for litigation.
Lockary v Kayfetz (1992, CA9 Cal) 974 F2d 1166, 92 CDOS 7725, 92 Daily Journal DAR 12535, 1992-2 CCH Trade
Cases P 69964, cert den (1993) 508 US 931, 124 L Ed 2d 298, 113 S Ct 2397 and (superseded by statute as stated in
Religious Technology Ctr. v Gerbode (1994, CD Cal) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8595) and (criticized in In re
Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. (1997, CA3 VI) 37 VI 398, 120 F3d 368, 27 ELR 21494) and (superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Margolis v Ryan (1998, CA9 Wash) 140 F3d 850, 98 CDOS 2618, 98 Daily Journal DAR
3611, 40 FR Serv 3d 1076).
Parties to lawsuit who were represented by counsel and who had no direct personal involvement in management of
litigation and in making decisions that resulted in actions which court found improper under Rule 11 cannot be held
liable for sanctions. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v Lea (1992, CA5 La) 979 F2d 377, 24 FR Serv 3d 791, cert den (1993)
507 US 1052, 123 L Ed 2d 652, 113 S Ct 1946.
In absence of active participation in preparation or decision to file paper by local counsel who signed it, it is
inappropriate to subject them to sanctions other than criticism for their apparent neglect. Golden Eagle Distributing
Corp. v Burroughs Corp. (1984, ND Cal) 103 FRD 124, 40 FR Serv 2d 346, revd on other grounds, remanded (1986,
CA9 Cal) 801 F2d 1531, 5 FR Serv 3d 737, reh den, en banc (1987, CA9) 809 F2d 584, 7 FR Serv 3d 228 and
(superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Associated Business Tel. Sys. Corp. v Cohn (1994, ND Cal) 1994
US Dist LEXIS 14746).
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff as well as his attorney where plaintiff actively participated in law suit and was
not merely passive victim of attorney's bad judgment and where he ignored opposing counsel's warnings about Rule 11
sanctions. Holley v Guiffrida (1986, DC Dist Col) 112 FRD 172, 41 CCH EPD P 36583.
Limited partnership is not natural person but one of statute and thus must act through legal counsel in matters of law;
therefore general partner who is not licensed attorney may not represent, under Fed. R Civ P 11, limited partnership in
pro se lawsuit. James D. Pauls, Ltd. v Pauls (1986, SD Fla) 633 F Supp 34, mod on other grounds, on reconsideration,
claim dismissed, motion den sub nom Lewis v Pauls (1986, SD Fla) 1986 US Dist LEXIS 30931.
Sanctions against prevailing party are clearly inappropriate. Fustok v Conticommodity Services, Inc. (1988, SD NY)
122 FRD 151, affd (1989, CA2 NY) 873 F2d 38, 13 FR Serv 3d 632.
Where plaintiffs were represented by numerous attorneys, all of whom committed violations of Rule 11, lead counsel
cannot accept ultimate responsibility and have all monetary sanctions assessed against him since associate counsel have
independent responsibility to avoid frivolous, vexatious, and harassing litigation and have individual obligation to act in
good faith and in conformity with rules. Harris v Marsh (1988, ED NC) 123 FRD 204.
In action arising from automobile accident, since defendant's insurance carrier was not named party and
interrogatories were directed to named defendants, there is no basis for imposing sanctions against insurance company
based on deceptive answers to interrogatories. Bergeson v Dilworth (1990, DC Kan) 132 FRD 277, vacated on other
grounds, remanded (1990, DC Kan) 749 F Supp 1555.
Where sexual discrimination action against Navy had been going on for almost 20 years, attorney who signed
objectionable document will not be subject to sanction since he had joined defense team only 2 months earlier and had
necessarily relied on those who had previously worked on case; likewise, where Secretary of Navy was sued in his
official capacity and had no knowledge of handling of case, and Secretary who resigned was removed from case, it
would be inappropriate to subject either outgoing Secretary or his replacement to sanction. Trout v O'Keefe (1992, DC
Dist Col) 144 FRD 587.
Individual who was defendant corporation's senior vice president and general counsel was not "party" as
contemplated by Rule 11 and cannot be sanctioned for signing affidavit. Leventhal v New Valley Corp. (1993, SD NY)
148 FRD 109.
Senior county attorneys who signed briefs in excessive-force case involving dog bite are responsible for informing
court, in connection with current case raising similar issue, of unfavorable decision rendered in that case, even though
senior attorneys may not have been actively involved in either prior or current case, because senior attorneys ought to be
supervising pleadings of junior assistants, and county attorney's office should implement tighter oversight of each
attorney's court filings; however, no sanctions will be imposed since court's publication of its concerns should suffice to
highlight seriousness of matter. Massey v Prince George's County (1996, DC Md) 918 F Supp 905.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Breach by counsel of FRCP 11 does not automatically require imposition of monetary sanctions. Shepherdson v
Nigro (1998, ED Pa) 179 FRD 150.
Sanctions are imposed against plaintiff's attorneys but not plaintiff, where attorneys pursued fraud causes of action
against banks that lacked factual and legal basis, but plaintiff testified that he had been told by 7 attorneys and 3 judges
that he had valid claim and right to jury trial, because plaintiff acted only on unreasonable advice of counsel. Bob
McLemore & Co v Branch Banking & Trust Co. (1999, WD NC) 54 F Supp 2d 554, affd (2000, CA4 NC) 2000 US App
LEXIS 3393.
Plaintiff was not subject to sanctions under FRCP 11(b) for filing federal-court action after identical state-court
action had been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants, or for asserting false allegations of fact and
false legal contentions in complaint, where plaintiff was unaware that her attorney had filed federal action. Hernandez
Valdez v Kreso, Inc. (2001, ND Tex) 144 F Supp 2d 663.
III. PERSONS AND ENTITIES ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS
25. Particular cases
Although complaint was dismissed prior to service on defendants, defendants are still parties entitled to award of
expenses under Rule 11, since violation occurred when complaint was filed for improper purpose and without
reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11. Bryant v Brooklyn Barbecue Corp. (1991, CA8 Mo) 932 F2d 697, 19 FR Serv
3d 1060, reh, en banc, den (1991, CA8) 1991 US App LEXIS 13200 and cert den (1991) 502 US 1005, 116 L Ed 2d 656,
112 S Ct 638.
Rule 11 allows for imposition of sanctions on party responsible for rule's violation, provided that represented party is
not sanctioned for violation involving unwarranted legal contentions; consequently, district court did not abuse its
discretion in sanctioning represented parties where parties misrepresented key facts during both depositions and trial
testimony and knowingly brought and pursued claims devoid of evidentiary support, and thus parties were sanctioned
for improper motivations and unfounded factual, not legal, contentions. Union Planters Bank v L & J Dev. Co. (1997,
CA6 Tenn) 115 F3d 378, 1997 FED App 169P, reh den (1997, CA6) 1997 US App LEXIS 19259.
District court cannot award sanctions including attorney's fees to pro se litigant, even though he was lawyer.
Massengale v Ray (2001, CA11 Fla) 267 F3d 1298, 14 FLW Fed C 1354.
Corporation which has not been named as defendant but which has been served and identified as conspirator in
complaint may be treated as "party" under Rule 11 and awarded costs and attorneys' fees which it has incurred in
frivolous action. Peth v Breitzmann (1985, ED Wis) 611 F Supp 50, 85-1 USTC P 9321, 55 AFTR 2d 1280.
Although one of defendants in securities fraud action appeared pro se, as attorney he is not barred from receiving fee
award under Rule 11. Bush v Rewald (1985, DC Hawaii) 619 F Supp 585, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92390, vacated in
part on other grounds, amd, in part, on reconsideration (1986, DC Hawaii) CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93739.
Generally, non-parties to case in litigation cannot bring FRCP 11 motions for sanctions, and non-party cannot
intervene in case in order to pursue imposition of FRCP 11 sanctions against party to litigation. Hochen v Bobst Group
(2000, DC Mass) 198 FRD 11.
Attorney for party in case cannot bring motion for FRCP 11 sanctions on his or her own behalf. Hochen v Bobst
Group (2000, DC Mass) 198 FRD 11.
Parties to action and certain other participants have standing to move for sanctions under FRCP 11. Hochen v Bobst
Group (2000, DC Mass) 198 FRD 11.
IV. APPLICABILITY TO PARTICULAR TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS
26. Actions removed to federal court
Sanctions cannot be imposed on plaintiff's attorney where complaint was originally filed in state court and later
removed to federal court since Rule 11 provides for sanctions only where pleading is signed in violation of rule, and at
time state court pleading was signed, attorney was not subject to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore could
not have signed in violation of Rule 11. Kirby v Allegheny Beverage Corp. (1987, CA4 Md) 811 F2d 253, 1 BNA IER
Cas 1580, 124 BNA LRRM 2745, 105 CCH LC P 12203, 6 FR Serv 3d 1267.
Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed on plaintiff whose complaint was originally filed in state court and later
removed to federal court by defendants' petition, since at time pleading was signed, Rule 11 did not apply and it could
not be given retrospective application. Stiefvater Real Estate, Inc. v Hinsdale (1987, CA2 NY) 812 F2d 805, 7 FR Serv
3d 56.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
In removed cases sanctions may only be imposed under Rule 11 for actions or proceedings following removal to
federal court and may not be imposed for filing of action in state court or for any proceedings or actions of parties in
state court. Meadow Ltd. Partnership v Meadow Farm Partnership (1987, CA4 Va) 816 F2d 970.
When complaint is filed in state court and is subsequently removed to federal court, Rule 11 applies at instant federal
jurisdiction is invoked over proceedings, since once removed, plaintiff is impressed with continuing responsibility to
review and re-evaluate his pleadings and, where appropriate, to modify them to conform to Rule. Herron v Jupiter
Transp. Co. (1988, CA6 Ohio) 858 F2d 332, 129 BNA LRRM 2611, 110 CCH LC P 10756, 12 FR Serv 3d 582.
Where complaint is properly filed in state court and then removed to federal court, it is inappropriate for federal
court to apply Rule 11 sanctions for filing of that complaint. In re Summers (1988, CA6 Ohio) 863 F2d 20, 130 BNA
LRRM 2305, 110 CCH LC P 10910, 12 FR Serv 3d 951.
Fact that counsel included as exhibit to his affidavit another attorney's state court filing does not subject other
attorney to Rule 11 sanctions since Rule only applies to papers filed in federal court. McMahon v Shearson/American
Express, Inc. (1990, CA2 NY) 896 F2d 17, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94936, 15 FR Serv 3d 1512.
In case removed to federal court, where possible violation of Rule 11 was committed, if at all, under state statute
similar to Rule 11, matter of possible violation will be referred to state court for such action as that court deems
advisable. Duarte v Donnelley (1967, DC Hawaii) 266 F Supp 380.
Rule 11 sanctions cannot be applied to complaint originally filed in state court and later removed to federal court.
Columbus, Cuneo, Cabrini Medical Center v Holiday Inn (1986, ND Ill) 111 FRD 444.
Frivolous complaint filed in state court and removed to federal court cannot by itself form basis of Rule 11 sanction.
Brandenburg v Chicago (1989, ND Ill) 129 FRD 159.
Rule 11 sanctions will not be imposed where complaint was filed in state court and removed by defendant to federal
court, since such action does not create Rule 11 obligation where none previously existed. Trace Services, Inc. v
American Meter Co. (1992, WD Pa) 141 FRD 47.
Although case was filed in state court, sanctions are appropriate since duties imposed by Rule 11 are continuing
duties, and after case was removed to federal court, reasonable inquiry would have revealed that continuation of case
violated rule, which fact was brought to attention of plaintiff's attorney. Schiappa v Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.
(1993, SD Ohio) 146 FRD 153.
Hotel association will not suffer FRCP 11 sanctions, even though it clearly lacked standing to bring federal civil
rights claims on behalf of residents of hotel based on community organization's alleged campaign of harassment and
intimidation motivated by racial bias against black and Latino residents, because association filed complaint in state
court, organization removed it to federal court, and Rule 11 may not be extended to apply to complaint that was not
filed in federal court. Hotel Saint George Assocs. v Morgenstern (1993, SD NY) 819 F Supp 310, 1993-1 CCH Trade
Cases P 70288.
Sanctions on plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel pursuant to FRCP 11 are denied, where attorney defendant claims
unfounded filing of malicious prosecution and related claims against him, because complaint was removed from state
court, making FRCP 11 inapplicable to initial filing, and plaintiff has not filed any sanctionable papers with court.
Kalika v Stern (1995, ED NY) 911 F Supp 594.
Although defendants, with help of their attorney, improperly removed state-court action to federal court in bad faith
and in violation of preclusion order, sanctions under FRCP 11 were not ordered, where action was remanded shortly
after its removal, and thus neither defendants nor attorney had opportunity to correct their errors. Park Nat'l Bank v
Kaminetzky (1996, SD Tex) 976 F Supp 571, dismd without op (1998, CA5 Tex) 165 F3d 24.
Federal rules do not apply to filings made in state court, even if action is later moved to federal court. Tompkins v
Cyr (2000, CA5 Tex) 202 F3d 770.
27. --Pleading or paper filed in federal court
Sanctions cannot be imposed under Rule 11 for period following removal to federal court during which only paper
filed was designation of expert witnesses which made no legal or factual contentions and which was not alleged to have
been made for improper purposes. Edwards v GMC (1998, CA5 Tex) 153 F3d 242, 74 CCH EPD P 45568, 41 FR Serv
3d 1073.
Complaint initially filed in state court and removed by defendant to federal court should not be subjected to scrutiny
under Rule 11 because it was not governed by that rule when signed and filed, but amended complaint filed after
removal to District Court is properly examined for compliance with Rule 11. Kendrick v Zanides (1985, ND Cal) 609
F Supp 1162, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92294.
Where claim filed in state court is known to be frivolous, Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate after case has been
removed to federal court and attorney has signed pleading in furtherance of that claim. Nichols v Firestone Tire &
Page 34
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rubber Co. (1989, DC Neb) 127 FRD 525, 131 BNA LRRM 3144, 14 FR Serv 3d 1387, mod, reconsideration den, in
part (1989, DC Neb) 127 FRD 526, 14 FR Serv 3d 1388.
Rule 11 sanctions will not be imposed where frivolous complaint was originally filed in state court and later removed
to federal court, although additional frivolous papers filed after removal are subject to sanctions. Robinson v Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. (1989, DC Mass) 129 FRD 15, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94866.
Once case is removed from state court, additional submissions filed in federal court are subject to Rule 11. R.W.
Int'l Corp. v Welch Foods (1990, DC Puerto Rico) 133 FRD 8, revd on other grounds, remanded (1991, CA1 Puerto
Rico) 937 F2d 11, 19 FR Serv 3d 1353, summary judgment gr, dismd, on remand (1993, DC Puerto Rico) 1993-2 CCH
Trade Cases P 70433, affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded, in part (1994, CA1 Puerto Rico) 13
F3d 478, 1994-1 CCH Trade Cases P 70488, subsequent app (1996, CA1 Puerto Rico) 88 F3d 49.
Fact that case was removed from state court has no bearing on application of Rule 11; Rule 11 applies to pleadings
once case is removed to federal court, and therefore attorney has duty to reevaluate his signed pleadings once they are in
federal court. Riley v Philadelphia (1991, ED Pa) 136 FRD 571, affd without op (1992, CA3 Pa) 953 F2d 1380.
Sanctions under FRCP 11 in form of attorney's fees and costs were warranted, where defense counsel gave notice of
removal 6 days into state-court trial and signed affidavit that only diverse parties remained in action, even though he
had been informed by plaintiff that nondiverse defendant was still party to action and defendant's counsel knowingly
filed appearance in District Court without being member of bar. Wallic v Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1999, DC
Colo) 40 F Supp 2d 1185, 44 FR Serv 3d 351.
28. Administrative proceedings
Rule 11 is not applicable to administrative hearing before administrative law judge and therefore cannot be used to
impose sanctions on claimant who in bad faith initiates or continues workers compensation proceedings under
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 USCS § § 901 et seq.). Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v
Brickner (1993, CA9) 11 F3d 887, 93 CDOS 8823, 93 Daily Journal DAR 15100, 27 FR Serv 3d 1126.
Where Secretary of Labor instituted administrative proceedings against construction company before Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, sanctions were not available to company under Rule 11 since proceedings were
not conducted in federal court, and because Commission Rules contain provision which is substantially same as Rule
11. Tri-State Steel Constr. Co. v Herman (1999, CA6) 164 F3d 973, 18 BNA OSHC 1602, 1998 CCH OSHD P 31736,
1999 FED App 11P.
Obligations of Rule 11 extend only to suits filed in federal court, not to such administrative procedures as filing
charge with EEOC. Santa Maria v Pacific Bell (2000, CA9 Cal) 202 F3d 1170, 2000 CDOS 600, 2000 Daily Journal
DAR 931, 10 AD Cas 245.
Obligations of Rule 11 extend only to suits filed in federal court, not to such administrative procedures as filing
charge with EEOC. Santa Maria v Pacific Bell (2000, CA9 Cal) 202 F3d 1170, 2000 CDOS 600, 2000 Daily Journal
DAR 931, 10 AD Cas 245.
29. Appellate proceedings
District Court is not authorized to award attorney's fees incurred by defendant in defending against plaintiff's appeal
of imposition of sanctions, because expenses incurred on appeal were not incurred because of filing initially made in
District Court, and because Rule 38 provides adequate remedy regarding appellate costs. Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx
Corp. (1990) 496 US 384, 110 L Ed 2d 359, 110 S Ct 2447, 1990-1 CCH Trade Cases P 69052, 16 FR Serv 3d 737
(superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Photocircuits Corp. v Marathon Agents (1995, ED NY) 162 FRD
449, 33 FR Serv 3d 780) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Morroni v Gunderson (1996, MD Fla)
169 FRD 168, 10 FLW Fed D 311) and (criticized in Ridder v City of Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR
Serv 3d 1288, 1997 FED App 94P) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hockley v Shan Enters. Ltd.
Pshp. (1998, DC NJ) 19 F Supp 2d 235, 42 FR Serv 3d 105) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Barnes v Department of Corrections (1999, 5th Dist) 74 Cal App 4th 126, 87 Cal Rptr 2d 594, 99 CDOS 6555, 99 Daily
Journal DAR 8353).
Where magistrate court imposed sanctions on attorney for filing baseless claim and on attorney's appeal to District
Court sanctions were greatly reduced, further sanctions will be imposed as result of attorney's appeal of District Court's
decision. Brown v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1986, CA5 Miss) 805 F2d 1242, 6 FR Serv 3d 388.
Although Rule 11 is not directly applicable to appellate court since it has not been incorporated by reference or
otherwise in appellate rules of court, its requirements help to define conduct becoming to member of bar, and sanctions
may be imposed for conduct inconsistent with its standards. In re Kelly (1986, CA7) 808 F2d 549, 6 FR Serv 3d 590.
Page 35
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rule 11 is not applicable to pleading filed in appellate court. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Relative to Perl (1988,
CA8 Minn) 838 F2d 304, 10 FR Serv 3d 107.
Party who successfully defends Rule 11 sanction on appeal will not be awarded costs and attorney's fees
automatically, although sanctions may be imposed on parties whose papers submitted to appellate court violate Rule 11.
Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc. (1989, CA9 Cal) 892 F2d 802, 13 USPQ2d 1354,
15 FR Serv 3d 672, affd (1991) 498 US 533, 112 L Ed 2d 1140, 111 S Ct 922, 91 CDOS 1588, 91 Daily Journal DAR
2366, 55 BNA FEP Cas 279, 18 FR Serv 3d 1153.
Sanctions may be imposed under Rule 11 at appellate level where Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
incorporated into circuit rules. Partington v Gedan (1990, CA9 Hawaii) 914 F2d 1349, 17 FR Serv 3d 1245, vacated in
part on other grounds, en banc (1991, CA9 Hawaii) 923 F2d 686, 91 CDOS 351, 91 Daily Journal DAR 513, 18 FR
Serv 3d 391.
Rule 11 may not be incorporated by reference into circuit's rules to allow imposition of sanctions on appeal since rule
should not be used to require payment for any activities outside context of District Court proceedings. Partington v
Gedan (1991, CA9 Hawaii) 923 F2d 686, 91 CDOS 351, 91 Daily Journal DAR 513, 18 FR Serv 3d 391.
Individual who clearly prevails on appeal from District Court's denial of request for Rule 11 sanctions is entitled
under Rule 11 to award of expenses incurred in prosecuting appeal. Westmoreland v CBS, Inc. (1985, App DC) 248 US
App DC 255, 770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451.
Individual who clearly prevails on appeal from District Court's denial of request for Rule 11 sanctions is entitled
under Rule 11 to award of expenses incurred in prosecuting appeal. Westmoreland v CBS, Inc. (1985, App DC) 248 US
App DC 255, 770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451.
Rule 11 authorizes appellee to recover costs it incurs in successful defense of Rule 11 award. Danik, Inc. v
Hartmarx Corp. (1989, App DC) 277 US App DC 333, 875 F2d 890, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68588, 15 FR Serv 3d
491, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds (1990) 496 US 384, 110 L Ed 2d 359, 110 S Ct 2447, 1990-1 CCH
Trade Cases P 69052, 16 FR Serv 3d 737 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Photocircuits Corp. v
Marathon Agents (1995, ED NY) 162 FRD 449, 33 FR Serv 3d 780) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Morroni v Gunderson (1996, MD Fla) 169 FRD 168, 10 FLW Fed D 311) and (criticized in Ridder v City of
Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288, 1997 FED App 94P) and (superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Hockley v Shan Enters. Ltd. Pshp. (1998, DC NJ) 19 F Supp 2d 235, 42 FR Serv 3d 105) and
(superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Barnes v Department of Corrections (1999, 5th Dist) 74 Cal App
4th 126, 87 Cal Rptr 2d 594, 99 CDOS 6555, 99 Daily Journal DAR 8353).
Where plaintiff appealed imposition of sanctions, plaintiff cannot be required, as part of Rule 11 sanction, to also pay
attorney fees incurred by defendant in defending such appeal since Court of Appeals has ample power to deal with
expenses incurred on appeal under its own rules. Brandt v Schal Assocs. (1990, ND Ill) 131 FRD 512.
30. Bankruptcy proceedings
District Court's award of sanctions under Rule 11 on appeal from bankruptcy court was inappropriate since Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are made explicitly inapplicable to proceedings in bankruptcy, except in/so/far as they may be
made applicable thereto by Bankruptcy Rules. In re Akros Installations (1987, CA9 Cal) 834 F2d 1526, 9 FR Serv 3d
1138 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Roete (1991, CA7 Ind) 936 F2d 963, 25 CBC2d 177,
CCH Bankr L Rptr P 74116, 20 FR Serv 3d 604) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hedges v
Resolution Trust Corp. (1994, CA9 Ariz) 32 F3d 1360, 94 CDOS 5400, 94 Daily Journal DAR 9907, 25 BCD 1475, 31
CBC2d 726, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 75988) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Determan v Sandoval
(In re Sandoval) (1995, BAP9 Cal) 186 BR 490, 95 Daily Journal DAR 13595).
Judgment creditor's pursuit of contempt proceedings against debtor in state court to collect its judgment were in
violation of automatic stay of 11 USCS § 362, and were not protected by either 11 USCS § 362(b)(4), or by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 because creditor was not agent of federal courts. In re Benalcazar (2002, BC ND Ill) 283 BR 514.
Where bankruptcy trustee argued that debtor's redemption obligation, which included paying accrued dividends, was
liability as to insolvency and non- Pereira v Dow Chem. Co. (In re Trace Int'l Holdings, Inc.) (2002, BC SD NY) 287
BR 98, 40 BCD 171.
On motion for summary judgment in dischargeability action under Bankruptcy Code, copy of amended petition to
modify and for declaratory judgment filed in debtor's and creditor ex-wife's divorce was admitted where document had
been sworn to by debtor's counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; however, portions that were merely argument were given no
greater weight than could be attributed to argument for evidentiary purposes. Cox v Cox (In re Cox) (2003, BC ED Tex)
292 BR 141.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Bankruptcy court determined that request for sanctions was not appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 9011, where court found that corporation failed to present any proof of perjury, subornation of perjury, fabrication of
evidence, or extortion related to debtor's failed preference action under 11 USCS § 547; court denied both sanctions
motion and cross-motion. Berger Indus. v Artmark Prods. Corp. (In re Berger Indus.) (2003, BC ED NY) 298 BR 37, 41
BCD 238.
31. Criminal proceedings
Provisions of Rule 11 have not been specifically incorporated by reference into federal rules of criminal procedure
and do not apply to criminal cases. United States v White (1992, CA2) 980 F2d 836.
FRCP 11 does not apply to proceeding on convicted federal defendant's motion to vacate sentence. Harrelson v
United States (1997, WD Tex) 967 F Supp 909.
32. Habeas corpus proceedings
Where petitioner sought through habeas corpus to achieve purely civil effect of preventing his deportation following
felony conviction, he will be held to standards of Rule 11, and sanction will be imposed for bringing frivolous action to
cause undeserved delay. United States v Quin (1988, CA1 Puerto Rico) 836 F2d 654, 10 FR Serv 3d 189, 103 ALR Fed
855.
Rule 11 is applicable to petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 USCS § 2254, but its sanctions may be
applied only in exceptional circumstances, and standard for imposing sanctions must reflect writ's special role,
resources of prisoners, and uncertainty in law. Anderson v Butler (1989, CA5 La) 886 F2d 111, 14 FR Serv 3d 1235.
Reasonable but unconfirmed belief that meritorious fact-based claim exists may obligate prisoner to raise and pursue
claim if habeas corpus petition is filed, and to do so does not violate Rule 11, since first petition must adequately set
forth all of state prisoner's colorable grounds for relief. United States v Barrett (1999, CA1 Me) 178 F3d 34, cert den
(2000, US) 145 L Ed 2d 1110, 120 S Ct 1208.
33. Proceeding over which court has no jurisdiction
District Courts possess inherent power over Rule 11 motions even under circumstances where jurisdiction over
underlying case is absent. Wojan v General Motors Corp. (1988, CA7 Ill) 851 F2d 969, 11 FR Serv 3d 914.
Even though District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over merits of claim, it had jurisdiction to impose Rule
11 sanctions. Willy v Coastal Corp. (1990, CA5 Tex) 915 F2d 965, 17 FR Serv 3d 1431, reh den, en banc (1990, CA5
Tex) 920 F2d 931 and affd (1992) 503 US 131, 117 L Ed 2d 280, 112 S Ct 1076, 92 CDOS 1818, 92 Daily Journal DAR
2850, 121 CCH LC P 10012, 21 FR Serv 3d 1121, 6 FLW Fed S 34, reh den (1992) 504 US 935, 118 L Ed 2d 596, 112 S
Ct 2001, 121 CCH LC P 10165.
Even if court does not have jurisdiction over underlying action, it may have jurisdiction to determine whether parties
have abused judicial system and whether sanctions are appropriate to remedy such abuse. Westlake North Property
Owners Ass'n v Thousand Oaks (1990, CA9 Cal) 915 F2d 1301, 17 FR Serv 3d 1363.
District Court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction over action may still impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
Chemiakin v Yefimov (1991, CA2 NY) 932 F2d 124, 19 FR Serv 3d 937.
Forfeiture of attorney fees, based on conflict of interest, to Austrian settlement class in relation to larger German
settlement also benefitting class, was properly denied, because whenever district court has federal jurisdiction over case,
it retains ancillary jurisdiction after dismissal to adjudicate collateral matters such as imposing FRCivP 11 sanctions;
court had no jurisdiction over treaty-like settlement, and attorneys acted in utmost good faith. In re Austrian & German
Bank Holocaust Litig. (2003, CA2 NY) 317 F3d 91, 54 FR Serv 3d 712.
34. Proceeding transferred to other District Court
Where counterclaim was severed and transferred to another District Court, original court no longer had jurisdiction
to impose sanctions for conduct arising out of counterclaim. Chrysler Credit Corp. v Country Chrysler, Inc. (1991,
CA10 Okla) 928 F2d 1509, 19 FR Serv 3d 272.
35. State court proceedings
Sanction cannot be imposed under Rule 11 for filing paper in state court. Hurd v Ralphs Grocery Co. (1987, CA9
Cal) 824 F2d 806, 126 BNA LRRM 2355, 107 CCH LC P 10108, 8 FR Serv 3d 918 (superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Buster v Greisen (1997, CA9 Alaska) 97 CDOS 2161, 97 Daily Journal DAR 4001).
Motion to enforce settlement agreement which was filed in state court in no way constituted pleading, motion, or
other paper falling under regulation of Rule 11. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Burke (1990, CA4 W Va) 897 F2d 734.
Page 37
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rule does not apply to complaint filed in state court. Schmitz v Campbell-Mithun, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 124 FRD 189.
Plaintiff's assertion of claim in federal court that already had been found to be frivolous in prior state-court action
was not subject to sanctions under FRCP 11, since plaintiff's filing reflected misunderstanding of law of former
adjudication rather than deliberate insult to court. Classic Tool Design, Inc. v Castrol Indus. N. Am., Inc. (1999, SD NY)
58 F Supp 2d 313.
V. APPLICABILITY TO PARTICULAR PLEADINGS, PAPERS AND CONDUCT
36. Generally
District Court did not act improperly in basing sanctions on bulk of filings and conduct of litigation, without basing
ruling on specific pleadings. Lupo v R. Rowland & Co. (1988, CA8 Mo) 857 F2d 482, 12 FR Serv 3d 281, cert den
(1989) 490 US 1081, 104 L Ed 2d 662, 109 S Ct 2101.
Although Rule 11 does not apply to documents that are not filed with court, litigant cannot escape Rule 11 sanctions
by failing to file papers with court that litigant has served on opponent and is required by order to file with court.
Antonious v Spalding & Evenflo Cos. (2002, CA FC) 281 F3d 1258, 62 USPQ2d 1060.
Rule 11 was not intended to be weapon against particular arguments in motion or pleading, but was designed to
address pleading as whole; thus, court must look to pleading or motion as whole when attempting to determine
propriety of Rule 11 sanctions, as litigants should not be penalized for presenting potentially meritorious issues or
grounds in motion. Martinez, Inc. v H. Landau & Co. (1985, ND Ind) 107 FRD 775.
Rule 11 applies only to conduct associated with signing and filing papers with court. Jones v International Riding
Helmets (1992, ND Ga) 145 FRD 120, affd (1995, CA11 Ga) 49 F3d 692, 31 FR Serv 3d 713, 8 FLW Fed C 1139.
37. Affidavit
Attorney's affidavit was signed, certified document, submitted to court and was within scope of "other papers"
appropriate for consideration under Rule 11, even though it was not formally filed and was submitted to court in support
of request for settlement conference. Eisenberg v University of New Mexico (1991, CA10 NM) 936 F2d 1131, 33 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 330, 20 FR Serv 3d 99.
Sanctions need not be imposed on defense counsel in civil fraud case arising from car battery purchase, even though
witness for defense first gave affidavit that marks on battery posts were consistent with testing, charging, or shipping
processes, then testified subsequently at deposition that pictures of batteries showed marks not caused by testing or
charging at plant, because witness's deposition testimony does not directly contradict his prior declaration, and defense
counsel did not knowingly misrepresent facts in violation of FRCP 11. Poe v Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1998, ND Ga) 1 F
Supp 2d 1472 (criticized in Lobo Exploration Co. v Amoco Prod. Co. (1999, Okla Civ App) 991 P2d 1048).
38. Conduct and arguments
Rule 11 does not impose upon District Courts burden of evaluating under ethical standards accuracy of all lawyers'
arguments, and therefore District Court's imposition of sanctions for conduct which it felt fell short of ethical
responsibilities of attorney would be reversed. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v Burroughs Corp. (1986, CA9 Cal) 801
F2d 1531, 5 FR Serv 3d 737, reh den, en banc (1987, CA9) 809 F2d 584, 7 FR Serv 3d 228 and (superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in Associated Business Tel. Sys. Corp. v Cohn (1994, ND Cal) 1994 US Dist LEXIS 14746).
Rule 11 sanctions may not be imposed on basis that plaintiffs failed to instruct United States marshal regarding writs
of attachment, since such conduct is not proscribed by rule, and since rule is not intended to remedy all manner of
attorney misconduct. United Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v United States Energy Management Systems, Inc. (1988,
CA9 Cal) 837 F2d 356, 10 FR Serv 3d 253.
District Court misconstrued Rule 11 by imposing sanctions for conduct of litigation after signing of pleadings, where
plaintiff's claims were not frivolous at time they were filed, since fact that some of claims were later found lacking and
evidentiary foundation is irrelevant to Rule 11 inquiry. Cunningham v County of Los Angeles (1988, CA9 Cal) 859
F2d 705, 12 FR Serv 3d 699, cert den (1990) 493 US 1035, 107 L Ed 2d 773, 110 S Ct 757.
Sanctions may not be imposed under Rule 11 for plaintiffs' failure to "throw in the towel" as soon as they discovered
that their claims were baseless, since Rule 11 applies only to pleading, motion, or other paper and cannot be used
against counsel who chose not to file pleading, motion, or other paper that court thought they ought to have filed.
Samuels v Wilder (1990, CA7 Ill) 906 F2d 272, 16 FR Serv 3d 1282, 111 OGR 38.
District Court improperly imposed additional sanctions on plaintiffs' attorneys based on their efforts to publicize their
baseless claims through media, since Rule 11 was clearly not designed to encompass such conduct. In re Kunstler
Page 38
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
(1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990,
CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
Rule 11 sanctions are proper only in situations involving signed pleading, and District Court's award of sanctions for
failure to appear at trial was therefore beyond scope of Rule 11. Landon v Hunt (1991, CA3 Pa) 938 F2d 450, 20 FR
Serv 3d 181.
Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate remedy for alleged attorney misconduct involving attempted bribery; rather,
sanctions are available under Rule 11 only with regard to papers filed with court. Trulis v Barton (1995, CA9 Cal) 107
F3d 685, 97 CDOS 1296, 97 Daily Journal DAR 1915, 36 FR Serv 3d 1422.
Rule 11 does not apply to oral advocacy whenever attorney advocates signed paper; rather, to be subject to rule, oral
statement must relate directly to particular representation contained in document that lawyer is then advocating and
must be made in furtherance of that matter. O'Brien v Alexander (1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 1479, 36 FR Serv 3d 558.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 is directed at papers signed in violation of rule, not at general misconduct Truesdell v Southern
Cal. Permanente Med. Group (2002, CA9 Cal) 293 F3d 1146, 2002 CDOS 5492, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 6933.
Appropriate grounds for sanctions for failure to participate in discovery and failure to obey discovery orders are
Rules 26 and 37, not Rule 11. Manarin v Fairbanks Co. (1988, ND Ill) 122 FRD 513.
Because actions plaintiff complains of are not contained in pleading, motion, or other paper, Rule 11 does not apply.
Insurance Co. of North America v J.S. Vig Constr. Co. (1992, ED Mich) 141 FRD 56.
Sanctions are imposed under FRCP 11 against attorney for former employee who brought tort action against former
employer and corporate officers, where counsel made misleading statements during oral argument on defendants'
motion to dismiss that went beyond bounds of zealous advocacy, because FRCP 11 applies to oral statements such as
these which reaffirmed representations in complaint and which were advocating sufficiency of complaint. O'Brien v
Alexander (1995, SD NY) 898 F Supp 162, 33 FR Serv 3d 608, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds, remanded
(1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 1479, 36 FR Serv 3d 558 and (criticized in Schmidt v Fleet Bank (1998, SD NY) RICO Bus
Disp Guide (CCH) P 9429).
39. Counterclaim and answer
Both counterclaim and answer may legitimately serve as bases of Rule 11 sanction. Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v
Architectural Research Corp. (1993, CA6 Mich) 989 F2d 213, 25 FR Serv 3d 272.
Sanctions under FRCP Rule 11 are appropriate, where builders filed copyright action against another builder,
alleging theft of home plans, and second builder filed counterclaim, alleging racketeering and antitrust violations by
builder, but failing to allege material misrepresentation by builder, to establish element of continuity necessary for
RICO claim, or to establish that builder undertook litigation for anticompetitive reasons, because counterclaim does not
show sufficient legal inquiry to support serious treble-damage claims under RICO or antitrust law. Harris Custom
Builders v Hoffmeyer (1993, ND Ill) 834 F Supp 256, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8395, 1993-2 CCH Trade Cases P
70376.
Imposition of sanctions against constable under FRCP 11 is denied, even though constable's counterclaims seeking
attorney's fees and claiming malicious use of process were dismissed preliminarily, because one-sentence request for
Rule 11 sanctions does not constitute legally sufficient motion under local Rule of Civil Procedure. Reitz v Dieter
(1993, ED Pa) 840 F Supp 353.
Attorney's motion for FRCP 11 sanctions against universal heir and sole legatee of estate must be denied, even
though he claims that her duplicative suits against him as well as her counterclaims in current interpleader action were
premature, wasteful, and/or frivolous, because attorney has not presented evidence to contradict heir's documentation of
her status, and she cannot be sanctioned for pursuing her legal rights. Pressman v Estate of Steinvorth (1994, SD NY)
860 F Supp 171.
40. Discovery motion (pre-1993 amendment cases)
Rule 11 clearly encompasses discovery motions. Westmoreland v CBS, Inc. (1985, App DC) 248 US App DC 255,
770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451.
41. Notice of appearance
Notice of appearance signed by plaintiff's substitute counsel and submitted to court was "paper" presented to court
and was sufficient to subject counsel to sanctions under Rule 11 since, by appearing in case, counsel affirmed to court
that case had arguable merit. Turner v Sungard Bus. Sys. (1996, CA11 Ala) 91 F3d 1418, 69 CCH EPD P 44342, 35 FR
Serv 3d 880, 10 FLW Fed C 267, reh, en banc, den (1996, CA11 Ala) 103 F3d 150.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
42. Papers not submitted to court
Rule 11 applies only when attorney has signed pleading, motion, or other paper, and thus where attorney has
breached settlement agreement which was signed by parties and which was basis for stipulation of dismissal, but which
was not submitted to court or reviewed by court or incorporated into court's order of dismissal, rule is inappropriate
vehicle for reviewing and disciplining attorney's misconduct. Adduono v World Hockey Asso. (1987, CA8 Minn) 824
F2d 617, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67635, 8 FR Serv 3d 532.
Rule 11 does not apply to situation where attorney in bankruptcy action failed to file formal appearance form and
affidavit required by local rules, and even if missing documents were regarded as equivalent of unsigned documents
which are covered by Rule 11, summary reversal of bankruptcy appeal was not within permissible range of sanctions for
such violation. Kovilic Constr. Co. v Missbrenner (1997, CA7 Ill) 106 F3d 768, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 77252.
43. Papers filed in state court
Where appellants opposed motion to intervene and orally requested extension of time to file opposition, but
magistrate refused requested extension, and at hearing, appellants' counsel stated that appellants relied primarily on
same arguments contained in memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to motion to intervene which was
filed in state court, District Court improperly awarded sanctions against appellants on basis of their state court
opposition papers, even though appellants never filed those papers in federal action, since court cannot award sanctions
on basis of its speculation that party would have filed certain papers had that party been given opportunity. Soules v
Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee (1988, CA9 Hawaii) 849 F2d 1176, 12 FR Serv 3d 460.
Rule 11 does not authorize sanctions for pleading filed in state court prior to removal of case to federal court.
Worthington v Wilson (1993, CA7 Ill) 8 F3d 1253, 27 FR Serv 3d 375.
Following removal of action to federal court, plaintiff cannot be sanctioned under Rule 11 for allegedly frivolous
complaint filed in state court, nor can he be sanctioned for failing to update or amend his original state court complaint.
Bisciglia v Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (1995, CA7 Wis) 45 F3d 223, 31 FR Serv 3d 102.
District courts are not authorized to sanction attorney for filings made in state court prior to removal to federal court;
further, following removal, attorney cannot be sanctioned simply for failure to withdraw pleadings filed in state court
that would have violated Rule 11 had they been filed in federal court. Edwards v GMC (1998, CA5 Tex) 153 F3d 242,
74 CCH EPD P 45568, 41 FR Serv 3d 1073.
44. Response to request for admission
Responses to requests for admission come within meaning of "pleading, motion, and other paper," and false answer
to request to admit may result in imposition of sanctions under either or both Rule 11 and Rule 37(c). A & V Fishing,
Inc., v Home Ins. Co. (1993, DC Mass) 145 FRD 285, 24 FR Serv 3d 1475.
45. Miscellaneous
Although plaintiff had filed notice of appeal, which would ordinarily divest district court of jurisdiction, plaintiff
should not have been sanctioned for filing motion to determine previous Rule 59(e) motion in district court where
appeal was premature, even though prematurity was not clear, since party should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for
taking reasonable steps to perfect appeal or to clarify its status. Bensalem Township v International Surplus Lines Ins.
Co. (1994, CA3 Pa) 38 F3d 1303, 30 FR Serv 3d 499, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA3 Pa) 1994 US App LEXIS 30669,
summary judgment proceeding sub nom Bensalem Township v Coregis Indem. Co. (1995, ED Pa) 1995 US Dist LEXIS
6329, affd without op (1996, CA3 Pa) 77 F3d 461.
Although attorney contesting imposition of sanctions did not sign groundless complaint, he did sign RICO case
statement which effectively reasserted positions taken in complaint, thereby making complaint's fraud claims his own
and making attorney subject to Rule 11 sanctions. O'Ferral v Trebol Motors Corp. (1995, CA1 Puerto Rico) 45 F3d
561, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8733, 30 FR Serv 3d 1206 (criticized in Bonilla v Trebol Motors Corp. (1997, DC
Puerto Rico) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 4341).
Letter containing false representations, which was sent by defendants' attorney to opposing counsel and to court, was
properly treated as "other paper" for purposes of imposing Rule 11 sanctions, where attorney deliberately sent copy of
letter to judge just three days before preliminary injunction hearing with stated purpose "to advise the court and all
parties" of its contents and letter had actual influence on judge's decision. Legault v Zambarano (1997, CA1 RI) 105
F3d 24, 72 BNA FEP Cas 1652, 70 CCH EPD P 44632, 36 FR Serv 3d 1229.
District court erred in imposing sanction of attorney fees under Rule 11, to extent that it was based on plaintiff's
failure to answer defendants' interrogatories fully, since subsection (d) excludes from purview of Rule 11 discovery
Page 40
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
responses and motions that are subject to provisions of Rules 26 and 37. Baffa v Donaldson (2000, CA2 NY) 222 F3d
52, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91056.
Informal request for adjournment cannot be considered motion and, even if it could be, failure to put it in writing
signed by counsel would, under Rule 11, preclude court from granting relief. Shapiro v Freeman (1965, SD NY) 38
FRD 308, 9 FR Serv 2d 30B.42, Case 1.
FRCP 11 sanctions may be imposed after FRCP 41(a)(1) dismissal for conduct that took place before dismissal.
Horton v TWA (1996, ED NY) 169 FRD 11.
Sanctions against defendant in declaratory judgment action are unwarranted, because plaintiffs have failed to follow
proper procedures under FRCP 9(c)(1) and 11, and have failed to establish that defendant's allegations in support of
motion for stay are utterly lacking support. Cortez v CMG Worldwide (1997, ND NY) 962 F Supp 308.
Sanctions will not be imposed upon FDIC and its attorneys for submitting allegedly inaccurate, incomplete, and
misleading information in response to motion for reconsideration, even if response presented facts which tended to
support claim that defendant participated in fraud of investment adviser, because it is obligation of counsel opposing
value of evidence, not proponent, to expose weaknesses in evidence--FDIC is not required to uncover and set forth facts
that support defendant's position. FDIC v Refco Group (1997, DC Colo) 989 F Supp 1052, motions ruled upon (1999,
DC Colo) 184 FRD 623, 51 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1573, motion gr, request den (1999, DC Colo) 46 F Supp 2d 1109.
FRCP 11 sanctions may be imposed for improper filings of FRCP 59(e) motions to reconsider. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v Huynh Pham (2000, SD Miss) 193 FRD 493.
Counsel and general counsel for financial company must pay $ 2,500 each to clerk of court as sanction for violation
of FRCP 11, even accepting their assertion that they did not deliberately set out to mislead court and that any errors in
their papers resulted from time pressures involved in preparing application for emergency relief, where false and
misleading assertions here were contained in verified complaint which was basis for ex parte application for
extraordinary remedy of writ of attachment, because they knew court would be required to place particular trust in truth
of verified complaint's sworn statements, and they had heightened obligation to insure that facts were accurately
portrayed. Four Star Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v Commonwealth Mgmt. Assocs. (2001, SD NY) 166 F Supp 2d 805.
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for defendant's improper motion to question jurors about
court's decision to bifurcate trial, which claimed that bifurcation was improper "outside influence" on jury deliberations
under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), was rejected without prejudice; court assumed that no appeal of decision to deny motion to
question jurors would follow. Am. Trim, L.L.C. v Oracle Corp. (2002, ND Ohio) 217 F Supp 2d 826.
Motion to dismiss was granted to plaintiff in admiralty action, in which vessel technical manager sought to limit
liability as owner pro hac vice, under Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 USCS App. § § 183-189, because
manager did not set forth any specific responsibilities that manager had for vessel, but manager was granted leave to
amend to extent that it could allege such facts without running afoul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Norfolk Dredging Co. v M/V
A.V. Kastner (2003, DC Md) 264 F Supp 2d 265.
VI. REQUIREMENT OF SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS ON PLEADING
46. Signature requirement, generally
When party files timely notice of appeal in Federal District Court, failure of the party to sign notice of appeal does
not require Federal Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal, because the complementary operation of Rule 4(a)(1) of
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 11(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure calls for signature on notice
of appeal, where Rule 4(a) provides that notice of appeal required to commence an appeal must be filed with district
clerk within 30 days after judgment or order appealed from is entered, Rule 11(a) provides that every paper filed in
District Court shall be signed, and Rule 11(a) provides in its final sentence that omission of the signature may be
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. Becker v Montgomery (2001, US) 149 L
Ed 2d 983, 121 S Ct 1801, 2001 CDOS 4275, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 5260, 2001 Colo J C A R 2615, 2001 Colo J C A
R 2657, 49 FR Serv 3d 357, 14 FLW Fed S 268, 2001.
Rule 11(a) of Federal Rules of Civil procedure provides in its final sentence that omission of the signature may be
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party; Rule 11 was formulated and should be
applied as a cohesive whole and, so understood, the signature requirement and the cure for an initial failure to meet the
requirement go hand in hand. Becker v Montgomery (2001, US) 149 L Ed 2d 983, 121 S Ct 1801, 2001 CDOS 4275,
2001 Daily Journal DAR 5260, 2001 Colo J C A R 2615, 2001 Colo J C A R 2657, 49 FR Serv 3d 357, 14 FLW Fed S
268, 2001.
Initial omission of signature is not jurisdictional impediment to pursuit of an appeal--even though Rules 3 and 4 of
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are jurisdictional provisions--as Rule 3(c)(1) details what notice of appeal must
Page 41
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
contain, signature requirement is not among Rule 3(c)(1)'s specifications, and Rule 11(a) of Federal Rules of Civil
procedure alone calls for and controls the signature requirement and renders it nonjurisdictional. Becker v Montgomery
(2001, US) 149 L Ed 2d 983, 121 S Ct 1801, 2001 CDOS 4275, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 5260, 2001 Colo J C A R
2615, 2001 Colo J C A R 2657, 49 FR Serv 3d 357, 14 FLW Fed S 268, 2001.
Supreme Court will not, without a rule change so ordering, extend meaning of word "signed" as that word appears in
Rule 11(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--which provides that every pleading, written motion, and other paper
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by
attorney, shall be signed by the party--such that party typing his or her name satisfies the signature requirement, because
the requirement of signature indicates a name handwritten or a mark handplaced. Becker v Montgomery (2001, US) 149
L Ed 2d 983, 121 S Ct 1801, 2001 CDOS 4275, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 5260, 2001 Colo J C A R 2615, 2001 Colo J C
A R 2657, 49 FR Serv 3d 357, 14 FLW Fed S 268, 2001.
Prescription of Rule 3(c)(2) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure--that pro se notice of appeal is considered filed
on behalf of the signer and signer's spouse and minor children (if they are parties), unless notice clearly indicates
otherwise--does not dislodge requirement that notice of appeal be signed from requirement's moorings in Rule 11(a) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and make the requirement jurisdictional specification under Rule 3 of Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, as Rule 3(c)(2) was designed to prevent the loss of right to appeal through inadvertent omission of
party's name when it is objectively clear that party intends to appeal. Becker v Montgomery (2001, US) 149 L Ed 2d
983, 121 S Ct 1801, 2001 CDOS 4275, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 5260, 2001 Colo J C A R 2615, 2001 Colo J C A R
2657, 49 FR Serv 3d 357, 14 FLW Fed S 268, 2001.
Fact that individual did not sign complaint tends to support determination that she did not sue, where, in addition,
such individual did not authorize anyone to sue for her and had no desire to sue. Hernandez-Avila v Averill (1984, CA2
NY) 725 F2d 25, 38 FR Serv 2d 553.
Unsigned complaint which was filed by nonlawyer on behalf of fellow inmate was properly dismissed as barred by
statute of limitations where plaintiff inmate did not even see complaint until after limitations period had run, since
purpose of Rule 11 signing requirement was to make certain that named parties in action in which there was no lawyer
had actually assented to filing of action on their behalf, and signed complaint filed after running of limitations period
could not relate back since original complaint had not been tendered by pro se party himself, and he had not even been
aware of original filing until after expiration of statute of limitations. Gonzales v Wyatt (1998, CA5 Tex) 157 F3d 1016,
41 FR Serv 3d 1613.
Participation by attorney in drafting appellate brief is per se substantial and must be acknowledged by signature, and
attorney must refuse to provide "ghostwriting" assistance unless client specifically commits himself to disclosing
attorney's assistance to court upon filing. Duran v Carris (2001, CA10 NM) 238 F3d 1268, RICO Bus Disp Guide
(CCH) P 10015, 2001 Colo J C A R 655.
Although timely habeas petition was not signed by inmate or his attorney, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) and 28
USCS § 1654, there was no doubt about who was filing or what judgment was attacked and, initial filing, together with
signed petition, demonstrated assent of inmate to petition; as later copy of same petition cured signature defect of initial
petition, inmate's petition was timely and should have been considered on its merits pursuant to 28 USCS § 2255. De
Aza-Paez v United States (2003, CA1 Puerto Rico) 343 F3d 552.
Purpose of signature of "at least one attorney of record in his individual name" is to hold attorney of record who
signs his individual name to strict accountability. United States use of Foster Wheeler Corp. v American Surety Co.
(1938, DC NY) 25 F Supp 225.
Attorney's signature on pleading is equivalent of affidavit of merit. Russo v Sofia Bros., Inc. (1941, DC NY) 2 FRD
80.
Defendant is not required to sign his answer when it is signed by his attorney. Neth v Kaylor (1941, DC Pa) 37 F
Supp 24.
Although Rule 11 requires that pleadings are to be signed by counsel, it does not invalidate unsigned pleadings. In
re Legon (1949, DC NY) 85 F Supp 946.
Although signature by attorney certifies that, to best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support that pleading (Rule 11), court burdened with duty not to entertain jurisdiction if it does not affirmatively
appear cannot infer its jurisdiction from attorney's certificate. Dodrill v New York C. R. Co. (1966, SD Ohio) 253 F
Supp 564.
Violation of Rule 11 occurred when defendant's attorney filed motion which was signed by defendant, not attorney.
Painewebber, Inc. v Can Am Financial Group, Ltd. (1988, ND Ill) 121 FRD 324, 12 FR Serv 3d 18, affd without op
(1989, CA7 Ill) 885 F2d 873.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Where petitioner's motion for certificate of appealability was stricken because it was not signed, and therefore, did
not comply with requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), court denied petitioner certificate of appealability following his
criminal conviction and denial of his habeas corpus petition because there was no motion or brief for court to consider.
Coleman v United States (2002, ED Mich) 227 F Supp 2d 717.
47. --Amendment of pleadings
Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing amended answer which was signed and contained everything the
original answer contained, although original answer was not signed. Holley Coal Co. v Globe Indem. Co. (1950, CA4
W Va) 186 F2d 291.
Plaintiff's failure to sign amended complaint as required by Rule 11 is mere technical defect and, especially since
none of defendants had previously pointed to this violation of Rule 11 and alleged prejudice, complaint would be treated
as properly amended. Burak v Pennsylvania (1972, ED Pa) 339 F Supp 534.
48. --Copies of pleadings
Requirement of Federal Rules that movant's attorney sign motion is satisfied if original motion is signed, even
though copies going out to numerous other parties are not signed. Anderson v Brady (1945, DC Ky) 5 FRD 85.
Where original pleading bears signature of one of attorneys of record for plaintiff and attorney has made affidavit
that he "personally signed the complaint in this action before it was filed and also personally signed the original of the
amended complaint before it was served and filed," omission of attorney's signature from copies served on defendant's
attorneys does not violate Rule 11. Pallant v Sinatra (1945, SD NY) 7 FRD 293, 65 USPQ 158.
Contention that Rule 11 was violated in that plaintiff's attorney was served with unsigned copy of answer is not well
founded, since only original answer need be signed; copies served on other party need not be signed. Porto Transport,
Inc. v Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp. (1956, DC NY) 20 FRD 1.
49. Sufficiency and propriety of signature
Typed name and address at close of motion is not signing of motion as required by Federal Rules. Freed v Inland
Empire Ins. Co. (1959, DC Utah) 174 F Supp 458.
Willingness of co-petitioner inmates to give inmate authority to act on their behalf suggested strongly that
co-petitioner inmates were not prepared to litigate their own claims as they must be if they wanted to prosecute lawsuit
in court. Lindell v Litscher (2002, WD Wis) 212 F Supp 2d 936.
50. --Attorney's signature
Requirements of Rule 11 and Rule 7 are met by motion made by firm of attorneys and signature by one signing
himself as member of firm, although his name is not included in firm name; where motion paper is followed by name of
firm of attorneys, "by W. J. Nunnally, Jr., a member of the firm," with name "W. J. Nunnally, Jr." signed by him and
rest typewritten, this is sufficient to comply with Rule 11. United States use of Foster Wheeler Corp. v American
Surety Co. (1938, DC NY) 25 F Supp 225.
Notice of motion complies with Federal Rules where signed by movant's attorney at end of requested relief; it is not
necessary for attorney to sign his name again to motion papers. United States use of Foster Wheeler Corp. v American
Surety Co. (1938, DC NY) 25 F Supp 225.
There is sufficient compliance with spirit of Rule 11 where defendant's answer is signed by associate of firm which
represents it, in absence of only member of firm who has knowledge of its contents, and final draft is prepared by
member after consultation with associate who is also fully acquainted with matters contained, and it is then signed by
latter, and both submit affidavits to this effect. Intra-Mar Shipping (Cuba) S. A. v John S. Emery & Co. (1951, DC NY)
11 FRD 284.
Signing by plaintiff's counsel of motion to amend complaint is sufficient under Federal Rules even though plaintiff
herself signs affidavit to original complaint. Davis v Yellow Cab Co. (1964, ED Pa) 35 FRD 159, 8 FR Serv 2d 15A.3,
Case 1.
Requirements of Rule 11 are satisfied where complaint is signed by plaintiff and by attorney who is not member of
district court bar and, at hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff is represented by member of district court
bar, whose name appears on complaint as plaintiff's co-counsel, and latter represents that he has ratified and adopted
signature of non-member co-counsel as his own. Pavlak v Duffy (1969, DC Conn) 48 FRD 396, 13 FR Serv 2d 516.
Affirmation of deputy attorney general in affidavit that he believes to best of his knowledge and information that at
time he signed complaint there was good ground to support allegations is sufficient proof of propriety of his signature
so as to defeat motion under Rule 11 to strike pleading as sham and false. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Litigation (1981, DC Md) 525 F Supp 1265, 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases P 64493, mod on other grounds (1981, DC Md)
541 F Supp 62 and affd (1983, CA4 Md) 704 F2d 125, 1983-1 CCH Trade Cases P 65291 and (ovrld in part on other
grounds as stated in Dee-K Enters. v Heveafil SDN. Bhd. (1997, ED Va) 982 F Supp 1138).
"Signature" and name of firm rather than signature of attorney in his individual name constitutes clear violation of
Rule 11. Stewart v Chicago (1985, ND Ill) 622 F Supp 35, 3 FR Serv 3d 582.
In trademark infringement case between plaintiff foundation and defendant church, where church filed motion for
recusal of judge and foundation pointed out that signature of church's counsel appeared on papers as rubber stamp
facsimile and motion was served not from where church's counsel's office was located but from where church leader
resided, court decided not to strike pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, but would allow foundation to offer evidence of
that conduct at contempt hearing that was to be rescheduled, and any finding that church's counsel had allowed church
leader to "ghost write" and facsimile-sign papers would be reported to legal disciplinary authorities. Te-Ta-Ma Truth
Found. v World Church of the Creator (2003, ND Ill) 246 F Supp 2d 980.
51. --Non-attorney's signature
Signature of prisoner's wife as his "attorney in fact" on complaint alleging deprivation of prisoner's civil rights was,
at most, technical defect in complaint, where wife was purporting to be husband's authorized agent, but did not
represent herself to be lawyer, and where prisoner himself, upon dismissal of complaint, signed pro se motion
requesting grant of certificate of probable cause to Federal Court of Appeals. Covington v Cole (1976, CA5 Tex) 528
F2d 1365, 21 FR Serv 2d 1031, reh den (1976, CA5 Tex) 533 F2d 1135.
Dismissal of pro se inmates' appeal was not warranted, where only one inmate signed notice of appeal originally, but
remaining inmates corrected their error of omitting their signatures as soon as it was brought to their attention; inmates
might very well have believed that appeal of inmate who initially signed notice was sufficient to preserve rights of all
inmates. Casanova v Dubois (2002, CA1 Mass) 289 F3d 142.
Although all prisoners who wanted to appeal dismissal of their pro se civil rights action had to sign notice of appeal
pursuant to requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), signature requirement was nonjurisdictional and violation was cured
when non-signing prisoners submitted signed copies of notice of appeal following notification by court clerk; holdings
in Mikeska v. Collins, 928 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1991) and Carter v. Stalder, 60 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 1995) that signature
requirement could only be cured only within time for filing notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) were effectively
overruled by U.S. Supreme Court's holding that violation of requirement could be cured if signature was properly
supplied once omission was called to party's attention. Wash v Johnson (2003, CA5 Miss) 343 F3d 685.
Signature by president of objecting creditor bank was substantial compliance. In re Legon (1949, DC NY) 85 F
Supp 946.
Where specifications of objections to bankrupt's release were signed by secretary of trustee corporation and
subscribed and sworn to by him, there was sufficient compliance Rule 11 notwithstanding fact that attorney for trustee
did not sign specifications. In re Poliner (1949, DC NY) 87 F Supp 995.
Habeas corpus petition would be deemed to substantially meet requirements of Rule 11, notwithstanding that
petitioner did not himself sign petition, since petitioner's co-defendant, who was assisting petitioner in drafting petition
and who did sign petition, was clearly operating with petitioner's consent and in best interest of petitioner, and may have
been required by expediency to sign and mail complaint in light of petitioner's allegations that federal prison authorities
restricted his ability to communicate by mail or verbally with co-defendant. Morris v United States (1975, ED Va) 399
F Supp 720.
Document captioned "Plaintiff's Traverse in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
Reconsideration of Forma Pauperis Status" is properly stricken where it is signed by unlicensed jailhouse lawyer,
notwithstanding that individual's contention that he is "counselor" as that term is generally defined. Valiant-Bey v
Morris (1985, ED Mo) 620 F Supp 903, dismd without op (1986, CA8 Mo) 786 F2d 1168.
Sanctions will not be imposed on defendant corporation which had its agent sign answers to interrogatories although
he did not have personal knowledge that all information contained in interrogatories was true, since Rule 33 requires
that agent sign for corporation and that all information available to corporation and its officers, directors, and employees
be provided. Chapman & Cole v Itel Container Int'l B.V. (1987, SD Tex) 116 FRD 550.
Where pleading was innocently, but incorrectly, signed by lawyer's wife, signature represents merely technical defect
and not substantive violation of Rule 11 and does not warrant voiding of complaint. Edwards v Groner (1987, DC VI)
116 FRD 578.
Pro se complaint which was signed by only one plaintiff who purported to be acting on behalf of himself and second
plaintiff was not in conformity with Rule 11 as to second plaintiff who did not sign complaint. Williams v Frame
(1992, ED Pa) 145 FRD 65.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Pro se age and race discrimination complaint was timely filed, where plaintiff personally filed request to proceed in
forma pauperis with attached complaint on April 30, 1991, clerk's office returned complaint to plaintiff by mail with
request that it be signed, and record shows signed request and complaint were received by clerk's office on May 10--one
day after May 9 filing deadline, because plaintiff's execution of complaint after notification of his oversight was prompt
for purposes of Rule 11, making good initial April 30 filing. Adams v Perloff Bros., Inc. (1992, ED Pa) 784 F Supp
1195.
Corporation has 20 days to file answer or amended answer signed by counsel, where original answer was signed only
by nonattorney corporate representative, corporations may not appear pro se, and plaintiffs have moved for default,
because plaintiffs have suffered no prejudice, and this situation should be handled under FRCP 11(a) rather than FRCP
55. Operating Eng'rs Local 139 Health Benefit Fund v Rawson Plumbing, Inc. (2001, ED Wis) 130 F Supp 2d 1022.
52. Statement of address
Pro se plaintiff's statement in all pleadings that her address was certain number on certain street in certain city
constituted binding judicial stipulation as to address. Webb v Nolan (1972, MD NC) 361 F Supp 418, affd (1973, CA4
NC) 484 F2d 1049, app dismd (1974) 415 US 903, 39 L Ed 2d 461, 94 S Ct 1397.
VII. GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS
A. In General
53. Generally
It is breach of counsel's obligation to court to file answer creating issues that counsel does not affirmatively believe
have basis. Arena v Luckenbach S.S. Co. (1960, CA1 Mass) 279 F2d 186, 3 FR Serv 2d 104, cert den (1960) 364 US
895, 5 L Ed 2d 189, 81 S Ct 222.
Sanctions may be imposed where only one of clauses of Rule 11 is violated, and pleading violates rule where it is
either not well grounded in fact and not warranted by good faith argument for extension of law or is interposed for
improper purpose. Robinson v National Cash Register Co. (1987, CA5 Tex) 808 F2d 1119, 6 FR Serv 3d 1202 (ovrld
in part on other grounds by Thomas v Capital Sec. Servs. (1988, CA5 Miss) 836 F2d 866, 45 CCH EPD P 37770, 10 FR
Serv 3d 329) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Childs v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1994, CA5 La) 29
F3d 1018, 29 FR Serv 3d 1032) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Monroe v Grider (1994, Tex App
Dallas) 884 SW2d 811).
Where district court did not identify specific instances of properly sanctionable conduct, award of sanctions under
Rule 11 must be vacated. MacDraw, Inc. v CIT Group Equip. Fin. (1996, CA2 NY) 73 F3d 1253, 34 FR Serv 3d 589.
Rule 11 requirement of attorney signing pleading to represent honest belief there is good ground to support claims
asserted in pleading merely adds ethical responsibility to conception that claim that is baseless should not survive.
Levy v Seaton (1973, SD NY) 358 F Supp 1, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93813.
Fact that defendant was not indicted by grand jury is not proper basis for Rule 11 motion in civil suit. Fisher Bros.
v Cambridge-Lee Industries, Inc. (1983, ED Pa) 585 F Supp 69, 38 FR Serv 2d 1013.
Rule 11 motion is inappropriate and untimely where it is filed after defendant-movant has agreed with other
defendants that certification of plaintiff class is appropriate and has joined in stipulating class for court's approval, since
stipulation constitutes agreement that plaintiffs' counsel is adequate. Fisher Bros. v Cambridge-Lee Industries, Inc.
(1983, ED Pa) 585 F Supp 69, 38 FR Serv 2d 1013.
Under Rule 11, attorney is deemed to certify both (1) his or her "knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry" and (2) absence of "any improper purpose". In re Ronco, Inc. (1985, ND Ill) 105 FRD 493, 1 FR
Serv 3d 1383, dismd without op (1986, CA7 Ill) 793 F2d 1295.
Attorney's duty to assure legitimacy of his pleadings is not relieved at time of filing. Erie Conduit Corp. v
Metropolitan Asphalt Paving Asso. (1985, ED NY) 106 FRD 451.
Party does not violate Rule 11 by making same argument or submitting identical memorandum of law in two
unrelated actions. Leach v Northern Telecom, Inc. (1991, ED NC) 141 FRD 420, 58 CCH EPD P 41341, 122 CCH LC
P 57024, 20 FR Serv 3d 1333.
Rule 11 reaches only filings in court and not subsequent continuation of lawsuit after discovery has demonstrated
that there is no reasonable basis for claim, since inaction is not sanctionable under Rule 11. Asllani v Board of Educ.
(1993, ND Ill) 150 FRD 120.
Breach by counsel of FRCP 11 does not automatically require imposition of monetary sanctions. Shepherdson v
Nigro (1998, ED Pa) 179 FRD 150.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
If, after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, court finds that FRCivP 11(b) has been violated, it may
impose sanction upon violator; such sanction may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. Dome Patent L.P. v Permeable
Techs., Inc. (1999, WD NY) 190 FRD 88.
Imposition of sanctions under FRCP 11 was not warranted, where Social Security Commissioner obtained remand
for further proceedings after learning that administrative record was lost, even though agency planned to wait 6-8
months before attempting to find file in expectation that file would show up on its own, and agency office requested
benefits claimant to help reconstruct record after another agency had, in fact, found file. McCullough v Apfel (2000, SD
Ind) 95 F Supp 2d 956.
54. Reasonableness standard
Standard for testing conduct under amended Rule 11 is reasonableness under the circumstances; District Court
should test signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at time pleading, motion, or other paper was
submitted. Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v Holtzman (1985, CA3 Pa) 775 F2d 535, 3 FR Serv 3d 109 (criticized
in Williams v United States (In re Williams) (1998, CA1 RI) 156 F3d 86).
Rule 11 does not require courts to warn attorneys that their conduct may be sanctionable prior to imposing sanctions;
however, once attorney expressly informs court of proposed course of conduct which does not violate any rule, court
order, or case law, and court does not indicate any disapproval, then it is objectively reasonable for attorney to proceed
in planned manner as made known to court. Pacific Dunlop Holdings v Barosh (1994, CA7 Ill) 22 F3d 113, 28 FR
Serv 3d 1050.
District court may consider attorney's post-filing actions if they are relevant to show whether reasonable basis existed
for filing complaint; therefore, in action alleging that defendants manufactured and distributed defective helmet which
caused injuries to plaintiffs' child, where defendant company in question was not incorporated until 1986 and plaintiffs'
attorney acknowledged that he knew this, and complaint did not state date of helmet's manufacture, district court did not
err in looking at attorney's post-filing actions such as his discovery requests to show that he knew that helmet was
manufactured before 1986 and that company was not proper defendant. Jones v International Riding Helmets (1995,
CA11 Ga) 49 F3d 692, 31 FR Serv 3d 713, 8 FLW Fed C 1139.
Test for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether litigant's conduct was reasonable under circumstances, and where
there was indication in evidence that plaintiff acted unreasonably in filing and pursuing litigation, district court's denial
of attorney's fees under Rule 11 must be affirmed. United States v $ 515,060.42 in United States Currency (1998, CA6
Tenn) 152 F3d 491, 1998 FED App 161P, reh den (1998, CA6) 1998 US App LEXIS 21512 and (criticized in United
States v $ 7,990.00 in United States Currency (1999, CA8 Minn) 170 F3d 843).
Under Rule 11, district court should have considered whether litigant's conduct was reasonable under circumstances
which surrounded actual filing of paper in question. Apostolic Pentecostal Church v Colbert (1999, CA6 Mich) 169 F3d
409, 43 FR Serv 3d 254, 1999 FED App 82P.
Standard to be applied under new version of Rule 11 is one of reasonableness; it is more stringent than original good
faith formula and it is expected that wider range of circumstances will trigger its violation. Marco Holding Co. v Lear
Siegler, Inc. (1985, ND Ill) 606 F Supp 204, 1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66446, 3 FR Serv 3d 394.
Imposition of FRCP 11 sanctions does not require finding of bad faith; rather, test as to whether attorney or party
made reasonable inquiry prior to signing pleading is objective standard of reasonableness under circumstances at time
attorney or party acted. Barth v Kaye (1998, ND NY) 178 FRD 371, affd (1999, CA2 NY) 1999 US App LEXIS 22827.
In determining whether FRCivP 11 has been violated, court must assess whether individual's conduct was reasonable
under circumstances; such test is objective standard. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc. v Slavin (1999, ED Tenn) 190
FRD 449.
Sanctions were unwarranted because plaintiff seaman was entitled to make motion for separate trials under rules,
seaman had withdrawn that portion of disputed motion once it was realized it was not reasonable given court's prior
orders, and legal issues upon which motion was based were not without merit. Rannals v Diamond Jo Casino (2003, ND
Ohio) 250 F Supp 2d 829.
Where court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was nothing more than veiled attempt to circumvent state appellate
process and to collaterally attack--in guise of federal civil rights action--validity of state court divorce decree and other
related orders, sanctions were imposed upon plaintiff's attorney pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) for filing frivolous
pleading: (1) attorney should have known that under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to review and modify state court divorce decree, and attorney's subjective belief that
Rooker-Feldman did not apply was insufficient to protect attorney from Rule 11 sanctions; and (2) even assuming
snapshot rule did not apply, attorney failed to assert proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction, as Federal Arbitration
Act was not independent source of federal jurisdiction. Jordaan v Hall (2003, ND Tex) 275 F Supp 2d 778.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
55. Discretion of court
Rule 11 clearly allows district courts discretion in appropriate cases to impose sanctions against non-signing
represented parties for violations of rule by their attorneys. Topalian v Ehrman (1993, CA5 Tex) 3 F3d 931, 26 FR
Serv 3d 1136, reh den (1993, CA5) 1993 US App LEXIS 30440.
56. Effect of good faith or bad faith
Subjective bad faith is not element to be proved under present Rule 11; standard is whether reasonable, competent
attorney admitted to practice before District Court would sign pleading in belief it was warranted by existing law or
good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Zaldivar v Los Angeles (1986, CA9 Cal)
780 F2d 823, 4 FR Serv 3d 264 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989,
CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Bad faith standard of Rule 11 motion for sanctions applies where underlying action was filed in 1980 and dismissed
in 1983; Rule 11 was amended to objective standard in 1983. Hashemi v Campaigner Publications, Inc. (1986, CA11
Ga) 784 F2d 1581, 4 FR Serv 3d 922 (superseded by statute as stated in Kale v Combined Ins. Co. (1988, CA1 Mass)
861 F2d 746, 48 BNA FEP Cas 563, 48 CCH EPD P 38446, 12 FR Serv 3d 837).
To determine "good faith" and "improper motive" when deciding whether to impose sanctions under Rule 11, court
must judge attorney's conduct under objective standard rather than by assessing subjective intent. Stevens v Lawyers
Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1986, CA4 NC) 789 F2d 1056, 4 FR Serv 3d 1151.
Following its amendment in 1983, Rule 11 no longer requires a finding of subjective bad faith before sanctions can
be imposed. Burkhart ex rel. Meeks v Kinsley Bank (1986, CA10 Kan) 804 F2d 588, 6 FR Serv 3d 650.
Standard by which courts are to judge conduct challenged under Rule 11 is no longer one of bad faith, but rather one
of objective reasonableness, and although District Court's order on this issue contains some language from former
version of rule, District Court did not err in finding that there had been no violation of Rule 11 where it found that
despite fact that plaintiff may have had weak case and did not ultimately prevail on merits, claims were not baseless.
Hartman v Hallmark Cards, Inc. (1987, CA8 Mo) 833 F2d 117, 4 USPQ2d 1864.
Since its revision in 1983, Rule 11 contains two grounds for sanctions which are found in "reasonable inquiry" clause
and "improper purpose" clause, and while bad faith remains sanctionable, it is not now prerequisite for sanctions since
"a pure heart no longer excuses an empty head." Lancellotti v Fay (1990, CA1 RI) 909 F2d 15, 17 FR Serv 3d 709
(superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Silva v Witschen (1994, CA1 RI) 19 F3d 725, 28 FR Serv 3d 420).
Where sua sponte Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanction denies lawyer opportunity to withdraw challenged document pursuant
to "safe harbor" provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A), appropriate mens rea standard is subjective bad faith rather
than objective unreasonableness. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP. (2003, CA2 NY) 323 F3d 86, 66 USPQ2d 1101, 55 FR
Serv 3d 205.
Because district court's sua sponte Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanction denied law firm opportunity to withdraw challenged
affidavit pursuant to "safe harbor" provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A), appropriate mens rea standard was
subjective bad faith; therefore, because district court judge accepted law firm's representation that its lawyers acted with
subjective good faith, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanction imposed by district court had to be vacated. In re Pennie & Edmonds
LLP. (2003, CA2 NY) 323 F3d 86, 66 USPQ2d 1101, 55 FR Serv 3d 205.
Denial of motion for sanctions was affirmed because insurance companies failed to identify any statutory or common
law basis that showed that insureds' motion for attorneys fees was frivolous or filed only as improper litigation tactic.
Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v Stillwell (2003, CA4 W Va) 336 F3d 311.
Rule 11 no longer inquires only into subjective good faith intent of party; under Rule as amended, court must
examine objective reasonableness of claim in light of existing law and facts. Michigan Nat'l Bank v Kroger Co. (1985,
ED Mich) 619 F Supp 1149.
Finding of subjective bad faith is not necessary for award of fees under Rule 11, but award of fees is even more
supportable when bad faith is present. EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986, ND Ill) 111 FRD 385, 42 BNA FEP Cas
33, 42 CCH EPD P 36801, 6 FR Serv 3d 331.
Showing of bad faith is not necessary to impose sanctions, and sanctions may be imposed even though attorneys'
filing of jurisdictionally-defective complaint was inadvertent error since imposition of sanctions is not merely to punish
attorneys, but to emphasize obligation of attorneys to exercise due care in preparation and filing of pleadings. Rowland
v Fayed (1987, DC Dist Col) 115 FRD 605.
In civil rights action by college professor against college, sanctions are not imposed under FRCP 11 against
professor's counsel, where counsel attempted to obtain, through motion to disqualify college's counsel, information
protected by attorney-client privilege, because although attempt to obtain protected information was arguably
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
misguided, it was not made in bad faith or for improper purpose, and sanctions are therefore not justified. Mobley v
Board of Regents (1996, SD Ga) 924 F Supp 1179, 16 ADD 772, 5 AD Cas 949, vacated on other grounds, motion den,
on reconsideration (1996, SD Ga) 26 F Supp 2d 1374.
Imposition of FRCP 11 sanctions does not require finding of bad faith; rather, test as to whether attorney or party
made reasonable inquiry prior to signing pleading is objective standard of reasonableness under circumstances at time
attorney or party acted. Barth v Kaye (1998, ND NY) 178 FRD 371, affd (1999, CA2 NY) 1999 US App LEXIS 22827.
Shipping company will not be sanctioned for bringing claims for contribution and indemnity, after company was
held liable as vessel owner for death of on-board loss control representative for surveying company, even though court
finds here that no one else is liable for death due to advanced liver disease, because allegations of complaint did not
completely lack evidentiary support at time of filing, and suit was not initiated in bad faith or in order to harass or
retaliate against defendants. Northern King Shipping Co. v MAPCO Petroleum Co. (2000, ED La) 96 F Supp 2d 542.
Finding of bad faith is not required for violation of FRCP 11. Clement v Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (2001, DC NJ)
198 FRD 634.
Sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 were inappropriate, and thus denied, because plaintiff owner made good faith,
although ultimately losing, argument to avoid judicial estoppel. Gagne v Zodiac Maritime Agencies, Ltd. (2003, SD
Cal) 274 F Supp 2d 1144.
57. Standard applicable to out-of-state attorney
New York attorneys filing suit in Illinois will be held to same standard as local attorneys, and their lack of
knowledge of Illinois law does not excuse their filing of unreasonable lawsuit. Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie v Life
Assurance Co. (1989, ND Ill) 128 FRD 233.
58. Reliance on co-counsel
Attorney who signed complaint violated Rule 11 by relying totally on other counsel to prepare and file complaint,
and he also shares equally in responsibility for violations contained in complaint. In re Kunstler (1990, CA4 NC) 914
F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990, CA4) 1990 US App
LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
Before signing paper prepared by out-of-town counsel, local counsel has obligation to satisfy himself that it complies
with applicable requirements. Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v Burroughs Corp. (1984, ND Cal) 103 FRD 124, 40
FR Serv 2d 346, revd on other grounds, remanded (1986, CA9 Cal) 801 F2d 1531, 5 FR Serv 3d 737, reh den, en banc
(1987, CA9) 809 F2d 584, 7 FR Serv 3d 228 and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Associated
Business Tel. Sys. Corp. v Cohn (1994, ND Cal) 1994 US Dist LEXIS 14746).
Rule 11 does not distinguish between foreign and local attorneys; at very least, local counsel that signs papers of
foreign counsel must read papers, and from that have basis for good faith belief that papers on their face appear to be
warranted by facts asserted and legal arguments made, and are not interposed for any improper purpose. Long v
Quantex Resources, Inc. (1985, SD NY) 108 FRD 416, 3 FR Serv 3d 1431, affd without op (1989, CA2 NY) 888 F2d
1376.
Sanctions will not be imposed on local counsel, although he signed frivolous pleading, where original counsel
testified at hearing on sanctions that he directed all of local counsel's actions in case and that he was responsible for any
violation of Rule 11 that was found to exist. Blossom v Blackhawk Datsun, Inc. (1988, SD Ind) 120 FRD 91, 11 FR
Serv 3d 196.
59. Reference to inadmissible evidence
Reference in motion or pleading to inadmissible evidence is not sanctionable offense. Investors Ins. Co. v Dorinco
Reinsurance Co. (1990, CA2 NY) 917 F2d 100, 18 FR Serv 3d 1343.
60. Misstatement, concealment or omission as to facts
Where attorney who was well-versed in facts of case filed answer containing denials that he knew were unfounded,
he cannot escape responsibility for his actions by asserting that such denials would have been reasonable if filed by
attorney unfamiliar with case who had conducted minimum inquiry acceptable under Rule 11. Artco Corp. v
Lynnhaven Dry Storage Marina, Inc. (1990, CA4 Va) 898 F2d 953, 15 FR Serv 3d 1474.
In action by patients against government-operated mental health facility, government attorney's false statement in
pleading that patients were free to leave facility violated Rule 11. Navarro-Ayala v Nunez (1992, CA1 Puerto Rico)
968 F2d 1421, 23 FR Serv 3d 101.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on plaintiff's attorney for including factual
allegations in various documents which were contradicted by opposing party's deposition and plaintiff's own admissions
and which attorney could not substantiate. Levine v FDIC (1993, CA2 Conn) 2 F3d 476, 26 FR Serv 3d 802.
Where district court acknowledged that plaintiff made reasonable inquiry before filing its complaint, but later
memorandum contained serious factual error when it incorrectly stated location of defendant business, such inadvertent
mistake was not sanctionable under Rule 11. Milwaukee Concrete Studios v Fjeld Mfg. Co. (1993, CA7 Wis) 8 F3d
441, 28 USPQ2d 1594, 27 FR Serv 3d 335.
Although plaintiff claimed that she did not contribute to or know contents of complaint which her attorney filed on
her behalf and which contained material misrepresentations, district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning
plaintiff where she maintained position taken by complaint during her testimony, even though it was apparent from
evidence that she knew her statements were false. Elliott v The M/V Lois B (1993, CA5 Tex) 980 F2d 1001, 24 FR Serv
3d 1071.
District court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiff's attorneys who had made numerous frivolous
arguments, relied on overruled case law, made arguments contrary to existing law, and relied on affidavits containing
blatant misrepresentations, thus showing their failure to make reasonable prefiling inquiry into facts. Villar v Crowley
Maritime Corp. (1993, CA5 Tex) 990 F2d 1489, 25 FR Serv 3d 1442, reh, en banc, den (1993, CA5 Tex) 997 F2d 883
and cert den (1994) 510 US 1044, 126 L Ed 2d 658, 114 S Ct 690 and (criticized in Marathon Oil Co. v Ruhrgas (1998,
CA5 Tex) 145 F3d 211).
Under plain language of rule, where defendant filed motion for sanctions alleging that plaintiff had made false
representations to court, court must determine whether any provisions of subdivision (b) have been violated, and court
cannot simply "decline" to impose sanctions without making requisite finding of whether violation had in fact been
committed. Warren v Guelker (1994, CA9 Wash) 29 F3d 1386, 94 CDOS 5414, 94 Daily Journal DAR 9910, 29 FR
Serv 3d 947.
Where plaintiffs filed case in federal court allegedly based on diversity of citizenship, but failed to plead complete
diversity of citizenship and, in fact, pleaded facts which tended to show that there was not complete diversity, sanctions
were properly imposed under Rule 11. Walker by Walker v Norwest Corp. (1997, CA8 SD) 108 F3d 158, 37 FR Serv 3d
39.
District court erred in sanctioning attorney for allegedly lying to court concerning what his clients had told him about
circumstances which gave rise to suit, where both clients testified in support of attorney's representations to court.
Ametex Fabrics v Just in Materials (1998, CA2 NY) 140 F3d 101.
Counsel should not have been sanctioned for manipulating pleadings in such way as to downplay importance of
particular issue, where critical information was not absent altogether. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v R&D Latex Corp. (2001,
CA9 Cal) 242 F3d 1102, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 2699.
Rule 11 does not require plaintiff to know at time of pleading all facts necessary to establish claim. Commer.
Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v Colin Serv. Sys., Inc. (2001, CA2 Conn) 271 F3d 374, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 10178.
False allegations in complaint were not excused by allegation that they resulted from miscommunications between
counsel and his clients. Top Entm't Inc. v Ortega (2002, CA1 Puerto Rico) 285 F3d 115.
Defendant's counsel are properly ordered to pay $ 5,000 to Government as sanction for violations of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 7, 11, and 26(g), and 28 USCS § 1927, which violations occurred in context of defendant's counsel's
election to pursue litigation strategy of actively concealing from plaintiff and court as long as possible fact that court
was without subject matter jurisdiction over action. Itel Containers International Corp. v Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc. (1985, DC NJ) 108 FRD 96, 3 FR Serv 3d 671.
Plaintiff and its counsel are subject to sanctions under Rule 11 where, inter alia, plaintiff learned prior to filing
complaint that one of its allegations in support of claim was untrue. Fleming Sales Co. v Bailey (1985, ND Ill) 611 F
Supp 507, 1 FR Serv 3d 1501.
Sanctions will be imposed on attorneys who signed motion for reconsideration in which witness' deposition
testimony was deliberately distorted in effort to support their argument. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986,
ND Ga) 112 FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64,
subsequent app (1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
Attorney's fees, costs and sanctions are imposed on attorney and plaintiffs who filed claims under 42 USCS § 1983
against city, police officers and sheriff's department alleging harassment and illegal search of house in attempting to
serve arrest warrant where complaint, trial brief, supplemental complaint, supplemental trial brief and final pretrial
order all contain utterly false and unsubstantiated statements such as untruthful allegations that person named in arrest
warrant did not live in house when she in fact did, untruthful allegations that police supervisor refused to assist
householder and investigate or stop search of house when householder prevented supervisor from speaking to officers
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
conducting search, untruthful allegations of police threats of physical violence when householder admitted police were
extremely courteous while in his home, alleging class action based on other illegal searches but offering "not a scintilla
of proof" of such other searches at pretrial or trial. O'Rourke v Norman (1986, WD Okla) 640 F Supp 1451, revd on
other grounds, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1989, CA10 Okla) 875 F2d 1465, cert den (1989) 493 US 918, 107
L Ed 2d 260, 110 S Ct 280.
Sanctions must be imposed on plaintiff who certified false statements in his complaint. Bynum v Michigan State
University (1987, WD Mich) 117 FRD 94, 59 BNA FEP Cas 983.
Where plaintiff's motion to bar testimony of defendant's expert witness was denied by sitting emergency judge, and
in later motion to reconsider denial, plaintiff's counsel made deliberate attempt to mislead court as to statements of
emergency judge and basis of judge's ruling in apparent attempt to have court second guess prior decision, sanctions
will be imposed. Taylor v Wagner (1987, ND Ill) 117 FRD 121, 9 FR Serv 3d 548.
Sanctions are appropriate where declaration filed by defendants contained at least one false statement and several
other misleading statements, thereby causing plaintiffs unnecessary work and showing disrespect for court. Mercury
Serv. v Allied Bank (1987, CD Cal) 117 FRD 147, affd without op (1990, CA9 Cal) 907 F2d 154 and (criticized in
Triad Sys. Corp. v Southeastern Express Co. (1995, CA9 Cal) 64 F3d 1330, 95 CDOS 6889, 95 Daily Journal DAR
11821, 36 USPQ2d 1028, 33 FR Serv 3d 468).
Sanctions will be imposed where application for temporary restraining order contained inaccurate information which
could easily have been checked by plaintiffs, especially where court informed plaintiffs that part of information was
incorrect and plaintiffs still made no effort to verify remaining information, and further, plaintiffs acted unreasonably in
defending against sanction proceedings. Business Guides v Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc. (1988, ND
Cal) 119 FRD 685.
Sanctions will be imposed on law firm which used as basis for its position affidavit which witness later testified was
lie, without disclosing later repudiation to court, and sanction is required regardless of whether attorney was aware that
witness had later repudiated his affidavit when attorney presented it to court. United Services Funds v Ward (1988, DC
Alaska) 121 FRD 673.
Where plaintiff's counsel's statements in motion were based on his independent questioning of plaintiff's employee,
whose replies were consistent with his earlier sworn deposition testimony, and where defense counsel conceded that if
he were faced with similar circumstances, he would probably have responded in same manner as counsel for plaintiff
did, counsel for plaintiff did not violate Rule 11. Manville Sales Corp. v Paramount Systems, Inc. (1988, ED Pa) 123
FRD 177, 13 FR Serv 3d 195.
Although plaintiff's deposition statement differed from formal pleading statement, such difference cannot serve as
basis for sanctioning plaintiff, nor is plaintiff's failure to produce book and letter in response to document requests
sanctionable under Rule 11. Kessler v Superior Care, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 127 FRD 513.
Where affiant's deposition testimony clearly evidenced that affidavit was not made on personal knowledge, third
party defendant's submission of affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment and its repeated arguments that
affiant was competent and that affidavit was sufficient violated Rule 11. Manildra Milling Corp. v Ogilvie Mills, Inc.
(1989, DC Kan) 127 FRD 686.
Although plaintiff misrepresented material facts to his attorney, other circumstances seemed to corroborate plaintiff's
lies, and attorney's reliance on plaintiff's representations was reasonable at time complaint was filed; therefore, no
sanctions should be imposed on attorney, but sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff. Mars v Anderman (1989, ED NY)
136 FRD 351.
Where plaintiff misrepresented facts to his attorney, but counsel had no reason to question plaintiff's representations
and did not act unreasonably in relying thereon no award of sanctions should be imposed against counsel. Albrecht v
Stranczek (1991, ND Ill) 136 FRD 155.
Sanctions imposed on plaintiff must be reversed where there was no evidence that he attempted to mislead his
attorneys to induce filing of frivolous lawsuit. Muller v Sherburne, Powers & Needham (1993, SD NY) 147 FRD 34,
26 FR Serv 3d 463.
Complaint was not well-grounded in fact where all three counts incorporated factual allegation known by plaintiff to
be false, and therefore sanction will be imposed on plaintiff's counsel amounting to defendants' fees and expenses
incurred in filing motion for sanctions. Ford v City of Cape Girardeau (1993, ED Mo) 151 FRD 116, affd without op
(1994, CA8 Mo) 26 F3d 126, reported in full (1994, CA8 Mo) 1994 US App LEXIS 14789.
In seeking preliminary injunction and unnoticed ex parte seizure order, plaintiff's attorney violated both spirit and
letter of Rule 11 where reasonable investigation of facts would have shown that there was little cause to seek
preliminary injunction and no basis for unnoticed ex parte relief, where attorney intentionally misrepresented certain
facts to court, and where attorney was dilatory in rectifying his mistakes and omissions once they were made known to
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
him. Super Power Supply v Macase Indus. Corp. (1994, CD Cal) 154 FRD 249, 94 Daily Journal DAR 4142, 31
USPQ2d 1677, 28 FR Serv 3d 961.
Attorney is fined $ 1,000 for his violations of FRCP 11, where, 9 months after being discharged by his client, he
filed motion with Seventh Circuit asking for hearing to respond to allegations about him in defendants' brief, because
(1) recitation of his attorney status was not well-grounded in fact, (2) appeal of personal matter was improper given lack
of personal standing, and (3) appeal prior to adverse ruling in district court was premature. Grove Fresh Distribs. v John
Labatt Ltd. (1995, ND Ill) 888 F Supp 1427, affd without op (1998, CA7 Ill) 134 F3d 374, reported in full (1998, CA7
Ill) 1998 US App LEXIS 1836 and reh, en banc, den (1998, CA7 Ill) 1998 US App LEXIS 9306 and cert den (1998) 525
US 877, 142 L Ed 2d 147, 119 S Ct 180.
Losing employment discrimination plaintiff is sanctioned pursuant to FRCP 11, where it is fairly clear that plaintiff
perjured himself at trial with regard to type and frequency of racial slurs he experienced, and clearly evident that
employer, rather than promoting harassment and racism, had made commendable efforts to diversify its workforce and
promote hiring of minorities, because this is precisely type of case for which Rule 11 was designed to provide remedy.
Cox v Preferred Tech. Group, Inc. (2000, ND Ind) 110 F Supp 2d 786.
Counsel for defendant in patent infringement action are subject to sanctions under Rule 11 where they filed motion
to dismiss or transfer on basis of inaccurate representation that accused products were never made or used in defendant's
manufacturing facility in district, and where they chose to make only cursory investigation of facts in 2 months between
filing of complaint and defendant's motion to dismiss. Coburn Optical Industries, Inc. v Cilco, Inc. (1985, MD NC)
610 F Supp 656, 226 USPQ 1018.
61. --Negligent or intentional omission
Although appellant did not misstate empirical fact, it did omit facts that were highly relevant to accurate
characterization of facts that were stated, and thus sanctions were properly imposed on appellant law firm which sought
continuance in bankruptcy case on grounds that it had just been appointed to represent creditors' committee, without
revealing that it had previously represented single creditor and was therefore familiar with case. In re Ronco, Inc.
(1988, CA7 Ill) 838 F2d 212, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 72185, 10 FR Serv 3d 463.
Where defendant repeatedly argued that certain corporate entities were indispensable parties when he knew that
corporations had no interest in action, and where defendant also withheld material information, thereby causing needless
expenses to plaintiffs and wasting resources of court, Rule 11 has been violated and sanctions must be imposed.
Durant v Traditional Invest., Ltd. (1991, SD NY) 135 FRD 42.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff's attorney who based action on statute which had been repealed several years
earlier and who deliberately failed to include in complaint statement regarding plaintiff's principal place of business in
order to fabricate complete diversity of citizenship between parties and obtain federal court jurisdiction. Route
Messenger Services, Inc. v Holt-Dow, Inc. (1991, SD NY) 139 FRD 311, 24 FR Serv 3d 184.
62. Misstatement or omission as to law
Attorneys were properly sanctioned for failing to cite adverse, controlling precedent in memorandum filed in support
of application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Jorgenson v County of Volusia (1988, CA11
Fla) 846 F2d 1350, 11 FR Serv 3d 516.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's counsel where his conduct throughout entire case demonstrated tactic
of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against his contention did not exist, and where he misstated
applicable law and failed to provide factual predicate to support one of his claims. Borowski v De Puy, Inc., Div. of
Boehringer Mannheim Co. (1988, CA7 Ill) 850 F2d 297, 11 FR Serv 3d 823.
Failure to cite relevant authority, whether it be case law or statutory provisions, does not alone justify imposition of
sanctions; however, if omitted case law and statutory provisions would render attorney's argument frivolous, he cannot
proceed with impunity in real or feigned ignorance of them. United States v Stringfellow (1990, CA9 Cal) 911 F2d
225, 17 FR Serv 3d 686, 20 ELR 21242, findings of fact/conclusions of law (1993, CD Cal) 1993 US Dist LEXIS 19113,
judgment entered (1998, CD Cal) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 21497.
Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was not abuse of discretion where plaintiff's arguments were directly contrary to
relevant case law which plaintiff did not distinguish and where plaintiff quoted from dissent as if it were majority
opinion. A-Abart Electric Supply, Inc. v Emerson Electric Co. (1992, CA7 Ill) 956 F2d 1399, 1992-1 CCH Trade
Cases P 69739, 22 FR Serv 3d 53, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA7) 1992 US App LEXIS 7566 and cert den (1992) 506 US
867, 121 L Ed 2d 137, 113 S Ct 194.
Plaintiff's attorneys were properly sanctioned for failing to fully explain to court holding in earlier case on which
they relied in apparent attempt to mislead court. Kale v Obuchowski (1993, CA7 Ill) 985 F2d 360, 24 FR Serv 3d 1442.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiff's attorneys who had made numerous frivolous
arguments, relied on overruled case law, made arguments contrary to existing law, and relied on affidavits containing
blatant misrepresentations, thus showing their failure to make reasonable prefiling inquiry into facts. Villar v Crowley
Maritime Corp. (1993, CA5 Tex) 990 F2d 1489, 25 FR Serv 3d 1442, reh, en banc, den (1993, CA5 Tex) 997 F2d 883
and cert den (1994) 510 US 1044, 126 L Ed 2d 658, 114 S Ct 690 and (criticized in Marathon Oil Co. v Ruhrgas (1998,
CA5 Tex) 145 F3d 211).
"Grandfatherees" under Supplemental Security Income program are denied attorney's fees under Rule 11 on grounds
that Health and Human Services Secretary's brief in support of previous motion to dismiss misrepresented that new
regulation had been issued and failed to cite relevant law on effect of mootness of named plaintiff's claim on class
certification motion, where (1) "misstatement" regarding issuance of instructions ceased being inaccurate shortly after
brief was filed, (2) there was no evidence that counsel acted purposefully to mislead plaintiffs or court, (3) added effort
expended on inaccuracy was de minimis, (4) law regarding mootness and class certification is complex and (5) general
proposition of law in Secretary's brief was not incorrect though more prudent approach would have been to distinguish
relevant Second Circuit decisions. Rice v Heckler (1986, SD NY) 640 F Supp 1051.
Court will not impose Rule 11 sanctions because of failure of plaintiffs and their attorney to act or because of oral
arguments made at motion hearing, but where plaintiffs' response to motion substantially mischaracterized existing law
in attempt to avoid full impact of earlier judgment, attorney has violated Rule 11. Truck Treads, Inc. v Armstrong
Rubber Co. (1988, WD Tex) 129 FRD 143, clarified, in part, amd (1988, WD Tex) 1988 US Dist LEXIS 17230 and mod
(1989, CA5 Tex) 868 F2d 1472, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68530, 13 FR Serv 3d 426, reh den (1989, CA5) 1989 US
App LEXIS 14480.
Where only authority cited by plaintiff's attorney to support motion was earlier case in which attorney had
represented one of parties, and pleadings signed by attorney in earlier case showed his knowledge that law was contrary
to position which he took in present action, attorney has violated Rule 11 and must pay reasonable expenses incurred by
defendant because of filing of motion. Michigan Mfrs. Service, Inc. v Robertshaw Controls Co. (1991, ED Mich) 134
FRD 154.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff's attorney who based action on statute which had been repealed several years
earlier and who deliberately failed to include in complaint statement regarding plaintiff's principal place of business in
order to fabricate complete diversity of citizenship between parties and obtain federal court jurisdiction. Route
Messenger Services, Inc. v Holt-Dow, Inc. (1991, SD NY) 139 FRD 311, 24 FR Serv 3d 184.
Plaintiff husband's claim under 42 USCS § 1983, that presence of defendant police officers authorized pursuant to
valid state court order to ensure peaceful removal of defendant wife's personal belongings from marital home violated
husband's constitutional rights, was unsupported and case law cited by husband was irrelevant or misconstrued;
defendants city and two officers were therefore entitled to attorney's fees under FRCivP 11 for having to defend 42
USCS § 1983 claim. Todd v City of Natchitoches (2002, WD La) 238 F Supp 2d 793.
Plaintiffs' counsel violated Rule 11 by filing pleadings which contained deliberate misrepresentations regarding
relevant case law. Cone Corp. v Hillsborough County (1994, MD Fla) 157 FRD 533, 8 FLW Fed D 410.
63. Failure to acknowledge or distinguish controlling precedent
Where plaintiffs filed present action even though they were aware of earlier cases which had settled exact issue they
raised, and when faced with motion for summary judgment invoking those cases, plaintiffs did not even attempt to
distinguish their case on any fact basis, District Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions. Peregoy v
Amoco Production Co. (1991, CA5 Tex) 929 F2d 196, 19 FR Serv 3d 966, cert den (1991) 502 US 864, 116 L Ed 2d
149, 112 S Ct 188.
Where plaintiffs' attorney filed complaint in state court which failed to distinguish or even acknowledge precedents
which held contrary to plaintiffs' claims, and after removal to federal court attorney, filed brief in opposition to motion
to dismiss which also failed to distinguish case, District Court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions on attorney.
Maciosek v Blue Cross & Blue Shield United (1991, CA7 Wis) 930 F2d 536 (criticized in Riordan v Commonwealth
Edison Co. (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 9317) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Eichhorn, Eichhorn &
Link v Travelers Ins. Co. (1995, ND Ind) 896 F Supp 812).
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney where case was contrary to settled precedent and had no
chance of success, and although defense counsel alerted plaintiff's counsel to frivolity of claim and pointed out directly
contrary precedent, plaintiff's attorney did not mention precedent or attempt to distinguish it. Smith v Blue Cross &
Blue Shield United (1992, CA7 Wis) 959 F2d 655, 22 FR Serv 3d 812.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Where case law was clearly contrary to position taken in complaint, but plaintiffs' attorney offered no argument why
that law should be extended, modified, or reversed, plaintiffs' attorney was properly sanctioned for bringing action.
Knipe v Skinner (1994, CA2 NY) 19 F3d 72, 28 FR Serv 3d 557.
District court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiff's counsel had violated Rule 11 when he
reasserted retaliatory discharge claim by filing amended complaint after he had been apprised by opposing counsel that
controlling case law would require dismissal of claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Flaherty v Gas
Research Inst. (1994, CA7 Ill) 31 F3d 451, 65 BNA FEP Cas 941, 65 CCH EPD P 43273, 29 FR Serv 3d 1481
(criticized in McDonnell v Cisneros (1996, CA7 Ill) 84 F3d 256, 70 BNA FEP Cas 1459, 68 CCH EPD P 44065).
Attorney's failure to disclose to court and to discuss potentially dispositive cases is sanctionable conduct. Cedar
Crest Health Center, Inc. v Bowen (1989, SD Ind) 129 FRD 519, 16 FR Serv 3d 1242.
Defendant's failure to cite relevant, controlling authority in motion is sanctionable under Rule 11 where cases were
determinative of defendant's argument and local rule mandated that party cite adverse, controlling authority. Cousin v
District of Columbia (1992, DC Dist Col) 142 FRD 574.
Where plaintiff's attorney was unaware of controlling case law at time he filed pleadings, such ignorance was not
reasonable under circumstances, and it is irrelevant whether counsel can, in retrospect and after further research,
distinguish controlling authority or make good faith argument for modification or extension of law. Terminix Int'l Co.,
L.P. v Kay (1993, ED Pa) 150 FRD 532, 27 FR Serv 3d 968.
Where plaintiffs simply ignored applicable Supreme Court precedent which was contrary to their position, whether
as result of negligence or intentional delaying tactic, requirements of Rule 11 have not been met. Schrag v Dinges
(1993, DC Kan) 150 FRD 664, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8396, affd, remanded (1995, CA10 Kan) 73 F3d 374,
reported in full (1995, CA10 Kan) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8919.
Employee's attorney was subject to sanction under FRCP 11 where he filed complaint against employer and union
under Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), and refused to withdraw it, despite employer's counsel's
demonstration of futility of employee's LMRA claims. Truesdell v S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group (2002, CD Cal) 209
FRD 169.
Employee's attorney was subject to sanction in Labor Management Relations Act action where he failed to take
advantage of safe harbor period under FRCP 11(c)(1)(A) presented by employer's service of proposed motion for
sanctions, and opposed employer's motion to dismiss on basis of wholly inapposite and inadequate authority. Truesdell
v S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group (2002, CD Cal) 209 FRD 169.
Defendant employer's failure to cite controlling Seventh Circuit precedent that allowed Chapter 13 debtor to bring
employment discrimination suit in his own name constituted sanctionable offense under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2).
Stansberry v Uhlich Children's Home (2003, ND Ill) 264 F Supp 2d 681, 14 AD Cas 690, 8 BNA WH Cas 2d 1361.
64. Failure to disclose contrary expert opinion
Failure to disclose contrary expert opinion to court does not violate Rule 11. Coffey v Healthtrust, Inc. (1993, CA10
Okla) 1 F3d 1101, 1993-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70327, 26 FR Serv 3d 604.
65. Repeated filing of same claim or motion
Where plaintiffs had filed previous suits against same defendants based on same legal theories and such suits had
been dismissed, sanctions will be imposed on plaintiffs for filing frivolous lawsuit, despite plaintiffs' claims of good
faith and even though they acted pro se. Kurkowski v Volcker (1987, CA8 Neb) 819 F2d 201, 7 FR Serv 3d 1297
(criticized in Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v Norfolk S. Corp. (1997, CA4 SC) 109 F3d 993, 154 BNA
LRRM 2940, 37 FR Serv 3d 413).
District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions where plaintiff had previously filed identical claims
in another district and had been sanctioned there, and District Court had admonished plaintiff in instant case that further
frivolous filings would result in sanctions, but he nevertheless filed second amended complaint containing frivolous
claims. Searcy v Houston Lighting & Power Co. (1990, CA5 Tex) 907 F2d 562, 17 FR Serv 3d 573, reh den (1990,
CA5) 1990 US App LEXIS 15958 and cert den (1990) 498 US 970, 112 L Ed 2d 421, 111 S Ct 438, reh den (1991) 498
US 1042, 112 L Ed 2d 707, 111 S Ct 718.
Where plaintiff admitted in earlier state court proceedings that defendant in question was not liable as plaintiff
claimed in present action, this admission provided adequate basis for district court's decision to impose sanctions.
Baxter v C.A. Muer Corp. (1991, CA6 Mich) 941 F2d 451, 14 EBC 1331, 20 FR Serv 3d 743, reh, en banc, den (1991,
CA6) 1991 US App LEXIS 22484.
District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on defendant which filed motion that was essentially
attempt to reargue motion filed 16 months earlier where such motion was barred under local rules. Virgin Atlantic
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Airways, Ltd. v National Mediation Bd. (1992, CA2 NY) 956 F2d 1245, 139 BNA LRRM 2541, 121 CCH LC P 10011,
22 FR Serv 3d 417, cert den (1992) 506 US 820, 121 L Ed 2d 34, 113 S Ct 67, 141 BNA LRRM 2408, 123 CCH LC P
10381.
Where defendants' motion to dismiss was granted on basis that contracts in question required arbitration of dispute,
sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs who nearly 2 years later filed request for change of venue and
consolidation of arbitration proceedings, which motion was not legally tenable and was almost exact copy of first
motion and failed to suggest any basis for court's jurisdiction in view of earlier dismissal. Mariani v Doctors Assoc.,
Inc. (1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 983 F2d 5, 24 FR Serv 3d 918.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on plaintiffs for filing third motion to remand where
court had previously denied two almost identical motions and made detailed findings of fact on issue. Sweeney v
Resolution Trust Corp. (1994, CA1 Mass) 16 F3d 1, cert den (1994) 513 US 914, 130 L Ed 2d 206, 115 S Ct 291, reh
den (1995) 513 US 1105, 130 L Ed 2d 678, 115 S Ct 785, subsequent app (1998, CA1 Mass) 136 F3d 216.
Where attorney disregarded directions of district court and continued in subsequent pre-trial order to plead matters
which had previously been decided against him and which were not issues in case for purposes of pre-trial order, court
properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions. Serritella v Markum (1997, CA7 Ill) 119 F3d 506, 38 FR Serv 3d 508, cert den
(1997) 522 US 999, 139 L Ed 2d 406, 118 S Ct 566.
Where district court refused to permit amendment to add claim of fraud, court's refusal was res judicata on merits of
claim in question, and therefore plaintiff's attempt to relitigate fraud claim by filing second suit was not warranted by
existing law and violated Rule 11. Crockett v Whisenhunt (In re Landscape Props.) (1997, CA8 Ark) 127 F3d 678, 31
BCD 719, 39 FR Serv 3d 140, reh den (1997, CA8 Ark) 1997 US App LEXIS 33337.
Relatively mild sanction of $ 500 was reasonable where plaintiff's attorney had brought four meritless actions against
plaintiff's employer in space of two years, and court had warned attorney at conclusion of third suit that complaint was
without merit and potentially frivolous, although sanctions were not imposed at that time. Worthy v Widnall (1998,
CA11 Ga) 138 F3d 885, 74 CCH EPD P 45493, 40 FR Serv 3d 657, 11 FLW Fed C 1180.
Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed on lead counsel who signed complaint, where counsel had previously
represented same plaintiffs in virtually identical lawsuit in another state and therefore knew that plaintiffs did not have
colorable claims. Finance Inv. Co. (Bermuda) v Geberit AG (1998, CA7 Ind) 165 F3d 526, 49 USPQ2d 1289, 42 FR
Serv 3d 515.
Where district court provided plaintiff's attorneys with comprehensive explanation as to why court deemed original
complaint to be without merit and stated that it would allow amendment of complaint only if each attorney representing
plaintiff personally signed any amended pleading in accordance with Rule 11, court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing sanctions on plaintiff's attorneys after they disregarded warnings of court and filed another baseless complaint
that mirrored original. Sprewell v Golden State Warriors (2000, CA9 Cal) 231 F3d 520, 2000 CDOS 8950, 2000 Daily
Journal DAR 11941, 84 BNA FEP Cas 378, 165 BNA LRRM 2779, 142 CCH LC P 10844.
Attorney who has filed numerous previous suits which have already settled all issues which were raised in present
case, last of such suits having already begun to rely on preclusive effect of earlier decisions, and who persisted in filing
4 insubstantial postjudgment motions after being warned of possibility of sanctions must have sanctions imposed
against him. McLaughlin v Bradlee (1986, App DC) 256 US App DC 119, 803 F2d 1197, 5 FR Serv 3d 1370.
Defendants are subject to sanction under Rule 11 for filing motion to dismiss which is duplicative of their motion for
reargument, where there was no need to file additional motion to preserve any defenses because they were part of record
on motion for reargument. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v Resnick Developers South, Inc. (1985, SD NY) 611 F
Supp 281.
Fine of $ 500 imposed under Rule 11 against attorney where two counts in complaint he filed were dismissed with
prejudice by court in previous action and two other counts were time-barred, because reasonable inquiry would have
revealed futility of refiling these claims in second action. Ruffin v ITT Continental Baking Co. (1986, ND Miss) 636 F
Supp 857.
Sanctions are imposed on pro se plaintiff in form of order against further filings of complaints without permission of
court where plaintiff had filed 18 complaints alleging same claims, all of which were dismissed, and plaintiff had been
warned against frivolous filings several times by other courts, because plaintiff's continuous pattern of groundless and
vexatious litigation required court to impose such sanctions under Rule 11. Sparrow v Reynolds (1986, DC Dist Col)
646 F Supp 834.
Motion for rehearing was frivolous since it was obviously nearly verbatim rehash of plaintiff's already considered
brief in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, and thus filing of motion was both unreasonable and vexatious.
Shields v Shetler (1988, DC Colo) 120 FRD 123.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Pro se plaintiff was sanctioned for violating FRCP 11 where he brought second lawsuit legally indistinguishable
from earlier lawsuit challenging EEOC's investigation and processing of charge, after earlier lawsuit had been dismissed
for lack of cause of action. Golyar v McCausland (1990, WD Mich) 738 F Supp 1090, 63 BNA FEP Cas 555, 53 CCH
EPD P 39999.
Attorney violated Rule 11 by filing complaint which was nearly identical to complaint filed in earlier action in which
summary judgment had been granted to defendant. Schiappa v Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (1993, SD Ohio) 146
FRD 153.
Where plaintiff's attorney filed frivolous claim without first making reasonable inquiry into basis for claim, and
although defendants' attorney warned him that claims were baseless and likely to be subject to Rule 11 sanctions,
plaintiff's attorney failed to take appropriate action, sanction of $ 1,000 is imposed on plaintiff's attorney to deter similar
conduct in future. Johnson v Tower Air (1993, ED NY) 149 FRD 461, 66 BNA FEP Cas 918, 64 CCH EPD P 43134,
27 FR Serv 3d 539.
Seller's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against buyer is granted, where buyer moved to dismiss seller's fraud claims,
but motion was repetition of motion previously denied, and buyer neither presented new arguments in support of motion
to dismiss nor even acknowledged that prior order applied to instant motion, because sanctions are appropriate where
counsel had no good-faith belief that pleading was well grounded in fact or law, or that previous ruling should be
reversed, and sanctions serve the purpose of discouraging vexatious and repetitive litigation. Siderpali, S.P.A. v Judal
Indus. (1993, SD NY) 833 F Supp 1023, 23 UCCRS2d 214.
Where plaintiff filed action in federal court after court in identical state action had granted motion to compel
arbitration, and plaintiff's attorney failed to distinguish relevant case authority stating that filing federal action under
circumstances was not proper, plaintiff's claims lacked reasonable legal foundation, and sanctions must be imposed on
plaintiff's attorney. Fransen v Terps Ltd. Liab. Co. (1994, DC Colo) 153 FRD 655, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98491.
Plaintiffs are placed on notice that any future filings in this district based on these facts may result in imposition of
sanctions under FRCP 11(b), where their pro se action against federal government officials claiming constitutional
violations in obtaining and execution of search warrant and seizure of their property was dismissed last year, because
this follow-up action naming federal magistrate, district, and circuit court judges and creating new causes of action is
fanciful, delusional, or more likely deliberate affront to judicial system. Bear v Potter (1999, WD NC) 89 F Supp 2d
687.
Attorney for daughter suing attorneys and accountants who handled her mother's will and trust for professional
malpractice is sanctioned under FRCP 11, where he should have realized that daughter's claims were barred by res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and state statute of limitations, because his position was not warranted by existing law or
nonfrivolous argument. Augustine v Adams (2000, DC Kan) 88 F Supp 2d 1166.
District court may strike repetitive filings under FRCP 11. Williams v Baldwin County Comm'n (2001, SD Ala) 203
FRD 512.
Defense counsel was denied award of attorney's fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 where he filed unnecessary response to
plaintiff's obviously mistaken refiling of same pleading, rather than calmly resolving matter by phone call. Phila. Gear
Corp. v Swath Int'l, Ltd. (2002, ED Pa) 200 F Supp 2d 493.
No reasonable attorney could have reasonably believed that second amended complaint had any reasonable chance of
success or that it stated RICO claim upon which relief could be granted where court had dismissed first RICO claim and
warned plaintiffs that they did not have RICO claim; therefore, sanctions were warranted. Andersen v Smithfield Foods,
Inc. (2002, MD Fla) 209 F Supp 2d 1278, 53 FR Serv 3d 22, 15 FLW Fed D 404.
Because district court had already denied summary judgment motion, defendants waived their public policy defense
and present summary judgment motion based on public policy grounds was procedurally improper; therefore, sanctions
were imposed. Wechsler v Hunt Health Sys. (2002, SD NY) 216 F Supp 2d 347.
Having reviewed many of individual's cases and numerous orders sanctioning individual and dismissing his actions,
court determined that individual re-filed complaints and motions regardless of laws and court orders prohibiting such
behavior whenever he was not satisfied with court orders, thereby harassing US, insurance company, and law firm, and
abusing judicial system; consequently, order barring individual from filing additional complaints without leave from
court was necessary to protect integrity of courts and to stop individual's harassment, and injunction that prohibited
individual from filing new complaints without leave of court was appropriate remedy because it did not unduly impair
individual's right of access to courts. Mikkilineni v Penn Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. (2003, DC Dist Col) 271 F Supp 2d
142.
In action by former patient against medical center, physicians, and medical school, alleging violations of 18 USCS §
1962, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 41-4, 42 USCS § 1985 and further alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in
violation of state law, patient, following dismissal of her claims, was not entitled, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, to amend
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
complaint because claims arising under 18 USCS § 1962 and 42 USCS § 1985 were previously adjudicated in state
court and were thus barred by res judicata, because claims arising under 18 USCS § 1962 were inextricably intertwined
with state court claims and were thus barred under Rooker-Feldman, and because, as to 18 USCS § 1962 claims,
patient failed to plead necessary predicate elements of mail fraud, as required by 18 USCS § 1341, failed to plead fraud
with particularity, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and also failed to show that alleged conspiracy was motivated by
racial or otherwise class-based animus under 42 USCS § 1985; sanctions against patient's counsel were warranted
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) because patient's claims had no basis in law or fact and were merely recasting of her state
court claims and because patient's counsel had been warned not to attempt to relitigate state court claims. Balthazar v
Atl. City Med. Ctr. (2003, DC NJ) 279 F Supp 2d 574.
Where individual was litigating, in one form or another, same issue virtually nonstop since 1988, court enjoined
individual from, either directly or indirectly litigating matter any further in any court. Johnson v Barnes (2003, SD Ga)
283 F Supp 2d 1297.
Once debtors' motion to reopen bankruptcy was denied, it could not be brought again raising substantially same
issues, and thus, bankruptcy court denied second motion to reopen and imposed sanctions against debtors' counsel under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), ordering partial reimbursement of creditor's attorney's fees, because debtors' counsel had
frivolously asserted that case on point was not good law, and had improperly cited another case for argument that court's
order denying their motion to reopen should be amended because rulings on debtors' prior motion to reopen and motion
for reconsideration were not "law of the case," and therefore, not binding on debtors. In re Crofford (2002, BC ED Ark)
286 BR 366, 40 BCD 142.
Debtor's motions to set aside agreed order and judgment and for clarification of order were debtor's third and fourth
attempts at setting aside order and settlement debtor had agreed to; bankruptcy court denied motions as being meritless
and imposed sanctions under its inherent authority to impose sanctions despite fact that trustee and trustee's attorneys
had not filed separate motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In re Martin (2003, BC ED Ark) 287 BR 423.
66. --Sanctions denied
Defense attorney who repeatedly sought reconsideration of denial of motion to dismiss did not file frivolous motions
in violation of Rule 11 where district court continued to change basis of its ruling and defense attorney's arguments
were soundly based in fact and in law. Conn v Borjorquez (1992, CA9 Ariz) 967 F2d 1418, 92 CDOS 5594, 92 Daily
Journal DAR 8922, 22 FR Serv 3d 1401.
Where district court ordered dismissal but retained jurisdiction to assess defendant's attorney fees and costs against
plaintiff and his attorneys if they refiled same action in another forum, district court's order was improper use of Rule
11, since by not imposing sanctions at time case was dismissed, court implicitly held that such sanctions were not
appropriate in case at bar, and whether or not sanctions were warranted in subsequent lawsuit would be for court
hearing that lawsuit to decide. Woodard v STP Corp. (1999, CA11 Ala) 170 F3d 1043, 43 FR Serv 3d 844, 12 FLW Fed
C 629.
Sanctioning defendant for making or repeating plausible argument that has failed previously in district court, when
failure to make or to repeat that argument will potentially have consequence of depriving defendant of favorable ruling
from appellate court, is not appropriate use of sanction power. Gibson v Chrysler Corp. (2001, CA9 Cal) 261 F3d 927,
2001 CDOS 7206, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 8907 (criticized in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.
(2001, ED NY) 166 F Supp 2d 740, 2001-2 CCH Trade Cases P 73465).
Although decision to file second suit was ill-advised, and complaint in second suit was identical to proposed
amended complaint in first suit, which plaintiff had been denied leave to file, District Court properly declines to impose
sanctions against plaintiff and his counsel, where second suit was filed before District Court's opinion and order in first
suit, in which court made clear that it had considered and rejected all of plaintiff's arguments, and where plaintiff's
counsel has represented that he brought second suit in attempt to prevent statute of limitations from running on
plaintiff's claims. Sendi v NCR Comten, Inc. (1986, ED Pa) 624 F Supp 1205.
Asserting claim that another District Court has denied does not demand Rule 11 sanctions where it is not patently
clear that claim has absolutely no chance of success under existing precedents and where reasonable argument can be
advanced to extend, modify, or reverse law as it stands. MacMillan, Inc. v American Express Co. (1989, SD NY) 125
FRD 71, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94368.
67. Violation of order against further lawsuits
District Court's award of $ 750 in attorneys' fees to defendant United States is not abuse of discretion where for more
than 3 decades plaintiff has been bringing lawsuits, each unsuccessful, in connection with claim that he was wrongfully
deprived of veteran's disability benefits in connection with his World War II service, instant suit falls squarely within
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
prohibition of order enjoining him from instituting further lawsuits based upon same claim, and, although plaintiff had
been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis by another judge, plaintiff apparently sought to obscure existence
of injunction by omitting from his filing documents, which required identification of related suits, any mention of his
other lawsuits. Di Silvestro v United States (1985, CA2 NY) 767 F2d 30, cert den (1985) 474 US 862, 88 L Ed 2d 146,
106 S Ct 177, reh den (1985) 474 US 990, 88 L Ed 2d 352, 106 S Ct 400.
District court properly dismissed inmate's in forma pauperis action against various correctional officers and imposed
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, where inmate falsely misrepresented his net worth, had lengthy history of bringing
similar meritless lawsuits with no reasonable factual basis, and had previously been enjoined by another court from
filing suits which did not comply with Rule 11. Attwood v Singletary (1997, CA11 Fla) 105 F3d 610, 37 FR Serv 3d
257, 10 FLW Fed C 699.
Attorney who did not review relevant documents before filing suit, but who knew that his client had been ordered by
court not to file another lawsuit pertaining to matters previously litigated, and who filed just such a suit in disregard of
court's order will have sanctions imposed upon him. Ginther v Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. (1986, SD Tex) 111 FRD
615, 4 FR Serv 3d 1356.
Plaintiff who had previously litigated issues in present suit and who had been ordered by court not to file another suit
concerning same issues but who nevertheless filed such a frivolous complaint has acted in bad faith and has
unnecessarily multiplied proceedings, thereby violating both letter and spirit of Rule 11, and therefore sanctions are
appropriate. Ginther v Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. (1986, SD Tex) 111 FRD 615, 4 FR Serv 3d 1356.
Where former employee filed 42 USCS § 1983 action to circumvent prior court order prohibiting his employment
related claims against school board, and action was time-barred anyway, court dismissed action, prohibited further
related actions in any federal court, and entered order for employee to show cause why $ 2000 in sanctions should not
have been assessed against employee. Malley v New York City Bd. of Educ. (2002, SD NY) 207 F Supp 2d 256.
Where plaintiff made all reasonable investigations before filing complaint, but without aid of discovery, further
information to prove their allegations was not practicably obtainable since defendant had refused to disclose necessary
information, plaintiff met Rule 11 standard for filing and maintaining its case. Hoffmann La Roche, Inc. v Invamed Inc.
(2000, CA FC) 213 F3d 1359, 54 USPQ2d 1846.
68. Effect of settlement
Although third-party defendant agreed to dismiss motion for sanctions against defendant in return for dismissal of
third-party complaint, court may still impose sanctions where it appears defendant made last minute settlement to avoid
imposition of sanctions for having failed to make reasonable inquiry into merits of claim before filing and for failing to
dismiss claim once discovery showed it was meritless. Chapman & Cole v Itel Container Int'l B.V. (1987, SD Tex) 116
FRD 550.
Sanctions under FRCP 11 were not warranted on ground that employee pursued claim that union's discriminatory
actions helped to bring about her constructive discharge, even though employee voluntarily resigned her position in
exchange for $ 350,000 from her employer, since it was objectively reasonable for her counsel to argue that employee
was forced to resign because her working conditions were intolerable in part because of union's conduct. Thompson v
United Transp. Union (2001, DC Kan) 167 F Supp 2d 1254.
69. Miscellaneous
Striking of defendant's answer did not preclude it from filing motion for summary judgment, and therefore no
sanctions will be imposed on defendant's attorney for filing motion. INVST Financial Group, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear
Systems, Inc. (1987, CA6 Mich) 815 F2d 391, 7 FR Serv 3d 529, cert den (1987) 484 US 927, 98 L Ed 2d 251, 108 S Ct
291.
In absence of extraordinary circumstances, submission of proposed order which is actually signed by one judge
cannot be considered objectively unreasonably by another, and therefore sanctions should not have been imposed on
attorney for submitting such order. Snow Machines, Inc. v Hedco, Inc. (1988, CA3 NJ) 838 F2d 718, 10 FR Serv 3d
722.
Where plaintiff did not file any opposition to motion to dismiss, which was first and only pleading filed by
defendant, but instead plaintiff voluntarily dismissed, as it had right to do, Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate. In re
Summers (1988, CA6 Ohio) 863 F2d 20, 130 BNA LRRM 2305, 110 CCH LC P 10910, 12 FR Serv 3d 951.
Where defamation lawsuit was not brought for purpose of harassment and had sound legal and factual basis,
although it was ultimately unsuccessful, no basis for award of attorney fees existed under Rule 11. Matta v May (1997,
CA5 Tex) 118 F3d 410, 25 Media L R 2398, 71 CCH EPD P 44941, 38 FR Serv 3d 320.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court's decision that plaintiffs had filed suit for improper purpose in violation of Rule 11(b)(1), based solely
on court's earlier determination that plaintiffs' claims were frivolous and violated Rule 11(b)(2), was abuse of discretion,
since it would subject clients to monetary sanctions which were explicitly prohibited by Rule 11(b)(2) Simon DeBartolo
Group, L.P. v Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. (1999, CA2 NY) 186 F3d 157, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 90531, 44 FR Serv
3d 959.
Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff and his attorney for filing affidavit that contradicted plaintiff's
prior deposition testimony in related action. Salovaara v Eckert (2000, CA2 NY) 222 F3d 19, 47 FR Serv 3d 41.
$ 2,000 fine was appropriate as against husband and wife's counsel for bringing and continuing to assert three
meritless claims of malicious prosecution, excessive force, and trespass because Missouri law did not warrant those
claims under facts of case, and counsel's assertions arose to level of frivolous arguments that did not seek extension of
any of those legal theories. Coonts v Potts (2003, CA8 Mo) 316 F3d 745, 54 FR Serv 3d 490.
If attorney's signature to pleading is to be more than hollow gesture, he must do more than obtain person willing to
lend his name as plaintiff, especially so where, as here, complacent plaintiff is without knowledge, is content to act that
role without reading complaint, and expects to be paid for his time; attorney's certification under such circumstances
runs flagrantly afoul of purpose of Rule 11. Freeman v Kirby (1961, SD NY) 27 FRD 395, 4 FR Serv 2d 100.
Defendant corporation's incomplete answer to interrogatory must be treated as failure to respond and merit sanctions.
Chapman & Cole v Itel Container Int'l B.V. (1987, SD Tex) 116 FRD 550.
Although plaintiff's deposition statement differed from formal pleading statement, such difference cannot serve as
basis for sanctioning plaintiff, nor is plaintiff's failure to produce book and letter in response to document requests
sanctionable under Rule 11. Kessler v Superior Care, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 127 FRD 513.
Although plaintiff's claims were weak and were dismissed after trial for failure of proof, no violation of Rule 11
occurred where claims were at least arguable and had some minimal basis in fact and in law and where no evidence of
improper purpose was present. Brasport, S.A. v Hoechst Celanese Corp. (1991, SD NY) 134 FRD 45, 18 FR Serv 3d
1535.
Where plaintiff's attorney refused to stipulate to dismissal of claim and later failed to appear or otherwise oppose
motion for summary judgment, counsel's conduct does not warrant imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. Curtiss v
Key Bank of Western New York, N.A. (1991, WD NY) 137 FRD 2.
District court's finding that certain of defendants' responses to request for admissions were insufficient did not in and
of itself trigger Rule 11 sanctions. Herrera v Scully (1992, SD NY) 143 FRD 545.
Complaint cannot be well-grounded in fact if client does not authorize its filing, therefore, attorney violated Rule 11
when he filed action on behalf of former client who had not authorized suit and when he failed to dismiss action after
client repudiated suit. Cimeo v East Whiteland-Tredyffrin Joint Transp. Auth. (1993, ED Pa) 151 FRD 55, 27 FR Serv
3d 1629.
Considering all circumstances, including complexity of legal and factual issues involved, plausibility of legal
positions advocated, undisputed extensive pre-filing investigation conducted by plaintiffs, extent to which development
of factual circumstances required discovery, and extensive legal research into applicable federal statutes, there were no
"exceptional circumstances" which warranted imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. Martin v Brown (1993, WD Pa)
151 FRD 580, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98145, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8438, subsequent app, remanded (1995,
CA3 Pa) 63 F3d 1252, 33 FR Serv 3d 551 (criticized in Satcorp Int'l Group v China Nat'l Silk Import & Export Corp.
(1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 3, 36 FR Serv 3d 463).
Sanctions were not appropriate because attorney already suffered pains of accepting case and representing client
without adequately investigating evidence supporting allegations; when he finally realized that his client's claims were
without merit, he moved to withdraw, only to have that motion denied by court. White v Camden City Bd. of Educ.
(2003, DC NJ) 251 F Supp 2d 1242, 91 BNA FEP Cas 540.
Defendant sued by estate for converting artwork was ordered to pay estate's expenses and attorney's fees incurred in
litigating cross-motions for sanctions where court specifically admonished defendant not to file meritless Fed. R. Civ. P.
11. Estate of Davis v Trojer (2003, SD NY) 287 F Supp 2d 455.
B. Adequacy of Inquiry
1. In General
70. Generally
Since enactment of amendment of Rule 11, more careful investigation and consideration of claims is required, and
therefore inclusion of boilerplate allegations is improper and subject to appropriate sanctions. Oliveri v Thompson
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
(1986, CA2 NY) 803 F2d 1265, 5 FR Serv 3d 761, cert den (1987) 480 US 918, 94 L Ed 2d 689, 107 S Ct 1373 and
(criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-76, RIA TC Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM 1916, 95 TNT
33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577, 70 CCH TCM
1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Rule 11 requires not that counsel plead facts, but that counsel know facts after conducting reasonable investigation,
and then only enough to make it reasonable to press litigation to point of seeking discovery. Frantz v United States
Powerlifting Federation (1987, CA7 Ill) 836 F2d 1063, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67832, 9 FR Serv 3d 1337.
District Court abuses its discretion to proceed with Rule 11 sanctions based on lack of reasonable factual inquiry,
without factual basis to measure complaint beyond complaint itself and affidavits. Davis v Crush (1988, CA6 Ohio)
862 F2d 84, 12 FR Serv 3d 926.
Litigants may not pretend that law favors their view and impose on court or their adversaries burden of research to
uncover basic rule, and attorneys who did so were properly sanctioned. Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A.
(1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385.
In determining whether Rule 11 has been violated, focus of court's inquiry should be reasonableness of investigation,
not whether opposing party was prejudiced by actions of party under scrutiny, and to consider prejudice alone is to
overlook fundamental objective of Rule 11, which is to encourage filing of documents that are well-grounded in both
law and fact. Bradgate Assocs. v Fellows, Read & Assocs. (1993, CA3 NJ) 999 F2d 745, 26 FR Serv 3d 587,
subsequent app (1994, CA3 NJ) 43 F3d 1460.
Requirement of reasonable inquiry before filing means party must consider whether any obvious affirmative
defenses bar case; however, party is not required to research and brief every defense potentially at issue. FDIC v
Calhoun (1994, CA5 Tex) 34 F3d 1291, 30 FR Serv 3d 868.
Although Rule 11 imposes duty of reasonable inquiry as to facts set forth in pleading, it is not necessary that
investigation into facts be carried to point of absolute certainty before complaint can be filed. Forbes v Eagleson (2000,
CA3 Pa) 228 F3d 471, 165 BNA LRRM 2584, 142 CCH LC P 10829, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9960.
Where plaintiff's allegations were specifically identified as likely to have evidentiary support after reasonable
opportunity for further investigation and discovery, and district court could have allowed plaintiff to amend complaint
to sufficiently plead elements of cognizable claim, sanctions were not warranted. Gurary v Winehouse (2000, CA2 NY)
235 F3d 792, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91284.
Counsel should not confuse Rule 11 with Rule 12(b)(6); plaintiff may have reasonable claim, indeed irrefutable
claim, assertion of which may nonetheless violate Rule 11 if plaintiff has failed to conduct any reasonable inquiry.
Foster v Michelin Tire Corp. (1985, CD Ill) 108 FRD 412.
Attorney signing pleadings is obligated under Rule 11 to refrain from raising claims without first conducting
reasonable inquiry into underlying facts and law on which those claims are predicated; "reasonable inquiry" standard at
very least requires some kind of investigation, and some affirmative conduct on part of attorney; attorney is also
obligated to dissuade client from pursuing specious claims, and thereby avoid possible sanctions by court, as well as
unnecessary costs of litigating worthless claim. Mohammed v Union Carbide Corp. (1985, ED Mich) 606 F Supp 252,
1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66602, 1 FR Serv 3d 507.
Litigation lawyers have broad responsibility under Rule 11 and Code of Professional Responsibility to confer with
client about facts, and not to accept client's version on faith but to probe client in that respect, to do lawyers' homework
on law, and then to counsel client about just which claims law reasonably supports in terms of facts lawyers' proper
investigation has disclosed. Fleming Sales Co. v Bailey (1985, ND Ill) 611 F Supp 507, 1 FR Serv 3d 1501.
Since its amendment in 1983, Rule 11 imposes affirmative duty on attorney signing pleadings to conduct
investigation into whether statements they are making are supported in fact and in law, and absence of bad faith does
not prevent violation of rule. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112 FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228,
revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app (1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
Plaintiff will be subject to sanctions where defendants showed that facts known to him before he filed complaint
were inconsistent with allegations in complaint and where plaintiff is unable to explain and to show that reasonable
inquiry was made that justified making allegations. Bannon v Joyce Beverages, Inc. (1987, ND Ill) 113 FRD 669.
Counsel's clear and concise statement regarding factual and legal basis for his position is best evidence that he has
adequately investigated facts and researched law supporting signed legal document, and merely using extremely
aggressive tactics in zealously representing client will not make counsel subject to sanctions. Norton Tire Co. v Tire
Kingdom Co. (1987, SD Fla) 116 FRD 236, affd (1988, CA11 Fla) 858 F2d 1533, 9 USPQ2d 1407, 1988-2 CCH Trade
Cases P 68306, 12 FR Serv 3d 803.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rule 11 does not require counsel to plead all facts, but rather to know facts after conducting sufficient investigation
to make it reasonable to press litigation to point of seeking discovery. Cook v Rockwell Int'l Corp. (1993, DC Colo)
147 FRD 237.
Counsel is not required before filing complaint to secure type of proof necessary to withstand motion for summary
judgment. Martin v Brown (1993, WD Pa) 151 FRD 580, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98145, RICO Bus Disp Guide
(CCH) P 8438, subsequent app, remanded (1995, CA3 Pa) 63 F3d 1252, 33 FR Serv 3d 551 (criticized in Satcorp Int'l
Group v China Nat'l Silk Import & Export Corp. (1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 3, 36 FR Serv 3d 463).
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiffs' attorneys who utterly failed in their responsibility to investigate and evaluate
facts prior to filing complaint which did not state all necessary elements to support allegations. Rodriguez-O'Ferral v
Trebol Motors Corp. (1994, DC Puerto Rico) 154 FRD 33, affd (1995, CA1 Puerto Rico) 45 F3d 561, RICO Bus Disp
Guide (CCH) P 8733, 30 FR Serv 3d 1206 (criticized in Bonilla v Trebol Motors Corp. (1997, DC Puerto Rico) 1997
US Dist LEXIS 4341).
Even if attorney signs and files motion without conducting research that, with luck, is supported by law discovered
after filing that motion, attorney has violated obligation imposed by FRCP 11 to conduct reasonable inquiry before
filing motion. Slater v Skyhawk Transp., Inc. (1999, DC NJ) 187 FRD 211, 44 FR Serv 3d 1345.
Pursuant to FRCP 11(b), district court granted bank's motion for sanctions where attorney had filed frivolous federal
complaint that simply sought, without citing any legal or factual support, to relitigate issues concerning execution of
state court judgment and seizure of personal property that had already been decided by state courts. Elsman v Std. Fed.
Bank (2003, ED Mich) 238 F Supp 2d 903.
For purposes of imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, it is irrelevant whether counsel's failure to conduct reasonable
inquiry into facts was willful or inadvertent. Coburn Optical Industries, Inc. v Cilco, Inc. (1985, MD NC) 610 F Supp
656, 226 USPQ 1018.
71. Objective or subjective standard
Language "formed after reasonable inquiry" in amended Rule 11 in effect changed standard for finding violation of
rule from subjective to objective one. Indianapolis Colts v Baltimore (1985, CA7 Ind) 775 F2d 177, 3 FR Serv 3d 51.
Subjective intent of attorney in filing suit is irrelevant in determining whether Rule 11 was violated, rather what must
be considered is whether attorney examined facts and law before instituting legal process and whether reasonable
attorney would have believed such action justified. Cabell v Petty (1987, CA4 Va) 810 F2d 463, 6 FR Serv 3d 1078.
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11, attorney must make reasonable inquiry into facts of case and law
that applies to those facts, and pleading must not be interposed for improper purpose; reasonable inquiry required by
Rule connotes objective standard relying on what reasonable attorney would do, rather than subjective standard judged
by whether individual attorney believes he conducted reasonable degree of research. McLaughlin v Western Casualty
& Surety Co. (1985, SD Ala) 603 F Supp 978.
Plaintiffs' subjective belief that law or facts are certain way is insufficient to avoid Rule 11 sanctions where plaintiffs
have failed to make reasonable inquiry to determine that pleadings they have signed are well grounded in fact.
Hilgeford v Peoples Bank, Inc. (1986, ND Ind) 113 FRD 161.
Subjective intent need no longer be shown to justify sanctions under Rule 11 since rule imposes affirmative duty on
each attorney to conduct reasonable inquiry into viability of pleading before it is signed. Touron v Dade County (1988,
SD Fla) 119 FRD 41, 59 BNA FEP Cas 1886.
Under objective approach to FRCP 11, finding of improper purpose can be determined following court's own review
of facts and law, and, when there is no legal or factual basis for claim, improper purpose may be deduced, but, when
there is basis for claim in law and fact, subjective intent of pleader is of no moment. Paciulan v George (1999, ND Cal)
38 F Supp 2d 1128.
Pro se Title VII (42 USCS § § 2000e et seq.) plaintiff will not be sanctioned pursuant to FRCP 11, even though he
relied on hearsay, subjective beliefs, and speculation to support claim, and continued to litigate even after his counsel
wisely withdrew, because court does not believe he propagated his suit in bad faith or committed perjury, and will
sanction pro se Title VII litigant only as matter of last resort. Waller v Sprint Mid Atl. Telecom (1999, ED NC) 77 F
Supp 2d 716.
FRCP 11 was violated where music company's affirmative defenses and counterclaims were asserted without
reasonable inquiry as required, and court awarded sanctions against company and its attorneys. Profile Publ'g & Mgmt.
Corp. APS v Musicmaker.com, Inc. (2003, SD NY) 242 F Supp 2d 363.
72. --Effect of good faith or bad faith
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Party can be held responsible for innocent, good faith mistake of law or for carelessness of counsel since reasonable
inquiry would reveal mistake, and counsel who is careless has not made reasonable inquiry. Lloyd v Schlag (1989,
CA9 Hawaii) 884 F2d 409, 11 USPQ2d 1623, 14 FR Serv 3d 476.
What constitutes reasonable inquiry for purposes of Rule 11 may depend on whether pleading, motion, or other paper
was based on plausible view of law and is thus more stringent standard than good faith. Nixon v Phillipoff (1985, ND
Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Sanctions against attorney under FRCP 11 were not appropriate, where she acted with objective bad faith but court
was unable to make determination regarding her subjective bad faith. Fink v Gomez (1999, CD Cal) 39 F Supp 2d 1225.
73. Standard applicable to client or pro se litigant
Standard for party is same as that for attorney, and both have affirmative duty to conduct reasonable inquiry into
facts and law before filing, although what is objectively reasonable for client may differ from what is objectively
reasonable for attorney, and applicable standard is one of reasonableness under circumstances. Business Guides, Inc. v
Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc. (1991) 498 US 533, 112 L Ed 2d 1140, 111 S Ct 922, 91 CDOS 1588, 91
Daily Journal DAR 2366, 55 BNA FEP Cas 279, 18 FR Serv 3d 1153.
Both attorneys and represented parties should be held to objective standard of reasonable inquiry into facts, although
"reasonable inquiry" for attorney is not necessarily same as that for client. Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic
Communications Enterprises, Inc. (1989, CA9 Cal) 892 F2d 802, 13 USPQ2d 1354, 15 FR Serv 3d 672, affd (1991)
498 US 533, 112 L Ed 2d 1140, 111 S Ct 922, 91 CDOS 1588, 91 Daily Journal DAR 2366, 55 BNA FEP Cas 279, 18
FR Serv 3d 1153.
Pro se plaintiff violated Rule 11 by filing lawsuit objecting to conduct of previous suit where man of his education,
given reasonable amount of time in law library to make reasonable inquiry into law, could have determined that such a
lawsuit was not permissible. Patterson v Aiken (1986, ND Ga) 111 FRD 354, affd (1988, CA11 Ga) 841 F2d 386,
1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67941, 10 FR Serv 3d 1232.
Although attorney should have recognized plaintiff's arguments as groundless, under standard of what reasonable pro
se litigant would do, Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. Vizvary v Vignati (1990, DC RI) 134 FRD 28, 17 FR Serv 3d
1117.
Plaintiffs, both as represented parties and as pro se litigants, are held to same objective standard of reasonableness in
making reasonable inquiry into facts and law when signing documents to be submitted to court and may be held
responsible for Rule 11 sanctions. Sassower v Field (1991, SD NY) 138 FRD 369, affd in part and vacated in part on
other grounds, remanded (1992, CA2 NY) 973 F2d 75, cert den (1993) 507 US 1043, 123 L Ed 2d 497, 113 S Ct 1879,
reh den (1993) 508 US 968, 124 L Ed 2d 698, 113 S Ct 2952 and (criticized in Alexander v United States (1997, CA7)
121 F3d 312).
It would be imprudent to impose objective standard of reasonable inquiry on nonsigning represented party who
obviously relied on her attorney to make reasonable inquiry concerning merits of case; however, such party may be
subject to sanctions if she deliberately fails to provide pertinent information to her attorney. Taylor v United States
(1993, DC Kan) 151 FRD 389.
Plaintiff is reprimanded for not conducting reasonable inquiry into legal basis for his claims but is not sanctioned
monetarily, where case clearly establishing lack of legal basis for claims against opposing counsel from prior suit was
not decided until 7 months after lawsuit was filed, even though it was ignored by plaintiff despite repeated attempts by
defendants to bring it to his attention, because formal reprimand and stern warning are enough to deter pro se plaintiff
here. McCampbell v KMPG Peat Marwick, L.L.P. (1997, ND Tex) 982 F Supp 445.
For purposes of District Court's consideration of sanctions under FRCP 11(b), although attorney may rely on
objectively reasonable representations of client, he cannot totally rely on uncorroborated word of his client and hearsay
witnesses for all of key contentions of his case. Gartenbaum v Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. (1998, SD NY) 26 F Supp 2d 645.
74. Reliance on co-counsel
Reliance on forwarding co-counsel will satisfy signing attorney's duty of reasonable inquiry only if he acquires
knowledge of facts sufficient to enable him to certify that paper is well grounded in fact, and attorney who signs
pleading cannot simply delegate to forwarding co-counsel his duty of reasonable inquiry. Unioil, Inc. v E.F. Hutton &
Co. (1986, CA9 Cal) 809 F2d 548, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67608, cert den (1987) 484 US 822, 98 L Ed 2d 45, 108
S Ct 83 and cert den (1987) 484 US 823, 98 L Ed 2d 47, 108 S Ct 85.
Local counsel who signed pleadings in reliance on assertions of outside counsel, but who made no independent
determination that materials complied with Rule 11, may be sanctioned when pleadings violate rule. Val-Land Farms,
Inc. v Third Nat'l Bank (1991, CA6 Tenn) 937 F2d 1110, 20 FR Serv 3d 236.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Attorneys who relied entirely on newspaper article and assurances of another attorney that class action was justified
violated Rule 11 by failing to personally make reasonable inquiry, especially since there was no necessity to file action
immediately and documents relied on by other attorney were freely available for examination. Garr v U.S. Healthcare
(1994, CA3 Pa) 22 F3d 1274, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98184, 28 FR Serv 3d 1333, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA3 Pa)
1994 US App LEXIS 16425.
While it is not necessary for plaintiff's present attorneys to have conducted their own inquiry into factual basis for
action, statement that "facts set forth in the original complaint are confirmed by the recollection of [plaintiff's attorney
in prior criminal proceeding]", without more, does not satisfy duty of inquiry under Rule 11, particularly where counsel
has in hand documents refuting those allegations. Kendrick v Zanides (1985, ND Cal) 609 F Supp 1162, CCH Fed
Secur L Rep P 92294.
Attorneys who authorized another attorney to sign their names to pleading were not relieved of necessity of reading
pleadings and making inquiries necessary to support them. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112
FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app
(1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
75. Reliance on client's assurances or information
Where plaintiff's attorney relied solely on hearsay information provided by his client in naming individual as
defendant, and attorney did not depose defendant in question or question other defendants or witnesses regarding his
involvement, despite repeated assertions by defendant in question that he was not involved in underlying controversy,
plaintiff's attorney failed to conduct reasonable inquiry and thus violated Rule 11. Mike Ousley Productions, Inc. v
WJBF-TV (1992, CA11 Ga) 952 F2d 380, 21 FR Serv 3d 1329.
In action against insurance company seeking benefits under uninsured motorist provision of policy, where during
course of discovery company amassed substantial and compelling evidence that plaintiff had deliberately staged
accident in order to collect under policy, and plaintiff's attorney conducted no discovery and made no investigation
beyond questioning plaintiff and his co-conspirators and reviewing evidence, district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11 by failing to make reasonable inquiry, particularly as attorney's
heavy reliance on his client's representations was unrealistic under circumstances. Childs v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. (1994, CA5 La) 29 F3d 1018, 29 FR Serv 3d 1032.
Attorney is entitled to rely on objectively reasonable representations of client, and in determining whether sanctions
should be imposed, court must focus on whether pretrial proceedings provided evidentiary support for factual
misrepresentations. Hadges v Yonkers Racing Corp. (1995, CA2 NY) 48 F3d 1320, 30 FR Serv 3d 1165.
Attorney may not be sanctioned under Rule 11 solely because his client's testimony was viewed by court as not
credible, unless it was incredible as matter of law and attorney filed post-trial memorandum espousing his client's
position, although under some circumstances, attorney may have affirmative obligation to investigate facts supporting
client's representations. Silverman v Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. (In re Big Rapids Mall Assocs.) (1996, CA6 Mich) 98
F3d 926, 29 BCD 1189, 36 CBC2d 1641, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 77171, 36 FR Serv 3d 346, 1996 FED App 341P.
Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed on attorney who made serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing against
various attorneys and officers of court, where attorney never investigated facts himself, but merely relied on affidavits
of his client, who admitted to lying and other fraudulent acts, and his client's father and friends. Anderson v County of
Montgomery (1997, CA7 Ill) 111 F3d 494, 37 FR Serv 3d 625, cert den (1997) 522 US 951, 139 L Ed 2d 289, 118 S Ct
371.
District court properly imposed sanctions on lead counsel who had signed complaint, where counsel claimed to have
relied on clients' word, which constituted inadequate pre-filing inquiry, and, under circumstances, counsel should have
been aware that there was no underlying factual basis for suit. Finance Inv. Co. (Bermuda) v Geberit AG (1998, CA7
Ind) 165 F3d 526, 49 USPQ2d 1289, 42 FR Serv 3d 515.
Government counsel reasonably relied on technical expertise of Forest Service to craft their litigation position, and
counsel's failure to perform burdensome task, such as independently surveying 150 national forests to confirm veracity
of Service's claims, did not amount to egregious conduct warranting sanctions. Dubois v United States Dept. of Agric.
(2001, CA1 NH) 270 F3d 77, 53 Envt Rep Cas 1844.
Although it is not invariably sanctionable to rely solely on client's word before filing suit, under circumstances of
present case it was unreasonable for plaintiff's attorney not to attempt to verify plaintiff's claims before filing
defamation suit since plaintiff could not prevail at trial unless one or more persons could be found to testify to having
received alleged defamations. Hilton Hotels Corp. v Banov (1990, App DC) 283 US App DC 232, 899 F2d 40.
Attorney who accepts client's assurance that certain facts exist or do not exist, when reasonable inquiry would reveal
otherwise, has not satisfied his obligation under Rule 11. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app
(1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
Sanctions will not be imposed on plaintiff's attorney for filing frivolous suit where plaintiff's misrepresentations of
fact made it appear complaint was valid and where attorney attempted to persuade plaintiff to drop case after defendants
filed summary judgment motion; however, sanctions will be imposed where certain portions of complaint demonstrate
complete failure to make adequate inquiry into law. Bynum v Michigan State University (1987, WD Mich) 117 FRD
94, 59 BNA FEP Cas 983.
Although plaintiff's attorney signed all of relevant documents, he conceded that he did not carefully read documents
because plaintiff, who had drafted documents, was himself experienced trial attorney, and that, in itself, is sufficient
basis for imposing sanctions on attorney; however, it also appears that he not only failed to make reasonable inquiry to
reassess plaintiff's claim, but perpetuated it with knowledge that it was false. Kenna v United States Dep't of Justice
(1989, DC NH) 128 FRD 172.
In action in which plaintiffs claimed that their signatures on agreement with defendants were forged, plaintiffs'
counsel was not justified in relying solely on assertion by his clients that they had not signed agreement, and thus
sanctions will be imposed on counsel for failure to make reasonable inquiry into facts before filing suit. Mastrobuono
v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 128 FRD 243, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94941.
Although plaintiff misrepresented material facts to his attorney, other circumstances seemed to corroborate plaintiff's
lies, and attorney's reliance on plaintiff's representations was reasonable at time complaint was filed; therefore, no
sanctions should be imposed on attorney, but sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff. Mars v Anderman (1989, ED NY)
136 FRD 351.
Where plaintiff misrepresented facts to his attorney, but counsel had no reason to question plaintiff's representations
and did not act unreasonably in relying thereon no award of sanctions should be imposed against counsel. Albrecht v
Stranczek (1991, ND Ill) 136 FRD 155.
In general, when attorney can get information necessary to certify validity of claim in public fashion and need not
rely on client, he must do so, but Rule 11 does not require that attorney interview every possible witness prior to filing
claim. Wigton v Rosenthall (1991, SD NY) 137 FRD 4.
With respect to information for which client is presumptively best source, unless there is good cause to doubt client's
veracity, attorney may assume client is telling truth and rely on client's statements without violating Rule 11. Reed v
Iowa Marine & Repair Corp. (1992, ED La) 143 FRD 648, revd on other grounds (1994, CA5 La) 16 F3d 82, 28 FR
Serv 3d 415.
If all attorney has is his client's assurance that facts exist or do not exist, when reasonable inquiry would reveal
otherwise, he has not satisfied his obligation under Rule 11. Coburn Optical Industries, Inc. v Cilco, Inc. (1985, MD
NC) 610 F Supp 656, 226 USPQ 1018.
76. --Time pressure or exigent circumstances
Where sufficient factual basis existed for defendants' claims, and given time constraints for filing motion to set aside
default judgment, attorney reasonably relied on information his clients gave him, sanctions were properly denied. R. K.
Harp Inv. Corp. v McQuade (1987, CA7 Ill) 825 F2d 1101, 8 FR Serv 3d 433.
Where circumstances require immediate action by counsel, reliance on declarations of client which were made under
penalty of perjury should be sufficient to constitute reasonable investigation for purposes of Rule 11. Hamer v Career
College Ass'n (1992, CA9 Cal) 979 F2d 758, 92 CDOS 9140, 92 Daily Journal DAR 15156, 24 FR Serv 3d 9.
Where attorney is forced to plead under exigent circumstances, reliance on affidavits of clients should be sufficient
to constitute reasonable investigation for purposes of Rule 11. Rodick v City of Schenectady (1993, CA2 NY) 1 F3d
1341, 26 FR Serv 3d 910.
Where plaintiffs' attorney had less than five days from time he was initially contacted to file action, it was reasonable
under circumstances for attorney to conduct less pre-filing inquiry and to rely on information supplied by his clients.
Homer v Halbritter (1994, ND NY) 158 FRD 236.
77. Reliance on news articles or public records
In action charging violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS § 78j(b)), plaintiff's attorney satisfies
requirements of Rule 11 in drafting and filing complaint even though he relies solely on information from Wall Street
Journal to support claims since fact that journal published self-serving denials of allegations by defendant does not
mean that there are not good grounds for plaintiff's complaint and that plaintiffs needed to conduct further investigation
in order to satisfy Rule 11. In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litigation (1982, DC Del) 550 F Supp 1127, CCH Fed Secur L Rep
P 99011.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Plaintiffs' reliance on news articles and public documents is sufficient to meet requirement of Rule 11 that plaintiffs
adequately investigate basis of their claims before filing. Kamerman v Steinberg (1986, SD NY) 113 FRD 511, CCH
Fed Secur L Rep P 92913.
78. Events occurring many years ago
Extent of reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11 varies from case to case; in case involving events occurring as
many as 25 years prior, principal witness to which is deceased, available facts may be limited prior to discovery, but
there comes time during discovery when counsel should know of specific facts which indicate that action is well
grounded. Touchstone v G.B.Q. Corp. (1984, ED La) 596 F Supp 805, 1 FR Serv 3d 398.
79. Effect of defendant's uncooperativeness
Where defendants refused plaintiffs access to material information that would bear on certain allegations in
complaint, District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose sanctions on plaintiffs for lack of prefiling
inquiry. Morda v Klein (1989, CA6 Mich) 865 F2d 782.
Where attorney hired private investigator to check out facts of his client's claims, and potential defendants were
hostile and refused to cooperate with attorney's efforts to uncover truth, attorney did not act unreasonably in filing
complaint in order to obtain right to conduct discovery. Kraemer v Grant County (1990, CA7 Wis) 892 F2d 686, 15 FR
Serv 3d 794.
Although plaintiff's employment discrimination action included count for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 USCS § § 2000e et seq.) which was barred because plaintiff had never filed complaint with EEOC, Rule 11
sanctions will not be imposed since defense counsel did not notify plaintiff's counsel of alleged violation and did not
send formal notice of intent to file motion for sanctions if count was not withdrawn, thus failing to afford plaintiff's
counsel benefit of safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Thomas v Treasury Management Ass'n (1994, DC Md) 158
FRD 364, 31 FR Serv 3d 631.
80. Recent change in law
Plaintiff's attorneys did not fail to conduct reasonable pre-filing investigation by not finding and reading two court
opinions which would have shown them that part of complaint was deficient, since earlier cases were decided only 10
days and 25 days before complaint was filed. Singh v Curry (1988, ND Ill) 122 FRD 27, vacated without op, remanded
(1988, CA7 Ill) 866 F2d 432.
81. Miscellaneous
District court should not have sanctioned attorney for failing to make further prefiling inquiries where additional
inquiry might have shown some noncritical statements were inaccurate or overstated, but would not have shown
motion's requests to have been baseless, and where failure to make additional inquiry did not unfairly burden other
party, and thus it could not be said that attorney failed to make reasonable inquiry. Navarro-Ayala v Hernandez-Colon
(1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 3 F3d 464, 26 FR Serv 3d 944.
Sanctions were appropriate with regard to motion to assert cross-claim where district court recognized that plaintiff's
attorney had not researched law at all, and attorney admitted that he had done no research on matter. Frank v
D'Ambrosi (1993, CA6 Ohio) 4 F3d 1378, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8408, 93-2 USTC P 50625, 72 AFTR 2d
6242, 93 TNT 212-13, app dismd (1994, CA6 Mich) 1994 US App LEXIS 15187.
In assessing Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff and his attorney, court incorrectly considered only reasonableness of
plaintiff's beliefs about allegations and not reasonableness of beliefs of attorney who actually signed pleadings. Souran
v Travelers Ins. Co. (1993, CA11 Fla) 982 F2d 1497, 24 FR Serv 3d 1339, 7 FLW Fed C 13.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against plaintiff's attorney, where attorney did not
make reasonable inquiry prior to trial to ensure that he could procure evidence to support his client's position, including
alleged witnesses to incident in question. Battles v City of Ft. Myers (1997, CA11 Fla) 127 F3d 1298, 39 FR Serv 3d
177, 11 FLW Fed C 738.
Where plaintiffs failed to produce even scintilla of evidence to support their claims, district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorneys on grounds that they could not have conducted inquiry
necessary to support their clients' claims. Chandler v Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. (1998, CA8 Mo) 137 F3d 1053, reh, en
banc, den (1998, CA8) 1998 US App LEXIS 8504 and cert den (1998) 525 US 922, 142 L Ed 2d 229, 119 S Ct 278.
Where simple telephone call would have shown that suit was improper, sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff for
failure to make reasonable inquiry. Portnoy v Wherehouse Entertainment Co. (1988, ND Ill) 120 FRD 73.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
2. Particular Issues, Claims or Circumstances
82. Accusations against opposing party or attorney
Plaintiffs' counsel violated Rule 11 by including in pleadings allegations that defendants' attorneys were guilty of
serious misconduct and criminal acts, where allegations were unsubstantiated and without reasonable basis, thereby
showing plaintiffs' counsel's failure to make reasonable inquiry into facts. Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v American Honda
Motor Co., Acura Auto. Div. (1993, DC NH) 148 FRD 25, 26 FR Serv 3d 46.
Where plaintiffs' counsel turned reasonable legal disputes into accusations of perjury and other misconduct and
requested that matter be referred to state bar disciplinary committees, complete lack of support for such accusations
shows that plaintiffs' counsel failed to make reasonable inquiry or acted to harass defendants, thereby violating Rule 11,
and consequently, sanction of $ 100 is imposed for each of 6 unfounded accusations. Kemp v Pfizer, Inc. (1993, ED
Mich) 152 FRD 556.
83. Admission to bar
Attorney who filed motion to admit out-of-state attorney to local bar but failed to comply with applicable rule by
revealing out-of-state attorney's past convictions and misconduct has violated Rule 11, particularly as he admitted not
even reading applicable rule and as his noncompliance appears to have been gross negligence bordering on bad faith,
and thus sanction will be imposed amounting to other party's costs, plus amount to reimburse court for expense of
wasted time. First Interstate Bank, N.A. v Estates Partnership (1987, DC Colo) 117 FRD 683, 10 FR Serv 3d 175.
84. Antitrust
Where at time plaintiffs' counsel filed complaint alleging unlawful conspiracy and unreasonable restraint of trade, he
knew facts that supported reasonable suspicion of cooperation between defendants and other parties who could have
been expected to benefit from defendants' intransigence, these factual circumstances and rational inferences that may be
drawn from them show that allegations comported with Rule 11's prefiling investigation requirements, since proving
conspiracy is usually difficult and often impossible without resort to discovery procedures, particularly where proof is
largely in hands of alleged conspirators, and requirement that counsel, before filing complaint, secure type of proof
necessary to withstand motion for summary judgment would set prefiling standard beyond that contemplated by rule.
Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v Lingle (1988, CA3 Pa) 847 F2d 90, 1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68028, 11 FR Serv 3d 255,
99 ALR Fed 553.
Since defending antitrust suit is generally expensive and time consuming, even where claims lack merit, plaintiff
bringing antitrust suit has responsibility to make thorough investigation before filing; thus, where plaintiff's attorney did
not meet with attorneys who had represented plaintiff during earlier arbitration and state court proceedings, nor did
attorney attempt to meet with defendant's representatives or anyone else having knowledge of situation, district court
did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiff's attorney for making insufficient prefiling inquiry. Wigod v
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1992, CA7 Ill) 981 F2d 1510, 1992-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70067, 24 FR Serv 3d 1319.
Counsel for plaintiff which filed complaint alleging that defendants engaged in horizontal price-fixing is liable for
monetary sanctions under Rule 11, where it is clear that any inquiry by counsel would have revealed that plaintiff had
made no purchases from defendants within 4 years, thus making any class representation inappropriate, and that
plaintiff itself had never had possible claim against one of named defendants because it had never made any purchases
from that company, contrary to express allegations in complaint. RPS Corp. v Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1984,
ND Ill) 1984-2 CCH Trade Cases P 66268, 40 FR Serv 2d 606.
Difficulty of investigating conspiracy, antitrust and monopolization charges prior to initiation of law suit lessens
extent of investigative efforts that attorney must undertake to satisfy "reasonable inquiry" standard of Rule 11.
Mohammed v Union Carbide Corp. (1985, ED Mich) 606 F Supp 252, 1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66602, 1 FR Serv 3d
507.
Pro se plaintiff met his obligation of reasonable inquiry where before filing antitrust claim he utilized law libraries of
2 courts and studied pertinent statutes and located some relevant cases, although he failed to understand all requirements
of this complex area of law. Patterson v Aiken (1986, ND Ga) 111 FRD 354, affd (1988, CA11 Ga) 841 F2d 386,
1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67941, 10 FR Serv 3d 1232.
No sanction is warranted under FRCP 11(c) in antitrust action, even though repairer of wire processing equipment
clearly did not undertake prefiling factual inquiry into existence of market or intent of equipment manufacturer to
monopolize, because assertion of claim that manufacturer had unlawfully controlled essential facility by refusing to sell
repairer spare parts was not groundless, frivolous, or "laughable." Tri-Tech Mach. Sales v Artos Eng'g Co. (1996, ED
Wis) 928 F Supp 836, 1996-2 CCH Trade Cases P 71486, 35 FR Serv 3d 353.
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85. Bankruptcy
District Court properly assessed Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff and his attorney where plaintiff, who was
insolvent debtor in bankruptcy proceedings, filed motion through new counsel challenging order of court approving
compromise agreement between trustee and creditor, since motion was clearly brought in bad faith where plaintiff's new
attorney admitted that he had not read transcript of hearing on compromise agreement, that he had not discussed
agreement with attorney who represented plaintiff at hearing, that he had not contacted counsel for Trustee or counsel
for creditor, that he did not know if plaintiff objected to compromise, that he did not know if compromise was in
plaintiff's best interest, and that he would possibly have filed motion even if compromise was in plaintiff's favor. In re
Ginther (1986, CA5 Tex) 791 F2d 1151, 4 FR Serv 3d 1375.
Even though debtor violated automatic stay provision and used it to undermine salutary purposes of Bankruptcy
Code, creditor's request for sanctions was denied. Christakis v McMahon (In re Christakis) (2003, BC DC Mass) 291
BR 9, 41 BCD 18.
86. Civil or constitutional rights
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney who filed claim alleging violations of Title VII (42 USCS § §
2000e et seq.) and seeking liquidated and exemplary damages, even though it was clear that Title VII did not allow
recovery of liquidated and exemplary damages, especially as attorney conceded that he had not made reasonable inquiry
into legal basis for claiming such damages, although he described his mistake as "drafting oversight." Chambers v
American Trans Air (1994, CA7 Ind) 17 F3d 998, 64 BNA FEP Cas 213, 63 CCH EPD P 42862, 28 FR Serv 3d 83, reh,
en banc, den (1994, CA7 Ind) 1994 US App LEXIS 9695.
In action by doctor alleging that he was discriminatorily discharged based on his race and national origin, doctor's
attorney did not violate Rule 11 by failing to ascertain, before accepting representation, that defendants' witnesses
would not corroborate doctor's assertion that he had been told that he could be fired because he was foreigner, since
doctor had evidentiary support consisting of at least his own testimony, and case was not legally insufficient simply
because doctor's testimony was uncorroborated. Uy v Bronx Mun. Hosp. Ctr. (1999, CA2 NY) 182 F3d 152, 76 CCH
EPD P 46124, 44 FR Serv 3d 344.
Plaintiff's counsel is subject to sanction under Rule 11, since even minimum inquiry into law before signing
complaint would have revealed that there can be no violation of 42 USCS § 1983 unless defendant is acting under
color of state law. Kuzmins v Employee Transfer Corp. (1984, ND Ohio) 587 F Supp 536, 35 BNA FEP Cas 653, 37
CCH EPD P 35258, 39 FR Serv 2d 1284.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff who brought civil rights action based on assertions that federal reserve notes are not
legal tender and that he was denied asserted right to jury trial in mortgage foreclosure action is properly ordered to pay
each of 3 defendants $ 750 in attorneys' fees and also to pay fine of $ 500 to Clerk of Court, since plaintiff's insistence
on litigating question in face of controlling precedent amounts to bad faith, his failure to discover overwhelming
precedent suggests lack of reasonable inquiry into law, and record is replete with motions and strange filings by plaintiff
that obfuscate issues presented and are suggestive of attempt to prolong suit and harass defendants. Nixon v Phillipoff
(1985, ND Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Attorney for plaintiffs filing 42 USCS § 1983 action is sanctioned under Rule 11 and ordered to pay portion of
excess costs of litigation, where (1) counsel failed to conduct reasonable inquiry prior to filing complaint and other
papers in suit and relied primarily on clients' falsified version of events, even though counsel had 19 months to conduct
his own investigation, and (2) counsel had obligation to research law regarding demand for class certification and
assertion that sheriff's practice of denying all warrants in same file violated Constitution; plaintiffs who perpetrated
fraud are liable under Rule 11 only for court costs, where large sanctions amount might act as deterrent to private
citizens who desire in good faith to bring suit for deprivation of civil rights. O'Rourke v Norman (1986, WD Okla) 640
F Supp 1451, revd on other grounds, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1989, CA10 Okla) 875 F2d 1465, cert den
(1989) 493 US 918, 107 L Ed 2d 260, 110 S Ct 280.
Attorney's fees, costs and sanctions are imposed on attorney and plaintiffs who filed claims under 42 USCS § 1983
against city, police officers and sheriff's department alleging harassment and illegal search of house in attempting to
serve arrest warrant where attorney, experienced in civil rights cases, made no investigation or reasonable inquiry into
facts, although he had 19 months in which to do so. O'Rourke v Norman (1986, WD Okla) 640 F Supp 1451, revd on
other grounds, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1989, CA10 Okla) 875 F2d 1465, cert den (1989) 493 US 918, 107
L Ed 2d 260, 110 S Ct 280.
Where plaintiff in Title VII (42 USCS § § 2000e-5 et seq.) action presented no evidence demonstrating actual
discriminatory intent or even raising inferences of bad intent on part of defendant and offered no witnesses, apart from
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himself, and where his documentary evidence was, at best, neutral, plaintiff will be subject to sanctions for failure to
make minimum factual and legal investigation required by Rule 11. George v Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1987, ND Ind)
116 FRD 628, 8 FR Serv 3d 1212.
In action alleging employment discrimination, in which amended complaint stated incorrectly date on which plaintiff
received his right to sue letter, in order to give court jurisdiction it did not have under correct date, plaintiff's attorney
either failed to make proper inquiry into facts or knowingly misrepresented facts, and therefore sanctions will be
imposed. Comer v Interstate United Corp. (1987, ND Ill) 118 FRD 79, 48 CCH EPD P 38440, 9 FR Serv 3d 816.
In employment discrimination action in which plaintiff employee possessed possibly illegal tape recordings of his
conversations with coworkers, some of which were crucial to resolving law suit, plaintiff's attorney's failure to listen to
tapes constituted sanctionable failure to make reasonable inquiry into facts. Lockette v American Broadcasting Cos.
(1987, ND Ill) 118 FRD 88.
Plaintiff should have realized from basic legal research that "at will" employee does not have property interest that
will invoke procedural protections of Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore plaintiff's claim that his firing involved
deprivation of due process was violation of Rule 11. McGregor v Board of County Comm'rs (1990, SD Fla) 130 FRD
464, 17 FR Serv 3d 313, affd (1992, CA11 Fla) 956 F2d 1017, 22 FR Serv 3d 233, 6 FLW Fed C 190, corrected (1992,
CA11 Fla) 6 FLW Fed C 363 and (criticized in Rubin v Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn (1997, CA6 Ohio) 110 F3d 1247,
CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99442, 37 FR Serv 3d 759, 1997 FED App 128P).
Rule 11 sanctions against civil rights plaintiffs' attorney will not be reconsidered, where plaintiffs thrice asserted §
1983 respondeat superior claims against city, mayor and police chief arising out of police shooting of their son, because
amended complaints seeking relief under clearly inapposite or nonexistent precedent were caused by attorney's failure
to research legal precedent. Gutierrez v Hialeah (1990, SD Fla) 729 F Supp 1329.
Where same two attorneys had filed two previous similar civil rights actions against same defendants, and summary
judgment had been granted in favor of one defendant on grounds that he had not been in office when alleged violations
occurred, asserting identical argument against same defendant in present case violated Rule 11. Johnson v McAdoo
(1993, WD Okla) 150 FRD 684.
State officials are entitled to dismissal of claims of former Medicaid providers and to payment of costs of this motion
by plaintiffs' attorneys under FRCP 11, where providers complain of termination of their "provider" status being part of
civil rights conspiracy against high-volume Medicaid providers, but officials claim terminations were rational, fair, and
legal part of budget reduction process, because attorneys should have quickly realized, inter alia, that deprivation of
Medicaid provider status is not deprivation remedied by 42 USCS § § 1983 and 1985. Cohen v Bane (1994, ED NY)
853 F Supp 620.
Sanctions under FRCP 11 against former employee's counsel were warranted for bringing time-barred claims and for
suing supervisor in her individual capacity under Title VII, where counsel failed to conduct reasonable inquiry into
relevant facts and law concerning Title VII claims, even after defense counsel specifically informed employee's counsel
by letter of inherent problem with claims. Shelton v Ernst & Young, LLP (2001, ND Ill) 143 F Supp 2d 982.
Attorney violated FRCP 11 by bringing civil rights action against police department and its employees under 42
USCS § 1981, Thirteenth Amendment, and state law, where contract element of § 1981 was missing and all but one
named plaintiffs were not racial minorities, no facts were proffered to support involuntary servitude element of
Thirteenth Amendment claim, and state-law claims did not allege loss of permanent bodily function or disfigurement, as
required by state's tort claims statute. Leuallen v Borough of Paulsboro (2002, DC NJ) 180 F Supp 2d 615.
Majority of statements former student complained of in motion for sanctions related to bona fide factual disputes,
e.g., student status at various relevant times, proper legal argument, e.g., when administrative complaint was properly
considered "filed," and innocuous procedural matters, e.g., whether college's motion is properly considered under Rule
12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56; thus, court denied motion for Rule 11 sanctions, and admonished student that filing procedurally
and substantively deficient motions is, in itself, basis for imposing sanctions. Curto v Smith (2003, ND NY) 248 F Supp
2d 132.
Where state law required plaintiff to resign his position at county property appraiser's office when he became
candidate for office of appraiser, and plaintiff took oath stating that he had resigned, reasonable inquiry would have
shown that plaintiff's suit claiming that he was discharged in violation of his constitutional rights was groundless and
destined to fail, and therefore filing of suit violated Rule 11. Baker v Alderman (1993, MD Fla) 150 FRD 202, 7 FLW
Fed D 278, remanded (1998, CA11 Fla) 158 F3d 516, 41 FR Serv 3d 1484.
87. Class actions
Attorney did not conduct reasonable inquiry before filing class action where he did not speak with individual
purporting to represent class of company's shareholders, nor did he question co-counsel who had communicated with
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individual to determine if individual's claims were typical of class and if he would fairly and adequately protect interests
of class, and therefore sanctions will be imposed. Unioil, Inc. v E.F. Hutton & Co. (1986, CA9 Cal) 809 F2d 548,
1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67608, cert den (1987) 484 US 822, 98 L Ed 2d 45, 108 S Ct 83 and cert den (1987) 484 US
823, 98 L Ed 2d 47, 108 S Ct 85.
Where complaint contained excessive damage claim and purported to act on behalf of class of plaintiffs which did
not exist, and plaintiff's attorney failed to explain or support these claims, district court reasonably concluded that
plaintiff's attorney never made appropriate inquiry as required by Rule 11 and did not abuse its discretion in imposing
sanctions. Durr v Intercounty Title Co. (1994, CA7 Ind) 14 F3d 1183, 27 FR Serv 3d 939, reh, en banc, den (1994,
CA7 Ind) 1994 US App LEXIS 2600 and cert den (1994) 513 US 811, 130 L Ed 2d 20, 115 S Ct 63.
Although attorney's inquiry into legal basis for filing class action was adequate, sanctions are imposed since attorney
made no attempt to ascertain whether named plaintiff was proper representative of class. Garr v U.S. Healthcare
(1994, CA3 Pa) 22 F3d 1274, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98184, 28 FR Serv 3d 1333, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA3 Pa)
1994 US App LEXIS 16425.
Plaintiff's attorney in class action did not violate Rule 11 by failing to make reasonable factual inquiry where local
rule allowed discovery in class actions only as to facts relevant to class certification and prohibited discovery on merits
until district court ruled on certification. Krim v Banctexas Group (1996, CA5 Tex) 99 F3d 775, 36 FR Serv 3d 525, reh
den (1996, CA5 Tex) 1996 US App LEXIS 34441.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions under Rule 11 on attorney who filed class action
without making any factual inquiry regarding other members of purported class and basis for claims on their behalf.
Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund (1998, CA7 Ill) 145 F3d 929, 40 FR Serv 3d 1050,
reh, en banc, den (1998, CA7 Ill) 1998 US App LEXIS 13273.
Attorney filing complaint alleging existence of class of persons entitled to relief has professional responsibility
before signing and filing such complaint to determine that there is sufficient evidentiary basis to support class action
allegations. Barnett v Laborers' International Union (1977, WD Pa) 75 FRD 544.
Six defendants in antitrust class action are entitled to relief under Rules 11 and 12(f) where plaintiff, without offering
any rational explanation, added defendants to list of defendants in amended complaint, in desperate, last ditch effort to
salvage its class allegation. Folding Cartons, Inc. v American Can Co. (1979, ND Ill) 28 FR Serv 2d 235.
Counsel for plaintiff which filed complaint alleging that defendants engaged in horizontal price-fixing is liable for
monetary sanctions under Rule 11, where it is clear that any inquiry by counsel would have revealed that plaintiff had
made no purchases from defendants within 4 years, thus making any class representation inappropriate, and that
plaintiff itself had never had possible claim against one of named defendants because it had never made any purchases
from that company, contrary to express allegations in complaint. RPS Corp. v Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1984,
ND Ill) 1984-2 CCH Trade Cases P 66268, 40 FR Serv 2d 606.
Pursuant to Rule 11, defendants' counsel is properly ordered to pay reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by
plaintiffs in connection with defendants' motion to decertify plaintiffs' class or, in alternative, to disqualify plaintiffs'
counsel, where sole basis for motion was telephone call from man identifying himself as former husband of member of
class, volunteering that one of plaintiffs' attorneys had led his former wife to believe that she would not be responsible
for costs of litigation regardless of outcome, where no steps were taken to verify telephone accounts except for
unsuccessful attempt to have caller make his declarations in writing, and where, before filing motion containing such
sweeping accusations, defense counsel should have at minimum requested extension of deadline for filing of motions to
disqualify based on newly discovered evidence. Bockman v Lucky Stores, Inc. (1985, ED Cal) 108 FRD 296, 38 BNA
FEP Cas 753, 37 CCH EPD P 35478, 3 FR Serv 3d 166.
Attorney who filed suit against magistrate who had recommended that attorney be removed as counsel in class
action, which suit was apparently filed so that magistrate must recuse himself from class action, failed to make
reasonable inquiry into factual and legal background of suit before filing and acted in bad faith in abusing judicial
process to obtain result to which he was not entitled, and therefore request for imposition of sanctions was granted.
Affeldt v Carr (1986, ND Ohio) 111 FRD 337, affd without op (1987, CA6 Ohio) 827 F2d 769, cert den (1988) 484 US
1067, 98 L Ed 2d 996, 108 S Ct 1032.
Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed on law firm which filed patent infringement counterclaims without first
applying claims of every patent that was being brought into lawsuit to accused device and concluding that there was
reasonable basis for finding of infringement of at least one claim of each patent. View Eng'g, Inc. v Robotic Vision Sys.
(2000, CA FC) 208 F3d 981, 54 USPQ2d 1179.
88. Conflict of interest
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions will be imposed on attorney who failed to make reasonable inquiry to determine potential conflict of
interest. Unioil, Inc. v E.F. Hutton & Co. (1986, CA9 Cal) 809 F2d 548, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67608, cert den
(1987) 484 US 822, 98 L Ed 2d 45, 108 S Ct 83 and cert den (1987) 484 US 823, 98 L Ed 2d 47, 108 S Ct 85.
Attorney is properly subject to sanctions pursuant to 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for filing motion to disqualify opposition law firm, where attorney fails to make reasonable inquiry into
relevant facts in spite of receiving information contrary to assertions of motion, and where motion is interposed to
harass opposing counsel, to cause unnecessary delay, and to needlessly increase cost of litigation. Wold v Minerals
Engineering Co. (1983, DC Colo) 575 F Supp 166, 38 FR Serv 2d 598.
Retailer is granted Rule 11 sanctions of attorney fees against copyright owner bringing infringement action who
motioned to disqualify retailer's attorney on conflict of interest grounds since attorney had previously filed copyright
application for owner in unrelated action, where (1) owner forced opposing party to incur cost of defending motion to
disqualify without adequate factual investigation; and (2) owner failed to request discovery or evidentiary hearing after
factual inadequacies of motion became patent. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v May Dep't Stores Co. (1986, ND
Ill) 640 F Supp 751.
In filing class action suit, plaintiffs' attorney violated Rule 11 by failing to inquire whether named plaintiff had any
potential conflicts of interest which would interfere with his ability to protect interests of class; and where additional
identical suits were filed by other attorneys on behalf of different plaintiffs against same defendant, these attorneys
violated Rule 11 by copying first complaint verbatim without verifying its accuracy. Greenfield v United States
Healthcare (1993, ED Pa) 146 FRD 118, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 97345, 25 FR Serv 3d 870, affd sub nom Garr v U.S.
Healthcare (1994, CA3 Pa) 22 F3d 1274, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98184, 28 FR Serv 3d 1333, reh, en banc, den (1994,
CA3 Pa) 1994 US App LEXIS 16425.
89. Contracts
In suit alleging breach of contract, gross negligence, and willful misconduct in valuation of assets for appraisal
report, where defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on basis of contract's covenant not to sue and its
arbitration provision, sanctions will not be imposed on plaintiffs where they made reasonable inquiry in case and where
it was reasonable for plaintiffs not to know that covenant would bar any suit concerning arbitration process, and where
plaintiffs had good faith argument as to their view of what law was or should be. Wasyl, Inc. v First Boston Corp.
(1987, CA9 Cal) 813 F2d 1579.
In action in which employment status of defendants was important factor, plaintiff's counsel's failure to read each
employment contract to determine such status before improperly naming independent contractors as employees was
careless failure to make reasonable inquiry and is subject to sanctions. Medical Emergency Service Associates, S.C. v
Foulke (1988, CA7 Ill) 844 F2d 391, 10 FR Serv 3d 1239.
Where action was based entirely on breach of certain 2-tier contract and search of plaintiff's files by its attorneys
would have revealed that no such contract existed, plaintiff's attorneys violated Rule 11 by failing to conduct reasonable
inquiry, and therefore sanction amounting to total costs incurred by defendants is imposed. Capital Sav. Bank v Pacific
Northwest Bell (1987, WD Wash) 117 FRD 672.
Attorney is ordered to show cause why Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed, where attorney filed breach of
employment contract complaint for client who was employee at will, because reasonable prefiling inquiry would have
disclosed relevant facts of case, applicable law, and legal conclusion that there was no basis for breach of contract
action. Lyles v K Mart Corp. (1989, WD NC) 703 F Supp 435, 112 CCH LC P 56072.
Where plaintiff, as representative of her mother's estate, brought suit against bank for failure to honor check drawn
on mother's account, but plaintiff and her attorney failed to examine signature card which constituted contract between
mother and bank, such failure to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiry and subsequent filing of papers to press claim
which reasonable attorney should have recognized was without factual and legal foundation requires that court impose
Rule 11 sanctions. Allen v Utley (1990, DC Dist Col) 129 FRD 1.
90. Conversion
In deciding whether to file civil or criminal conversion action, attorney must look for objective evidence from which
criminal intent can be inferred before filing lawsuit since Rule 11 requires specific, identifiable evidence of surrounding
facts or circumstances to support claim, and it is insufficient to simply stake out position and rely on results of
post-filing discovery. Agristor Leasing v McIntyre (1993, SD Ind) 150 FRD 150.
Defendant sued by estate for converting artwork was not entitled to sanctions because, although there was no direct
evidence that defendant surreptitiously spirited away pieces of art from decedent's home, she failed to sufficiently refute
estate's contention that defendant rightfully possessed, but did not rightfully own, artwork; thus defendant failed to
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demonstrate that complaint was so baseless as to be sanctionable. Estate of Davis v Trojer (2003, SD NY) 287 F Supp
2d 455.
91. Copyrights
Although not all of plaintiffs' claims in copyright infringement action were frivolous, sanctions will be imposed on
plaintiffs' attorney who added frivolous claim for money damages without making even minimal investigation of
writing to defendant to inquire if it had sold or planned to sell or distribute manual in question. Hays v Sony Corp. of
America (1988, CA7 Ill) 847 F2d 412, 7 USPQ2d 1043, 11 FR Serv 3d 15.
Order imposing sanctions on attorney in copyright infringement case was vacated and remanded for detailed factual
findings because it was not clear from the order what misconduct was considered in the sanctions. Christian v Mattel,
Inc. (2002, CA9 Cal) 286 F3d 1118, 2002 CDOS 3176, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 3975, 62 USPQ2d 1385.
92. Defamation
Complaint in defamation action violated Rule 11 where reasonable inquiry would have included reading allegedly
defamatory article and questioning client which would have revealed that statements in question were true. McGhee v
Sanilac County (1991, CA6 Mich) 934 F2d 89, 18 Media L R 2319, 19 FR Serv 3d 860.
Although it is not invariably sanctionable to rely solely on client's word before filing suit, under circumstances of
present case it was unreasonable for plaintiff's attorney not to attempt to verify plaintiff's claims before filing
defamation suit since plaintiff could not prevail at trial unless one or more persons could be found to testify to having
received alleged defamations. Hilton Hotels Corp. v Banov (1990, App DC) 283 US App DC 232, 899 F2d 40.
In action for wrongful discharge, where uncontroverted evidence showed that plaintiff employees had signed releases
in return for severance pay and that plaintiff's attorneys knew of releases before filing claim, and where one plaintiff and
attorneys also pursued slander claim although their investigation showed no evidence to support claim, sanctions are
imposed on plaintiffs and their attorneys. White v General Motors Corp. (1989, DC Kan) 126 FRD 563, affd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded (1990, CA10 Kan) 908 F2d 675, 6 BNA IER Cas 236, 17 FR Serv 3d
384, cert den (1991) 498 US 1069, 112 L Ed 2d 850, 111 S Ct 788, 6 BNA IER Cas 288.
Sanctions will not be imposed on plaintiff, even though he perhaps should have known that group defamation claim
on behalf of 500 Nigerians engaged in international business with U.S. citizens--based on negative television news
magazine program-- could not succeed with such large group, because Second Circuit has determined that FRCP 11(c)
sanctions should be imposed with caution and all doubts be resolved in favor of pleadings signer. Anyanwu v Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. (1995, SD NY) 887 F Supp 690, 24 Media L R 1021.
Sanctions will not be imposed on anti-abortion activist for bringing defamation action against National Organization
for Women and its executive vice-president, who charged activist with being involved in conspiracy to murder abortion
doctors, even though defendants assert there is no conceivable basis for him to argue that statements at issue were
untrue or uttered with actual malice, because, while his claims may ultimately prove meritless based on substantive law,
it cannot be said that claims are completely lacking in either factual or legal basis within meaning of FRCP 11. Horsley
v Feldt (2000, ND Ga) 128 F Supp 2d 1374.
93. Discovery (pre-1993 amendment cases)
Implication in defendant's brief that plaintiff's counsel lied when he stated that witness was too ill to be deposed
warrants sanction under Rule 11, notwithstanding that witness agreed to testify shortly after plaintiff's counsel's last
report, where defendant's counsel could have asked witness whether his health would have permitted him to testify
previously or whether plaintiff's counsel had encouraged him to guard his health zealously, to detriment of discovery
process, but defendant's counsel failed to do so. AM International, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co. (1984, ND Ill) 39 FR
Serv 2d 433.
Pro se petitioners who filed petition to quash summons issued by Internal Revenue Service to bank officer requesting
information concerning petitioners' financial affairs are subject to sanctions under Rule 11 where petition is virtually
identical to those submitted in three prior cases and raise issues which have been conclusively dealt with by courts, and
where, even if petitioners were unaware of existing case law, reasonable inquiry directed to source from which form
petition was obtained would have readily uncovered status of such petitions in courts. Johnson v United States (1985,
ED Pa) 607 F Supp 347, 85-1 USTC P 9384, 1 FR Serv 3d 626, 56 AFTR 2d 5167.
Defendant's failure to produce responsive documentary evidence during course of discovery reflects failure of
defendant and its counsel to conduct reasonable inquiries before filing discovery responses and other pleadings, and
such omissions are sanctionable where undisclosed documents and information refuted asserted factual basis for other
papers filed by defendant. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v Turnage (1987, ND Cal) 115 FRD 543.
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Defendant's motion for sanctions, based on plaintiff's alleged failure to properly respond to discovery requests by
timely turning over to defendant documents in question, was itself a violation of Rule 11 since defendant's motion was
filed in retaliation for plaintiff's motion for sanctions under Rule 37, and reasonable investigation of documents in
question would have revealed that they were not germane to action. Fashion House, Inc. v K Mart Corp. (1988, DC
RI) 124 FRD 15.
94. Endangered species
Where plaintiff's attorney brought suit under Endangered Species Act (16 USCS § § 1531-1544) only one day after
giving notice of intent to sue, instead of waiting 60 days before filing as statute required, and counsel then failed to
disclose to court problem with notice requirement, sanctions were properly imposed since duty of reasonable inquiry
includes duty of reasonable disclosure. Maine Audubon Soc. v Purslow (1990, CA1 Me) 907 F2d 265, 16 FR Serv 3d
1264, 21 ELR 20044.
95. Environmental law
Sanctions are not warranted where third-party defendants in hazardous waste action contended that site operator's
allegation that defendants deposited PCBs at site was so lacking in factual support that reasonable inquiry by counsel
would have determined they were false, because complicated discovery process would be necessary to determine
accuracy of allegations and there is no indication that reasonable inquiry would have shown falsity. New York v Shore
Realty Corp. (1986, ED NY) 648 F Supp 255, 25 Envt Rep Cas 1305, 17 ELR 20588.
96. Expert witnesses
Rule 11 placed presignature obligation on plaintiff and her attorney to conduct reasonable inquiry into qualifications
of their expert before filing pleading containing erroneous information, and costs incurred by defendant as result of
failure to conduct such inquiry are properly assessed against plaintiff and her counsel. Duncan v WJLA-TV, Inc. (1984,
DC Dist Col) 106 FRD 4, 40 FR Serv 2d 1376.
97. Fraud
Actions of plaintiff's attorneys in alleging fraud and criminal conduct without adequate investigation, and in
maintaining that position after discovery depositions revealed all relevant facts and provided logical and reasonable
explanation, violate letter and spirit of both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 USCS § 1927, making
sanctions appropriate. Woodfork v Gavin (1985, ND Miss) 105 FRD 100, 1 FR Serv 3d 209.
Counterclaim, filed in action for dissolution of partnership comprised of father and son, filed by father alleging fraud
and conversion by son, violated Rule 11, where there was no evidence that son was guilty of fraud or conversion and
where father swore under oath to his counsel who notarized counterclaim that contents were true, because there was no
evidence that father engaged in prefiling inquiry and no evidence that allegations of fraud and conversion were well
grounded in fact. Walker v Walker (1994, DC Neb) 854 F Supp 1443.
98. Fraud on court
Where plaintiff brought action to set aside earlier jury verdict for defendant on basis that defendant's trial attorney
conspired with witness to present perjured testimony, and only evidence of this alleged conspiracy was evidentiary
conflict between witnesses testimony and statements made by different party in subsequent lawsuit, such routine
evidentiary conflict does not justify action for fraud on court or serious allegations of attorney misconduct, and
therefore sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff and its attorneys for failure to conduct reasonable factual or legal
investigation before bringing action. Cleveland Demolition Co. v Azcon Scrap Corp., Div. of Gold Fields American
Industries, Inc. (1987, CA4 Va) 827 F2d 984, 8 FR Serv 3d 453.
Although pedestrian committed fraud on court warranting dismissal of negligence action by claiming to have
suffered injuries (including severe carpal tunnel syndrome) in fall on sidewalk, while concealing fact that pedestrian had
incurred carpal tunnel and other injuries before sidewalk accident, court declined to impose sanctions on pedestrian's
counsel; court was, however, disappointed with counsel's claim that evidence of prior accidents had been freely and
voluntarily provided. Hull v Municipality of San Juan (2002, DC Puerto Rico) 230 F Supp 2d 239.
Where fraud had been practiced upon state court and justice defiled, and state court addressed those improprieties
and sanctioned corporations for full amount of city's expenses incurred from litigating there, $ 609,310 plus interest,
instant court found that corporations' actions before it did not warrant sanctions, noting their takings claim was
dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment, and costs were assessed against them. Fala Corp. v United States
(2002) 54 Fed Cl 1.
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99. Immunity
Where defendants claimed absolute immunity based on their appointment by district judge to serve as members of
committee formed to assist that court in administration and distribution of settlement fund, reasonable investigation into
existing law would not have revealed claim to absolute immunity which would be unassailable under particular facts
and circumstances of present case, and accordingly, Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. United States Government ex
rel. Houck v Folding Carton Admin. Committee (1988, ND Ill) 121 FRD 69, 1988-2 CCH Trade Cases P 68177.
In action by citizens against state, minimal research would have revealed that Eleventh Amendment has been
extended by U.S. Supreme Court to bar such suits, and thus Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate. Miles v Georgia Dep't
of Revenue (1992, SD Ga) 143 FRD 302.
100. Injunctive relief
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney who filed motion to set aside summary judgment in attempt
to revive case which was nearly seven years old, even though he admitted that he could find no support for his position.
Berwick Grain Co. v Illinois Dep't of Agric. (2000, CA7 Ill) 217 F3d 502.
Motion for injunction filed by pro se plaintiff with regard to nonparty violated Rule 11 since reasonable inquiry into
facts and law would have shown plaintiff that no basis for injunctive relief exists against nonparty. Thomas v Taylor
(1991, SD Ga) 138 FRD 614.
Plaintiff's attorney violated both spirit and letter of Rule 11 in seeking preliminary injunction where reasonable
investigation of facts would have shown that there was little cause to seek such relief. Super Power Supply v Macase
Indus. Corp. (1994, CD Cal) 154 FRD 249, 94 Daily Journal DAR 4142, 31 USPQ2d 1677, 28 FR Serv 3d 961.
It was objectively unreasonable for plaintiffs' counsel to file affidavits, delayed deposition errata sheets, and
supplemental interrogatory answers in which plaintiffs contradicted their earlier deposition testimony and interrogatory
answers, and district court acted well within its discretion in granting defendants reimbursement for portion of their
attorneys' fees to compensate them for waste of court's and counsels' time. Margo v Weiss (2000, CA2 NY) 213 F3d 55,
54 USPQ2d 1769.
101. Jurisdiction
In action by employee against employer for violations of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USCS § 794(1982), District
Court abused its discretion in ordering Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney for failure to make
reasonable inquiry into jurisdictional basis for cause of action, where plaintiff's attorney necessarily had to rely on
information from plaintiff as to whether defendant received "federal financial assistance" as required by act, where
plaintiff's attorney requested relevant information from the defendants, who declined to provide information, and where
relevant law was unsettled. Kamen v American Tel. & Tel. Co. (1986, CA2 NY) 791 F2d 1006, 1 AD Cas 894, 40 BNA
FEP Cas 1517, 40 CCH EPD P 36163, 4 FR Serv 3d 979 (criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo
1995-76, RIA TC Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM 1916, 95 TNT 33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner
(1995) TC Memo 1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577, 70 CCH TCM 1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Where plaintiff's attorney failed to perform reasonable inquiry into applicable law prior to signing complaint and
overlooked well-established principle of law, and where complaint was jurisdictionally deficient, sanctions were
properly imposed. International Shipping Co., S.A. v Hydra Offshore, Inc. (1989, CA2 NY) 875 F2d 388, 1989 AMC
1701, 13 FR Serv 3d 1134, cert den (1989) 493 US 1003, 107 L Ed 2d 558, 110 S Ct 563.
Plaintiff's failure to determine existence of diversity prior to filing suit and its failure to respond promptly when error
came to light are appropriate grounds for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Pollution Control Indus. of Am. v Van
Gundy (1994, CA7 Ind) 21 F3d 152, 28 FR Serv 3d 604.
Although plaintiff showed poor judgment and engaged in sloppy legal work in asserting diversity jurisdiction, court
did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions where plaintiff's lack of knowledge of defendants' business structures
could have provided reasonable basis for claim of diversity jurisdiction, and where, moreover, defendant was ultimately
held liable. Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v Faberge USA (1994, CA2 NY) 23 F3d 41, 28 FR Serv 3d
1505.
Defendant national banking associations, deemed citizens of every state in which they were located, had presence in
Texas, where plaintiff insurance company was corporate citizen, yet insufficient jurisdictional inquiry was made at trial;
circuit court remanded to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed, whether any nondiverse parties were
dispensable, whether some jurisdiction might be salvaged, and whether Rule 11 sanctions should have been imposed on
appellant's counsel. United Republic Ins. Co. v Chase Manhattan Bank (2003, CA2 NY) 315 F3d 168.
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Plaintiff and her counsel were required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) to establish evidentiary support for amount in
controversy prior to filing in federal court, and it was not acceptable to file federal suit with no basis for assertion that
stakes exceed $ 75,000, and then use discovery process to have merits resolved ahead of any jurisdictional inquiry.
Macken v Jensen (2003, CA7 Ill) 333 F3d 797.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's counsel has duty to out-of-state defendant to make reasonable inquiry as to nature,
quality, or quantity of defendant's contacts with state for compliance with long-arm statute; it matters not that action
was first filed in state court. Hasty v Paccar, Inc. (1984, ED Mo) 583 F Supp 1577, 40 FR Serv 2d 1213.
Where plaintiffs were represented by experienced law firm which had sufficient time, manpower, and expertise to
determine appropriate forum prior to filing action, and plaintiffs' counsel do not contend that they were misled
concerning citizenship of defendants, and reasonable investigation would have disclosed fact that diversity of
citizenship did not exist, plaintiffs' counsel violated Rule 11 and will be required to pay defendants' attorney fees for
defending action in federal court before it was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs and refiled in state court. Hussey
Copper, Ltd. v Oxford Financial Group (1987, WD Pa) 121 FRD 252.
Plaintiff in diversity action against builder is denied Rule 11 sanctions on grounds that defendants in their motion to
dismiss action for lack of in personam jurisdiction alleged "fact" that plaintiff had signed condominium contract in
Florida where there is nothing to suggest that builder's attorney did not make reasonable inquiry into facts before
confusing them. David v Weitzman (1987, DC Conn) 677 F Supp 95.
Filing of complaint involving custody dispute in federal court was violation of Rule 11 since even cursory review of
law would have revealed defect in subject matter jurisdiction and since state court had already made determination of
custody on merits, and thus it was patently clear that claim had absolutely no chance of success. Neustein v Orbach
(1990, ED NY) 130 FRD 12, 16 FR Serv 3d 224.
Breach of contract plaintiff's attorney must pay defendants' attorney's fees under Rule 11, following dismissal of
breach of contract action for lack of in personam jurisdiction over defendants, because attorney made no reasonable
prefiling inquiry to determine whether defendants had contacts with Illinois sufficient to support court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them. Phoenix Airway Inn Assoc. v Essex Financial Services, Inc. (1990, ND Ill) 741 F Supp
734, 18 FR Serv 3d 24.
Action brought seeking to overturn arbitrator's decision that plaintiff had been fired for just cause was sanctionable
as frivolous where pleadings indicated almost complete lack of understanding of law applicable to vacating arbitrator's
labor grievance decision. Ridge v United States Postal Service (1992, ND Ill) 154 FRD 182, app dismd (1993, CA7)
1993 US App LEXIS 879.
Where reasonable investigation by defendant would have shown that defense of lack of personal jurisdiction had
been waived, filing of motion for summary judgment based on this defense violated Rule 11. Committe v Dennis
Reimer Co., L.P.A. (1993, DC Vt) 150 FRD 495.
Plaintiff's personal injury suit is dismissed and plaintiff's counsel is sanctioned $ 1,000 under 1983 version of FRCP
11, where plaintiff was Maryland resident and first-named defendant--in suit arising out of injury suffered on water
slide in oceanfront resort town--was also Maryland corporation, because plaintiff's counsel persisted in suit long after it
should have been apparent that jurisdictional foundation did not exist, arguing frivolously that supplemental jurisdiction
could be used to avoid or defeat rule of complete diversity. Ware v Jolly Roger Rides (1994, DC Md) 857 F Supp 462.
Plaintiff's counsel is sanctioned $ 5,000 under FRCP 11 for filing and pursuing federal action against Indian casino
operators, where lawsuit combined into single complaint 3 separate, unrelated claims, and alleged that there was
jurisdiction over both defendants by reason of 28 USCS § § 1332, 1332, and 1343, because, in fact, federal courts do
not have jurisdiction over either defendant under any of these laws, or any other law. Charland v Little Six, Inc. (2000,
DC Minn) 112 F Supp 2d 858, 47 FR Serv 3d 1152.
Counsel for employee failed to allege jurisdiction properly under any of claims in complaint and his lack of
knowledge of elemental standards of federal pleading practice caused court to sanction employee's counsel by way of
order to pay defendants' reasonable attorney fees incurred in litigation plus costs and expenses. Soler v P.R. Tel. Co.
(2002, DC Puerto Rico) 230 F Supp 2d 232, 54 FR Serv 3d 976.
102. Labor relations
Rule 11 attorney fees and sanctions against defendant union for alleged contumacious conduct are not warranted,
where employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) union counsel, relying primarily on union for factual
support for claim, made reasonable inquiry into facts, (2) although unaccepted by court, position argued by union was
plausible view of law, (3) union's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation, but
was legitimate challenge to employer's acts, and (4) no facts were ever revealed suggesting union should have changed
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its litigation position, so union did not fail to properly review and reevaluate its position as case developed. Marshall
Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660
F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff employer for allegedly filing baseless complaint are not warranted, where
employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) employer counsel's inquiry into facts, relying heavily
on her client and its agents, was not unreasonable, (2) inquiry into law resulted in taking of position that was plausible
and accepted by court, (3) employer's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation,
but was in legitimate pursuit of its perceived rights, and (4) employer complied with reevaluation obligation by agreeing
that employee discharge issue was arbitrable. Marshall Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660 F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
FRCP 11 sanctions are not warranted in discharged employees' challenge to arbitration, even though claims for
vacating arbitration awards lacked merit, because (1) some issues raised have not yet been addressed by Sixth Circuit,
(2) not all state tort claims were preempted by federal labor law, and (3) there was proper investigation into factual
merits of claims. Blanchard v Simpson Plainwell Paper Co. (1995, WD Mich) 925 F Supp 510.
103. Malicious prosecution
Counterclaim which alleged malicious prosecution was filed without reasonable prefiling inquiry into requirements
of such claim and therefore violated Rule 11, since even minimal inquiry into law of malicious prosecution would have
revealed that such claim requires termination of allegedly offending lawsuit in favor of party now claiming malicious
prosecution, which had not occurred in present case. Doe v Maywood Hous. Auth. (1995, CA7 Ill) 71 F3d 1294, 33 FR
Serv 3d 1006.
104. Medical staff privileges
Sanctions are imposed against group of chiropractors who brought action against hospitals for alleged refusal to
grant staff privileges where chiropractors did not individually request privileges through normal channels, where they
were not individually denied privileges, where only effort to obtain privileges was demand letter from counsel for group
for privileges for all chiropractors as alternative to lawsuit, where demand was made without regard to individual
qualifications or hospitals' legitimate business interests and where purpose of suit was to coerce rather than raise
legitimate controversy because Rule 11 imposes affirmative duty on counsel to make reasonable inquiry into facts and
law and not to interpose pleadings for improper purposes, and reasonable inquiry would have shown request for
privileges through channels and denial thereof was prerequisite to action notwithstanding subjective belief that denial
would have been made regardless, and court has affirmative duty under Rule 11 to impose sanctions for baseless
litigation. Colorado Chiropractic Council v Porter Memorial Hospital (1986, DC Colo) 650 F Supp 231, 1986-2 CCH
Trade Cases P 67215.
Sanctions against plaintiff under FRCP 11 are not warranted, even though court dismissed his wrongful garnishment
claim after finding it to be in nature of malicious prosecution action, where other jurisdictions have used term "abuse of
process" to refer to wrongful garnishment, because law is arguably unclear and suit was not unreasonable. Vanover v
Cook (1999, DC Kan) 77 F Supp 2d 1176.
105. Parties
Where affidavits were filed which swore that one of named defendants had not been involved in matters which were
subject of complaint, and plaintiff subsequently filed amended complaint which still named defendant in question, it is
evident that plaintiff conducted no inquiry before repeating baseless charges, and frivolous amended complaint violated
Rule 11. Townsend v Holman Consulting Corp. (1991, CA9 Cal) 929 F2d 1358.
Where complaint named as defendant corporation believed, on basis of similar names and shared logo, to be parent
company of intended defendant, such assumption was not unreasonable and should not result in sanctions, but where
plaintiff's attorney made no further investigation before filing amended complaint and named defendant had during this
time provided proof that it was not parent company of alleged wrongdoer, sanctions will be imposed for filing of
amended complaint naming same corporation as defendant as was named in original complaint. Fuji Photo Film
U.S.A., Inc. v Aero Mayflower Transit Co. (1986, SD NY) 112 FRD 664, 6 FR Serv 3d 188.
Where plaintiff's counsel stated that he relied upon hearsay statements made by 2 individuals to his client concerning
defendant's connection with matters which formed basis of lawsuit, but attorney produced no supporting affidavits from
these individuals, it appears that defendant was joined to lawsuit upon hope that as discovery progressed he would
somehow be implicated; therefore, plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 11 by failing to conduct reasonable factual inquiry
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and by neglecting his continuing obligation to re-evaluate his client's position as facts were discovered. Mike Ousley
Productions, Inc. v Cabot (1990, SD Ga) 130 FRD 155, affd (1992, CA11 Ga) 952 F2d 380, 21 FR Serv 3d 1329.
In action in which plaintiff sued wrong corporation because plaintiff's counsel ignored at least eight items of
information that would have warned reasonable lawyer of possibility of error regarding corporate status of defendant,
plaintiff's attorney violate Rule 11 by not making prefiling investigation regarding corporate status of defendant.
Temple v WISAP USA (1993, DC Neb) 152 FRD 591.
In action by employees against employer under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 USCS § § 201 et seq.) in
which caption named only "OTR Drivers" as party plaintiff, with "consents" signed by individual employees attached,
plaintiffs' attorney's use of mere descriptive term as plaintiff was improper since there was no capacity to sue as
representative of employees, but attorney's error does not prove that he failed to inquire into procedural and
jurisdictional requirements prior to filing action, although he clearly misapprehended those requirements; however,
simple error alone does not establish violation of Rule 11, and therefore sanctions will not be imposed. OTR Drivers v
Frito-Lay (1995, DC Ky) 160 FRD 146, 2 BNA WH Cas 2d 981.
Sanctions against plaintiff were proper where plaintiff was licensed attorney who provided her own attorney in
employment discrimination case with apparently incorrect information as to who should be named as defendants.
Sussman v Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A. (1993, MD Fla) 150 FRD 209, 7 FLW Fed D 304.
106. Patents
District court did not abuse its discretion in patent case by denying third parties' motion for Rule 11 sanctions against
defendant where case presented difficult legal and factual issues, defendant's counsel did not disregard their obligation
to support their positions by relevant legal authority, and defendant submitted well-researched arguments in professional
manner that assisted court in addressing issues, although court ultimately found defendant's arguments unpersuasive.
Additive Controls & Measurement Sys. v Flowdata, Inc. (1996, CA FC) 96 F3d 1390, 40 USPQ2d 1106, 35 FR Serv 3d
1285, subsequent app (1998, CA FC) 154 F3d 1345, 47 USPQ2d 1906, reh den (1998, CA FC) 1998 US App LEXIS
26534.
Where claim of patent infringement was not unreasonable in light of information available at time of filing, but claim
was withdrawn following discovery and shortly before trial, trial court properly denied sanctions which had been sought
on grounds of failure to conduct adequate prefiling investigation. Rohm & Haas Co. v Brotech Corp. (1997, CA FC)
127 F3d 1089, 44 USPQ2d 1459, reh, en banc, den (1997, CA FC) 1997 US App LEXIS 35546.
Plaintiff company which brought suit for patent infringement, alleging that it was exclusive licensee of patent when
in fact it had non-exclusive license, will have sanctions imposed on it since reasonable inquiry would have shown that
license agreement gave plaintiff non-exclusive rights to patent. Michod v Walker Magnetics Group, Inc. (1987, ND Ill)
115 FRD 345, 4 USPQ2d 1815.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff which filed suit against patent holder where only controversy was between
plaintiff and patent holder's licensee and reasonable inquiry would have revealed that patent holder was not responsible
for actions of its licensee which had no authority to act on behalf of patent holder. Sherman Treaters, Ltd. v Ahlbrandt
(1987, DC Dist Col) 115 FRD 519.
Counsel for defendant in patent infringement action are subject to sanctions under Rule 11 where they filed motion
to dismiss or transfer on basis of inaccurate representation that accused products were never made or used in defendant's
manufacturing facility in district, and where they chose to make only cursory investigation of facts in 2 months between
filing of complaint and defendant's motion to dismiss. Coburn Optical Industries, Inc. v Cilco, Inc. (1985, MD NC)
610 F Supp 656, 226 USPQ 1018.
107. Personal injury or death
District Court abused its discretion in denying motion for sanctions under Rule 11 where pre-filing investigation
conducted by plaintiff's attorneys was insufficient because it failed to disclose that claim against drug manufacturer
based on products liability theory was well grounded in fact or that there existed any likelihood that additional medical
records would be located which would identify proper defendants, who could have been found through reasonable
inquiry prior to filing. Albright v Upjohn Co. (1986, CA6 Ky) 788 F2d 1217, 5 FR Serv 3d 786.
Where attorney's investigation before filing of complaint was not so lacking as to constitute bad faith, nor was
violation of pre-1983 version of Rule 11 shown, sanctions would not be imposed on attorney who asserted market share
and enterprise theories of liability and named as defendant in wrongful death suit every manufacturer of chemical
responsible for decedent's death where it could not be determined which company had supplied chemical to decedent's
employer. Glaser v Cincinnati Milacron, Inc. (1986, CA3 Pa) 808 F2d 285, 6 FR Serv 3d 737.
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Motion made pursuant to Rule 11 to dismiss action for injunctive and monetary relief against defendants for
defendants' alleged contamination of water supply with leukemia-causing trichloroethylene (TCE) is denied, even
though plaintiff may not have conclusive evidence that TCE causes leukemia, since evidence that TCE causes other
health problems and statistical evidence regarding incidence of leukemia constitutes sufficient basis for good faith belief
that TCE was factor contributing to plaintiff's illness and plaintiff's counsel checked complaint line by line with retained
expert and was advised that each allegation was justified. Anderson v Cryovac, Inc. (1983, DC Mass) 96 FRD 431, 19
Envt Rep Cas 1405, 37 FR Serv 2d 980.
Attorney, representing seamen in their asbestosis claims, who sought voluntary dismissal of claims on grounds that
they were too expensive to pursue did not violate Rule 11 where he conducted reasonable investigation before filing,
including obtaining expert opinion that plaintiffs had asbestosis, and where evidence available to him made it
reasonable for him to conclude that plaintiffs had contracted asbestosis as result of their work, and where attorney,
although perhaps overzealous, did not act improperly, and to impose sanctions would violate spirit of Rule 11 by going
beyond its intent. Whittington v Ohio River Co. (1987, ED Ky) 115 FRD 201, 1987 AMC 2867, 7 FR Serv 3d 636.
In personal injury suit dealing with allegedly defective helmet, where minimal investigation would have shown that
defendant company was not yet incorporated at time helmet was purchased and therefore could not have manufactured
it, filing of complaint violated Rule 11, and sanction equal to defendant's costs and fees will be imposed on plaintiffs'
attorney to be paid to defendant. Jones v International Riding Helmets (1992, ND Ga) 145 FRD 120, affd (1995, CA11
Ga) 49 F3d 692, 31 FR Serv 3d 713, 8 FLW Fed C 1139.
108. Punitive or liquidated damages
Plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 11 by persisting in asserting that county could be held liable for punitive damages
where adequate prefiling investigation would have revealed that claim was not valid. Waltz v County of Lycoming
(1992, CA3 Pa) 974 F2d 387, 23 FR Serv 3d 432, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA3) 1992 US App LEXIS 24488.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney who filed claim alleging violations of Title VII (42 USCS § §
2000e et seq.) and seeking liquidated and exemplary damages, even though it was clear that Title VII did not allow
recovery of liquidated and exemplary damages, especially as attorney conceded that he had not made reasonable inquiry
into legal basis for claiming such damages, although he described his mistake as "drafting oversight." Chambers v
American Trans Air (1994, CA7 Ind) 17 F3d 998, 64 BNA FEP Cas 213, 63 CCH EPD P 42862, 28 FR Serv 3d 83, reh,
en banc, den (1994, CA7 Ind) 1994 US App LEXIS 9695.
109. Recusal of judge
Counsel exceeds bounds of advocacy by filing motion to vacate order and grant rehearing based on judge's failure to
recuse himself where sole basis for motion is letter from person not involved in case and where counsel files motion
without investigating accuracy of statements in letter when reasonable inquiry would have enabled counsel to learn of
factual errors. Maier v Orr (1985, CA) 758 F2d 1578.
110. Removal of action to federal court
District Court properly imposes sanctions under Rule 11 against counsel who filed removal petition, where counsel
could have discovered by reasonable effort that case was no longer removable, notwithstanding contention that
counsel's ignorance should be excused because certain research steps were taken and because no ill intent existed.
McLaughlin v Western Casualty & Surety Co. (1985, SD Ala) 105 FRD 624.
District Court imposed sanctions on defendant's attorney, who had filed petition for removal to District Court, which
was based on memorandum prepared by codefendant's counsel, where defendant's counsel conducted no independent
inquiry into legal basis for removal and where there was, in fact, no legal basis for petition whatsoever. Pravic v U.S.
Industries-Clearing (1986, ED Mich) 109 FRD 620.
Where defendants removed case purportedly pursuant to 28 USCS § 1441, which prohibits removal where any
defendant is citizen of jurisdiction in which action is brought, reasonable inquiry would have shown that such removal
was improper since one of defendants was citizen of original jurisdiction, and therefore sanctions are imposed. Elanex
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v Wegner & Bretschneider, P.C. (1989, DC Dist Col) 129 FRD 381, 15 FR Serv 3d 242.
Contempt sanctions are warranted against attorney, where attorney and client were held jointly and severally liable
for Rule 11 sanctions and attorney did not pay his share and then subsequently violated court-ordered payment plan for
reimbursement of client for sanctions he paid but attorney owed, since client must be compensated and attorney must be
coerced to follow court order. Verone v Taconic Tel. Corp. (1993, ND NY) 826 F Supp 632, supp op (ND NY) 826 F
Supp 632.
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Sanction of $ 1,000 monetary penalty is imposed on counsel for defendant employer in pregnancy discrimination
case, where counsel, perhaps motivated by overly aggressive desire to get his clients into federal forum, pursued
insupportable argument that filing of EEOC complaint necessarily invokes Title VII (42 USCS § § 2000e et seq.)
retaliation claim, because removal of action violated FRCP 11(b)(2). Knestrick v IBM (1996, ED Mich) 945 F Supp
1080, 72 BNA FEP Cas 969, 70 CCH EPD P 44589.
Where consumers' motion to remand their action for breach of warranties, negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation regarding allegedly defective seat belts was granted, even though there had been number of similar
cases filed against manufacturer in other circuits in which removal had been found to be improper, court refused to
grant sanctions as manufacturer's removal was not objectively frivolous where its theory of removal had not yet been
rejected by other federal courts in those circumstances. Coker v Daimlerchrysler Corp. (2002, ND Ga) 220 F Supp 2d
1367.
In employment discrimination case, because court concluded that corporate employer's removal was proper,
employee's request for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 USCS § 1447(c) was denied; employer's request for
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(1)(A) sanctions was contained in its opposition to employee's motion to remand, was therefore
procedurally defective, and more importantly, employee's motion to remand was not so patently frivolous as to warrant
sanctions. Arellano v Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2003, SD Cal) 245 F Supp 2d 1102.
111. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
Attorney failed his Rule 11 duty to make reasonable inquiry as to merit of pleadings he signed where plaintiff's
claims arose out of same nucleus of operative fact as those which he had raised in earlier unsuccessful lawsuit. Holley
v Guiffrida (1986, DC Dist Col) 112 FRD 172, 41 CCH EPD P 36583.
112. RICO
Sanctions were properly imposed on defendant for asserting RICO counterclaim where reasonable prefiling
investigation was not made and where trial judge found counterclaim without merit and part of defensive strategy
designed to make cost of litigation so high that plaintiff would be forced to abandon fight. Chapman & Cole v Itel
Container Int'l B.V. (1989, CA5 Tex) 865 F2d 676, 13 FR Serv 3d 124, cert den (1989) 493 US 872, 107 L Ed 2d 155,
110 S Ct 201.
Where complaint alleged violation of RICO statute (18 USCS § 1962), yet facts known to attorney at time
complaint was signed showed no apparent connection between plaintiffs and defendant, attorney had duty to investigate
to substantiate defendant's role in RICO enterprise and failure of attorney to go beyond mere reliance on word of client
was insufficient to discharge duty imposed by Rule 11. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v Integrated Resources, Inc.
(1987, SD NY) 114 FRD 684, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67467, 6 FR Serv 3d 1092.
Purchaser of seller's assets and right to corporate name is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions despite seller's assertion
that purchaser allegedly filed RICO cross-claim in order to gain leverage in arbitration proceeding, to obtain additional
discovery, and without reasonable investigation into facts supporting personal jurisdiction over individual defendants,
where (1) there is substantial authority that RICO claims are not arbitrable, (2) RICO action is distinct legal claim and
purchaser is entitled to discovery, and (3) there is colorable ground for exercise of personal jurisdiction on RICO claim.
J.D. Marshall International, Inc. v Redstart, Inc. (1987, ND Ill) 656 F Supp 830.
Deterrence value of FRCP 11 is particularly important in RICO context, as commencement of civil RICO action has
almost inevitable stigmatizing effect on those named as defendants. Katzman v Victoria's Secret Catalogue (1996, SD
NY) 167 FRD 649, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9073, reh den (1996, SD NY) 939 F Supp 274 and affd (1997, CA2
NY) 113 F3d 1229, reported in full (1997, CA2 NY) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9313.
Attorney was subject to sanctions where attorney was instructed by court to investigate carefully before deciding
whether to file amended complaint, and thereafter filed amended RICO complaint that no reasonable and competent
attorney would have believed had merit. Martinez v Martinez (2002, DC NM) 207 F Supp 2d 1303, RICO Bus Disp
Guide (CCH) P 10293.
Defendant's request for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 were denied where court had found that there was
sufficient evidence to withstand motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' RICO claim under 18 USCS § 1962(c)
where defendant has simultaneously drawn salary as president of wholesaler and personally kept sales commissions
from manufacturer. USA Certified Merchs., LLC v Koebel (2003, SD NY) 262 F Supp 2d 319.
113. Seizure or forfeiture of property
Rule 11 does not create independent cause of action, but rather creates remedial tool available to court where clear
showing is made of improper conduct on part of person signing and filing pleading; government is entitled to summary
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judgment on counterclaim for sanctions based on contention that government counsel filed complaint for seizure of
counterfeit drugs without first making reasonable inquiry as to whether it was well grounded in fact and warranted by
law. United States v Articles of Drug (1984, DC Neb) 601 F Supp 392.
114. Securities
Where complaint alleging securities violations was signed by 2 attorneys, and neither attorney had previous
experience in area and neither researched or read relevant case law, both attorneys failed to make reasonable inquiry,
and since neither was aware of precedent in jurisdiction which held contrary to arguments raised in complaint, they
could not have intended good faith argument for reversal of existing law. Crookham v Crookham (1990, CA8 Iowa)
914 F2d 1027, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95479, 17 FR Serv 3d 1381.
Securities fraud plaintiffs' counsel is denied reconsideration of sanctions imposed pursuant to FRCP 11, even though
he argues he filed nonfrivolous lawsuit with just one unwarranted claim, where, in fact, approximately 17 of 19 pages of
amended complaint set forth allegations primarily--if not exclusively--relevant to 15 USCS § 78n(e) claim deemed
frivolous, because complaint was primarily frivolous. Polar Int'l Brokerage Corp. v Reeve (2000, SD NY) 120 F Supp
2d 267, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91209.
Sanctions were not warranted since investors' allegations of securities misconduct were not frivolous and were
sufficient to be submitted to jury, regardless of fact that investors' arguments were unconvincing to court or to jury;
investors' allegations had testimonial support, and fact that jury found testimony of financial advisors' witnesses more
credible than that of investors did not indicate that investors' allegations lacked factual basis, proper inquiry, or proper
motive. Crawford v Deutsche Bank AG (2003, ED Va) 271 F Supp 2d 829.
115. Service of process
Where plaintiffs served wrong individual, who had same name as intended defendant, because he was only one by
that name listed in telephone directory, sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs for failure to make reasonable
inquiry. Callahan v Schoppe (1989, CA5 Tex) 864 F2d 44, 12 FR Serv 3d 1434.
Defendant's guilty plea was voluntary despite defendant's contentions that defendant's attorney threatened defendant
where instant court held that attorney merely warned defendant and also where defendant stated at plea colloquy that
plea was free and voluntary and made with advice of counsel. United States v Cothran (2002, CA5 La) 302 F3d 279.
Sanctions against plaintiff are not warranted where, although plaintiff failed to personally serve defendant, she
exercised reasonable diligence in her attempts to do so and acted on information obtained through reasonable inquiries.
Baden v Craig-Hallum, Inc. (1987, DC Minn) 115 FRD 582.
Sanctions must be imposed where any responsible attorney making reasonable inquiry would have discovered that
there simply exists no support for plaintiffs' argument that service was improper. Gutterman v Eimicke (1989, ED NY)
125 FRD 348, 14 FR Serv 3d 74.
116. Standing
Where plaintiff did not have standing to bring suit alleging violation of particular federal statute, and plaintiff's
attorneys voluntarily dismissed complaint after 6 months of discovery, it is apparent that plaintiff's attorneys failed to
make adequate prefiling investigation, and therefore sanctions are warranted, but sanction of $ 300 will be imposed
instead of full amount of attorney fees since lesser amount is sufficient deterrent. Muraoka v American Osteopathic
Asso. (1987, ND Ill) 117 FRD 616, 45 BNA FEP Cas 419, 45 CCH EPD P 37705.
117. Statute of limitations
Although statute of limitations provided good defense in end, Rule 11 requirement of reasonable inquiry into facts
and law supporting pleading was not violated where plaintiffs had nonfrivolous argument for avoiding limitations bar.
O'Connell v Champion International Corp. (1987, CA8 Minn) 812 F2d 393, 48 BNA FEP Cas 504, 42 CCH EPD P
36919, 7 FR Serv 3d 107.
Fine of $ 500 imposed under Rule 11 against attorney where two counts in complaint he filed were dismissed with
prejudice by court in previous action and two other counts were time-barred, because reasonable inquiry would have
revealed futility of refiling these claims in second action. Ruffin v ITT Continental Baking Co. (1986, ND Miss) 636 F
Supp 857.
Where cursory investigation of documents contained in plaintiff's file irrefutably demonstrated that he had not filed
his suit within set time limits, at best, plaintiff's attorney failed to conduct reasonable investigation before filing motion,
and at worst, he deliberately misrepresented jurisdictional facts to court and therefore violated Rule 11 by filing
frivolous pleadings. Comer v Interstate United Corp. (1988, ND Ill) 119 FRD 392, 48 CCH EPD P 38441.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Complaint filed after expiration of statute of limitations was unreasonable for purposes of Rule 11, and pro se litigant
who refused to voluntarily dismiss action when informed of deficiency will have sanction imposed amounting to
defendant's costs and fees related to filing of motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and sanctions. Brown v
Consolidated Freightway (1993, ND Ga) 152 FRD 656, 64 CCH EPD P 43175.
Products liability defendant will not be sanctioned for arguing that plaintiff's refiling in federal court was untimely,
where argument was based on interpretation of state savings statute providing for commencement of new actions within
6 months of "failure" of action otherwise than upon merits, because argument that action failed when judge granted
voluntary dismissal motion--instead of when journal entry was signed and filed--was not convincing but was
reasonable. Matzke v Merck & Co. (1994, DC Kan) 848 F Supp 936.
Sanctions will be imposed against employer under FRCP 11, where union contends employer knew that it was filing
untimely complaint to vacate arbitration award, even though employer asserts its argument for equitable tolling was not
frivolous, because (1) employer failed to show that counsel's negligence in filing complaint was in any sense
"excusable," and (2) case law leaves no room for urging that "excusable neglect" is sufficient grounds for equitable
tolling. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. v United Plant Guard Workers, Local 538 (1996, DC Conn) 989 F Supp 102.
118. Taxation
Taxpayer who filed petition to quash summons issued by Internal Revenue Service to bank as third-party
recordkeeper to obtain testimony and examine books, papers, and other records of taxpayer is ordered to appear and
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on him under Rule 11, where face of complaint shows that taxpayer
not only failed to make reasonable inquiry into whether he had good cause of action before filing suit, but also
deliberately sought to harass and cause needless litigation. White v United States (1986, ED NC) 629 F Supp 992, 86-2
USTC P 9653, 58 AFTR 2d 5345.
In action seeking injunctive relief from government's efforts to collect money allegedly owed by plaintiff to IRS,
although plaintiff informed her attorney on eve of hearing that she had found notice of assessment and demand for
payment which complaint alleged that plaintiff had not received, attorney did not violate Rule 11 where he had
requested all relevant documents from plaintiff and had checked IRS records and reasonably believed notice had not
been sent, since attorney could not be held liable for his client's disorganization and failure to find notice. Taylor v
United States (1993, DC Kan) 151 FRD 389.
Taxpayer's refund action is dismissed and she is sanctioned $ 500 for each tax year refund sought, for total of $
2,000, where she failed to file properly executed tax return or administrative refund claim thereby depriving court of
jurisdiction, and she has been charged $ 500 penalty on at least 2 occasions by IRS but is apparently undeterred,
because her conduct falls squarely within type of offending behavior targeted by FRCP 11. Ruble v United States (2001,
ND Ga) 159 F Supp 2d 1381, 2001-2 USTC P 50559, 88 AFTR 2d 5078.
119. Unjust enrichment
District Court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiff for failing to investigate legal basis for claim where
suit alleged unjust enrichment, yet plaintiff had never conferred any benefit on defendant, and plaintiff's counsel failed
to locate any legal authority to support argument for extension or modification of existing theory of unjust enrichment.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v Association of Flight Attendants (1988, App DC) 274 US App DC 370,
864 F2d 173, 130 BNA LRRM 2307, 110 CCH LC P 10866, 12 FR Serv 3d 979.
120. Miscellaneous
Sanctions imposed against plaintiff and its attorneys were proper where attorneys delayed almost 3 months in
investigating merits of case and then, claiming impending limitations deadline left no time for investigation, relied
solely on client's assertions in filing claim and never examined records of previous actions between parties to determine
if position taken in complaint was justified. Southern Leasing Partners v McMullan (1986, CA5 Miss) 801 F2d 783,
1988 AMC 608, 5 FR Serv 3d 753 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Childs v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1994, CA5 La) 29 F3d 1018, 29 FR Serv 3d 1032).
Sanctions were properly imposed on both plaintiff and his attorney where dates of transgressions alleged in amended
complaint were later changed in response to interrogatories, making it apparent that attorney had not made reasonable
inquiries before filing complaint and showing that transgressions alleged in amended complaint had nothing to do with
impropriety alleged in original complaint and that amended complaint was completely frivolous. McCabe v General
Foods Corp. (1987, CA9 Cal) 811 F2d 1336, 1 BNA IER Cas 1632, 106 CCH LC P 55696, 7 FR Serv 3d 882, 96 ALR
Fed 1.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney on grounds that he failed to make reasonable inquiry into law
and facts where claims were totally unsupported by existing law and were legally insufficient, particularly since
attorney in question was third attorney who worked on case and he failed to inquire why previous attorneys left, and
since record by time he entered case showed case was not supported by facts. Brown v Federation of State Medical
Bds. (1987, CA7 Ill) 830 F2d 1429, 44 CCH EPD P 37398, 9 FR Serv 3d 1 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Mars
Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Where complaint was frivolous and filed without prior, reasonable inquiry into law, as evidenced by fact that
complaint was based on theory which previous case law had rejected, sanctions must be imposed, and fact that
defendant's attorney spent considerable time researching law and preparing motion to dismiss is insufficient to show
that case was complex and that sanctions were therefore inappropriate. Frantz v United States Powerlifting Federation
(1987, CA7 Ill) 836 F2d 1063, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67832, 9 FR Serv 3d 1337.
Sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuit were properly imposed on pro se plaintiff for filing suit attempting to relitigate
claims settled in prior unsuccessful lawsuits, since reasonable person of plaintiff's education, given reasonable time in
law library, should have been able to determine that no basis for suit existed, and plaintiff is not shielded by fact that he
acted pro se. Patterson v Aiken (1988, CA11 Ga) 841 F2d 386, 1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67941, 10 FR Serv 3d
1232.
Counsel's failure to properly investigate facts prior to filing suit and his failure to withdraw complaint when facts
were revealed to him by defendants' attorney during early stages of discovery warrant imposition of sanctions for failure
to make reasonable efforts to insure that pleading he signs is grounded in fact. Alvarado-Morales v Digital Equipment
Corp. (1988, CA1 Puerto Rico) 843 F2d 613, 10 FR Serv 3d 1350.
District Court's basis for imposing sanctions, failure to present specific facts, did not adequately credit information
plaintiffs' attorney had uncovered, and plaintiffs were not obliged to prove their case in order to escape sanctions.
Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v Lingle (1988, CA3 Pa) 847 F2d 90, 1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68028, 11 FR Serv 3d 255,
99 ALR Fed 553.
Where reasonable inquiry into law and facts of plaintiff's claim would have told his attorney that claim was
inadequate at time he signed pleading, and where attorney made no effort to establish facts necessary to support
plaintiff's claim and, in fact, did not believe such evidence was available, award of sanctions was justified. St. Amant v
Bernard (1988, CA5 La) 859 F2d 379, 48 BNA FEP Cas 510, 48 CCH EPD P 38426, 12 FR Serv 3d 1199.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney for failure to make reasonable inquiry where he did not even
contact 3 pivotal parties until after first amended complaint was filed, and where he persisted in naming large number of
defendants even after he was advised that case law established that such individuals had no liability. King v Idaho
Funeral Service Asso. (1988, CA9 Idaho) 862 F2d 744, 1988-2 CCH Trade Cases P 68349, 12 FR Serv 3d 1078.
Where complaint, affidavit, and appellate briefs together fell short of establishing case or controversy between
plaintiff and particular defendants, making it clear that plaintiff and his attorney had failed to investigate both factual
and legal aspects of claim, Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed. Greening v Moran (1992, CA7 Ill) 953 F2d 301,
21 FR Serv 3d 1372, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA7) 1992 US App LEXIS 2695 and cert den (1992) 506 US 824, 121 L
Ed 2d 42, 113 S Ct 77.
District court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiff's attorneys who had made numerous frivolous
arguments, relied on overruled case law, made arguments contrary to existing law, and relied on affidavits containing
blatant misrepresentations, thus showing their failure to make reasonable prefiling inquiry into facts. Villar v Crowley
Maritime Corp. (1993, CA5 Tex) 990 F2d 1489, 25 FR Serv 3d 1442, reh, en banc, den (1993, CA5 Tex) 997 F2d 883
and cert den (1994) 510 US 1044, 126 L Ed 2d 658, 114 S Ct 690 and (criticized in Marathon Oil Co. v Ruhrgas (1998,
CA5 Tex) 145 F3d 211).
Where counsel obtained declarations from private investigator, and during depositions ability and veracity of
investigator became suspect and serious issues of credibility and authenticity of declarants surfaced, but counsel
nevertheless filed declarations with court, under circumstances, counsel violated their duty to conduct reasonable
inquiry to determine that declarations were well-grounded in fact. Security Farms v International Bhd. of Teamsters
(1997, CA9 Cal) 124 F3d 999, 97 CDOS 6727, 97 Daily Journal DAR 10940, 156 BNA LRRM 2148, 134 CCH LC P
10046, 47 Fed Rules Evid Serv 597, 38 FR Serv 3d 856.
In action against pension fund seeking additional retirement benefits for time period when plaintiff was still
employed part-time, where plan clearly foreclosed benefits for one in plaintiff's position, both plaintiff and his attorney
should have known or through reasonable investigation discovered that plaintiff was not entitled to benefits which he
sought, and therefore sanctions were warranted. Senese v Chicago Area Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Fund (2001,
CA7 Ill) 237 F3d 819, 25 EBC 1721, reh den (2001, CA7 Ill) 2001 US App LEXIS 2206.
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District court's award of sanctions for costs incurred in responding to investor group's filing of motion for mootness
was reversed and remanded because investor group's withdrawal of its tender offer rendered moot both sides' claims
under § 14(e) (15 USCS § 78n(e)) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934; investor group's position that case was moot
was correct, and accordingly, it could not serve as basis for imposition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions. Hartmarx Corp.
v Abboud (2003, CA7 Ill) 326 F3d 862, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92402.
Rule 11 is violated where plaintiff filed suit more than 2 years after underlying incident, subsequently amended his
complaint, and yet 8 months into litigation summarizes facts supporting his allegations as "none" and "none yet." Foster
v Michelin Tire Corp. (1985, CD Ill) 108 FRD 412.
Sanctions will be imposed where reasonable amount of research would have revealed to attorney that there was no
legal foundation for position which he has taken in pleadings. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga)
112 FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app
(1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
Rule mandates imposition of sanction where there is no indication in any of papers filed by plaintiff's attorney that he
made any inquiry whatsoever into law governing plaintiff's claims, where attorney did not come anywhere near stating
federal question cognizable in District Court, and where attorney's arguments could not be construed as legitimate
attempt to extend law interpreting statutes and constitutional amendments on which he based plaintiff's claims. Doe v
Keane (1987, WD Mich) 117 FRD 103.
Pro se plaintiff has violated Rule 11 where he filed lengthy, rambling complaint which was unintelligible and barren
of any factual foundation whatsoever, showing that plaintiff failed to conduct reasonable inquiry into facts and law, and
where defendants appeared to have been chosen at random in frivolous manner. Pfeifer v Valukas (1987, ND Ill) 117
FRD 420.
Sanctions must be imposed under Rule 11 against plaintiffs' attorney, where reasonable inquiry into facts and law
would have revealed that plaintiffs' state tort claims were clearly barred on basis of facts in complaint and that plaintiffs
lacked standing for much of relief sought, even though RICO claim was arguably reasonable under good faith argument
for modification of law to prevent claim from being time-barred, since Rule 11 imposes liability on objective basis and
counsel's good faith defense cannot preclude liability. Baker v Citizens State Bank (1987, DC Minn) 661 F Supp 1196.
Sanctions imposed under Rule 11 for interposing frivolous counterclaim are withdrawn where counsel for defendant
did not previously have opportunity to establish that it had good faith basis to sign pleading containing counterclaim,
and memoranda in support of motion for reconsideration now established that defense counsel did conduct objectively
reasonable inquiry which disclosed reasonable factual basis for counterclaim. Fischer v Samuel Montagu, Inc. (1989,
SD NY) 131 FRD 379.
Although plaintiff's attorney admitted that he missed seeing relevant exemption to statute upon which action was
based because pocket part was missing from volume he consulted, his actions do not require imposition of Rule 11
sanctions since attorney did request guidance from practitioners in field and did attempt some plausible arguments
based upon statute. Miller v Borough of Riegelsville (1990, ED Pa) 131 FRD 90, 30 BNA WH Cas 278, 117 CCH LC
P 35432.
Where defendant sought to amend answer to add counterclaims on basis of newly uncovered facts, but evidence
showed that "new" facts had been known to members of defendant company for several years, even if they had not
previously been known to attorneys who signed motion, attorneys violated Rule 11 by failing to conduct adequate
research before filing motion. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v A.J. Stratton Syndicate (1990, SD NY) 132 FRD 139.
Filing of motion to "revisit" court's decision 16 months after it was made violated Rule 11 where reasonable inquiry
would have revealed that both local rule and case law counseled against such motion. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v
National Mediation Bd. (1990, ED NY) 132 FRD 342, 117 CCH LC P 10425, affd in part and revd in part on other
grounds, remanded (1992, CA2 NY) 956 F2d 1245, 139 BNA LRRM 2541, 121 CCH LC P 10011, 22 FR Serv 3d 417,
cert den (1992) 506 US 820, 121 L Ed 2d 34, 113 S Ct 67, 141 BNA LRRM 2408, 123 CCH LC P 10381.
Plaintiff's failure to present any evidence at trial to support allegations in complaint was proof that plaintiff's attorney
did not undertake proper investigation before filing complaint and that complaint was filed as "preemptive strike" to
delay foreclosure action later filed by defendants and was intended to harass or annoy defendants. Project 74
Allentown, Inc. v Frost (1992, ED Pa) 143 FRD 77, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8176, 24 FR Serv 3d 489, affd
without op (1993, CA3 Pa) 998 F2d 1004.
Attorney who unintentionally misrepresented plaintiff corporation's principal place of business in complaint will not
be sanctioned since he acted in reasonable, competent manner when he relied on corporation's assistant general counsel,
who was member of bar, to determine corporation's principal place of business; however, corporation may be
sanctioned where its in-house counsel participated in litigation and attorney of record reasonably relied on findings of
fact and conclusions of law made by in-house counsel, since Rule 11 imposed affirmative duty on represented party, as
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
principal for in-house counsel, to conduct reasonable inquiry into facts and law. Continental Ins. Co. v Construction
Indus. Servs. Corp. (1993, ED NY) 149 FRD 451, 27 FR Serv 3d 689.
Where pro se plaintiffs simply copied complaint used by other plaintiffs in similar case, but failed investigate
whether complaint had been successful and obviously never even read statutes which they cited, plaintiffs failed to
conduct reasonable inquiry into facts and law before filing complaint and thus violated Rule 11, even under more
lenient standard applied to pro se plaintiffs. Martin v Farmers First Bank (1993, ED Pa) 151 FRD 44.
Purely hypothetical trespass and nuisance claims alleging land contamination based on gasoline spill will be
dismissed without prejudice, even though landowner asserts that FRCP 8(e) and 11(b)(3) allow party to hypothetically
plead essential elements of claim, where landowner here still owns potentially polluted property and could have tested
for contamination before filing lawsuit, because FRCP 11(b)(3) is limited safety valve for parties who must plead
certain facts, but cannot confirm them before pleading because adversary controls information necessary to substantiate
claims. Sprague Farms v Providian Corp. (1996, CD Ill) 929 F Supp 1125.
Where plaintiff filed perfunctory response to defendant's motion for summary judgment without making reasonable
inquiry which would have shown that summary judgment was proper, sanctions will be imposed. Balfour Guthrie, Inc.
v Hunter Marine Transport, Inc. (1987, MD Tenn) 118 FRD 66, 9 FR Serv 3d 1256.
C. Facts, Existing Law or Argument Warranting Pleading
1. In General
121. Generally
Fact that judges who have ruled on merits of pleading disagree provides significant evidence that pleading was not
frivolous or unreasonable. Indianapolis Colts v Baltimore (1985, CA7 Ind) 775 F2d 177, 3 FR Serv 3d 51.
Although plaintiff is unlikely to prevail, it has shown it has colorable legal claim, and this is sufficient to avoid
sanctions. Magnus Electronics, Inc. v La Republica Argentina (1987, CA7 Ill) 830 F2d 1396.
As amended in 1993, Rule 11 allows imposition of sanctions upon finding that factual allegation had no evidentiary
support, unless there was specific disclaimer that additional investigation was necessary, and eliminates provision that
pleading was, to best of signer's knowledge, well grounded in fact; as result, sanctions may not be imposed unless
particular allegation is utterly lacking in support. O'Brien v Alexander (1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 1479, 36 FR Serv 3d
558.
Failure to withdraw or amend counterclaim that attorney knew lacked any factual basis demonstrated that attorney
never performed reasonable inquiry into defendant's counterclaim before it was presented to court at trial, and fact that
attorney abandoned certain factual contentions in counterclaim would not allow him to avoid sanctions. Divane v Krull
Elec. Co. (1999, CA7 Ill) 200 F3d 1020, 23 EBC 2476.
District court cannot order sanctions for violation of Rule 11(b)(2) against represented party. Baffa v Donaldson
(2000, CA2 NY) 222 F3d 52, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91056.
Lawyers have responsibility before subscribing their names to complaints which contain serious charges to ascertain
that reasonable basis exists for allegations, even if they are made upon information and belief. Miller v Schweickart
(1976, SD NY) 413 F Supp 1059.
Lawyers have responsibility before subscribing their names to complaints to ascertain that reasonable basis exists for
allegations for jurisdiction and for relief requested. Ferrer Delgado v Sylvia De Jesus (1976, DC Puerto Rico) 440 F
Supp 979.
Whether plaintiff's action is so without factual and legal foundation that it can be considered frivolous or
unreasonable is standard in determining whether sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate. Zaldivar v Los Angeles
(1984, CD Cal) 590 F Supp 852, 40 FR Serv 2d 476, revd on other grounds (1986, CA9 Cal) 780 F2d 823, 4 FR Serv 3d
264 (ovrld in part by Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
There is no possible justification under objective standard for loading down complaint with worthless claims which
are totally unsupported by allegations. Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 596 F Supp 13, 40 FR
Serv 2d 703, affd (1985, CA7 Ill) 771 F2d 194, 2 FR Serv 3d 1414 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Parmelee
v True (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 17314) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Marliere v Village of
Woodridge (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 4379).
When there is no objective basis for attorney's belief that motion is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law, then court should impose
sanctions under Rule 11. Woodfork v Gavin (1985, ND Miss) 105 FRD 100, 1 FR Serv 3d 209.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Attorney's sincere belief that law warrants position he has taken is insufficient to satisfy mandate of Rule 11. Lyle v
Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112 FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without
op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app (1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
122. Continuing duty
Rule 11 imposes obligation on counsel at time papers are filed in District Court, but does not impose continuing duty
on counsel to amend previous pleadings when their factual or legal basis dissolves, however, once incorrectness of fact
stated in pleading is revealed, such incorrect statement cannot be asserted again in later motion. Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Associated Contractors (1989, CA11 Ga) 877 F2d
938, 14 FR Serv 3d 450, reh den, en banc (1989, CA11 Ga) 888 F2d 1398 and cert den (1990) 493 US 1079, 107 L Ed
2d 1038, 110 S Ct 1133.
Where plaintiffs justifiably included defendant in question in original complaint, District Court's rule 11 sanctions
award was abuse of discretion, even if at some point it became clear that defendant was not at fault, since rule applies
only to initial signing and imposes no continuing duty on signer. MGIC Indem. Corp. v Moore (1991, CA9 Cal) 952
F2d 1120, 91 Daily Journal DAR 16035, 21 FR Serv 3d 720.
Rule 11 obligates attorney who signs document not only to conduct reasonable investigation into facts before filing,
but also to continually review his position as facts come to light; if he becomes aware of information which reasonably
leads him to believe that there is no factual or legal basis for his position, then he is under obligation to re-evaluate
earlier certification. Woodfork v Gavin (1985, ND Miss) 105 FRD 100, 1 FR Serv 3d 209.
Although Rule 11 does not require updating of pleadings to reflect developments, further pleadings filed after new
information comes to light are subject to Rule 11 and must take new information into account. D'Aquino v
Citicorp/Diner's Club, Inc. (1991, ND Ill) 139 FRD 357, 57 BNA FEP Cas 178, 59 CCH EPD P 41771.
123. Pleading containing frivolous and nonfrivolous claims
Where plaintiffs' lawsuit, taken as whole, was legally and factually substantial enough to reach jury, sanctions are
inappropriate, even though complaint contained several counts which were meritless as matter of law and one count
which would prove factually groundless, since inclusion of these claims had no appreciable effect on litigation of
plaintiffs' otherwise nonfrivolous lawsuit. Burull v First Nat'l Bank (1987, CA8 Minn) 831 F2d 788, 9 FR Serv 3d 557,
cert den (1988) 485 US 961, 99 L Ed 2d 425, 108 S Ct 1225.
Although summary judgment motion was partially successful, where substantial part of it was based on arguments
which were not well-grounded in fact or law, District Court's decision to impose sanctions was proper. Melrose v
Shearson/American Express, Inc. (1990, CA7 Ill) 898 F2d 1209, 15 FR Serv 3d 1416.
Party cannot escape Rule 11 sanctions with respect to document that is basically false, misleading, or inadequately
supported simply by pointing to separable, minor portion of that document that meets requirement of rule. Bay State
Towing Co. v Barge American 21 (1990, CA1 Mass) 899 F2d 129, 16 FR Serv 3d 582.
Although frivolous motion was contained in same document as nonfrivolous motion, nonfrivolous motion does not
protect frivolous motion from imposition of sanctions. Townsend v Holman Consulting Corp. (1990, CA9 Cal) 914
F2d 1136, 91 Daily Journal DAR 4058, 17 FR Serv 3d 801, amd, reh, en banc, den (1991, CA9 Cal) 91 CDOS 2524,
reported in full (1991, CA9 Cal) 929 F2d 1358.
Pleading containing both frivolous and nonfrivolous claims may violate Rule 11. Dodd Ins. Servs, v Royal Ins. Co.
(1991, CA10 Colo) 935 F2d 1152, 19 FR Serv 3d 1292.
Even if one or two of defenses alleged by defendants in their answer may not be applicable to case, sanctions were
inappropriate because answer as whole was otherwise sound. Partington v Gedan (1992, CA9 Hawaii) 961 F2d 852,
92 CDOS 3168, 92 Daily Journal DAR 5065, 22 FR Serv 3d 580, amd (1992, CA9 Cal) 92 CDOS 5942, 92 Daily
Journal DAR 9319 and cert den (1992) 506 US 999, 121 L Ed 2d 537, 113 S Ct 600.
Nonfrivolous federal claims do not create "safe harbor" for frivolous state law claims and do not protect plaintiff
from imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Pan-Pacific & Low Ball Cable Television Co. v Pacific Union Co. (1993, CA9
Cal) 987 F2d 594, 93 CDOS 1531, 93 Daily Journal DAR 2786, 25 FR Serv 3d 461 (superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Buster v Greisen (1997, CA9 Alaska) 97 CDOS 2161, 97 Daily Journal DAR 4001) and (criticized
in In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. (1997, CA3 VI) 37 VI 398, 120 F3d 368, 27 ELR 21494) and (criticized in
Margolis v Ryan (1998, CA9 Wash) 140 F3d 850, 98 CDOS 2618, 98 Daily Journal DAR 3611, 40 FR Serv 3d 1076).
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against pro se plaintiff who filed second frivolous
suit against President, despite court's prior warning. Saunders v Bush (1994, CA5 Tex) 15 F3d 64, 1 BNA WH Cas 2d
1473, 127 CCH LC P 33068, cert den (1994) 512 US 1207, 129 L Ed 2d 813, 114 S Ct 2678, 2 BNA WH Cas 2d 128.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions on plaintiff's attorney for bringing several frivolous
claims, even though one allegedly nonfrivolous claim was apparently misunderstood by court due to ambiguity in
pleading, since other frivolous claims were certainly sufficient to justify sanctions. Merriman v Security Ins. Co. (1996,
CA5 Tex) 100 F3d 1187, 36 FR Serv 3d 833.
Attorney may be sanctioned for frivolous portions of complaint which he filed, even though meritorious claims may
have also been included. Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund (1998, CA7 Ill) 145 F3d
929, 40 FR Serv 3d 1050, reh, en banc, den (1998, CA7 Ill) 1998 US App LEXIS 13273.
Plaintiffs' justification for inadequate pleading that their counsel could not contact them to discuss the factual
allegations to be included in their complaint because they were on extended world tour was in reality confession of
deficiency in pleading, which could not be excused. Top Entm't Inc. v Ortega (2002, CA1 Puerto Rico) 285 F3d 115.
Sanctions are not precluded simply because complaint contains some state law claims which are well-grounded in
fact and based on existing law, since each count of complaint must meet standards of Rule 11 and since claim relied on
for federal jurisdiction violates Rule 11 so that entire complaint is tainted. Brandt v Schal Assoc., Inc. (1988, ND Ill)
121 FRD 368.
Inclusion of one sufficient and adequately investigated claim does not insulate counsel from liability for filing stream
of unsubstantiated claims as riders. Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co. (1988, ND Ill) 123 FRD 299, CCH Fed
Secur L Rep P 94531, 97 ALR Fed 91.
Frivolous argument in otherwise nonfrivolous motion does not warrant sanctions under rule 11. Premier
Commercial Corp. v FMC Corp. (1991, ND Cal) 139 FRD 670.
124. Intervening change in law
Where action was commenced and final amended complaint filed before court rendered decisions in other cases
which were authorities for dismissal of present action, plaintiffs' action was not frivolous since they could not have
anticipated direction court would take, and therefore sanctions were properly denied. Creative Bath Products, Inc. v
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. (1988, CA2 NY) 837 F2d 561, 10 FR Serv 3d 199 (ovrld in part on other grounds by
United States v Indelicato (1989, CA2) 865 F2d 1370) and cert den (1989) 492 US 918, 106 L Ed 2d 588, 109 S Ct
3241.
Court should not use hindsight and apply case law decided after motion was filed to determine if it was proper, but
rather court should focus on time when document was signed to determine if paper was well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Sheets v
Yamaha Motors Corp. (1990, CA5 La) 891 F2d 533, 13 USPQ2d 1637, 15 FR Serv 3d 643, reh den, en banc (1990,
CA5 La) 897 F2d 528.
Where party's position was warranted by existing law at time of its argument, and party duly informed court of
change in law that undermined its position, Rule 11 sanctions will not be imposed. Maseda v Honda Motor Co. (1989,
SD Fla) 128 FRD 124, 14 FR Serv 3d 1499.
125. Law unclear or unsettled
Single District Court opinion from another circuit cannot justify Rule 11 sanctions for failure to adhere to its holding,
as such penalty would chill attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories in area of law which
cannot be regarded as settled. Zaldivar v Los Angeles (1986, CA9 Cal) 780 F2d 823, 4 FR Serv 3d 264 (ovrld in part
on other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
In bringing suit plaintiffs acted reasonably under circumstances where jurisdictional issues and questions of statutory
construction involved in case were fairly debatable and not easily resolved and where there was no clear, binding
precedent on issue, and because rule is intended to deter frivolous suits, not to deter novel legal arguments or cases of
first impression, no sanctions will be imposed. Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v B.R. Starnes
Co. (1987, CA11 Fla) 827 F2d 1454 (criticized in Lenon v St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1998, CA10 Colo) 136 F3d 1365,
21 EBC 2601, 1998 Colo J C A R 1123, 40 FR Serv 3d 152).
Where areas of law in which plaintiffs brought their claims were not yet clear-cut or well-settled, claims were not so
frivolous that it was abuse of discretion for District Court to conclude that action was warranted by existing law or good
faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and therefore sanctions will not be imposed on
plaintiffs. Fudge v Penthouse International, Ltd. (1988, CA1 RI) 840 F2d 1012, 14 Media L R 2353, 10 FR Serv 3d
737, cert den (1988) 488 US 821, 102 L Ed 2d 42, 109 S Ct 65.
Where complaint dealt with unsettled area of law and relied upon theory of liability which, while novel and
unsuccessful, was not plainly unreasonable, summary judgment is sanction enough for plaintiff's failure to allege facts
sufficient to support claim. Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v Cement Express, Inc. (1988, CA3 Pa) 841 F2d 66, 108
Page 84
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
CCH LC P 10368, 10 FR Serv 3d 1026, cert den (1988) 488 US 848, 102 L Ed 2d 101, 109 S Ct 128, 110 CCH LC P
10806.
Although legal theory asserted by plaintiffs was erroneous, law was not so clear and well-fixed that plaintiffs' legal
theory was unreasonable, both as matter of existing law and as request for its modification or extension, and therefore
award of sanctions must be vacated. Smith International, Inc. v Texas Commerce Bank (1988, CA5 Tex) 844 F2d 1193,
CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93770, 11 FR Serv 3d 85.
Where District Court's judgment in favor of defendant is reversed, sanctions imposed in plaintiffs for filing frivolous
law suit must also be reversed since claims were meritorious and were based on contractual language which had never
been interpreted by courts. Operating Engineers Pension Trust v A-C Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 859 F2d 1336, 109 CCH
LC P 10624, mod on other grounds, reh den, en banc (1988, CA9) 110 CCH LC P 10895.
Sanctions should not have been imposed where plaintiff alleged unusual set of facts in relatively rare case in which
there was no clearly applicable precedent, since it cannot be said that Rule 11 is violated unless it is patently clear that a
claim has absolutely no chance of success. Official Publications, Inc. v Kable News Co. (1989, CA2 NY) 884 F2d 664,
1989-2 CCH Trade Cases P 68742, 14 FR Serv 3d 1156.
Where particular point of law was unsettled, it was enough that party crafted reasonable position based on existing
precedents and in good faith reliance on District Court's original order, and even if such position was ultimately loosing
one, it did not merit Rule 11 sanction. Securities Industry Ass'n v Clarke (1990, CA2 NY) 898 F2d 318, CCH Fed
Secur L Rep P 94966, 16 FR Serv 3d 79.
Although it was not unreasonable for district judge to rule against plaintiff, where there was no controlling precedent
in jurisdiction and plaintiff cited certain cases supporting its view, District Court abused its discretion in holding that
position taken by plaintiff was unreasonable and violation of Rule 11. TMF Tool Co. v Muller (1990, CA7 Ill) 913 F2d
1185, 17 FR Serv 3d 615.
Although complaint was held time-barred, where attorney acknowledged adverse law but made good faith argument
for modification of applicable statute of limitations and cited precedents, no violation of Rule 11 occurred; further,
where attorney restated dismissed claims in amended complaint solely to preserve them for appeal, and law regarding
need for such restatement was unclear at time, sanctions should not have been imposed. Smith v National Health Care
Services (1991, CA7 Ill) 934 F2d 95, 19 FR Serv 3d 1085.
Where plaintiffs allowed key evidence to be destroyed before suit was filed, suit was "appallingly ill-advised," but
case law was not clear on whether destruction of evidence might simply result in rebuttable, negative presumption, and
therefore Rule 11 was not violated. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. Corp. (1992, CA9 Wash)
982 F2d 363, 92 CDOS 10241, 92 Daily Journal DAR 17224, 1993 AMC 1506, 24 FR Serv 3d 353.
Where no appellate court had previously considered, much less rejected, legal position argued by plaintiff, plaintiff's
argument was not sanctionable. Milwaukee Concrete Studios v Fjeld Mfg. Co. (1993, CA7 Wis) 8 F3d 441, 28
USPQ2d 1594, 27 FR Serv 3d 335.
Where defendant's crossclaim raised point of first impression involving complex issue, sanctions should not have
been imposed on grounds that claim was frivolous and meritless. United States v Alexander (1993, CA5 Tex) 981 F2d
250, 37 Envt Rep Cas 1149, 24 FR Serv 3d 913, 23 ELR 20791.
Where law is arguably unclear, counsel cannot be sanctioned for advocating plausible legal theory. CJC Holdings,
Inc. v Wright & Lato, Inc. (1993, CA5 Tex) 989 F2d 791, 25 FR Serv 3d 1398.
Where plaintiffs filed amended complaint which included claims on which summary judgment already had been
granted to defendants, and plaintiffs explained that they were trying to preserve claims for appeal and were relying on
case which required amended complaint filed after dismissal to restate all claims to preserve them for appeal, district
court should not have imposed sanctions on plaintiffs' attorneys for repleading claims on which summary judgment had
been granted since there was no case law directly in point, and they relied in good faith on case dealing with similar
situation. USS-POSCO Indus. v Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (1994, CA9 Cal) 31 F3d 800, 94
CDOS 5703, 94 Daily Journal DAR 10458, 146 BNA LRRM 2961, 128 CCH LC P 11147, 1994-1 CCH Trade Cases P
70647.
District court erred in imposing sanction consisting of defendants' costs and attorney fees on plaintiff under Rule 11
where complaint was not entirely frivolous and raised some important questions of first impression in circuit dealing
with substantial constitutional issues only recently commented upon by Supreme Court. Peloza v Capistrano Unified
Sch. Dist. (1994, CA9 Cal) 37 F3d 517, 94 CDOS 7611, 94 Daily Journal DAR 14090, cert den (1995) 515 US 1173,
132 L Ed 2d 878, 115 S Ct 2640.
District court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions on defendant's attorney based on statements contained in
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, where attorney's contentions regarding interpretation of new
law were well within bounds of fair adversarial argument and did not espouse position which had no chance of success,
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
and although her explanation of effects of law was not completely thorough, it was plausible and not unwarranted under
circumstances. Cox v Saunders (In re Sargent) (1998, CA4 Va) 136 F3d 349, 39 FR Serv 3d 1124, cert den (1998) 525
US 854, 142 L Ed 2d 108, 119 S Ct 133.
District court's imposition of sanctions against investor group was reversed and remanded because it did not take into
account changes in regulatory regime governing tender offers; question whether investor group's alleged change in
position violated 17240.14e-8 was open to interpretation under new merger and acquisition rules, and was therefore,
inappropriate basis for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions. Hartmarx Corp. v Abboud (2003, CA7 Ill) 326 F3d 862, CCH Fed
Secur L Rep P 92402.
Where asserted defense involved unsettled legal issue, sanctions will not be imposed on defendant on grounds of
asserting claim which was not warranted by existing law. Painewebber, Inc. v Can Am Financial Group, Ltd. (1988,
ND Ill) 121 FRD 324, 12 FR Serv 3d 18, affd without op (1989, CA7 Ill) 885 F2d 873.
Where issues raised by complaint were either issues of first impression or matters on which reasonable minds could
differ, sanctions are inapplicable. Pitre v Louisiana Health Service & Indem. Co. (1988, WD La) 122 FRD 497.
Where law is not yet established in state, it is impossible to say that claim was unwarranted by existing law or good
faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Carlton v Jolly (1989, ED Va) 125 FRD 423,
affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 721, reported in full (1990, CA4 Va) 18 FR Serv 3d 728 and affd without op
(1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 721 and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 722 and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va)
911 F2d 722 and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 722.
Plaintiff's filing of motion to alter or amend earlier judgment did not warrant sanctions, even though it was
unsuccessful, since it was neither unreasonable nor improper in view of complexity of issues, lack of clear precedent,
and historical ambiguity involved in issues presented by case. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v Michigan (1992,
WD Mich) 152 FRD 562, affd (1993, CA6 Mich) 11 F3d 1341, 27 FR Serv 3d 1139 (criticized in Cox v Koch (1996,
CA10) 1996 US App LEXIS 3101).
In view of novelty of present fact pattern, it cannot be said that District Court abused its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for sanctions, since plaintiff's argument moved its claim just out of area of frivolousness. Everpure,
Inc. v Cuno, Inc. (1989, CA) 875 F2d 300, 10 USPQ2d 1855, cert den (1989) 493 US 853, 107 L Ed 2d 112, 110 S Ct
154.
126. Effect of evidence produced during discovery
Although certain facts revealed during discovery weakened position taken by defendant in counterclaim, those facts
did not require defendant's attorneys to withdraw counterclaim, and since attorneys neither ignored nor misrepresented
any factual matter that came to their attention, but rather acknowledged facts and argued position as zealously as
possible, sanctions should not be imposed simply because claim was unsuccessful. Motown Productions, Inc. v
Cacomm, Inc. (1988, CA2 NY) 849 F2d 781, 7 USPQ2d 1320.
Plaintiff's pursuit of its cause of action was objectively frivolous once three key witnesses had been deposed and had
repudiated their earlier accusations which had formed basis for plaintiff's amended complaint, and plaintiff's counsel
acted unreasonably in filing brief in opposition to summary judgment once this evidence came to light. Fahrenz v
Meadow Farm Partnership (1988, CA4 Va) 850 F2d 207, 11 FR Serv 3d 1167.
Where plaintiffs conducted investigation which was reasonable under circumstances, but were unable to determine
until discovery was conducted that their claims were baseless, filing of complaint did not violate Rule 11; however,
sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs for filing motion for reconsideration of summary judgment which
presented no new facts or legal theories, despite warnings from District Court judge. Samuels v Wilder (1990, CA7 Ill)
906 F2d 272, 16 FR Serv 3d 1282, 111 OGR 38.
Plaintiffs' attorney violated Rule 11 where he insisted on pursuing claim even though defendants during discovery
offered explanations and evidence to show that there was no grounds for action and plaintiffs had no evidence to the
contrary and reasonable inquiry would have caused competent attorney to conclude that pleading was not well grounded
in fact. Farino v Advest, Inc. (1986, ED NY) 111 FRD 345, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92812, 6 FR Serv 3d 618.
Although defendant's counterclaim was reasonable at time it was filed, where defendant later testified at deposition
that he had no knowledge of facts underlying claim, claim should have been dropped, and failure to do so is cause for
imposition of sanctions on defendant's attorney. Blossom v Blackhawk Datsun, Inc. (1988, SD Ind) 120 FRD 91, 11 FR
Serv 3d 196.
Although filing of suit was not unreasonable under circumstances, where at close of discovery plaintiffs' attorney
knew or should have known that he had no witnesses to provide necessary proof of causation and depositions of two of
his clients cast grave doubts on their earlier claims, it was objectively unreasonable and violation of Rule 11 for attorney
to sign subsequent documents. Paese v New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. (1994, SD NY) 158 FRD 34.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions will not be imposed on minor and his mother, even though their defamation action against mental
health-care facility was denied summarily, where they alleged that his medical chart contained false and defamatory
material and was published to various school officials and his former attorney without permission, because evidentiary
support for publication was legitimately unknown at time of filing and depended largely on information known only to
facility which could only be found through discovery process. Foxworth by Collins v Chichester Sch. Dist. (1999, ED
Pa) 35 F Supp 2d 446.
Where plaintiff's attorney, after having had full opportunity for discovery, should have realized that claims against
particular defendants were wholly invalid and that there existed no reasonable basis on which to form belief that either
of these defendants could be liable to plaintiff, plaintiff's failure to dismiss claims violated Rule 11. Denny v Hinton
(1990, MD NC) 131 FRD 659, affd without op (1991, CA4 NC) 937 F2d 602 and affd (1991, CA4 NC) 20 FR Serv 3d
934.
127. Argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law
Although court refused to overturn rule established in previous cases, plaintiff's attack on rule was not frivolous and
therefore motion for Rule 11 sanctions was denied. Gilmore v Shearson/American Express, Inc. (1987, CA2 NY) 811
F2d 108.
Sanctions must be imposed where plaintiff's argument was not warranted by existing law and where plaintiff's
counsel ignored existing law so that case could not be called effort to alter existing law. Szabo Food Serv. v Canteen
Corp. (1987, CA7 Ill) 823 F2d 1073, 8 FR Serv 3d 273, cert dismd (1988) 485 US 901, 99 L Ed 2d 229, 108 S Ct 1101
and (criticized in Sussman by & Through Guilden v Bank of Isr. (1995, CA2 NY) 56 F3d 450, 32 FR Serv 3d 978).
Where plaintiff's counsel made reasonable and elaborate inquiry into facts supporting her claim and presented
creative theory that has not yet been recognized by courts in defining duty owed by union to its members, fact that
argument failed to persuade District Court does not demonstrate that plaintiff's counsel lacked requisite good faith in
attempting to advance law, and therefore sanctions are inappropriate. Hurd v Ralphs Grocery Co. (1987, CA9 Cal) 824
F2d 806, 126 BNA LRRM 2355, 107 CCH LC P 10108, 8 FR Serv 3d 918 (superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Buster v Greisen (1997, CA9 Alaska) 97 CDOS 2161, 97 Daily Journal DAR 4001).
Although same question had previously been litigated in similar suit between parties, where intervening Supreme
Court decision had dealt with issue, thus defeating collateral estoppel, counsel had not violated rule in raising issue
again and arguing for extension, modification, or reversal of law. International Asso. of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, Lodge 751 v Boeing Co. (1987, CA9 Wash) 833 F2d 165, 45 BNA FEP Cas 791, 126 BNA LRRM 3303, 45
CCH EPD P 37593, 108 CCH LC P 10253, cert den (1988) 485 US 1014, 99 L Ed 2d 715, 108 S Ct 1488, 46 BNA FEP
Cas 888, 128 BNA LRRM 2144, 47 CCH EPD P 38172, 108 CCH LC P 10476.
Where complaint alleging securities violations was signed by 2 attorneys, and neither attorney had previous
experience in area and neither researched or read relevant case law, both attorneys failed to make reasonable inquiry,
and since neither was aware of precedent in jurisdiction which held contrary to arguments raised in complaint, they
could not have intended good faith argument for reversal of existing law. Crookham v Crookham (1990, CA8 Iowa)
914 F2d 1027, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95479, 17 FR Serv 3d 1381.
Defendant's use of particular cases as precedent, while aggressive use of distinguishable cases in effort to squeeze
too much from them, did not justify imposition of sanctions, since Rule 11 does not restrict counsel to citing cases
directly on point. Protective Life Ins. Co. v Dignity Viatical Settlement Partners, L.P. (1999, CA1 Mass) 171 F3d 52, 43
FR Serv 3d 1252.
District court's imposition of sanctions against investor group was reversed and remanded because it did not take into
account changes in regulatory regime governing tender offers; because Securities and Exchange Commission's
interpretation of new regulatory rules specifically contemplated announcement of tender offers with something less than
fully committed financing, investor group's legal position was warranted by nonfrivolous argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or establishment of new law. Hartmarx Corp. v Abboud (2003, CA7 Ill) 326
F3d 862, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92402.
Rule 11 sanction is properly imposed upon party's attorney whose argument in support of motion was foreclosed by
circuit precedent and who was informed of such precedent by opposing attorney prior to filing motion, where motion
cannot be viewed as good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, since it did not
mention controlling precedent. Blake v National Casualty Co. (1984, CD Cal) 607 F Supp 189.
Attorneys who argued that plaintiff's claim was warranted by existing law when it was not has violated his obligation
under Rule 11 and will not be exempt from sanctions because he later argues that his earlier statement was badly
worded attempt to argue for change in law. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112 FRD 392, 6 FR
Page 87
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app (1989, CA11 Ga)
893 F2d 347.
Rule mandates imposition of sanction where there is no indication in any of papers filed by plaintiff's attorney that he
made any inquiry whatsoever into law governing plaintiff's claims, where attorney did not come anywhere near stating
federal question cognizable in District Court, and where attorney's arguments could not be construed as legitimate
attempt to extend law interpreting statutes and constitutional amendments on which he based plaintiff's claims. Doe v
Keane (1987, WD Mich) 117 FRD 103.
Sanctions must be imposed where it is patently clear that plaintiffs had absolutely no chance of success under
existing precedents and that no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify, or reverse law as it stands.
Gutterman v Eimicke (1989, ED NY) 125 FRD 348, 14 FR Serv 3d 74.
Where arguments advanced by plaintiff's counsel to support complaint had been presented to four other circuit courts
and had been rejected by all, and counsel presented court with no reason why it should receive arguments more
favorably, nor did he provide court with any intervening case law to support his position, complaint had no basis in
existing law and counsel made no reasonable argument for modification of that law, and therefore sanctions are
warranted. Knipe v Skinner (1993, ND NY) 146 FRD 58, 25 FR Serv 3d 1180, remanded (1994, CA2 NY) 19 F3d 72,
28 FR Serv 3d 557.
Although legal authority cited by plaintiff's attorney did not completely support plaintiff's claims which seemed
unlikely to succeed, such claims were not entirely without merit, and particularly due to complexity of issues, plaintiff's
position was warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and Rule 11 was not violated. Taylor v United States (1993, DC Kan) 151 FRD 389.
Award of sanctions under FRCP 11 is not appropriate, where plaintiffs in trademark and trade dress violation case
sought sanctions against infringers for making motion for partial summary judgment which flew in face of controlling
precedent in Seventh Circuit, infringer claimed to make good faith argument for modification of Seventh Circuit
precedent in light of Second Circuit rulings, and plaintiff also misstated holding of case in response to summary
judgment motion, because both plaintiff and infringer have violated rules, and where both sides are guilty, imposition of
sanctions is inappropriate. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v Fluid-Quip, Inc. (1993, ND Ill) 834 F Supp 1008, 29 USPQ2d 1732.
FRCP 11 sanctions will not be imposed against automobile transit corporation which sought judicial review of Board
of Arbitration decision adverse to it, even though its theory for injunctive relief was novel in asking court to forge new
exception to 29 USCS § 104 to advance public policy of having parties to labor dispute solve their disputes through
arbitration, because corporation's other arguments against decision were not frivolous and novel argument sought only
reasonable extension and modification of existing law. Complete Auto Transit v Chauffeurs, Local Union No. 414, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters (1994, ND Ind) 848 F Supp 848, 29 FR Serv 3d 697.
Sanctions are imposed under FRCP 11 against plaintiff who filed action against Humane Society seeking damages
for its alleged trespass and confiscation of his cats and demanding return of cats which was dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds, where court had dismissed plaintiff's replevin action for lack of evidence that he owned cats,
because counsel presented no authority for ignoring doctrine of res judicata and statute of limitations, and his argument
that "justice is more important than efficiency in this case" is frivolous. Poag v Humane Soc'y (1995, WD Okla) 907 F
Supp 1487, 34 FR Serv 3d 186.
Even though plaintiff improperly filed declaratory action, there is no indication that it did so to harass, cause delay,
or increase cost of litigation, and additionally, action is being dismissed in court's discretion, and record does not
demonstrate that plaintiff failed to make good faith attempt to extend or modify existing law, so therefore, defendants'
Rule 11 motion will be denied. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Taylor (1988, MD NC) 118 FRD 426.
128. Merits of claim
Although plaintiff did not raise genuine issue of material fact, it cannot be said that there is absolutely nothing in
evidence to support his argument, nor is there evidence that he made no attempt to ascertain whether argument might
have basis in fact, and therefore motion for Rule 11 expenses, fees, and sanctions is denied. Colan v Cutler-Hammer,
Inc. (1987, CA7 Ill) 812 F2d 357, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93146, cert den (1987) 484 US 820, 98 L Ed 2d 42, 108 S Ct
79.
Although facts stated in complaint did not suffice to create genuine issue for trial and attorney ultimately failed to
find and present substantial support for complaint, some circumstantial evidence, however weak, did exist to support
plaintiffs' claims, and therefore complaint was not so lacking in plausibility as to make attorney's decision to sign and
certify it subject to sanctions. California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v Franciscan Ceramics, Inc. (1987, CA9 Cal)
818 F2d 1466, cert den (1988) 484 US 1006, 98 L Ed 2d 650, 108 S Ct 698.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rule 11 does not permit imposition of sanctions simply for bringing meritless lawsuit, without any finding that party
or his lawyer signed paper in violation of rule. National Asso. of Government Employees, Inc. v National Federation of
Federal Employees (1988, CA5 Tex) 844 F2d 216, 128 BNA LRRM 2297, 11 FR Serv 3d 74, 95 ALR Fed 163.
Defendant will not be compensated for his expenses through imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs
simply because defendant has won where plaintiffs did not act unreasonably in filing and pursuing action which was
ultimately dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute when plaintiffs decided not to proceed further when it
became apparent that defendant was judgment proof and that plaintiffs would not be able to collect judgment if they
obtained one. Mihalik v Pro Arts, Inc. (1988, CA6 Ohio) 851 F2d 790, 11 FR Serv 3d 1043.
District Court should not have imposed sanctions for conduct of litigation after signing of pleadings since plaintiff's
claims were not frivolous at time they were filed, and fact that some of claims were later found lacking in evidentiary
foundation is irrelevant to Rule 11 inquiry. Cunningham v County of Los Angeles (1988, CA9 Cal) 869 F2d 427,
reported at (1988, CA9 Cal) 879 F2d 481, cert den (1990) 493 US 1035, 107 L Ed 2d 773, 110 S Ct 757.
District Court misconstrued Rule 11 by imposing sanctions for conduct of litigation after signing of pleadings, where
plaintiff's claims were not frivolous at time they were filed, and fact that some of claims were later found lacking in
evidentiary foundation is irrelevant to Rule 11 inquiry. Benigni v Hemet (1988, CA9 Cal) 879 F2d 473, 14 FR Serv 3d
692, reh den, en banc (1989, CA9) 882 F2d 356.
Where plaintiff reasonably relied on decision in previous case which seemed to support his claim, although court
ultimately rejected claim, no violation of Rule 11 occurred. Mackey v Pioneer Nat'l Bank (1989, CA9 Wash) 867 F2d
520, 113 CCH LC P 56103, 13 FR Serv 3d 638.
In determining whether Rule 11 has been violated, District Court need only determine whether parties' positions are
patently unmeritorious or frivolous, and where District Court evaluated defendants' position in terms of its potential for
success on merits, under circumstances of case, this constituted abuse of discretion. Dura Systems, Inc. v Rothbury
Invest., Ltd. (1989, CA3 Pa) 886 F2d 551, 15 FR Serv 3d 9, cert den (1990) 493 US 1046, 107 L Ed 2d 838, 110 S Ct
844.
Not all unsuccessful legal arguments are frivolous or warrant sanction, and although positions advanced by plaintiff
were faulty, they were not so untenable as matter of law as to necessitate sanction, particularly in light of complex
questions involved. Mareno v Rowe (1990, CA2 NY) 910 F2d 1043, 17 FR Serv 3d 936, cert den (1991) 498 US 1028,
112 L Ed 2d 673, 111 S Ct 681.
In determining whether attorney violated Rule 11, court must look at whether attorney has abused judicial process,
but court does not pass judgment on merits of action. CTC Imports & Exports v Nigerian Petroleum Corp. (1991, CA3
Pa) 951 F2d 573, 1992 AMC 1243, 21 FR Serv 3d 931, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA3) 1992 US App LEXIS 545 and cert
den (1992) 504 US 914, 118 L Ed 2d 554, 112 S Ct 1950 and cert den (1992) 506 US 917, 121 L Ed 2d 246, 113 S Ct
328.
Although plaintiff's motion to amend complaint was denied, district court did not err in denying sanctions since
plaintiff had reasonable basis for filing its motion, and simply being unsuccessful is never enough, by itself, to justify
sanctions. Arab African Int'l Bank v Epstein (1993, CA3 NJ) 10 F3d 168, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8441.
Although defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney for alleged misconduct was ultimately denied, question
was close, and therefore judge did not abuse his discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to impose Rule 11 sanctions for
filing motion to disqualify. Hauser v Farrell (1994, CA9 Nev) 14 F3d 1338, 94 CDOS 304, 94 Daily Journal DAR
542, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98024, 28 FR Serv 3d 841.
Although defendants' third-party claim was exceedingly thin, it had enough factual and legal support to render
district court's unexplained Rule 11 sanction abuse of discretion. FirsTier Bank, N.A. v Zeller (1994, CA8 Neb) 16 F3d
907, 17 EBC 2313, 94 TNT 42-18, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA8) 1994 US App LEXIS 7817 and cert den (1994) 513
US 871, 130 L Ed 2d 126, 115 S Ct 194, 18 EBC 2056.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs' attorney for failing to make reasonable prefiling investigation where
one claim was barred by statute of limitations which could easily have been discovered before filing, attorney conceded
that fraud claim was without foundation, and other claims were mere speculations and fell far short of being
well-grounded in fact. Johnson v A. W. Chesterton Co. (1994, CA7 Wis) 18 F3d 1362, 28 FR Serv 3d 38.
Sanctions were not warranted against defendant where there was no evidence that its arguments were interposed for
any improper purpose, nor were defendant's contentions so patently void of any legal or factual basis that attorney's fees
were required, since it seemed clear from record that defendant had presented colorable claims and made plausible
arguments in support of its positions. W.K. Webster & Co. v American President Lines (1994, CA2 NY) 32 F3d 665,
1995 AMC 134.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Although plaintiff's case was weak and doomed to failure after district court made its factual findings, where claim
was at least colorable at time of signing of pleading, district court went beyond its discretion by applying clarity of
hindsight to judge complaint. FDIC v Calhoun (1994, CA5 Tex) 34 F3d 1291, 30 FR Serv 3d 868.
Where attorney had brought numerous cases against government on same theory, although with different plaintiffs,
and such claims had repeatedly been rejected, district court properly sanctioned attorney for filing frivolous complaint
for bringing case at bar based on same theory which argued that Federal Aviation Administration did not have authority
to suspend pilot's certificate or to revoke airline's operating certificate in response to violations of safety regulations.
Roundtree v United States (1994, CA9 Alaska) 40 F3d 1036, 94 CDOS 8829, 94 Daily Journal DAR 16414, 30 FR Serv
3d 1401.
Where district court refused to address merits of claims and dismissed without prejudice on grounds of forum non
conveniens, it was improper to impose Rule 11 sanctions on grounds that claims were frivolous since it was not patently
clear that claims had absolutely no chance of success. Sussman by & Through Guilden v Bank of Isr. (1995, CA2 NY) 56
F3d 450, 32 FR Serv 3d 978, cert den (1995) 516 US 916, 133 L Ed 2d 210, 116 S Ct 305.
Sanctions should only be imposed if it is patently clear that claim has absolutely no chance of success, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of signing attorney; therefore, district court's decision not to impose sanctions will not be
reversed where plaintiff's arguments were not completely lacking in merit. K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs. v Walker Mfg.
Co. (1995, CA2 NY) 61 F3d 123, 1995-2 CCH Trade Cases P 71068.
Where district court had ruled that it would not allow compensatory and punitive damages for alleged ADEA (29
USCS § § 621 et seq.) violations, plaintiff's demand for such damages in supplemental complaint was frivolous
because it was barred by the law of the case, and therefore filing of supplemental complaint violated requirement of
Rule 11 that legal contentions must be warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. Morley v Ciba-Geigy Corp. (1995, CA2 NY) 66 F3d 21, 68 BNA FEP Cas
1624, 33 FR Serv 3d 573.
Where meritless RICO claim was added to action which was thereafter removed to federal court, and plaintiff's
attorney filed motion to remand which argued that removal was improper because defendants should have investigated
sufficiency of RICO claim and realized that it was meritless, district court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions on
plaintiff's attorney, not for filing admittedly meritless RICO claim in state court in attempt to obtain treble damages, but
rather for his baseless argument in motion for remand. Burnette v Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1995, CA9 Cal) 72
F3d 766, 95 CDOS 9868, 95 Daily Journal DAR 17171, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8939, 33 FR Serv 3d 1337.
Attorney may not be sanctioned for complaint which was well-founded, solely because she failed to conduct
reasonable inquiry; thus, where medical reports had been published prior to filing of complaint which supported
plaintiffs' allegations that defendants knew of and failed to disclose link between their weight-loss program and
gallstones, complaint was well-founded, even though plaintiffs' attorneys were unaware of reports at time of filing, and,
consequently, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed. Moore v Keegan Mgmt. Co. (In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig.)
(1996, CA9 Cal) 78 F3d 431, 96 CDOS 1355, 96 Daily Journal DAR 2305, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99053, 33 FR Serv
3d 1099 (criticized in Fink v Gomez (1999, CD Cal) 39 F Supp 2d 1225).
Although defendant's removal of case to federal court and its opposition to remand were ultimately unsuccessful,
they were not frivolous and are therefore not sanctionable, since for legal argument to merit sanctions under Rule 11 it
must be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance that argument will be successful. Shafii v British
Airways, PLC (1996, CA2 NY) 83 F3d 566, 152 BNA LRRM 2263, 131 CCH LC P 11578.
Plaintiff's claims were not frivolous and did not merit sanctions, although they were unsuccessful, where her legal
theories were thinly supported by facts, and where precedent relied on by defendant to prove that plaintiff's claims were
meritless was not at all similar to case at bar. Hartleip v McNeilab, Inc. (1996, CA6 Mich) 83 F3d 767, 71 BNA FEP
Cas 1636, 132 CCH LC P 58128, 1996 FED App 138P.
Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed on attorney who ignored relevant case law which negated his claims.
Anderson v County of Montgomery (1997, CA7 Ill) 111 F3d 494, 37 FR Serv 3d 625, cert den (1997) 522 US 951, 139 L
Ed 2d 289, 118 S Ct 371.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff and his attorney where evidence
supported court's criticism of merits of plaintiff's claims and manner in which they were presented, court had warned
plaintiff and his attorney that their claims appeared to be frivolous and that much of their conduct seemed to be aimed at
media, despite warnings plaintiff and his attorney continued to disregard proper procedure and defendants'
well-supported motions for summary judgment, and response of plaintiff and his attorney to court's order to show cause
regarding sanctions was so superficial as to be insulting to court and to policies underlying Rule 11. Ivy v Kimbrough
(1997, CA8 Ark) 115 F3d 550.
Page 90
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions under Rule 11, where plaintiff's complaint was
frivolous, and based on procedural history of case, complaint offered no reasonable basis for which action could
proceed. Estate of Blue v County of Los Angeles (1997, CA9 Cal) 120 F3d 982, 97 CDOS 5741, 97 Daily Journal DAR
9238, cert den (1998) 522 US 1111, 140 L Ed 2d 107, 118 S Ct 1042.
Although district court did not provide specific findings in support of its denial of Rule 11 sanctions, record
contained adequate rationale for denial, including court's notation that plaintiff's claims were "colorable at least in part,"
and therefore, district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions on grounds that claims were not without
foundation in law or in fact. Salois v Dime Sav. Bank, FSB (1997, CA1 Mass) 128 F3d 20, RICO Bus Disp Guide
(CCH) P 9411.
Where only one of four contracts between parties was before court, court's order regarding arbitration applied only to
claims arising under that contract, and consequently, motion for preliminary injunction limiting scope of arbitration to
that contract was not frivolous, nor was it unmeritorious attempt to relitigate previously decided issue; thus, district
court erred in imposing sanctions under Rule 11 for filing of motion. Industrial Risk Insurers v M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH (1998, CA11 Fla) 141 F3d 1434, 40 FR Serv 3d 1258, 11 FLW Fed C 1432, cert den (1999)
525 US 1068, 142 L Ed 2d 659, 119 S Ct 797.
In action by borrowers against bank, district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on
plaintiffs' attorney based on his allegations of misconduct by bank during meeting, where tape recording of meeting
clearly indicated that allegations were without factual foundation. Chaudhry v Gallerizzo (1999, CA4 Md) 174 F3d 394,
43 FR Serv 3d 1063, cert den (1999, US) 145 L Ed 2d 181, 120 S Ct 215.
Although plaintiff improperly interpreted earlier case law, his interpretation was not objectively unreasonable, and
therefore, district court erred in imposing sanctions under Rule 11 based on position taken by plaintiff with respect to
that issue. Salovaara v Eckert (2000, CA2 NY) 222 F3d 19, 47 FR Serv 3d 41.
Sanctions should not have been imposed on counsel who had some plausible basis, even though it was quite weak,
for making argument in question. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v R&D Latex Corp. (2001, CA9 Cal) 242 F3d 1102, 2001 Daily
Journal DAR 2699.
Relief under Rule 11 which requires attorney who signs pleading to represent that good ground exists to support
claim is discretionary and requires showing of claim not simply lacking in merit, but bordering on frivolity. Nemeroff v
Abelson (1979, SD NY) 469 F Supp 630, 4 Media L R 2505, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96849, 27 FR Serv 2d 676, affd in
part and revd in part on other grounds (1980, CA2 NY) 620 F2d 339, 6 Media L R 1075, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
97317, 29 FR Serv 2d 243 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Davis v Veslan Enterprises (1985, CA5
Tex) 765 F2d 494, 2 FR Serv 3d 836) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Westmoreland v CBS,
Inc. (1985, App DC) 248 US App DC 255, 770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451) and (superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Zaldivar v Los Angeles (1986, CA9 Cal) 780 F2d 823, 4 FR Serv 3d 264).
Refusal to conclude that party's conduct of action was either frivolous or represented bad faith attempt to willfully
abuse judicial process is particularly warranted where court has not passed judgment on merits of party's claim.
Dahlberg v Becker (1984, ND NY) 581 F Supp 855, affd (1984, CA2 NY) 748 F2d 85, cert den (1985) 470 US 1084, 85
L Ed 2d 144, 105 S Ct 1845.
Court need not consider whether claims would have ultimately been successful, but only whether, when filed, claims
had some chance of success, and since it was not patently clear that claims had absolutely no chance of success,
complaint was not frivolous. Quadrozzi v New York (1989, SD NY) 127 FRD 63, 1989-2 CCH Trade Cases P 68668,
15 FR Serv 3d 1051.
Since every motion which is denied is motion not warranted by existing law, that fact alone does not make motion
subject to Rule 11 sanctions; rather, party moving for sanctions must demonstrate that other party did not make
reasonable inquiry into existing law. Leach v Northern Telecom, Inc. (1991, ED NC) 141 FRD 420, 58 CCH EPD P
41341, 122 CCH LC P 57024, 20 FR Serv 3d 1333.
In civil rights action seeking damages against defendants in both individual and official capacities, where plaintiff's
counsel completely failed to present any factual or legal basis in support of any of their claims against any of
defendants, filing complaint under such circumstances constituted violation of Rule 11. Johnson v McAdoo (1993, WD
Okla) 150 FRD 684.
Sanctions are imposed against plaintiff, who is attorney appearing pro se and who filed action against Chief Justice
of U.S. and 60 others, where court found lawsuit frivolous, because (1) action was baseless and ignored basic principles
of jurisdiction, immunity, and collateral estoppel, and (2) plaintiff was unrepentant and unremorseful and gave every
indication that he would continue to file frivolous, resource-wasting lawsuits. Babigian v Rehnquist (1995, DC Dist
Col) 901 F Supp 17, affd without op (1996, App DC) 323 US App DC 289, 107 F3d 922, reported in full (1996, App
DC) 1996 US App LEXIS 30575.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions against former employee's attorney under FRCP 11(c)(2) were warranted, where attorney failed to make
reasonable inquiry into factual or legal basis for pleading second cause of action, which was nearly identical to first
cause of action that had been stayed pending arbitration, and refused to withdraw complaint despite clear indication that
withdrawal was proper, in that case presented no factual support for court's personal jurisdiction over parties, employee
was required to arbitrate action under terms of her employment contract, and numerous claims were incurably defective
on their face. Howard v Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (1997, SD NY) 977 F Supp 654, affd without op (1999, CA2
NY) 173 F3d 844, reported in full (1999, CA2 NY) 1999 US App LEXIS 8402.
FRCP 11 sanctions were appropriate against plaintiff, who filed and proceeded with sixth lawsuit raising same
claims, despite having fully litigated matter to Court of Appeals and having been sanctioned by state court for persisting
against defendant, where plaintiff's purpose was to continue pattern of harassment, and plaintiff's legal arguments were
frivolous and lacked evidentiary support. Armstrong v Koury Corp. (1998, DC NC) 16 F Supp 2d 616, request den
(1998, MD NC) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 12287 and affd without op (1999, CA4 NC) 168 F3d 481, reported in full (1999,
CA4 NC) 1999 US App LEXIS 412.
Employer's counterclaim was patently devoid of allegations rising to colorable claim for any of tort theories that
employer's counsel had belatedly conjured in attempt to avoid sanctions; therefore, sanctions were clearly warranted.
Jacques v DiMarzio, Inc. (2002, ED NY) 216 F Supp 2d 139.
Although defendant continued to litigate despite being advised of two controlling decisions adverse to its position,
district court did not err in refusing to impose sanctions, where court concluded that defendant's arguments were not
totally baseless and had some logical and practical appeal. Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v NACCO Materials
Handling Group, Inc. (2000, CA7 Ill) 202 F3d 965, 23 EBC 2625, 163 BNA LRRM 2321, 140 CCH LC P 10655.
129. --Grant or denial of summary judgment
District Court's denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not preclude later imposition of sanctions on
plaintiffs' attorney for bringing frivolous lawsuit since only documents before court at time motion was made may have
suggested existence of factual dispute. Muthig v Brant Point Nantucket, Inc. (1988, CA1 Mass) 838 F2d 600, 10 FR
Serv 3d 512, 98 ALR Fed 417.
Even though court granted summary judgment for defendant on all claims, case presented numerous difficult issues
that were not without foundation, and therefore district judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to award attorneys'
fees and other expenses. Forsberg v Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. (1988, CA9 Or) 840 F2d 1409, 54 BNA FEP Cas
1873, 45 CCH EPD P 37758, amd (1988, CA9 Or) 46 CCH EPD P 37996.
Although District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, defendant's request for attorney's fees and
costs is rejected because plaintiff's complaint was not frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or filed in bad faith.
Bennett v Corroon & Black Corp. (1988, CA5 La) 845 F2d 104, 46 BNA FEP Cas 1329, 46 CCH EPD P 37955, cert
den (1989) 489 US 1020, 103 L Ed 2d 201, 109 S Ct 1140, 50 BNA FEP Cas 874, 49 CCH EPD P 38760 and
(superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Journigan v Eastover Bank for Sav. (1992, SD Miss) 805 F Supp
415, 60 BNA FEP Cas 583) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Rudisell v S.H.R.M. Catering
Servs. (1994, ED La) 64 BNA FEP Cas 592).
Mere fact that counsel's position was rejected on summary judgment does not justify imposing sanctions under Rule
11, since counsel does not have to be right on his legal position to avoid sanctions, only reasonable. Miltier v Downes
(1991, CA4 Va) 935 F2d 660, 19 FR Serv 3d 1177.
Although district court correctly found plaintiff's evidence to be insufficient for purposes of summary judgment, that
does not mean that plaintiff's claims were factually unfounded for purposes of Rule 11, and since plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to make out prima facie case, district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions. Warren
v City of Carlsbad (1995, CA9 Cal) 58 F3d 439, 95 CDOS 4777, 95 Daily Journal DAR 8194, 75 BNA FEP Cas 3, 32
FR Serv 3d 835, cert den (1996) 516 US 1171, 134 L Ed 2d 209, 116 S Ct 1261, 78 BNA FEP Cas 1536.
Although plaintiff's arguments supporting her claims were undoubtedly weak, and district court granted summary
judgment against her, her claims were not so devoid of factual support that sanctions were appropriate. Bilharz v First
Interstate Bank (1996, CA7 Wis) 98 F3d 985.
Denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment does not shield plaintiff's attorney from Rule 11 sanctions, since
such denial in no way establishes that plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or that suit had any basis in fact. Healey v
Chelsea Resources, Ltd. (1990, SD NY) 133 FRD 449, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95734, 18 FR Serv 3d 918.
130. Effect of granting motion for reconsideration
Having entertained plaintiff's application for reargument on and reconsideration of order dismissing complaint,
District Court should not have imposed sanctions on notion that application was frivolous. O.N.E. Shipping, Ltd. v
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A. (1987, CA2 NY) 830 F2d 449, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67727, 1988 AMC
191, 9 FR Serv 3d 498, cert den (1988) 488 US 923, 102 L Ed 2d 322, 109 S Ct 303.
131. Effect of grant or denial of directed verdict
Sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuit were improper where District Court judge denied directed verdict, indicating
that case had sufficient merit to go to trial. National Asso. of Government Employees, Inc. v National Federation of
Federal Employees (1988, CA5 Tex) 844 F2d 216, 128 BNA LRRM 2297, 11 FR Serv 3d 74, 95 ALR Fed 163.
Although evidence to support claim was elicited in court in such incomplete fashion as to lead to directed verdict
disposing of count, it was not so sparse as to be sanctionable on grounds that it was not well grounded in fact. Carlton
v Jolly (1989, ED Va) 125 FRD 423, affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 721, reported in full (1990, CA4 Va) 18
FR Serv 3d 728 and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 721 and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 722
and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 722 and affd without op (1990, CA4 Va) 911 F2d 722.
132. Miscellaneous
Sanctions against attorney for filing suit are not appropriate where his investigation and experience, coupled with
client's story, made it appear likely that client had valid claim, even though evidence discovered after suit was filed
apparently refuted claim. Oliveri v Thompson (1986, CA2 NY) 803 F2d 1265, 5 FR Serv 3d 761, cert den (1987) 480
US 918, 94 L Ed 2d 689, 107 S Ct 1373 and (criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-76, RIA TC
Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM 1916, 95 TNT 33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo
1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577, 70 CCH TCM 1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Sanctions should not have been imposed where defendant's legal theory was not frivolous and where defendant's
motion to reconsider and other filings were made in attempt to alert court to its own inconsistent rulings. FDIC v
Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co. (1988, CA7 Ill) 847 F2d 440, 11 FR Serv 3d 671.
Sanctions should not be imposed where claims are not so lacking in plausibility as to make counsel's decision to sign
and certify complaint sanctionable under Rule 11, and where, although counsel ultimately failed to adduce sufficient
support for allegations, action was not completely baseless under standard of objective reasonableness. Woodrum v
Woodward County (1989, CA9 Cal) 866 F2d 1121, 13 FR Serv 3d 390.
Although underlying complaint was frivolous, award of sanctions cannot include defendant's expenses for opposing
plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment because motion had sound basis in fact and law and therefore was
not frivolous. Lloyd v Schlag (1989, CA9 Hawaii) 884 F2d 409, 11 USPQ2d 1623, 14 FR Serv 3d 476.
Where plaintiff, who was himself attorney, and plaintiff's attorney were both involved in earlier transactions with
defendant and should have known that plaintiff's claims were frivolous, sanctions will be imposed on both plaintiff and
his attorney. Pelletier v Zweifel (1991, CA11 Ga) 921 F2d 1465, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95841, 21 FR Serv 3d 1217,
reh, en banc, den (1991, CA11 Ga) 931 F2d 901, cert den (1991) 502 US 855, 116 L Ed 2d 131, 112 S Ct 167 and
(criticized in United States v Blum (1999, CA9 Cal) 1999 US App LEXIS 24849) and (criticized in System Mgmt., Inc. v
Loiselle (2000, DC Mass) 2000 US Dist LEXIS 3178).
Although previously decided case was quite similar to case at bar, there were sufficient factual and theoretical
differences to permit plaintiff's attorney to take position that earlier case was not controlling, and therefore sanctions
were not warranted. Thompson v Duke (1991, CA7 Ill) 940 F2d 192, 20 FR Serv 3d 172 (superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Land v Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Health &
Welfare Fund (1994, CA7 Ill) 25 F3d 509, 18 EBC 1471, 28 FR Serv 3d 1362).
Successful defendants were not entitled to attorney fees simply because they won, since claim was not frivolously
brought, especially considering plaintiff's lack of legal representation, nor was it brought without proper evidentiary
support. Kennedy v National Juvenile Detention Ass'n (1999, CA7 Wis) 187 F3d 690, 51 USPQ2d 1677, reh, en banc,
den (1999, CA7 Wis) 1999 US App LEXIS 23736 and cert den (2000, US) 145 L Ed 2d 1079, 120 S Ct 1169.
Where plaintiff candidly testified that at time complaint was filed, he hoped to discover information that would
reveal basis for lawsuit against defendant, and plaintiff was further unable to provide extrinsic evidence to rebut
defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's attorney did not make reasonable inquiry into facts and law before
signing pleadings, thus violating Rule 11. Mercury Air Group, Inc. v Mansour (2001, CA5 Tex) 237 F3d 542.
Whatever possible merit suit might have had, it should have been obvious to any lawyer that relief was barred on
multiple grounds, including res judicata, Eleventh Amendment, judicial estoppel, and qualified immunity, and it was
unreasonable for district court to deny relief under Rule 11. Bethesda Lutheran Homes & Servs. v Born (2001, CA7 Wis)
238 F3d 853, 72 Soc Sec Rep Serv 419.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Although no court could find fault with attorney who has construed disputed facts in light most favorable to his
client, attorney is subject to sanctions under Rule 11 where testimony and documentary evidence received at trial give
absolutely no support to his post-trial construction of facts. Armada Supply, Inc. v S/T Agios Nikolas (1985, SD NY)
613 F Supp 1459.
Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is warranted where plaintiff's complaint, his testimony at trial, and his deposition
revealed no basis in law or in fact for his claims, and where he also offered no support for his claim in response to
defendants' motion for sanctions. Hammonds v Board of Election Comm'rs (1986, ND Ill) 112 FRD 33.
Where defendant's brief argued cogently for inclusion within exception spelled out in earlier case, defendant's
argument was based on existing law, and sanctions will not be imposed, even though facts of case at bar did not
precisely fit formula set out in earlier case. Incopero v Farmers Ins. Exchange (1986, DC Nev) 113 FRD 28, 7 FR Serv
3d 976.
Plaintiff's counsel will be required to pay attorney fees and costs of one of defendants as sanction where counsel
knew early in proceeding that case was weak but did nothing during discovery to strengthen claim although small
amount of effort would have either enabled him to build case or to realize that there was none and where case was
ultimately abandoned by plaintiff. Golemi v Creative Food Design, Ltd. (1987, DC Dist Col) 116 FRD 73.
Plaintiff did not violate Rule 11 by signing and filing complaint since it had legal basis for complaint, nor did
plaintiff violate Rule by signing and filing papers with court that enabled it to continue discovery to investigate factual
basis of its case, even though plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed action. Sauls v Penn Virginia Resources Corp. (1988,
WD Va) 121 FRD 657, 12 FR Serv 3d 74.
Where plaintiffs' counsel signed joint pretrial order as basis for proceeding to trial, but then conceded plaintiffs'
inability to prove their case, filing of joint pretrial order was clear violation of Rule 11. Burger-Moss v Steinman
(1989, SD NY) 127 FRD 452, 13 USPQ2d 1495.
Where nothing in record leads to conclusion that plaintiffs' original complaint was frivolous on merits, although
plaintiff made number of procedural errors in course of pursuing its claim, these errors do not affect merits of
underlying complaint and are not reason for imposition of sanctions. Hilmon Co. v Hyatt Int'l, S.A. (1991, DC VI) 138
FRD 66, 20 FR Serv 3d 1022.
Plaintiffs' motions for relief from summary judgment based upon new evidence, new case law, excusable neglect,
and misconduct were frivolous, requiring sanctions. Kirby v GE (2000, WD NC) 210 FRD 180.
2. Particular Issues, Claims or Circumstances
133. Amendment of complaint
It was abuse of discretion for District Court to impose sanction on attorney based solely upon its perception that
attorney had willfully and deliberately violated terms of its order granting leave to amend complaint, where District
Court's order was ambiguous and was fully susceptible of interpretation placed upon it by attorney, and attorney
consequently had reasonable grounds to believe that his amended complaint was in compliance with order at time it was
submitted. Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v Holtzman (1985, CA3 Pa) 775 F2d 535, 3 FR Serv 3d 109 (criticized
in Williams v United States (In re Williams) (1998, CA1 RI) 156 F3d 86).
Where party's complaint has been dismissed for failure to adequately set forth elements of his claim, and he has been
given leave to replead in an effort to cure deficiency, it is to be expected that amended complaint will repeat other
allegations found in original complaint, and therefore sanctions should not be imposed simply because amended
complaint was repetitious. Stern v Leucadia Nat'l Corp. (1988, CA2 NY) 844 F2d 997, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93717,
11 FR Serv 3d 61, cert den (1988) 488 US 852, 102 L Ed 2d 109, 109 S Ct 137.
Where plaintiff was given leave to replead after first complaint failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity to
satisfy Rule 9, and second complaint also failed to comply with Rule 9, sanctions should not be imposed where it was
not patently clear that there was absolutely no chance that new material could cure defect. Stern v Leucadia Nat'l
Corp. (1988, CA2 NY) 844 F2d 997, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93717, 11 FR Serv 3d 61, cert den (1988) 488 US 852,
102 L Ed 2d 109, 109 S Ct 137.
Where District Court issued order specifying how second amended complaint should be rewritten, but plaintiff's
counsel apparently disregarded court's directions in drafting third amended complaint, and further, where plaintiff's
counsel disregarded clear precedent in jurisdiction regarding legislative immunity and assumed conflicting position in
complaints and refused to acknowledge that precedent favored defendants' position, District Court properly found that
plaintiff's counsel had violated Rule 11. De Sisto College v Line (1989, CA11 Fla) 888 F2d 755, 15 FR Serv 3d 54,
cert den (1990) 495 US 952, 109 L Ed 2d 544, 110 S Ct 2219.
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Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's attorney is properly ordered to pay $ 100 to defendants' attorney to offset such
attorneys' fees and costs as were incurred in bringing motion to strike that portion of amended complaint which asserted
claim for punitive damages, where plaintiff's attorney acted with flagrant disregard for District Court's ruling on
plaintiff's motion to amend, which ruling set forth parameters of amendment that would be permitted, and where,
furthermore, plaintiff had no reasonable basis for concluding that claim for punitive damages could be asserted 12 years
after institution of action. Index Fund, Inc. v Hagopian (1985, SD NY) 107 FRD 95, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92255, 2
FR Serv 3d 1278.
Where plaintiff's attorney filed amended complaint which differed substantially from proposed amended complaint
which court had given plaintiff permission to file, filing of amended complaint violated Rule 11 since it was objectively
unreasonable for attorney to believe that he had permission to file any amended complaint he chose, even if it was
grossly different from one he had proposed. Dover Steel Co. v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (1993, ED Pa) 151
FRD 570.
134. Antitrust
Rule 11 sanctions are properly imposed against attorney for plaintiff who asserted claim of antitrust violation by
non-competitors without any allegation of antitrust injury, since competent attorney, after reasonable inquiry, would
have recognized that such claim was destined to fail. Eastway Constr. Corp. v New York (1985, CA2 NY) 762 F2d 243,
1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66634, 1 FR Serv 3d 849.
Policy is to leave resolution of Rule 11 matters primarily in hands of trial judge, who by virtue of his close contact
with parties is best able to determine propriety of sanctions, and therefore, although binding precedent plainly
foreclosed plaintiff's anti-trust claim, it cannot be said that trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to impose Rule
11 sanctions. Norton Tire Co. v Tire Kingdom Co. (1988, CA11 Fla) 858 F2d 1533, 9 USPQ2d 1407, 1988-2 CCH
Trade Cases P 68306, 12 FR Serv 3d 803.
Plaintiffs' attorneys were censured for dragnet complaint alleging, inter alia, violations of antitrust laws and failure to
pay interest on escrow accounts, where suit was brought against 177 named defendants (every individual or lending
institution listed in Philadelphia phone book under heading of mortgage brokers or related headings) and then suit was
dismissed against defendants to whom complaint did not apply, but dismissal was not ordered against remaining
defendants to whom complaint did apply. Kinee v Abraham Lincoln Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n (1973, ED Pa) 365 F
Supp 975, 1974-1 CCH Trade Cases P 74927, 17 FR Serv 2d 1339.
Trial court in antitrust action by transporter of industrial waste against competitor would deny defendant's motion for
sanctions against plaintiff's attorney under old Rule 11, which does not require reasonable inquiry on part of attorney
before filing pleading, where attorneys' knowledge that defendant corporation had offered to purchase part of another
competitor is sufficient basis to allege in good faith that defendant corporation had in fact purchased competitor, where
knowledge of plaintiff's attorneys of parallel behavior and of contemporaneous negotiations between defendant and
other competitor provides good faith basis for price-fixing allegations, and where knowledge of plaintiffs' attorneys of
competitor's substantial debt to defendant's subsidiary, and their information about defendant's right of first refusal over
another competitor's facility provide good faith basis for attorneys' allegations that defendant's interests in competitors
violate Clayton Act. Mr. Frank, Inc. v Waste Management, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 591 F Supp 859, 1984-1 CCH Trade
Cases P 66024.
Plaintiff is not liable for monetary sanctions under Rule 11 for signing pleadings alleging illegal tying arrangements
in antitrust action, since, despite fact that alleged conduct did not rise to level of cause of action for violation of antitrust
laws, plaintiff did have at least colorable claim based on extension of existing law. Florida Monument Builders v All
Faiths Memorial Gardens (1984, SD Fla) 605 F Supp 1324.
Although plaintiff's antitrust suit was dismissed at close of its case on ground that testimony of its alter ego was so
incredible as to preclude any possibility of recovery, sanctions under Rule 11 are nevertheless inappropriate, since
evidence existed which tended to support plaintiff's claim, at least on issue of liability, and since, although plaintiff's
attorney was aware of credibility problems of plaintiff's alter ego when action was filed, as result of having represented
him with regard to charges of mail fraud and forgery, even convicted felons may suffer antitrust damages, and it was not
unreasonable for attorney to believe that plaintiff could prove such damages notwithstanding its alter ego's background.
Erie Conduit Corp. v Metropolitan Asphalt Paving Asso. (1985, ED NY) 106 FRD 451.
District Court properly declines to impose Rule 11 sanctions where it finds that plaintiff's antitrust claims, although
without merit, constitute attempt to create novel cause of action, and that plaintiff's due process claim was objectively
reasonable effort to challenge what plaintiff viewed as arbitrary treatment at hands of governmental entity. Skepton v
County of Bucks (1985, ED Pa) 613 F Supp 1013, 1985-2 CCH Trade Cases P 66813.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Although District Court cannot conclude that plaintiff or its counsel acted in subjective bad faith in bringing antitrust
action against defendant, defendant is properly awarded attorney's fees under Rule 11 for period commencing with
plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment and attorney's fees, where facts sufficient to lead
competent attorney to recognize futility of claim were made apparent at least concurrently with defendant's summary
judgment motion, if not sooner, notwithstanding plaintiff's claim that defendant's tardiness in responding to
interrogatories and document requests constitutes excuse for plaintiff's persistence in asserting meritless claim, and
where plaintiff made only token efforts to discover information pertinent to viability of its claim. Burlington Coat
Factory Warehouse v Belk Bros. Co. (1985, SD NY) 621 F Supp 224.
No sanctions will be ruled against counsel for antitrust plaintiff, who asserted in summary judgment papers that
officer of defendant corporation had admitted during deposition that real purpose of his corporation's trade secret action
against plaintiff was to interfere with its business relationships, where there was genuine confusion over whether
deponent's answer to question was "absolutely" or "absolutely not," because, even though deponent obviously intended
to answer "absolutely not," plaintiff's counsel relied in good faith on deletion of "not" in deposition transcript he
believed to be accurate. Grip-Pak, Inc. v Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (1986, ND Ill) 651 F Supp 1482, 1986-2 CCH Trade
Cases P 67295.
Where there was no substantial indication of economic tie between plaintiff and defendant, and no reasonably
competent attorney could believe defendant was liable to plaintiff for antitrust violations as alleged in complaint,
attorney who signed complaint containing deficient claim after failing to discover facts which might justify such claim
has violated Rule 11. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v Integrated Resources, Inc. (1987, SD NY) 114 FRD 684,
1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67467, 6 FR Serv 3d 1092.
Where plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their antitrust claims after discovery caused them to conclude that claims were
not viable, sanctions will not be imposed since facts as they were known to plaintiffs prior to discovery and at time
complaint was filed made it reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that cause of action under antitrust laws existed.
Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v Integrated Resources, Inc. (1987, SD NY) 118 FRD 45, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P
67807.
Children's clothing distributor's 15 USCS § 1 claim against clothing retailer is dismissed with leave to amend
complaint within 20 days, and Rule 11 sanctions will not be imposed, where complaint alleges retailer caused clothing
manufacturer to break off plaintiff's New York distributorship by threatening to boycott manufacturer, but fails to allege
that plaintiff competes with either manufacturer or retailer, because pleading fails to state either (1) that competitors
engaged in group boycott of plaintiff, or (2) that manufacturer and retailer acted to restrain competition, but court
cannot say plaintiff has absolutely no chance of establishing valid antitrust claim after amendment of pleading.
Schwartz v Jamesway Corp. (1987, ED NY) 660 F Supp 138, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67584.
Denial of airline passenger's antitrust and Federal Aviation Act claims against foreign airline for assessing her
ten-dollar excess baggage fee does not entitle airline to Rule 11 sanctions where passenger's theories were at least
colorable, since Rule 11 is not intended to chill attorneys' creativity and relevant inquiry is whether competent attorney
could have formed reasonable belief that pleading was warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. McElderry v Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (1988, SD NY) 678 F Supp 1071,
1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67878.
Professional society of pharmacies and its general counsel shall be sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing action
asserting 15 USCS § § 1 and 13 claims against insurer, where complaint charged insurer with granting lower rate for
major medical insurance coverage to society's competitor, because: (1) 15 USCS § 13 clearly applies only to goods and
commodities and not to services such as insurance, and (2) facts known to counsel did not come close to supporting
economically plausible basis for 15 USCS § 1 claim. Empire State Pharmaceutical Soc., Inc. v Empire Blue Cross &
Blue Shield (1991, SD NY) 778 F Supp 1253, 1991-2 CCH Trade Cases P 69636, 21 FR Serv 3d 111.
135. Appeal and review
Where plaintiffs attempted to obtain de novo review of substantive arguments that have twice been determined to
lack merit by asking court to set aside established doctrine known as "the law of the case," sanctions were properly
imposed on plaintiff's attorneys. Hamer v County of Lake (1989, CA7 Ill) 871 F2d 58, cert den (1989) 493 US 849,
107 L Ed 2d 104, 110 S Ct 146, reh den (1989) 493 US 985, 107 L Ed 2d 526, 110 S Ct 526.
Although appellant's failure to order transcript rendered its appeal "without merit," sanctions under Rule 11 are
improper where there is no evidence to indicate that appeal was not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law
or that it was interposed for any improper purpose. United States ex rel. Leno v Summit Constr. Co. (1989, CA9 Idaho)
892 F2d 788, 36 CCF P 75774.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
136. Arbitration
Where plaintiffs brought second motion to compel arbitration after filing appeal from denial of first motion, and
second motion was based on same underlying dispute as first motion, obvious jurisdictional barrier, duplicitous nature
of second motion, and plaintiffs' lack of candor before court justify imposition of sanctions. Pipe Trades Council, U.A.
Local 159 v Underground Contrs. Ass'n (1987, CA9 Cal) 835 F2d 1275, 127 BNA LRRM 2327, 10 FR Serv 3d 376,
amd, reh, en banc, den (1988, CA9) 1988 US App LEXIS 19508.
In action brought by union to compel employer to submit grievance to arbitration, employer's refusal to submit to
arbitration was not frivolous, and thus sanctions against employer were properly denied. Local 232, Allied Industrial
Workers v Briggs & Stratton Corp. (1988, CA7 Wis) 837 F2d 782, 127 BNA LRRM 2451, 108 CCH LC P 10316, 10 FR
Serv 3d 553.
Where union had agreed to final and binding arbitration, and arbitrator determined that union had waived claim in
question, union had no right to relitigate arbitrator's decision in federal court, and union's argument to contrary was
frivolous and legally unreasonable and warranted sanctions. Teamsters Local Union No. 760 v United Parcel Service,
Inc. (1990, CA9 Wash) 921 F2d 218, 90 CDOS 9032, 90 Daily Journal DAR 14072, 136 BNA LRRM 2114, 117 CCH
LC P 10474, 18 FR Serv 3d 1122.
Arbitration award entered in Louisiana pursuant to parties' franchise agreement was upheld, and franchisees were
denied relief from default arbitration order under Fed.R Civ. P. 60(b), and sanctions were entered against franchisees for
baseless challenges to arbitration order. G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v Wilson (2003, CA9 Cal) 326 F3d 1096, 2003 CDOS
3371, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 4313, 55 FR Serv 3d 425.
Sanctions will not be granted against party on grounds that party's motion to compel arbitration was unwarranted by
existing law where recent case law supported motion and only relevant case denying such motion was brought to court's
attention by party making motion. Farino v Advest, Inc. (1986, ED NY) 111 FRD 345, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92812,
6 FR Serv 3d 618.
Arbitration is compelled and current action stayed pending arbitration but costs are not imposed on registered
representative of brokerage firm who sued firm, because even though firm was correct that underlying action is subject
to arbitration, court does not find that issue was so clear that refusal immediately to submit to arbitration was
unreasonable or warranted sanctions under FRCP 11(b)(1). O'Donnell v First Investors Corp. (1995, SD NY) 872 F
Supp 1274.
Sanctions are not imposed under FRCP 11 against securities broker who filed trademark infringement action against
other brokers, where court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration, because determination of scope of
securities dealers' code and rules regarding arbitration was not without some measure of uncertainty and it cannot be
said that plaintiff conducted less than minimal investigation into factual and legal bases for its claims. Lombard Secs. v
Thomas F. White & Co. (1995, DC Md) 903 F Supp 895.
Sanctions will not be imposed on plaintiff, even though appeal and motion to vacate decision of arbitrators regarding
contract dispute is arguably frivolous under FRCP 11(b)(2) given present state of Louisiana law, because court chooses
to exercise discretion given under FRCP 11(c) and not sanction. Evangeline Tel. Co. v AT&T Communications of the S.
Cent. States (1995, WD La) 916 F Supp 598.
If union has complied with FRCP 11, court will award attorney's fees for all time incurred by union after notification
to employer that it intended to move for summary judgment and seek sanctions, because employer failed to back down
despite clarity of controlling precedent against it, failed to find legitimate basis on which to challenge that precedent,
and failed to address obvious and key justification for arbitrator's decision. Mitchell Plastics v Glass, Molders, Pottery,
Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union (1996, WD Pa) 946 F Supp 401, 155 BNA LRRM 2496, 37 FR Serv 3d 227.
In dispute arising from medical services agreement between doctor and hospital, court determined that doctor could
avoid risk of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and Fed. R. App. P. 38 if doctor accepted denial of doctor's untimely
and unjustified demand for arbitration by declining to seek interlocutory review of order denying that demand.
Uwaydah v Van Wert County Hosp. (2002, ND Ohio) 246 F Supp 2d 808.
137. Attorneys fees
Failure of plaintiff's attorney to apportion his time between plaintiff's 2 claims in making original fee request does
not justify imposition of sanctions where request for total fee was arguably defensible under law in circuit in that
District Court had not yet ruled that claims were distinctly different, and when it did, plaintiff's attorney recognized his
obligation to apportion fees between separate claims. Zuniga v United Can Co. (1987, CA9 Cal) 812 F2d 443, 124
BNA LRRM 2888, 106 CCH LC P 12247.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiffs' attorney is properly assessed attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses which defendants
expended in resisting fee application, where, in settlement of case, plaintiffs signed documents purporting to release
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
defendants from liability for costs and fees, plaintiffs' counsel had himself signed court's order dismissing case which
stated that parties were to bear their own costs, and plaintiffs' counsel's motion for fee and brief on fee issue completely
failed to note documents signed by plaintiffs and his supplemental brief which finally addressed effect of releases
lacked legal merit. Blackwell v Board of Offender Rehabilitation (1985, SD Ga) 609 F Supp 772, 1 FR Serv 3d 1512,
affd (1987, CA11 Ga) 807 F2d 914, 6 FR Serv 3d 1309.
Parties' settlement agreement and civil rights plaintiff's dismissal of action with prejudice preclude award of
attorney's fees under 42 USCS § 1988, but plaintiff will not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for seeking such award,
where policemen agreed to pay arrestee $ 1,500 and "costs" to settle on morning of trial, because reference to "costs"
could arguably include attorney's fees, even though court held reference was not sufficiently explicit under Eighth
Circuit precedents to preserve issue of award of attorney's fee. Pilliard v Meyer (1988, ED Mo) 689 F Supp 979.
Defendants' motion for sanctions was denied because submissions made by counsel for plaintiff as part of counsel's
application for fees were not contradictory when one document discussed counsel's regular hourly rate and another
document discussed counsel's fee arrangement with plaintiffs; documents did not rise to level of being not well
grounded, legally untenable, or brought with purpose of vexatiously multiplying proceedings. Cobell v Norton (2002,
DC Dist Col) 211 FRD 7.
Adversary plaintiff seller of real estate was entitled to recovery from adversary defendant debtors for damages,
prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest, but request for attorney's fees for breach of contract suit was denied.
Sanner v Poli (In re Poli) (2003, BC ED Va) 298 BR 557.
138. Bankruptcy
On appeal of bankruptcy court's decision, law firm's representation that new evidence had been uncovered is
sanctionable where "new evidence" was simply play on words and referred to facts well known to litigants before
bankruptcy court ruled. In re Ronco, Inc. (1988, CA7 Ill) 838 F2d 212, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 72185, 10 FR Serv 3d
463.
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for sanctions, sought on grounds that
complaint was not warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, where district judge noted that several rulings by bankruptcy judge did support plaintiffs' theory, plaintiffs' counsel
apparently conferred with bankruptcy judge about matter, and counsel communicated with defendant about possibility
of litigation before action was filed. Burkhart v Kinsley Bank (1988, CA10 Kan) 852 F2d 512, 11 FR Serv 3d 469.
Where attorney filed for relief for client under Chapter 7 of Bankruptcy Code less than 180 days after client
voluntarily dismissed earlier case under Chapter 13 following creditor's filing of request for relief from automatic stay,
attorney's action was clear violation of Bankruptcy Code (11 USCS § 109(g)(2)) in effort to thwart collection attempts
by client's creditor, and district court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions on attorney for Chapter 7 filing. Moran v
Frisard (In re Ulmer) (1994, CA5 La) 19 F3d 234, 30 CBC2d 1865, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 75820, 28 FR Serv 3d 1028
(criticized in In re Richardson (1998, BC MD La) 217 BR 479, 32 BCD 114) and (criticized in In re Hackett (1999, ED
La) 1999 US Dist LEXIS 6900).
139. Civil or constitutional rights
Arguments raised were not so lacking in legal merit as to justify imposition of sanctions where attorney's clients
settled their claims under 42 USCS § 1983 for civil rights violations and signed releases of all causes of action,
including those for attorney's fees, and where attorney subsequently filed motion for award of attorney's fees, arguing
that public policy and congressional intent in enacting 42 USCS § 1983 prevents litigants from settling claims for
attorney's fees, that success on claim of one appellant was outside terms of releases, and that including attorney's fees
within settlement offer constituted act of duress creating ethical conflict between attorney and his clients. Blackwell v
Department of Offender Rehabilitation (1987, CA11 Ga) 807 F2d 914, 6 FR Serv 3d 1309.
Where defendant tenant in holdover dispossess proceeding sought to remove case to federal court following state
court proceedings which had constituted final judgment and sought to raise due process and equal protection claims
which had not been raised in state courts, it should have been patently obvious to any attorney who had familiarized
himself with law governing removal of actions to federal courts that this was frivolous action, and therefore sanctions
were properly imposed on defendant's attorney. Four Keys Leasing & Maintenance Corp. v Simithis (1988, CA2 NY)
849 F2d 770.
Where plaintiffs' attorney filed action alleging violations of 42 USCS § 1983, and only state action alleged was
court clerk's acceptance and filing of documents, complaint was patently frivolous, and district court did not err in
imposing sanctions. Gaskell v Weir (1993, CA9 Cal) 10 F3d 626, 93 CDOS 8588, 93 Daily Journal DAR 14773, 27
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
FR Serv 3d 609, appeal after remand, motion to dismiss app den, motion gr sub nom Hall v Contra Costa County (1995,
CA9 Cal) 50 F3d 14, reported in full (1995, CA9 Cal) 1995 US App LEXIS 741.
Filing of 42 USCS § 1983 complaint alleging conspiracy, which was deficient for lack of detail and specificity, was
not unreasonable and did not constitute egregious conduct, thus sanctions were unwarranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
even though complaint was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Tahfs v Proctor (2003, CA6 Mich) 316 F3d
584, 2003 FED App 15P.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff who brought civil rights action based on assertions that federal reserve notes are not
legal tender and that he was denied asserted right to jury trial in mortgage foreclosure action is properly ordered to pay
each of 3 defendants $ 750 in attorneys' fees and also to pay fine of $ 500 to Clerk of Court, since plaintiff's insistence
on litigating question in face of controlling precedent amounts to bad faith, his failure to discover overwhelming
precedent suggests lack of reasonable inquiry into law, and record is replete with motions and strange filings by plaintiff
that obfuscate issues presented and are suggestive of attempt to prolong suit and harass defendants. Nixon v Phillipoff
(1985, ND Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Sanctions are awarded against attorney who presented arguments so legally unreasonable and so lacking in factual
support that they prove attorney failed to undertake "reasonable inquiry" into state of law, where experienced labor
attorney tried to assert revolutionary change in jurisdictional requirements under Title VI, without single case to support
it, as current state of law. Worrell v Uniforms to You & Co. (1987, ND Cal) 655 F Supp 246, reported at (1987, ND
Cal) 673 F Supp 1461, 45 BNA FEP Cas 1535, 45 CCH EPD P 37809.
Defendants, city and city justice of the peace sued under § 1983 for allegedly violating plaintiff's right to counsel
and right to bail, did not violate Rule 11 by arguing that plaintiff's claim was barred by statute of limitations, municipal
immunity, and plaintiff's failure to file notice of claim under Utah Governmental Immunity Act, where defendants
withdrew statute of limitations and city immunity claims but maintained incorrect position on notice of claim, since §
1983 law is in state of flux and plaintiff's claims have also been found to be insupportable. Edwards v Hare (1988, DC
Utah) 682 F Supp 1528.
Civil rights action brought against plaintiff's former wife was unquestionably frivolous, where action failed to set
forth any colorable basis for personal jurisdiction against wife, action challenged correctness of numerous state court
decisions (which federal district court clearly lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review), and plaintiff did not allege
that he was deprived of any constitutional right by his former wife, who was not even arguably state actor. Levine v
County of Westchester (1996, SD NY) 164 FRD 372, 34 FR Serv 3d 305.
Attorney violated FRCP 11 by bringing frivolous § 1983 action against state entities and officers acting in their
official capacities and against federal entities and officers, since responsible practitioner in field should have known that
§ 1983 did not apply to federal government or to states or their officers in their official capacities. Mendez v Draham
(2002, DC NJ) 182 F Supp 2d 430.
In action alleging racial and sexual discrimination by county, plaintiffs' counsel violated Rule 11 by filing second
amended complaint which was frivolous and groundless in light of counsel's disregard of court's specific order to show
injury-in-fact in any additional amended complaint. Cone Corp. v Hillsborough County (1994, MD Fla) 157 FRD 533,
8 FLW Fed D 410.
140. --Education
Where complaint alleged that defendants violated plaintiff's and his daughter's Fourth Amendment rights by
conducting search of plaintiff's car in school parking lot after sniffer dog reacted to it, but plaintiff testified at trial that
he did not think that his or his daughter's constitutional rights had been violated, and where previous case had settled
law in this area, District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions jointly and severally upon plaintiff and
his attorney. Jennings v Joshua Independent School Dist. (1989, CA5 Tex) 877 F2d 313.
State school superintendents and state may not recover attorney's fees expended in defending 42 USCS § 1983 suit
brought by "homeschooling" parents under either 42 USCS § 1988 or Rule 11, where parents presented variety of
constitutional challenges to state statute mandating that minors receive educational services from competent instructors
at least substantially equivalent to instruction given in public schools, because even though parents' claims could not
survive summary judgment none of their arguments were so frivolous, unreasonable or groundless as to warrant
sanctions. Blackwelder v Safnauer (1988, ND NY) 689 F Supp 106, app dismd (1989, CA2 NY) 866 F2d 548.
Sanctions of $ 100,000 are imposed against attorney who filed action against school district and officials on behalf of
student who received 1-day suspension for threatening to punch teacher in her head, because (1) claim was not
grounded in law or fact, (2) attorney acted unprofessionally towards defendants in this and several other cases, and (3)
previous efforts at deterrence failed. Giangrasso v Kittatinny Regional High Sch. Bd. of Educ. (1994, DC NJ) 865 F
Supp 1133.
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141. --Employment discrimination
Filing employment discrimination claim was not objectively unreasonable just because plaintiff received adverse
determination from Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, where language of statute in question is ambiguous
and plaintiff's interpretation of statute was not necessarily unreasonable and there is no case authority in this or any
other circuit which addresses interpretation to be accorded specific language on which plaintiff relied, and therefore no
violation of Rule 11 occurred. Schaefer v Transportation Media, Inc. (1988, CA7 Ill) 859 F2d 1251, 47 BNA FEP Cas
855, 47 CCH EPD P 38350, 11 FR Serv 3d 1301, reh den (1988, CA7) 1988 US App LEXIS 18071.
Mere establishment of prima facie case of discrimination in action brought under Title VII (42 USCS § 2000e) will
not by itself insulate litigants and their counsel from sanctions for continued litigation of otherwise patently frivolous
case, since threshold standards for establishing racial discrimination are purposely low. Blue v United States Dep't of
Army (1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 525, 54 CCH EPD P 40260, 17 FR Serv 3d 737, cert den (1991) 499 US 959, 113 L Ed
2d 645, 111 S Ct 1580, 56 CCH EPD P 40798 and (criticized in In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. (1997, CA3 VI)
37 VI 398, 120 F3d 368, 27 ELR 21494).
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff and his counsel are properly ordered to pay reasonable attorneys' fees to defendant's
counsel for time expended in prosecuting defendant's motion to dismiss, where federal jurisdiction in case was
originally premised on violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, but complaint was devoid of any claim of
discrimination encompassed by Title VII, stating claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act instead.
Johnson v Kut Kwick Corp. (1984, SD Ga) 620 F Supp 748, 3 FR Serv 3d 848.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's counsel is properly assessed reasonable expenses incurred by defendant as result of
filings necessitated by plaintiff's unwarranted opposition to motion to strike claims for compensatory and punitive
damages under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, where plaintiff's attempt to avoid legal issue by contending that
one of counts was pendent claim for conspiracy was belied by complaint, and where plaintiff's assertion, 5 months after
motion to strike was filed, that compensatory and punitive damages were permitted under ADEA constituted untimely,
unpersuasive, and borderline unethical act. Carvalho v MacArthur Corp. (1985, SD Fla) 615 F Supp 164, 37 BNA FEP
Cas 1587, 37 CCH EPD P 35305.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's counsel is properly ordered to pay defendant's costs and attorneys' fees upon dismissal
of action for unconstitutional discharge of employee, where District Court repeatedly asked plaintiff's attorneys to state
legal and factual basis for action, and they failed to do so on each occasion and accordingly were warned about
likelihood of sanctions if court determined that action was frivolous. Vega v Federal Aviation Admin. (1985, ED NY)
621 F Supp 1177.
In employment discrimination suit, where defendant's attorney tendered offer of judgment that did not provide for
payment of attorney's fees, District Court refused to assess sanctions under Rule 11, stating that exclusion of attorney's
fees in defendant's offer did not demonstrate bad faith or improper purpose, and that error was understandable in light of
particular posture of case and recent unsettling activity in decisional law. Bentley v Bolger (1986, CD Ill) 110 FRD
108, 44 BNA FEP Cas 619, 4 FR Serv 3d 445.
In action alleging sexual discrimination and harassment by former employer, where plaintiff stated in complaint that
upon information and belief, supervisors continue to sexually harass women employees today, concerning which
statement she answered in interrogatory that she had no present knowledge of specific facts regarding this allegation but
would supplement her answer as facts came to light, allegation is not so improper as to be violation of Rule 11.
Broderick v Shad (1987, DC Dist Col) 117 FRD 306, 43 BNA FEP Cas 532, 7 FR Serv 3d 1275.
Rule 11 sanctions are imposed upon counsel for defendants who opposed plaintiff's motion to remand civil rights
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where (1) defendants' assertion that mere filing of charge with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is not jurisdictional prerequisite to filing Title VII (42 USCS § §
2000e et seq.) action in federal court is legally unreasonable and lacking in factual support, (2) counsel's reliance on
clearly erroneous interpretation of case law does not meet requisite good faith standard for extension of law, and (3)
there is strong inference of improper purpose behind pleading, given counsel's experience in labor and employment law.
Worrell v Uniforms to You & Co. (1987, ND Cal) 673 F Supp 1461, 45 BNA FEP Cas 1535, 45 CCH EPD P 37809.
Employer, accused of violating Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 USCS § 206(d)) and 42 USCS § § 1981 and 2000e et
seq. for dismissing black female personnel supervisor pursuant to 20 percent workforce reduction decision, is not
entitled to Rule 11 sanctions where plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to survive employer's motion for
summary judgment, because attorney's expectations that discovery would produce such evidence was neither
unreasonable nor vexatious. Grant v Pfizer, Inc. (1988, SD NY) 683 F Supp 41, 46 BNA FEP Cas 638, 46 CCH EPD P
37853, 48 CCH EPD P 38432.
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Although plaintiff's racial discrimination claim was unsuccessful, sanctions against race discrimination plaintiffs and
their counsel are rarely granted since incidence of racist attitudes and conduct is so common that any totally arbitrary
conduct by employer must be treated as circumstantial evidence that racial bias tainted adverse decision, and sanctions
are particularly inappropriate where, as here, there are arguable soft spots in defense. Pickens v Children's Mercy
Hospital (1989, WD Mo) 124 FRD 209, 49 CCH EPD P 38729.
In age discrimination action, where record at time plaintiff's counsel filed complaint contained essentially no
evidence other than suspicion of age discrimination, this was insufficient to justify filing of complaint, and sanction
under Rule 11 is warranted on basis that attorney did not make objectively reasonable judgment that claim was
well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. D'Aquino v Citicorp/Diner's Club, Inc. (1991, ND Ill) 139 FRD
357, 57 BNA FEP Cas 178, 59 CCH EPD P 41771.
Summarily defeated age discrimination plaintiff is sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing wholly and patently
insufficient post-trial motions, where surgeon was replaced as Chief of Ambulatory Surgery by 3 younger part-time
surgeons due to hospital restructuring geared to attracting new doctors to hospital, because surgeon's "new" arguments
that hospital misrepresented facts and that his language barrier prohibited effective communication with his attorney,
presented in some 25 pages of memoranda without citation to any authority, were utterly without legal foundation.
Patel v Lutheran Medical Ctr. (1991, ED NY) 775 F Supp 592, 62 CCH EPD P 42503.
Sanctions are not imposed under Rule 11 against employer in employees' employment discrimination action, where
employer did not withdraw its motion to dismiss upon employees' receipt of "right-to-sue" letters, because although
employer's action bordered on frivolous, court would exercise discretion and not impose sanctions sua sponte. Chandler
v Fast Lane (1994, ED Ark) 868 F Supp 1138, 66 BNA FEP Cas 675.
Sanctions are not imposed under FRCP 11 against Buddhist minister in connection with her unsuccessful claim
against Buddhist church and individual ministers, alleging sexual harassment, disparate wage treatment, and other
discrimination in violation of state constitution, where there is little case law dealing with issue of whether party may
state claim for employment discrimination not resulting in termination, and no case holding that there is not, because
claim is not sufficiently frivolous or without merit to warrant sanctions. Himaka v Buddhist Churches of Am. (1995, ND
Cal) 919 F Supp 332, 68 CCH EPD P 44088, summary judgment gr, dismd, sanctions disallowed (1995, ND Cal) 917 F
Supp 698.
142. --Misconduct by law enforcement official
In context of civil rights suit brought by survivors of individual who had died of injuries received when defendant
law enforcement officers employed tear gas to flush him out of house, District Court properly imposes Rule 11
sanctions against defendant deputy sheriff's attorney who had argued that exigent circumstances justified deputy
sheriff's warrantless entry into house to save decedent, where deputy sheriff's deposition indicates that he was impatient
to resolve stalemate and that he was concerned that decedent was lying in wait inside house to ambush any officer who
entered, but nothing in deposition suggests that he was concerned about decedent's health or that he believed that
decedent might have succumbed to tear gas smoke and be in need of help. Frazier v Cast (1985, CA7 Ill) 771 F2d 259,
2 FR Serv 3d 1405.
Although plaintiff may have lacked standing to bring action against district attorney who had offered to drop charges
against plaintiff if he would sign release of civil rights claims against arresting officers who had allegedly beaten
plaintiff, bringing of suit was insufficient to warrant imposition of sanctions against plaintiff's attorney. Oliveri v
Thompson (1986, CA2 NY) 803 F2d 1265, 5 FR Serv 3d 761, cert den (1987) 480 US 918, 94 L Ed 2d 689, 107 S Ct
1373 and (criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-76, RIA TC Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM
1916, 95 TNT 33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo 1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577,
70 CCH TCM 1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Complaint alleging that police had violated constitutional rights of third party by issuing certain traffic tickets and
that justice of peace had violated plaintiff's civil rights in some unidentified fashion was totally without merit,
unintelligible and completely frivolous, and therefore sanctions were properly imposed. Clark v Green (1987, CA5
Tex) 814 F2d 221, 7 FR Serv 3d 366.
Where plaintiff brought civil rights action following search of his car, in spite of fact that, as he testified at trial, he
did not think that his constitutional rights had been violated by any of actions of those involved in search, it was not
abuse of discretion for District Court to conclude that complaint was filed in violation of Rule 11. Jennings v Joshua
Independent School Dist. (1989, CA5 Tex) 869 F2d 870, 13 FR Serv 3d 413, substituted op, in part, on reh (1989, CA5
Tex) 877 F2d 313 and cert den (1990) 496 US 935, 110 L Ed 2d 660, 110 S Ct 3212.
Complaint must be dismissed and FRCP 11 sanctions imposed against plaintiffs' attorney to extent 42 USCS § 1983
claims are made against police officers who merely executed search warrant, where plaintiffs' attorney was warned
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about Rule 11 obligation prior to filing of amended complaint, because discovery cannot be relied on to excuse filing of
vacuous complaint where plaintiffs had no knowledge of violation by executing officers at time of filing. Harden v
Peck (1988, ND Ill) 686 F Supp 1254.
143. --Prisoners
Reasonable but unconfirmed belief that meritorious fact-based claim exists may obligate prisoner to raise and pursue
claim if habeas corpus petition is filed, and to do so does not violate Rule 11, since first petition must adequately set
forth all of state prisoner's colorable grounds for relief. United States v Barrett (1999, CA1 Me) 178 F3d 34, cert den
(2000, US) 145 L Ed 2d 1110, 120 S Ct 1208.
144. Continuance
Appellant's argument for continuance is not sanctionable, although argument was weak, since part of appellant's
submission was that, if continuance for discovery had been granted, more compelling case would have been presented,
and since argument was not precluded by any existing precedent. In re Ronco, Inc. (1988, CA7 Ill) 838 F2d 212, CCH
Bankr L Rptr P 72185, 10 FR Serv 3d 463.
145. Contracts
In case turning upon general concepts of "basis of bargain" and "reasonable reliance" in which plaintiff had glimmer
of chance of prevailing, court did not err in refusing to impose sanctions, despite defendant's argument that plaintiff's
claims were not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. Hoover Universal, Inc. v Brockway Imco, Inc.
(1987, CA4 Va) 809 F2d 1039, 3 UCCRS2d 46.
In suit alleging breach of contract, gross negligence, and willful misconduct in valuation of assets for appraisal
report, where defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on basis of contract's covenant not to sue and its
arbitration provision, sanctions will not be imposed on plaintiffs where they made reasonable inquiry in case and where
it was reasonable for plaintiffs not to know that covenant would bar any suit concerning arbitration process, and where
plaintiffs had good faith argument as to their view of what law was or should be. Wasyl, Inc. v First Boston Corp.
(1987, CA9 Cal) 813 F2d 1579.
In action revolving around interpretation of terms of contract, District Court erred in imposing sanctions on plaintiffs
for bringing frivolous lawsuit on grounds that contract language clearly prohibited action they desired, since case law
declares that plaintiffs must be given opportunity to present extrinsic evidence as to intention of parties in drafting
contract, although wisdom of such law is doubtful. Trident Ctr. v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 847
F2d 564.
Rule 11 was violated where attorney knew counterclaim was false, since based on a contract which did not exist, but
allowed issue to go to trial. American Auto. Asso. v Rothman (1952, DC NY) 104 F Supp 655.
Where complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud, but there was no evidence of any agreement or negotiations to
support existence of contract and complaint described no representations made by defendant to plaintiff to support
allegation of fraud, plaintiff's attorney violated Rule 11 in filing claims. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v Integrated
Resources, Inc. (1987, SD NY) 114 FRD 684, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67467, 6 FR Serv 3d 1092.
Sanctions should not be imposed on defendants for filing action against plaintiff in state court, based on same
contractual relationship as federal action, after filing motion to dismiss federal court action for lack of personal
jurisdiction, since it could be argued that filing motion to dismiss relieved them of any obligation to file answer to that
complaint, so that no compulsory counterclaims could exist until motion was decided and answer became due, and
therefore decision not to file counterclaim in federal action was not unwarranted by existing law. H & D Wireless Ltd.
Partnership v Sunspot (1988, DC Conn) 118 FRD 307.
Defendant's 2 objections to order granting specific performance have no basis whatever in fact or law since first
objection flies in face of specific language of applicable rule and second objection ignores entirely facts of case and
both lacked any citation to relevant law, and therefore sanctions will be imposed. Eakin v Continental Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. (1988, ND Ill) 121 FRD 363, affd (1989, CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 114, 8 UCCRS2d 422, reh den (1989,
CA7) 1989 US App LEXIS 9392.
FRCP 11 sanctions will not be imposed against secured creditor based on its response to debtor's motion for
summary judgment in debtor's action alleging wrongful repossession of tractor-trailer, because motion was not filed for
improper purpose and response presented objectively reasonable arguments addressing legitimate concerns. Clark v
Associates Commercial Corp. (1994, DC Kan) 877 F Supp 1439, 26 UCCRS2d 601.
146. --Tortious interference
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District Court properly denied motion for sanctions for bringing counterclaim against attorney for tortious
interference with contract since no state case directly precluded such tort under similar circumstances, and thus District
Court reasoned that it could not say that tortious interference counterclaim was not warranted by good faith argument
for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Knight v Sharif (1989, CA5 Miss) 875 F2d 516, reh den (1989,
CA5) 1989 US App LEXIS 12070.
147. Contribution and indemnity
Sanctions were properly imposed on defendant who filed third party complaint, where defendant's allegations and
claim of right to indemnity and contribution were groundless in context of third party complaint, and even cursory
review of applicable law on third party practice would have revealed this. Stewart v American International Oil & Gas
Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 845 F2d 196, 10 FR Serv 3d 1119, 100 OGR 260.
Where defendant restaurant owner in slip and fall case filed cross-claim against builder of stairs in question, taking
position that if it were liable to plaintiff, codefendant would be liable to it, defendant should have amended claim or
dropped it upon learning builder was not designer of stairs, and failure to do so will result in sanctions. Golemi v
Creative Food Design, Ltd. (1987, DC Dist Col) 116 FRD 73.
148. Copyrights
In copyright infringement action involving advertising jingles, absence of evidence indicating that plaintiff did not
authorize defendant's use of jingles does not indicate that plaintiff's claims lack any basis in law or fact, because
establishing absence of license is not element of proof required to state prima facie claim of copyright infringement, but
rather is affirmative defense which must be proved by defendant. Lulirama Ltd. v Axcess Broadcast Servs. (1997, CA5
Tex) 128 F3d 872, 44 USPQ2d 1731.
Pursuant to Rule 11, defendant is entitled to fees incurred in defense of plaintiff's copyright infringement claims
where (1) when complaint was filed, plaintiff knew that allegations of sweeping ownership in fictional character were
unsupported by rights plaintiff actually possessed, (2) plaintiff used lawsuit as part of larger effort to acquire some
portion of profits derived from distribution of video game, and (3) plaintiff viewed corporate litigation as "profit
center", and known insufficiency of claims asserted did not inhibit use of litigation where opportunity for profitable
settlement existed. Universal City Studios, Inc. v Nintendo Co. (1985, SD NY) 615 F Supp 838, 227 USPQ 96, affd
(1986, CA2 NY) 797 F2d 70, 230 USPQ 409, cert den (1986) 479 US 987, 93 L Ed 2d 581, 107 S Ct 578.
In copyright action which turned on authenticity of plaintiff's signature on certain documents, where plaintiff signed
complaint stating that signature was forged but later admitted he had signed documents, plaintiff had actual knowledge
that filing complaint constituted wrongful conduct and therefore is personally liable for Rule 11 sanctions; further,
attorney who continued to pursue claim despite plaintiff's contradictions without even consulting handwriting expert is
also liable for sanctions. Estate of Calloway v Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp. (1991,
SD NY) 138 FRD 646, 23 FR Serv 3d 834, affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds (1993, CA2 NY) 9 F3d 237,
27 FR Serv 3d 753, cert den (1994) 511 US 1081, 128 L Ed 2d 459, 114 S Ct 1829.
Where counsel for defendants filed notice of taking deposition upon oral examination, counsel clearly ignored plain
body of law which limits oral depositions of plaintiffs in copyright infringement actions such as one at bar, and since
defense counsel was warned of restriction by plaintiffs' counsel, but failed to show that his action was warranted by
good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, Rule 11 was violated. Brockman Music v
Aire/Ink Inc. (1993, DC Mo) 151 FRD 652.
In copyright case involving mannequin head, infringement defendant will not be sanctioned for its two-faced
strategy, where it pleaded that head is not copyrightable while simultaneously obtaining copyright registration for its
allegedly infringing head, because FRCP 8(e)(2) allows inconsistent pleadings, litigant may hedge its bets, and this
common litigation and business strategy cannot be sanctioned under FRCP 11. Pivot Point Int'l v Charlene Prods., Inc.
(2001, ND Ill) 170 F Supp 2d 828.
149. Corporate takeovers
If incumbent management of target corporation attempts to tie up tender offeror in litigation by unsupported
allegations of false and misleading statements in tender offer materials filed with Securities and Exchange Commission
and disseminated to shareholders, court should invoke appropriate sanctions under Rule 11. Florida Commercial
Banks v Culverhouse (1985, CA11 Fla) 772 F2d 1513, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92321.
150. Costs of suit
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District court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sanction defendants for filing bill of costs that included
photocopying costs where plaintiff alleged that defendants knew that such costs were not recoverable, but plaintiff cited
no authority and presented no evidence that defendants' request was improper. Murdock v Stout (1995, CA9 Cal) 54 F3d
1437, 95 CDOS 3100.
151. Damages
Sanction may be imposed based on prayer for relief where amendment of damages claimed is excessive and
unexplained and appears to have been made frivolously and for purpose of harassment. Hudson v Moore Business
Forms, Inc. (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA FEP Cas 898.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's attorney is properly ordered to pay $ 100 to defendants' attorney to offset such
attorneys' fees and costs as were incurred in bringing motion to strike that portion of amended complaint which asserted
claim for punitive damages, where plaintiff's attorney acted with flagrant disregard for District Court's ruling on
plaintiff's motion to amend, which ruling set forth parameters of amendment that would be permitted, and where,
furthermore, plaintiff had no reasonable basis for concluding that claim for punitive damages could be asserted 12 years
after institution of action. Index Fund, Inc. v Hagopian (1985, SD NY) 107 FRD 95, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92255, 2
FR Serv 3d 1278.
Where plaintiff claimed she suffered mental anguish as result of her termination from her job, but she admitted she
suffered no public humiliation, she suffered no physical reaction and did not consult any physician or psychiatrist, she
had no corroborating evidence and could point to no circumstances affording guarantee of genuineness and these facts
were all within her knowledge at outset, complaint's allegation of damages for mental anguish was frivolous and in
violation of Rule 11. Selbst v Touche Ross & Co. (1987, SD NY) 116 FRD 665, 60 BNA FEP Cas 1354, 44 CCH EPD
P 37405.
In action brought against airline for emotional trauma suffered when airplane developed engine trouble and had to be
diverted, although plaintiff's counsel could be faulted for failing to settle or discontinue at earlier time when plaintiff's
long history of emotional problems had been demonstrated from medical records, sanctions will not be imposed,
although action was questionable one. Class v Eastern Airlines, Inc. (1987, SD NY) 117 FRD 511, 8 FR Serv 3d 330.
Prayer for relief demanding large sums of money or seeking other relief without factual support may be sanctionable.
Thomas v Yonkers Police Dep't Transp. Unit (1993, SD NY) 147 FRD 77.
152. Defamation
Rule 11 sanctions based on bad faith are not imposed where documents supporting motion for sanctions do not
demonstrate that published statement under which plaintiff sued for libel and defamation was true, and was known to be
true by plaintiff and his attorney. Hashemi v Campaigner Publications, Inc. (1986, CA11 Ga) 784 F2d 1581, 4 FR
Serv 3d 922 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Kale v Combined Ins. Co. (1988, CA1 Mass) 861 F2d
746, 48 BNA FEP Cas 563, 48 CCH EPD P 38446, 12 FR Serv 3d 837).
District Court erred in assessing sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney under Rule 11 based on finding that plaintiffs'
attorney filed defamation action in bad faith where court made erroneous findings that plaintiffs should have had
knowledge of actual statements made by defendants before filing complaint, that plaintiffs' attorney had improper
purpose of silencing defendants, who were expert witnesses in another case, and obtaining discovery advantage in that
case, and that attorneys should have recognized that defendants' statements were not fact but nonactionable opinion,
since plaintiffs' knowledge of defendants' actual statements was irrelevant to their action, the evidence did not support
finding of improper purpose, and good faith argument could be made that defendants' statements should not be
constitutionally protected. In re Yagman (1986, CA9 Cal) 796 F2d 1165, 13 Media L R 1545, 5 FR Serv 3d 305, reh
den, amd (1986, CA9 Cal) 803 F2d 1085, 5 FR Serv 3d 1443.
Where defendant magazine published derogatory and insulting comments about plaintiff, although such comments
were opinion and were therefore protected by First Amendment, plaintiff will not be subject to sanctions for bringing
suit arguing for extension of law to hold defendant liable for defamation. Ault v Hustler Magazine (1988, CA9 Or) 860
F2d 877, 15 Media L R 2205, cert den (1989) 489 US 1080, 103 L Ed 2d 837, 109 S Ct 1532.
In defamation action, plaintiff's argument that actual malice could be inferred from evidence that quotations in article
were fictionalized was plausible and made in good faith since issue was unsettled at time complaint was filed, and
therefore request for sanctions was properly denied. Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1989, CA9 Cal) 895 F2d
1535, revd on other grounds, remanded (1991) 501 US 496, 115 L Ed 2d 447, 111 S Ct 2419, 91 CDOS 4683, 91 Daily
Journal DAR 7272, 18 Media L R 2241.
Court declined to award sanctions after determining that judicial proceedings privilege barred libel suit against
attorney and law firm, given that attorney's inclusion of proposed mediator as recipient copied on e-mails addressed to
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plaintiff raised at least some question as to whether privilege applied to communications between attorney and plaintiff.
Messina v Fontana (2003, DC Dist Col) 260 F Supp 2d 173.
153. Disability benefits
In action appealing denial of social security disability benefits by Secretary of United States Department of Health
and Human Services, where evidence supporting Secretary was so slight and contrary evidence so overwhelming,
reasonable attorney for Secretary could not have concluded that minimal supporting evidence constituted substantial
evidence needed to affirm administrative decision under 42 USCS § 405, and thus Secretary objectively could not have
believed his position to be well grounded in fact as rule requires. Adamson v Bowen (1988, CA10 Colo) 855 F2d 668,
CCH Unemployment Ins Rep P 14107A, 11 FR Serv 3d 606.
Sanction in amount of $ 300 is properly imposed upon plaintiff's attorney where competent attorney after reasonable
inquiry would have determined that judicial review of Veterans Administration's decision denying veterans benefits is
precluded by relevant statutory and case law. Johnson v Veterans Admin. (1985, ND Miss) 107 FRD 626, 3 FR Serv 3d
706.
154. Discovery (pre-1993 amendment cases)
Rule 11 sanctions were properly assessed against attorney who brought motion to produce documents and to place
them under court's seal where motion lacked evidentiary support and also lacked any indication of rationale for motion
or of type of document attorney desired to be placed under seal and where at hearing attorney was unable to
satisfactorily explain basis for motion, making it apparent that he had failed to adequately assess nature of record.
Brown v National Bd. of Medical Examiners (1986, CA7 Ill) 800 F2d 168, 5 FR Serv 3d 1459.
Where defendants filed affidavits showing that meeting plaintiffs' discovery requests would be lengthy process and
extraordinarily burdensome, and such affidavits were not false and were made after reasonable inquiry, sanctions
against defendants were properly denied. Shivangi v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (1987, CA5 Miss) 825 F2d 885, CCH
Fed Secur L Rep P 93364, 8 FR Serv 3d 980.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff's counsel for conduct during second round of discovery that involved
production of data, at great expense to defendant, that would be relevant only after it had been subjected to analysis by
professional statisticians, since although motions to compel production indicated that necessary expert would be hired to
analyze data, plaintiff's counsel knew or should have known that no expert would be hired. Greenberg v Hilton Int'l
Co. (1989, CA2 NY) 870 F2d 926, 52 BNA FEP Cas 627, 49 CCH EPD P 38861, 13 FR Serv 3d 262, remanded, on reh
(1989, CA2 NY) 875 F2d 39, 52 BNA FEP Cas 638, 50 CCH EPD P 39119.
Motion to reconsider magistrate's discovery order was frivolous and violated Rule 11 since it contained no new
evidence or arguments of law that explained why magistrate should change original order that was proper when made.
Magnus Elecs., Inc. v Masco Corp. (1989, CA7 Ill) 871 F2d 626, 13 FR Serv 3d 778, cert den (1989) 493 US 891, 107 L
Ed 2d 188, 110 S Ct 237.
Rule 11 sanctions are properly assessed against defendant in favor of non-party witness who successfully defended
against defendant's petition for order to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt of court for refusing to
permit videotaping of deposition absent court order for videotaping. Westmoreland v CBS, Inc. (1985, App DC) 248
US App DC 255, 770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451.
Although Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's application for enforcement of administrative subpoena is
properly granted, defendant county cannot be faulted for not accepting U.S. Magistrate's prior ruling in case involving
different underlying investigation as final word on issue of whether it was required to comply with EEOC subpoena
absent court order, and county is therefore not liable for attorneys' fees under Rule 11. EEOC v County of Hennepin
(1985, DC Minn) 623 F Supp 29, 39 BNA FEP Cas 1811, 38 CCH EPD P 35540.
155. Employment
In action by former employee alleging discrimination, counterclaim by employer alleging employee breached
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract, although not based on existing law, was not
frivolous, but rather attempt to expand developing area of law and therefore did not warrant sanctions. Hudson v
Moore Business Forms, Inc. (1987, CA9 Cal) 827 F2d 450, 44 BNA FEP Cas 1310, 2 BNA IER Cas 1049, 44 CCH
EPD P 37335, 108 CCH LC P 55842, 8 FR Serv 3d 1200, reported at, amd (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA
FEP Cas 898.
In action brought by former employee alleging that his discharge was in violation of procedures in company's
employee handbook and in violation of public policy exception to at-will employee contracts, although plaintiff was
unsuccessful, his claims were not frivolous considering changing law in this area, and therefore sanctions should not be
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imposed. Gaiardo v Ethyl Corp. (1987, CA3 Pa) 835 F2d 479, 2 BNA IER Cas 1587, 108 CCH LC P 55851, 9 FR
Serv 3d 1378, 95 ALR Fed 93.
In action brought by former employee alleging sex discrimination and wrongful discharge, in which employer
counterclaimed for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, counterclaim was not frivolous, although
unlikely to succeed, but rather attempt to expand developing area of law. Hudson v Moore Business Forms, Inc. (1987,
CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA FEP Cas 898.
Although plaintiff's attorney improperly split wrongful discharge claim by simultaneously filing separate suits in
state and federal courts, attorney did not sign original pleading in violation of requirements of Rule 11 since federal
claim did not become baseless until after state summary judgment. Hogue v Royse City (1991, CA5 Tex) 939 F2d
1249, 56 BNA FEP Cas 1264, 57 CCH EPD P 40949, 20 FR Serv 3d 658.
Sanctions are warranted in addition to order to strike, where plaintiffs in wrongful discharge action alleged that
defendants, in effort to force plaintiffs to quit, made plaintiffs work in room described as "concentration camp" and that
plaintiffs were "tortured psychologically" and "brainwashed," because such material is immaterial, scandalous, and not
well grounded in fact. Alvarado Morales v Digital Equipment Corp. (1987, DC Puerto Rico) 669 F Supp 1173, affd
(1988, CA1 Puerto Rico) 843 F2d 613, 10 FR Serv 3d 1350.
In action for wrongful discharge, where uncontroverted evidence showed that plaintiff employees had signed releases
in return for severance pay and that plaintiff's attorneys knew of releases before filing claim, and where one plaintiff and
attorneys also pursued slander claim although their investigation showed no evidence to support claim, sanctions are
imposed on plaintiffs and their attorneys. White v General Motors Corp. (1989, DC Kan) 126 FRD 563, affd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded (1990, CA10 Kan) 908 F2d 675, 6 BNA IER Cas 236, 17 FR Serv 3d
384, cert den (1991) 498 US 1069, 112 L Ed 2d 850, 111 S Ct 788, 6 BNA IER Cas 288.
Retired airline employee's attorney will be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing pleading asserting common-law tort
claims against airline, even though such claims were withdrawn upon filing of airline's motion to dismiss, because law
is well settled that state-law torts arising from employment-related disputes in airline industry have been preempted by
Railway Labor Act (45 USCS § § 151 et seq.) and attorney made no reasonable argument for extension, modification,
or reversal of law as it currently stands. Dennis v Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1990, ED NY) 746 F Supp 288,
63 BNA FEP Cas 1428, 55 CCH EPD P 40550.
Where EEOC charge alleged sex discrimination, but complaint alleged racial discrimination by employer, and
plaintiff's attorney was repeatedly notified of discrepancy and resulting failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but
made no effort to amend complaint, plaintiff's attorney was careless in prosecution of suit which resulted in pleading
which was not well-grounded in fact and warranted by law, and thus Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate. Hansboro v
Northwood Nursing Home (1993, ND Ind) 151 FRD 95.
Sanctions are not warranted under FRCP 11, where employee claimed that employer violated Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 USCS § 623, by offering employees who lost jobs in workforce reduction enhanced
benefits for signing release of all claims against employer, including ADEA claims, on theory that older workers had to
give up more benefits than younger workers for same benefits, because employee stated novel theory of ADEA liability
which, although unprecedented, is not inconsistent with terms of statute, and defendant did not show that complaint was
not well founded or that it was asserted for improper purpose. DiBiase v SmithKline Beecham Corp. (1993, ED Pa)
834 F Supp 143, 17 EBC 1148, 63 BNA FEP Cas 96, 64 CCH EPD P 43052.
Under objective test, when plaintiffs and their counsel filed this wrongful employment termination action, it was
reasonable to believe that their pleading had merit in attempting to expand recently created exception to general rule,
and further, there is no evidence in record to substantiate defendant's charge that plaintiffs' sole purpose in filing action
was to harass defendant, and accordingly, defendant's motion for sanctions is denied. Gaiardo v Ethyl Corp. (1987,
MD Pa) 122 FRD 175, 2 BNA IER Cas 1586, 12 FR Serv 3d 1063, affd (1987, CA3 Pa) 835 F2d 479, 2 BNA IER Cas
1587, 108 CCH LC P 55851, 9 FR Serv 3d 1378, 95 ALR Fed 93.
156. Fraud or mistake
Sanctions consisting of defendant's expenses in moving to dismiss plaintiffs' fraud claims are appropriate where,
although initial reasonable inquiry was made before claims were asserted, it should have been apparent to plaintiffs after
completion of discovery that claims were groundless, and plaintiffs therefore should have dropped claims at that time.
Yonkers v Otis Elevator Co. (1988, CA2 NY) 844 F2d 42, 10 FR Serv 3d 1088.
Combined effect of Rules 9(b) and 11 is that attorney before commencing action involving fraud or mistake must
have more specific information reasonably believed to be trustworthy than would be required if he or she were
commencing any other kind of action. Re Ramada Inns Secur. In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litigation (1982, DC Del) 550
F Supp 1127, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99011.
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Actions of plaintiff's attorneys in alleging fraud and criminal conduct without adequate investigation, and in
maintaining that position after discovery depositions revealed all relevant facts and provided logical and reasonable
explanation, violate letter and spirit of both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 USCS § 1927, making
sanctions appropriate. Woodfork v Gavin (1985, ND Miss) 105 FRD 100, 1 FR Serv 3d 209.
If plaintiff does not possess relevant, indispensable facts to state fraud claim with particularity, precepts upon which
Rules 9(b) and 11 are founded mandate that he has no business charging fraud on slim hope that he may use discovery
to put meat on bare bones of his fraud claim; fraud is too serious a charge and litigation is too expensive to allow such
tactics, and RICO is even more so. Beck v Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co. (1985, ND Ill) 621 F Supp 1547, CCH Fed Secur
L Rep P 92455.
Where complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud, but there was no evidence of any agreement or negotiations to
support existence of contract and complaint described no representations made by defendant to plaintiff to support
allegation of fraud, plaintiff's attorney violated Rule 11 in filing claims. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v Integrated
Resources, Inc. (1987, SD NY) 114 FRD 684, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67467, 6 FR Serv 3d 1092.
Failure to satisfy Rule 9's particularity requirements does not support sanctions. MacMillan, Inc. v American
Express Co. (1989, SD NY) 125 FRD 71, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94368.
Defendants who prevailed in breach-of-contract action by hotel owner, alleging defective and untimely performance
of construction duties, are not awarded attorney's fees against owner pursuant to FRCP 11, where defendants claimed
that owner and its counsel engaged in fraud, because prior to trial court found that neither party presented any evidence
upon which reasonable jury could conclude that any party had engaged in fraudulent conduct, thus precluding any
evidence concerning any issue of fraud from being presented to jury. Taber Partners I v Insurance Co. of N. Am. (1996,
DC Puerto Rico) 926 F Supp 36, subsequent app (1997, CA1 Puerto Rico) 1997 US App LEXIS 19876.
157. Immunity
Provision of Rule 11 that attorney's signature on document certifies that, to best of his knowledge, information and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or good faith
argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, means that in case ostensibly raising probable
question of judicial or prosecutorial immunity, counsel for plaintiff is affirming that, after making reasonable inquiry, he
believes in good faith that defendant official cannot successfully show he has defense of immunity, and that counsel,
having that good faith belief, is able to state with some particularity what those facts are. Elliott v Perez (1985, CA5
La) 751 F2d 1472, 1 FR Serv 3d 382 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Baker v Putnal (1996, CA5 Tex) 75
F3d 190, 34 FR Serv 3d 1221) and (criticized in Gates v City of Dallas (1998, ND Tex) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 3442).
District Court properly imposed sanction of attorney's fee in amount of $ 1,000 to be paid by plaintiff's lawyer to
state Attorney General who was providing legal representation for defendant state judge, where plaintiff brought civil
rights action against judge on basis of order, entered in contested divorce proceeding, awarding temporary custody of
children to state agency, since there was no legal basis for informed belief that judge was subject to claim for damages,
and since there was basis for District Court's finding that action was filed for improper purpose of attempt to compel
state judge to recuse himself. Chu v Griffith (1985, CA4 Va) 771 F2d 79.
Where complaint alleged that judges and other court officials conspired against plaintiff in ruling against him, but
judges were absolutely immune from prosecution, and plaintiff failed to allege any facts to support his claims,
complaint was not well grounded in law and did not present good faith argument for modification of law and thus is in
violation of Rule 11. McAfee v 5th Circuit Judges (1989, CA5 La) 884 F2d 221, 15 FR Serv 3d 382, cert den (1990)
493 US 1083, 107 L Ed 2d 1046, 110 S Ct 1141.
Where District Court issued order specifying how second amended complaint should be rewritten, but plaintiff's
counsel apparently disregarded court's directions in drafting third amended complaint, and further, where plaintiff's
counsel disregarded clear precedent in jurisdiction regarding legislative immunity and assumed conflicting position in
complaints and refused to acknowledge that precedent favored defendants' position, District Court properly found that
plaintiff's counsel had violated Rule 11. De Sisto College v Line (1989, CA11 Fla) 888 F2d 755, 15 FR Serv 3d 54,
cert den (1990) 495 US 952, 109 L Ed 2d 544, 110 S Ct 2219.
Attorney's action against judges and court reporter was obviously barred by judicial immunity and was not warranted
by existing law nor by good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Marley v Wright
(1991, WD Okla) 137 FRD 359, affd without op (1992, CA10 Okla) 968 F2d 20, reported in full (1992, CA10) 1992 US
App LEXIS 15384.
158. Injunctive relief
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On basis of analysis which avoids hindsight and resolves all doubts in favor of plaintiff's counsel, no violation of
Rule 11 occurred where it was not clear at time plaintiff sought preliminary injunction that plaintiff had absolutely no
chance of demonstrating likelihood of success on merits of its claim. Jewelers of America, Inc. v Amirghanyan (1987,
SD NY) 115 FRD 274.
159. Insurance
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney who filed meritless claim alleging that plaintiff's insurance
company which had defended claim made against plaintiff, its insured, had failed to conclude litigation fast enough,
where no cause or other authority was cited to suggest that such delay breached legal duty defendant insurance company
owed to plaintiff insured. Brown v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1986, CA5 Miss) 805 F2d 1242, 6 FR Serv 3d 388.
Where there was evidence that boat had been stolen and deliberately sunk, attorney violated Rule 11 by continuing to
pursue counterclaim that insurance company acted in bad faith in refusing to pay marine insurance claim on boat.
Aetna Ins. Co. v Meeker (1992, CA11 Fla) 953 F2d 1328, 1992 AMC 2393, 21 FR Serv 3d 846, 6 FLW Fed C 33.
Sanctions under FRCivP 11 were apprioriate where attorney raised clearly frivolous apportionment argument during
settlement negotiations between insurance company and its insured, and no reasonable attorney would have believed
that attorney had any evidence to support claim that insurance company failed to negotiate settlement in good faith on
behalf of insured, whose liability was reasonably clear. Nyer v Winterthur Int'l (2002, CA1 Mass) 290 F3d 456.
Rule 11 may be invoked when claims are made in bad faith, carelessly, recklessly, or without basis in fact or law, but
where there was sufficient foundation to warrant defendant insurance company's counterclaims and cross claims, even
though allegations were not sustained at trial, sanctions will be denied. Monarch Ins. Co. v Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
Ltd. (1986, SD NY) 110 FRD 590.
Counsel is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions for filing action for credit life insurance beneficiary, even though
decedent had made material misrepresentation on insurance application, where insurer's reliance upon misrepresentation
was not established until claims manager's testimony was obtained and there was no evidence of harassment or delay in
filing action. Pedersen v Chrysler Life Ins. Co. (1988, ND Miss) 677 F Supp 472.
Sanctions are imposed against insured who alleged insurer committed RICO violations based on predicate acts of
mail fraud by mailing 3 letters which allegedly demonstrated scheme to defraud insured by denying coverage for earlier
policy years in order to be absolved of duty to defend or indemnify insured in pending lawsuit, because letters were
innocuous business communications which could not possibly constitute predicate acts of mail fraud, and because
sanctions would discourage further thoughtless litigation and would compensate insurer for expense incurred in
responding to RICO claim. Asbeka Indus. v Travelers Indem. Co. (1993, ED NY) 831 F Supp 74, RICO Bus Disp
Guide (CCH) P 8483 (criticized in Mejia-Ricart v Bear Stearns & Co. (1996, SD NY) 1996 US Dist LEXIS 2518).
Sanctions against health-care insurer are not called for under FRCP 11, where it sought reimbursement of medical
expenses it allegedly paid due to doctor's malpractice from doctor's medical malpractice insurer, because there is no
evidence of any improper purpose for filing of this claim, nor is suit unwarranted under existing law. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v Halifax Ins. Plan (1997, MD Fla) 961 F Supp 271, 10 FLW Fed D 728.
160. Judicial bias and recusal
Where defendant's attorney filed motion for recusal of judge, arguing that judge's adverse rulings in prior cases and
his legitimate criticisms of attorney in present case showed bias, sanctions will be imposed on attorney since recusal
motion was not well grounded in fact, was not warranted by existing law or by good faith argument for extension of
law, and was filed for improper purpose of delay. INVST Financial Group, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (1987,
CA6 Mich) 815 F2d 391, 7 FR Serv 3d 529, cert den (1987) 484 US 927, 98 L Ed 2d 251, 108 S Ct 291.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff and his attorneys for filing legally and factually frivolous lawsuit,
where, following divorce proceeding in which plaintiff's wife was granted custody of couple's children, plaintiff filed
motion for recusal of judge on ground that judge was incompetent because he was suffering from terminal cancer, after
which plaintiff filed present suit, second of two actions alleging that his wife, her attorney, judge's secretary, and county
attorney had conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights by thwarting recusal hearing. Collins v Walden
(1987, CA11 Ga) 834 F2d 961, 9 FR Serv 3d 1149.
Rule 11 sanctions were appropriately imposed where record showed that recusal motion lacked legitimate legal and
factual basis. Porous Media Corp. v Pall Corp. (2000, CA8 Minn) 201 F3d 1058, 53 USPQ2d 1445.
161. Jurisdiction
Imposition of sanctions on plaintiff's attorney constituted abuse of discretion where sanctions were based on fact that
in response to defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff filed motion to stay proceedings until
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discovery could be completed in related state case to establish jurisdictional facts and to allow for orderly disposition of
case. Century Products, Inc. v Sutter (1988, CA6 Mich) 837 F2d 247, 10 FR Serv 3d 608.
Since law is very clear that contract for construction or sale of vessel is not maritime in nature, federal court
obviously lacked jurisdiction over suit filed in admiralty to recover for customization of yacht which was carried out as
part of original sale, and sanctions must be imposed on attorney who filed such suit for which there was no
jurisdictional basis. Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v Gemini Lady (1988, CA11 Fla) 853 F2d 848, 11 FR Serv 3d 1495.
Sanction for filing complaint that was not warranted by existing law was proper because plaintiff failed to properly
verify that subject matter jurisdiction existed. Lloyd v Schlag (1989, CA9 Hawaii) 884 F2d 409, 11 USPQ2d 1623, 14
FR Serv 3d 476.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs did not have standing and district court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over action which should have been pursued in state court. East St. Louis v Circuit
Court for Twentieth Judicial Circuit (1993, CA7 Ill) 986 F2d 1142, 24 FR Serv 3d 1383.
District court improperly imposed Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff's attorneys on grounds that plaintiff must have
known that complaint lacked factual foundation for federal court subject matter jurisdiction, where court based its ruling
on erroneous view of law concerning subject matter jurisdiction, and, in fact, plaintiff's attorneys' argument concerning
plaintiff's principal place of business was not completely without factual foundation. Montrose Chem. Corp. v American
Motorists Ins. Co. (1997, CA9 Cal) 117 F3d 1128, 97 CDOS 5185, 97 Daily Journal DAR 8432, 38 FR Serv 3d 93.
Rule 11 liability extends to attorney's conduct in bringing suit against Argentina where plaintiff American company
had no basis under applicable statute for asserting that Argentina would be answerable in American court for even its
admitted misconduct and where cause of action concerned acts of Argentina in defrauding plaintiff company of sales
price of its goods, which claim was not based upon commercial activity carried on by Argentina in United States or
causing direct effect in United States. Magnus Electronics, Inc. v Argentine Republic (1986, ND Ill) 112 FRD 141.
Defendant which filed motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be sanctioned since personal
jurisdiction obviously existed and motion was not filed in good faith, and imposition of sanctions need not wait until
end of trial. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v Sona Distributors, Inc. (1986, SD Fla) 117 FRD 170, judgment entered
(1987, SD Fla) 663 F Supp 64 and affd (1988, CA11 Fla) 847 F2d 1512, 11 FR Serv 3d 687.
Purchaser who filed motions to vacate and quash execution for improper service and lack of jurisdiction is not
subject to Rule 11 sanctions where jurisdictional issue of "active" versus "passive" purchaser-lessee constituted
cognizable, nonfrivolous claim despite purchaser's citation to repealed statute. PHI Technologies v New England
Sound & Communications, Inc. (1986, DC Mass) 634 F Supp 547.
Although District Court believes Rule 11 sanctions should be assessed for plaintiff's unreasonable and prolonged
opposition to dismissing case in which there was no basis for federal jurisdiction, no sanctions are properly awarded
since divided panel of Second Circuit has decided that "creative" pleading to assert federal jurisdiction should not be
penalized by Rule 11 sanctions. Richter v Russo (1986, SD NY) 647 F Supp 565, 6 FR Serv 3d 276.
Plaintiff's assertion of federal question jurisdiction based on Rule 11 was not so frivolous as to warrant sanctions
where complaint alleged that defendants' previous frivolous suit against third party damaged plaintiff. Port Drum Co. v
Umphrey (1988, ED Tex) 119 FRD 26, affd (1988, CA5 Tex) 852 F2d 148, 12 FR Serv 3d 114.
Court will not impose sanctions against pro se plaintiff who brought securities and malpractice claims against law
firm and accounting firm where claims were determined to have no jurisdictional foundation, because given plaintiff's
lack of legal training it was objectively reasonable for him to believe this court would be appropriate forum for
resolution of his claim. Ferreri v Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel (1988, ED Pa) 690 F Supp 400.
Where plaintiff filed complaint seeking review of state Supreme Court decision, Rule 11 has been violated and
sanctions must be imposed since it is well established that District Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over final
judgment of state court. Ribeau v Board of County Comm'rs (1990, DC Kan) 133 FRD 604, 18 FR Serv 3d 980.
Fraud/breach-of-contract case arising from settlement of prior dispute between parties is dismissed with prejudice
but sanctions are denied, where confusing family dispute--dismissed 12 years ago for lack of jurisdiction--still suffers
from lack of basis for federal jurisdiction, because clearly improper complaint, although waste of court's and defendants'
time, will not be sanctioned under FRCP 11 out of deference to pro se status of plaintiffs. Grossbard v President
Container (1994, SD NY) 840 F Supp 296, affd without op (1994, CA2 NY) 41 F3d 1501.
Plaintiffs and defendants in diversity action arising from injuries allegedly sustained by Pennsylvania plaintiffs at
Florida amusement park are both denied Rule 11 sanctions because issue whether defendants are subject to in personam
jurisdiction in Middle District of Pennsylvania had not been decided in district previously and precedent exists to
support positions of plaintiffs and defendants. Cresswell v Walt Disney Productions (1987, MD Pa) 677 F Supp 284.
162. --Diversity of citizenship
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Sanctions will be imposed where counsel filed petition for removal alleging diversity of citizenship when reasonable
investigation would have shown that diversity did not exist. S.A. Auto Lube v Jiffy Lube Int'l (1988, CA7 Ill) 842 F2d
946, 10 FR Serv 3d 1126 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill)
880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Sanctions will not be imposed on counsel who filed removal petition alleging that nondiverse defendant was
fraudulently joined and that diversity therefore existed, since argument was not objectively unreasonable. S.A. Auto
Lube v Jiffy Lube Int'l (1988, CA7 Ill) 842 F2d 946, 10 FR Serv 3d 1126 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Mars Steel
Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's attorney is properly assessed $ 5,000 fine where, for purpose of invoking District
Court's diversity jurisdiction, he submitted document to court which purported to disclaim any interest in lawsuit on part
of nondiverse parties when in fact such parties retained 27.5 percent interest in any recovery by plaintiff under
agreement between attorneys. Hearld v Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care (1985, ED Tex) 107 FRD 17.
Sanctions will not be imposed on pro se defendant who signed answer admitting jurisdiction and who later, when
represented by counsel, filed successful motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to lack of
diversity of citizenship of parties, since it was not unreasonable for pro se defendant to fail to appreciate consequences
of distinction between her West German citizenship and her New Jersey domicile and residence. Lagermax Lagerhaus
UND Speditions-Aktiengesellschaft v Boroff (1987, SD NY) 115 FRD 278.
Attorneys' failure to recognize absence of diversity jurisdiction of parties is sanctionable. Rowland v Fayed (1987,
DC Dist Col) 115 FRD 605.
Breach of contract action is dismissed and Rule 11 sanctions are imposed on British corporation's original counsel,
where counsel asserted in original complaint that district court had diversity jurisdiction over action by British
corporation against Irish corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary that sells and rents videotapes in Georgia,
because it is fundamental principle of federal civil procedure that no diversity exists in suit between 2 aliens. Caspian
Invest., Ltd. v Vicom Holdings, Ltd. (1991, SD NY) 770 F Supp 880.
163. Labor relations
Trial judge did not abuse discretion in declining to award attorney fees to defendant who successfully defended
action prosecuted by National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation seeking to recover damages for employment
discrimination under Railway Labor Act where plaintiff and counsel were relying on anti-discrimination provisions in
hiring in other labor laws that were not dissimilar in purpose and scope to Railway Labor Act and thus court could not
say that analogies to such acts were drawn with no good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. Nelson v Piedmont Aviation, Inc. (1984, CA4 NC) 750 F2d 1234, 118 BNA LRRM 2138, 102 CCH LC P
11310, cert den (1985) 471 US 1116, 86 L Ed 2d 259, 105 S Ct 2358, 119 BNA LRRM 2376, 102 CCH LC P 11445.
District Court properly assessed sanctions under Rule 11 against plaintiff's attorneys where attorneys, experienced
labor law practitioners, filed suit on behalf of plaintiff, who was employer bound by collective bargaining agreement to
pay certain sums to local union, against that union, when attorneys knew or should have known that matter had already
been litigated, that plaintiff had no cause of action against union, that pleading was not warranted by existing law or
good faith argument for change in existing law, and court stated that given attorneys' expertise, strong inference arises
that they had improper purpose in bringing action. Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v Landscape Contractors Council (1986,
CA9 Cal) 790 F2d 1421, 123 BNA LRRM 2101, 104 CCH LC P 11971, 5 FR Serv 3d 833.
Sanctions under Rule 11 against attorney for union members who unsuccessfully challenged alleged breach of
collective bargaining agreement by employer and unfair representation by union under 29 USCS § 185 are not proper
where plaintiffs' argument that exceptions to Clayton exhaustion rule applied to their case was made in good faith, and
was bona fide and reasonable. Reinhardt v International Union, United Auto., etc. (1986, ED Mich) 636 F Supp 864.
Rule 11 attorney fees and sanctions against defendant union for alleged contumacious conduct are not warranted,
where employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) union counsel, relying primarily on union for factual
support for claim, made reasonable inquiry into facts, (2) although unaccepted by court, position argued by union was
plausible view of law, (3) union's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation, but
was legitimate challenge to employer's acts, and (4) no facts were ever revealed suggesting union should have changed
its litigation position, so union did not fail to properly review and reevaluate its position as case developed. Marshall
Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660
F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff employer for allegedly filing baseless complaint are not warranted, where
employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
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counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) employer counsel's inquiry into facts, relying heavily
on her client and its agents, was not unreasonable, (2) inquiry into law resulted in taking of position that was plausible
and accepted by court, (3) employer's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation,
but was in legitimate pursuit of its perceived rights, and (4) employer complied with reevaluation obligation by agreeing
that employee discharge issue was arbitrable. Marshall Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660 F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Union's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against union member who alleged that those on trial board were biased against
him in violation of 29 USCS § 411(a)(5) is denied, where member was legally privileged to argue in good faith for
extension of existing law and to seek enlargement of concept of "discipline" in 29 USCS § 411(a)(5) as Rule 11 was
not intended to preclude litigants or counsel from asserting new theories. Perales Vara v Laborers' International
Union, Local 89 (1987, SD Cal) 662 F Supp 492, 126 BNA LRRM 2676.
Union is not entitled to sanctions pursuant to FRCP 11 against employer after summary judgment was entered in
favor of union in employer's action seeking declaration that provision in collective bargaining agreement providing for
401(k) plan was void, because in light of very difficult question presented by case, there is no basis for describing
employer's position as frivolous and there is no evidence that employer intended to harass union by filing action. A.M.
Castle & Co. v United Steelworkers (1995, ND Ill) 898 F Supp 602.
Award of costs and fees to defendants is not warranted but plaintiff's attorney must pay $ 500 penalty into court,
where his persistence in pursuing labor law complaint was based on lack of experience rather than intent to harass or
injure, as he sincerely but incorrectly believed he could overcome statute of limitations by proving continuing violation
of his client's rights. Benton v G & O Mfg. Co. (1995, DC Conn) 921 F Supp 905.
164. Land patent
Frivolity of pro se plaintiffs' cause demands imposition of $ 250 fine as Rule 11 sanction, where action is based on
purported land patent which indicates on its face that it is self-serving document, drafted by plaintiffs to grant
themselves title to land superior to that of defendant bank which had made loan to plaintiffs secured by mortgage on
property and which had had plaintiffs evicted from property following foreclosure action. Hilgeford v Peoples Bank,
Portland (1985, ND Ind) 607 F Supp 536, 2 FR Serv 3d 356, affd (1985, CA7 Ind) 776 F2d 176, 3 FR Serv 3d 1358,
cert den (1986) 475 US 1123, 90 L Ed 2d 188, 106 S Ct 1644.
Plaintiff who filed action to have District Court declare his rights under "land patent" is subject to sanctions under
Rule 11 where land patent at issue was drafted by plaintiff himself in attempt to create superior title in land through
personal fiat, and where plaintiff had been given copy of opinion rendered in substantially similar case and had been
specifically alerted to possibility of Rule 11 sanctions but persisted in litigation in blatant disregard of such notice.
Nixon v Individual Head of St. Joseph Mortg. Co. (1985, ND Ind) 612 F Supp 253, 2 FR Serv 3d 1011, affd without op
(1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 595.
165. Malicious prosecution
Defendant did not violate Rule 11 in bringing counterclaim which alleged malicious prosecution, which federal law
does not recognize as tort, where state tort of malicious prosecution arguably falls within ancillary jurisdiction of
District Court and arguably may be pleaded in counterclaim. Emanuel v American Credit Exchange (1989, CA2 NY)
870 F2d 805 (criticized in Johnson v Eaton (1996, CA5 La) 80 F3d 148).
166. Mortgages
Sanctions are warranted where mortgagor filed pro se action against savings and loan institution based on
institution's practice of paying loan proceeds by check rather than legal tender, because such action has no basis in law
and constitutes abuse of access to courts. Thiel v First Federal Sav. & Loan Asso. (1986, ND Ind) 646 F Supp 592.
167. Motion to strike
Where only filing by defendants had been motion to dismiss, and established law is that such motions do not
constitute responsive pleadings, plaintiffs were free to amend complaint without leave of court, and therefore
defendant's motion to strike amended complaint on grounds that he had previously filed responsive pleading was utterly
frivolous. East Boston Ecumenical Community Council, Inc. v Mastrorillo (1989, DC Mass) 124 FRD 12.
District court's sua sponte order directing plaintiff and his attorney to pay $ 5,000 penalty to defendants exceeded
court's authority under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). Hutchinson v Pfeil (2000, CA10 Okla) 208 F3d 1180, 46 FR Serv 3d 179.
168. Motion to withdraw
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Sanctions are imposed against attorney who filed motion to withdraw from representing plaintiff in products liability
action against automobile manufacturer less than 2 months prior to trial, where (1) in motion to withdraw, attorney
stated that his withdrawal would not prejudice plaintiff, (2) attorney had assumed sole responsibility for development,
preparation, and trial of liability phase of case, (3) attorney's assumption that someone from another firm would become
involved was unreasonable given facts, and (4) attorney's assumption that case could not have been ready for trial even
had he not withdrawn and that court would have been forced to grant continuance is presumptive, arrogant, and
self-serving, because attorney failed to produce any credible evidence that supports his representation that plaintiff
would not be prejudiced by his withdrawal. Bullard v Chrysler Corp. (1996, ED Tex) 925 F Supp 1180, 35 FR Serv 3d
1079.
169. Offer of judgment
Where evidence showed that offer of judgment covered entire complaint, plaintiffs' conditional acceptance was not
well-grounded in fact, and defendant is entitled to attorney's fees incurred after date of plaintiff's acceptance. Whitcher
v Matthews (1991, WD NC) 136 FRD 582.
170. Parties
In action arising out of explosion during repairs of barge, it was not unreasonable under system of notice pleading to
join defendants, who may have been associated with repair work that led to explosion, and District Court did not err in
refusing to grant defendants' motion for sanctions under Rule 11 that was filed because plaintiffs did not voluntarily
dismiss their claims against defendants after they decided not to pursue claims, since plaintiffs were not required to
dismiss claims, and it was enough that plaintiffs did not oppose defendants' efforts to secure summary judgment.
Jackson Marine Corp. v Harvey Barge Repair, Inc. (1986, CA5 La) 794 F2d 989, 6 FR Serv 3d 120.
Where plaintiff filed amended complaint naming same defendants, although one of defendants had filed
uncontroverted affidavits sworn by himself and others which showed that he had not been involved in matter which was
subject of complaint, charges against that defendant in amended complaint were baseless and frivolous. Townsend v
Holman Consulting Corp. (1990, CA9 Cal) 914 F2d 1136, 91 Daily Journal DAR 4058, 17 FR Serv 3d 801, amd, reh,
en banc, den (1991, CA9 Cal) 91 CDOS 2524, reported in full (1991, CA9 Cal) 929 F2d 1358.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs who improperly joined certain defendants with respect to whom there
was no actual case or controversy, and plaintiffs' argument that defendants suffered no harm because they were
indemnified for all their legal fees is irrelevant. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v Continental Illinois Corp. (1987, ND
Ill) 116 FRD 252.
Where one of original defendants was dismissed by court because it was neither necessary nor indispensable party,
sanctions will be imposed on plaintiffs for attempting to replead claim against that defendant through motion to amend
complaint, where additional allegations contained in proposed complaint failed to repair defects of original complaint
against defendant in question. Air Wisconsin Pilots Protection Committee v Sanderson (1988, ND Ill) 124 FRD 615,
134 BNA LRRM 2565, 116 CCH LC P 10236.
Where defendant repeatedly argued that certain corporate entities were indispensable parties when he knew that
corporations had no interest in action, and where defendant also withheld material information, thereby causing needless
expenses to plaintiffs and wasting resources of court, Rule 11 has been violated and sanctions must be imposed.
Durant v Traditional Invest., Ltd. (1991, SD NY) 135 FRD 42.
Sanctions are not imposed under FRCP 11, where endangered bird was named as plaintiff in citizen suit under
Endangered Species Act (16 USCS § § 1531 et seq.), where although there is no controlling case law directly
supporting bird's right to appear as named plaintiff, defendants presented no direct authority to contrary, and numerous
cases have permitted species to appear as named parties, albeit without analyzing standing question, because competent
attorney would not have concluded that naming bird was contrary to existing law. Hawaiin Crow v Lujan (1991, DC
Hawaii) 906 F Supp 549.
In case involving Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 USCS § §
9601-9657), where facts available to plaintiff at time complaint was signed caused it to believe that defendant in
question had probably transported waste to site at issue, plaintiff did not violate Rule 11 by signing complaint naming
defendant as party, even though plaintiff may have wrongly interpreted facts and later dismissed defendant.
Hillsborough County v A & e Rd. Oiling Serv. (1995, MD Fla) 160 FRD 655, 8 FLW Fed D 668.
171. Personal injury, death and property damage
Where Libyan citizens and residents filed suit seeking damages for injuries, death, and property loss sustained in
United States air strike on Libya, plaintiffs' counsel surely knew that case offered no hope whatsoever of success, and
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therefore filing such complaint was violation of Rule 11. Saltany v Reagan (1989, App DC) 281 US App DC 20, 886
F2d 438, cert den (1990) 495 US 932, 109 L Ed 2d 501, 110 S Ct 2172.
In action to recover for personal injuries and property damages following automobile accident involving plaintiff and
serviceman, where evidence, including government reports of accident, overwhelmingly supported plaintiff's claim
concerning defendant serviceman's negligence, defendant government violated Rule 11 by continuing to dispute its
liability and by alleging that plaintiff was contributorily negligent after evidence became known. Joseph v United
States (1988, DC Hawaii) 121 FRD 406, affd without op (1990, CA9 Hawaii) 904 F2d 40.
Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate, where sexual partner's tort action against estate of his deceased HIV-infected
lover was dismissed on grounds that partner was exposed to virus by decedent, who misled partner about his HIV status,
but partner did not contract HIV and so failed to allege compensable injury, because partner tested novel theory of
liability, and sanctions would penalize him for unsuccessful originality, AIDS law is in transition, similar claims have
been allowed in other jurisdictions, and decedent should not benefit from contemptuous conduct. J.B. v Bohonovsky
(1993, DC NJ) 835 F Supp 796, 28 FR Serv 3d 468.
Hotel owner was not subject to sanctions under FRCP 11 since it withdrew its position when it voluntarily dismissed
its claims against third-party defendant, despite its failure to candidly acknowledge that it did not have evidence to
support its allegations. Hockley v Shan Enters. Ltd. Pshp. (1998, DC NJ) 19 F Supp 2d 235, 42 FR Serv 3d 105.
172. Professional malpractice
Third-party negligence complaints against corporation's accountant were not filed in violation of Rule 11, where they
were filed prior to Court of Appeals decisions limiting scope of accountant's liability for negligent conduct, and where
they had reasonable chance of stating viable cause of action, since law on subject was in disarray. Lumbard v Maglia,
Inc. (1985, SD NY) 621 F Supp 1542.
In medical malpractice action, where plaintiff's counsel filed statement in accordance with Rule 26 of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure stating that particular doctor would testify on behalf of plaintiff and describing nature of doctor's
planned testimony, when in fact doctor had not agreed to testify for plaintiff and did not hold opinions ascribed to him,
sanctions must be imposed on plaintiff's counsel for violation of Rule 11. Saunders v Lucy Webb Haynes-National
Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries (1989, DC Dist Col) 124 FRD 3.
173. Removal of action to federal court
It was not abuse of discretion for District Court to impose monetary sanction, based on 10 percent rate from original
date for entry of state court judgment prior to removal until date District Court remanded case to state court, against
diverse state court defendant which filed petition for removal on day prior to scheduled hearing on plaintiff's motion for
judgment on verdict, where (1) there is no merit to diverse defendant's contention that it became clear during plaintiff's
closing argument that claims against non-diverse defendants had been abandoned, and (2) under state law existing at
time of removal petition, such petition delayed entry of state court judgment and would have saved diverse defendant
substantial amount of interest if sanctions had not been imposed. Davis v Veslan Enterprises (1985, CA5 Tex) 765 F2d
494, 2 FR Serv 3d 836.
Sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 against attorney because his petition for removal to federal court was
frivolous and interposed for improper purpose of delay are proper where attorney failed to join necessary defendant,
where attorney filed second removal petition without having cured deficiency in earlier petition which had already been
rejected, and where attorney was unaware of case law which made removal of action in question improper. Hewitt v
Stanton (1986, CA9 Cal) 798 F2d 1230, 5 FR Serv 3d 1326.
Although defendant's petition to remove case to federal court was denied, no sanctions will be imposed on
defendant's attorney where no precedent existed in circuit to govern removal of type of case in question, removal issue
was complex and "close question," defendant would have benefited significantly by removal so that defendant's counsel
had duty to attempt it, and argument was made in good faith pursuit of legitimate interest of client. Vatican Shrimp Co.
v Solis (1987, CA5 Tex) 820 F2d 674, 1987 AMC 2426, cert den (1987) 484 US 953, 98 L Ed 2d 371, 108 S Ct 345,
1988 AMC 2403 and reh, en banc, den (1987, CA5 Tex) 1987 US App LEXIS 17852.
Rule does not make signature on document absolute guarantee as to correctness of theory of law upon which it is
grounded; thus District Court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions on attorney for filing frivolous removal
petition where there was testimony that under circumstances it was reasonable to believe that there was colorable basis
for removal, and district judge conceded that jurisdiction and removal are difficult areas, and opposing counsel testified
that he thought petition was well-founded. El Paso v Socorro (1990, CA5 Tex) 917 F2d 7, 18 FR Serv 3d 766.
Where plaintiff's negligence action was removed to federal court, where remand was denied on grounds that
jurisdictional amount had been met, after which plaintiff voluntarily dismissed action, and plaintiff later filed second
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identical negligence action which was also removed to federal court, plaintiff's second motion to remand on grounds
that jurisdictional amount had not been met was clearly not warranted by existing law, since she had already received
ruling from same court based on same facts in previous action which stated that remand was improper, and therefore,
court's award of costs to defendant as sanction on plaintiff was not abuse of discretion. Chase v Shop 'N Save
Warehouse Foods (1997, CA7 Ill) 110 F3d 424.
District Court imposed sanctions on defendant's attorney, who had filed petition for removal to District Court, which
was based on memorandum prepared by codefendant's counsel, where defendant's counsel conducted no independent
inquiry into legal basis for removal and where there was, in fact, no legal basis for petition whatsoever. Pravic v U.S.
Industries-Clearing (1986, ED Mich) 109 FRD 620.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff's attorney who filed petition for removal to federal court on basis of petroleum
franchise agreement which would be covered by federal law, even though attorney knew at time of filing that franchise
agreement had been mutually rescinded by parties. Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v D'Arpino (1986, SD NY) 112 FRD
668.
Where plaintiff's state action, which was obviously without merit, was removed to federal court, and plaintiff filed
even more frivolous motion to remand after being advised by court by letter that federal jurisdiction was proper, and
after motion to remand was denied, plaintiff filed appeal, sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff, even though he acted
pro se, particularly as he held himself out as having some legal expertise. Westridge v Allstate Ins. Co. (1988, WD Ark)
118 FRD 617.
Award of attorneys' fees is denied, where party which obtained remand of improperly removed case claimed removal
was not good faith action, because removal issue was clearly arguable and supported by case law and thus removal
petition was filed in good faith. Kelly v State of California (1988, DC Nev) 687 F Supp 1494, affd without op (1989,
CA9 Nev) 880 F2d 416 and (criticized in Kruse v Hawaii (1995, CA9 Hawaii) 68 F3d 331, 95 CDOS 8020, 95 Daily
Journal DAR 13778).
Where defendants removed case to federal court and plaintiffs then filed affidavits waiving right to recover more
than $ 49,999, in attempt to defeat federal jurisdiction by keeping amount in controversy less than $ 50,000, sanctions
will be imposed on plaintiffs' attorney since contention that such waiver would defeat federal court's removal
jurisdiction was not warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law. Gediman v Turner (1991, DC Mass) 135 FRD 23.
Filing removal of action to federal court was sanctionable under Rule 11 because legal theory underlying removal so
lacked arguable basis in law that it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to rely on it. In re Pozsga (1994, DC Ariz)
158 FRD 435.
Plaintiffs' counsel, pursuant to FRCP 11(c), is sanctioned for reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred to
oppose his motion for remand, where information necessary for motion to remand has been in plaintiffs' possession
since inception of lawsuit in 1993, yet counsel waited until conclusion of jury trial to bring this argument to court's
attention, because counsel's wait-and-see approach to proper motion practice in federal court defies reason and
professionalism. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v Truck Ins. Exch. (1997, ED NY) 979 F Supp 155, affd without
op, in part, vacated without op, in part, remanded without op (1999, CA2 NY) 173 F3d 843, reported in full (1999, CA2
NY) 1999 US App LEXIS 7540.
Award of sanctions, pursuant to FRCP 11(b), was denied where employees were granted reimbursement of attorneys'
fees and costs for employer's inappropriate removal of complaint that was based solely on state labor law and merely
referenced Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USCS § 201 et seq., in support of class certification. In re Wal-Mart Emple.
Litig. (2003, ED Wis) 271 F Supp 2d 1080.
Petitioner for writ of mandamus, together with its counsel, are jointly and severally liable to pay respondent amount
equal to respondent's costs and attorneys' fees incurred in opposing petition, where petitioner sought writ directing
District Court to vacate its order remanding state court action, to retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, what petitioner says
is portion of that action that embodies claims arising under federal patent laws, and to vacate its stay of proceedings in
petitioner's federal court suit for declaratory judgment as to validity of patents, where there was not even colorable basis
for petitioner's attempted removal of state court action, which was based on breach of contract, to District Court, and
where, since there is no colorable basis to challenge remand order in view of statute and Supreme Court authority which
competent counsel could not possibly have failed to recognize, petition must have been based solely on hope of
delaying further impact of state court judgment and was therefore frivolous. In re Oximetrix, Inc. (1984, CA) 748 F2d
637, 223 USPQ 1068.
174. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions against plaintiffs and attorney who signed their pleadings were proper where suit was barred by res
judicata since it involved same parties and claims as earlier suit which plaintiffs had filed against defendants and had
lost. Robinson v National Cash Register Co. (1987, CA5 Tex) 808 F2d 1119, 6 FR Serv 3d 1202 (ovrld in part on other
grounds by Thomas v Capital Sec. Servs. (1988, CA5 Miss) 836 F2d 866, 45 CCH EPD P 37770, 10 FR Serv 3d 329)
and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Childs v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1994, CA5 La) 29 F3d 1018, 29
FR Serv 3d 1032) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Monroe v Grider (1994, Tex App Dallas) 884 SW2d
811).
Where plaintiff brought numerous actions based on same claim, and even cursory examination of law would have
shown that this repeat litigation had no valid legal basis and was barred by res judicata and administrative time bar,
sanctions will be imposed for violation of Rule 11. Uithoven v U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1989, CA5 Miss) 884
F2d 844, 14 FR Serv 3d 792.
Where action involved identical facts and issues and same parties as earlier action, it was clearly barred by res
judicata, and therefore sanctions must be imposed on plaintiff for bringing such action. King v Hoover Group, Inc.
(1992, CA8 Neb) 958 F2d 219, 7 BNA IER Cas 455, 139 BNA LRRM 2718, 121 CCH LC P 10031, 22 FR Serv 3d 154.
In action brought on behalf of number of claimants, inclusion of several plaintiffs whose claims were barred by res
judicata was patently frivolous and violated Rule 11. Paganucci v City of New York (1993, CA2 NY) 993 F2d 310, 61
BNA FEP Cas 1420, 61 CCH EPD P 42256, 25 FR Serv 3d 1014, cert den (1993) 510 US 826, 126 L Ed 2d 58, 114 S
Ct 90, 62 BNA FEP Cas 1520, 62 CCH EPD P 42556.
Where second action involved same parties and same transactional nucleus of fact as prior suit, and it sought to
relitigate issues that were conclusively resolved in prior suit, reasonable and competent inquiry by plaintiff's attorney
would have shown him that second action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of prior judgment,
and therefore, district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that second suit was baseless and made without
reasonable inquiry and was thus frivolous and brought to harass defendants. Buster v Greisen (1997, CA9 Alaska) 104
F3d 1186, 97 CDOS 390, 97 Daily Journal DAR 624, 20 EBC 2375, 36 FR Serv 3d 1400, amd, reh den (1997, CA9
Alaska) 97 CDOS 2161, 97 Daily Journal DAR 4001 and cert den (1997) 522 US 981, 139 L Ed 2d 378, 118 S Ct 441,
21 EBC 2376.
District court abused its discretion in declining to sanction stockholder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) where: (1)
denial of leave to amend in first action barred filing of same pleading in second action because denial of motion to
amend in first action was judgment on merits of claims in proposed amended pleading; and (2) stockholder's counsel
should have known that second action was barred by first action. Prof'l Mgmt. Assocs. v KPMG LLP (2003, CA8 Minn)
345 F3d 1030, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92525, 56 FR Serv 3d 902, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2003, CA8) 2003 US
App LEXIS 23668.
Court will decline to impose sanctions on petitioner pursuant to Rule 11, where, although petitioner's right to relief
was barred by res judicata, respondent disingenuously failed to refer to certain communications which were obviously
germane to issue in arguing that petitioner had waived right to relief. Ank Shipping Co. v Seychelles Nat'l Commodity
Co. (1984, SD NY) 596 F Supp 1455.
Sanctions are properly imposed against plaintiff's counsel pursuant to Rule 11 where it should have been apparent to
him that bringing instant action on same facts as prior action would be barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or
both. Cannon v Loyola University of Chicago (1985, ND Ill) 609 F Supp 1010, affd (1986, CA7 Ill) 784 F2d 777, 4
FR Serv 3d 241, cert den (1987) 479 US 1033, 93 L Ed 2d 834, 107 S Ct 880.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff where those aspects of complaint that were not barred by res judicata simply
failed to state claim. Touron v Dade County (1988, SD Fla) 119 FRD 41, 59 BNA FEP Cas 1886.
Where complaint was barred by doctrine of res judicata since plaintiff had filed essentially same cause of action
against same defendants approximately one year earlier and action had been dismissed, complaint was frivolous, and
sanctions must be imposed. Nothwang v Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc. (1991, DC Or) 139 FRD 675.
Counsel for present and former city police officers allegedly wrongfully denied promotion to sergeant is subject to
sanction under Rule 11, where counsel also represented about 50 of these plaintiffs in prior case making same claim
which resulted in dismissal on merits with res judicata effect, because imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is mandatory
when claims asserted have absolutely no chance of success. Paganucci v New York (1992, SD NY) 785 F Supp 467, 61
BNA FEP Cas 1412, affd (1993, CA2 NY) 993 F2d 310, 61 BNA FEP Cas 1420, 61 CCH EPD P 42256, 25 FR Serv 3d
1014, cert den (1993) 510 US 826, 126 L Ed 2d 58, 114 S Ct 90, 62 BNA FEP Cas 1520, 62 CCH EPD P 42556.
Meritless suit filed in state court, which primarily sought to have res judicata decision in prior federal action
overturned, should have been re-evaluated by counsel to determine whether legal and factual basis for suit existed at
time of removal to federal court, and continuation of suit was violation of Rule 11 and warrants imposition of sanctions
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
in amount of defendants' attorney fees against plaintiffs and their attorney. Roberts v Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (1987, MD
La) 117 FRD 581, 9 FR Serv 3d 882, affd without op (1988, CA5 La) 857 F2d 1471.
175. RICO
Although defendants claimed that complaint was frivolous and aimed at obtaining "nuisance settlement," district
court properly denied their Rule 11 motion because prescriptive period underlying RICO action is unsettled and
plaintiffs' claims were held to have been timely filed, and because although plaintiffs' assertions were inconsistent,
counsel's advocacy of plaintiffs' position was made in good faith. Davis v A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (1987, CA5 La)
823 F2d 105, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93329, 8 FR Serv 3d 557.
In action by journalists alleging that bombing of press conference was product of defendant's RICO enterprise which
had goal of overthrowing Nicaraguan government, plaintiffs and their attorney must have known prior to filing lawsuit
that they had no competent evidence and that complaint was not well-grounded in fact, and therefore district court
properly awarded attorney's fees and costs to defendants. Avirgan v Hull (1991, CA11 Fla) 932 F2d 1572, 20 FR Serv
3d 754, cert den (1992) 502 US 1048, 116 L Ed 2d 813, 112 S Ct 913 and cert den (1992) 506 US 952, 121 L Ed 2d 330,
113 S Ct 405.
Although merits of suit were doubtful, RICO claim raised good faith arguments based on existing law, and attorneys'
investigation, while not perfect, was reasonable under circumstances, and therefore District Court abused its discretion
in imposing sanctions. Smith v Our Lady of the Lake Hosp. (1992, CA5 La) 960 F2d 439, RICO Bus Disp Guide
(CCH) P 8011, 22 FR Serv 3d 1043 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Remedial Care v Shalala
(1994, ED La) 1994 US Dist LEXIS 18138).
Because any reasonably competent lawyer would know that mass picketing interfering with free movement about
jobsite accompanied by some harsh words and minor mischief is neither Hobbs Act nor RICO violation, let alone
criminal conspiracy, plaintiff employee's effort to argue contrary exceeds limits of acceptable advocacy and violates
Rule 11; furthermore, employer's decision to commence this litigation, rather than to seek immediate injunctive relief in
state court, and to insist on discovery into highly sensitive and marginally relevant matters, such as identity of
committee's members and contributors, raises strong inference that employer's purpose was to harass committee,
presumably to disrupt or discourage its advocacy of hostile views. WSB Electric Co. v Rank & File Committee to Stop
2-Gate System (1984, ND Cal) 103 FRD 417, 117 BNA LRRM 2994, 40 FR Serv 2d 568.
Defendant city officials' motion for attorneys' fees and costs under Rule 11 is properly denied, notwithstanding that
plaintiff's civil action against them under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is subject to dismissal
due to plaintiff's lack of standing, and notwithstanding officials' contention that suit was instituted solely to embarrass
defendants and to gain publicity to further plaintiff's political ambitions, where District Court has not addressed merits
of plaintiff's claim, but deems it arguable that proper plaintiff may successfully bring RICO action against defendant
officials, and where, although plaintiff did conduct news conference after filing complaint, he was quoted as saying that
any recovery would inure to city, and his intent is thus unclear. Flaherty v Torquato (1985, WD Pa) 623 F Supp 55,
affd without op (1986, CA3 Pa) 800 F2d 1133.
Where plaintiffs pursuing RICO claim failed to allege separate entities as liable persons and enterprise, in keeping
with precedent of which they had notice, they may be sanctioned under Rule 11, Rules of Civil Procedure; attorney
cannot continue to pursue claim with knowledge of legal authority and then concede issue. Harrison v Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. (1990, ND Ill) 132 FRD 184, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds , app dismd, remanded (1992,
CA7 Ill) 974 F2d 873, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96993, 23 FR Serv 3d 898, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA7) 1992 US App
LEXIS 33597 and cert den (1993) 509 US 904, 125 L Ed 2d 688, 113 S Ct 2994 and (criticized in Maher v Durango
Metals (1998, CA10 Colo) 144 F3d 1302, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 90214, 1998 Colo J C A R 2478).
Sanctions should be awarded to compensate RICO/securities/mail fraud defendants to some extent, where class of
investors in real estate limited partnerships sues on basis of alleged omissions in private placement memoranda, because
plaintiffs have compelled defendants to restate what was already manifest in memoranda, and to defend against
groundless, frivolous lawsuit which has consumed valuable resources of counsel. Sable v Southmark/Envicon Capital
Corp. (1993, SD NY) 819 F Supp 324, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 97687, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8283.
RICO plaintiff is not subject to sanction under FRCP 11, even though plaintiff dropped claim after it was challenged
by motion to dismiss and court indicated plaintiff probably had not shown "type of conduct required to maintain RICO
claim," where plaintiff yacht purchaser asserted in nonfrivolous manner that fraudulent activities involved 17 fax
transmissions, including several requests for new financing arrangements, and took roughly from October 1992 to
August 1994, because plaintiff was not in position of having "absolutely no chance of success under existing
precedent." Pobel v Hans Christian Yachts (1996, DC Md) 933 F Supp 494, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9211.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Officers and directors of savings and loan are not granted Rule 11 sanctions on grounds that plaintiffs instituted
RICO action without any basis and attempted to search for basis through discovery, where (1) plaintiffs presented
evidence that association to defraud them may have existed and (2) discovery is appropriate tool to identify members of
association. Citizens Sav. Asso. v Franciscus (1986, MD Pa) 656 F Supp 153.
176. Sanctions
Motion to reconsider imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is groundless and subject to additional sanctions where it
merely restates earlier motion for which sanctions were originally assessed. Brown v National Bd. of Medical
Examiners (1986, CA7 Ill) 800 F2d 168, 5 FR Serv 3d 1459.
District Court properly imposed sanctions on plaintiff for filing motion for imposition of sanctions on defendant on
grounds that defense had no basis in law when, in fact, existing law supported defense, and therefore plaintiff's
statement in motion was itself not warranted by existing law. Local 106, Service Employees International Union v
Homewood Memorial Gardens, Inc. (1988, CA7 Ill) 838 F2d 958, 127 BNA LRRM 2692, 108 CCH LC P 10318, 10 FR
Serv 3d 546 (criticized in McNealy v Caterpillar, Inc. (1998, CA7 Ill) 139 F3d 1113, 157 BNA LRRM 2778, 135 CCH
LC P 58423).
Filing motion to reconsider imposition of sanctions was itself frivolous where notice of appeal had already been
filed. Townsend v Holman Consulting Corp. (1990, CA9 Cal) 914 F2d 1136, 91 Daily Journal DAR 4058, 17 FR Serv
3d 801, amd, reh, en banc, den (1991, CA9 Cal) 91 CDOS 2524, reported in full (1991, CA9 Cal) 929 F2d 1358.
Counsel filing specious Rule 11 motion was admonished that he himself faced exposure to Rule 11 sanctions in age
discrimination case, where employer's motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations was denied based on employee's
theory of equitable tolling, because employer's motion raised legitimate dispute and, further, because it was not
responsibility of employer to anticipate defenses available to employee and admonished counsel. Harris v WGN
Continental Broadcasting Co. (1986, ND Ill) 650 F Supp 568, 42 BNA FEP Cas 1039.
Where, instead of opposing plaintiffs' motion for sanctions on merits, defendant filed its own motion for sanctions on
ground that case law was contrary to plaintiffs' position, even though plaintiffs had informed defendant of case law
supporting their position, sanctions will be imposed on defendant for filing frivolous motion. United States v San
Francisco (1990, ND Cal) 132 FRD 533, 55 CCH EPD P 40344, affd (1992, CA9 Cal) 976 F2d 1536, 92 CDOS 8323,
92 Daily Journal DAR 13691, 61 BNA FEP Cas 440, 60 CCH EPD P 41810, reh den, vacated in part on other grounds,
remanded (1993, CA9) 984 F2d 345, 93 CDOS 916, 61 BNA FEP Cas 457, 60 CCH EPD P 42054.
Sanction of $ 97,825.48 was reasonable amount to impose on small law firm which filed expensive patent
infringement counterclaims without conducting reasonable inquiry, where amount was less than half of plaintiff's
expenses in defending against counterclaims, amount was reduced by plaintiff's expenses in defending claims which
were not completely baseless, and it appeared from financial records supplied to court that amount in question would
not bankrupt firm. View Eng'g, Inc. v Robotic Vision Sys. (2000, CA FC) 208 F3d 981, 54 USPQ2d 1179.
177. Securities
Where it was clear under existing precedents that pleading had no chance of success and there was no reasonable
argument to extend, modify, or reverse law as it stood, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (15 USCS §
78u-4(c)(1) required district court to impose sanctions for violation of Rule 11. Corroon v Reeve (2001, CA2 NY) 258
F3d 86.
Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, once substantial violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) is found,
existence of some nonfrivolous claims does not suffice to rebut statutory presumption on ground that full sanctions
would be unreasonable and unjust burden. Gurary v Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc. (2002, CA2) 303 F3d 212, CCH Fed Secur
L Rep P 91967.
Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, substantial violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) occurs
whenever nonfrivolous claims that are joined with frivolous ones are insufficiently meritorious to save complaint as
whole from being abusive; under this interpretation, district court must examine qualitative substance of nonfrivolous
claims in order to assess whether these claims were, in fact, legitimate filings that had potential of prevailing or whether
they patently lacked merit and only narrowly avoided being deemed frivolous themselves. Gurary v Nu-Tech Bio-Med,
Inc. (2002, CA2) 303 F3d 212, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91967.
Presence of some nonfrivolous claims in otherwise frivolous complaint under Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that either violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 is de minimis or that
sanctions would create unreasonable burden. Gurary v Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc. (2002, CA2) 303 F3d 212, CCH Fed
Secur L Rep P 91967.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Award of full fees and costs was warranted against attorney for his filing of frivolous lawsuit under Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 where attorney's violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) was substantial and
attorney failed to show that sanctions would impose substantial burden. Gurary v Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc. (2002, CA2)
303 F3d 212, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91967.
Rule 11 sanctions are unwarranted where investor's complaint under securities laws was taken virtually verbatim
from model complaint distributed at CLE seminar and several counts were pled without any legal basis, because at least
some of investor's claims have facial validity and are federally cognizable. Baden v Craig-Hallum, Inc. (1986, DC
Minn) 646 F Supp 483, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93022.
Action by limited partnership against managing partner, alleging violation of § 12 of Securities Exchange Act of
1933 (15 USCS § 771), is frivolous and without merit since only purchaser of security has standing under statute, and
in addition, action was filed after limitations period had run and for purpose of litigating in federal rather than state
court, and therefore sanctions must be imposed. Storage Technology Partners II v Storage Technology Corp. (1987,
DC Colo) 117 FRD 675, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93580, 9 FR Serv 3d 450.
Rule 11 was not violated by either plaintiff investors or defendant accounting firm, where, in midst of huge securities
fraud litigation arising out of alleged global conspiracy to garner millions of dollars of investments in bogus oil
recovery technology, plaintiffs claimed that defendant took part in and/or conspired to commit fraudulent acts by merely
agreeing to perform and performing accounting services for oil technology partnership, which claim was summarily
dismissed, because no showing can be made that investors' complaint, alleging that use of accounting firm's name in
offering memoranda influenced them to invest, was frivolous or not well-grounded in fact or law, nor that accounting
firm's Rule 11 motion for sanctions was frivolous. Roberts v Heim (1987, ND Cal) 670 F Supp 1466, CCH Fed Secur
L Rep P 93291, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds (1988, CA9 Cal) 857 F2d 646, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
94028, 12 FR Serv 3d 810, cert den (1989) 493 US 1002, 107 L Ed 2d 556, 110 S Ct 561.
In action alleging securities fraud in which testimony of both plaintiff and defendant disclosed that defendant was
essentially bystander and neither responsible for plaintiff's investments nor for fraud that resulted, and nothing in
evidence presented was surprise or unexpected by plaintiff, plaintiff did not have grounds in nature of probable cause
for lawsuit, and although plaintiff should not be penalized for bringing suit or for conducting reasonable discovery, he
should be penalized for activity beyond that point. Hookom v Sensor (1988, SD Ohio) 121 FRD 63.
Sanctions were unwarranted against former corporate officer who brought claims against corporation for federal and
state securities fraud, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract; although securities fraud claims were untimely,
officer had some basis for believing that claims might be allowed, and officer also had some basis for asserting
promissory estoppel and contract claims where corporation had made promise, albeit illusory one, to compensate for
fraud. Del Sontro v Cendant Corp. (2002, DC NJ) 223 F Supp 2d 563, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91969.
178. Service of process
Defendant which had filed answer and counterclaim had waived motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of
process, and since even cursory review of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 would have revealed that this defense
lacked any foundation in law, defendant's attorney was properly sanctioned for filing motion. INVST Financial Group,
Inc. v Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (1987, CA6 Mich) 815 F2d 391, 7 FR Serv 3d 529, cert den (1987) 484 US 927, 98 L
Ed 2d 251, 108 S Ct 291.
Where claim was clearly precluded by statute of limitations, was identical to at least one other claim already
adjudicated on plaintiff's behalf, and suffered from procedural defects in pleadings and service and filing, attorney had
no factual or legal justification for signing this complaint which was not well grounded in fact. Napier v Thirty or
More Unidentified Federal Agents, etc. (1988, CA3 NJ) 855 F2d 1080, 47 CCH EPD P 38336, 12 FR Serv 3d 1.
Fact that district court considered defendant's service of claim to be "sloppy" did not render filing sanctionable under
Rule 11. United States v Alexander (1993, CA5 Tex) 981 F2d 250, 37 Envt Rep Cas 1149, 24 FR Serv 3d 913, 23 ELR
20791.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff's attorney who did not properly serve defendants and was then put on notice
by defendants' attorney that service was inadequate, but who subsequently filed affidavit accompanying motion for
entry of default judgment in which he swore that defendants had been properly served, although he knew that his
affidavit was not well grounded in fact. Gas Reclamation, Inc. v Jones (1985, SD Tex) 113 FRD 1.
Although plaintiff's would-be service of defendant was held ineffective and resultant default judgment was set aside,
plaintiff's position that service was effective is reasonable and is supported by precedent from other jurisdictions, and
thus defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions is denied. United States v Nuttall (1988, DC Del) 122 FRD 163.
179. Standing
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs did not have standing and district court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over action which should have been pursued in state court. East St. Louis v Circuit
Court for Twentieth Judicial Circuit (1993, CA7 Ill) 986 F2d 1142, 24 FR Serv 3d 1383.
Action by limited partnership against managing partner, alleging violation of § 12 of Securities Exchange Act of
1933 (15 USCS § 771), is frivolous and without merit since only purchaser of security has standing under statute, and
in addition, action was filed after limitations period had run and for purpose of litigating in federal rather than state
court, and therefore sanctions must be imposed. Storage Technology Partners II v Storage Technology Corp. (1987,
DC Colo) 117 FRD 675, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93580, 9 FR Serv 3d 450.
Defendants' motion for sanctions was denied where, without deciding whether plaintiffs were correct that denial of
opportunity to participate in restructuring of public housing constituted injury-in-fact, at very least it constituted
non-frivolous basis for asserting injury sufficient to confer standing upon them, particularly in light of fact that § 514
of Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (42 USCS § 1437f note) and 24401.500
indicated that Department of Housing and Urban Development had to establish procedures for residents of affected
neighborhood to participate in restructuring process. Neighborhood Research Inst. v Campus Ptnrs. for Cmty. Urban
Dev. (2002, SD Ohio) 212 FRD 374.
180. Statute of limitations
In action where defendant interposed defense of statute of limitations against plaintiff and counterclaimed against
others for contribution and indemnity if defendant were compelled to pay damages in main suit, and where District
Court held that by signing original answer, Rule 11 estopped defendant from denying such original claim which was
barred by relevant statute of limitations, pleading was not in violation of Rule 11 since issue of statute of limitation and
forbearance were largely factual issues for jury to determine and lawyers for defendant could well have had belief that
there was good ground to support statute of limitation defense and at same time have similar good faith belief that they
well might lose on affirmative defense, in which event they would want to seek contribution or indemnity from those
they felt were responsible for client's loss. Kingsport v Steel & Roof Structure, Inc. (1974, CA6 Tenn) 500 F2d 617.
Sanctions must be imposed against attorney who filed suit in which claims were barred by statute of limitations and
were so meritless that it was patently clear that plaintiffs had absolutely no chance of success under existing precedents
and where no reasonable argument was advanced to extend, modify, or reverse law as it stood. Norris v Grosvenor
Marketing, Ltd. (1986, CA2 NY) 803 F2d 1281, 6 FR Serv 3d 109.
Where plaintiff's action was barred by statute of limitations, and defense counsel informed plaintiff of this fact before
suit was filed, and plaintiff's argument for tolling statute was not meritorious and was not reasonably likely to achieve
change in law, sanctions are appropriate. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v Fernandez (1987, CA8 Mo) 830 F2d 952, 9
FR Serv 3d 381.
District Court erred in refusing defendant's motion for sanctions where action was subject to known statute of
limitations defense, and plaintiff had no reasonable basis in law on which to challenge this defense. United States v
Gavilan Joint Community College Dist. (1988, CA9 Cal) 849 F2d 1246, 12 FR Serv 3d 850.
Sanctions were properly imposed on defendant and his attorney where they continued to assert statute of limitations
defense after being warned by court that such defense was groundless and where statute and precedent were contrary to
defendant's position, but he made no argument for reinterpreting statute or reversing precedent. United States v Milam
(1988, CA11 Ga) 855 F2d 739, 12 FR Serv 3d 65.
Where claim was clearly precluded by statute of limitations, was identical to at least one other claim already
adjudicated on plaintiff's behalf, and suffered from procedural defects in pleadings and service and filing, attorney had
no factual or legal justification for signing this complaint which was not well grounded in fact. Napier v Thirty or
More Unidentified Federal Agents, etc. (1988, CA3 NJ) 855 F2d 1080, 47 CCH EPD P 38336, 12 FR Serv 3d 1.
Although plaintiff's complaint appeared on its face to be time-barred, his argument for equitable modification
removed any element of frivolousness regarding that issue, and thus sanctions should not be imposed on that basis.
Kale v Combined Ins. Co. (1988, CA1 Mass) 861 F2d 746, 48 BNA FEP Cas 563, 48 CCH EPD P 38446, 12 FR Serv
3d 837.
Although pro se plaintiff's motion to vacate prior dismissal of his case was time-barred, sanctions are inappropriate
where there is nothing in record to indicate that plaintiff knew or should have known that his motion was time-barred
and nothing in record indicates that plaintiff proceeded in bad faith or from desire to harass defendants. Maduakolam v
Columbia University (1989, CA2 NY) 866 F2d 53, 12 FR Serv 3d 1271.
Where plaintiff brought numerous actions based on same claim, and even cursory examination of law would have
shown that this repeat litigation had no valid legal basis and was barred by res judicata and administrative time bar,
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sanctions will be imposed for violation of Rule 11. Uithoven v U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1989, CA5 Miss) 884
F2d 844, 14 FR Serv 3d 792.
Sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff and his attorney for bringing suit 4 years after statute of limitations had
run and arguing that Utah's statute of limitations violated Utah Constitution's open courts provision since such argument
was not warranted by existing law. McHenry v Utah Valley Hosp., Div. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (1991,
CA10 Utah) 927 F2d 1125, cert den (1991) 502 US 894, 116 L Ed 2d 217, 112 S Ct 263.
Although complaint was held time-barred, where attorney acknowledged adverse law but made good faith argument
for modification of applicable statute of limitations and cited precedents, no violation of Rule 11 occurred; further,
where attorney restated dismissed claims in amended complaint solely to preserve them for appeal, and law regarding
need for such restatement was unclear at time, sanctions should not have been imposed. Smith v National Health Care
Services (1991, CA7 Ill) 934 F2d 95, 19 FR Serv 3d 1085.
Although defendants' motion for reconsideration of ruling with respect to applicable limitations period was filed
within several weeks of trial date, imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is not appropriate, where defendants have
raised plausible legal theory in connection with motion, and where no element of bad faith is present. Greenfield v
District of Columbia (1985, DC Dist Col) 623 F Supp 47.
Action by limited partnership against managing partner, alleging violation of § 12 of Securities Exchange Act of
1933 (15 USCS § 771), is frivolous and without merit since only purchaser of security has standing under statute, and
in addition, action was filed after limitations period had run and for purpose of litigating in federal rather than state
court, and therefore sanctions must be imposed. Storage Technology Partners II v Storage Technology Corp. (1987,
DC Colo) 117 FRD 675, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93580, 9 FR Serv 3d 450.
Where cursory investigation of documents contained in plaintiff's file irrefutably demonstrated that he had not filed
his suit within set time limits, at best, plaintiff's attorney failed to conduct reasonable investigation before filing motion,
and at worst, he deliberately misrepresented jurisdictional facts to court and therefore violated Rule 11 by filing
frivolous pleadings. Comer v Interstate United Corp. (1988, ND Ill) 119 FRD 392, 48 CCH EPD P 38441.
Sanctions are imposed on corporation and its president where president knew before case was filed in federal court
that it was time-barred, where president attempted to represent corporation himself although law required corporation to
be represented by counsel, and where president filed voluminous papers and indulged in repeated personal attacks on
opposing party and its counsel. Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v Nordstrom, Inc. (1988, SD NY) 123 FRD 435.
Filing of claim which was clearly precluded by applicable statute of limitations is ground for imposition of sanctions,
and where counsel failed to raise equitable tolling defense before entry of final judgment, he may not assert such
defense for purposes of avoiding sanctions. Matthews v Freedman (1989, ED Pa) 128 FRD 194, 53 CCH EPD P
39756, 15 FR Serv 3d 876, affd without op (1990, CA3 Pa) 919 F2d 135 and affd without op (1990, CA3 Pa) 919 F2d
135.
Plaintiff's attorney is subject to Rule 11 sanctions where he continued to press claim which was clearly barred.
Lolling v Patterson (1991, CD Ill) 138 FRD 109.
181. Supersedeas bond
Where defendant's attorney signed supersedeas bond that clearly failed to comport with requirements called for by
law, and plaintiff's attorney filed opposition pointing out defects and requesting sanctions, after which defendant's
attorney filed amended supersedeas bond which did not correct all problems of original, district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing sanctions against defendant's attorney in amount of reasonable expenses incurred by plaintiff in
connection with defective supersedeas bond. EEOC v Clear Lake Dodge (1995, CA5 Tex) 60 F3d 1146, 68 BNA FEP
Cas 663, 33 FR Serv 3d 104.
182. Taxation
Sanctions were properly imposed on taxpayer's attorney who filed action in which taxpayer appealed imposition of
penalty resulting from her claim on income tax return of "war tax credit" where theories advanced by attorney had been
uniformly rejected by courts in past and it was not reasonable to believe that taxpayer's position was plausible. Dalton
v United States (1986, CA4 NC) 800 F2d 1316, 86-2 USTC P 9683, 5 FR Serv 3d 1326, 58 AFTR 2d 5775, cert den
(1987) 481 US 1024, 95 L Ed 2d 516, 107 S Ct 1911.
Imposition of sanctions on plaintiff acting pro se is proper where plaintiff taxpayer opposed assessment of taxes on
grounds that money he received did not constitute wages or taxable income but rather was equal, nontaxable exchange
of property, his labor for money, since such position is not warranted by existing law and no good faith argument was
raised for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and plaintiff's total rejection of well-established precedent
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did not meet obligations imposed by Rule 11 on one signing civil pleadings. Casper v Commissioner (1986, CA10)
805 F2d 902, 86-2 USTC P 9818, 6 FR Serv 3d 876, 58 AFTR 2d 6210.
Sanctions should not be imposed on attorney who stated in her answer that she had insufficient knowledge of
disputed facts to admit or deny them because she was unable to procure files from IRS in time to respond
knowledgeably to many of allegations made in complaint. Canton Police Benevolent Ass'n v United States (1988, CA6
Ohio) 844 F2d 1231, 9 EBC 1880, 88-1 USTC P 9285, 61 AFTR 2d 1065.
Plaintiffs are subject to sanctions under Rule 11, where their original complaint sought temporary order restraining
defendant Internal Revenue Service officials from enforcing tax liens and levies, which claim is clearly barred by
Anti-Injunction Act, and where amended complaint asserted constitutional right of plaintiffs to pre-seizure hearing,
which claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court decisions to effect that application of Anti-Injunction Act is not denial of
due process so long as taxpayer has access to judicial review in refund action. Smith v Egger (1985, ED Cal) 108 FRD
44, 85-2 USTC P 9711, 88-1 USTC P 9259, 57 AFTR 2d 410.
Plaintiff is subject to sanctions under Rule 11 where his arguments regarding Internal Revenue laws and his
exemption from such laws are clearly without merit and contrary to existing case law. Richcreek v Grecu (1985, SD
Ind) 612 F Supp 111, 85-2 USTC P 9520, 56 AFTR 2d 5732.
Pursuant to Rule 11, District Court properly orders petitioners to pay $ 250 in attorneys' fees to IRS, and to pay clerk
of court $ 250 as sanction for filing meritless petition to quash IRS summons, notwithstanding that petitioners may have
relied on opinions of others including individual who sat at counsel table with them, where such individual had had
similar petition denied in another district. Sloan v United States (1985, ND Ind) 621 F Supp 1072, 86-1 USTC P 9159,
57 AFTR 2d 562, dismd, in part, without op, affd, in part, without op (1987, CA7 Ind) 812 F2d 1410 and affd (1991,
CA7 Ind) 939 F2d 499, 91-2 USTC P 50388, 68 AFTR 2d 5351, reh, en banc, den (1991, CA7) 1991 US App LEXIS
21219 and cert den (1992) 502 US 1060, 117 L Ed 2d 110, 112 S Ct 940, reh den (1992) 503 US 953, 117 L Ed 2d 654,
112 S Ct 1518.
District Court declined to impose sanctions under Rule 11 on plaintiff, who appeared pro se in action to quash
summons issued by IRS, where plaintiff prepared action by following instructions on summons, which contained
outdated version of Rule 11 and which had no mention of possible sanctions for frivolous action. White v United States
(Branch Banking & Trust Co.) (1986, ED NC) 109 FRD 654, 4 FR Serv 3d 958.
Where pro se plaintiff filed frivolous action against IRS alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights,
sanctions under Rule 11 to reimburse government for cost of defending against frivolous suit and to deter future
frivolous actions were permissible, but where plaintiff did not act maliciously but was only using court as forum for his
political and religious views, additional sanctions to punish plaintiff would not be proper, even though punishment is
acceptable purpose of Rule 11. Auen v Sweeney (1986, ND NY) 109 FRD 678.
Arguments put forth by plaintiff in attempt to avoid federal income tax liability are frivolous since same arguments
have been raised and rejected in countless cases, including several brought by plaintiff himself, and therefore sanctions
will be imposed on plaintiff, particularly since judge in earlier action withheld sanctions on condition that plaintiff
refrain from further similar actions against tax laws, which order plaintiff disobeyed. McKeown v LTV Steel Co. (1987,
ND Ind) 117 FRD 139.
Association's case is dismissed and its attorney is subject to sanction under Rule 11, where claim asserted was thinly
veiled rehash of challenge to repeal of tax exemption on pension income for retired police and firefighters, which
challenge had been tried fully and unsuccessfully in state court, because association lacked standing, member's claims
are barred by 28 USCS § 1341 and res judicata, and attorney should have known that his only proper route for review
was in U.S. Supreme Court. Keating v Rhode Island (1992, DC RI) 785 F Supp 1094.
"Tax protester" is directed to pay $ 7,000 sanction under FRCP 11, where protester challenged credit union's
payment of $ 31.40, pursuant to federal tax levy, toward his back-tax bill of $ 29,369.03, because protester's disjointed
discourse about, inter alia, judicial impartiality, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and illegality of federal
taxation system leave no doubt about frivolity of his lawsuit. Lake v Department of the Treasury (1995, ND Ga) 905 F
Supp 1061, 33 FR Serv 3d 1286, 76 AFTR 2d 6725, 95 TNT 197-80, affd without op (1996, CA11 Ga) 102 F3d 554.
Taxpayers are subject to sanction under FRCP 11, where they sued bank and others involved with seizure of their
property in satisfaction of tax liabilities, because their claims are utterly without legal merit, as claims are based upon
unreasonable views of doctrine of federalism, which are unsupported by any credible interpretation of Constitution. Ivy
v Mason (1998, DC Idaho) 30 F Supp 2d 1268, 98-2 USTC P 50571, 82 AFTR 2d 5319.
Taxpayer clearly and knowingly violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), when taxpayer continued to challenge imposition of
penalty under 26 USCS § 6702, after taxpayer was warned repeatedly that argument that pension benefit was not
"income" was spurious and frivolous. Myrick v United States (2002, DC Ariz) 217 F Supp 2d 979, 2002-2 USTC P
50487, 89 AFTR 2d 2920.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court declined to impose sanctions against U.S. in matter initiated by taxpayer, challenging imposition of
taxes and penalties by IRS, where U.S. inadvertently failed to provide taxpayer with one page of 14-page motion, and
U.S. subsequently provided missing page to taxpayer. Hart v United States (2003, ND Ohio) 291 F Supp 2d 635, 2003-2
USTC P 50680, 92 AFTR 2d 5976.
183. Trade secrets
After District Court denied defendant's request for protective order on grounds that disputed information did not
constitute trade secrets, defendant sought to depose individuals possessing information in order to determine what
remained confidential, however, District Court concluded that much of information sought was irrelevant, but sanctions
imposed against defendant must be vacated since counsel's actions were more indicative of vigorous advocacy than of
bad faith or impropriety which Rule 11 is intended to curb. Smith v BIC Corp. (1989, CA3 Pa) 869 F2d 194, 16 Media
L R 1286, 10 USPQ2d 1052, 13 FR Serv 3d 181.
184. Trademarks and trade dress
In action for injunctive relief for false designation of origin under Lanham Act and for unfair competition, plaintiff's
counsel cannot, in good faith, include in his complaint count for trademark infringement before he is aware of evidence
to support such claim, since such conduct violates both letter and spirit of Rule 11; therefore, motion to amend
complaint to include allegation of trademark infringement does not come too late, even when made on day of trial,
where good grounds to support claim are discovered less than one week prior to trial and no prejudice to opposing party
is found. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v Detroit Forming, Inc. (1984, CA4 SC) 743 F2d 1039, 223 USPQ 1291, 81 ALR
Fed 659.
In trade dress infringement suit in which court granted plaintiff permanent injunction against defendant, defendant's
action in presenting redesigned product to court for examination with respect to injunction was reasonable and
prevented further delay and expense and does not warrant imposition of sanctions. Service Ideas, Inc. v Traex Corp.
(1988, CA7 Wis) 846 F2d 1118, 6 USPQ2d 1937.
In domain-name registrant's suit against trademark owners seeking to demonstrate lawful use of domain name,
district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against trademark owners for factual contentions because some
contentions were not lacking in support and some contentions were legal arguments. Storey v Cello Holdings, L.L.C.
(2003, CA2 NY) 347 F3d 370, 68 USPQ2d 1641.
Rule 11 sanctions are not imposed on plaintiff in trademark infringement action, where (1) there was reasonable
basis to bring action since plaintiff was aware that defendant planned to market over-the-counter tablet similar to
plaintiff's in formula, dosage, and color, and (2) there is insufficient evidence to conclude plaintiff acted to harass
defendants or delay litigation. American Home Products Corp. v Barr Laboratories, Inc. (1987, DC NJ) 656 F Supp
1058, 3 USPQ2d 1194, affd (1987, CA3 NJ) 834 F2d 368, 5 USPQ2d 1073.
185. Venue; convenience and propriety of forum
District Court properly imposed sanctions for plaintiffs' persistence in litigating in plainly improper federal forum,
where virtually identical action had previously been filed in state court and had not yet been finally determined.
Hapaniewski v Chicago Heights (1989, CA7 Ind) 883 F2d 576, 14 FR Serv 3d 786, cert den (1990) 493 US 1071, 107 L
Ed 2d 1023, 110 S Ct 1116.
District Court properly sanctioned pro se plaintiff where plaintiff, who claimed to have legal education, filed action
in improper forum and had previously filed same action in other improper forums after he had exhausted his legal
remedies. Spain v National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1990, CA5 Tex) 906 F2d 194.
Sanctions cannot be sustained on ground that plaintiffs selected forum inconvenient to defendants where venue was
not improper since there were clear contacts with forum, although they were outweighed by other factors. Sussman by &
Through Guilden v Bank of Isr. (1995, CA2 NY) 56 F3d 450, 32 FR Serv 3d 978, cert den (1995) 516 US 916, 133 L Ed
2d 210, 116 S Ct 305.
In interest of preserving atmosphere of friendly cooperation and professional collegiality which should exist between
opposing attorneys in civil litigation, District Court properly declines to impose sanctions under Rule 11 for simply
alleging improper venue, and for failing to retract allegation in absence of motion, where venue was not known to be
improper when initially selected by plaintiff's attorney, and where inconvenience and delay suffered by defendant do
not counterbalance other considerations. Hot Locks, Inc. v Ooh La La, Inc. (1985, SD NY) 107 FRD 751, 3 FR Serv 3d
696.
In personal injury action which was dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens, because plaintiffs' attorneys had
previously represented plaintiffs in identical actions in other jurisdictions which were dismissed for same reason,
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
sanctions will be imposed on attorneys who knew established legal precedent was contrary to their position, but who did
not present good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Rojas v DeMent (1991, SD
Fla) 137 FRD 30.
186. Miscellaneous
In habeas corpus proceeding brought by woman who sought to enforce plea agreement to prevent her deportation to
Switzerland, 12-line blunderbuss reply to application for writ, which stated that parties representing government in
agreement were no longer associated with Department, that government was in no position to admit or deny any
agreement with petitioner, and that only proper remedy for petitioner was to prove existence of agreement and its
nonperformance, did not comply with Rule 11 in which effective filing of pleading is certificate by counsel that it is
filed in good faith in belief that it is well-founded, since when answer was filed Department had letters prepared by
prior employees in which bargain was restated and fear was expressed that agreement would not be honored, and since
both parties were readily available in area. Geisser v United States (1975, CA5 Fla) 513 F2d 862, 20 FR Serv 2d 945.
Sanctions were properly imposed on both plaintiff and his attorney where dates of transgressions alleged in amended
complaint were later changed in response to interrogatories, making it apparent that attorney had not made reasonable
inquiries before filing complaint and showing that transgressions alleged in amended complaint had nothing to do with
impropriety alleged in original complaint and that amended complaint was completely frivolous. McCabe v General
Foods Corp. (1987, CA9 Cal) 811 F2d 1336, 1 BNA IER Cas 1632, 106 CCH LC P 55696, 7 FR Serv 3d 882, 96 ALR
Fed 1.
Complaint based on reasonable inquiry should not be found to be factually frivolous unless some clear authority or
litigant's own clear admission erases factual underpinning from some essential element of litigant's pleading, and
therefore no sanctions will be imposed on plaintiffs and their attorney where attorney spent approximately 100 hours
interviewing his clients and reviewing records and researching law, where he enlisted experienced counsel to conduct
further interviews and to review complaint, and where, although complaint contained factual errors, it was not frivolous.
Greenberg v Sala (1987, CA9 Nev) 822 F2d 882, 8 FR Serv 3d 729.
Sanctions were properly imposed on defendant for filing motion which was not warranted by existing law where
defendant made motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim on grounds that statute upon which it was based was
unconstitutional, despite fact that statute had previously been ruled to be constitutional. Kern Oil & Refining Co. v
Tenneco Oil Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 840 F2d 730, 10 FR Serv 3d 962, 5 UCCRS2d 1380, cert den (1988) 488 US 948, 102
L Ed 2d 367, 109 S Ct 378.
Where claim was clearly precluded by statute of limitations, was identical to at least one other claim already
adjudicated on plaintiff's behalf, and suffered from procedural defects in pleadings and service and filing, attorney had
no factual or legal justification for signing this complaint which was not well grounded in fact. Napier v Thirty or
More Unidentified Federal Agents, etc. (1988, CA3 NJ) 855 F2d 1080, 47 CCH EPD P 38336, 12 FR Serv 3d 1.
Although third party complaint was poorly pleaded, it presented arguable claim for liability and thus was not
frivolous, for even if attorney was wrong about third party defendant's liability, court is reluctant to impose sanctions for
factual errors, especially errors in papers filed before opportunity for discovery, if litigant has conducted reasonable
inquiry into facts. Jensen Electric Co. v Moore, Caldwell, Rowland & Dodd, Inc. (1989, CA9 Cal) 873 F2d 1327, 13
FR Serv 3d 1155 (criticized in Kokomo Tube Co. v Dayton Equip. Servs. Co. (1997, CA7 Ind) 123 F3d 616).
Sanctions were properly imposed on pro se plaintiff where it was well-settled that statutes under which he brought
suit offered no possibility of relief he sought. Vukadinovich v McCarthy (1990, CA7 Ind) 901 F2d 1439, 16 FR Serv 3d
915, reh den, en banc (1990, CA7) 1990 US App LEXIS 9683 and cert den (1991) 498 US 1050, 112 L Ed 2d 780, 111 S
Ct 761.
Because complaint so patently failed to state claim and because plaintiffs and their counsel made no attempt to
convince district court that claim was not entirely baseless, it cannot be said that district court abused its discretion
when it awarded fees grounded upon both 42 USCS § 1988 and Rule 11. Price v Hawaii (1991, CA9 Hawaii) 939
F2d 702, 91 CDOS 5398, 91 Daily Journal DAR 8389, amd, reh den (1991, CA9) 91 CDOS 6333, reported in full
(1991, CA9 Hawaii) 91 Daily Journal DAR 9688, amd (1991, CA9 Hawaii) 91 CDOS 7485, 91 Daily Journal DAR
11462 and cert den (1992) 503 US 938, 117 L Ed 2d 622, 112 S Ct 1479, 112 S Ct 1480.
Where state school of mines possessed fossil which had been seized by government, but was acting merely as agent
of government, attorney for plaintiffs who sought to recover fossil did not violate Rule 11 by naming school as
defendant, even though court determined that school was not proper party, since law was unclear regarding under what
circumstances possession was enough to sue possessor. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v South Dakota Sch.
of Mines & Technology (1993, CA8 SD) 12 F3d 737, 28 FR Serv 3d 232, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA8) 1994 US App
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
LEXIS 1655 and cert den (1994) 513 US 810, 130 L Ed 2d 18, 115 S Ct 61 and subsequent app (1996, CA8 SD) 88 F3d
614.
Because any reasonably competent lawyer would know that mass picketing interfering with free movement about
jobsite accompanied by some harsh words and minor mischief is neither Hobbs Act nor RICO violation, let alone
criminal conspiracy, plaintiff employee's effort to argue contrary exceeds limits of acceptable advocacy and violates
Rule 11; furthermore, employer's decision to commence this litigation, rather than to seek immediate injunctive relief in
state court, and to insist on discovery into highly sensitive and marginally relevant matters, such as identity of
committee's members and contributors, raises strong inference that employer's purpose was to harass committee,
presumably to disrupt or discourage its advocacy of hostile views. WSB Electric Co. v Rank & File Committee to Stop
2-Gate System (1984, ND Cal) 103 FRD 417, 117 BNA LRRM 2994, 40 FR Serv 2d 568.
Pursuant to Rule 60(b), defendants are properly relieved from order awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiff after
defendants unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, where District Court ruled in favor of defendants on further
consideration of portion of their original motions, where successful settlement negotiations may have been furthered by
manner in which defendants organized and presented their motion for summary judgment, and where defense attorneys
were at all times acting with subjective good faith. Wells v Oppenheimer & Co. (1985, SD NY) 106 FRD 258, 2 FR
Serv 3d 433.
Both plaintiff and his counsel are charged with sanctions for filing frivolous, unreasonable claim that had absolutely
no chance for success in which it was alleged that plaintiff's father had had him committed to mental institution when he
was minor and that father is therefore liable for financial support of plaintiff, now adult, and his wife and children.
Fried v Fried (1986, SD NY) 113 FRD 103, 6 FR Serv 3d 221.
Pro se litigant who filed suit against multiple defendants alleging improprieties in foreclosure sale and enforcement
of tax liens on piece of real property is sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing frivolous action and subject to court's review
of subsequent complaints before summons and service proceed where (1) litigant who bid $ 23 in silver coin cannot
assert priority over approximately $ 25,000 credit to claim ownership to 6 acres of real estate and (2) litigant's assertion
that IRS employees disregarded constitutional mandates in enforcing lien failed to raise genuine issues of material fact.
Elmore v McCammon (1986, SD Tex) 640 F Supp 905, 86-2 USTC P 9668, 58 AFTR 2d 5520.
Test under current Rule 11 is objective test of reasonableness under circumstances, rather than subjective test of bad
faith, and thus where defendant prevailed only after presenting extensive evidence to rebut plaintiff's claims, plaintiff's
case was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, and therefore defendant's motion for attorneys' fees and
expenses is denied. EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1987, ND Ill) 114 FRD 615, 42 BNA FEP Cas 1358, 7 FR Serv 3d
192, vacated in part on other grounds, reconsideration den, remanded (1991, ND Ill) 138 FRD 523.
Denial of airline passenger's antitrust and Federal Aviation Act claims against foreign airline for assessing her
ten-dollar excess baggage fee does not entitle airline to Rule 11 sanctions where passenger's theories were at least
colorable, since Rule 11 is not intended to chill attorneys' creativity and relevant inquiry is whether competent attorney
could have formed reasonable belief that pleading was warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. McElderry v Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (1988, SD NY) 678 F Supp 1071,
1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67878.
In an action brought by FDIC involving former savings and loan association, statement by plaintiff's counsel that
plaintiff did not have representative who could appear as plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) representative since none of plaintiff's
representatives participated in underlying transaction did not constitute admission that no factual basis existed for filing
of complaint, and therefore Rule 11 sanctions were denied. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v Village Creek Joint
Venture (1989, ND Tex) 130 FRD 357, 16 FR Serv 3d 927.
Where arguments asserted by defendants in motion for summary judgment had no basis in fact, and in support of
their arguments defendants cited 4 pages of transcript from administrative hearing which contained testimony which
was either irrelevant or proof of inaccuracy of defendants' arguments, defendants' counsel has violated Rule 11 and
sanctions must be imposed. Soler v G & U, Inc. (1991, SD NY) 138 FRD 47, 1 BNA WH Cas 2d 180.
Real estate broker is not subject to FRCP 11 sanctions, where broker took position in federal action which was
diametrically opposed to position taken in state court, because while broker's decision to change position is not
reasonable, some case law exists which supports broker's contention that until its prior position has been successfully
maintained, it can hold whatever position it chooses before any court of its choice. AFN, Inc. v Schlott, Inc. (1992, DC
NJ) 798 F Supp 219.
Trustee sons are entitled to FRCP 11 sanctions against father's attorney, where father sought to have sons removed as
pension trustees for family business, sons counterclaimed against father and attorney, and then attorney sought to block
settlement of matter, going so far as to assert RICO and abuse-of-process claims against sons, because these claims
grew out of nothing more than glorified discovery dispute, had no reasonable basis, and were interposed for improper
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
purposes of harassing sons and perpetuating acrimony of situation. Leogrande v Leogrande (1992, ED NY) 799 F Supp
1354, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8240.
Defendants' motion for sanctions was denied, where no binding precedent clearly established that plaintiffs had no
private right of action under Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act, and although court ultimately
was not persuaded that private right of action under 42 USCS § 1437a necessarily indicated that private right of action
existed under 42 USCS § 1437f, court could not conclude that such argument was frivolous. Neighborhood Research
Inst. v Campus Ptnrs. for Cmty. Urban Dev. (2002, SD Ohio) 212 FRD 374.
Court would not impose sanctions on plaintiffs for asserting claims contrary to existing law where only existing law
came from jurisdictions whose precedent was not binding on court. Neighborhood Research Inst. v Campus Ptnrs. for
Cmty. Urban Dev. (2002, SD Ohio) 212 FRD 374.
Court declined to impose sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 even though court found defendants' motion for relief
from default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to be without merit. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v Inversiones
Errazuriz, Limitada (2003, SD NY) 246 F Supp 2d 231.
Where plaintiff's prefiling inquiry revealed evidence which tended to exculpate defendant in question, and further
discovery failed to uncover any evidence to refute initial findings that exculpated defendant, claim was not well
grounded in fact and was filed for improper purposes, and therefore sanctions will be imposed. Balfour Guthrie, Inc. v
Hunter Marine Transport, Inc. (1987, MD Tenn) 118 FRD 66, 9 FR Serv 3d 1256.
D. Improper Purpose
1. In General
187. Generally
Attorney who filed groundless complaint without reasonable inquiry and for improper purpose of pressuring and
intimidating defendants is not exonerated from sanctions simply because he had second proper motive of attempting to
vindicate plaintiffs' rights when he filed complaint. Silva v Witschen (1994, CA1 RI) 19 F3d 725, 28 FR Serv 3d 420.
District court erred in imposing sanctions on attorney as result of his methodology in executing judgment against
store, where attorney's actions were not unreasonable, even though court suspected that execution was carried out in
manner intended to embarrass store, since it is not role of Rule 11 to safeguard defendant from public criticism that may
result from assertion of non-frivolous claims. Whitehead v Food Max of Miss., Inc. (2002, CA5 Miss) 277 F3d 791, 51
FR Serv 3d 433.
Even though pleading may have been well-grounded in law or fact, fact that it was filed for improper purpose
violates Rule 11. Ballentine v Taco Bell Corp. (1991, ED NC) 135 FRD 117.
Pleading that satisfies Rule 11 requirement of being well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law cannot
harass defendant, regardless of plaintiff's subjective intent; however, filing of pleading for improper purpose is not
immunized from Rule 11 sanctions just because it is well-grounded in fact and law, as where number of unexplained
and irrelevant pleadings and accompanying exhibits are filed. In re Flinn (1991, SD Fla) 139 FRD 698, 21 FR Serv 3d
35, affd without op (1994, CA11 Fla) 22 F3d 1097.
In action by child restraint system manufacturer, which alleged violation of 35 USCS § 271(a), (b), (c) by
competitor, competitor was not entitled to dismissal of action as FRCP 11 sanction; competitor's Rule 11 motion was
transparent effort to procure favorable Markman claim construction determination and to thereby influence resolution of
action; dismissal of patent infringement action on merits via Rule 11 would have subjected manufacturer to prejudice
and would have run counter to precepts of Rule 11. Safe-Strap Co. v Koala Corp. (2003, SD NY) 270 F Supp 2d 407.
188. Avoidance of settlement agreement
Sanctions were properly imposed on attorney who filed motion for award of attorney's fees without informing court
that when his clients had settled with defendants, they had signed releases of all their claims against defendants,
including claims for costs and attorney's fees, and attorney's duty to inform court was not altered by fact that judge
before whom motion was filed was same one who had presided over settlement conferences. Blackwell v Department
of Offender Rehabilitation (1987, CA11 Ga) 807 F2d 914, 6 FR Serv 3d 1309.
Where evidence showed that defendant agreed to settlement, she was properly subjected to sanctions for filing appeal
alleging that she had not assented to judgment below, where her position was supported only by her own testimony on
her state of mind and was overwhelmingly contradicted by evidence of her conduct during settlement process,
particularly since defendant has taken conflicting positions during course of this proceeding, with results that issues
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were clouded and time of opposing counsel was needlessly consumed. Ahern v Central Pacific Freight Lines (1988,
CA9 Or) 846 F2d 47.
Shareholder derivative action plaintiff's attorneys will be sanctioned for violating FRCP 11(b)(1), where they admit
principal reason for filing summary judgment motion against individual directors was to protect corporation's "vital
rights" in proposed settlement, because desire to bring issues in class action settlement to court's attention is objectively
"improper" use of motion for summary judgment. In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig. (2000, DC NJ) 96 F
Supp 2d 403.
Alleged copyright infringer's conduct was not vexatious under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 where it had attempted, from early
stages of litigation, to resolve dispute without further burdening parties or Court, making several settlement offers, and
only when settlement did not appear possible did alleged infringer seek discovery. Baker v Urban Outfitters, Inc. (2003,
SD NY) 254 F Supp 2d 346, 60 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1606.
189. Multiplication of litigation
Attorney who filed motion to reconsider which totally lacked any evidence that court failed to consider material fact
presented to it has unnecessarily and unreasonably multiplied litigation and is guilty of violation of Rule 11. Unioil,
Inc. v E.F. Hutton & Co. (1986, CA9 Cal) 809 F2d 548, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67608, cert den (1987) 484 US
822, 98 L Ed 2d 45, 108 S Ct 83 and cert den (1987) 484 US 823, 98 L Ed 2d 47, 108 S Ct 85.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on plaintiff where court found that plaintiffs
unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied proceedings by serving additional defendant, even though plaintiffs must have
been aware that defendant would move to dismiss litigation due to untimely service of process and that motion would be
granted, as similar motions of other defendants had been. Ordower v Feldman (1987, CA7 Ill) 826 F2d 1569, 8 FR
Serv 3d 1005.
Where plaintiffs brought second motion to compel arbitration after filing appeal from denial of first motion, and
second motion was based on same underlying dispute as first motion, obvious jurisdictional barrier, duplicitous nature
of second motion, and plaintiffs' lack of candor before court justify imposition of sanctions. Pipe Trades Council, U.A.
Local 159 v Underground Contrs. Ass'n (1987, CA9 Cal) 835 F2d 1275, 127 BNA LRRM 2327, 10 FR Serv 3d 376,
amd, reh, en banc, den (1988, CA9) 1988 US App LEXIS 19508.
Sanctions were properly imposed on union which filed petition for order to compel compliance with arbitration
procedures and which, while unfavorable decision was being appealed, filed second motion for relief on petition in
transparent attempt to relitigate issue, although trial court no longer had jurisdiction over subject matter. Pipe Trades
Council, U.A. Local 159 v Underground Contrs. Ass'n (1987, CA9 Cal) 835 F2d 1275, 127 BNA LRRM 2327, 10 FR
Serv 3d 376, amd, reh, en banc, den (1988, CA9) 1988 US App LEXIS 19508.
Where defendant unnecessarily delayed and multiplied proceedings by filing contrived third party complaint in
which it sought to establish sufficient contacts with another state to induce District Court to transfer, sanctions were
properly imposed. Stewart v American International Oil & Gas Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 845 F2d 196, 10 FR Serv 3d
1119, 100 OGR 260.
Where action between same parties and based on same claims was pending in another jurisdiction, plaintiff's
attorneys should have known that filing present action was not justified by existing law and that it unnecessarily
multiplied proceedings, and accordingly, sanctions were appropriate under Rule 11. Bolivar v Pocklington (1992, CA1
Puerto Rico) 975 F2d 28, 23 FR Serv 3d 723.
Related action pending in state court was no bar to federal action and did not constitute evidence that plaintiffs had
filed "duplicative" action to harass defendants, and consequently district court abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11
sanctions based on improper motive. Barrett v Tallon (1994, CA10 Okla) 30 F3d 1296, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P
8607, 29 FR Serv 3d 1543.
Where attorney continued to maintain her case in federal court long after she realized that it had no merit, district
court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions based on her vexatious multiplication of proceedings, calculated from date on
which she admittedly determined that her case was unwinnable. Edwards v GMC (1998, CA5 Tex) 153 F3d 242, 74
CCH EPD P 45568, 41 FR Serv 3d 1073.
Plaintiff's attempt to invoke jurisdiction of District Court by action in replevin constitutes grounds for sanctions
under Rule 11, where action is no more than duplication of proceedings pending before General Services Board of
Contract Appeals and claim needlessly expands scope of litigation. Sealtite Corp. v General Services Admin. (1985,
DC Colo) 614 F Supp 352.
Plaintiff who had previously litigated issues in present suit and who had been ordered by court not to file another suit
concerning same issues but who nevertheless filed such a frivolous complaint has acted in bad faith and has
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
unnecessarily multiplied proceedings, thereby violating both letter and spirit of Rule 11, and therefore sanctions are
appropriate. Ginther v Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. (1986, SD Tex) 111 FRD 615, 4 FR Serv 3d 1356.
Taxpayer who filed petition to quash summons issued by Internal Revenue Service to bank as third-party
recordkeeper to obtain testimony and examine books, papers, and other records of taxpayer is ordered to appear and
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on him under Rule 11, where face of complaint shows that taxpayer
not only failed to make reasonable inquiry into whether he had good cause of action before filing suit, but also
deliberately sought to harass and cause needless litigation. White v United States (1986, ED NC) 629 F Supp 992, 86-2
USTC P 9653, 58 AFTR 2d 5345.
Sanctions will be imposed on defendants' counsel who, at request of his clients, filed motion which needlessly
increased costs of litigation by seeking to impose sanctions on plaintiff's attorney for delaying depositions when he was
called out of town on emergency. Williams v General Motors Corp. (1993, MD Ga) 158 FRD 510, 66 BNA FEP Cas
578.
190. Miscellaneous
District Court erred in assessing sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney under Rule 11 based on finding that plaintiffs'
attorney filed defamation action in bad faith where court made erroneous findings that plaintiffs should have had
knowledge of actual statements made by defendants before filing complaint, that plaintiffs' attorney had improper
purpose of silencing defendants, who were expert witnesses in another case, and obtaining discovery advantage in that
case, and that attorneys should have recognized that defendants' statements were not fact but nonactionable opinion,
since plaintiffs' knowledge of defendants' actual statements was irrelevant to their action, the evidence did not support
finding of improper purpose, and good faith argument could be made that defendants' statements should not be
constitutionally protected. In re Yagman (1986, CA9 Cal) 796 F2d 1165, 13 Media L R 1545, 5 FR Serv 3d 305, reh
den, amd (1986, CA9 Cal) 803 F2d 1085, 5 FR Serv 3d 1443.
Sanctions are appropriate where attorney made no good faith argument for reversal of law which was contrary to his
position and action appeared to have been filed in speculative effort to find someone financially liable before statute of
limitations expired. Cabell v Petty (1987, CA4 Va) 810 F2d 463, 6 FR Serv 3d 1078.
Because defendant's argument supporting removal petition is not frivolous, and because there is no support in record
for independent finding of improper purpose, it cannot be said that petition was filed for improper purpose in violation
of rule, and therefore, whether or not petition for removal was justified as matter of law, decision of district court
awarding sanctions against defendant and its attorney must be reversed. Lemos v Fencl (1987, CA9 Cal) 828 F2d 616,
9 FR Serv 3d 197.
In action involving automobile insurance policies, where plaintiffs at considerable expense deposed witnesses on
ownership issues, and on morning of trial one of defendant insurance companies informed plaintiffs that it intended to
drop ownership arguments and base its case on automatic termination issue, District Court properly found that insurance
company acted reasonably under circumstances and refused to award attorneys' fees to plaintiffs. Rossman v State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1987, CA4 Va) 832 F2d 282 (criticized in OMI Holdings v Royal Ins. Co. of Can. (1998,
CA10 Kan) 149 F3d 1086, 1998 Colo J C A R 3573).
Where plaintiff filed 110-page brief in support of his motion for partial summary judgment, and with this brief filed
what District Court described as "1,200 page, unindexed, unnumbered, foot-high pile of material" which court was
unable to fathom and which was determined to be conscious and wanton affront to judicial process, to court, and to
opposing counsel, and where plaintiff in response to defendants' motion to dismiss relied in part upon federal rule of
evidence that had not been adopted, District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff had violated
rule. Willy v Coastal Corp. (1988, CA5 Tex) 855 F2d 1160, 4 BNA IER Cas 819, 12 FR Serv 3d 305.
Although they were purportedly appeals of magistrate's order, attorneys' papers which ran hundreds of pages and
included in appendices arguments which should have been included in body of briefs were in fact frivolous attacks upon
magistrate and opposing counsel, and consequently, such papers violated Rule 11. Magnus Elecs., Inc. v Masco Corp.
(1989, CA7 Ill) 871 F2d 626, 13 FR Serv 3d 778, cert den (1989) 493 US 891, 107 L Ed 2d 188, 110 S Ct 237.
Counsel's repeated requests for evidentiary hearing on allegedly disparaging comments made by opposing counsel in
elevator violated Rule 11 since purpose of rule is to discourage groundless, irrelevant proceedings. Magnus Elecs., Inc.
v Masco Corp. (1989, CA7 Ill) 871 F2d 626, 13 FR Serv 3d 778, cert den (1989) 493 US 891, 107 L Ed 2d 188, 110 S
Ct 237.
Fact that plaintiff's complaint was vague and conclusory does not justify sanctions under Rule 11 because of
plaintiff's counsel's blatant disregard of local rules of court and his "lackadaisical" attitude in failing to respond to
defendants' motion for award of attorney fees. Simpson v Welch (1990, CA4 Va) 900 F2d 33, 52 BNA FEP Cas 882,
53 CCH EPD P 39800, 16 FR Serv 3d 695.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District Court plainly had grounds for imposing sanctions on plaintiff where court found that plaintiff offered no
factual information to support claim and that plaintiff had brought action for two improper purposes. Danvers v
Danvers (1992, CA6 Ohio) 959 F2d 601, 22 FR Serv 3d 47, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA6) 1992 US App LEXIS 11640.
Where client had not signed original document, and attorney filed copy attempting to persuade court that original had
been signed, attorney violated Rule 11 in filing document for improper purpose. American Airlines, Inc. v Allied Pilots
Ass'n (1992, CA5 Tex) 968 F2d 523, 23 FR Serv 3d 847, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA5 Tex) 977 F2d 576.
Nonfrivolous complaint which was filed in part to exert pressure on defendants was not filed for improper purpose,
and pre-filing letter threatening lawsuit and warning of adverse consequences to defendants does not reflect improper
purpose. Sussman by & Through Guilden v Bank of Isr. (1995, CA2 NY) 56 F3d 450, 32 FR Serv 3d 978, cert den
(1995) 516 US 916, 133 L Ed 2d 210, 116 S Ct 305.
Where action containing both state and federal claims was removed to federal court, plaintiffs did nothing
"reprehensible" and therefore did not violate Rule 11 by dropping federal claims and defendants involved with them
solely in order to obtain remand to state court. Baddie v Berkeley Farms (1995, CA9 Cal) 64 F3d 487, 95 CDOS 6643,
95 Daily Journal DAR 11417, 150 BNA LRRM 2164, 130 CCH LC P 11408.
Where district court allowed plaintiff to file supplementary complaint with express proviso that she seek no
compensatory or punitive damages, but plaintiff, in direct contravention of court's order, filed complaint which sought
such damages, complaint was filed for improper purpose in violation of Rule 11, and both plaintiff and her attorney may
be subject to sanctions. Morley v Ciba-Geigy Corp. (1995, CA2 NY) 66 F3d 21, 68 BNA FEP Cas 1624, 33 FR Serv 3d
573.
Where both parties filed motions for sanctions against opposing party, both motions were denied, since both parties
had contributed to disharmony in proceedings. Walker v City of Bogalusa (1999, CA5 La) 168 F3d 237, 43 FR Serv 3d
61.
Where district court found that plaintiff bank had proceeded to litigate in bad faith and awarded insurer sanctions
under its inherent power, ample evidence supported district court's exercise of its inherent authority to award attorneys
fees; FRCP 11, rather than Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.51, governed award of sanctions for frivolous conduct, since Ohio
statute was procedural in nature, but FRCP 11 sanctions were not available, since defendant insurer had failed to notify
bank with "safe harbor" letter. First Bank of Marietta v Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2002, CA6 Ohio) 307 F3d 501,
2002 FED App 356P.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing severe monetary sanctions on defendant as result of defense
counsel's misrepresentations to court which followed lengthy series of misdeeds involving willful misconduct and bad
faith shown by persistent pattern of abuse and callous disregard of court orders. Perkinson v Gilbert/Robinson, Inc.
(1987, App DC) 261 US App DC 198, 821 F2d 686, 8 FR Serv 3d 383.
There is sufficient evidence to impose sanctions against plaintiff's attorney for acts and conduct that transgress both
Rule 11 and 28 USCS § 1927, where he repeatedly failed to attend sessions on time, he failed to adhere to stipulations,
he made frivolous motions seeking reargument of decided motions, and he sought to avoid determination of merits of
pending motions made by opposing parties. Tedeschi v Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. (1984, SD NY) 579 F Supp
657, 38 FR Serv 2d 1081, affd (1985, CA2 NY) 757 F2d 465, cert den (1985) 474 US 850, 88 L Ed 2d 122, 106 S Ct
147.
Rule 11 sanctions will not be assessed against plaintiff's counsel on basis of motion to strike offer of judgment,
notwithstanding that defendants had orally clarified terms of ambiguous written offer prior to motion, where plaintiff
was not motivated by improper purpose in prosecuting motion but sought to correct written record of case to avoid
future confusion in assignment of fees and costs. Boorstein v New York (1985, SD NY) 107 FRD 31, 3 FR Serv 3d 29
(criticized in Williams v Greifinger (1999, SD NY) 1999 US Dist LEXIS 5785).
Defendant's counsel is subject to sanctions under Rule 11 on basis of defendant's opposition to plaintiffs' motion for
relief from stipulation of confidentiality to enable plaintiff to disclose certain deposition to Securities and Exchange
Commission, where defendant's counsel had himself turned over deposition in question to SEC on date prior to filing
opposition to disclosure motion. Sharjah Inv. Co. v P.C. Telemart, Inc. (1985, SD NY) 108 FRD 90, CCH Fed Secur L
Rep P 92413.
Where plaintiff voluntarily agreed to dismiss lawsuit against defendants but then pursued suit and filed motion for
entry of default judgment, such actions showed that plaintiff acted with improper purpose, and sanctions would be
imposed. Gas Reclamation, Inc. v Jones (1985, SD Tex) 113 FRD 1.
Pursuant to Rule 11, defendant is entitled to fees incurred in defense of plaintiff's copyright infringement claims
where (1) when complaint was filed, plaintiff knew that allegations of sweeping ownership in fictional character were
unsupported by rights plaintiff actually possessed, (2) plaintiff used lawsuit as part of larger effort to acquire some
portion of profits derived from distribution of video game, and (3) plaintiff viewed corporate litigation as "profit
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
center", and known insufficiency of claims asserted did not inhibit use of litigation where opportunity for profitable
settlement existed. Universal City Studios, Inc. v Nintendo Co. (1985, SD NY) 615 F Supp 838, 227 USPQ 96, affd
(1986, CA2 NY) 797 F2d 70, 230 USPQ 409, cert den (1986) 479 US 987, 93 L Ed 2d 581, 107 S Ct 578.
Defendant city officials' motion for attorneys' fees and costs under Rule 11 is properly denied, notwithstanding that
plaintiff's civil action against them under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is subject to dismissal
due to plaintiff's lack of standing, and notwithstanding officials' contention that suit was instituted solely to embarrass
defendants and to gain publicity to further plaintiff's political ambitions, where District Court has not addressed merits
of plaintiff's claim, but deems it arguable that proper plaintiff may successfully bring RICO action against defendant
officials, and where, although plaintiff did conduct news conference after filing complaint, he was quoted as saying that
any recovery would inure to city, and his intent is thus unclear. Flaherty v Torquato (1985, WD Pa) 623 F Supp 55,
affd without op (1986, CA3 Pa) 800 F2d 1133.
Where pro se plaintiff filed frivolous action against IRS alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights,
sanctions under Rule 11 to reimburse government for cost of defending against frivolous suit and to deter future
frivolous actions were permissible, but where plaintiff did not act maliciously but was only using court as forum for his
political and religious views, additional sanctions to punish plaintiff would not be proper, even though punishment is
acceptable purpose of Rule 11. Auen v Sweeney (1986, ND NY) 109 FRD 678.
In employment discrimination suit, where defendant's attorney tendered offer of judgment that did not provide for
payment of attorney's fees, District Court refused to assess sanctions under Rule 11, stating that exclusion of attorney's
fees in defendant's offer did not demonstrate bad faith or improper purpose, and that error was understandable in light of
particular posture of case and recent unsettling activity in decisional law. Bentley v Bolger (1986, CD Ill) 110 FRD
108, 44 BNA FEP Cas 619, 4 FR Serv 3d 445.
Attorney who filed suit against magistrate who had recommended that attorney be removed as counsel in class
action, which suit was apparently filed so that magistrate must recuse himself from class action, failed to make
reasonable inquiry into factual and legal background of suit before filing and acted in bad faith in abusing judicial
process to obtain result to which he was not entitled, and therefore request for imposition of sanctions was granted.
Affeldt v Carr (1986, ND Ohio) 111 FRD 337, affd without op (1987, CA6 Ohio) 827 F2d 769, cert den (1988) 484 US
1067, 98 L Ed 2d 996, 108 S Ct 1032.
In case involving partition of property, sanctions will be imposed on parties who transferred portion of property in
effort to hinder partition and who did not inform court about transfer. Blocker v Oil & Marine Corp. (1986, ED La)
113 FRD 55.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff, attorney acting pro se, where he has persistently and single-mindedly used his
suit for tax refund to wage personal attack against every attorney who has represented defendant government in this
action, against every judge who has ruled against him, and against every clerk or paralegal or representative with whom
he has had contact, and where adjudication of suit has consumed resources completely disproportionate to its merits,
and where plaintiff has been warned repeatedly that his actions would subject him to sanctions at conclusion of case but
has been undeterred by warnings and previous imposition of sanctions Lapin v United States (1987, DC Hawaii) 118
FRD 632, 10 FR Serv 3d 492.
Purchaser of seller's assets and right to corporate name is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions despite seller's assertion
that purchaser allegedly filed RICO cross-claim in order to gain leverage in arbitration proceeding, to obtain additional
discovery, and without reasonable investigation into facts supporting personal jurisdiction over individual defendants,
where (1) there is substantial authority that RICO claims are not arbitrable, (2) RICO action is distinct legal claim and
purchaser is entitled to discovery, and (3) there is colorable ground for exercise of personal jurisdiction on RICO claim.
J.D. Marshall International, Inc. v Redstart, Inc. (1987, ND Ill) 656 F Supp 830.
Rule 11 sanctions are imposed upon counsel for defendants who opposed plaintiff's motion to remand civil rights
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where (1) defendants' assertion that mere filing of charge with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is not jurisdictional prerequisite to filing Title VII (42 USCS § §
2000e et seq.) action in federal court is legally unreasonable and lacking in factual support, (2) counsel's reliance on
clearly erroneous interpretation of case law does not meet requisite good faith standard for extension of law, and (3)
there is strong inference of improper purpose behind pleading, given counsel's experience in labor and employment law.
Worrell v Uniforms to You & Co. (1987, ND Cal) 673 F Supp 1461, 45 BNA FEP Cas 1535, 45 CCH EPD P 37809.
Sanctions are imposed on corporation and its president where president knew before case was filed in federal court
that it was time-barred, where president attempted to represent corporation himself although law required corporation to
be represented by counsel, and where president filed voluminous papers and indulged in repeated personal attacks on
opposing party and its counsel. Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v Nordstrom, Inc. (1988, SD NY) 123 FRD 435.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Where plaintiffs' counsel never intended to litigate action which was filed to get publicity, to embarrass state and
county officials, to use as leverage in criminal proceedings, to obtain discovery for use in criminal proceedings, and to
intimidate those involved in prosecution of plaintiffs, these purposes are improper and warrant sanctions. Robeson
Defense Committee v Britt (1989, ED NC) 132 FRD 650, affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded
(1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990,
CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
Borrowers' motion for sanctions pursuant to FRCP 11 is denied, where motion questions 2 arguments made on
behalf of bank president accused of illegal lending activities, because, although defenses were frivolous, record is
devoid of evidence that attorney raised arguments in bad faith or for improper purpose. Kovian v Fulton County Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. (1994, ND NY) 857 F Supp 1032.
Monetary sanctions are imposed pursuant to FRCP 11 against attorney who filed complaint against 22 defendants
which was dismissed on grounds that it was frivolous and without merit and was filed with intent to harass and punish
perceived enemies and opposing litigants, because (1) litigation began in 1978 over nonpayment of check for $ 1,500
and escalated into baseless crusade to expose corruption in government, and (2) attorney's reply to motion for sanctions
contained same baseless and vindictive vituperations typical of prior pleadings. Ortman v Thomas (1995, ED Mich) 906
F Supp 416, 34 FR Serv 3d 78, affd, mod on other grounds (1996, CA6 Mich) 99 F3d 807, 1996 FED App 353P.
Sanctions will be imposed on plaintiff's attorney for continuing to pursue claims of false imprisonment, abuse of
process, and negligent investigation which plainly lacked legal or factual basis, but not for "improper purpose," because
attorney has behaved in dilatory manner with regard to litigation schedule ever since case was removed and his filings
have lacked even flimsy legal and factual support, but it is clear that his underlying purpose has been to vindicate his
client's rights in court. Coates v UPS (1996, DC Md) 933 F Supp 497, 35 FR Serv 3d 699, affd (1997, CA4 Md) 129
F3d 116, reported in full (1997, CA4 Md) 1997 US App LEXIS 30346.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 USCS § § 1601 et seq.) plaintiff and his attorney are jointly and severally
liable for sanctions totaling $ 6,250, where there is no evidence that plaintiff in fact suffered mental or emotional
distress and nothing to support claim of punitive damages, because plaintiff and his attorney from outset engaged in
joint effort to convert simple debt collection action into full-fledged assault against defendant and his status as
lawyer/debt collector. Terran v Kaplan (1997, DC Ariz) 989 F Supp 1025.
Sanctions against counsel for barge are unwarranted under FRCP 11(a), even though counsel's multiple use of term
extortion in its opposition to summary judgment was improper hyperbole, unwelcome in legal memoranda, where
counsel argues it was using term to mean only "exorbitant charges" and not to convey sense of illegality, because court
finds that improper characterization of ship repairer's behavior, under totality of circumstances, does not amount to
frivolous legal argument as required to impose Rule 11 sanctions. May Ship Repair Contr. Corp. v Barge Columbia
N.Y. (2001, SD NY) 160 F Supp 2d 594.
Defendants' motion for sanctions was denied where, despite their bald accusations that plaintiffs' ultimate goal in
filing lawsuit was to push existing low-income housing out of their community, defendants failed to present any
evidence of improper motive. Neighborhood Research Inst. v Campus Ptnrs. for Cmty. Urban Dev. (2002, SD Ohio)
212 FRD 374.
Where plaintiff's prefiling inquiry revealed evidence which tended to exculpate defendant in question, and further
discovery failed to uncover any evidence to refute initial findings that exculpated defendant, claim was not well
grounded in fact and was filed for improper purposes, and therefore sanctions will be imposed. Balfour Guthrie, Inc. v
Hunter Marine Transport, Inc. (1987, MD Tenn) 118 FRD 66, 9 FR Serv 3d 1256.
2. Harassment, Intimidation and Coercion
191. Baseless claim or motion
District court's order imposing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against manufacturers was reversed, where manufacturers
filed 19 motions in limine in nine days before trial, and although their conduct violated spirit of district court's reminder
for them to file such motions in time for district court to rule on them, their actions were not akin to contempt;
manufacturers' motion in limine, seeking to exclude any mention of Germany's World War II conduct, since
manufacturers were German companies, may have been overkill, but it did not meet contempt-of-court standard; and
there was material variance between district court's oral Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B) notice, which localized district
court's complaint to World War II motion, and sanction imposed, which encompassed other in limine motions. Kaplan v
DaimlerChrysler (2003, CA11 Fla) 331 F3d 1251, 16 FLW Fed C 670.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
In domain-name registrant's suit against trademark owners seeking to demonstrate lawful use of domain name,
district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against trademark owners for improper purpose. Storey v Cello
Holdings, L.L.C. (2003, CA2 NY) 347 F3d 370, 68 USPQ2d 1641.
Sanctions are imposed against group of chiropractors who brought action against hospitals for alleged refusal to
grant staff privileges where chiropractors did not individually request privileges through normal channels, where they
were not individually denied privileges, where only effort to obtain privileges was demand letter from counsel for group
for privileges for all chiropractors as alternative to lawsuit, where demand was made without regard to individual
qualifications or hospitals' legitimate business interests and where purpose of suit was to coerce rather than raise
legitimate controversy because Rule 11 imposes affirmative duty on counsel to make reasonable inquiry into facts and
law and not to interpose pleadings for improper purposes, and reasonable inquiry would have shown request for
privileges through channels and denial thereof was prerequisite to action notwithstanding subjective belief that denial
would have been made regardless, and court has affirmative duty under Rule 11 to impose sanctions for baseless
litigation. Colorado Chiropractic Council v Porter Memorial Hospital (1986, DC Colo) 650 F Supp 231, 1986-2 CCH
Trade Cases P 67215.
Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate against owner of industrial and hazardous waste hauling, storage and disposal
company that had knowledge from prior unsuccessful suit that § 1983 claim was unwarranted, given existing law, but
proceeded pro se in order to harass defendants, public officials, attorneys and competing company that interfered with
operation of business. Fiore v Thornburgh (1987, WD Pa) 658 F Supp 161, 7 FR Serv 3d 946, affd without op (1987,
CA3 Pa) 833 F2d 304.
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff employer for allegedly filing baseless complaint are not warranted, where
employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) employer counsel's inquiry into facts, relying heavily
on her client and its agents, was not unreasonable, (2) inquiry into law resulted in taking of position that was plausible
and accepted by court, (3) employer's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation,
but was in legitimate pursuit of its perceived rights, and (4) employer complied with reevaluation obligation by agreeing
that employee discharge issue was arbitrable. Marshall Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660 F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Where plaintiff's attorney filed meritless application for recusal and disqualification of judge, but cited no statutes or
cases in support of his position, and much of affidavits filed with motion were immaterial, speculative, and threatening,
since no reasonable attorney could come to conclusion that court was biased against either him or his client, true
purpose of filing motions must have been to delay and to harass. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v Federal Reserve Bank
(1990, WD NY) 129 FRD 462, affd without op (1990, CA2 NY) 923 F2d 843, cert den (1991) 500 US 942, 114 L Ed 2d
480, 111 S Ct 2238.
Where claims were unwarranted and without foundation and were apparently filed simply to harass defendants, and
plaintiffs' attorney had been specifically warned with regard to prosecution of claims foreclosed by absolute immunity
and had been admonished concerning Rule 11, his failure to heed those warnings and his persistence in filing claims
must be sanctioned. Jennings v Emry (1990, ND Ind) 133 FRD 134.
Plaintiff's failure to present any evidence at trial to support allegations in complaint was proof that plaintiff's attorney
did not undertake proper investigation before filing complaint and that complaint was filed as "preemptive strike" to
delay foreclosure action later filed by defendants and was intended to harass or annoy defendants. Project 74
Allentown, Inc. v Frost (1992, ED Pa) 143 FRD 77, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8176, 24 FR Serv 3d 489, affd
without op (1993, CA3 Pa) 998 F2d 1004.
Trustee sons are entitled to FRCP 11 sanctions against father's attorney, where father sought to have sons removed as
pension trustees for family business, sons counterclaimed against father and attorney, and then attorney sought to block
settlement of matter, going so far as to assert RICO and abuse-of-process claims against sons, because these claims
grew out of nothing more than glorified discovery dispute, had no reasonable basis, and were interposed for improper
purposes of harassing sons and perpetuating acrimony of situation. Leogrande v Leogrande (1992, ED NY) 799 F Supp
1354, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8240.
Cybersquatting claimant's unwarranted factual assertions and unreasonable legal arguments to harass and wear down
defendant warranted award of attorney's fees and costs to defendant under FRCP 11. Storey v Cello Holdings, L.L.C.
(2002, SD NY) 182 F Supp 2d 355.
Motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, filed by defendant city and officials, was denied (1) due to
defendants' failure to serve motion on plaintiff employee first, in order to give employee chance to withdraw any
frivolous action, and (2) because there was no factual or legal basis for motion. Hennessy v City of Long Beach (2003,
ED NY) 258 F Supp 2d 200.
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Sanctions were imposed upon plaintiff's attorney pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) for filing pleading for improper
purposes based on conclusion that both plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, who were dissatisfied with rulings of state
court, sought intervention of federal court for purposes of delaying or obstructing contempt hearing, disqualifying state
court judge and circumventing restrictions contained in final divorce decree. Jordaan v Hall (2003, ND Tex) 275 F Supp
2d 778.
192. Inconvenient forum
Filing in inconvenient but proper forum is not legitimate ground for Rule 11 sanctions unless choice was made for
improper purpose such as harassment. Newton v Thomason (1994, CA9 Cal) 22 F3d 1455, 94 CDOS 2977, 94 Daily
Journal DAR 5690, 22 Media L R 1609, 30 USPQ2d 1633, 28 FR Serv 3d 1039.
Civil RICO plaintiffs, whose claims against entire court system of county in West Virginia have been repeatedly
rejected, who have sought a new forum after each rejection, and whose latest forum choice of California is result of
desire to inconvenience defendants, have filed papers for improper purpose of harassing defendants and are subject to
Rule 11 sanctions. Damiani v Adams (1987, SD Cal) 657 F Supp 1409.
193. Number of witnesses
Defendant's pretrial statement listing 200 witnesses to testify to essentially same thing was objectively unreasonable
and vexatious, regardless of defense counsel's motives, and thus sanction of $ 250 will be imposed on counsel
personally. Derechin v State University of New York (1991, WD NY) 138 FRD 362, affd (1992, CA2 NY) 963 F2d
513, 58 CCH EPD P 41457, 22 FR Serv 3d 685.
194. Prayer for relief; damages
Sanction may be imposed based on prayer for relief where amendment of damages claimed is excessive and
unexplained and appears to have been made frivolously and for purpose of harassment. Hudson v Moore Business
Forms, Inc. (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA FEP Cas 898.
Pursuant to Rule 11, sanctions in amount equivalent to all of plaintiff's costs in responding to counterclaim and in
moving for sanctions are properly imposed jointly and severally against defendants' law firm and against individual
attorneys who signed original counterclaim, where it appears that counterclaim which sought some $ 4,000,000,000 in
punitive damages from plaintiff, an unemployed woman over 50 years of age whose husband is living on retirement,
was interposed to harass plaintiff and intimidate potential litigants from bringing wrongful discharge claims. Hudson v
Moore Business Forms (1985, ND Cal) 609 F Supp 467, 37 BNA FEP Cas 1672, 37 CCH EPD P 35285, 38 CCH EPD
P 35676, affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded (1987, CA9 Cal) 827 F2d 450, 44 BNA FEP Cas
1310, 2 BNA IER Cas 1049, 44 CCH EPD P 37335, 108 CCH LC P 55842, 8 FR Serv 3d 1200, reported at, amd (1987,
CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA FEP Cas 898.
195. Successive complaints or other filings
Claim of harassment under Rule 11 on basis of successful filings in other actions requires identity of parties involved
in success of claim and clear indication that proposition urged in repeat claim was resolved in earlier claim. Zaldivar v
Los Angeles (1986, CA9 Cal) 780 F2d 823, 4 FR Serv 3d 264 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v
Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Successive complaints based upon propositions of law previously rejected may constitute harassment under Rule 11,
but harassment under Rule 11 cannot be based on complaint which is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law. Zaldivar v Los Angeles (1986, CA9 Cal) 780 F2d 823, 4 FR Serv 3d 264 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Mars
Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Where action was fourth proceeding and second law suit brought in federal court arising out of same subject matter,
and plaintiff admitted that claim in question was based upon speculation and subsequently disavowed claim, and
attorney undertook no discovery to develop this claim, facts supported inference that litigation was meant to harass
opposing parties. St. Amant v Bernard (1988, CA5 La) 859 F2d 379, 48 BNA FEP Cas 510, 48 CCH EPD P 38426, 12
FR Serv 3d 1199.
Where plaintiff filed second motion to compel production of documents which largely duplicated its first motion to
compel which had been denied earlier with no motion for reconsideration being filed, and magistrate decided that
second motion was filed for purpose of harassing defendant, lower court did not err in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on
plaintiff. Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1992, CA9 Cal) 981 F2d 429, 92 CDOS 9768, 92
Daily Journal DAR 16315, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8160, 1992-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70068, 24 FR Serv 3d
485, cert den (1993) 508 US 908, 124 L Ed 2d 247, 113 S Ct 2336.
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Where plaintiffs' attorney filed second nearly identical action, relying on only slightly different legal theories, four
days after dismissal of earlier action, district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that attorney had
violated Rule 11 by interposing pleading which had no good faith basis in law for improper purpose of harassing
defendants. Knipe v Skinner (1994, CA2 NY) 19 F3d 72, 28 FR Serv 3d 557.
Where earlier action involving same parties had been dismissed and unsuccessfully appealed, plaintiff's counsel
violated Rule 11 when he filed second action based on same set of facts and attempted to relitigate many of same issues
for apparent purpose of harassing FAA. Knipe v United States (1993, ND NY) 151 FRD 24, remanded (1994, CA2
NY) 19 F3d 72, 28 FR Serv 3d 557.
Defendant, dismissed from civil case due to lack of personal jurisdiction, is denied sanctions pursuant to FRCP 11,
despite fact that pro se plaintiff had previously filed essentially same claim against defendant in state court action,
because state court had dismissed action before plaintiff's filing in this court, and plaintiff's actions overall have been
inconsistent with conclusion that plaintiff brought multiple suits against defendant solely to harass her with duplicative
litigation. Jarmuth v Turetsky (1993, DC Dist Col) 815 F Supp 5, 26 FR Serv 3d 289.
Sanctions are imposed against plaintiffs who filed civil rights action arising out of township's denial of site plan
approval, where action was premised upon facts and theories previously dismissed on merits by both federal and state
courts on 5 occasions, because sanctions under FRCP 11 are appropriate in light of repeated failure by plaintiffs to
articulate viable claim against defendants or to comply with court's directive to amend their complaint. Kratage v
Charter Twp. of Commerce (1996, ED Mich) 926 F Supp 102.
Plaintiff's counsel is sanctioned $ 3,000, where present case is third he has brought in this court on behalf of this
plaintiff and against essentially same defendants, because, with one exception, points raised in postjudgment motions
have no discernable legal or factual relationship to reason why case was dismissed--his failure to follow magistrate
judge's discovery orders--and points can only have been presented to harass in violation of FRCP 11(b)(1) and (2). Jean
v Dugan (1998, ND Ind) 29 F Supp 2d 939, 43 FR Serv 3d 336.
196. Miscellaneous
District Court properly imposed sanction of attorney's fee in amount of $ 1,000 to be paid by plaintiff's lawyer to
state Attorney General who was providing legal representation for defendant state judge, where plaintiff brought civil
rights action against judge on basis of order, entered in contested divorce proceeding, awarding temporary custody of
children to state agency, since there was no legal basis for informed belief that judge was subject to claim for damages,
and since there was basis for District Court's finding that action was filed for improper purpose of attempt to compel
state judge to recuse himself. Chu v Griffith (1985, CA4 Va) 771 F2d 79.
Although pro se plaintiff's motion to vacate prior dismissal of his case was time-barred, sanctions are inappropriate
where there is nothing in record to indicate that plaintiff knew or should have known that his motion was time-barred
and nothing in record indicates that plaintiff proceeded in bad faith or from desire to harass defendants. Maduakolam v
Columbia University (1989, CA2 NY) 866 F2d 53, 12 FR Serv 3d 1271.
Where plaintiff attorney used information gained during his former attorney-client relationship with defendants to
bring suit against them, such bad faith qualified as improper purpose under rule, and since complaint was part of
harassing technique aimed at exacting revenge on those plaintiff felt had cheated him in some way, imposition of Rule
11 sanctions was justified. Weisman v Alleco, Inc. (1991, CA4 Md) 925 F2d 77.
District Court did not err in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff where there was testimony that plaintiff filed
lawsuit with deliberate intent to blackmail defendants into paying him off. Healey v Chelsea Resources, Ltd. (1991,
CA2 NY) 947 F2d 611, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96289, 21 FR Serv 3d 139.
Even if attorney had objectively reasonable belief that there was no stay in effect when attorney obtained writ of
execution for judgment against retailer, so that attorney's conduct did not violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), sanctions
were proper under Rule 11(b)(1) because attorney requested writ for improper purposes of embarrassing retailer and
self-promotion; attorney's conduct in contacting media and making improper comments about retailer's willingness to
pay judgment constituted evidence of improper purpose. Whitehead v Food Max of Miss., Inc. (2003, CA5 Miss) 332
F3d 796, 55 FR Serv 3d 947, reh, en banc, den, motion den (2003, CA5 Miss) 2003 US App LEXIS 15383.
Attorney is properly subject to sanctions pursuant to 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for filing motion to disqualify opposition law firm, where attorney fails to make reasonable inquiry into
relevant facts in spite of receiving information contrary to assertions of motion, and where motion is interposed to
harass opposing counsel, to cause unnecessary delay, and to needlessly increase cost of litigation. Wold v Minerals
Engineering Co. (1983, DC Colo) 575 F Supp 166, 38 FR Serv 2d 598.
Because any reasonably competent lawyer would know that mass picketing interfering with free movement about
jobsite accompanied by some harsh words and minor mischief is neither Hobbs Act nor RICO violation, let alone
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
criminal conspiracy, plaintiff employee's effort to argue contrary exceeds limits of acceptable advocacy and violates
Rule 11; furthermore, employer's decision to commence this litigation, rather than to seek immediate injunctive relief in
state court, and to insist on discovery into highly sensitive and marginally relevant matters, such as identity of
committee's members and contributors, raises strong inference that employer's purpose was to harass committee,
presumably to disrupt or discourage its advocacy of hostile views. WSB Electric Co. v Rank & File Committee to Stop
2-Gate System (1984, ND Cal) 103 FRD 417, 117 BNA LRRM 2994, 40 FR Serv 2d 568.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff who brought civil rights action based on assertions that federal reserve notes are not
legal tender and that he was denied asserted right to jury trial in mortgage foreclosure action is properly ordered to pay
each of 3 defendants $ 750 in attorneys' fees and also to pay fine of $ 500 to Clerk of Court, since plaintiff's insistence
on litigating question in face of controlling precedent amounts to bad faith, his failure to discover overwhelming
precedent suggests lack of reasonable inquiry into law, and record is replete with motions and strange filings by plaintiff
that obfuscate issues presented and are suggestive of attempt to prolong suit and harass defendants. Nixon v Phillipoff
(1985, ND Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Taxpayer who filed petition to quash summons issued by Internal Revenue Service to bank as third-party
recordkeeper to obtain testimony and examine books, papers, and other records of taxpayer is ordered to appear and
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on him under Rule 11, where face of complaint shows that taxpayer
not only failed to make reasonable inquiry into whether he had good cause of action before filing suit, but also
deliberately sought to harass and cause needless litigation. White v United States (1986, ED NC) 629 F Supp 992, 86-2
USTC P 9653, 58 AFTR 2d 5345.
Attorney's fees, costs and sanctions are imposed on attorney and plaintiffs who filed claims under 42 USCS § 1983
against city, police officers and sheriff's department alleging harassment and illegal search of house in attempting to
serve arrest warrant where: (1) attorney, experienced in civil rights cases, made no investigation or reasonable inquiry
into facts, although he had 19 months in which to do so, (2) complaint, trial brief, supplemental complaint,
supplemental trial brief and final pretrial order all contain utterly false and unsubstantiated statements such as untruthful
allegations that person named in arrest warrant did not live in house when she in fact did, untruthful allegations that
police supervisor refused to assist householder and investigate or stop search of house when householder prevented
supervisor from speaking to officers conducting search, untruthful allegations of police threats of physical violence
when householder admitted police were extremely courteous while in his home, alleging class action based on other
illegal searches but offering "not a scintilla of proof" of such other searches at pretrial or trial, (3) plaintiffs and attorney
acted in bad faith with purpose to harass police department, and (4) overbroad complaint named unrelated defendants.
O'Rourke v Norman (1986, WD Okla) 640 F Supp 1451, revd on other grounds, vacated on other grounds, remanded
(1989, CA10 Okla) 875 F2d 1465, cert den (1989) 493 US 918, 107 L Ed 2d 260, 110 S Ct 280.
Letters sent by plaintiff's attorney to one of defendants, stating that defendant was not his "main target" and offering
to work out arrangement regarding defendant's testimony, although showing lack of good judgment on attorney's part,
do not necessitate imposition of sanctions since they do not prove that complaint was filed against this defendant for
improper purpose of coercing testimony against other defendants which would be helpful to plaintiff. Hall v Helms
(1987, WD NC) 118 FRD 51, 10 FR Serv 3d 171.
Rule 11 sanctions are not imposed on plaintiff in trademark infringement action, where (1) there was reasonable
basis to bring action since plaintiff was aware that defendant planned to market over-the-counter tablet similar to
plaintiff's in formula, dosage, and color, and (2) there is insufficient evidence to conclude plaintiff acted to harass
defendants or delay litigation. American Home Products Corp. v Barr Laboratories, Inc. (1987, DC NJ) 656 F Supp
1058, 3 USPQ2d 1194, affd (1987, CA3 NJ) 834 F2d 368, 5 USPQ2d 1073.
Rule 11 attorney fees and sanctions against defendant union for alleged contumacious conduct are not warranted,
where employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) union counsel, relying primarily on union for factual
support for claim, made reasonable inquiry into facts, (2) although unaccepted by court, position argued by union was
plausible view of law, (3) union's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation, but
was legitimate challenge to employer's acts, and (4) no facts were ever revealed suggesting union should have changed
its litigation position, so union did not fail to properly review and reevaluate its position as case developed. Marshall
Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660
F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Where plaintiffs' counsel never intended to litigate action which was filed to get publicity, to embarrass state and
county officials, to use as leverage in criminal proceedings, to obtain discovery for use in criminal proceedings, and to
intimidate those involved in prosecution of plaintiffs, these purposes are improper and warrant sanctions. Robeson
Defense Committee v Britt (1989, ED NC) 132 FRD 650, affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
(1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990,
CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
In action alleging RICO violations, where plaintiff's attorney admitted that it was not until after original complaint
was filed that he conducted factual inquiry allowing him to plead plaintiff's claims with sufficient particularity, and
where plaintiff apparently filed complaint at time calculated to gain publicity and to harass defendants, but then made
no attempt to serve defendants with complaint, Rule 11 has been violated. Bryant v Brooklyn Barbeque Corp. (1990,
WD Mo) 130 FRD 665, affd (1991, CA8 Mo) 932 F2d 697, 19 FR Serv 3d 1060, reh, en banc, den (1991, CA8) 1991
US App LEXIS 13200 and cert den (1991) 502 US 1005, 116 L Ed 2d 656, 112 S Ct 638.
Although defendant prevailed at trial, where court had twice ruled that plaintiff had presented legally sufficient
evidentiary basis upon which to put its claim to jury, plaintiff clearly did not violate Rule 11 by filing claim; however,
defendant's motion to impose sanctions on plaintiff itself violated Rule 11 since motion presented nothing new and
under circumstances conclusion was inescapable that motion was only intended to harass plaintiff and needlessly
increase cost of litigation. EEOC v Tandem Computers (1994, DC Mass) 158 FRD 224, 30 FR Serv 3d 1030.
Letter from plaintiff's firm to defendants, threatening to attempt to admit damaging evidence if case was not settled,
was insufficient to show that plaintiff's claims were brought with improper purpose, and, thus, did not warrant
imposition of sanctions under FRCP 11(b)(1). Koziol v Hanna (2000, ND NY) 107 F Supp 2d 170.
Abusive language toward opposing counsel, asserting that counsel is racist, is one form of harassment prohibited by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Pigford v Veneman (2003, DC Dist Col) 215 FRD 2, reconsideration den, motion to strike den (2003,
DC Dist Col) 216 FRD 1.
Even though plaintiff improperly filed declaratory action, there is no indication that it did so to harass, cause delay,
or increase cost of litigation, and additionally, action is being dismissed in court's discretion, and record does not
demonstrate that plaintiff failed to make good faith attempt to extend or modify existing law, so therefore, defendants'
Rule 11 motion will be denied. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Taylor (1988, MD NC) 118 FRD 426.
Under objective test, when plaintiffs and their counsel filed this wrongful employment termination action, it was
reasonable to believe that their pleading had merit in attempting to expand recently created exception to general rule,
and further, there is no evidence in record to substantiate defendant's charge that plaintiffs' sole purpose in filing action
was to harass defendant, and accordingly, defendant's motion for sanctions is denied. Gaiardo v Ethyl Corp. (1987,
MD Pa) 122 FRD 175, 2 BNA IER Cas 1586, 12 FR Serv 3d 1063, affd (1987, CA3 Pa) 835 F2d 479, 2 BNA IER Cas
1587, 108 CCH LC P 55851, 9 FR Serv 3d 1378, 95 ALR Fed 93.
Sanctions were not warranted against class action defendant under FRCP 11, where, in its reply brief in support of
summary judgment motion, defendant used strong language involving allegations of fact and allegations of possible
improper contact by counsel with possible opt-in plaintiffs, because case issues were hotly contested, counsel for both
sides held completely different legal and factual positions, and defendant's allegations had not been made in bad faith.
Hipp v Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (1997, MD Fla) 973 F Supp 1033, 11 FLW Fed D 123.
3. Unnecessary delay or expense
197. Baseless claim
Sanctions were properly imposed on defendant for asserting RICO counterclaim where reasonable prefiling
investigation was not made and where trial judge found counterclaim without merit and part of defensive strategy
designed to make cost of litigation so high that plaintiff would be forced to abandon fight. Chapman & Cole v Itel
Container Int'l B.V. (1989, CA5 Tex) 865 F2d 676, 13 FR Serv 3d 124, cert den (1989) 493 US 872, 107 L Ed 2d 155,
110 S Ct 201.
District court properly imposed monetary sanctions on defendant corporation's law firm for persisting in frivolous
defenses and counter claims and attempting to delay payment of corporation's debt to plaintiff investor; inter alia,
corporation's claims lacked specific allegation of any representation that was false or particular concealed fact, no
evidence of fraud was shown, and lack of quorum of directors was belied by corporation's minutes. MHC Inv. Co. v
Racom Corp. (2003, CA8 Iowa) 323 F3d 620.
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff employer for allegedly filing baseless complaint are not warranted, where
employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) employer counsel's inquiry into facts, relying heavily
on her client and its agents, was not unreasonable, (2) inquiry into law resulted in taking of position that was plausible
and accepted by court, (3) employer's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation,
but was in legitimate pursuit of its perceived rights, and (4) employer complied with reevaluation obligation by agreeing
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
that employee discharge issue was arbitrable. Marshall Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660 F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Where even most cursory research would have revealed that under facts here presented plaintiff had no private claim
for relief under statutes in question, inclusion of these claims for relief in complaint needlessly prolonged litigation and
substantially increased its cost, plaintiff and his attorney are jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees and costs
reasonably incurred by defendant in meeting these claims for relief. Shields v Shetler (1988, DC Colo) 120 FRD 123.
Disciplined cytotechnologist's attorney must pay $ 4,945 in attorney's fees incurred by employer in defense of
frivolous labor claims he adamantly pursued, despite adequate notice by employer's counsel that sanctions would be
sought absent withdrawal, because sanctions under FRCP 11 are justified to deter attorney's persistent prosecution of
claims without any reasonable basis in law. Truesdell v Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group (2001, CD Cal) 151 F
Supp 2d 1174.
Court chose to impose reprimand against plaintiffs for filing futile motion for reconsideration and warned parties,
and bar, that it would not be reluctant to impose monetary sanction in future cases. Miller v Norfolk S. Rwy. Co. (2002,
ND Ohio) 208 F Supp 2d 851.
Where plaintiffs admitted that they intentionally included causes of action in their complaint that they did not believe
had good faith basis in law, but which plaintiffs believed would give rise to judicial consideration of general
constitutional concerns, court ordered them to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for advancing legal causes
of action, which they apparently did not believe were warranted by existing law, and did not intend to defend by arguing
for extension of law or establishment of new law. City of Roseville v Norton (2002, DC Dist Col) 219 F Supp 2d 130.
As much of alleged offending behavior by defendant's counsel consisted of letters and other communications with
plaintiffs counsel, letters were not type of submission contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; similarly, representations
made by counsel in conferences, before court, even if inaccurate, were not subject to Rule 11 sanctions unless presented
in conjunction with offending filing; however, one submission by defendant's counsel violated Rule 11, specifically,
defense counsel's cross motion for Rule 11 sanctions was sanctionable. Nike, Inc. v Top Brand Co. Ltd. (2003, SD NY)
216 FRD 259.
198. Discovery
Where party conducted discovery in such manner that it caused unnecessary delays, unduly burdened witnesses, and
needlessly increased costs of litigation, attorneys' actions were not objectively reasonable under circumstances and
therefore merit sanctions. Chapman & Cole v Itel Container Int'l B.V. (1987, SD Tex) 116 FRD 550.
Sanctions were warranted under FRCP 11 against insurer's counsel in insured's suit against insurer for breach of
contract, where counsel withheld deposition errata sheet from insured for more than 7 months, which changed testimony
of witness from affirmative answer to negative one. Davidson Hotel Co. v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2001, WD
Tenn) 136 F Supp 2d 901, motion to strike gr, sanctions allowed (2001, WD Tenn) 136 F Supp 2d 901.
199. Excessively long brief
Where magistrate set 40 page limit on briefs which law firm exceeded by over 600 pages, and court found that briefs
were interposed for improper purpose of unnecessarily delaying litigation process, law firm is sanctioned $ 50,000, to
be paid exclusively by firm unless it can certify to court that its client forced it to violate magistrate's order. Glass v
IDS Fin. Servs., Inc. (1991, DC Minn) 137 FRD 262, 20 FR Serv 3d 984.
200. Misleading documents
Although plaintiff's attorney made submissions to court containing statements which were erroneous and evidently
calculated to mislead court, they were incidental to dispute and neither unduly prolonged litigation nor increased
defendant's cost of defending action, and though affront to court, statements are not actionable under Rule 11.
Televideo Systems, Inc. v Mayer (1991, SD NY) 139 FRD 42.
Sanctions will be imposed in attorneys who signed misleading documents intended to burden opposition and to
exhaust their resources and thus impair their ability to fully present their case. Harthman v Texaco, Inc. (In re Tutu
Wells Contamination Litig.) (1995, DC VI) 31 VI 250, 162 FRD 46, injunction gr (1995, DC VI) 885 F Supp 776, revd
without op, remanded (1995, CA3 VI) 74 F3d 1228.
201. Motion to disqualify opposition counsel
Where motion to disqualify defendant's co-counsel was filed two weeks before scheduled trial date and no
explanation was given for delay in investigating issue, late date on which motion was filed indicated attempt to interrupt
opposing counsel's trial preparation and to increase litigation costs, and thus motion was interposed for improper
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
purpose in violation of Rule 11. Harrison v Edison Bros. Apparel Stores (1998, CA4 NC) 151 F3d 176, 14 BNA IER
Cas 1149, 136 CCH LC P 58467, 41 FR Serv 3d 558.
Attorney is properly subject to sanctions pursuant to 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for filing motion to disqualify opposition law firm, where attorney fails to make reasonable inquiry into
relevant facts in spite of receiving information contrary to assertions of motion, and where motion is interposed to
harass opposing counsel, to cause unnecessary delay, and to needlessly increase cost of litigation. Wold v Minerals
Engineering Co. (1983, DC Colo) 575 F Supp 166, 38 FR Serv 2d 598.
Where plaintiff's attorney waited until 2 weeks before trial to file motion to disqualify one of defendant's attorneys,
although motion could have been filed more than year earlier, late date of filing indicates desire to interrupt trial and
increase costs, and consequently Rule 11 sanctions are imposed on plaintiff's attorney equal to defendant's costs
associated with defending motion. Harrison v Edison Bros. Apparel Stores (1993, MD NC) 146 FRD 142, 8 BNA IER
Cas 1067, 25 FR Serv 3d 111, subsequent app (1998, CA4 NC) 151 F3d 176, 14 BNA IER Cas 1149, 136 CCH LC P
58467, 41 FR Serv 3d 558.
202. Motion to vacate default
District Court properly refused to impose sanctions on defendants for delay in seeking to set aside default judgment
where defendants relied on attorney to pursue action and attorney had stated that "everything would be taken care of"
and that settlement was imminent. R. K. Harp Inv. Corp. v McQuade (1987, CA7 Ill) 825 F2d 1101, 8 FR Serv 3d 433.
Motion to vacate default judgment under Rule 60 extraordinary circumstances standard, which was denied, does not
warrant sanctions just because movant failed to justify excessive delay, since time limitation is not rigid but depends on
balancing in each case. Fustok v Conticommodity Services, Inc. (1988, SD NY) 122 FRD 151, affd (1989, CA2 NY)
873 F2d 38, 13 FR Serv 3d 632.
203. Recusal motion
Where defendant's attorney filed motion for recusal of judge, arguing that judge's adverse rulings in prior cases and
his legitimate criticisms of attorney in present case showed bias, sanctions will be imposed on attorney since recusal
motion was not well grounded in fact, was not warranted by existing law or by good faith argument for extension of
law, and was filed for improper purpose of delay. INVST Financial Group, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (1987,
CA6 Mich) 815 F2d 391, 7 FR Serv 3d 529, cert den (1987) 484 US 927, 98 L Ed 2d 251, 108 S Ct 291.
Motion for recusal based on weak, inappropriate, and incongruous arguments was specious and warrants sanctions
under Rule 11 since apparent purpose of motion was to cause delay. Ricci v Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc. (1986, DC
Me) 111 FRD 369.
Where plaintiff's attorney filed meritless application for recusal and disqualification of judge, but cited no statutes or
cases in support of his position, and much of affidavits filed with motion were immaterial, speculative, and threatening,
since no reasonable attorney could come to conclusion that court was biased against either him or his client, true
purpose of filing motions must have been to delay and to harass. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v Federal Reserve Bank
(1990, WD NY) 129 FRD 462, affd without op (1990, CA2 NY) 923 F2d 843, cert den (1991) 500 US 942, 114 L Ed 2d
480, 111 S Ct 2238.
204. Removal petition
Sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 against attorney because his petition for removal to federal court was
frivolous and interposed for improper purpose of delay are proper where attorney failed to join necessary defendant,
where attorney filed second removal petition without having cured deficiency in earlier petition which had already been
rejected, and where attorney was unaware of case law which made removal of action in question improper. Hewitt v
Stanton (1986, CA9 Cal) 798 F2d 1230, 5 FR Serv 3d 1326.
Costs and attorneys fees are awarded where defendants obviously filed removal petition alleging counterclaims
under federal law solely to delay administration of justice by disrupting state court proceedings already in progress.
Ident Corp. of America v Wendt (1986, ED Mo) 638 F Supp 116, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67867.
Petitioner for writ of mandamus, together with its counsel, are jointly and severally liable to pay respondent amount
equal to respondent's costs and attorneys' fees incurred in opposing petition, where petitioner sought writ directing
District Court to vacate its order remanding state court action, to retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, what petitioner says
is portion of that action that embodies claims arising under federal patent laws, and to vacate its stay of proceedings in
petitioner's federal court suit for declaratory judgment as to validity of patents, where there was not even colorable basis
for petitioner's attempted removal of state court action, which was based on breach of contract, to District Court, and
where, since there is no colorable basis to challenge remand order in view of statute and Supreme Court authority which
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competent counsel could not possibly have failed to recognize, petition must have been based solely on hope of
delaying further impact of state court judgment and was therefore frivolous. In re Oximetrix, Inc. (1984, CA) 748 F2d
637, 223 USPQ 1068.
205. Service of process
Where plaintiff's attorney was grossly negligent in failing to make sure that service of process was accomplished,
then served alias summons and complaint on defendant and filed motion for enlargement of time for serving complaint,
and subsequently failed to acknowledge that his actions had caused defendant and court unnecessary time and expense,
refused to accept blame for his errors, and failed to acknowledge consequences his actions had had on his client,
defendant's motion for imposition of sanctions is granted. Stinson v American Sterilizer Co. (1989, MD Ala) 127 FRD
689.
206. Summary judgment motion
Where district court denied defendant's first motion for partial summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's
retaliatory discharge claim, and defendant subsequently filed second motion for partial summary judgment with regard
to same claim but based on entirely different grounds and supported by proper affidavit, district court abused its
discretion in sanctioning defendant for filing second motion which district court described as unnecessary and intended
to harass and to increase costs. Gann v Fruehauf Corp. (1995, CA5 Miss) 52 F3d 1320, 32 FR Serv 3d 959, reh, en
banc, den (1995, CA5 Miss) 62 F3d 398.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was not made for improper purpose, such as delay, and was not without
color of authority, and therefore sanctions are inappropriate. Motown Record Corp. v Mary Jane Girls, Inc. (1987, SD
NY) 118 FRD 35.
207. Miscellaneous
Where defendant unnecessarily delayed and multiplied proceedings by filing contrived third party complaint in
which it sought to establish sufficient contacts with another state to induce District Court to transfer, sanctions were
properly imposed. Stewart v American International Oil & Gas Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 845 F2d 196, 10 FR Serv 3d
1119, 100 OGR 260.
In action to recover for computer damaged during shipping, where defendant refused to accept judge's summary
judgment ruling on liability and continued to file motions which were unresponsive to issues which remained in case,
despite protestations of opposing counsel and warnings from court, and argued that judge had erred but presented to
court no argument supporting that assertion, District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's
filings caused unnecessary delay and needless increase in cost of litigation and lacked any apparent legitimate purpose.
Deere & Co. v Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft (1988, CA7 Ill) 855 F2d 385, 11 FR Serv 3d 1420.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff who brought civil rights action based on assertions that federal reserve notes are not
legal tender and that he was denied asserted right to jury trial in mortgage foreclosure action is properly ordered to pay
each of 3 defendants $ 750 in attorneys' fees and also to pay fine of $ 500 to Clerk of Court, since plaintiff's insistence
on litigating question in face of controlling precedent amounts to bad faith, his failure to discover overwhelming
precedent suggests lack of reasonable inquiry into law, and record is replete with motions and strange filings by plaintiff
that obfuscate issues presented and are suggestive of attempt to prolong suit and harass defendants. Nixon v Phillipoff
(1985, ND Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Pursuant to Rule 11, third-party defendant's attorney is properly ordered to pay $ 2,000 to third-party plaintiff and $
5,000 to Clerk of Court, where third-party defendant's pleadings and conduct of its defense were frivolous, and where
its defense was interposed for purpose of delaying repayment of $ 250,000 which it had improperly retained on closing
of sale of markets, and which it had put to its general corporate purposes. Michigan Nat'l Bank v Kroger Co. (1985,
ED Mich) 619 F Supp 1149.
Rule 11 sanctions are not imposed on plaintiff in trademark infringement action, where (1) there was reasonable
basis to bring action since plaintiff was aware that defendant planned to market over-the-counter tablet similar to
plaintiff's in formula, dosage, and color, and (2) there is insufficient evidence to conclude plaintiff acted to harass
defendants or delay litigation. American Home Products Corp. v Barr Laboratories, Inc. (1987, DC NJ) 656 F Supp
1058, 3 USPQ2d 1194, affd (1987, CA3 NJ) 834 F2d 368, 5 USPQ2d 1073.
Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate where litigation was unreasonably extended by plaintiffs, court issued order to
show cause why case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment was
patently insufficient, and plaintiff's litigation after order to show cause was unjustified since pleadings and affidavits
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
were not well grounded in law or fact. Markel v Scovill Mfg. Co. (1987, WD NY) 657 F Supp 1102, CCH Fed Secur L
Rep P 93269, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67582, vacated without op (1988, CA2 NY) 859 F2d 148.
Rule 11 attorney fees and sanctions against defendant union for alleged contumacious conduct are not warranted,
where employer brought action to stay arbitration of implementation of work rules and discharge of employee and union
counterclaimed to compel arbitration of both issues, because (1) union counsel, relying primarily on union for factual
support for claim, made reasonable inquiry into facts, (2) although unaccepted by court, position argued by union was
plausible view of law, (3) union's action was not taken to harass, delay or increase unnecessarily costs of litigation, but
was legitimate challenge to employer's acts, and (4) no facts were ever revealed suggesting union should have changed
its litigation position, so union did not fail to properly review and reevaluate its position as case developed. Marshall
Durbin, Tupelo, Inc. v United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, etc., Local 1529 (1987, ND Miss) 660
F Supp 234, 126 BNA LRRM 3195.
Where pleading filed by defendant seeks result which is detrimental to defendant, it is apparent that defendant's
purpose in filing pleading is to delay proceedings, and therefore sanctions will be imposed. Eakin v Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (1988, ND Ill) 121 FRD 363, affd (1989, CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 114, 8 UCCRS2d 422, reh
den (1989, CA7) 1989 US App LEXIS 9392.
Where defendant repeatedly argued that certain corporate entities were indispensable parties when he knew that
corporations had no interest in action, and where defendant also withheld material information, thereby causing needless
expenses to plaintiffs and wasting resources of court, Rule 11 has been violated and sanctions must be imposed.
Durant v Traditional Invest., Ltd. (1991, SD NY) 135 FRD 42.
Magistrate's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on shipowner's counsel personally in complex case involving damaged
cargo was abuse of discretion, where magistrate cited counsel's opposition to motions for sanctions against himself and
shipowner as serving only to cause unnecessary delay and needless increase in cost of litigation, because attorneys must
be free to defend against Rule 11 sanction that would be detrimental to their good name and reputation without running
risk of further sanctions. San Shiah Enter. Co. v Pride Shipping Corp. (1992, SD Ala) 783 F Supp 1334.
Sanctions are imposed against former employee who sued employer, where employee filed amended complaint in
spite of employer's repeated reference to legal authorities showing employee's lack of standing to assert claim of third
party, where employee waited until employer expended time and money taking depositions and until court considered
employer's motions to dismiss and for partial summary judgment to seek leave to replead causes of action, because
employee's action demonstrated lack of candor with court and amounted to advancement of frivolous claims. Osborn v
Bell Helicopter Textron (1993, ND Tex) 828 F Supp 446, 1993-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70345, 27 FR Serv 3d 408.
Defendants' motion for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions was denied where, even though plaintiff violated Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(1) by seeking leave to amend and to intervene and then abandoning those claims only to assert them later in
separate lawsuit, because plaintiff advanced legitimate reason why he chose not to pursue claims in lawsuit, which was
that he believed that abstention doctrine announced in Heck barred him from pursuing claims while related prosecution
was still pending. McCormick v City of Lawrence (2003, DC Kan) 218 FRD 687.
Even though plaintiff improperly filed declaratory action, there is no indication that it did so to harass, cause delay,
or increase cost of litigation, and additionally, action is being dismissed in court's discretion, and record does not
demonstrate that plaintiff failed to make good faith attempt to extend or modify existing law, so therefore, defendants'
Rule 11 motion will be denied. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Taylor (1988, MD NC) 118 FRD 426.
In action charging that defendant's earlier lawsuit against President of United States maliciously and tortiously
interfered with alleged contract between President and citizens of U.S. for effective governance, instant case was
brought for improper purposes of punishing defendant for exercising her right to file tort action, to divert defendant's
attention from earlier lawsuit, to cause delays, and to increase defendant's costs and attorney fees, and therefore
plaintiffs are subject to sanctions for violating Rule 11. Schramek v Jones (1995, MD Fla) 161 FRD 119, 9 FLW Fed D
4.
VIII. PARTICULAR SANCTIONS
A. In General
208. Generally
Where Rule 11 violation was found to have occurred, court could impose sanctions. Thomas v Capital Sec.
Services, Inc. (1987, CA5 Miss) 812 F2d 984, 43 CCH EPD P 37053, 7 FR Serv 3d 379.
Rule 11, by its express language, mandates imposition of sanctions once violation of rule is discovered. Thomas v
Capital Sec. Servs. (1988, CA5 Miss) 836 F2d 866, 45 CCH EPD P 37770, 10 FR Serv 3d 329.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
When violation has occurred, court is not required to impose least severe sanction, rather least severe sanction
adequate to serve purpose of Rule 11 should be imposed. Harmony Drilling Co. v Kreutter (1988, CA5 Tex) 846 F2d
17, 11 FR Serv 3d 651.
Some sanction is mandatory once court finds complaint to be groundless. O'Malley v New York City Transit
Authority (1990, CA2 NY) 896 F2d 704, 15 FR Serv 3d 1367.
Although appellate courts in this circuit strongly suggest that sanction chosen be least severe necessary to achieve
objective of rule, courts are not required to apply least severe sanction; rather, sanction is simply required to be
appropriate. Kirk Capital Corp. v Bailey (1994, CA8 Mo) 16 F3d 1485, 28 FR Serv 3d 88.
Where district court finds that disciplinary sanction more severe than admonition, reprimand, or censure under Rule
11 is warranted, it should refer matter to appropriate disciplinary authorities; consequently, district court's order
suspending attorney from practice for violation of Rule 11 was improper. Thornton v GMC (1998, CA5 La) 136 F3d
450, 40 FR Serv 3d 343.
If, after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, court finds that FRCivP 11(b) has been violated, it may
impose sanction upon violator; such sanction may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. Dome Patent L.P. v Permeable
Techs., Inc. (1999, WD NY) 190 FRD 88.
Wide discretion is accorded to district judges in selecting appropriate sanction for FRCivP 11 violations, including
authority to issue directives of nonmonetary nature. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc. v Slavin (1999, ED Tenn) 190
FRD 449.
Bankruptcy court's order denying sanctions under Rule 11 was interlocutory in nature and was not immediately
appealable. Empresas Omajede, Inc. v Bennazar-Zequeira (2000, CA1 Puerto Rico) 213 F3d 6.
209. Discretion of court
Under amendment effective December 1,1993, imposition of sanctions for Rule 11 violation is discretionary rather
than mandatory. Knipe v Skinner (1994, CA2 NY) 19 F3d 72, 28 FR Serv 3d 557.
Absent specific motion for attorney fees, district court only had authority to order sanctions payable to court. Baffa v
Donaldson (2000, CA2 NY) 222 F3d 52, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91056.
In determining whether reasons exist for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, District Court is accorded wide discretion,
but once court finds that factors do exist, Rule 11 requires that sanctions of some sort be imposed. Westmoreland v
CBS, Inc. (1985, App DC) 248 US App DC 255, 770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451.
Where district court found that plaintiff had egregiously abused judicial process, Rule 11 required that sanction of
some sort be imposed, since once court finds sanctionable conduct, it has no discretion whether to impose sanction;
court may exercise discretion at that point only in selecting appropriate sanction. Rafferty v NYNEX Corp. (1995, App
DC) 314 US App DC 1, 60 F3d 844, 130 CCH LC P 57956, 1995-2 CCH Trade Cases P 71066, 32 FR Serv 3d 448.
On motion for sanctions after defendant filed motion with factual inaccuracies, court had discretion to decide
whether violation had occurred and what sanctions it would impose if there had been violation. Long v United States
DOJ (2002, DC Dist Col) 207 FRD 4.
210. Factors determining appropriate sanction
Absence of deliberate harassment may be consideration in choosing appropriate sanction, but it is not factor in
determining violation. Cabell v Petty (1987, CA4 Va) 810 F2d 463, 6 FR Serv 3d 1078.
Offending party's litigation history is one factor which court may consider in determining appropriate Rule 11
sanction, and where attorney had been sanctioned in several other actions, district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing sanction of $ 50,000, specifically finding that amount to be minimum necessary to deter future misconduct.
White v General Motors Corp. (1992, CA10 Kan) 977 F2d 499, 23 FR Serv 3d 1104.
In determining what sanctions are appropriate under Rule 11, court should consider deterrence, harassment of
opposing party, and reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Filippini v Austin (1985, CD Cal) 106 FRD 425, 112 CCH LC P
11460.
Since purpose of sanctions under Rule 11 is to deter future violations, it is appropriate to consider past conduct in
determining whether sanctions should be imposed and nature of any sanctions to be imposed. Kramer v Tribe (1994,
DC NJ) 156 FRD 96, affd without op (1995, CA3 NJ) 52 F3d 315, cert den (1995) 516 US 907, 133 L Ed 2d 195, 116 S
Ct 274, subsequent app (1998, CA3 NJ) 159 F3d 1351.
Maryland resident suing Virginia attorney for legal malpractice is bounced out of court but will not be sanctioned
under FRCP 11, even though claims against his unpaid "attorney" are entirely unwarranted and unsupported by
evidence, because pro se plaintiff's financial situation makes imposition of monetary sanctions inappropriate, and it
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
appears that nonmonetary sanctions would have no deterrent effect on him. Wilder v Greidinger (1997, DC Md) 989 F
Supp 746.
211. Miscellaneous
Although plaintiff's claims did not survive summary judgment, bringing such claims was objectively reasonable, and
sanctions were not appropriate simply because plaintiff's factual allegations had insufficient support in record to survive
summary judgment. Schrag v Dinges (1994, DC Kan) 153 FRD 665, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8543.
Automobile accident victim, seeking recovery for damages against insurance company which refused to settle claim,
is not entitled to treble damages under Louisiana law, but has right to seek sanctions under FRCP Rule 11 and under 28
USCS § 1927. West v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1988, MD La) 683 F Supp 156.
B. Monetary Sanctions
1. In General
212. Generally
Monetary sanction may be imposed without finding of criminal intent and without affording due process protections
mandated by Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 42(b), since Rule 11 neither defines nor limits types of sanctions that
may be appropriate, although court should consider purpose to be achieved by sanction. Eisenberg v University of New
Mexico (1991, CA10 NM) 936 F2d 1131, 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 330, 20 FR Serv 3d 99.
Although sanctions may properly include award of counsel fees and expenses, prime goal should be deterrence of
repetition of improper conduct, and award of counsel fees or other monetary sanction should not automatically be
sanction of choice; moreover, Rule 11 permits award only of those expenses directly caused by improper filing. Waltz
v County of Lycoming (1992, CA3 Pa) 974 F2d 387, 23 FR Serv 3d 432, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA3) 1992 US App
LEXIS 24488.
Rule 11 application for attorneys' fees can only be made by motion; it cannot be made by request in amended
complaint. Burma-Bibas, Inc. v Excelled Leather Coat Corp. (1984, SD NY) 584 F Supp 1214, 223 USPQ 969.
Monetary sanctions under Rule 11 are unnecessary where suit is dismissed with prejudice and defendants have not
answered complaint or expended any time or money to defend charges. Illinois C. G. R. Co. v J & L Contractors, Inc.
(1988, CD Ill) 121 FRD 391.
Rule 11 also applies to motions invoking Rule 11, and if both sides engage in improper litigation conduct, court may
make any monetary sanctions payable to clerk, rather than to opposing party. HMB Acquisition Corp. v Cohen (1992,
SD NY) 143 FRD 50, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8177, vacated in part on other grounds (1992, SD NY) 145 FRD
30.
213. Liability between attorney and client
Amount of sanction imposed for bringing frivolous antitrust and civil rights claims will be divided equally between
plaintiff and counsel. Eastway Constr. Corp. v New York (1987, CA2 NY) 821 F2d 121, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P
67601, 8 FR Serv 3d 1101, cert den (1987) 484 US 918, 98 L Ed 2d 226, 108 S Ct 269.
Sanctions consisting of defendant's attorney fees and costs were properly imposed on plaintiff's attorney who
improperly attempted to remove case to federal court, and not on plaintiff who settled suit "without benefit of counsel."
Ballard's Service Center, Inc. v Transue (1989, CA1 RI) 865 F2d 447, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68474, 13 FR Serv
3d 773.
Court's authority to impose Rule 11 sanction and to determine that sanction should be borne by lawyer and not client
includes authority to make express terms of sanction order effective and to order attorney to reimburse clients for
amount of sanction which he deducted from their portion of settlement. Farino v Walshe (1991, CA2 NY) 938 F2d 6,
20 FR Serv 3d 144.
Where more than one person has violated Rule 11, such persons, including attorney and client, may be jointly and
severally liable for Rule 11 sanctions, and such liability in no way relieves any individual of his nondelegable
obligations. Estate of Calloway ex rel. LMN Prods. v Marvel Entertainment Group (1993, CA2 NY) 9 F3d 237, 27 FR
Serv 3d 753, cert den (1994) 511 US 1081, 128 L Ed 2d 459, 114 S Ct 1829.
Where complaint violated Rule 11 because facts alleged did not form legal basis for relief sought, sanction should be
imposed on attorneys representing plaintiff, not on lay client who did not sign complaint, since violation concerned
issue of law to be assessed by attorneys, and there was no factual basis for concluding that client did anything to warrant
any Rule 11 sanction. Kirk Capital Corp. v Bailey (1994, CA8 Mo) 16 F3d 1485, 28 FR Serv 3d 88.
Page 141
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
In civil rights action brought in bad faith, plaintiff's attorney would not be personally liable to prevailing defendants
for their attorney's fees where record indicates that attorney acted reasonably, in good faith, and in professional manner
at all times in case. Friedgood v Axelrod (1984, SD NY) 593 F Supp 395, 40 FR Serv 2d 752.
Failure of plaintiff's attorney to conduct any investigation whatsoever into defamation claim against defendant
justifies imposition of monetary sanctions against plaintiff under Rule 11, and both plaintiff and his attorney will be
jointly and severally liable for sanctions awarded under Rule. Mohammed v Union Carbide Corp. (1985, ED Mich)
606 F Supp 252, 1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66602, 1 FR Serv 3d 507.
Defendant's reasonable attorney fees in defending frivolous suit must be paid by plaintiffs' attorney who relied on
statements of his clients that basis for suit existed, without making reasonable inquiry which would have revealed
otherwise and plaintiffs will not be responsible for any portion of such fees, even though they failed to inform attorney
of relevant facts, since competent counsel would have investigated facts and told clients that their claims were without
merit. Slane v Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist. (1987, DC Colo) 115 FRD 61.
Sanctions specifically assessed against attorney are not recoverable from client since allowing that would effectively
negate purpose of Rule, to interpose reasonable attorney's assessment of merits of dispute. Schaffer v Chicago Police
Officers (1988, ND Ill) 120 FRD 514, 11 FR Serv 3d 481.
Where action was brought in Illinois although parties were residents of Arizona and Utah and complained of conduct
occurred in Utah, and complaint alleged diversity jurisdiction even though it was lacking, sanction will be imposed
amounting to attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by defendants which would not have been
incurred but for sanctionable conduct, and that amount must be paid by plaintiffs' counsel without any right of
reimbursement from plaintiffs unless counsel can demonstrate that sanctionable conduct, in whole or in part, was
attributable to plaintiffs themselves. Laine v Morton Thiokol, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 124 FRD 625.
Sanctions should be borne jointly by plaintiff and his attorney where both knowingly participated in frivolous lawsuit
based on false claims, and thus plaintiff and his attorney are jointly and severally liable for expenses and attorney fees
of defendants. Kenna v United States Dep't of Justice (1989, DC NH) 128 FRD 172.
Where case was absolutely meritless and plaintiffs' counsel failed to make reasonable inquiry into either facts or law,
sanction consisting of attorney fees and expenses of all defendants is imposed, with half of total to be paid in equal
shares by four named plaintiffs and half of total to be paid by plaintiffs' attorney, according to conditions set out.
Peregoy v Amoco Production Co. (1990, ED Tex) 133 FRD 113, 19 FR Serv 3d 963.
Contempt sanctions are warranted against attorney, where attorney and client were held jointly and severally liable
for Rule 11 sanctions and attorney did not pay his share and then subsequently violated court-ordered payment plan for
reimbursement of client for sanctions he paid but attorney owed, since client must be compensated and attorney must be
coerced to follow court order. Verone v Taconic Tel. Corp. (1993, ND NY) 826 F Supp 632, supp op (ND NY) 826 F
Supp 632.
Sanction of $ 3,737.99 cost of litigation is imposed on slip-and-fall plaintiff but not on her attorney, where attorney
apparently became aware of key witness's past association with plaintiff and possibility of her presenting falsified
evidence when she admitted her perjury to court during trial, even though it is attorney's signature on complaint that
technically violates FRCivP 11, because under circumstances it is appropriate to impose sanction only on plaintiff.
Devine v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (1999, SD Miss) 52 F Supp 2d 741, 44 FR Serv 3d 776.
Appellate court vacated order imposing sanctions for filing frivolous complaint against plaintiff estate representative
because trial court improperly charged party for legal responsibilities reserved to party's attorney. Satterlee v Northside
Developers, Inc. (2003, DC VI) 216 FRD 330.
Where plaintiff and his attorney violated Rule 11 by refusing to dismiss claims after discovery revealed that they
were groundless, counsel is held jointly and severally liable with plaintiff for payment of costs, excluding attorney fees,
and plaintiff will not recover that portion of his cost to which he would have been entitled pursuant to Rule 54. Denny
v Hinton (1990, MD NC) 131 FRD 659, affd without op (1991, CA4 NC) 937 F2d 602 and affd (1991, CA4 NC) 20 FR
Serv 3d 934.
214. Liability between parties
Sanctions should not be portioned equally among plaintiffs to frivolous lawsuit but should be divided appropriately,
considering manner and extent of each plaintiff's violation. Smith International, Inc. v Texas Commerce Bank (1988,
CA5 Tex) 844 F2d 1193, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93770, 11 FR Serv 3d 85.
Alzheimer patient's son must pay his stepbrother's costs of defending against trifling, paltry federal lawsuit, where
son has not alleged his only valid cause of action (i.e., breach of contract) he might have against stepbrother who
allegedly promised that he would pay health care costs of patient; this complaint is perfect example of type of conduct
that FRCP 11 was designed to prevent. Matter v Williams (1993, CD Ill) 832 F Supp 244.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
215. Miscellaneous
Where injunction issued by Court of Appeals did not prevent debtor from burdening court with frivolous motions
and appeals, Court will impose monetary sanctions as authorized by FRCP 11. In re Martin-Trigona (1986, CA2
Conn) 795 F2d 9.
Where district court stated that it was imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 USCS § 1927, but did not
indicate portion of sanctions imposed under each provision, meaningful review is impossible, and therefore, entire order
imposing sanctions must be vacated and remanded. Zuk v Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Medical College (1996,
CA3 Pa) 103 F3d 294, 41 USPQ2d 1296, 36 FR Serv 3d 1515.
Motion for attorney fees and costs filed after grant of summary judgment as to 4 out of 5 claims may be denied
without prejudice to right to refile motion after trial on remaining claim. Doe v Thomas (1985, ND Ill) 604 F Supp
1508.
2. Propriety of Monetary Sanctions
a. Costs and Expenses of Litigation
216. Generally
Use of attorney fees and expenses as measure for sanctions does not violate purpose of Rule 11, and attorney fees
and expenses incurred in establishing Rule 11 violation may be included in sanction. Brandt v Schal Assoc., Inc.
(1992, CA7 Ill) 960 F2d 640, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 7976, 23 FR Serv 3d 1080.
Not every cost on appeal from award of Rule 11 sanctions is cost incurred because of violative filing in district court,
but courts retain discretion to award attorney fees on appeal as part of costs incurred because of sanctionable district
court filing. Official Airline Guides v Goss (1993, CA9 Or) 6 F3d 1385, 93 CDOS 7498, 93 Daily Journal DAR 12757,
28 USPQ2d 1641.
Following December 1, 1993, amendment to Rule 11, district court is specifically allowed to include costs associated
with sanctions proceedings as part of sanctions award imposed on party which violated rule. Margolis v Ryan (1998,
CA9 Wash) 140 F3d 850, 98 CDOS 2618, 98 Daily Journal DAR 3611, 40 FR Serv 3d 1076.
217. Award sought against plaintiff or attorney
Where plaintiff's adversary demonstrated that plaintiff's pleadings were without substance but plaintiff's attorney
revised them only slightly and filed them twice more, district judge properly awarded costs and fees for second and
third filings, notwithstanding contentions of plaintiff's attorney that complaint was filed at insistence of his clients and
that he did nothing out of ordinary in context of high-volume, low-margin law practice. In re TCI, Ltd. (1985, CA7 Ill)
769 F2d 441, 13 CBC2d 299, 2 FR Serv 3d 1373 (criticized in Adams v Inman (In re Inman) (1998, BAP8 Mo) 218 BR
458).
Where Supreme Court had not spoken directly on issue raised by plaintiff's lawsuit, but its pronouncements in
several cases supported position taken by plaintiff, plaintiff did not make frivolous claim and her attorney did not act
irresponsibly, and therefore sanctions consisting of costs should not have been imposed. Freeman v Michigan, Dep't of
State (1987, CA6 Mich) 808 F2d 1174, 42 BNA FEP Cas 1090, 42 CCH EPD P 36905.
Award of attorney's fees and costs to defendant government was inappropriate where facts upon which award was
based were incomplete and misleading and evidence showed that plaintiff had acted reasonably under circumstances
and that government had been uncooperative in handling matter at issue until suit was brought. Conklin v United States
(1987, CA10) 812 F2d 1318, 87-1 USTC P 9208.
Where complaint lacked effectual basis, District Court did not err in awarding as sanctions defendant's attorney fees
and expenses, including cost of pursuing Rule 11 motion. Mike Ousley Productions, Inc. v WJBF-TV (1992, CA11 Ga)
952 F2d 380, 21 FR Serv 3d 1329.
Where plaintiff knowingly offered falsified document into evidence, district court did not err in imposing sanction of
$ 8,882.50 on plaintiff individually to compensate defendant for costs incurred in challenging manufactured document.
Pope v Federal Express Corp. (1995, CA8 Mo) 49 F3d 1327, 66 CCH EPD P 43477, 31 FR Serv 3d 1246.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's attorney is properly assessed defendant's attorneys' fees and costs, since reasonable
prefiling inquiry would have disclosed that complaint was not warranted under well-settled law, where plaintiff
employees sought to recover damages from employer for alleged wrongful discharge in absence of statutory or
contractual basis for recovery. Ring v R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 597 F Supp 1277, 119 BNA LRRM
Page 143
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
2693, 37 CCH EPD P 35310, 120 CCH LC P 56769, 40 FR Serv 2d 1158, dismd without op, affd without op (1986,
CA7 Ill) 804 F2d 143.
Since proceedings were frivolous and apparently brought to delay IRS investigation, attorneys' fees and costs are
properly assessed against plaintiff taxpayer under 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
where taxpayer petitioned to quash IRS summons issued to insurance company, erroneously relying for jurisdictional
basis on 26 USCS § 7609(b)(2) which applies only to summons issued to third-party recordkeepers, and where
amended petition which taxpayer was granted leave to file was virtually identical to original petition, except for
rearrangement of some paragraphs, and thus failed to cure jurisdictional defect. Davenport v Bell (1984, ND Ill) 600 F
Supp 568, 85-1 USTC P 9193, 55 AFTR 2d 1126.
Plaintiff's counsel would be required to pay attorneys' fees and expenses where plaintiff filed suit against 101
defendants and then voluntarily dismissed 89 defendants due to evidence that they had not supplied materials which
allegedly caused death of plaintiff's decedent, since there was no merit in contention that Rule 11 did not permit
imposition of attorneys' fees as sanction prior to its amendment, and lapse of 16 months between dismissal of
defendants and imposition of sanction did not deprive court of jurisdiction where entry of judgment as to dismissed
defendants had not become final, delay was caused by meritless joinder of numerous defendants which required time for
court to organize and wade through volumes of briefs before reaching decision, and court could have relied upon ability
to impose conditions upon dismissal and delayed approval of order of voluntary dismissal pending decision as to
whether sanctions should be imposed which might have required plaintiff's counsel to incur attorneys' fees of 89
defendants for additional 16 months. Glaser v Cincinnati Milacron, Inc. (1985, WD Pa) 2 FR Serv 3d 1260.
Attorney is properly made accountable for costs and expenses including attorneys' fees where he instituted lawsuit in
bad faith, he was intent on harassing defendants, and when faced with dismissal of case, he proceeded to inundate court
with frivolous motions. McLaughlin v Bradlee (1985, DC Dist Col) 602 F Supp 1412, 1 FR Serv 3d 365, affd (1986,
App DC) 256 US App DC 119, 803 F2d 1197, 5 FR Serv 3d 1370.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiffs' attorney is properly assessed attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses which defendants
expended in resisting fee application, where, in settlement of case, plaintiffs signed documents purporting to release
defendants from liability for costs and fees, plaintiffs' counsel had himself signed court's order dismissing case which
stated that parties were to bear their own costs, and plaintiffs' counsel's motion for fee and brief on fee issue completely
failed to note documents signed by plaintiffs and his supplemental brief which finally addressed effect of releases
lacked legal merit. Blackwell v Board of Offender Rehabilitation (1985, SD Ga) 609 F Supp 772, 1 FR Serv 3d 1512,
affd (1987, CA11 Ga) 807 F2d 914, 6 FR Serv 3d 1309.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's counsel is properly ordered to pay defendant's costs and attorneys' fees upon dismissal
of action for unconstitutional discharge of employee, where District Court repeatedly asked plaintiff's attorneys to state
legal and factual basis for action, and they failed to do so on each occasion and accordingly were warned about
likelihood of sanctions if court determined that action was frivolous. Vega v Federal Aviation Admin. (1985, ED NY)
621 F Supp 1177.
Attorneys who signed complaint filed by taxpayer to avoid penalty for filing frivolous return are liable for costs
incurred by Internal Revenue Service in defending case, where attorneys certified complaint under Rule 11, but suit was
absolutely without any basis in law and fact, and taxpayer's decision was not warranted by existing law or by a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Frost v Commissioner (1985, SD Miss) 624
F Supp 316, 86-1 USTC P 9234, 3 FR Serv 3d 1057, 57 AFTR 2d 804.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff is properly ordered to reimburse defendants for their reasonable attorneys' fees and
other costs they incurred in being forced to litigate meritless action, where, viewing action against them in context of
entire complaint, court would be hard pressed to conclude that litigation was not intended to harass or needlessly
increase cost of litigation. Kearney v Todd L. Smith, P.A. (1985, SD NY) 624 F Supp 1008, 4 FR Serv 3d 369.
Monetary sanctions covering costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred by defendants in responding to suit would
be imposed on plaintiff and his attorney as sanctions for filing law suit after issues had previously been litigated and
court had ordered plaintiff not to file another suit pertaining to same matters. Ginther v Texas Commerce Bank, N.A.
(1986, SD Tex) 111 FRD 615, 4 FR Serv 3d 1356.
Where frivolity of plaintiff's lawsuit might not have been apparent at time it was filed but became obvious after
plaintiff was deposed, and plaintiff refused defendants' settlement offer which was made after his deposition, sanctions
will be imposed on plaintiff in amount of fees and costs incurred by defendants after plaintiff's deposition since plaintiff
could and should have prevented these expenses. Hammonds v Board of Election Comm'rs (1986, ND Ill) 112 FRD 33.
In wrongful death case alleging that defendant negligently gave plaintiff's decedent permission to fly plane which
crashed, where plaintiff's attorneys failed to conduct reasonable inquiry to determine that no evidence supported claim,
sanctions imposed on plaintiff's attorneys will consist of defendant's attorney's fees and costs in defending against this
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issue. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112 FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op,
remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app (1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
Sanctions consisting of $ 1,000 fine plus defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs are appropriate to impose
on plaintiffs who persisted in filing frivolous lawsuits, ignored orders of court and attempted to issue own orders and to
invalidate appearances filed by defendants' attorneys, thereby prejudicing defendants and burdening court, all in effort
to harass defendants. Hilgeford v Peoples Bank, Inc. (1986, ND Ind) 113 FRD 161.
Defendants are not awarded costs under Rule 11 where court finds no evidence of sham or false allegations at core of
recited legal injury; though plaintiffs' counsel may have been egregiously in error when initially seeking a federal
forum, he learned quickly and responded promptly and skillfully in managing to keep his clients' case afloat. Leroux v
Lomas & Nettleton Co. (1986, DC Mass) 626 F Supp 962, 3 FR Serv 3d 1433.
Rule 11 sanctions for fees and costs will be granted against employees of private hospital who alleged discharge in
violation of Title VII because of discrimination against them because of their Baptist religion and their supervisor's
religious beliefs against extramarital affairs where: (1) suit was filed after EEOC claims were denied, (2) claims are
frivolous and unreasonable because law is clear that hospital is private and no state action is involved, (3) employees'
first memorandum was filled with conclusory statements unsupported by law and sole authority cited was inappropriate,
and (4) no legal argument has been made to show claims might be proper under good faith extension, modification or
reversal of existing law. McCrory v Rapides Regional Medical Center (1986, WD La) 635 F Supp 975, 40 BNA FEP
Cas 750, 39 CCH EPD P 36028, affd without op (1986, CA5 La) 801 F2d 396, 44 BNA FEP Cas 1243.
Sanctions against ex-husband and his attorney are granted, where 42 USCS § 1983 complaint filed against ex-wife
was devoid of legal merit and was commenced in retaliation for ex-wife's efforts to collect valid judgment for child
support arrears; appropriate sanctions include award of costs and attorney fees, as well as compensation for having to
defend meritless lawsuit. Martin v Supreme Court of New York (1986, ND NY) 644 F Supp 1537.
In imposing sanctions on plaintiff's attorney, charges made by defendant's attorney for photocopying and LEXIS
research will not be imposed on plaintiff's attorney since such costs may be characterized as overhead costs similar to
maintaining library, even though individual lawyers and firms may bill their clients for such charges. Doe v Keane
(1987, WD Mich) 117 FRD 103.
Rule 11 sanctions are imposed against dismissed federal civil service employee in Title VII action, because utter
absence of evidence of discrimination shows that case was filed in bad faith with intent to harass and badger defendants
with imaginary claims as last-ditch effort to get job back, and also employee clearly gave perjured testimony and lied to
her attorney, and thus she is charged with actual costs and attorney's fees. Jackson-Colley v Department of Army Corps
of Engineers (1987, ED Mich) 655 F Supp 122, 43 BNA FEP Cas 617.
Attorneys who signed amended complaint for firearms manufacturer are subject to Rule 11 sanctions consisting of
paying United States reasonable expenses incurred in moving to dismiss former or present EPA employees included as
defendants in manufacturer's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action, where (1) manufacturer was on notice of U.S.'s
position on impropriety of including other defendants on FTCA claim 6 months prior to filing amended complaint, and
(2) clear state of law indicates that U.S. is only proper defendant in FTCA action under 28 USCS § 2679(a) K.W.
Thompson Tool Co. v United States (1987, DC NH) 656 F Supp 1077, 25 Envt Rep Cas 1761, affd (1988, CA1 NH) 836
F2d 721, 27 Envt Rep Cas 1121, 18 ELR 20729.
Attorneys for corporation which brought § 1983 action alleging that state court judgment imposed upon corporation
was denial of due process are required to pay defendants' Rule 11 attorney's fees and expenses and is subject to $ 15,000
fine, where (1) sole reason for suit was to harass defendant and prevent collection of judgment, and (2) there was no
objective basis to believe suit was warranted by existing law. Alcan Aluminum Corp. v Lyntel Products, Inc. (1987,
ND Ill) 656 F Supp 1138.
Plaintiff's 42 USCS § 1983 claim arising out of divorce and custody proceeding in Texas county court and related
activities is dismissed, because her claim fails to allege state action as to numerous defendants and is too vague to state
viable civil rights claim; furthermore, court orders plaintiff under Rule 11 to pay costs and attorney's fees incurred by
several defendants in defending this frivolous action and forbids her to file any further causes of action in this court
until monetary sanctions have been paid. Daniels v Stovall (1987, SD Tex) 660 F Supp 301.
Employer who prevailed in employment discrimination case is not entitled to award of attorney fees or costs
pursuant to 42 USCS § 1988, Rule 11, or Rule 68 where (1) plaintiff's action was not frivolous or unreasonable, (2)
fact that judgment was entered against plaintiff precludes application of Rule 68, and (3) plaintiff's conduct in litigation
and refusal of settlement offer did not warrant Rule 11 sanctions. Lewis v Safeway Stores, Inc. (1987, DC Md) 671 F
Supp 361.
Sanctions amounting to defendant's relevant attorney fees and expenses will be imposed on plaintiff's lawyers where
prayer for relief in complaint sought relief which was clearly prohibited by contract between parties on which action
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
was based. Diversified Technologies Corp. v Jerome Technologies, Inc. (1988, ND Ill) 118 FRD 445, 10 FR Serv 3d
571.
Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 are appropriate against both plaintiff and his attorney with respect to pleadings and
papers filed without reasonable inquiry where such failure was deliberate and intentional on part of plaintiff and
plaintiff's lead counsel and where pleadings were not in pursuit of any legal cause of action genuinely believed by
plaintiff or his counsel to exist at time their documents were filed, but rather for purpose of coercing settlement from
defendants, and therefore sanction will be imposed amounting to defendant's reasonable attorney fees, costs, and jury
per diems paid by government. Elster v Alexander (1988, ND Ga) 122 FRD 593.
Arrestee's 42 USCS § 1983 claims against judgment holders, city, and police officer are dismissed and plaintiff's
attorneys are ordered to pay defendants' attorneys' fees and costs under Rule 11, where arrestee's constitutional rights
were not violated by judgment holders' attempt to collect judgment which ultimately led to plaintiff's arrest under valid
warrant issued on false assumption that plaintiff had been served with appropriate legal papers, because plaintiff's
counsel advanced wrong legal theories in support of their client's case. Theis v Smith (1988, ND Ill) 676 F Supp 874.
Trust company and its attorneys, under Rule 11, are awarded costs and attorneys' fees incurred on motion to dismiss
fourth pro se complaint by individual seeking $ 2 billion in damages and complaint is also dismissed as to state supreme
court justice, because (1) RICO claim asserts only one allegedly fraudulent transaction and does not satisfy requirement
of pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) attorney's request for and judge's order precluding plaintiff from making any
further motions or commencing any new actions relating to same subject matter neither deprived plaintiff of right of
access to federal court nor obstructed legal processes in violation of 18 USCS § 1512 since order was intended merely
to control plaintiff's litigious conduct in state court. Cornett v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (1988, SD NY) 684 F
Supp 78, affd without op (1990, CA2 NY) 902 F2d 1556, cert den (1991) 498 US 1047, 112 L Ed 2d 774, 111 S Ct 754.
Attorney's fees and costs of defending against constitutional claims of attorney/litigant will be charged against him as
sanction, where there was no legal basis for bringing of deprivation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim, and no
factual basis for pursuit of discrimination/conspiracy claim, because short recorded history of case fairly bulges with
facts that justify findings of subjective bad faith and objective lack of merit. Burgos v Murphy (1988, SD NY) 692 F
Supp 1571.
Costs and reasonable attorney's fees are assessed jointly against physician and his attorney under Rule 11, where §
1983 claim challenging due process afforded physician during license revocation proceedings has already been litigated
in state court appeal of revocation and former § 1983 suit, because current action is frivolous and vexatious, and
sanctions should be imposed. Damino v Barrell (1988, ED NY) 702 F Supp 954, affd without op (1989, CA2 NY) 875
F2d 307, cert den (1989) 493 US 817, 107 L Ed 2d 36, 110 S Ct 69.
Where action was brought in Illinois although parties were residents of Arizona and Utah and complained of conduct
occurred in Utah, and complaint alleged diversity jurisdiction even though it was lacking, sanction will be imposed
amounting to attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by defendants which would not have been
incurred but for sanctionable conduct, and that amount must be paid by plaintiffs' counsel without any right of
reimbursement from plaintiffs unless counsel can demonstrate that sanctionable conduct, in whole or in part, was
attributable to plaintiffs themselves. Laine v Morton Thiokol, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 124 FRD 625.
Amended complaint which was gross deviation from Rule 8 requirements of short and plain statement of claims and
simple, concise, and direct averments violated Rule 11, and therefore defendant is awarded its attorney fees, costs, and
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in opposing and arguing for dismissal of offending portions of complaint. Les
Mutuelles du Mans Vie v Life Assurance Co. (1989, ND Ill) 128 FRD 233.
In action for damages under 42 USCS § 1983, allegedly arising from village's arbitrary denial of liquor license,
plaintiff's argument that statute of limitations in federal action was tolled by pending state court action seeking
administrative review of denial of license was frivolous, and since reasonable inquiry into law regarding statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions would have shown that action was time-barred, Rule 11 sanctions must be imposed
requiring plaintiff to reimburse village for amount of expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred. Sports Bar, Inc.
v Downers Grove (1989, ND Ill) 129 FRD 161.
Attorney who made factual misrepresentations in motion for leave to amend complaint must pay reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by defendants in responding to that portion of motion. Perkins v General
Motors Corp. (1990, WD Mo) 129 FRD 655, 16 FR Serv 3d 336, affd (1992, CA8 Mo) 965 F2d 597, 59 BNA FEP Cas
28, 58 CCH EPD P 41508, 22 FR Serv 3d 695, cert den (1992) 506 US 1020, 121 L Ed 2d 581, 113 S Ct 654, 60 CCH
EPD P 41879.
Taxpayers' counsel is sanctioned for costs and attorney's fees incurred by IRS to have frivolous suit dismissed, where
counsel repeatedly asserted completely unfounded argument that Supreme Court "eliminated Anti-Declaratory
Judgment and Anti-Injunction Sections of Internal Revenue Code" when in fact those statutes--26 USCS § 7421 and
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
28 USCS § 2201--remain very much in force and preclude relief from tax liens and levies sought by taxpayers, because
counsel failed to make requisite reasonable inquiry to insure that his arguments were warranted by existing law.
Greenhouse v United States (1991, SD NY) 780 F Supp 136.
Plaintiff's attorney must pay defendants their costs and attorney's fees generated by this litigation, where plaintiff
Program/Operations Assistant was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance and professed not to understand law,
because basic inquiry by plaintiff's counsel should have revealed groundlessness of claims and precluded suit which was
frivolous and in violation of FRCP 11. Dewilde v Guy Gannett Pub. Co. (1992, DC Me) 797 F Supp 55, 61 BNA FEP
Cas 543, 127 CCH LC P 57624.
Where amended complaint added frivolous claims against 2 new defendants, and plaintiffs refused to admit their
mistake and filed misleading pleadings, reasonable sanction would include defendants' costs, expenses, and attorney
fees, and sanction should be severe since previous sanction against plaintiffs' attorney in this case had failed to deter
additional violations. Schrag v Dinges (1993, DC Kan) 150 FRD 664, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8396, affd,
remanded (1995, CA10 Kan) 73 F3d 374, reported in full (1995, CA10 Kan) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8919.
Fine of $ 200 payable to court by attorney who persisted in pursuing client's § 1983 claim despite his failure to
make reasonable factual investigation was sufficient sanction under FRCP 11 to deter attorney from filing baseless §
1983 claims, although should attorney file another such claim without taking steps necessary to meet Rule's reasonable
inquiry standard, fine assessed by court would be higher. Saltz v City of New York (2001, SD NY) 129 F Supp 2d 642.
218. --Pro se plaintiff, generally
Pro se plaintiff who insisted that Internal Revenue Code did not apply to him would be required to pay defendants'
attorney fees, costs and expenses on ground that entire suit was frivolous and brought in bad faith. Cameron v IRS
(1984, ND Ind) 593 F Supp 1540, 84-2 USTC P 9845, 54 AFTR 2d 6260, affd (1985, CA7 Ind) 773 F2d 126, 85-2
USTC P 9661, 56 AFTR 2d 5851.
Pro se plaintiff is assessed attorney's fees and costs where court previously ordered plaintiff to proceed in state court
and plaintiff, in contradiction of court's order, had dismissed state action and moved to amend court's order, because
motion was without legal or factual foundation and was in direct violation of court's order. Illes v Wilton Manors
(1987, SD Fla) 654 F Supp 1212, affd without op (1988, CA11 Fla) 859 F2d 925.
Pro se plaintiff who brought action for declaratory judgment that he is immune from taxation as "merchant and trader
at law on a cash basis" is properly assessed reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees under Rule 11 and 28 USCS §
2412 in view of frivolous nature of suit. McKinney v Regan (1984, MD La) 599 F Supp 126, 55 AFTR 2d 1509.
219. --Frivolous motion
Sanctions of costs and attorney's fees were properly imposed on plaintiffs' counsel who had filed motion for
reconsideration of entry of summary judgment which was based on 2 propositions, one of which was frivolous and
second of which had been abandoned by plaintiffs' failure to comply with local rule. EBI, Inc. v Gator Industries, Inc.
(1986, CA1 Puerto Rico) 807 F2d 1.
Plaintiff who instigated specious motion in order to obtain delay after continuance had been denied should be liable
for monetary sanctions representing defendants' expenses and attorneys' fees. Ricci v Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc.
(1986, DC Me) 111 FRD 369.
Sanctions must be imposed on plaintiff's attorney who continuously filed frivolous motions containing "endless inane
assertions" dealing with such topics as religion and need for world peace, most of which were unrelated to issues of case
and which resulted in needless delays and expenses, and therefore attorney is directed to personally pay that part of
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees which are attributable to his violation of Rule 11. Edwards v Groner (1989, DC VI)
24 VI 292, 124 FRD 605, 13 FR Serv 3d 1149.
Where court granted defendants additional time to submit their expert reports due to untimely filing of plaintiff's own
expert's report, plaintiff's motion to bar defendants' expert's testimony due to untimeliness was frivolous and filed for
improper purpose of harassing defendants, and therefore plaintiff's counsel must pay defendants' counsel fees and costs
incurred in defending the present motion. Lukas v Nasco Int'l, Inc. (1989, DC NJ) 128 FRD 619, 16 FR Serv 3d 946.
220. Award sought against defendant or attorney
Costs and attorneys' fees were properly assessed against defendant who made Rule 60(b) motion seeking to set aside
stipulation by parties dismissing lawsuit, where defendant's first attorney testified that he had been authorized to sign
stipulation but that, in order to delay its entry for business reasons, defendant hired another attorney to attempt to have
stipulation set aside, and where there is evidence to support assumption that it was defendant, and not her attorney, who
was catalyst behind frivolous motion. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Hand (1985, CA10 NM) 763 F2d 1184, 2 FR Serv 3d 20.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff is entitled to award of attorneys' fees and costs incident to defense of particular
argument asserted by defendant where long and unbroken line of cases by Circuit's Court of Appeals and District Courts
within Circuit has explicitly rejected identical argument, and where defendant declined to accept invitation to
demonstrate that court's reliance upon cited cases was misplaced or to assert good faith argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and defendant's attorneys are properly made responsible for payment of such
award where they were responsible for assertion of frivolous argument. Booker v Atlanta (1984, ND Ga) 586 F Supp
340, 39 FR Serv 2d 425, affd without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 827 F2d 775.
Pursuant to Rule 11, defendants' counsel is properly ordered to pay reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by
plaintiffs in connection with defendants' motion to decertify plaintiffs' class or, in alternative, to disqualify plaintiffs'
counsel, where sole basis for motion was telephone call from man identifying himself as former husband of member of
class, volunteering that one of plaintiffs' attorneys had led his former wife to believe that she would not be responsible
for costs of litigation regardless of outcome, where no steps were taken to verify telephone accounts except for
unsuccessful attempt to have caller make his declarations in writing, and where, before filing motion containing such
sweeping accusations, defense counsel should have at minimum requested extension of deadline for filing of motions to
disqualify based on newly discovered evidence. Bockman v Lucky Stores, Inc. (1985, ED Cal) 108 FRD 296, 38 BNA
FEP Cas 753, 37 CCH EPD P 35478, 3 FR Serv 3d 166.
Defense counsel for defendant who was dropped from suit on eve of trial because she was not United States citizen
required to reimburse plaintiffs for reasonable costs and fees incurred, where plaintiffs plead diversity jurisdiction on
information and belief, and defendant's answer stated that defendant was without information or knowledge sufficient to
form belief determine her citizenship is properly placed on her counsel rather than on plaintiffs' counsel. Wymer v
Lessin (1985, DC Dist Col) 109 FRD 114, 4 FR Serv 3d 1163.
Defendant company, which introduced into evidence as important part of its defense fabricated evidence in form of
contract which carried forged signature of plaintiff company's president, is liable under Rule 11 for costs, including
attorneys' and experts' fees and other expenses, incurred by plaintiff as result of defendant's offering of fabricated
evidence. Aida Engineering, Inc. v Red Stag, Inc. (1986, ED Wis) 110 FRD 650.
Union local is entitled to recover its costs and attorney's fees incurred in bringing action to enforce arbitration award
of back pay for wrongfully discharged employee, where employer's position that arbitrator's ambiguous award
implicitly provided for reduction of back pay due to employee's failure to mitigate was unreasonable, especially after
employer never raised mitigation issue at arbitration hearing, because employer's position, though not taken in bad faith,
was not justified by existing law nor reasonable argument to modify or reverse established precedents, and thus
objective standard of Rule 11 was breached by employer. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, etc., Local Union No. 330 v Elgin
Eby-Brown Co. (1987, ND Ill) 670 F Supp 1393, 127 BNA LRRM 2950, 109 CCH LC P 10665.
221. --Counterclaim
Where District Court concluded that counterclaim was wholly frivolous and harassing, court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering defendant's attorney to reimburse plaintiff for costs of litigating counterclaim and subsequent
sanction proceedings. Hudson v Moore Business Forms, Inc. (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA FEP Cas 898.
222. --Motion to dismiss
Sanction consisting of plaintiff's fees and expenses incurred in defending against frivolous motion to dismiss was
properly imposed on defendants and their attorney where defendant company based in Hong Kong moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, even though shareholders and directors of second defendant company, which does business
in Florida, were almost identical and even though business of two companies was closely intertwined. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v Sona Distributors (1988, CA11 Fla) 847 F2d 1512, 11 FR Serv 3d 687.
Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, under Rule 11, where defendants, pursuant to
their motion to dismiss, fail to cite single case or authority in their supporting memorandum and, therefore, fail to
conduct "reasonable inquiry" required by Rule 11. National Survival Game, Inc. v Skirmish, U.S.A., Inc. (1985, SD
NY) 603 F Supp 339, 226 USPQ 287, 40 FR Serv 2d 1378.
223. --Motion to vacate default
Where court found that defendant's motion to vacate default judgment was materially false and intended to deceive
court and to vex plaintiff, court properly imposed monetary sanction consisting primarily of plaintiff's attorney fees and
costs of running courtroom for day. Rose v Franchetti (1992, CA7 Ill) 979 F2d 81, 23 FR Serv 3d 1047.
224. Miscellaneous
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Government is entitled under Rule 11 to costs, including attorney's fees, incurred since date of prior judgment
finding tax litigant's defenses baseless; arguments presented after prior judgment are vexatious repetition. United
States v Carley (1986, CA2) 783 F2d 341, 86-1 USTC P 9248, 57 AFTR 2d 822, cert den (1986) 476 US 1142, 90 L Ed
2d 697, 106 S Ct 2251.
Award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses directly attributable to successful defense against meritless
petition for contempt constitutes appropriate Rule 11 sanction. Westmoreland v CBS, Inc. (1985, App DC) 248 US App
DC 255, 770 F2d 1168, 2 FR Serv 3d 1451.
Consistent with mandates of Rule 11, court may grant government's request for attorneys' fees and costs where
plaintiff argued that Internal Revenue Code does not apply to him despite clear precedents to contrary which removed
any colorable basis in law for claim. Young v IRS (1984, ND Ind) 596 F Supp 141, 84-2 USTC P 9860, 40 FR Serv 2d
239, 54 AFTR 2d 6367.
Class plaintiffs and others may be awarded attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule 11
where attorney attempted to disrupt settlement of securities litigation for sole purpose of obtaining fee-related
concessions in connection with other litigation. In re Itel Sec. Litigation (1984, ND Cal) 596 F Supp 226, CCH Fed
Secur L Rep P 91825, 40 FR Serv 2d 612, affd (1986, CA9 Cal) 791 F2d 672, 5 FR Serv 3d 483, cert den (1987) 479
US 1033, 93 L Ed 2d 834, 107 S Ct 880.
Sanctions for improper petition for removal will be attorneys' fees and subpoena fees to be paid by attorneys who
signed removal petition. McLaughlin v Western Casualty & Surety Co. (1985, SD Ala) 603 F Supp 978.
NLRB is entitled to attorney fees and expenses under Rule 11 where employers had obvious lack of merit in bringing
claim for mandamus and injunctive relief, employers' counsel offered flimsy reasons for inability to prepare for hearing
scheduled by NLRB, subpoenas duces tecum served upon NLRB director were extremely broad and burdensome, and
court is convinced that employers attempted to harass NLRB and achieved delay not otherwise obtainable rather than
assert constitutional claims in good faith. Centra, Inc. v Hirsch (1985, ED Pa) 630 F Supp 42.
Easement owner is entitled to Rule 11 attorney fees and expenses incurred in securing right to use its easement,
where dominant tenement owner had been granted permanent injunction authorizing use of easement and servient
tenement loaner acted vexatiously and unreasonably to multiply proceedings. Can Am Industries, Inc. v Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. (1986, CD Ill) 631 F Supp 1180.
Trust attorney is liable for attorney's fees and costs in tax action where attorney's behavior throughout litigation was
dilatory and contumacious, and attorney had to be ordered to appear at show cause hearing; interests of justice require
imposition of sanctions. F.P.P. Enterprises v United States (1986, DC Neb) 646 F Supp 713, 86-2 USTC P 9770, 58
AFTR 2d 5975, affd (1987, CA8 Neb) 830 F2d 114, 87-2 USTC P 9536, 60 AFTR 2d 5710.
Sanctions in form of reimbursements of reasonable attorney fees and expenses are imposed on defendant company
which brought actions against former codefendants, although facts known to defendant company showed that there was
no basis for such action, and where defendant company refused to dismiss former codefendants from action unless they
agreed to make no further claims of any kind against company at any time. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v Continental
Illinois Corp. (1987, ND Ill) 113 FRD 637.
Defendant will be reimbursed by plaintiff for all fees and expenses incurred as a result of all complaints and other
papers filed by plaintiff in violation of Rule 11 and for those expenses incurred by defendant's motion for attorneys'
fees, but defendant will not be reimbursed for fees and expenses incurred as a result of plaintiff's appeals, absent explicit
instructions from appellate courts. Sherman Treaters, Ltd. v Ahlbrandt (1987, DC Dist Col) 115 FRD 519.
Attorney who filed motion to admit out-of-state attorney to local bar but failed to comply with applicable rule by
revealing out-of-state attorney's past convictions and misconduct has violated Rule 11, particularly as he admitted not
even reading applicable rule and as his noncompliance appears to have been gross negligence bordering on bad faith,
and thus sanction will be imposed amounting to other party's costs, plus amount to reimburse court for expense of
wasted time. First Interstate Bank, N.A. v Estates Partnership (1987, DC Colo) 117 FRD 683, 10 FR Serv 3d 175.
Mortgagor and his attorneys are assessed attorney's fees and costs incurred by United States in foreclosure action,
where mortgagor's pleadings were not well-grounded in fact or warranted by even good faith argument for change in
existing law, and where court finds actions of mortgagor and attorneys to be motivated by improper purpose of delaying
proceedings as long as possible to garner income tax benefits and increase attorney's fees payable out of subject of
foreclosure action. United States v Allen L. Wright Dev. Corp. (1987, ND Ill) 667 F Supp 1218.
Airline is assessed costs and attorney's fees under Rule 11 where plaintiff asked for reasonable costs of defending
airline's motion for reargument on ruling that airline was not entitled to baggage liability limitation under Warsaw
Convention, because airline failed to set forth any matters or decisions which court overlooked, merely rehashed
previous arguments, and obviously meant to burden plaintiff, an individual, with expense of response. Vekris v
Peoples Express Airlines, Inc. (1988, SD NY) 701 F Supp 87.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Adverse publicity and attention received by attorney as result of being sanctioned is not adequate deterrent for
offender and others who might similarly abuse legal system, and Rule 11's dual purposes of deterrence and
compensation will best be served by requiring attorney to pay costs he imposed on his adversary by his conduct. S.A.
Auto Lube v Jiffy Lube Int'l (1990, ND Ill) 131 FRD 547.
b. Attorneys' Fees
225. Generally
Attorney against whom award of fees is justified under Rule 11 does not escape liability just because behavior of
attorney's client is even worse. Blair v Shenandoah Women's Center, Inc. (1985, CA4 W Va) 757 F2d 1435.
Rule 11 authorizes District Court to assess attorney's fees against party or his attorney who irresponsibly initiates or
litigates cause of action, and existence of bad faith is not required. Ballard's Service Center, Inc. v Transue (1989, CA1
RI) 865 F2d 447, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68474, 13 FR Serv 3d 773.
Award of attorney fees for violation of Rule 11 is authorized only if it is imposed on motion and is warranted for
effective deterrence, and award of attorney fees imposed by district court on its own initiative was not valid sanction.
Thornton v GMC (1998, CA5 La) 136 F3d 450, 40 FR Serv 3d 343.
Although case meets threshold condition of frivolousness for award of attorneys' fees as set out in Rule 11, District
Court properly exercises its discretion not to grant such fees where case is fresh and there has been only small amount
of litigation in it. Swierkowski v United States (1985, ED Cal) 620 F Supp 149, 85-2 USTC P 9640, 56 AFTR 2d 5946,
affd without op (1986, CA9 Cal) 800 F2d 1145, cert den (1987) 479 US 1093, 94 L Ed 2d 161, 107 S Ct 1306.
226. Award sought against plaintiff or attorney
Defendants established prima facie entitlement to modest amount of attorneys' fees that they sought, and case must
therefore be remanded to district judge for reconsideration of his order denying out of hand defendants' motion for
attorneys' fees, where history of plaintiff's litigation against defendants suggests that instant suit is latest chapter in
campaign of harassment, and where defendants pointed this out in their motion but district judge did not mention point
in his order. Tarkowski v County of Lake (1985, CA7 Ill) 775 F2d 173, 3 FR Serv 3d 231.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying award of attorney fees as sanctions under Rule 11 against plaintiff
and his lawyers, given appellate deference to as District Court's first hand knowledge of counsel's conduct. La Rouche
v National Broadcasting Co. (1986, CA4 Va) 780 F2d 1134, 12 Media L R 1585, 19 Fed Rules Evid Serv 990, 4 FR
Serv 3d 42, cert den (1986) 479 US 818, 93 L Ed 2d 34, 107 S Ct 79.
Attorney fees will not be granted to defendant, who requested fees on grounds that plaintiffs' pleadings and
supporting motions were frivolous, where defendant made only general challenge to all motions which was not adequate
to preserve claims as to each motion separately considered. Trevino v Holly Sugar Corp. (1987, CA5 Tex) 811 F2d
896, 43 BNA FEP Cas 280, 42 CCH EPD P 36877.
Where plaintiffs violated Rule 11 by failing to determine existence of diversity before filing suit, defendants' attorney
fees were unreasonable and will not be included in sanction since defendants failed to mitigate damages when they did
not address diversity issue, but instead prepared elaborate motion to dismiss based on other grounds. Pollution Control
Indus. of Am. v Van Gundy (1994, CA7 Ind) 21 F3d 152, 28 FR Serv 3d 604.
Where district court found that plaintiff bank had proceeded to litigate in bad faith and awarded insurer sanctions
under its inherent power, ample evidence supported district court's exercise of its inherent authority to award attorneys
fees; FRCP 11, rather than Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.51, governed award of sanctions for frivolous conduct, since Ohio
statute was procedural in nature, but FRCP 11 sanctions were not available, since defendant insurer had failed to notify
bank with "safe harbor" letter. First Bank of Marietta v Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2002, CA6 Ohio) 307 F3d 501,
2002 FED App 356P.
Defendant bank is not entitled to award of attorneys' fees under Rule 11, notwithstanding dismissal of complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, where (1) although bank's passive maintenance of 4 correspondent
bank accounts in state to facilitate international banking transactions was insufficient contact to satisfy due process, it
cannot be said there was no reasonable basis for plaintiff's argument that bank had minimum contacts with state, (2)
conclusion that bank's receipt of $ 250,000 investment installment through one of its correspondent bank accounts
within state was not material act in alleged fraudulent scheme does not mean that plaintiff had no reasonable basis for
making such assertion, and (3) bank has not established that plaintiffs acted wantonly or in bad faith in bringing action.
Leema Enterprises, Inc. v Willi (1984, SD NY) 582 F Supp 255, 39 FR Serv 2d 162.
Fact that plaintiff had repeatedly initiated obviously groundless actions, coupled with specifics of action under False
Claims Act [31 USCS § § 3729 et seq.] sufficiently establish imprints of improper purposes for suits in violation of
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Rule 11, and would provide basis for award of attorney fees. United States ex rel. U.S.-Namibia (Southwest Africa)
Trade & Cultural Council, Inc. v Africa Fund (1984, SD NY) 588 F Supp 1350.
Action of plaintiff's attorney involuntarily dismissing civil rights suit pursuant to Rule 41 prior to hearing on
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, does not make defendants prevailing party or entitle them to award of attorney fees
under Rule 11, since plaintiffs can voluntarily dismiss action under Rule 41 as matter of right when defendants have not
answered complaint or moved for summary judgment, since voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not make
defendants prevailing party, and since allegations in complaint, although poorly drafted, have not been shown to be
vexatious, frivolous, groundless, brought in bad faith, or brought to harass or embarrass defendants; defendants are not
entitled to attorney fees under Rule 11, where plaintiff's attorney could reasonable have believed that he would be able
to establish state action. Fernandez v Southside Hospital (1984, ED NY) 593 F Supp 840.
Defendant is not entitled to attorneys' fees as automatic consequence of success on motion to dismiss for failure to
state claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Robinson v C.R. Laurence Co. (1985, DC Colo) 105 FRD 567, 2 FR Serv 3d
360.
After dismissing federal diversity complaint on ground of prior state action pending between same parties involving
same issues, court would not award attorney fees for violation by plaintiff of Rule 11 in having brought unnecessary,
forum-shopping lawsuit, where state court is about 2 years further behind in its docket than federal court, federal forum
is more convenient geographically, and artful conniving by litigants to gain access to diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts has been tolerated in past. Coast Mfg. Co. v Keylon (1985, SD NY) 600 F Supp 696.
Although plaintiff failed to establish that diversity existed and motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction was granted, attorney fees will not be awarded to defendants under Rule 11 where lack of uniform authority
existed on subject of citizenship of alien corporations under § 1332(c). Chok v S & W Berisford, PLC (1985, SD NY)
624 F Supp 440.
Attorney's fees were assessed against plaintiff's counsel under Rule 11 where action against defendant was clearly
barred by res judicata, which satisfied requirement that plaintiff's counsel be shown to have acted in bad faith to
willfully abuse the judicial system. Sam & Mary Housing Corp. v New York State (1986, SD NY) 632 F Supp 1448.
Broker is not entitled to attorney's fees under Rule 11 where question regarding statute of limitations applicable to
client's RICO claims against broker was unsettled and client's counsel acted in good faith, even though claims were
dismissed on summary judgment. Davis v A.G. Edwards & Sons (1986, WD La) 635 F Supp 707, affd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, remanded (1987, CA5 La) 823 F2d 105, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93329, 8 FR Serv 3d
557.
Defendant state court judges are entitled to award of attorney fees under standards of both Rule 11 and 42 USCS §
1988, where plaintiff brought action under 42 USCS § 1983 alleging that judges' denial of oral request for jury trial
and hearing, for speeding ticket case, deprived him of freedom of speech and right to jury trial, since plaintiff was
clearly aware, from prior suit against same judge, that doctrine of judicial immunity barred suit, and complaint was
therefore vexatious, frivolous, groundless and in blatant disregard of Rule 11 requirements. Dyson v Sposeep (1986,
ND Ind) 637 F Supp 616.
Where plaintiff and its attorney initially filed suit in Connecticut when they knew or should have known that this was
improper venue, and they continued to prosecute litigation in name of plaintiff which they knew or should have known
was not entitled to any relief, such actions constitute flagrant and costly violations of Rule 11, and therefore sanction
amounting to defendant's reasonable attorney fees will be imposed on plaintiff and its counsel. M.S. Chambers & Son,
Inc. v Tambrands, Inc. (1987, DC Mass) 118 FRD 274.
Sanctions in form of attorney's fees and of resolving jurisdictional issue in favor of plaintiff are imposed under Rules
11 and 37, where defendant first lied to court in affidavit regarding its contacts with forum state and continued to rely
on false affidavit in face of court's order directing that discovery proceed in good faith, because defendant clearly
disobeyed court's order and filed affidavit in bad faith which contained matters not well grounded in fact. Boron v
West Texas Exports, Inc. (1988, SD Fla) 680 F Supp 1532, affd without op (1989, CA11 Fla) 869 F2d 1500.
Where plaintiffs filed lawsuit seeking to enforce provisions of collective bargaining agreement to which they were
not parties and from which they were expressly excluded, plaintiffs and their counsel together are ordered to pay
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by defendant in defending lawsuit and in bringing motion for sanctions. Nichols v
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1989, DC Neb) 127 FRD 525, 131 BNA LRRM 3144, 14 FR Serv 3d 1387, mod,
reconsideration den, in part (1989, DC Neb) 127 FRD 526, 14 FR Serv 3d 1388.
Where plaintiff and her attorney knowingly used manufactured document to advance case, plaintiff and her attorney
will be liable, as Rule 11 sanction, for attorney fees incurred by defendants in proving that document was false. Pope v
Federal Express Corp. (1991, WD Mo) 138 FRD 684.
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In action involving numerous defendants, where there was no evidence to support naming of dismissed defendants,
their inclusion in complaint violated Rule 11, but sanction of attorney fees is not appropriate since little work was done
solely on behalf of dismissed defendants, so attorneys will be required to pay fine of $ 200 for each dismissed
defendant, plus they will be required to attend seminar regarding Rule 11 sanctions and to file proof of attendance with
court. Martin v Brown (1993, WD Pa) 151 FRD 580, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98145, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P
8438, subsequent app, remanded (1995, CA3 Pa) 63 F3d 1252, 33 FR Serv 3d 551 (criticized in Satcorp Int'l Group v
China Nat'l Silk Import & Export Corp. (1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 3, 36 FR Serv 3d 463).
Plaintiffs' counsel was sanctioned personally for attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by defendants because he acted
unreasonably and vexatiously and his advocacy needlessly multiplied proceedings; record supported conclusion that
plaintiff's counsel's conduct warranted sanctions under FRCP 11 and 28 USCS § 1927 where he (1) amended
complaint four different times, delaying litigation process, and forcing defendants to amend and refile their pleading, (2)
failed to properly serve some defendants, (3) failed to prosecute case on several occasions, which eventually led to its
dismissal, (4) failed to oppose defendants' various motions to dismiss, forcing court to intervene and warn him, resulting
in needless use of court's and defendants' resources, (5) failed to provide notification of motions to defendants' counsel
on several occasions, and (6) failed to appear in chambers for conferences. Bermudez v 1 World Prods. (2002, DC
Puerto Rico) 209 FRD 287.
Sanctions were warranted against plaintiffs' counsel and defendants were awarded their attorneys' fees where court
found that plaintiffs' counsel sued one defendant for sole purpose of destroying defendants' right to remove action to
federal court; plaintiffs' counsel promised to dismiss him once deadline to remove was safely behind them and even
agreed to pay his defense costs. Phillips v First Nat'l Bank of Weatherford (2002, ND Tex) 258 F Supp 2d 501.
District court imposed reduced amount of attorney's fees as sanctions against party and his attorney who failed to
appear for oral argument, and then moved to reschedule argument, as sufficient to deter future misconduct. Kassab v
Aetna Indus. (2003, ED Mich) 265 F Supp 2d 819.
Victorious tax defendant is not entitled to attorney fees under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) (28 USCS §
2412) or under Rule 11, where defendant is already entitled to fees under Internal Revenue Code (26 USC § 7430),
because (1) 28 USCS § 2412(e) precludes application of EAJA "to costs, fees, and other expenses in connection with
any proceeding to which § 7430 applies," and (2) question of applicability of EAJA and Rule 11 is moot since
defendant has already recouped fees for himself under 26 USCS § 7430. United States v McPherson (1987, MD NC)
660 F Supp 298, 87-2 USTC P 9512, 60 AFTR 2d 5288, revd on other grounds (1988, CA4 NC) 840 F2d 244, 88-1
USTC P 9194, 61 AFTR 2d 677.
227. --Pro se plaintiff, generally
Although court can properly consider plaintiff's ability to pay monetary sanctions as one factor in assessing
sanctions, it cannot decline to impose sanctions simply because plaintiff was proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis.
Warren v Guelker (1994, CA9 Wash) 29 F3d 1386, 94 CDOS 5414, 94 Daily Journal DAR 9910, 29 FR Serv 3d 947.
Pro se plaintiff's contention that Internal Revenue Code does not apply to him, despite clear precedents to contrary,
justifies finding of subjective bad faith warranting assessment of defendant's reasonable attorneys' fees under Rule 11.
Snyder v IRS (1984, ND Ind) 596 F Supp 240, 84-2 USTC P 9894, 40 FR Serv 2d 496, 54 AFTR 2d 6425.
Pro se plaintiff in legal malpractice suit is liable for Rule 11 attorney fees incurred by his former attorney where
plaintiff had no reasonable belief, when filing complaint, that attorney had improperly permitted his action to be
dismissed. Cavallary v Lakewood Sky Diving Center (1985, SD NY) 623 F Supp 242, 3 FR Serv 3d 628.
Attorney fees are properly awarded to defendant in negligence action under Rule 11 where pro se plaintiff filed
second action after judge ruled he was contractually bound not to sue defendant, which raised no new issues.
Cavallary v Lakewood Sky Diving Center (1985, SD NY) 623 F Supp 242, 3 FR Serv 3d 628.
Pro se plaintiff is liable for attorney fees under Rule 11 when plaintiff is fully aware of lack of legal merit to claims,
but spitefully proceeds with action. Cavallary v Lakewood Sky Diving Center (1985, SD NY) 623 F Supp 242, 3 FR
Serv 3d 628.
Pro se tax litigant is liable under Rule 11 for attorney fees of defendants after presenting arguments precluded by
precedent and invalid on merits, and although Rule 11 sanctions should not be used to chill creativity, creativity must be
in service of good faith application of law or at least good faith request for change in law. Pawlowske v Chrysler Corp.
(1985, ND Ill) 623 F Supp 569, 86-1 USTC P 9392, 57 AFTR 2d 892, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ill) 799 F2d 753.
Pro se plaintiff alleging baseless claims about legality of currency system or recognition of legal tender after losing
bid at sheriff's sale, and pursuing same basic issues after numerous decisions were decided adversely to plaintiff and
after plaintiff was warned by court to cease pursuing meritless claims, is ordered to pay defendant's attorney fees in
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
amount of $ 500 and to pay clerk of court $ 2,000 as sanction for significant expenditure of judicial resources in order to
deal with absolutely groundless and frivolous claim. Nixon v Rose (1985, ND Ind) 631 F Supp 794.
District Court imposes Rule 11 sanctions consisting of attorney's fees and fines on pro se debtor plaintiffs who had
utilized debt consolidation benefits and brought action to escape their legal obligations. Terpstra v Farmers &
Merchants Bank (1985, ND Ind) 634 F Supp 47, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 792 F2d 142.
Although 1993 version of Rule 11 specifies that monetary sanctions may not be awarded against represented party
for violation, where pro se plaintiff was practicing attorney, he must be held to same objective standard applied to
counsel representing third party, and therefore plaintiff is subject to monetary sanctions for Rule 11 violations involving
frivolous contentions of law. Segarra v Messina (1994, ND NY) 158 FRD 230.
228. --Frivolous or harassing motion
District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs under Rule 11 as sanction against
plaintiff who filed motion for leave to amend for improper purpose of determining whether defendant would resist it,
and withdrew motion in accordance with pre-conceived plan to do so if motion were opposed; defendant's attorneys
could have been informally contacted in order to ascertain whether they would object rather than subjecting them to
considerable expense of opposing motion. Cohen v Virginia Electric & Power Co. (1986, CA4 Va) 788 F2d 247, 229
USPQ 729, 5 FR Serv 3d 425.
Sanction of attorney's fees was properly denied where case clarifying doctrine with which plaintiff's case dealt and
refuting plaintiff's argument was decided after plaintiff's relevant motions were filed, and therefore it could not be said
that plaintiff filed motions merely to harass. Hufsmith v Weaver (1987, CA8 Ark) 817 F2d 455, 1987-1 CCH Trade
Cases P 67544.
Defendant was entitled, under Rule 11, to attorney fees incurred in resisting unwarranted motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56, which motion plaintiff had improperly used in attempt to invoke court action to narrow issues
for trial. SFM Corp. v Sundstrand Corp. (1984, ND Ill) 102 FRD 555, 39 FR Serv 2d 658.
229. --Frivolous or harassing claim or suit
District court did not abuse discretion in awarding defendants attorney fees under Rule 11 where plaintiff's filing of
complaint was egregious and blatant violation of rule, in that claim was barred by well established principles of res
judicata enunciated by United States Supreme Court, and plaintiff's 10 year history of litigation demonstrates penchant
for harassing medical school defendants. Cannon v Loyola University of Chicago (1986, CA7 Ill) 784 F2d 777, 4 FR
Serv 3d 241, cert den (1987) 479 US 1033, 93 L Ed 2d 834, 107 S Ct 880.
District court properly ordered 42 USCS § 1983 plaintiff to pay defendants' costs and attorneys' fees, and probably
would have erred if it had not awarded attorneys' fees under Rule 11, where plaintiff's equal protection claim against
housing authority official was not supported by any legally relevant facts, and where other claims had already been
rejected by state courts and were clearly without merit and frivolous. Bartel Dental Books Co. v Schultz (1986, CA2
NY) 786 F2d 486, 5 FR Serv 3d 414, cert den (1986) 478 US 1006, 92 L Ed 2d 713, 106 S Ct 3298.
District Court properly awarded Rule 11 attorney fees against plaintiff's attorney who filed civil rights action against
his former wife, her lawyer, and state judge who rendered divorce decree, where record reflects no reasonable inquiry
into facts surrounding conclusory conspiracy allegations, long-standing Supreme Court precedent grants absolute
immunity to state judge from liability for damages for judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, and slight research
would have revealed that litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing complaints about those actions
in lower federal courts cast in form of civil rights suits. Hale v Harney (1986, CA5 Tex) 786 F2d 688, 4 FR Serv 3d
643.
Attorneys' fees were rightly imposed for filing of civil complaint which made very serious criminal charges without
foundation, which allegations could not have been believed to be well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or
good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. MGIC Indem. MGIC Indem. Corp. v
Weisman (1986, CA9 Hawaii) 803 F2d 500.
District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to defendant where plaintiff's position was not without
foundation and could not be termed unreasonable. District No. 8, International Asso. of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v Clearing, Div. of U.S. Industries, Inc. (1986, CA7 Ill) 807 F2d 618, 124 BNA LRRM 2074, 105 CCH LC P
12119.
In action involving contract in which plaintiff company agreed to buy oil at set price from defendant company,
sanctions consisting of defendant's attorney's fees were properly imposed on plaintiff which argued that its breach of
contract in refusing to purchase oil when market price dropped after Saudi Arabia flooded market was excused by
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
contract's "Act of God" clause. Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v Southern Fuels Co. (1987, CA4 Md) 813 F2d 1327, 7
FR Serv 3d 321, cert den (1987) 484 US 829, 98 L Ed 2d 60, 108 S Ct 99.
In action by newspaper publishing association appealing arbitrator's decision regarding interpretation of contract with
union, sanction of attorney fees will not be imposed on association which was able to make colorable argument that
arbitrator had exceeded his authority by reading past practices of parties into contract as contractual requirement,
despite express provision that entire agreement of parties was embodied within written contract, where District Court
held that arbitrator merely used past practices to interpret existing contract. Chicago Newspaper Publishers' Asso. v
Chicago Web Printing Pressmen's Union No. 7 (1987, CA7 Ill) 821 F2d 390, 125 BNA LRRM 2617, 106 CCH LC P
12395, 7 FR Serv 3d 1412.
Award of attorney fees as sanction against unsuccessful plaintiff was improper where, although plaintiff's claim may
be characterized as without foundation, there is no evidence that he was in bad faith in bringing claim or that it was
brought for any purpose other than to receive what he thought he was entitled to under law. Nesmith v Martin Marietta
Aerospace (1987, CA11 Fla) 833 F2d 1489, 45 BNA FEP Cas 1023, 45 CCH EPD P 37606, 10 FR Serv 3d 41.
Where record makes obvious that counsel from beginning should have known of factual inadequacy of plaintiffs'
claim against particular defendant, sanction of payment of that defendant's attorney fees was properly imposed on
plaintiffs' counsel. Muthig v Brant Point Nantucket, Inc. (1988, CA1 Mass) 838 F2d 600, 10 FR Serv 3d 512, 98 ALR
Fed 417.
Although plaintiffs' suit does not merit relief, their causes of action were plausible, and therefore District Court did
not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees. O'Neal v De Kalb County (1988, CA11 Ga) 850 F2d 653, 11 FR Serv
3d 899.
Where claims against one of defendants were dismissed without prejudice on plaintiff's motion, plaintiff should not
be required to pay that defendant's attorney fees as sanction under Rule 11 since record does not indicate claims were
filed for improper purpose or were frivolous or without legal merit or factual support. Gillette v Delmore (1989, CA9
Or) 886 F2d 1194, 106 ALR Fed 383.
Having found that plaintiff was under physical and mental strain at time he filed complaint, District Court declined to
award fees to defendants, properly concluding that although stress and ill health do not excuse violation of rule,
presence of such factors may mitigate punishment. Weisman v Alleco, Inc. (1991, CA4 Md) 925 F2d 77.
District court did not err in imposing sanction on plaintiff equal to defendant's actual attorney fees where suit was
wholly frivolous and should never have been brought since there was no evidence to support plaintiff's allegations, and
therefore award of attorney fees was least severe sanction adequate to serve purposes of Rule 11. Granader v McBee
(1994, CA5 Tex) 23 F3d 120, 29 FR Serv 3d 656.
Assertion of frivolous claims identical to those previously struck by higher court as frivolous warrants award of
attorneys' fees taxed against plaintiff and her counsel for time spent in answering and preparing to defend against
frivolous claims. Andre v Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust (1983, SD NY) 97 FRD 699, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
99189, 37 FR Serv 2d 228.
Attorney fees are properly awarded against attorney who brought breach of fair representation claim against union
based primarily on attorney's emotional belief and not on any legal or factual grounds. Taylor v Belger Cartage
Service, Inc. (1984, WD Mo) 102 FRD 172.
Attorneys' fees are properly assessed against plaintiff's counsel where there was no plausible basis for plaintiff's
attempt to invoke District Court's subject matter jurisdiction and complaint appears to have been filed as no more than
duplication of state court action. Weir v Lehman Newspapers, Inc. (1985, DC Colo) 105 FRD 574, 2 FR Serv 3d 1494.
Where taxpayer's complaint is "frivolous as a matter of law," and has been filed solely for purposes of harassment
and delay, court will award attorneys' fees to IRS under authority of Rule 11. Smith v Egger (1985, ED Cal) 108 FRD
44, 85-2 USTC P 9711, 88-1 USTC P 9259, 57 AFTR 2d 410.
Award of attorney fees under Rule 11 would be made in action by taxpayer for return of money levied by Internal
Revenue Service where complaint is frivolous, its allegations are intemperate, and it appears to have been filed for
purpose of harassing and intimidating government officials in performance of their duties. Eske v Hynes (1985, ED
Wis) 601 F Supp 142, 85-1 USTC P 9286, 55 AFTR 2d 720.
Award of attorney fees is appropriate under Rule 11 against plaintiffs who brought purported admiralty action
seeking return of original birth certificates which were on file with state department of health services, inasmuch as
there is nothing in allegations of amended complaint to show that complaint is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and since allegations are so
patently frivolous and groundless as to evince improper purpose on part of plaintiffs in making them. Felix v Arizona
Dep't of Health Services, Goods, Vital Records Section (1985, DC Ariz) 606 F Supp 634.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Although District Court cannot conclude that plaintiff or its counsel acted in subjective bad faith in bringing antitrust
action against defendant, defendant is properly awarded attorney's fees under Rule 11 for period commencing with
plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment and attorney's fees, where facts sufficient to lead
competent attorney to recognize futility of claim were made apparent at least concurrently with defendant's summary
judgment motion, if not sooner, notwithstanding plaintiff's claim that defendant's tardiness in responding to
interrogatories and document requests constitutes excuse for plaintiff's persistence in asserting meritless claim, and
where plaintiff made only token efforts to discover information pertinent to viability of its claim. Burlington Coat
Factory Warehouse v Belk Bros. Co. (1985, SD NY) 621 F Supp 224.
Under Rule 11, plaintiff's counsel is liable for attorney fees of defendant employer for bringing claim which
competent attorney, after reasonable inquiry, would have found destined to fail, in that state-court jurisprudence showed
no retreat from employment-at-will doctrine. Zick v Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1985, ND Ill) 623 F Supp 927, 4 FR
Serv 3d 74.
Attorney fees as sanction are not warranted under Rule 11 where pleadings reveal that all parties vigorously
attempted to litigate action in area of law not well settled under unusual factual settings, since sanction would chill
enthusiasm of counsel in prosecuting civil RICO (18 USCS § § 1961-1968) case under factually novel theory. Van
Dorn Co., Central States Can Co. Div. v Howington (1985, ND Ohio) 623 F Supp 1548, 4 FR Serv 3d 1199.
Where plaintiff's counsel signed pretrial order listing all of plaintiff's claims against defendant after discovery was
complete and when counsel should have known that there was no credible evidence to support plaintiff's claims, District
Court found that it was objectively unreasonable for plaintiff's counsel to sign pretrial order and to continue to prosecute
case, and thus court imposed sanctions of attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11 against plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel.
Advo System, Inc. v Walters (1986, ED Mich) 110 FRD 426.
Defendants in labor relations action were not entitled to award of attorney fees under Rule 11 where plaintiff
employees reasonably could have interpreted state precedent to mean that employees can maintain breach of contract
action against employer in state court and that state court's statute of limitations for breach of contract actions would
apply, despite fact that action ultimately was dismissed under federal statute of limitations. Wenneshiemer v Fore Way
Express, Inc. (1986, ED Wis) 624 F Supp 502, 122 BNA LRRM 2362, 112 CCH LC P 11307.
Action brought under 42 USCS § 1983 alleging that plaintiff had been arrested by dirty tricks was not meritless so
as to give rise to award of attorney fees as sanctions under Rule 11, where reasonable attorney could have concluded
that allegations supporting claims might be established, in light of fact that earlier arrest warrant had been held
unlawful. Singer v Bell (1986, SD NY) 627 F Supp 737.
Where complaint by medical corporation erroneously alleges specific contractual relationship between individual
physicians and medical corporation which has possession of contract, there is violation of Rule 11 and physicians shall
be awarded fees incurred in investigating contractual relationship and filing and briefing of Rule 11 motion. Medical
Emergency Service Associates (MESA) S.C. v Foulke (1986, ND Ill) 633 F Supp 156, affd (1988, CA7 Ill) 844 F2d 391,
10 FR Serv 3d 1239.
Award of attorney fees is imposed against employee's counsel in action against employer where employee
voluntarily dismissed action halfway through case in chief, conducted while former Rule 11 requiring bad faith was in
effect, but where fees sought by employer were for portion of proceedings subsequent to 1983 amendment, because case
had no merit under existing law, no reasonable argument to change law and was frivolous to extreme, and conduct of
counsel was considered under Rule 11 as amended. Cowden v Montgomery County Soc. for Cancer Control (1986, SD
Ohio) 653 F Supp 1072, 8 EBC 1754.
Private attorney's fees are awarded to county commissioner following voluntary dismissal of action by police officer
in which commissioner was subject to baseless allegations of corrupt activity, where complaint seemed to allege
wrongdoing only in commissioner's official capacity, because allegations would have supported action against
commissioner individually and, as public official, commissioner was entitled to seek private counsel. Hawkins v
Schirack (1986, ND Ohio) 659 F Supp 1.
RICO defendant's Rule 11 motion for costs and attorneys' fees is granted, where sketchy, conclusory complaint
alleges plaintiff made $ 5,000 loan to one brother who ran his own company, other brother's separate company cashed
loan check and its employee reviewed loan agreement, and now original borrower has defaulted after paying only $ 300,
and complaint claims RICO violation, state consumer protection act violation, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and
common law count for money lent, because plaintiff's counsel apparently filed complaint (1) as fishing expedition in
hope that discovery would uncover evidence of claim, or (2) as harassment in hope that defendant would settle rather
than face time and expense of litigation. Barlow v McLeod (1986, DC Dist Col) 666 F Supp 222, affd without op
(1988, App DC) 274 US App DC 70, 861 F2d 303.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Attorney's fees are warranted where plaintiff's attorney instituted admiralty action based on alleged oral contract for
repairs to vessel's machinery and attorney ignored or failed to discover well-established law which should have
dissuaded him from filing such action. Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v Gemini Lady (1987, SD Fla) 662 F Supp 1525,
affd (1988, CA11 Fla) 853 F2d 848, 11 FR Serv 3d 1495.
Prevailing defendant village is not entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 USCS § 1988 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, where
Iranian-American couple brought discrimination suit following village's denial of zoning variance for development of
their property, but couple's claims were all summarily dismissed for pleading deficiencies and untimeliness, because
couple's unartful complaint was not frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, but in fact had reasonable basis in law.
Tabrizi v Glen Ellyn (1988, ND Ill) 684 F Supp 207, affd (1989, CA7 Ill) 883 F2d 587, 14 FR Serv 3d 402.
Oil company is awarded reasonable attorney's fees expended in defense of frivolous claim by holder of power of
attorney with respect to debentures of bankrupt oil company indebted to oil company under multibillion dollar Texas
judgment, where civil rights-like claim is that oil company forced bankruptcy and default on bankrupt's debenture
agreements by insisting on compliance with Texas bond and lien provisions for insuring enforcement of judgments,
which impermissibly burdened bankrupt oil company's due process right to appeal judgment against it, because such
sanctions are authorized and proper under Rule 11 or 42 USCS § 1988. Crigler v Pennzoil Co. (1988, SD NY) 687 F
Supp 120, affd without op (1989, CA2 NY) 875 F2d 307.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), bank was awarded full amount of attorney's fees and costs requested, where award
was necessary due to complaining attorney's want of diligence in researching and supporting allegations set forth in
complaint and to effectively deter similar conduct in future, and bank's attorneys had submitted affidavit documenting
attorney's fees and costs and reasonableness of those costs and fees. Elsman v Std. Fed. Bank (2003, ED Mich) 238 F
Supp 2d 903.
Attorney's fees are awarded to divorced wife, where former husband brought action challenging state supreme court's
ruling on divorce decree and alleging constitutional violations by wife and state judge, because husband's attorney
clearly knew or should have known that wife was not state actor and complaint indicated on its face that District Court
had no jurisdiction to review decision of state supreme court. Thrush v Morrison (1987, MD Pa) 665 F Supp 372, 8 FR
Serv 3d 720, affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 845 F2d 1016, cert den (1988) 488 US 825, 102 L Ed 2d 51, 109 S Ct 74
and affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 845 F2d 1016.
230. Award sought against defendant or attorney
District Court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on defendants, and although court implied that counterclaim was entirely
unjustified, neither data submitted nor findings of court indicated how any particular pleading, motion, or paper related
to any particular expense or attorney fee, and therefore, award of attorney fees must be vacated. Bodenhamer Bldg.
Corp. v Architectural Research Corp. (1989, CA6 Mich) 873 F2d 109, 13 FR Serv 3d 1144.
Power to tax attorneys' fees against defense counsel existed under Rule 11 where court found that defense counsel
had needlessly and vexatiously required plaintiff and its counsel to expend excess funds to respond to patently frivolous
motion. North American Foreign Trading Corp. v Zale Corp. (1979, SD NY) 83 FRD 293.
Reasonable attorneys' fees incurred as result of defendant's unsuccessful motion to dismiss are appropriately awarded
to plaintiff pursuant to Rule 11, where defendant maintained, contrary to well-settled law, that despite plaintiff's foreign
citizenship, his state residency destroyed complete diversity as required between plaintiff and defendant. Villalva v
Boulevard Hospital Corp. (1983, SD NY) 37 FR Serv 2d 1282.
Plaintiff's claim that it is entitled to attorneys' fees under Rule 11 is without merit where it erroneously seeks to rely
upon allegations in defendants' amended answer which was filed after amended complaint. Burma-Bibas, Inc. v
Excelled Leather Coat Corp. (1984, SD NY) 584 F Supp 1214, 223 USPQ 969.
Attorney's fees are assessed against former client for litigating in bad faith where law firm sued client for fees
involved in creation of trust and client filed false answer on behalf of trust for purpose of delay. Kramer, Levin,
Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v Aronoff (1986, SD NY) 638 F Supp 714.
Counsel for apartment manager in 42 USCS § 1982 action is liable for attorney's fees, where (1) counsel's claim that
apartment manager cannot be named as party to lawsuit since she lacked ownership interest is unfounded, because 42
USCS § 1982 liability may be extended to agents and employees, (2) no authority exists to support counsel's assertion
that security deposit is required to make prima facie showing under 42 USCS § 1982, and (3) counsel's assertions that
testimony of "testers" is immaterial and irrelevant is absurd. Treadwell v Kennedy (1987, CD Ill) 656 F Supp 442.
Attorney's fees will not be granted to plaintiff as Rule 11 sanctions, where government counsel did not review all
resources and facts underlying action prior to filing its answer, since such burden could never be imposed at time of
answering complaint nor does reasonable inquiry requirement of Rule 11 mandate such review by counsel. Canton
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Police Benevolent Ass'n v United States (1987, ND Ohio) 658 F Supp 411, 87-1 USTC P 9209, 60 AFTR 2d 5589, affd
(1988, CA6 Ohio) 844 F2d 1231, 9 EBC 1880, 88-1 USTC P 9285, 61 AFTR 2d 1065.
Pursuant to Rule 11 defendants and their counsel must pay plaintiff its attorney's fees incurred in addressing removal
petition and bringing successful motion to remand action to state court, where reasonable prefiling inquiry by
defendants' counsel would have revealed that plaintiff's cause of action stemmed from municipal law, that constitutional
implications arose only from defenses raised, and that removal petition was not well grounded in fact or warranted by
law; fees will not be awarded under either 28 USCS § 1927 or 42 USCS § 1988 since counsel did not file for removal
in bad faith or prevail in federal civil rights action. Cobb County v Butler (1988, ND Ga) 682 F Supp 50, 10 FR Serv
3d 702.
Rule 11 sanction charging attorney's fees to promissory-notes maker's attorney is imposed, where it was clear from
start that maker conceded his execution of and default on notes, because to extend proceedings by contesting whether
FDIC or bank purchasing most assets of insolvent bank held notes was unreasonable and waste of court resources.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Horn (1990, DC Colo) 751 F Supp 186.
Where defendants and their attorneys repeatedly refused to comply with obviously legitimate discovery requests,
Rule 11 has been violated by both defendants and their counsel, and they shall be jointly liable for plaintiff's related
attorney fees. United States v International Bhd. of Teamsters (1991, SD NY) 134 FRD 50, 138 BNA LRRM 2827, 118
CCH LC P 10531, supp op, mod on other grounds (1991, SD NY) 1991 US Dist LEXIS 2878 and vacated, remanded
(1991, CA2 NY) 948 F2d 1338, 138 BNA LRRM 2839, 120 CCH LC P 11014, 21 FR Serv 3d 304.
In imposing sanctions on defendant for violation of Rule 11, attorney fees cannot be awarded to plaintiff who acted
pro se and incurred no attorney fees; however, defendant and its attorneys must jointly pay any other expenses incurred
by plaintiff in connection with his opposition to offending motion, and court will reprimand defendant and its attorneys.
Committe v Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A. (1993, DC Vt) 150 FRD 495.
231. Miscellaneous
Union was entitled to sanctions in form of attorneys' fees where company's attack on arbitration award was frivolous,
barred by statute of limitations, barred by company's submission to arbitration without reservation, and barred by
arbitrator's opinion stating he was interpreting collective bargaining agreement. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 8 (1986, CA7 Ill) 802 F2d 247, 123 BNA LRRM
2654, 105 CCH LC P 12044, 5 FR Serv 3d 793.
Union will not be awarded attorney fees as sanction against company which refused to honor award of arbitrator
since company's position that arbitrator's award exceeded authority granted by parties' contract was not totally devoid of
arguable merit. Local 879, Allied Industrial Workers v Chrysler Marine Corp. (1987, CA7 Wis) 819 F2d 786, 125
BNA LRRM 2681, 106 CCH LC P 12426.
District court did not violate its mandate on remand by simply reducing sanction of fee award under Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2), rather than deciding on specific entries in fee petition, because attorney asserted only boilerplate objections to
all but two entries and court did not mandate that district court use particular methodology on remand. Divane v Krull
Elec. Co. (2003, CA7 Ill) 319 F3d 307.
District court erred, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), by including in sanction against attorney $ 4,800 in fees
that were generated by trustee before filing of sanctionable answer and counterclaim. Divane v Krull Elec. Co. (2003,
CA7 Ill) 319 F3d 307.
Notion that jurors should be hailed into court to answer in civil action for damages for verdict they have rendered is
so outrageous that award of attorneys' fees is proper under Rule 11. Sunn v Dean (1984, ND Ga) 597 F Supp 79.
Neither plaintiff nor defendant in trademark infringement suit is entitled to award of attorney fees under Rule 11,
where it was not patently clear that claims had absolutely no chance of success under existing precedent or reasonable
argument for extension, modification or reversal of current law, and plaintiff's allegations that Rule 11 motion was
brought in bad faith are destined to fail. El Greco Leather Products Co. v Shoe World, Inc. (1985, ED NY) 623 F Supp
1038, 228 USPQ 574.
Award of attorney fees is denied in action where conduct resulting in inclusion of aggrieved party was not
demonstration of bad faith as required by preamendment version of rule which was applicable at time of filing of
complaint. Water Technologies Corp. v Calco, Ltd. (1987, ND Ill) 658 F Supp 980, 1 USPQ2d 1872.
Complaint appealing arbitration award was so totally devoid of merit as to warrant imposition of Rule 11 sanctions,
but it was inappropriate to award attorney fees for time spent on matters extraneous to suit itself, such as time devoted
to matters relating to press coverage. Quick & Reilly, Inc. v Jacobson (1989, SD NY) 126 FRD 24, CCH Fed Secur L
Rep P 94461.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Employer and its current counsel are jointly and severally ordered to pay union's reasonable attorneys' fees incurred
after employer's first post-counterclaim filing, where union's answer and counterclaim put employer's current lawyers
on notice that "delegation" issue was waived by predecessor counsel, because current counsel's continued pursuit of that
issue contravened FRCP 11, requiring imposition of appropriate sanction. National Wrecking Co. v International Bhd.
of Teamsters, Local No. 731 (1992, ND Ill) 790 F Supp 785.
Rule 11 sanction of attorney fees is not awarded to either plaintiff or defendant in collective bargaining dispute; Rule
11 does not authorize court to sanction party or attorney certifying documents, labeling of which is improper under local
rules, but which is grounded in law and fact and not filed for improper purpose, and Rule 11 does not authorize
sanctions, other than striking of pleading, motion, or other paper, where party or attorney signed no pleadings, motions,
or other papers. Interior Finish Contractors Asso. v Drywall Finishers Local Union No. 1955 (1985, ED Pa) 625 F
Supp 1233.
c. Other
232. Fine
Rule 11 sanction of ordering plaintiff's attorney in civil rights action to pay fine to clerk of court is reversed and
remanded where court reverses summary judgment in favor of defendants, since court finds that attorney was not
granted adequate opportunity by district court to submit materials in opposition to defendants' converted summary
judgment motions; however, if district court on remand dismisses claim with prejudice under Rule 12(b), it can request
submissions under Rule 11 on issue of whether attorney signing complaint believed, after reasonable inquiry, that
complaint was well grounded in fact. Donaldson v Clark (1986, CA11 Ga) 786 F2d 1570, 4 FR Serv 3d 694, reh gr,
vacated without op (1986, CA11 Ga) 794 F2d 572.
Rule permits imposition of appropriate sanction since it is designed to punish and to deter frivolous suits and to
discourage dilatory and abusive tactics, and fine may be appropriate sanction. Cheek v Doe (1987, CA7 Ill) 828 F2d
395, 87-2 USTC P 9464, 7 FR Serv 3d 1408, 60 AFTR 2d 5080, cert den (1987) 484 US 955, 98 L Ed 2d 374, 108 S Ct
349.
Where plaintiff and her attorney knowingly offered falsified document into evidence, and plaintiff's attorney had
previously been sanctioned for violating Rule 11 in another case, district court did not err in imposing sanction of $
25,000 on attorney. Pope v Federal Express Corp. (1995, CA8 Mo) 49 F3d 1327, 66 CCH EPD P 43477, 31 FR Serv 3d
1246.
Where attorney had previously been censured for violation of Rule 11 and had been warned that future transgressions
would not be treated so leniently, and attorney continued to engage in same type of inappropriate conduct, monetary
sanction of $ 1,500 was appropriate. Serritella v Markum (1997, CA7 Ill) 119 F3d 506, 38 FR Serv 3d 508, cert den
(1997) 522 US 999, 139 L Ed 2d 406, 118 S Ct 566.
Imposition of $ 10,000 punitive sanction on individual, as opposed to corporation or collective entity, requires that
person sanctioned receive procedural protections appropriate to criminal case. Mackler Prods., Inc. v Cohen (1998, CA2
NY) 146 F3d 126 (criticized in Revson v Cinque & Cinque (1999, SD NY) 70 F Supp 2d 415).
District Court imposes Rule 11 sanctions consisting of attorney's fees and fines on pro se debtor plaintiffs who had
utilized debt consolidation benefits and brought action to escape their legal obligations. Terpstra v Farmers &
Merchants Bank (1985, ND Ind) 634 F Supp 47, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 792 F2d 142.
Where plaintiff persisted in prosecuting action that was totally without merit and where court found strong
indications that plaintiff continued to prosecute case for purposes of harassment, District Court imposed fine pursuant to
Rule 11 to be paid to clerk of court, stating that plaintiff must be held accountable for waste of judicial resources. Advo
System, Inc. v Walters (1986, ED Mich) 110 FRD 426.
Where plaintiff's two attorneys both violated Rule 11 by filing frivolous complaint without sufficient inquiry into
factual and legal basis for claims, sanction will be imposed against both consisting of written reprimand and fine of $
1,200 to be paid to court, and further, attorney who was primarily responsible for most of pleadings and who has
previously been admonished for similar misconduct will be required to pay defendants' reasonable costs and attorney
fees. Johnson v McAdoo (1993, WD Okla) 150 FRD 684.
Plaintiffs are sanctioned $ 1,000 under FRCP 11 for filing fifth attempt to assert claims against IRS, where their real
property was properly levied upon and sold at tax lien foreclosure sale in late 1970s, because no claims advanced by
plaintiffs are premised upon existing law or reasonable extension or modification of existing law and, in view of prior
litigation efforts in this court, it is obvious that present action was intended as continuation of vexatious attack upon
every person and/or entity with connection to seizure and sale of their former property. Beckman v Battin (1995, DC
Mont) 926 F Supp 971, 84 AFTR 2d 6382.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Attorney who signed petition for discharge or sentence reduction is fined $ 1,000 pursuant to FRCP 11, where
petition raised issues already determined by Seventh Circuit, because attorney disregarded his ethical and legal
obligations, and failed to respond to order describing specific conduct that appeared to be sanctionable. Bardney v
United States (1996, ND Ill) 945 F Supp 152.
Fine of $ 1,000 would be assessed under FRCP 11 against law firm representing employee claiming wrongful
termination, when firm persisted in factually incorrect claim that employer breached promise to credit former period of
employment in determining retirement benefits, as it would be too difficult to determine what percentage of employee's
legal fees were incurred in refuting claim. Gambello v Time Warner Communs., Inc. (2002, ED NY) 186 F Supp 2d 209.
233. --As penalty or punishment (pre-1993 amendment cases)
District court acted improperly in assessing $ 500 fine against plaintiff's attorney in civil rights action; though Rule
11 does not expressly forbid imposition of fine paid to clerk of court as punishment, fine imposed for this purpose is
sanction in nature of criminal contempt, and court imposing fine must follow procedural safeguards applicable to
criminal contempt proceedings before levying fine. Donaldson v Clark (1986, CA11 Ga) 786 F2d 1570, 4 FR Serv 3d
694, reh gr, vacated without op (1986, CA11 Ga) 794 F2d 572.
District Court erred in imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 on litigious prisoner who filed civil rights actions
under 42 USCS § 1983, where fine was imposed as punishment since it was based in part on inmate's failure to comply
with court order and court failed to afford inmate procedural protections required in criminal contempt proceedings, and
where payment of sanction was precondition to inmate's ability to file future actions, and consequently possible total bar
to inmate's access to courts; and court stated that where prepayment of fine restricts filing of future actions, findings
must first be made to determine whether litigant is able to make payment. Cotner v Hopkins (1986, CA10 Okla) 795
F2d 900, 5 FR Serv 3d 1467.
Where district judge added $ 1000 sanction to fees requested by defendant's counsel as punishment for plaintiff's
counsel's outrageous conduct throughout lawsuit and in order to deter such conduct in future, district judge abused his
discretion by tacking on arbitrary sum to fees requested by opposing counsel in order to penalize offending counsel.
Magnus Elecs., Inc. v Masco Corp. (1989, CA7 Ill) 871 F2d 626, 13 FR Serv 3d 778, cert den (1989) 493 US 891, 107 L
Ed 2d 188, 110 S Ct 237.
234. Interest
It was not abuse of discretion for District Court to impose monetary sanction, based on 10 percent rate from original
date for entry of state court judgment prior to removal until date District Court remanded case to state court, against
diverse state court defendant which filed petition for removal on day prior to scheduled hearing on plaintiff's motion for
judgment on verdict, where (1) there is no merit to diverse defendant's contention that it became clear during plaintiff's
closing argument that claims against non-diverse defendants had been abandoned, and (2) under state law existing at
time of removal petition, such petition delayed entry of state court judgment and would have saved diverse defendant
substantial amount of interest if sanctions had not been imposed. Davis v Veslan Enterprises (1985, CA5 Tex) 765 F2d
494, 2 FR Serv 3d 836.
235. Further monetary sanctions
Where plaintiff's complaint, charging that 7 percent interest rate was usurious and that since bank which had loaned
him money was required to keep cash reserves of only 5 percent of its total deposits, he should be required to repay only
5 percent of his loan, was dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and irrational, and plaintiff then filed second identical,
but augmented, complaint, sanctions were properly imposed on plaintiff, and additional monetary sanctions will be
imposed following plaintiff's appeal. Farguson v MBank Houston, N.A. (1986, CA5 Tex) 808 F2d 358, 6 FR Serv 3d
825.
Further monetary sanctions will be imposed on plaintiffs who challenged disallowance of various adjustments and
imposition of penalties by Internal Revenue Service on same theories they asserted in previous appeals which were also
dismissed as frivolous with sanctions imposed. Stelly v Commissioner of IRS (1987, CA5 Tex) 808 F2d 442, 87-1
USTC P 9164, 59 AFTR 2d 519.
236. Other particular claims or awards
In action by former employee alleging discrimination, counterclaim by employer alleging that employee breached
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract, which claim sought $ 4.2 million in damages
from unemployed plaintiff, is frivolous and therefore subject to monetary sanctions where claim was wholly
unsubstantiated and without reasonable support and appeared to have been made for purposes of harassment. Hudson v
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Moore Business Forms, Inc. (1987, CA9 Cal) 827 F2d 450, 44 BNA FEP Cas 1310, 2 BNA IER Cas 1049, 44 CCH
EPD P 37335, 108 CCH LC P 55842, 8 FR Serv 3d 1200, reported at, amd (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 1156, 48 BNA
FEP Cas 898.
Sanction of $ 30 and injunction against further suit until sanction is satisfied are imposed on inmate who filed in
forma pauperis civil rights action alleging that during his detention in county jail sheriff unlawfully removed from
inmate's head silver dollar worth $ 126,000,000 and sent it to department of corrections which nefariously converted it
in violation of his constitutional rights. Jackson v Carpenter (1991, CA5 Tex) 921 F2d 68, 18 FR Serv 3d 1120.
District court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiff's attorney $ 150 where in opposition to defendant's
summary judgment motion, plaintiff's attorney filed brief identical to one he had filed in support of remand motion, and
such response was improper and impertinent. Ramirez v Fox Television Station (1993, CA9 Cal) 998 F2d 743, 93
CDOS 5337, 93 Daily Journal DAR 9045, 62 BNA FEP Cas 489, 143 BNA LRRM 2834, 62 CCH EPD P 42449, 125
CCH LC P 10768, 26 FR Serv 3d 1158.
Under Rule 11, sanctions are payable to adversaries, but not by violating attorney to his own client. Mark Indus. v
Sea Captain's Choice (1995, CA9 Wash) 50 F3d 730, 95 CDOS 2056, 95 Daily Journal DAR 3516, 31 FR Serv 3d 823.
Order of direct pay-out by sanctioned parties to injured party was within court's discretion where injured party
incurred expenses as direct result of sanctioned parties' improperly motivated actions, sanctioned parties' wealth was
largely protected from efforts by injured party to execute or garnish, and sanctioned parties never challenged their
ability to pay nor opposed injured party's affidavits detailing expenses incurred. Union Planters Bank v L & J Dev. Co.
(1997, CA6 Tenn) 115 F3d 378, 1997 FED App 169P, reh den (1997, CA6) 1997 US App LEXIS 19259.
Court will award interim benefits in social security cases, as well as other equitable remedies including remedies
directly against attorneys, Secretary's staff, or Secretary herself, pursuant to Rule 11, should there continue to be
inordinate delays in social security appeals on court's docket, as in cases where excuse that administrative hearing tape
is inaudible is interposed solely for purposes of delay. Brooks v Heckler (1985, ED Ky) 605 F Supp 729.
Sanctions against ex-husband and his attorney are granted, where 42 USCS § 1983 complaint filed against ex-wife
was devoid of legal merit and was commenced in retaliation for ex-wife's efforts to collect valid judgment for child
support arrears; appropriate sanctions include award of costs and attorney fees, as well as compensation for having to
defend meritless lawsuit. Martin v Supreme Court of New York (1986, ND NY) 644 F Supp 1537.
Where plaintiff filed endless stream of redundant and meritless pleadings, sanctions will not be limited merely to
amount of costs and attorney fees incurred by opposing party, but additional sanctions payable directly to clerk of court
will be imposed for wasting judicial resources. Cannon v Loyola University of Chicago (1987, ND Ill) 116 FRD 243.
Attorney who filed motion to admit out-of-state attorney to local bar but failed to comply with applicable rule by
revealing out-of-state attorney's past convictions and misconduct has violated Rule 11, particularly as he admitted not
even reading applicable rule and as his noncompliance appears to have been gross negligence bordering on bad faith,
and thus sanction will be imposed amounting to other party's costs, plus amount to reimburse court for expense of
wasted time. First Interstate Bank, N.A. v Estates Partnership (1987, DC Colo) 117 FRD 683, 10 FR Serv 3d 175.
Consequential damages are not authorized for Rule 11 violation. West v West (1989, ND Ga) 126 FRD 82.
3. Amount of Award
a. In General
237. Generally
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding monetary sanction without first having evidence submitted
concerning appropriateness of amount since rule requires only that sanction be appropriate, not that it equal attorney's
fees. Ordower v Feldman (1987, CA7 Ill) 826 F2d 1569, 8 FR Serv 3d 1005.
With respect to amount of sanction, what constitutes reasonable expenses within context of Rule does not necessarily
mean actual expenses and attorney's fees, and determination of appropriate sanction is left to sound discretion of trial
court. Fahrenz v Meadow Farm Partnership (1988, CA4 Va) 850 F2d 207, 11 FR Serv 3d 1167.
Where sanctions are imposed on United States government as party in civil action, amount of sanction is not limited
to attorney fees. Mattingly v United States (1991, CA9 Nev) 939 F2d 816, 91 CDOS 6110, 91 Daily Journal DAR
9113, 91-2 USTC P 50377, 20 FR Serv 3d 27, 68 AFTR 2d 5361.
In imposing sanctions, court is not limited to amount of attorney fees that will compensate opposing party for harm
inflicted by conduct that violates rule, and punitive sanctions may be imposed. Mercury Serv. v Allied Bank (1987, CD
Cal) 117 FRD 147, affd without op (1990, CA9 Cal) 907 F2d 154 and (criticized in Triad Sys. Corp. v Southeastern
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Express Co. (1995, CA9 Cal) 64 F3d 1330, 95 CDOS 6889, 95 Daily Journal DAR 11821, 36 USPQ2d 1028, 33 FR
Serv 3d 468).
When imposing monetary sanctions pursuant to FRCP 16 or 37, reasonableness requirement of FRCP 11 should be
applied; thus, court may only award reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v Sara Lee
Hosiery (1997, DC NJ) 177 FRD 205, motions ruled upon (1997, DC NJ) 177 FRD 245, 49 Fed Rules Evid Serv 84,
vacated in part on other grounds, summary judgment gr, in part, summary judgment den, in part (1998, DC NJ) 179
FRD 450.
238. Factors determining amount
In determining amount of sanctions to be awarded under Rule 11, court should consider what portion of attorney's
fees requested was incurred by misconduct of moving party's attorney in frivolously asserting 37 separate affirmative
defenses, requiring remand to lower court for findings. Mossman v Roadway Express, Inc. (1986, CA9 Cal) 789 F2d
804, 41 CCH EPD P 36510, 4 FR Serv 3d 1140.
Plaintiff which filed complaint in violation of rule and then voluntarily dismissed it under Rule 41 will still be
subject to sanctions for violation, although early dismissal reduces amount of sanctions by reducing attorney fees.
Szabo Food Serv. v Canteen Corp. (1987, CA7 Ill) 823 F2d 1073, 8 FR Serv 3d 273, cert dismd (1988) 485 US 901, 99
L Ed 2d 229, 108 S Ct 1101 and (criticized in Sussman by & Through Guilden v Bank of Isr. (1995, CA2 NY) 56 F3d
450, 32 FR Serv 3d 978).
When determining monetary sanctions appropriate in given case, District Court must expressly consider other party's
reasonable expenses and attorney fees, amount reasonably necessary to deter wrongdoer, offender's ability to pay,
offending party's history and experience, severity of violation, degree to which malice or bad faith contributed to
violation, risk of chilling type of litigation involved, and other factors as deemed appropriate in individual
circumstances. White v General Motors Corp. (1990, CA10 Kan) 908 F2d 675, 6 BNA IER Cas 236, 17 FR Serv 3d
384, cert den (1991) 498 US 1069, 112 L Ed 2d 850, 111 S Ct 788, 6 BNA IER Cas 288.
In determining amount of sanction to be imposed, District Court may take into account questionable behavior of
prevailing attorneys, as well as fact that, while amended complaint was sanctionable, it was only "marginally frivolous."
Automatic Liquid Packaging, Inc. v Dominik (1990, CA7 Ill) 909 F2d 1001, 17 FR Serv 3d 606.
Offending party's litigation history is one factor which court may consider in determining appropriate Rule 11
sanction, and where attorney had been sanctioned in several other actions, district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing sanction of $ 50,000, specifically finding that amount to be minimum necessary to deter future misconduct.
White v General Motors Corp. (1992, CA10 Kan) 977 F2d 499, 23 FR Serv 3d 1104.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanction of $ 15,000 on plaintiff where plaintiff produced no
evidence to support his allegations, facts alleged in complaint were misleading and factually incorrect, plaintiff offered
no evidence to show that sanctions would result in financial hardship, and amount represented less than attorney fees
and expenses incurred by defendants who had acted promptly to dispose of case as soon as it became evident that
plaintiff lacked support for his allegations. Estiverne v Sak's Fifth Ave. (1993, CA5 La) 9 F3d 1171, 27 FR Serv 3d
1028.
Where district court imposed sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney for filing baseless claims, it was abuse of discretion for
court to determine sua sponte that amount of attorney fees requested by defendants as sanction should be reduced by 80
percent based solely on discrepancy in size of law firms involved in suit. Johnson v A. W. Chesterton Co. (1994, CA7
Wis) 18 F3d 1362, 28 FR Serv 3d 38.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions equal to full amount of defendant's attorney fees and
costs where both plaintiff's original and amended complaints in their entirety were sanctionable filings and neither of
plaintiff's two theories was well-grounded in fact or law, and thus all of defendant's fees were reasonably incurred in
responding to sanctionable filings. Katz v Household Int'l (1996, CA7 Ill) 91 F3d 1036, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99281,
35 FR Serv 3d 905.
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover entire amount of its costs and attorney fees where not all of defendant's claims and
allegations were meritless; rather, plaintiff may recover only costs and fees which were incurred because of meritless
pleadings, motions, and other papers. United States ex rel. Evergreen Pipeline Constr. Co. v Merritt Meridian Constr.
Corp. (1996, CA2 NY) 95 F3d 153, 41 CCF P 76981, 45 Fed Rules Evid Serv 745.
In determining amount of sanctions to be imposed under Rule 11, court may consider all of circumstances involved
in action. Gilmer v Cleveland (1985, ND Ohio) 617 F Supp 985.
Sanctions imposed need not equal total attorneys' fees and expenses of other party, and in determining amount,
consideration will be given to financial conditions of parties and reasonableness of attorneys' fees with regard to both
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
hourly rate charged and length of time devoted to case. Anschutz Petroleum Marketing Corp. v E.W. Saybolt & Co.
(1986, SD NY) 112 FRD 355.
Amount of sanction will not be reduced simply because plaintiff and his attorney have suffered adverse press
scrutiny, because defendant is large corporation which can afford to pay its own costs and fees, or because plaintiff's
attorney has lost contingency fee case and therefore did not get paid. Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co. (1989, ND
Ill) 127 FRD 135.
In deciding to impose sanction of $ 50,000 on plaintiff's attorney for filing frivolous suit, consideration was given to
attorney's knowledge and experience in areas at issue, her recent history of sanctionable conduct, her ability to pay, and
reasonable attorney fees of nearly $ 170,000 incurred by defendant. White v General Motors Corp. (1991, DC Kan)
139 FRD 178, 7 BNA IER Cas 221, affd (1992, CA10 Kan) 977 F2d 499, 23 FR Serv 3d 1104.
Where plaintiff's counsel failed to make prefiling investigation and consequently named wrong corporation as
defendant, least severe sanction consistent with goals of Rule 11 is fine of $ 15,000, together with reprimand and
admonishment of counsel, and defendant will not be fully compensated for costs incurred since it did not endeavor to
mitigate or provide notice of possibility of sanctions, plaintiff's counsel did not act willfully or vindictively and was not
repeat offender, offending pleading was not "extremely frivolous," fully compensatory monetary sanction in case such
as this created danger of chilling vigorous advocacy, and certain facts tended to support plaintiff's erroneous position,
although plaintiff's counsel stubbornly maintained suit when evidence should have made error apparent. Temple v
WISAP USA (1993, DC Neb) 152 FRD 591.
Given severity and pervasiveness of attorney's conduct, and especially in light of his bad faith in violating 28 USCS §
1927 and court's inherent authority, entire amount of organization's attorney's fees attributable to his conduct was
minimum necessary to deter similar future misconduct. Chosin Few, Inc. v Scott (2002, WD NC) 209 F Supp 2d 593.
In determining amount of sanction to be imposed on plaintiff, she will not be credited with amount she contended
she was "overbilled" in past sanction where defendant's attorney previously charged higher hourly rate which was used
by court in determining past sanction. Sussman v Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A. (1994, MD Fla) 152 FRD 648, 7 FLW
Fed D 690.
239. --Ability to pay
District Courts should consider various mitigating factors in their calculation of total monetary compensation owed
by lawyers who have been found to have violated Rule 11, and particularly relevant equitable factor is sanctioned
party's ability to pay, since deterrent effect of award of attorney fees depends on extent of sanctioned party's resources,
and where District Court imposed sanction without regard to these factors, case will be remanded. Doering v Union
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders (1988, CA3 NJ) 857 F2d 191, 12 FR Serv 3d 41.
Where District Court took into account ability of sanctioned attorney to pay, it did not abuse its discretion in
awarding sum which will be hardship on attorney, since sanction was intended as punishment and deterrence, and since
attorney did not state that he could not pay such amount. Kapco Mfg. Co. v C & O Enters. (1989, CA7 Ill) 886 F2d
1485, 14 FR Serv 3d 1332.
Monetary sanction imposed without any consideration of ability to pay would constitute abuse of discretion,
although burden is upon parties being sanctioned to come forward with evidence of their financial status, and court
should refrain from imposing monetary award so great that it will bankrupt offending parties or force them from future
practice of law. In re Kunstler (1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in
part, motion gr, in part (1990, CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111
S Ct 1607.
Ability of sanctioned party to pay is one factor court should consider when imposing sanctions, but burden is on
sanctioned party to produce probative evidence of his inability to pay sanctions. Gaskell v Weir (1993, CA9 Cal) 10
F3d 626, 93 CDOS 8588, 93 Daily Journal DAR 14773, 27 FR Serv 3d 609, appeal after remand, motion to dismiss app
den, motion gr sub nom Hall v Contra Costa County (1995, CA9 Cal) 50 F3d 14, reported in full (1995, CA9 Cal) 1995
US App LEXIS 741.
Where sanction equivalent to fraction of actual and reasonable fees requested is sufficient to deter future violations,
court did not abuse its discretion by awarding lesser amount, nor did court abuse its discretion in refusing, under
circumstances, to grant discovery of offending party's financial status. Runfola & Assocs. v Spectrum Reporting II
(1996, CA6 Ohio) 88 F3d 368, 1996-2 CCH Trade Cases P 71465, 35 FR Serv 3d 434, 1996 FED App 198P (criticized
in Ridder v City of Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288, 1997 FED App 94P).
District court erred by imposing, without comment, very severe penalty of $ 8,750 on attorney for violating Rule 11,
since purpose of Rule 11 is to deter, not to compensate, and although monetary sanctions are not forbidden, they are not
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
encouraged, and mitigating factors, including ability to pay, must be considered in fashioning sanctions. Zuk v Eastern
Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Medical College (1996, CA3 Pa) 103 F3d 294, 41 USPQ2d 1296, 36 FR Serv 3d 1515.
District court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanction equal to defendant's attorney fees of $ 36,167.21 on
plaintiff who had filed frivolous lawsuit, where court concluded that such fees were reasonable considering amount of
time spent and type of work done; further, court did not err in failing to consider sanctioned attorney's ability to pay
where attorney did not raise that point before district court. Crockett v Whisenhunt (In re Landscape Props.) (1997, CA8
Ark) 127 F3d 678, 31 BCD 719, 39 FR Serv 3d 140, reh den (1997, CA8 Ark) 1997 US App LEXIS 33337.
It was disingenuous for attorney to claim that due to financial hardship he was unable to pay sanction imposed
against him where he had previously claimed before district court that there was no evidence or indication that he would
be unable to pay sanction. Divane v Krull Elec. Co. (2003, CA7 Ill) 319 F3d 307.
b. Costs and Expenses of Litigation
240. Generally
Where sanctions are clearly mandated due to plaintiff's counsel's handling of case, but counsel has limited financial
resources, award of costs pursuant to 17 USCS § 505 is also sufficient to meet mandatory requirements of sanctions
under Rule 11, and attorney's fees will not be awarded as additional sanction under Rule 11. Humphrey v Columbia
Records, Div. of CBS, Inc. (1989, SD NY) 124 FRD 564.
Where sanction such as censure or reprimand does not appear to be sufficient to deter future violations by offending
attorney, sanction of reasonable attorney fees and costs will be imposed, although attorney will not be required to pay
all of defendant's attorney fees since primary goal of rule is deterrence, not compensation. Schiappa v
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (1993, SD Ohio) 146 FRD 153.
241. Failure to mitigate
Where complaint alleged federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, and it should have been readily
apparent to defendant's attorney that plaintiff had incorrectly stated defendant's citizenship and that diversity did not
exist, defendant violated its duty to mitigate damages under Rule 11, and therefore District Court erred in awarding
defendant entire amount of fees and costs it incurred in defending litigation where defendants made no effort to contact
plaintiff's counsel concerning error and chose instead to respond to complaint by filing extensive motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in alternative, improper venue. Dubisky v Owens (1988, CA7 Ill) 849 F2d 1034,
11 FR Serv 3d 574.
In petition for sanctions under FRCP 11 for bringing groundless RICO claim, fact that defendants made strategic
decision to launch attack on legal sufficiency of plaintiff's RICO claim, sole basis of federal jurisdiction, does not
demonstrate failure to mitigate Rule 11 damages; defendant is entitled to its fees in researching RICO dismissal motions
and fact that defendant lost dismissal motions is irrelevant to fact that it should never have had to make motions in first
place. Brandt v Schal Assocs. (1990, ND Ill) 131 FRD 485.
Where plaintiff's attorney was unaware of controlling case law which would have shown that action was baseless,
but defendants' attorney also failed to cite controlling authority to court or to bring it to plaintiff's counsel's attention,
since plaintiff's attorney's violation of Rule 11 was result of negligence and not bad faith, and due to defendants'
counsel's failure to mitigate fees and expenses, amount requested by defendants for reimbursement of fees and expenses
will be reduced by half. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P. v Kay (1993, ED Pa) 150 FRD 532, 27 FR Serv 3d 968.
Section 1983 plaintiff is sanctioned $ 1,800 to partially pay back county for attorney's fees incurred, where pro se
plaintiff was poor, uninformed, and not notified of motion for sanctions, and county's response to suit was unnecessary,
because suit was ill-founded, both procedurally and substantively, and plaintiff failed to heed advice of court to seek
advice of attorney, but only part of requested $ 5,250 in expenses and costs is awarded since county could have more
swiftly ended this frivolous suit. Taylor v County of Copiah (1995, SD Miss) 937 F Supp 580.
242. Doubled amount
Double costs and reasonable attorney's fees are assessed against appellants and their attorney where appellants filed
frivolous income tax returns on which they refused to supply information needed and then protested imposition of
penalties, arguing that documents they had filed were not intended to be returns and therefore did not fall within statute
which provided for penalties. Leogrande v United States (1987, CA2 NY) 811 F2d 147, 87-1 USTC P 9176, 59 AFTR
2d 618, cert den (1987) 484 US 819, 98 L Ed 2d 38, 108 S Ct 75.
Sanction of double costs and attorney fees will be imposed following plaintiff's appeal where all of arguments that
plaintiff makes on appeal, like arguments that it raised before District Court, are frivolous; law is well settled and
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
contrary to plaintiff's arguments; plaintiff's allegations ignored contrary Supreme Court precedents; plaintiff has history
of repetitive and meritless claims requiring needless expenditure of judicial time; plaintiff did not hire expert to
substantiate its antitrust claims until more than 2 years after filing complaint; plaintiff conducted no discovery during 10
month period set for discovery and then sought repeated delays to make up for lost time; and plaintiff failed to file
papers opposing defendant's timely motion for summary judgment, but then appeared after entry of judgment urging
first District Court, then this court, to set aside judgment because its expert made mistake. Coastal Transfer Co. v
Toyota Motor Sales (1987, CA9 Cal) 833 F2d 208, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67774.
Sanctions in form of double costs and attorney's fees and expenses will be imposed on attorney who disregarded
court's injunction against further litigation of particular claim and filed motion to vacate judgment after it was affirmed
on appeal. Zerman v Jacobs (1986, SD NY) 113 FRD 13.
243. Other awards against plaintiff
Sanctions imposed against attorney, representing expenses and attorneys' fees of defendants, were substantial but not
patently unreasonable in light of massive liability that complaint filed by attorney threatened to impose on defendants.
Unioil, Inc. v E.F. Hutton & Co. (1987) 484 US 822, 98 L Ed 2d 45, 108 S Ct 83 and cert den (1987) 484 US 823, 98 L
Ed 2d 47, 108 S Ct 85.
Union and employees, whose action against employer was dismissed for failure to exhaust procedures provided for
in collective bargaining contract, are properly ordered to pay costs plus additional $ 1,000 to reimburse employer for
part of its reasonable expenses in defending against frivolous appeal, given clarity of precedents of both Supreme Court
and instant court with respect to exhaustion issue. Confederacion Laborista de Puerto Rico v Cerveceria India, Inc.
(1985, CA1 Puerto Rico) 778 F2d 65, 120 BNA LRRM 3501, 103 CCH LC P 11714.
Plaintiff and her attorney appealing summary judgment for defendants in civil rights action must each pay half of
reasonable attorneys' fees for defendants and double costs where appeal rests on serious misstatement of state law by
asserting that application for stay has effect of stay itself, appeal is motivated by revenge, and assertions of law are
"wildly untrue." Thornton v Wahl (1986, CA7 Ill) 787 F2d 1151, 4 FR Serv 3d 687, cert den (1986) 479 US 851, 93 L
Ed 2d 116, 107 S Ct 181.
Where each plaintiff signed admittedly frivolous complaint and sanctions against each were clearly called for,
sanction consisting of entire amount of defendant's costs and attorneys' fees may be imposed on each plaintiff. Doyle v
United States (1987, CA5 Tex) 817 F2d 1235, 87-2 USTC P 9496, 7 FR Serv 3d 878, 60 AFTR 2d 5101, cert den (1987)
484 US 854, 98 L Ed 2d 114, 108 S Ct 159.
Where prison inmate brought suit alleging that prison officials discriminated against him in failing to raise his trusty
status, and claim was without slightest support of any factual allegations, sanction of $ 15 to reimburse court for costs
was properly imposed on inmate for filing frivolous lawsuit. Whittington v Lynaugh (1988, CA5 Tex) 842 F2d 818, 10
FR Serv 3d 1280, cert den (1988) 488 US 840, 102 L Ed 2d 83, 109 S Ct 108.
Plaintiff's attorney, who filed pleading in opposition to requested injunction that misstated facts and legal holdings of
District Court, clearly violated Rule 11, but sanction should not encompass attorney fees and legal expenses which
defendants incurred prior to attorney's improper filing. Truck Treads, Inc. v Armstrong Rubber Co. (1989, CA5 Tex)
868 F2d 1472, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68530, 13 FR Serv 3d 426, reh den (1989, CA5) 1989 US App LEXIS
14480.
Where defendants spent more than $ 48,000 opposing claim, but considerable amount of work performed could be
used in related court actions, sanction in sum of $ 10,000 was not abuse of trial judge's discretion in case where
plaintiff's attorney failed to conduct proper pretrial inquiry into court's subject matter jurisdiction. International
Shipping Co., S.A. v Hydra Offshore, Inc. (1989, CA2 NY) 875 F2d 388, 1989 AMC 1701, 13 FR Serv 3d 1134, cert den
(1989) 493 US 1003, 107 L Ed 2d 558, 110 S Ct 563.
Where plaintiff's violation of Rule 11 cost defendant approximately same amount, in terms of attorney fees and
expenses, as defendant's violation of Rule 37 cost plaintiff, District Court did not err when it decreed that neither side
should be permitted to recoup its losses, thereby effectively sanctioning each litigant in amount it stood to gain through
other's violation. Anderson v Beatrice Foods Co. (1990, CA1 Mass) 900 F2d 388, 31 Envt Rep Cas 1161, 16 FR Serv
3d 572, 20 ELR 20806, reh den (1990, CA1) 31 Envt Rep Cas 1584 and cert den (1990) 498 US 891, 112 L Ed 2d 193,
111 S Ct 233.
District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant $ 30,000 for attorney fees and expenses as sanction
for plaintiff's violation of Rule 11 where action was meritless and based on at least one fraudulent document and where
plaintiff's responses to defendant's requests for admissions misstated known, relevant facts. Peerless Industrial Paint
Coatings Co. v Canam Steel Corp. (1992, CA8 Mo) 979 F2d 685, 24 FR Serv 3d 457.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court erred by including in sanction award defendant's expenses and attorney fees incurred in prosecuting
Rule 11 motion and in opposing plaintiff's motion to reconsider award since such costs were not incurred because of
plaintiff's frivolous claims. Pan-Pacific & Low Ball Cable Television Co. v Pacific Union Co. (1993, CA9 Cal) 987
F2d 594, 93 CDOS 1531, 93 Daily Journal DAR 2786, 25 FR Serv 3d 461 (superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Buster v Greisen (1997, CA9 Alaska) 97 CDOS 2161, 97 Daily Journal DAR 4001) and (criticized in In re
Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. (1997, CA3 VI) 37 VI 398, 120 F3d 368, 27 ELR 21494) and (criticized in Margolis v
Ryan (1998, CA9 Wash) 140 F3d 850, 98 CDOS 2618, 98 Daily Journal DAR 3611, 40 FR Serv 3d 1076).
Where plaintiff's claims were utterly baseless and sanction amounting to defendant's attorney fees and expenses was
imposed by appellate court, district court should not have reduced award on ground that plaintiff had insurance to cover
his attorney fees and expenses. Pelletier v Zweifel (1993, CA11 Ga) 987 F2d 716, 27 FR Serv 3d 1408, 7 FLW Fed C
214, cert den (1993) 510 US 918, 126 L Ed 2d 258, 114 S Ct 311.
Garnishee is entitled to award of fees and disbursements corresponding to time expended after plaintiffs should have
dropped garnishment, where, notwithstanding that court had expressed doubts about validity of garnishment which
threw upon plaintiffs burden of justifying course they had pursued, plaintiffs thereafter filed extensive memorandum
seeking to justify garnishment when they would have been better disposed, after brief review of law, to recognize lack
of justification and to have either dropped garnishment or to have reissued it through federal court in state where
employer and garnishee were located. Robbins v Spencer's Steel Storage, Inc. (1983, ND Ill) 38 FR Serv 2d 240.
Rule 11 placed presignature obligation on plaintiff and her attorney to conduct reasonable inquiry into qualifications
of their expert before filing pleading containing erroneous information, and costs incurred by defendant as result of
failure to conduct such inquiry are properly assessed against plaintiff and her counsel. Duncan v WJLA-TV, Inc. (1984,
DC Dist Col) 106 FRD 4, 40 FR Serv 2d 1376.
Plaintiff would be ordered to pay defendants amount of $ 50 on account of their reasonable expenses incurred in
making motion for summary judgment, where plaintiff's claim is entirely unwarranted by existing law or good faith
argument for modification or extension of existing law, and where plaintiff is schooled in law, having recently
completed law school and taken bar examination, so that there is every reason to hold him to certification he made by
signing pleadings filed in instant action. Heimbaugh v San Francisco (1984, ND Cal) 591 F Supp 1573.
Pursuant to Rule 11, it is appropriate to require plaintiff's lawyers to pay one-third of fees and costs incurred by
defendants in connection with their motion to dismiss complaint, where such complaint was ponderous, extravagant,
overblown, and largely devoid of colorable legal basis. Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 596 F
Supp 13, 40 FR Serv 2d 703, affd (1985, CA7 Ill) 771 F2d 194, 2 FR Serv 3d 1414 (ovrld in part on other grounds as
stated in Parmelee v True (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 17314) and (ovrld as stated on other grounds in Marliere
v Village of Woodridge (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 4379).
Third-party defendant which sought to have third-party complaint dismissed on 4 different grounds is entitled under
Rule 11 only to attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred in bringing motion on ground on which it ultimately
prevailed, where other 3 grounds were meritless. Shaps v D.F.D.S. A/F Copenhagen (1985, SD NY) 1 FR Serv 3d 134.
Counsel fees of $ 2,324.94 plus costs of $ 489.20 would be imposed against plaintiff and his counsel, where plaintiff
filed motion for leave to amend complaint to add additional claims, fully intending to withdraw motion and assert
claims in state court if defendant opposed motion, since plaintiff could have learned of defendant's opposition to
assertion of claims in federal forum for mere price of telephone call and plaintiff therefore needlessly increased cost of
litigation. Cohen v Virginia Electric & Power Co. (1985, ED Va) 2 FR Serv 3d 564.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's attorney is properly ordered to pay $ 100 to defendants' attorney to offset such
attorneys' fees and costs as were incurred in bringing motion to strike that portion of amended complaint which asserted
claim for punitive damages, where plaintiff's attorney acted with flagrant disregard for District Court's ruling on
plaintiff's motion to amend, which ruling set forth parameters of amendment that would be permitted, and where,
furthermore, plaintiff had no reasonable basis for concluding that claim for punitive damages could be asserted 12 years
after institution of action. Index Fund, Inc. v Hagopian (1985, SD NY) 107 FRD 95, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92255, 2
FR Serv 3d 1278.
Where defendants' attorneys attempt to keep their efforts and therefore their fees to minimum, but duplicity of
plaintiff makes greater expenses necessary, it is appropriate to make defendants whole by imposing on plaintiff sanction
of defendants' total attorney fees and expenses. Gas Reclamation, Inc. v Jones (1985, SD Tex) 113 FRD 1.
Pro se plaintiff alleging baseless claims about legality of currency system or recognition of legal tender after losing
bid at sheriff's sale, and pursuing same basic issues after numerous decisions were decided adversely to plaintiff and
after plaintiff was warned by court to cease pursuing meritless claims, is ordered to pay defendant's attorney fees in
amount of $ 500 and to pay clerk of court $ 2,000 as sanction for significant expenditure of judicial resources in order to
deal with absolutely groundless and frivolous claim. Nixon v Rose (1985, ND Ind) 631 F Supp 794.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Lawyer/investor's frivolous securities fraud complaint is dismissed and lawyer/investor must pay $ 2,368.90 balance
due on his account with discount brokerage house plus $ 5,000, pursuant to Rule 11, to brokerage house and to stock
exchange by way of costs and attorneys fees, where lawyer/investor alleges brokerage house failed to advise him of
well-publicized pending tender offer for corporation whose stock he purchased call options for, and stock exchange
fraudulently continued to make market in common stock option contracts of corporation after well-publicized tender
offer for corporation, because court cannot countenance claim by attorney based on idea that securities laws require
brokerage houses and exchanges to insure prospective investors from risk of loss in market due to their own laziness
and stupidity. Polur v American Stock Exchange, Inc. (1986, SD NY) 637 F Supp 1190, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
92955, affd without op (1987, CA2 NY) 816 F2d 670.
Although imposition of attorney's fees is warranted where vexatious and unreasonable claims were filed under 42
USCS § 1983 for purpose of harassing police department--attorney and plaintiffs lied to court in alleging claims of
illegal search pursuant to bench warrant--court will exercise discretion as to amount so as not to deter future litigants in
civil rights actions, and thus, where costs of $ 2,098 and attorney's fees of $ 59,287 are found reasonable, costs of $
2,098 are assessed against plaintiffs and 1/3 of attorney's fees, $ 19,956, are assessed against attorney. O'Rourke v
Norman (1986, WD Okla) 640 F Supp 1451, revd on other grounds, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1989, CA10
Okla) 875 F2d 1465, cert den (1989) 493 US 918, 107 L Ed 2d 260, 110 S Ct 280.
Partial award for fees and costs is imposed as sanctions arising out of dismissal of frivolous antitrust action by
chiropractors against hospitals for allegedly refusing staff privileges, where sanctions were granted for fees and costs
incurred between time of filing of complaint and time of filing of answer to extent they related to conceptualizing
defenses and preparing answer, but were denied for use other time and expense including prelitigation matters relating
to demand letter and motion for summary judgment, because Rule 11 contemplates only sanctions which arise from
improper complaint, thus eliminating pre-complaint time, and motion for summary judgment was not in response to
complaint but approach to resolve substantive issues, and while court was obligated by Rule 11 to proceed sua sponte
on issue of sanctions, excessive sanctions were to be avoided in order not to risk chilling development of further
litigation in burgeoning field of health care antitrust. Colorado Chiropractic Council v Porter Memorial Hospital
(1986, DC Colo) 650 F Supp 231, 1986-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67215.
Attorney is jointly and severally liable under 28 USCS § 1927 and Rule 11 for one-third of $ 162,000 fee and cost
award against client in unsuccessful civil rights action against municipality and others, where claims were groundless
and litigation was unreasonable and vexatious, because even if attorney had felt claim was well founded in beginning,
she pursued it well after it became apparent it was frivolous, and continued notwithstanding judicial warnings.
Deretich v St. Francis (1986, DC Minn) 650 F Supp 645, judgment entered (1997, DC Minn) 1997 US Dist LEXIS
5332, affd (1998, CA8 Minn) 1998 US App LEXIS 13015.
Whether or not competent attorney could form reasonable belief as to viability of original complaint, conduct of
litigation was frivolous and abusive and not directed toward just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of action,
causing costs to be unnecessarily and vexatiously escalated, and therefore sanction of $ 100,000 was proper where
defendants incurred fees and expenses of nearly $ 1,000,000. Bastien v R. Rowland & Co. (1987, ED Mo) 116 FRD
619, 9 FR Serv 3d 66, affd (1988, CA8 Mo) 857 F2d 482, 12 FR Serv 3d 281, cert den (1989) 490 US 1081, 104 L Ed
2d 662, 109 S Ct 2101.
Sanction of $ 3,226.03, to be imposed on pro se plaintiff for filing frivolous lawsuit, is appropriate where defendants
incurred reasonable fees and costs of this amount in defending action, where plaintiff's history of filing such lawsuits
has shown sanction necessary to deter him from instituting further baseless litigation and abusing judicial resources, and
where there is no evidence that sanction will create undue hardship on plaintiff, who never filed petition to proceed in
forma pauperis or advised court that he could not afford counsel or claimed that he lacked ability to pay monetary
sanctions. Pfeifer v Valukas (1987, ND Ill) 117 FRD 420.
Although plaintiff's counsel's initial investigation and early reliance thereon was reasonable, rule imposes continuing
duty to inquire into facts, and thus where key witnesses, when deposed, began to change their stories and to contradict
each other, counsel should have been aware that earlier reliance on statements of these witnesses was misplaced and that
no basis for claim existed, and therefore sanction will be imposed on plaintiff's counsel in amount of expenses incurred
by defendant after such time as it should have been clear that claim was not well grounded in fact. Meadow Ltd.
Partnership v Heritage Sav. & Loan Assoc. (1987, ED Va) 118 FRD 432, affd (1988, CA4 Va) 850 F2d 207, 11 FR
Serv 3d 1167.
Award of costs and attorney fees to prevailing defendants is properly adjusted in light of pro se plaintiffs'
circumstances, but court should not refuse to impose any award, since plaintiffs acted in bad faith in repeatedly bringing
actions in various forums in order to harass defendants. Damiani v Adams (1987, SD Cal) 657 F Supp 1409.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Children's clothing distributor's 15 USCS § 2 claim against clothing retailer is dismissed and Rule 11 monetary
sanction of defendant's reasonable incremental expense of opposing claim must be imposed on plaintiff's counsel, where
counsel admits in opposition papers that plaintiff apparently can make "no plausible claim that defendant dominates
retail market in any portion of United States," because upon reasonable inquiry there was no basis upon which to file
claim. Schwartz v Jamesway Corp. (1987, ED NY) 660 F Supp 138, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67584.
Plaintiff's attorney is ordered to pay half government's costs of deposing Coast Guard personnel on claim of
negligent rescue of vessel by Coast Guard, where claim was dropped on eve of trial, because reasonable inquiry would
have revealed to counsel that facts surrounding rescue operation do not give rise to negligent rescue claim. Albinder v
United States (1987, SD NY) 703 F Supp 246, 1988 AMC 2582.
Where defendants made reasonable efforts to avoid further litigation and attempted to resolve their differences with
plaintiffs without further resort to court, and where less severe sanctions have been ineffective against plaintiffs and
their attorney, as result of their numerous violations of Rule 11, plaintiffs and their attorney will be required to pay as
sanction entire amount of defendants' attorney fees and expenses, amounting to over $ 24,000. Truck Treads, Inc. v
Armstrong Rubber Co. (1988, WD Tex) 129 FRD 143, clarified, in part, amd (1988, WD Tex) 1988 US Dist LEXIS
17230 and mod (1989, CA5 Tex) 868 F2d 1472, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68530, 13 FR Serv 3d 426, reh den (1989,
CA5) 1989 US App LEXIS 14480.
Where sanctions are imposed on plaintiff and his attorney for filing veritable carbon copy of complaint which was
previously dismissed as frivolous, all reasonable attorney fees and costs of one defendant must be paid, but second
defendant who merely filed brief requests to join other defendant's motions will be paid only about half of that amount.
Chestnutt v Horizon Air Industries, Inc. (1990, ED Wash) 133 FRD 154.
Where patent holder failed to conduct appropriate factual inquiry before filing patent infringement action,
appropriate sanction is all of expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by all defendants from time of filing of
complaint through claims for sanctions, but excluding fees and costs already paid by plaintiff pursuant to awards by
court and excluding also consequential damages. Refac Int'l, Ltd. v Hitachi, Ltd. (1991, CD Cal) 141 FRD 281,
reported at, in part (1991, CD Cal) 19 USPQ2d 1855.
Where plaintiff pursued frivolous litigation for nearly three years and attempted to mislead court concerning his
financial status, harsh monetary sanction is in order, and therefore plaintiff is ordered to pay all fees and expenses
incurred by defendants in defending action, which amount to $ 10,712.50. Becker v Dougherty (1993, ED Mich) 145
FRD 441, affd (1994, CA6 Mich) 25 F3d 1047, reported in full (1994, CA6 Mich) 1994 US App LEXIS 14342.
Where even cursory investigation into facts and law would have revealed that many of claims were barred by statute
of limitations and that pleading requirements for RICO action were not met, Rule 11 sanctions are warranted; however,
since not all claims suffer from sanctionable infirmities, sanction will consist of costs of defending offending causes of
action. Levy v Aaron Faber, Inc. (1993, SD NY) 148 FRD 114.
Where plaintiff's counsel improperly filed amended complaint without leave of court, sanction will consist of
payment of costs and attorney fees incurred by defendants in contesting filing of amended complaint, and, to extent that
justice requires that some amendment be allowed, plaintiff's counsel must also pay cost of repeating earlier depositions
to cover new claims. Dover Steel Co. v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (1993, ED Pa) 151 FRD 570.
Where plaintiffs' request to reopen discovery lacked arguable basis in fact or law, plaintiffs' attorney will be
sanctioned $ 100 as partial compensation to defendants for expenses incurred in responding to motion. Chalmers v
Petty (1991, MD NC) 136 FRD 399.
244. Other awards against defendant
Defendant and his counsel are liable for attorney's fees and costs totaling $ 21,677 when defendant's use of
value-in-use method was fatuous approach to valuation of leasehold improvements, and when counterclaim seeking
punitive damage award of $ 1,000,000 was unjustified, and when defendant and defendant's counsel showed general
indifference to discovery rules, thereby supporting awards of sanctions under Rules 11 and 37(b). Olga's Kitchen of
Hayward, Inc. v Papo (1985, ED Mich) 108 FRD 695, 3 FR Serv 3d 1486, affd in part without op and revd in part
without op (1987, CA6 Mich) 815 F2d 79.
Attorney fees and costs of $ 6165 are assessed against state defendants and $ 2500 against defendants' attorneys
personally, where defendants filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in prison conditions suit which were
legally untenable and requested court to rule in factual vacuum, and where defendants filed 20 potentially dispositive
motions on last possible day, which court found to be interposed for improper purpose of furthering personal animosity
among attorneys. Knop v Johnson (1987, WD Mich) 667 F Supp 512, 8 FR Serv 3d 1109, app dismd, stay den (1988,
CA6 Mich) 841 F2d 1126.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions in amount equal to costs and attorneys' fees incurred in answering defendant's counterclaim are imposed
on defense counsel for bringing counterclaim that was both frivolous and interposed for improper purpose, and
sanctions are imposed against defendant in amount equal to plaintiff's full costs and attorneys' fees, less amounts
attributable to counterclaim, for interposing its defense in bad faith. Fischer v Samuel Montagu, Inc. (1989, SD NY)
125 FRD 391, amd (1989, SD NY) 131 FRD 379.
Where defendant's bad faith misrepresentation of facts to court in motion to modify earlier ruling triggered extra,
needless activity by plaintiff's attorneys, defendant will be required, as sanction, to pay full amount of fees and expenses
incurred by plaintiff as result of defendant's improper conduct, since fee shifting is appropriate sanction under these
circumstances. Brandt v Schal Assocs. (1990, ND Ill) 131 FRD 512.
Where defendants filed second motion to dismiss based on same grounds as first motion to dismiss, sanctions must
be imposed since second motion was without merit and frivolous and not made in good faith, and minimum amount
necessary under circumstances to deter future undesirable behavior is amount of plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and
expenses. United Pacific Ins. Co. v Durbano Constr. Co. (1992, DC Utah) 144 FRD 402.
In subjecting defendant to sanction for failing to make proper inquiry into facts before filing answer, losses caused to
plaintiffs may be considered by court in determining what is reasonable sanction, although reimbursing victim is not
primary aim of Rule 11; consequently, where defendant's filing caused plaintiffs to incur costs but did not affect
attorney fees which they would have incurred anyway, reasonable sanction requires defendant to pay all of plaintiffs'
costs and one-third of their attorney fees. Geler v National Westminster Bank (1992, SD NY) 145 FRD 25.
Defense attorneys who filed opposition to summary judgment motion must be sanctioned where it was readily
apparent to reasonable, objective observer that asserted defenses were frivolous and lacked substance; however,
sanction will consist only of plaintiff's reasonable expenses and fees incurred in connection with summary judgment
motion, and attorneys will not be required to pay portion of sanction allocated to bankrupt defendant corporation.
Leventhal v New Valley Corp. (1993, SD NY) 148 FRD 109.
245. Miscellaneous
Sanctions imposed for filing specious motion should be measured by expenses, including attorneys' fees, resulting
from opposing improper motion and arguing what sanctions should be, but expenses must be reasonable, and excessive
charges for attorneys' fees for attorneys who were merely spectators and did not actively participate will not be included
in sanctions. Ricci v Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc. (1986, DC Me) 111 FRD 369.
Employees' Rule 11 motion is granted and court will impose sanctions of $ 1,000 as reasonable attorney's fees and
costs upon local union's attorney, where union's attorney pursued its Rule 11 motion against employees claiming
employees' motion for attorney's fees was untimely and without jurisdictional basis even after employees' counsel's
letter laid out strong legal basis for their motions, because union's attorney's failure to address employees' cited
authority and pursuit of motion for sanctions without legal basis indicates union's Rule 11 motion was asserted
primarily to cause harassment and delay. Bygott v Leaseway Transp. Corp. (1986, ED Pa) 637 F Supp 1433, 111 CCH
LC P 11147.
Party who filed notice of removal which failed to invoke any legal basis for removal and which was filed out of time
has violated Rule 11, and sanction to be imposed will include expenses which opposing party incurred by having to
oppose frivolous removal notice, but will not include expenses of bringing motion for sanctions, since sanction
ordinarily includes only compensation for expenses generated by rule violation itself. Unanue Casal v Unanue Casal
(1989, DC NJ) 132 FRD 146, 18 FR Serv 3d 147, affd, sanctions allowed (1990, CA1 Puerto Rico) 898 F2d 839, 16 FR
Serv 3d 160.
Insurer is entitled to certain of its attorney's fees and expenses as damages/sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, where its
costs associated with investigating claims, trial preparation, and proceedings which ensued were needlessly increased,
because alleged insureds (1) ratified material misrepresentations set forth in application by their agent, (2)
counterclaimed against insurer even though they knew about misrepresentations, and (3) filed supplemental proofs of
loss quadrupling amount of meritless claims against insurer. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v Lea (1992, ED La) 782 F
Supp 1144, amd (1992, CA5 La) 979 F2d 377, 24 FR Serv 3d 791, cert den (1993) 507 US 1052, 123 L Ed 2d 652, 113
S Ct 1946.
c. Attorneys' Fees
246. Generally
Although imposition of sanctions in form of attorneys' fees and costs was upheld on appeal, appellee will not
automatically be awarded additional attorneys' fees incurred in defending appeal, especially where appeal was not
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
wholly without merit. Orange Production Credit Asso. v Frontline Ventures, Ltd. (1986, CA9) 801 F2d 1581, 6 FR
Serv 3d 692.
District Court can rely on unopposed affidavits of defendant's attorneys setting amount of their fees and is not
required to hold evidentiary hearing to set attorneys' fees for Rule 11 purposes. Doyle v United States (1987, CA5 Tex)
817 F2d 1235, 87-2 USTC P 9496, 7 FR Serv 3d 878, 60 AFTR 2d 5101, cert den (1987) 484 US 854, 98 L Ed 2d 114,
108 S Ct 159.
In awarding attorney fees as sanction for frivolous litigation, entire amount need not be routinely awarded, and
District Court in its discretion may choose to award only that portion of prevailing party's attorney's fee which court
thinks is reasonable to serve sanctioning purpose of Rule. Eastway Constr. Corp. v New York (1987, CA2 NY) 821 F2d
121, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67601, 8 FR Serv 3d 1101, cert den (1987) 484 US 918, 98 L Ed 2d 226, 108 S Ct 269.
Party seeking sanction attorneys' fees must present request from which correct amount may be computed with
reasonable dispatch, and failure to do this justifies rejection of request. In re Central Ice Cream Co. (1987, CA7 Ill)
836 F2d 1068, 18 CBC2d 205, 9 FR Serv 3d 957.
When sanctions are imposed on plaintiff who files frivolous suit against government, government may be awarded
reasonable attorney fees at market rate, and such sanctions are not limited by rate set in Equal Access to Justice Act (28
USCS § 2412). Napier v Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, etc. (1988, CA3 NJ) 855 F2d 1080, 47 CCH
EPD P 38336, 12 FR Serv 3d 1.
Where original complaint is improper pleading, all attorney fees reasonably incurred in defending against claims
asserted in complaint form proper basis for sanctions. Gaskell v Weir (1993, CA9 Cal) 10 F3d 626, 93 CDOS 8588, 93
Daily Journal DAR 14773, 27 FR Serv 3d 609, appeal after remand, motion to dismiss app den, motion gr sub nom Hall
v Contra Costa County (1995, CA9 Cal) 50 F3d 14, reported in full (1995, CA9 Cal) 1995 US App LEXIS 741.
247. Factors considered
In imposing sanction for bringing frivolous law suit, it is proper to base amount of sanction on attorney fees of party
forced to defend such suit. Collins v Walden (1987, CA11 Ga) 834 F2d 961, 9 FR Serv 3d 1149.
Monetary sanction should never be based solely on amount of attorney fees claimed by injured party, and only
attorney time which is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated. In re Kunstler (1990, CA4
NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990, CA4) 1990 US
App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
Imposition of sanctions that amounted to award of attorney fees to opposing party was not abuse of discretion,
however, only attorney fees that directly resulted from sanctionable conduct could be included in sanction. Divane v
Krull Elec. Co. (1999, CA7 Ill) 200 F3d 1020, 23 EBC 2476.
Where sanction consisting of opposing party's attorney fees is to be imposed on attorney, calculation of amount
should be based on actual time records rather than after-the-fact reconstruction, and lawyer employed by nonprofit
office may not recover for her client court awarded fees at same rate as lawyer employed by private law firm when such
recovery would yield significant windfall. Burgos v Murphy (1988, SD NY) 123 FRD 440, affd without op (1989, CA2
NY) 876 F2d 890.
248. Duty to mitigate
That defendants' counsel failed to mitigate amount of their fees will not affect amount of sanction where defendants'
counsel submitted hourly fee statements exceeding $ 50,000, but District Court imposed sanction of $ 10,000 on
plaintiffs' counsel, and plaintiffs' own expert testified that $ 13,000 would have been reasonable fee. Crookham v
Crookham (1990, CA8 Iowa) 914 F2d 1027, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95479, 17 FR Serv 3d 1381.
Attorney who has been ordered to pay opposing counsel's expenses may only be liable for reasonable attorney fees,
and since nonviolating party has duty to mitigate, sanction may not include expenses and fees which were avoidable or
self-imposed. Spiller v Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr. (1990, CA5 Tex) 919 F2d 339, 57 BNA FEP Cas 99, 55 CCH EPD
P 40460, 18 FR Serv 3d 768 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Shaw v Housing Auth. (1993, WD La)
158 BR 400, 62 BNA FEP Cas 1521).
In determining amount of sanctions to be imposed on plaintiff, district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
separate attorney fees for each defendant where reasonable mitigation efforts did not require that all defendants be
represented by one attorney due to possible conflicts of interest. Silva v Witschen (1994, CA1 RI) 19 F3d 725, 28 FR
Serv 3d 420.
Trustees mitigated its legal fees by informing attorney that it would file for sanctions immediately after hearing
testimony that attorney had denied in his answer; despite warning, attorney failed to withdraw his counterclaim and
district court properly refused to reduce sanction on this ground. Divane v Krull Elec. Co. (2003, CA7 Ill) 319 F3d 307.
Page 169
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Victim of frivolous lawsuit must use reasonable means to terminate litigation and to prevent costs of frivolous suit
from becoming excessive; if party eventually wins Rule 11 sanctions but has failed to use least expensive route to early
resolution, court may rule that not all expenses which it incurred in making formal motions were reasonable attorneys'
fees that should be awarded under Rule 11. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115 v Armour &
Co. (1985, ND Cal) 106 FRD 345.
249. Hourly rate
Where attorney's fees and actual charges for related expenses will provide sufficient deterrent, it is abuse of
discretion to compute fees and expenses based on hourly charges in excess of prevailing market rate. Jackson v Law
Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor (1989, CA6 Ky) 875 F2d 1224, 14 FR Serv 3d 313, reh den (1989, CA6)
1989 US App LEXIS 9965.
Appropriate hourly fee to be applied in calculating award of attorney fees is prevailing rate in district in which suit is
litigated, irrespective of fee usually charged by attorney, and regardless of whether party hired attorney from another
locality where normal rates charged by attorneys differ. Segarra v Messina (1994, ND NY) 158 FRD 230.
Attorney's fees should be calculated according to prevailing rates in community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. Binghamton Masonic Temple v Bares (1996, ND NY) 168 FRD
121.
250. Awards against plaintiff
District Court's award of $ 750 in attorneys' fees to defendant United States is not abuse of discretion where for more
than 3 decades plaintiff has been bringing lawsuits, each unsuccessful, in connection with claim that he was wrongfully
deprived of veteran's disability benefits in connection with his World War II service, instant suit falls squarely within
prohibition of order enjoining him from instituting further lawsuits based upon same claim, and, although plaintiff had
been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis by another judge, plaintiff apparently sought to obscure existence
of injunction by omitting from his filing documents, which required identification of related suits, any mention of his
other lawsuits. Di Silvestro v United States (1985, CA2 NY) 767 F2d 30, cert den (1985) 474 US 862, 88 L Ed 2d 146,
106 S Ct 177, reh den (1985) 474 US 990, 88 L Ed 2d 352, 106 S Ct 400.
Because defendant would have deposed physician even if he had been properly designated as fact witness, but would
have sent associate to deposition rather than partner, District Court properly imposed on plaintiff sanction consisting of
difference between partner's hourly rate and associate's rate for time spent at deposition, as well as defendant's cost in
prosecuting motion for sanctions, where plaintiff's initial interrogatory answer caused defense counsel to conclude that
physician was going to testify as medical expert for plaintiffs, and where misunderstanding, which plaintiffs' counsel
should have been aware of, was not cured until it was too late to avoid consequences. Basch v Westinghouse Electric
Corp. (1985, CA4 Md) 777 F2d 165, 3 FR Serv 3d 365, cert den (1986) 476 US 1108, 90 L Ed 2d 365, 106 S Ct 1957.
Where defendant incurred attorney fees of $ 52,912.50 in defending frivolous litigation, District Court judge may use
his discretion in determining amount of sanction to be imposed on plaintiff, but bottom range of discretion appropriate
is $ 10,000. Eastway Constr. Corp. v New York (1987, CA2 NY) 821 F2d 121, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67601, 8
FR Serv 3d 1101, cert den (1987) 484 US 918, 98 L Ed 2d 226, 108 S Ct 269.
Sanction in amount of defendants' attorney fees was properly imposed on plaintiff who filed frivolous lawsuit where,
although defendants never answered plaintiff's complaint, they did prepare response, and defendants' attorneys
presented itemized billings, payment check, calendar entries, time sheets, and prepared draft answers for each of
individual defendants to prove amount of fees incurred. Patterson v Aiken (1988, CA11 Ga) 841 F2d 386, 1988-1
CCH Trade Cases P 67941, 10 FR Serv 3d 1232.
Where defendant expended considerable effort preparing and submitting its motion for summary judgment in
response to complaint which plaintiff should have known was frivolous after completion of discovery, sanctions were
properly imposed in amount of fees defendant incurred in preparing material after close of discovery, at rates defendant
was actually billed during that period. Flip Side Prods. v Jam Prods. (1988, CA7 Ill) 843 F2d 1024, 1988-1 CCH
Trade Cases P 67964, 10 FR Serv 3d 1070, cert den (1988) 488 US 909, 102 L Ed 2d 249, 109 S Ct 261.
Where sanctions were imposed on plaintiff for filing frivolous lawsuit, award of $ 1,500, which District Court
estimated was amount of reasonable attorney fees for preparation of Rule 11 motion, does not constitute abuse of
discretion since rule was designed not only to compensate wronged party, but also to deter frivolous litigation. Medical
Emergency Service Associates, S.C. v Foulke (1988, CA7 Ill) 844 F2d 391, 10 FR Serv 3d 1239.
Sanction imposed on plaintiff which was equal to approximately 20 percent of defendants' attorney fees for
defending frivolous action was not excessive. Calloway v Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Indus. Corp.
Page 170
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
(1988, CA2 NY) 854 F2d 1452, 11 FR Serv 3d 1083, revd in part on other grounds (1989) 493 US 120, 107 L Ed 2d 438,
110 S Ct 456, 15 FR Serv 3d 1 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Religious Technology Ctr. v
Gerbode (1994, CD Cal) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8595) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Triad Sys. Corp. v Southeastern Express Co. (1995, CA9 Cal) 64 F3d 1330, 95 CDOS 6889, 95 Daily Journal DAR
11821, 36 USPQ2d 1028, 33 FR Serv 3d 468) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stuart I. Levin &
Assocs., P.A. v Rogers (1998, CA11 Fla) 156 F3d 1135, 48 USPQ2d 1442, 41 FR Serv 3d 1294, 12 FLW Fed C 123).
Sanctions amounting to all attorney fees incurred by individual who was wrongfully served as defendant after
plaintiffs failed to make reasonable inquiry to obtain correct address for proper service were properly imposed on
plaintiffs. Callahan v Schoppe (1989, CA5 Tex) 864 F2d 44, 12 FR Serv 3d 1434.
Where defense attorneys supported their fee request with sufficient information, there was no abuse of discretion in
denying request for discovery by plaintiff's attorney against whom sanctions were imposed, and since rule provides
"make-whole" remedy to place prevailing party in position it would have been in had frivolous argument not been
advanced, it is appropriate to award all fees incurred as result of initial frivolous position, including fees for litigating
amount of fees to be awarded, without separate independent finding of frivolousness at each stage of proceedings.
Borowski v DePuy, Inc., Div. of Boehringer Mannheim Co. (1989, CA7 Ill) 876 F2d 1339, 13 FR Serv 3d 794.
In awarding government attorney fees and costs against plaintiffs, District Court did not err in determining amount of
sanction where amount of time spent by government attorneys was not unreasonable since case involved relatively
complex issues and extensive documentary evidence, where nothing in record suggested that government presented
evidence which was unnecessary to its case, and where government bill as to attorney time was detailed. Lemaster v
United States (1989, CA6 Ohio) 891 F2d 115, 90-1 USTC P 50032, 15 FR Serv 3d 599, 64 AFTR 2d 5858.
Where plaintiff's lawsuit could not even colorably be maintained in federal court since whole purpose of lawsuit was
apparently to forestall state court foreclosure proceeding from which plaintiff had taken no appeal, and federal civil
rights laws do not provide vehicle to attack state court judgments nor to sanction conduct of state court judges for
actions taken within scope of their judicial authority, trial court properly allowed defendant's counsel to claim all of his
fees as sanction, particularly as plaintiff never responded to defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions and so may be
deemed to have conceded that they were properly imposed and reasonable in amount sought. Bogney v Jones (1990,
CA5 Tex) 904 F2d 272, 17 FR Serv 3d 249, reh den (1990, CA5) 1990 US App LEXIS 15142.
Although wholly frivolous, action survived motion for summary judgment, and for purposes of Rule 11, fees
attributable to plaintiff's pleading ended with court's ruling on that motion; thus, fees incurred prior to time District
Court ruled on defendants' motion for summary judgment were appropriate least severe sanction. Jennings v Joshua
Independent School Dist. (1991, CA5 Tex) 948 F2d 194, 21 FR Serv 3d 350, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA5 Tex) 952
F2d 402 and cert den (1992) 504 US 956, 119 L Ed 2d 226, 112 S Ct 2303, 112 S Ct 2304.
District Court abused its discretion in awarding as sanction full amount of defendant's attorney fees where
defendant's attorney spent several hours researching and preparing for discovery on action she claimed was without
merit on its face and did not move for dismissal of action. Danvers v Danvers (1992, CA6 Ohio) 959 F2d 601, 22 FR
Serv 3d 47, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA6) 1992 US App LEXIS 11640.
Sanction of $ 7,500, which was approximately half of fees incurred by defendants in defending plaintiffs' meritless
motion, was reasonable and within court's discretion. Mariani v Doctors Assoc., Inc. (1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 983 F2d
5, 24 FR Serv 3d 918.
It would be excessive to impose sanction which completely reimbursed defendants for attorney fees for 279.1 hours
of legal work when defendants claimed that complaint was obviously frivolous; appropriate sanction would be
defendants' expenses and legal fees for 50 hours work in connection with motion to dismiss and 25 hours for
prosecuting Rule 11 motion. Kirk Capital Corp. v Bailey (1994, CA8 Mo) 16 F3d 1485, 28 FR Serv 3d 88.
District court did not err in awarding attorney fees of $ 8,000 to defendant where plaintiffs' groundless complaint
involved litigation lasting more than two years, and defense spent vastly more than amount of sanction on attorney fees,
but district court chose figure that was fairly nominal but large enough to serve as deterrent and warning to counsel.
O'Ferral v Trebol Motors Corp. (1995, CA1 Puerto Rico) 45 F3d 561, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8733, 30 FR
Serv 3d 1206 (criticized in Bonilla v Trebol Motors Corp. (1997, DC Puerto Rico) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 4341).
Rule 11 permits award of those expenses directly caused by baseless filing, including attorney fees for defending
against such filing; therefore, where magistrate determined that fees sought by defendants were reasonable and that only
substantial monetary sanction would deter plaintiff's attorney from engaging in similar conduct in future, and plaintiff's
attorney offered no specific examples of excessive fees or vague billing records, district court did not abuse its
discretion in setting sanction to be imposed on plaintiff's attorney in amount equal to fees and costs reasonably incurred
by defendants in defending baseless action. Lorentzen v Anderson Pest Control (1995, CA7 Ill) 64 F3d 327, 33 FR Serv
Page 171
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
3d 259, reh, en banc, den (1995, CA7 Ill) 1995 US App LEXIS 27686 and cert den (1996) 517 US 1136, 134 L Ed 2d
547, 116 S Ct 1423.
Sanction amounting to all attorney fees and costs will not be disturbed on appeal where plaintiff argues only that
total amount of time spent by defendant's attorneys was unreasonable, not that hourly rate or that any specific
expenditure of time was unreasonable, and where District Court, which was able to observe day-to-day course of
litigation and quality of counsel, found that these amounts were reasonable in light of frivolous and unfounded nature of
law suit. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v Association of Flight Attendants (1988, App DC) 274 US App
DC 370, 864 F2d 173, 130 BNA LRRM 2307, 110 CCH LC P 10866, 12 FR Serv 3d 979.
In determining amount of sanction, where District Court termed amount of fees requested by defendants as
"excessive" and awarded sanction of more than half amount requested, no abuse of discretion occurred since amount
could have been justified for punitive and deterrent purposes, and only rarest case could justify finding abuse of
discretion in award of sanction in amount less than costs and attorney's fees incurred. Danik, Inc. v Hartmarx Corp.
(1989, App DC) 277 US App DC 333, 875 F2d 890, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68588, 15 FR Serv 3d 491, affd in part
and revd in part on other grounds (1990) 496 US 384, 110 L Ed 2d 359, 110 S Ct 2447, 1990-1 CCH Trade Cases P
69052, 16 FR Serv 3d 737 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Photocircuits Corp. v Marathon Agents
(1995, ED NY) 162 FRD 449, 33 FR Serv 3d 780) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Morroni v
Gunderson (1996, MD Fla) 169 FRD 168, 10 FLW Fed D 311) and (criticized in Ridder v City of Springfield (1997,
CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288, 1997 FED App 94P) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Hockley v Shan Enters. Ltd. Pshp. (1998, DC NJ) 19 F Supp 2d 235, 42 FR Serv 3d 105) and (superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Barnes v Department of Corrections (1999, 5th Dist) 74 Cal App 4th 126, 87 Cal
Rptr 2d 594, 99 CDOS 6555, 99 Daily Journal DAR 8353).
Although defendant expended $ 68,000 in attorney fees in defending frivolous suit, $ 5,000 sanction was not abuse
of discretion where court balanced defendant's entitlement to compensation against plaintiff's attorney's ability to pay
and objective of deterring litigation abuse, and where court then followed principle of imposing least severe sanction
adequate to purpose of Rule 11. Hilton Hotels Corp. v Banov (1990, App DC) 283 US App DC 232, 899 F2d 40.
Harassing, vexatious and oppressive conduct of lawsuits by plaintiff are self-evident and warrant sanctions in form of
award of attorney fees, consisting of simple flat-fee award which is more easily and appropriately ascertained than by
multiplying number of hours by appropriate billing rate. Taylor v Prudential-Bache Secur., Inc. (1984, ND NY) 594 F
Supp 226, 39 FR Serv 2d 1309, affd without op (1984, CA2 NY) 751 F2d 371.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's counsel is properly ordered to pay $ 200 to defendants in diversity action, where
plaintiff's counsel overlooked jurisdictional problem in complaint, assuming his client was incorporated in Maryland
where it was headquartered, when it was actually incorporated in Delaware as was defendant corporation; requested
reimbursement of defendants' attorneys' fees for 73.8 hours, totaling over $ 7,800, is excessive and inappropriate, since
hours claimed far exceed amounts of time necessary to file pleading responding to complaint to dispose of diversity
issue, rule requires that work expended be causally linked to improperly filed paper, and defendants' assertion that
complaint was wholly lacking in merit and filed only for purposes of extortion and defamation is undercut by fact that
individual defendant made offers of settlement before suit was filed. Weisman v Rivlin (1984, DC Dist Col) 598 F
Supp 724, 1 FR Serv 3d 1527.
Plaintiff and its attorney shall be jointly and severally liable for $ 25,000 in attorney fees as sanction under Rule 11
for improperly signing pleadings for conspiracy claim in antitrust, since review of affidavits submitted by plaintiff
shows that none of affiants refer to existence of conspiracy between named defendants, and since plaintiff did not
conduct any proper independent investigation before filing claim for conspiracy among defendants, basing allegations
instead on beliefs and experiences of attorney. Florida Monument Builders v All Faiths Memorial Gardens (1984, SD
Fla) 605 F Supp 1324.
Since taxpayer's suit against IRS and various IRS agents seeking damages for mental anguish caused by alleged
intimidation and harassment was frivolous, and done for purpose of harassment and delay, government awarded $ 1,000
in attorney's fees. Booker v IRS (1985, ED Va) 86-1 USTC P 9296, 56 AFTR 2d 6471.
Failure of plaintiff's attorney to conduct any investigation whatsoever into defamation claim against defendant
justifies imposition of monetary sanctions against plaintiff under Rule 11; however, in determining sanctions, defendant
should have submitted itemized statement of number of hours spent by its attorneys, description of particular services
conducted during that time, and hourly rate that attorneys charged for such services, and without such accounting, court
is unable to make objective determination on amount of money which defendant is entitled; defendant is entitled to
recovery of those expenses incurred up to and including hearing on its first motion for summary judgment, at which
defamation claims were dismissed by court. Mohammed v Union Carbide Corp. (1985, ED Mich) 606 F Supp 252,
1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66602, 1 FR Serv 3d 507.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff who brought civil rights action based on assertions that federal reserve notes are not
legal tender and that he was denied asserted right to jury trial in mortgage foreclosure action is properly ordered to pay
each of 3 defendants $ 750 in attorneys' fees and also to pay fine of $ 500 to Clerk of Court, since plaintiff's insistence
on litigating question in face of controlling precedent amounts to bad faith, his failure to discover overwhelming
precedent suggests lack of reasonable inquiry into law, and record is replete with motions and strange filings by plaintiff
that obfuscate issues presented and are suggestive of attempt to prolong suit and harass defendants. Nixon v Phillipoff
(1985, ND Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Where defendant's attorney spent excessive amount of time preparing for and defending obviously frivolous lawsuit
and charged hourly rate which is clearly excessive, only charges for reasonable amount of time at reasonable rate will
be imposed as sanctions on plaintiff's attorney. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v Integrated Resources, Inc. (1987, SD
NY) 114 FRD 684, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67467, 6 FR Serv 3d 1092.
Sanctions imposed on plaintiff's attorney for filing frivolous law suit will consist of half of defendant's attorney's fees
since, although fees charged by defendant's attorney were reasonable, imposition of full amount of fees would critically
harm small practice of plaintiff's attorney. Doe v Keane (1987, WD Mich) 117 FRD 103.
Where attorney who handled major portion of defense sought reimbursement for only 33.25 hours of time spent on
case, all of which were accounted for in detail, additional sanction for 11 hours spent on case by other attorneys will not
be imposed on plaintiff's attorney where no accounting of how hours were spent is given. Doe v Keane (1987, WD
Mich) 117 FRD 103.
Where plaintiff did not have standing to bring suit alleging violation of particular federal statute, and plaintiff's
attorneys voluntarily dismissed complaint after 6 months of discovery, it is apparent that plaintiff's attorneys failed to
make adequate prefiling investigation, and therefore sanctions are warranted, but sanction of $ 300 will be imposed
instead of full amount of attorney fees since lesser amount is sufficient deterrent. Muraoka v American Osteopathic
Asso. (1987, ND Ill) 117 FRD 616, 45 BNA FEP Cas 419, 45 CCH EPD P 37705.
Attorney fees and expenses for investigator and medical expert are awarded to police officers resulting from
successful defense of civil rights action because alleged victim fabricated entire claim, and financial status of alleged
victim did not justify reduction of award; attorney was exonerated because of having been misled by client.
Kappenberger v Oates (1987, SD NY) 663 F Supp 991.
Attorney's fees of $ 10,000 are imposed against plaintiff's attorney, who brought action to enforce contract for sale of
vessel in District Court which had no jurisdiction over case, because reasonable inquiry into jurisdictional basis would
have shown that court lacked both admiralty and diversity jurisdiction over action. International Shipping Co., S.A. v
Hydra Offshore, Inc. (1987, SD NY) 675 F Supp 146, 1989 AMC 1712, 9 FR Serv 3d 1017, affd (1989, CA2 NY) 875
F2d 388, 1989 AMC 1701, 13 FR Serv 3d 1134, cert den (1989) 493 US 1003, 107 L Ed 2d 558, 110 S Ct 563.
Attorney's fee award of $ 4,200 for employer's attorney is upheld and increased by $ 975 to compensate time spent
defending against frivolous challenge to fee award, where National Labor Relations Board attorneys filed contempt
proceedings against employer without properly investigating charge of employee and then failed timely to respond to
fee request, because action of government attorneys violated Rule 11 and was not "substantially justified" under 28
USCS § 2412. Silverman on behalf of NLRB v Ehrlich Beer Corp. (1987, SD NY) 687 F Supp 67, 129 BNA LRRM
2067.
Although award of fees due to frivolity of plaintiff's reply to defendant's counterclaim appears justified, amount of
time claimed to have been expended by defendant's attorneys and resulting fees are so far-reaching and unjustified and
ludicrous that fees must be denied. Acutrnx, Inc. v Multispec, Ltd. (1988, WD NY) 123 FRD 64.
Where much of conduct of plaintiffs and their attorneys was within scope of proper conduct, it would be unfair to
force them to pay all of costs which defendant incurred in connection with preparing and presenting motion to dismiss,
and therefore sanction will consist only of attorney fees for reasonable amount of time for defendant to have spent
preparing its response to frivolous issues. Cedar Crest Health Center, Inc. v Bowen (1989, SD Ind) 129 FRD 519, 16
FR Serv 3d 1242.
Hospital is awarded $ 500 in attorney's fees plus costs of court against plaintiff and his counsel under Rule 11, where
plaintiff injured by descending electronic gate at hospital in January 1980 filed complaint in October 1988, arguing that
4-year statute of limitations barring his action was in violation of "open courts" provision of state constitution, because
reasonable inquiry into law would have shown that 4-year statute of limitations was constitutionally sound. McHenry v
Utah Valley Hospital, Div. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (1989, DC Utah) 724 F Supp 835, affd (1991, CA10
Utah) 927 F2d 1125, cert den (1991) 502 US 894, 116 L Ed 2d 217, 112 S Ct 263.
Where plaintiff withheld relevant facts from her attorney and from court and attorney appeared to have made little or
no effort to investigate facts before filing suit, plaintiff and her attorney shall be jointly and severally liable for amount
Page 173
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
of sanctions, and where defendants spent approximately $ 68,000 on attorney fees, this amount, although reasonable,
will be reduced to $ 55,000 in calculating amount of sanction. Allen v Utley (1990, DC Dist Col) 129 FRD 1.
In computing amount of sanction, where time spent by defendant's attorneys in opposing frivolous lawsuit was
reasonable and rates which they charged were comparable to other similarly qualified attorneys, these amounts are
multiplied together to arrive at loadstar amount, and there is no compelling reason to reduce this amount where
plaintiffs' attorney had previously been sanctioned for filing identical frivolous action in another court and had
discussed with plaintiffs their indemnification of him for further imposition of sanctions in action. Harb v Gallagher
(1990, SD NY) 131 FRD 381.
Where sanctions are imposed on plaintiff for filing frivolous pleadings, sanction amount will not include attorney
fees incurred by defendant in opposing plaintiff's motion to depose certain witness since testimony of that witness was
relevant to suit. Healey v Chelsea Resources, Ltd. (1990, SD NY) 133 FRD 449, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95734, 18
FR Serv 3d 918.
251. --Pro se plaintiff
Pursuant to Rule 11, state prisoner who brought action pro se is properly assessed with defendants' attorneys' fees in
amount of $ 200 and fine payable to clerk of court in amount of $ 100, where prisoner attempted in instant action to
reassert his claims against various prison authorities who were defendants in earlier case, despite fact that court
previously held such claims to be meritless, and where controlling precedent and earlier suit removed every colorable
basis in law for prisoner's position. Williams v Duckworth (1985, ND Ind) 617 F Supp 597.
252. Awards against defendant
Although amount of sanctions imposed on defendant was less than half of amount which plaintiffs requested as
attorney fees, imposition of sanctions was well within sound discretion of District Court where, even though full
amounts requested appeared to be reasonable, lesser amount was sufficient to get attention of defendant and deter it
from further abuses. Stewart v American International Oil & Gas Co. (1988, CA9 Cal) 845 F2d 196, 10 FR Serv 3d
1119, 100 OGR 260.
Defendant and defense counsel in personal injury action resulting in 2 trials must pay plaintiff amount of her costs,
including attorney's fees, from institution of suit to present as sanctions award under Rules 11, 26(g) and 37(b) for time
and energy plaintiff was forced to expend as result of defendant's and defense counsel's discovery abuses, where
magistrate found that defendant deliberately failed to comply with discovery requests, was unnecessarily obstructive in
providing pertinent documents and witnesses for depositions, failed to obey court orders, failed to maintain files
relevant to litigation, and defendant's counsel regularly exceeded bounds of zealous representation and ignored
obligations to cooperate in good faith during discovery process. Perkinson v Houlihan's/D.C., Inc. (1985, DC Dist
Col) 108 FRD 667, 4 FR Serv 3d 219.
In determining amount of sanctions to be imposed on defendant, plaintiff's attorney's fees for time spent on
unnecessary efforts or on motions which plaintiff must have regarded as unlikely to succeed will be disallowed, as will
fees of third party defendant's attorneys who spent excessive amount of time in obtaining dismissal based on
uncomplicated issues. Anschutz Petroleum Marketing Corp. v E.W. Saybolt & Co. (1986, SD NY) 112 FRD 355.
Plaintiff is awarded $ 25,000 attorney fees in patent case, where foreign defendant forced service under Hague
Convention despite having same counsel and defending same claims as its United States subsidiary, defendants
repeatedly failed to respond fully and candidly to interrogatories, and refused to disclose existence of patent, all of such
conduct evincing apparent tactics of needless delay and expense, and utter refusal to act with candor and good faith in
bringing issues before court for proper resolution. Sheets v Yamaha Motors Corp. (1987, ED La) 657 F Supp 319, 3
USPQ2d 1856, affd in part and remanded in part (1988, CA5 La) 849 F2d 179, 7 USPQ2d 1461, 11 FR Serv 3d 892.
Where defendant filed motion containing grossly misleading and irresponsible interpretation of relevant statute,
sanction must be imposed and will consist of reasonable attorney fees for time spent responding to frivolous pleading,
but will not include expenses for preparation of motion for sanction. Practice Management Assoc., Inc. v Walding
(1991, MD Fla) 138 FRD 148.
253. Miscellaneous
Removing party is ordered to forfeit removal bond and pay $ 1,000 in attorney's fees, where party filed removal
petition after it was time-barred, petition clearly indicated court had no original or diversity jurisdiction, and removal
appeared to have been done for improper purpose of causing unnecessary delay. In re Estate of Sellers (1987, WD
Wash) 657 F Supp 168.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
In civil suit, where pro hac vice defense counsel had violated Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct and all
defense counsel had violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 USCS § 1927 in their pursuit of motion for recusal, local rule
authorized court to revoke nonresident attorneys' pro hac vice status, and did not require referral of matter to
disciplinary panel before court revoked that status; thus, court revoked their pro hac vice status and ordered all defense
counsel to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs' attorney fees. Obert v Republic Western Ins. Co. (2003, DC RI) 264 F
Supp 2d 106.
d. Other Particular Awards or Claims
254. Fine
Where plaintiff, who had been fined for filing frivolous income tax returns, sought to have Sixteenth Amendment
and entire income tax system declared unconstitutional, and plaintiff had previously filed two similar unsuccessful law
suits, sanction consisting of $ 1500 fine and injunction against filing any further actions without leave of court was not
excessive. Miller v United States (1989, CA7 Ind) 868 F2d 236, 89-1 USTC P 9184, 63 AFTR 2d 695.
Pursuant to Rule 11, court may assess plaintiff's attorney with $ 250 fine on its own motion where plaintiff's attorney
filed case in wrong district on last day permitted by relevant statutes of limitation. Barton v Williams (1983, ND Ohio)
38 FR Serv 2d 966.
Plaintiff's attorney is properly assessed with $ 200 fine for violating Rule 11 by filing frivolous lawsuit, completely
lacking in merit, where plaintiff sought tort damages from federal government for alleged negligent enforcement of
Immigration and Nationality Act, alleging that citizen of Kenya, who was father of plaintiff's infant child, returned to
Kenya with child without plaintiff's prior knowledge or consent, and notwithstanding that infant did not have passport.
Dore v Schultz (1984, SD NY) 582 F Supp 154, 39 FR Serv 2d 161.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff's attorney is properly assessed $ 5,000 fine where, for purpose of invoking District
Court's diversity jurisdiction, he submitted document to court which purported to disclaim any interest in lawsuit on part
of nondiverse parties when in fact such parties retained 27.5 percent interest in any recovery by plaintiff under
agreement between attorneys. Hearld v Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care (1985, ED Tex) 107 FRD 17.
Plaintiff's attorney who ignored court orders and did not file pleadings with reasonable diligence fined $ 2,500,
plaintiff granted time to secure different counsel, and case continued until new counsel obtained. Navarro v Cohan
(1985, SD Fla) 109 FRD 86.
Frivolity of pro se plaintiffs' cause demands imposition of $ 250 fine as Rule 11 sanction, where action is based on
purported land patent which indicates on its face that it is self-serving document, drafted by plaintiffs to grant
themselves title to land superior to that of defendant bank which had made loan to plaintiffs secured by mortgage on
property and which had had plaintiffs evicted from property following foreclosure action. Hilgeford v Peoples Bank,
Portland (1985, ND Ind) 607 F Supp 536, 2 FR Serv 3d 356, affd (1985, CA7 Ind) 776 F2d 176, 3 FR Serv 3d 1358,
cert den (1986) 475 US 1123, 90 L Ed 2d 188, 106 S Ct 1644.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiff who brought civil rights action based on assertions that federal reserve notes are not
legal tender and that he was denied asserted right to jury trial in mortgage foreclosure action is properly ordered to pay
each of 3 defendants $ 750 in attorneys' fees and also to pay fine of $ 500 to Clerk of Court, since plaintiff's insistence
on litigating question in face of controlling precedent amounts to bad faith, his failure to discover overwhelming
precedent suggests lack of reasonable inquiry into law, and record is replete with motions and strange filings by plaintiff
that obfuscate issues presented and are suggestive of attempt to prolong suit and harass defendants. Nixon v Phillipoff
(1985, ND Ind) 615 F Supp 890, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ind) 787 F2d 596.
Pursuant to Rule 11, state prisoner who brought action pro se is properly assessed with defendants' attorneys' fees in
amount of $ 200 and fine payable to clerk of court in amount of $ 100, where prisoner attempted in instant action to
reassert his claims against various prison authorities who were defendants in earlier case, despite fact that court
previously held such claims to be meritless, and where controlling precedent and earlier suit removed every colorable
basis in law for prisoner's position. Williams v Duckworth (1985, ND Ind) 617 F Supp 597.
Plaintiff, who brought action pro se against IRS seeking injunctive relief and punitive damages, and was tax preparer
who impressed court as being capable of reading and understanding court order, was subject to fine of $ 50 under Rule
11 for filing motion for default that was not well grounded in fact or law, where motion was based on failure to file
answer by certain date and court had extended time to file response beyond that date. Keese v United States (1985, SD
Tex) 632 F Supp 85, 86-1 USTC P 9389, 57 AFTR 2d 848.
Sanctions consisting of $ 1,000 fine plus defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs are appropriate to impose
on plaintiffs who persisted in filing frivolous lawsuits, ignored orders of court and attempted to issue own orders and to
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invalidate appearances filed by defendants' attorneys, thereby prejudicing defendants and burdening court, all in effort
to harass defendants. Hilgeford v Peoples Bank, Inc. (1986, ND Ind) 113 FRD 161.
Attorneys for corporation which brought § 1983 action alleging that state court judgment imposed upon corporation
was denial of due process are required to pay defendants' Rule 11 attorney's fees and expenses and is subject to $ 15,000
fine, where (1) sole reason for suit was to harass defendant and prevent collection of judgment, and (2) there was no
objective basis to believe suit was warranted by existing law. Alcan Aluminum Corp. v Lyntel Products, Inc. (1987,
ND Ill) 656 F Supp 1138.
Rejected medical school applicant and her attorney husband are cited for civil contempt for failing to comply with
citations to discover their assets and for filing additional case against rejecting medical schools in direct violation of
injunction, where assets were sought to pay Rule 11 sanction of attorneys' fees and costs of 7 medical schools forced to
defend against couple's frivolous suits over 10-year period, and court fines rejected applicant is fined $ 100 per business
day until she voluntarily dismisses 1987 case which violates injunction and disqualifies attorney husband from in any
way assisting wife in any proceeding arising out of her rejected applications to medical schools. Cannon v Loyola
University of Chicago (1987, ND Ill) 676 F Supp 823.
Civil rights claim is dismissed rather than transferred, and attorney/plaintiff and his attorney are each fined $ 1500
under Rule 11 where plaintiff sought to transfer case from Indiana which had previously been dismissed in Illinois state
court, statute of limitations had run, and service of process was not perfected for 7 months after commencing suit,
because (1) full faith and credit clause and res judicata bar relitigation, (2) venue in Indiana was clearly improper, and
(3) plaintiff and his attorney failed to make reasonable inquiry into legal basis for claims which were clearly barred in
federal court. Hapaniewski v Chicago Heights (1988, ND Ind) 684 F Supp 1011.
Court fines plaintiff's attorney $ 500 under FRCP Rule 11 where plaintiff's attorney accused defense attorney in lease
litigation of adopting position not reasonably based in law or fact, because defense attorney actually prevailed in case,
plaintiff's counsel frivolously accused defense lawyer of violating Rule 11, and court will not tolerate misuse of rule as
litigation tactic. Draper & Kramer, Inc. v Baskin-Robbins, Inc. (1988, ND Ill) 690 F Supp 728, 11 FR Serv 3d 363.
Plaintiff's attorneys will be fined $ 100 as sanction for filing repeated requests for Rule 11 sanctions against
defendant's attorneys where motions filed by defendant were based on law, and therefore plaintiff's requests for
sanctions were themselves not well-grounded in law. Colby v J.C. Penney Co. (1989, ND Ill) 127 FRD 509, 11 EBC
1645, 50 BNA FEP Cas 1869.
Sanctions must be imposed on plaintiff who deliberately misrepresented facts to his attorney and caused frivolous
complaint to be filed, but since defendant was not entirely blameless, sanction will be in form of $ 3,000 fine payable to
U.S. Treasurer. Mars v Anderman (1989, ED NY) 136 FRD 351.
Investment banker and his counsel are each directed to pay $ 2,500 fine under Rule 11, where response to defendant's
first summary-judgment motion asserted that banker was working in London and purposely omitted his extensive and
primary connection with New York, because sanctions are particularly appropriate where misleading allegations are
used to prevent summary judgment. Warshay v Guinness PLC (1990, SD NY) 750 F Supp 628, affd without op (1991,
CA2 NY) 935 F2d 1278.
Plaintiff's counsel is fined $ 500 for misleading and unethical representation of state and federal controlling law
governing sexual display in establishments serving alcoholic beverages, where it is abundantly evident that plaintiffs'
counsel are aware of state supreme court and United States Supreme Court decisions, which they omitted from their
memorandum of law. Jorgenson v County of Volusia (1986, MD Fla) 625 F Supp 1543, revd without op (1987, CA11
Fla) 824 F2d 973.
255. --Against defendant or attorney
In action by patients against government-operated mental health facility, where government attorney violated Rule
11 by falsely stating that patients were free to leave facility, $ 20,000 fine imposed by district court as sanction was
grossly disproportionate and inappropriate and would be reduced to $ 6,500. Navarro-Ayala v Nunez (1992, CA1
Puerto Rico) 968 F2d 1421, 23 FR Serv 3d 101.
District court properly imposed monetary sanctions on defendant corporation's law firm for persisting in frivolous
defenses and counter claims and attempting to delay payment of corporation's debt to plaintiff investor; because issue of
sanctions was raised sua sponte by district court, amount assessed was payable to court, and amount, equal to
three-fourths of fees and expenses of investor's attorneys and less than one percent of amount that corporation attempted
to avoid paying investor, was appropriate. MHC Inv. Co. v Racom Corp. (2003, CA8 Iowa) 323 F3d 620.
Sanction was erroneous because sanctions were inappropriate, given safe harbor provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,
unless offending party had opportunity to withdraw complaint without suffering sanctions. Retail Flooring Dealers of
Am., Inc. v Beaulieu of Am., Inc. (2003, CA9 Cal) 339 F3d 1146, 2003 CDOS 7293.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Defendant and counsel who filed motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was fined $ 5,000 under
authority of Rule 11 where it was evident that defendant, which was Hong Kong corporation, was present in state for
jurisdictional purposes through general agent and information establishing agency could have been obtained by
defendant's counsel from client with reasonable inquiry prior to filing motion. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v Group
Systems International Far East, Ltd. (1986, CD Cal) 109 FRD 594.
Where defense counsel sought to have District Court reconsider its own remand order but failed to address question
of whether court had jurisdiction to review its own order, and overwhelming law was that court did not have
jurisdiction, sanction in form of $ 1,000 fine will be imposed. Valparaiso v Iron Workers Local Union # 395 (1987,
ND Ind) 118 FRD 466, 10 FR Serv 3d 87.
Where defendant company repeatedly impeded discovery by blocking plaintiff's access to company's files and
arguing that requested documents were not relevant when they clearly were relevant, sanction will be imposed
consisting of plaintiff's attorney fees, with additional fine of $ 1,000 to be imposed on company itself for its
recalcitrance in cooperating with discovery process and for its refusal to abide by reasonable agreement which
company's attorney had made with plaintiff's attorney in attempt to resolve impasse. Scarfo v Cabletron Sys. (1994,
DC NH) 153 FRD 9, 64 BNA FEP Cas 222, remanded (1995, CA1 NH) 54 F3d 931, 67 BNA FEP Cas 1474.
256. Other particular awards or claims
District Court abused discretion in assessing Rule 11 sanctions in amount of $ 250,000 against plaintiffs' attorney in
defamation action where District Court waited until end of trial to impose sanctions for misconduct accumulated
throughout trial, thus perpetuating waste of judicial resources contrary to purpose of rule, and where judge assessed
sanction without examining reasonableness of amounts requested, any misconduct on part of defense counsel that may
have contributed to continuation of action, and ability of plaintiffs' attorney to pay enormous sum, all of which must be
considered to ensure that sanctions do not exceed those expenses and fees that were reasonably necessary to resist
improper actions. In re Yagman (1986, CA9 Cal) 796 F2d 1165, 13 Media L R 1545, 5 FR Serv 3d 305, reh den, amd
(1986, CA9 Cal) 803 F2d 1085, 5 FR Serv 3d 1443.
Imposition of $ 10 sanction was proper where plaintiff admitted that present case, which was dismissed by District
Court, raised issues virtually identical to those he raised in 3 previously dismissed actions, and thus record supports
District Court's conclusion that plaintiff needed to be deterred from further abuse of process. Knoll v Webster (1988,
CA10 Utah) 838 F2d 450.
Sanction of $ 19,307 imposed on plaintiff and his attorney was not abuse of discretion where plaintiff had filed
confusing and misleading and ill-founded pleadings, had asserted baseless allegations, had repeatedly misquoted state
disciplinary and evidentiary rules, and had threatened to depose each of defendant company's 80 officers and employees
in effort to harass defendant which had repeatedly tried, in open court and in private communications, to advise plaintiff
and his attorney of these violations and to mitigate its own expenses. Willy v Coastal Corp. (1990, CA5 Tex) 915 F2d
965, 17 FR Serv 3d 1431, reh den, en banc (1990, CA5 Tex) 920 F2d 931 and affd (1992) 503 US 131, 117 L Ed 2d
280, 112 S Ct 1076, 92 CDOS 1818, 92 Daily Journal DAR 2850, 121 CCH LC P 10012, 21 FR Serv 3d 1121, 6 FLW
Fed S 34, reh den (1992) 504 US 935, 118 L Ed 2d 596, 112 S Ct 2001, 121 CCH LC P 10165.
Where attorney had been sanctioned in several other actions, district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
sanction of $ 50,000, specifically finding that amount to be minimum necessary to deter future misconduct. White v
General Motors Corp. (1992, CA10 Kan) 977 F2d 499, 23 FR Serv 3d 1104.
Sanction of $ 200,000 did not constitute impermissible fee shifting where plaintiff's attorney's sanctionable conduct
included assertion of felonious conduct by client's former lawyer, which assertion was made in order to avoid
well-deserved grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. Estate of Calloway ex rel. LMN Prods. v Marvel
Entertainment Group (1993, CA2 NY) 9 F3d 237, 27 FR Serv 3d 753, cert den (1994) 511 US 1081, 128 L Ed 2d 459,
114 S Ct 1829.
Sanctions of $ 400 would be imposed on plaintiff's counsel for filing tort claim against city, since counsel failed to
make reasonable inquiry into facts and law and discover that required notice of claim had not been filed with city.
McQuire v New York (1985, SD NY) 3 FR Serv 3d 361.
Sanction in amount of $ 300 is properly imposed upon plaintiff's attorney where competent attorney after reasonable
inquiry would have determined that judicial review of Veterans Administration's decision denying veterans benefits is
precluded by relevant statutory and case law. Johnson v Veterans Admin. (1985, ND Miss) 107 FRD 626, 3 FR Serv 3d
706.
Plaintiff's counsel is liable for sanctions in amount of $ 500 for arguing that attorney-client privilege protected from
disclosure tape recordings of conversations between his client and third parties, when conversations were neither
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
confidential nor between attorney and client. H.L. H.L. Hayden Co. v Siemens Medical Systems, Inc. (1985, SD NY)
108 FRD 686.
Penalty of $ 250 shall be imposed on taxpayer's attorney who filed action in wrong district and "exacerbated"
situation by filing frivolous motion to strike pleadings based on his contention that IRS attorney was not member of bar
of this district court. Hersh v United States (1986, ED Wis) 86-2 USTC P 9503, 57 AFTR 2d 1371.
Lawyer/investor's frivolous securities fraud complaint is dismissed and lawyer/investor must pay $ 2,368.90 balance
due on his account with discount brokerage house plus $ 5,000, pursuant to Rule 11, to brokerage house and to stock
exchange by way of costs and attorneys fees, where lawyer/investor alleges brokerage house failed to advise him of
well-publicized pending tender offer for corporation whose stock he purchased call options for, and stock exchange
fraudulently continued to make market in common stock option contracts of corporation after well-publicized tender
offer for corporation, because court cannot countenance claim by attorney based on idea that securities laws require
brokerage houses and exchanges to insure prospective investors from risk of loss in market due to their own laziness
and stupidity. Polur v American Stock Exchange, Inc. (1986, SD NY) 637 F Supp 1190, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
92955, affd without op (1987, CA2 NY) 816 F2d 670.
Rule 11 assessment of costs of $ 20 an hour for 25 hours wasted judicial time is appropriate sanction where
disgruntled employee, who was passed over for promotion, filed Title VII action against his employer, U.S. Army,
where evidence allowed no possible inference of racial discrimination. Edwards v Marsh (1986, ED Mich) 644 F Supp
1564, 42 BNA FEP Cas 117.
Sanctions in amount of $ 3,700 are imposed where attorney filed unreasonable fee petition in social security case and
petition was not well grounded in fact, contained patently unreasonable documentation of hours, and was interposed for
improper purpose of recovering unwarranted attorney's fees, because petition borders upon abuse of process and fraud
upon court. Moore v Secretary of Health & Human Services (1986, ED Mich) 651 F Supp 514.
District Court imposes additional $ 1,000 Rule 11 sanction and enjoins habeas corpus petitioner from filing
additional frivolous documents or lawsuits, from filing any new action in federal court without first obtaining leave of
court, and from filing any action in federal court arising out of Peoples Bank's foreclosure on property securing his loan,
where petitioner has already had 3 previous frivolous lawsuits dismissed with Rule 11 sanctions of $ 250, $ 500 and $
1,000 imposed but not yet paid, because petitioner's current and previously filed pleadings, motions and other papers,
including self-manufactured documents purporting to (1) appoint new Master of district court, (2) order arrest of bank
employees and court clerks, and (3) usurp jurisdictional power of district court, are neither well grounded in fact nor
warranted by existing law. Hilgeford v Peoples Bank, Inc. (1986, ND Ind) 652 F Supp 230.
Where far-reaching complaint contained numerous claims which were clearly foreclosed by judicial immunity or
prosecutorial immunity, which had not exhausted available state remedies as required, which were precluded by
applicable statute of limitations, and which were clearly beyond jurisdiction of court, Rule 11 was clearly violated, and
where plaintiffs failed to file statement showing reasonable investigation had been made as ordered by District Court,
sanction of $ 5,000 will be imposed on plaintiffs and their counsel, and they will also be required to pay attorney fees
and costs disbursements of all defendants. Naked City, Inc. v Aregood (1987, ND Ind) 117 FRD 634.
British citizen's habeas corpus petition is denied and $ 2,000 sanction under Rules 7 and 11 is assessed against his
attorneys, where basis of complaint is that, prior to his waiving jury trial, neither petitioner's attorney nor trial court told
him that he would face deportation as result of conviction for possessing approximately 41,000 pounds of marijuana,
because clear precedent cited by petitioner's own counsel holds that alien defendant's trial counsel has no obligation to
advise him of potential deportation consequences of guilty plea, much less waiver of jury trial, and petition can only be
categorized as thinly masked attempt to delay inevitable deportation. Quin v United States (1987, DC Puerto Rico) 652
F Supp 454.
Rule 11 sanctions are imposed against both dismissed federal civil service employee and her attorney in Title VII
action filed by dismissed employee, because (1) utter absence of evidence of discrimination shows that case was filed in
bad faith with intent to harass and badger defendants with imaginary claims as last-ditch effort to get job back, and also
employee clearly gave perjured testimony and lied to her attorney, and thus she is charged with actual costs and
attorney's fees, and (2) attorney is charged $ 500 sanction due to his continued efforts on trying merits of discharge
despite court admonition, and his rambling and redundant questions, lack of continuity in presentation,
mischaracterizations of testimony, and unfamiliarity with elementary evidentiary rules and procedures. Jackson-Colley
v Department of Army Corps of Engineers (1987, ED Mich) 655 F Supp 122, 43 BNA FEP Cas 617.
Sanctions of $ 100 are imposed on counsel for employee's filing frivolous § 1983 claim; claim is frivolous, not
because complaint contained no allegations of state action but only that employer received federal contracts, but
because counsel submitted frivolous memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion wherein counsel stated that she
had inquired into facts of claim and that plaintiff had alleged employer contracts with state, which was untrue and
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
showed recklessness and absence of good faith, and reasonable attorney would have requested leave to amend
complaint. Woods v Princeton Packaging, Inc. (1987, WD Wash) 655 F Supp 215, 55 BNA FEP Cas 240.
Sanctions of $ 200 are imposed upon attorney where counsel was aware of prior voluntary dismissal, 2 denied
motions for relief of judgment, and affirmation of denial by Court of Appeals, and it was clear and known to counsel
that statute of limitation had run on race and national origin discrimination claim. Chang v Meese (1987, DC Puerto
Rico) 660 F Supp 782.
Municipal attorney is liable for $ 500 in sanctions, where although attorney was substantially unprepared to discuss
claim at pretrial conference because city law department had not yet received case records, attorney had already filed
answer denying allegations with his affidavit stating his answers were true. Simpson v Philadelphia (1987, ED Pa) 660
F Supp 951.
Sanctions totalling $ 5,000 are imposed under Rules 11 and 16(f) against counsel for parties in federal court, who
attempted under rubric of tort claims to make probate claims against estate of ancestor who died in 1950, where counsel
filed 2 suits on behalf of feuding parties, failed to comply with pretrial scheduling order, and made claims which were
legally frivolous and factually spurious, because counsel recklessly disregarded prior case law, rules of court, and
ethical rules. Roberts v McCrory (1987, WD Okla) 693 F Supp 998.
Because court has spent considerable time and money on sanction proceedings due to plaintiffs' filing of complaint
without reasonable investigation, sanctions will be imposed in amount which will reasonably reimburse taxpayers for
cost of these satellite proceedings. Business Guides v Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc. (1988, ND Cal)
119 FRD 685.
Employer is entitled to Rule 11 sanctions from plaintiff's counsel in amount of $ 100 on basis of plaintiff's claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, because attorney failed to make reasonable inquiry into applicable statute of
limitations. Grant v Pfizer, Inc. (1988, SD NY) 683 F Supp 41, 46 BNA FEP Cas 638, 46 CCH EPD P 37853, 48 CCH
EPD P 38432.
Sanctions will be imposed on attorney who filed brief in opposition to motion for summary judgment where brief
interposed unfounded defense and contained statements and allegations which attorney knew were false, and under
circumstances, sanction should be significant but not compensatory, and therefore sanctions of $ 4,000 are imposed on
attorney. First City Federal Sav. Bank v Dennis (1989, SD NY) 128 FRD 180.
Sanctions of $ 2,000 payable to defense attorneys are imposed upon unsuccessful state litigant, where essence of his
§ 1983 claim in this case is that state commissions and officials have not disciplined judges and lawyers who were
involved at one time or another in his many lawsuits, because Rule 11 sanctions are necessary since cause of action has
been fully addressed by court of law and has been found to be not only meritless but also patently frivolous. Perry v
Barnard (1989, SD Ind) 745 F Supp 1394, affd without op (1990, CA7 Ind) 911 F2d 736, reported in full (1990, CA7)
1990 US App LEXIS 14304.
In action against city and officials alleging sexual discrimination, where plaintiff has been held liable for majority of
defendants' attorney fees and costs under 42 USCS § 1988, Rule 11 sanction of $ 1,000, is imposed on plaintiff's
attorney since complaint and all briefs clearly reflected failure to conduct reasonable research. Powell v Adams (1991,
ED Wis) 138 FRD 128.
Where plaintiff filed groundless action for improper purposes and forced defendants to spend vast amounts of money
to mount their defense, substantial sanction is called for to deter similar conduct in future; consequently, attorney and
plaintiff who signed verification of complaint are sanctioned $ 50,000 each to be paid to defendants. Project 74
Allentown, Inc. v Frost (1992, ED Pa) 143 FRD 77, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8176, 24 FR Serv 3d 489, affd
without op (1993, CA3 Pa) 998 F2d 1004.
Although plaintiff's attorney committed flagrant violations of Rule 11 causing defendant to incur attorney fees in
excess of $ 4100, sanction of $ 2700 will be imposed since this should be sufficient to punish attorney, who has limited
resources and little experience, and to deter him from similar filings in future; in addition, court recommends that
attorney send letter of apology to defendant's counsel. Redd v Fisher Controls (1993, WD Tex) 147 FRD 128, 25 FR
Serv 3d 1502.
257. --Against pro se plaintiff
Sanction of $ 11,500 is too severe to impose on pro se litigant for bringing frivolous suit challenging constitutionality
of income tax and seeking reimbursement for taxes withheld, particularly where trial judge did not give sufficient
statement of reasons for amount of sanction and where applicable statute dictates maximum penalty amount of $ 5,000.
Cheek v Doe (1987, CA7 Ill) 828 F2d 395, 87-2 USTC P 9464, 7 FR Serv 3d 1408, 60 AFTR 2d 5080, cert den (1987)
484 US 955, 98 L Ed 2d 374, 108 S Ct 349.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Pro se plaintiff's use of abusive language toward opposing counsel in posttrial motion is one form of harassment
prohibited by Rule 11, but where record showed that plaintiff's income for past 7 years ranged between $ 22,200 and $
28,657, $ 20,000 sanction is excessive and will be reduced to $ 1,800. Coats v Pierre (1989, CA5 Tex) 890 F2d 728,
15 FR Serv 3d 583, reh den (1990, CA5) 1990 US App LEXIS 2183 and cert den (1990) 498 US 821, 112 L Ed 2d 44,
111 S Ct 70.
Pursuant to Rule 11, pro se petitioner is properly ordered to pay $ 50 to clerk of court as sanction for filing motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, where such motion is duplicative of previous motions made recently by petitioner. Sanders
v Ft. Wayne (1985, ND Ind) 616 F Supp 467.
Rule 11 sanction of $ 1,000 to compensate for expenditure of judicial time is properly assessed against pro se
plaintiff who brought frivolous action against state court judges under 42 USCS § 1983 despite awareness that doctrine
of judicial immunity barred suit. Dyson v Sposeep (1986, ND Ind) 637 F Supp 616.
Pro se copyright infringement plaintiffs are sanctioned in amount of $ 3,500 under Rule 11, where plaintiffs refer to
counsel for defendant television network in correspondence and submissions as "Laurel" and "Hardy," because pro se
plaintiffs impertinently viewed their role as comedy writers more than as litigants in federal copyright case, and
references were not only unseemly but also intended to harass. Novak v National Broadcasting Co. (1992, SD NY) 779
F Supp 1428.
258. --Against defendant or attorney
In action in which defendant's employment status was critical issue, and in which defendant's attorney filed frivolous
pleading denying that defendant was plaintiff's employee, sanction of $ 3,000 did not constitute abuse of discretion
since Rule 11 permits imposition of monetary penalties, apart from those for expenses and attorney fees, for frivolous
conduct, and amount of penalty imposed by District Court appears roughly commensurate with frivolous nature of
attorney's denial and with burden imposed on plaintiff in proving employee issue at trial. Insurance Ben. Admrs. v
Martin (1989, CA7 Ill) 871 F2d 1354, 14 FR Serv 3d 457.
Sanction of $ 20,000 is not excessive where violation was clear and sanctioned party was not unrepresented or
unsophisticated or suffering some pressing need, since imposition of stiff penalties may encourage self-policing by
attorneys and discourage other plaintiffs from taking positions lacking in merit, and since most of plaintiff's fees were
incurred because of defendant's sanctionable filing. Bay State Towing Co. v Barge American 21 (1990, CA1 Mass) 899
F2d 129, 16 FR Serv 3d 582.
Defendant's counsel are properly ordered to pay $ 5,000 to Government as sanction for violations of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 7, 11, and 26(g), and 28 USCS § 1927, which violations occurred in context of defendant's counsel's
election to pursue litigation strategy of actively concealing from plaintiff and court as long as possible fact that court
was without subject matter jurisdiction over action. Itel Containers International Corp. v Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc. (1985, DC NJ) 108 FRD 96, 3 FR Serv 3d 671.
Pursuant to Rule 11, third-party defendant's attorney is properly ordered to pay $ 2,000 to third-party plaintiff and $
5,000 to Clerk of Court, where third-party defendant's pleadings and conduct of its defense were frivolous, and where
its defense was interposed for purpose of delaying repayment of $ 250,000 which it had improperly retained on closing
of sale of markets, and which it had put to its general corporate purposes. Michigan Nat'l Bank v Kroger Co. (1985,
ED Mich) 619 F Supp 1149.
Japanese company is entitled to $ 1,500 as punitive sanction against California corporations' attorneys under Rule 11,
where attorneys filed frivolous motion to dismiss for lack of venue, because actions of attorneys' clients, as spelled out
in complaint, showed clearly that venue was proper, although not most convenient, in Northern District of California.
National Computer, Ltd. v Tower Industries, Inc. (1989, ND Cal) 708 F Supp 281.
Sanction of $ 2,500 imposed jointly and severally upon president of management services company and defendants'
counsel is warranted under Rule 11, where company being sued by trustees of fund it was hired to manage asserted
counterclaims having no colorable basis in law, because president averred purported facts entitling counterclaimants to
recover and assisted counsel in pursing positions interposed solely as dilatory tactic to delay entry of judgment against
defendants. Greenblatt v Prescription Plan Services Corp. (1992, SD NY) 783 F Supp 814, 14 EBC 2828.
Plaintiff employee's motion for sanctions against defendant railroad company under FRCP 11 is denied, where
defendant company moved to strike portion of employee's complaint, brought under 26 USCS § § 7431(a)(2) et seq.,
that requested damages for emotional distress due to disclosure of tax information, since motion to strike was not
unwarranted and actually raised question of first impression. Hrubec v National R.R. Passenger Corp. (1993, ND Ill)
829 F Supp 1502, 27 FR Serv 3d 697.
Motion for reconsideration, amounting to third request for discovery of tax returns of counterclaim defendant, is
denied without sanction, where defendant amended counterclaims to state claim for piercing corporate veil and seems
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
sincere in his belief that tax returns would be helpful to this claim, because court cannot conclude motion was brought
in bad faith. Fort Wash. Resources v Tannen (1994, ED Pa) 858 F Supp 455.
C. Other Sanctions
259. Dismissal
It is well within district court's discretion to dismiss complaint on grounds that it fails to state any claims upon which
relief can be granted and that plaintiffs' attorney fails to comply with Rule 11 where no facts are alleged supporting
anti-trust conspiracy. Heart Disease Research Foundation v General Motors Corp. (1972, CA2 NY) 463 F2d 98, 1972
CCH Trade Cases P 74076, 16 FR Serv 2d 380.
Since notice of appeal must be signed by party or party's attorney, and since prisoner who alone signed notice of
appeal purporting to be on behalf of all plaintiffs--the prisoner, his mother, and another prisoner--was not attorney,
purported appeals of prisoner's mother and other prisoner had to be dismissed. McKinney v De Bord (1974, CA9 Cal)
507 F2d 501.
In case where complaint was not signed by plaintiff but by plaintiff's wife as his "attorney in fact", sua sponte
dismissal of complaint with prejudice was improper in face of arguable defect which was at most technical; even if it
might have been appropriate to dismiss complaint without prejudice to its refiling with plaintiff's signature, interest of
justice required that complaint be treated as properly filed. Covington v Cole (1976, CA5 Tex) 528 F2d 1365, 21 FR
Serv 2d 1031, reh den (1976, CA5 Tex) 533 F2d 1135.
Appeals as to two of three appellants who did not sign notice of appeal was dismissed since one justification of Rule
11 is to make certain that persons who are named as parties are actually in assent to filing of action on their behalf.
Scarrella v Midwest Federal Sav. & Loan (1976, CA8 Minn) 536 F2d 1207, 21 FR Serv 2d 1033, cert den (1976) 429
US 885, 50 L Ed 2d 166, 97 S Ct 237.
In civil rights action brought by prison inmates against various prison officials, even if there was any merit to
complaint against prison officials, voluminous amount of frivolous documents submitted in connection with this
litigation supports dismissal with prejudice as Rule 11 sanction. American Inmate Paralegal Assoc. v Cline (1988,
CA8 Mo) 859 F2d 59, cert den (1988) 488 US 996, 102 L Ed 2d 590, 109 S Ct 565.
Where evidence clearly refuted claim made by plaintiff inmate in complaint, and plaintiff made other clearly
untruthful statements to court, District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants summary judgment on
claim and in dismissing remaining related claims as sanction. Joiner v Delo (1990, CA8 Mo) 905 F2d 206, 16 FR Serv
3d 1153.
Where District Court imposed fine on plaintiffs for violation of Rule 11 and warned them that if they failed to pay
fine by set date court would dismiss entire action, but plaintiffs did not pay fine or demonstrate their inability to pay and
asked court to stay sanction pending appeal, District Court was fully justified in dismissing action with prejudice
whether or not monetary sanction was legally justified. Vakalis v Shawmut Corp. (1991, CA1 Mass) 925 F2d 34, 18
FR Serv 3d 1247.
Dismissal of plaintiff's claim with prejudice was appropriate sanction where plaintiff failed to timely respond to
motion to dismiss and filed several motions directly to court and not through is his appointed counsel, and defendants
were significantly prejudiced by plaintiff's actions, and plaintiff not his counsel, was responsible for violations of Rule
11. Green v Dorrell (1992, CA10 Okla) 969 F2d 915, cert den (1993) 507 US 940, 122 L Ed 2d 720, 113 S Ct 1336.
District court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing pro se plaintiff's civil rights action with prejudice as sanction
for ignoring court's repeated warnings and for failing to provide any evidence substantiating allegations in his motion
for injunctive relief. Carman v Treat (1993, CA8 Mo) 7 F3d 1379, 27 FR Serv 3d 292, reh den (1993, CA8) 1993 US
App LEXIS 31653.
Petition which attacked validity of petitioner's alleged wife's conviction and order of probation, as well as petitioner's
own conviction, was insufficient to give court jurisdiction to resolve issues regarding alleged wife's conviction where
she did not sign pleadings or otherwise indicate she assented to filing of action in her behalf, and where there was
nothing in pleadings to indicate that petitioner had any standing to contest the wife's conviction. Huffman v Nebraska
Bureau of Vital Statistics (1970, DC Neb) 320 F Supp 154.
Although complaint, in stockholder's action under § 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act [15 USCS § 78p(b)], for
recovery of insiders' short-swing profits did not disclose fact that prior to commencement of action defendant directors
had paid to corporation substantial part of claimed profits in settlement of claim, pleading, although lacking in candor,
would not be dismissed under Rule 11, as this would deprive corporation, for whose benefit action was brought, of
whatever balance might be found to be due it. Lewis v Wells (1971, SD NY) 325 F Supp 382, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
92980.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Rule 11 motion supported by affidavits but without support from documentation are not enough for court to dismiss
claims as sham. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig. (1976, CD Cal) 416 F Supp 161, 22 FR Serv 2d 368.
Dismissal of tort action as sanction under Rule 11 is not proper where plaintiffs' attorney conducted reasonable
inquiry before filing suit, including consulting with expert, talking to claimants, and receiving oral opinion from doctor
who examined most of claimants, prior to filing action; correct procedure for moving for dismissal on basis of
insufficient evidence to maintain claim and no genuine issue as to any material fact is Rule 56 rather than Rule 11.
Wagner v Allied Chemical Corp. (1985, DC Md) 623 F Supp 1407.
In action brought by investor against broker, where plaintiff failed to comply with discovery order requiring him to
turn over records of other investment accounts and falsely stated in pleadings that no other such accounts existed,
sanction of dismissal is appropriate. Murray v Dominick Corp. of Canada, Ltd. (1987, SD NY) 117 FRD 512, CCH
Fed Secur L Rep P 93512.
Where indigent plaintiff filed action to harass and intimidate defendant, appropriate sanction is granting of
defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice and award of some of defendant's attorney fees. Ballentine v Taco Bell
Corp. (1991, ED NC) 135 FRD 117.
Where plaintiff's attorney omitted his signature from complaint and failed to remedy defect after notice from
defendants, complaint will be stricken and dismissed without prejudice. Hadlock v Baechler (1991, WD Ark) 136 FRD
157.
Where two of plaintiffs have not signed complaint or any of pleadings, nor has attorney signed any pleadings on their
behalf, claims of these 2 plaintiffs are dismissed. Lawton v Medevac Mid-America, Inc. (1991, DC Kan) 138 FRD 586.
Although court must consider availability of lesser sanctions prior to dismissal, explicit discussion of those
alternatives is not required. Gemisys Corp. v Phoenix Am., Inc. (1999, ND Cal) 186 FRD 551, 50 USPQ2d 1876.
Pursuant to FRCP 11(c)(1)(B) and its inherent authority, district court dismissed individual's complaint asserting
various tort, fraud, and civil rights claims against United States, bonding company, and law firm where individual
intentionally circumvented previous court order requiring leave to file amended complaints by filing identical complaint
in separate action, any sanction other than dismissal would not have effectively punished and deterred individual's
misconduct as it would have permitted case to exist in violation of court's previous order, and individual's history of
misconduct in other judicial districts demonstrated that sanction other than dismissal would be ineffective. Mikkilineni v
Penn Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. (2003, DC Dist Col) 271 F Supp 2d 151.
Considering contentious history of unduly prolonged litigation, district court did not abuse its discretion in
sanctioning party by dismissing his counterclaims, where court concluded that counterclaims had been designed
primarily to harass other parties. Marina Mgmt. Servs. v Vessel My Girls (2000, App DC) 202 F3d 315.
260. --False document or testimony
Where plaintiff and his attorney deliberately falsified plaintiff's deposition, dismissal of action with prejudice was
appropriate sanction. Combs v Rockwell Int'l Corp. (1991, CA9 Cal) 927 F2d 486, 91 CDOS 1689, 91 Daily Journal
DAR 2585, 118 CCH LC P 10622, 18 FR Serv 3d 1445, cert den (1991) 502 US 859, 116 L Ed 2d 138, 112 S Ct 176,
120 CCH LC P 10945 and (criticized in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Natural Beverage Distribs. (1995, CA9 Cal) 69 F3d
337, 95 CDOS 8383, 95 Daily Journal DAR 14487, 33 FR Serv 3d 266).
Dismissal of lawsuit did not constitute abuse of district court's discretion where dismissal was based on court's
finding that manufactured and perjured testimony had been introduced in attempt to enhance case through fraudulent
conduct. Pope v Federal Express Corp. (1992, CA8 Mo) 974 F2d 982, 59 CCH EPD P 41758.
District court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing employee's civil rights complaint as sanction for employee's
reliance on falsified documents to support claims; by bringing false, fraudulent and salacious charges of discrimination
against defendants, employee exploited judicial process and subjected her former colleagues and employer to
unnecessary embarrassment and mental anguish. Jimenez v Madison Area Tech. College (2003, CA7 Wis) 321 F3d 652,
91 BNA FEP Cas 193.
In action brought by investor against broker, where plaintiff failed to comply with discovery order requiring him to
turn over records of other investment accounts and falsely stated in pleadings that no other such accounts existed,
sanction of dismissal is appropriate. Murray v Dominick Corp. of Canada, Ltd. (1987, SD NY) 117 FRD 512, CCH
Fed Secur L Rep P 93512.
Where defendant admittedly and intentionally defrauded court by filing fraudulent document and committed perjury
in furtherance of that fraud, defendant's counterclaim will be dismissed, default judgment will be entered against him,
and he is ordered to pay all of plaintiff's costs and attorney fees resulting from fraudulent document. Sun World, Inc. v
Olivarria (1992, ED Cal) 144 FRD 384, 24 FR Serv 3d 1408.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
261. --For failure to state address
Plaintiff is not entitled to dismissal or striking of pleading for failure of defendants to indicate address of attorneys
where plaintiff asserts no prejudice resulting from want of compliance. McCorstin v U. S. Dep't of Labor (1980, CA5
Ala) 630 F2d 242, 7 Fed Rules Evid Serv 30, cert den (1981) 450 US 999, 68 L Ed 2d 201, 101 S Ct 1705.
Failure to typewrite name of attorney below his signature on complaint in compliance with local rule and failure to
insert attorney's address in compliance with Rules were insufficient ground for dismissing action, although such
derelictions may warrant striking of pleading. Bareco Oil Co. v Alexander (1940, DC Iowa) 33 F Supp 32.
Where attorney signed complaint but did not state his address, court refused to dismiss complaint on such a technical
ground but informed clerk not to accept such a complaint in future. Miller v Long (1945, DC SC) 7 FRD 133.
Dismissal of complaint is not warranted though attorney of record failed to set forth his address at foot of complaint
immediately below his signature because such failure does not appear to be willful disregard or circumvention of Rule
11 where address was set forth on back of complaint and defense counsel apparently was not confused because all
defense motions were properly addressed to plaintiff's attorney. Filler v Port Washington Union Free School Dist.
(1977, ED NY) 436 F Supp 1231, 24 FR Serv 2d 31.
262. Professional discipline of attorney
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider attorney's appeal of district court's decision to send referral letter to
state bar association concerning attorney's allegations of fraud against former clients; letter could not considered
sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B) as it made no specific finding of misconduct nor did it express any opinion on
attorney's actions. Teaford v Ford Motor Co. (2003, CA10 Kan) 338 F3d 1179.
Motion to disbar attorney under Rule 11 is denied, even though Rule 11 permits imposition of sanctions for bad faith
misconduct of counsel, since it was never contemplated that "appropriate sanction" would include disbarment from
practice. Piazza v Carson City (1987, DC Nev) 652 F Supp 1394.
Sanctions should be borne jointly by plaintiff and his attorney where both knowingly participated in frivolous lawsuit
based on false claims, and thus plaintiff and his attorney are jointly and severally liable for expenses and attorney fees
of defendants, and additionally, copy of order will be sent to state Supreme Court's committee on professional conduct
for whatever action it may deem appropriate. Kenna v United States Dep't of Justice (1989, DC NH) 128 FRD 172.
Where attorney, who filed frivolous lawsuit in which none of pleadings was well grounded in fact, had been
sanctioned on numerous occasions for violations of federal rules, including Rule 11, monetary sanction and written
reprimand alone would be insufficient to deter him from similar misconduct in future; therefore, in addition to being
reprimanded, attorney shall be referred to disciplinary board of Supreme Court of state for possible further disciplinary
proceedings in accordance with provisions of local rules. Matthews v Freedman (1989, ED Pa) 128 FRD 194, 53 CCH
EPD P 39756, 15 FR Serv 3d 876, affd without op (1990, CA3 Pa) 919 F2d 135 and affd without op (1990, CA3 Pa)
919 F2d 135.
Where attorney filed lawsuit for improper purpose, continued to argue unmeritorious claim long after it was obvious
that it had no support, and demonstrated his improper motives by litigation strategies which included giving false
reports to media regarding action, and where attorney had long history of conduct of this nature, action is dismissed,
matter is referred to proper authorities for disciplinary proceedings and investigation of possible criminal conduct, and
attorney is ordered to pay defendants' attorney fees. Kramer v Tribe (1994, DC NJ) 156 FRD 96, affd without op (1995,
CA3 NJ) 52 F3d 315, cert den (1995) 516 US 907, 133 L Ed 2d 195, 116 S Ct 274, subsequent app (1998, CA3 NJ) 159
F3d 1351.
Where plaintiff's attorney in employment discrimination claim brought under Title VII (42 USCS § § 2000e et seq.)
filed unreasonable, outrageously inflated fee request which demonstrated bad faith, fee request is denied, matter is
referred to Disciplinary Council of Supreme Court of Tennessee to determine if disciplinary action is warranted, and
counsel is ordered to complete legal education program in legal ethics. Keener v Department of Army (1991, MD
Tenn) 136 FRD 140, 55 BNA FEP Cas 200, affd (1992, CA6) 1992 US App LEXIS 2822.
263. Public reprimand or admonishment
Trial court abused discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions in form of published opinion reprimanding plaintiff's
counsel for filing declaratory judgment action against malpractice carrier raising issue of potential coverage for one of
defendants, since action had reasonable basis in fact and law, was not objectively frivolous, and was not filed for
improper purpose. Stevens v Lawyers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1986, CA4 NC) 789 F2d 1056, 4 FR Serv 3d 1151.
Sanction of public reprimand is appropriate, even though unreasonable actions of sanctioned lawyer have put his
adversary to substantial expense, since Rule 11 is not designed to provide restitution in every case to litigant who has
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
been damaged by conduct of opposing counsel. Pony Express Courier Corp. v Pony Express Delivery Service (1989,
CA9 Cal) 872 F2d 317, 10 USPQ2d 1475, 13 FR Serv 3d 423.
Public reprimand was appropriate sanction for filing frivolous removal petition which was promptly dismissed,
thereby averting damage to defendants. Unanue-Casal v Unanue-Casal (1990, CA1 Puerto Rico) 898 F2d 839, 16 FR
Serv 3d 160.
Plaintiffs' attorneys were censured for dragnet complaint alleging, inter alia, violations of antitrust laws and failure to
pay interest on escrow accounts, where suit was brought against 177 named defendants (every individual or lending
institution listed in Philadelphia phone book under heading of mortgage brokers or related headings) and then suit was
dismissed against defendants to whom complaint did not apply, but dismissal was not ordered against remaining
defendants to whom complaint did apply. Kinee v Abraham Lincoln Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n (1973, ED Pa) 365 F
Supp 975, 1974-1 CCH Trade Cases P 74927, 17 FR Serv 2d 1339.
Attorney who filed motion in misguided sense of overzealousness, but without making false allegations, should be
reprimanded. Ricci v Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc. (1986, DC Me) 111 FRD 369.
Reprimand was appropriate sanction where defendant's attorney filed general denial in lawsuit brought by United
States for failure to repay student loans since simply questioning client would have produced evidence that general
denial was not proper. United States v Minisee (1986, SD Ohio) 113 FRD 121, 7 FR Serv 3d 995.
Attorneys for plaintiff are formally reprimanded for failing to make reasonable inquiry into facts before filing
complaint in which allegations against defendants in question were not well grounded in fact at time complaint was
filed and for failing to voluntarily dismiss complaint as to these defendants when it became clear as result of discovery
that there was no factual basis for allegations. Propst v Greene (1988, WD NC) 123 FRD 535.
Sanctions must be imposed on plaintiff's attorney for failing to conduct reasonable inquiry before filing lawsuit
which was time-barred, but since defendant waited over 4 years before presenting its statute of limitations defense to
court, such protracted delay in raising clearly meritorious defense should not be rewarded with fees and costs, and
therefore written reprimand to plaintiff's counsel is sufficient sanction. Murphy v Klein Tools, Inc. (1988, DC Kan)
123 FRD 643.
Where attorney, who filed frivolous lawsuit in which none of pleadings was well grounded in fact, had been
sanctioned on numerous occasions for violations of federal rules, including Rule 11, monetary sanction and written
reprimand alone would be insufficient to deter him from similar misconduct in future; therefore, in addition to being
reprimanded, attorney shall be referred to disciplinary board of Supreme Court of state for possible further disciplinary
proceedings in accordance with provisions of local rules. Matthews v Freedman (1989, ED Pa) 128 FRD 194, 53 CCH
EPD P 39756, 15 FR Serv 3d 876, affd without op (1990, CA3 Pa) 919 F2d 135 and affd without op (1990, CA3 Pa)
919 F2d 135.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration of unsuccessful motion for summary judgment was not filed pursuant to any
ascertainable rule or provision and therefore was not warranted by existing law or by good faith argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, but instead of award of attorney's fees and expenses requested by plaintiffs,
less severe sanction of reprimand is sufficient. Atkins v Marathon LeTourneau Co. (1990, SD Miss) 130 FRD 625, 17
FR Serv 3d 498.
Where jurisdictional theories relied on were not warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension,
modification, or reversal, and violation of Rule 11 was apparently due to attorney's poor legal research ability,
appropriate sanction under circumstances is written admonishment. Total Television Entertainment Corp. v Chestnut
Hill Village Assoc. (1992, ED Pa) 145 FRD 375, 24 FR Serv 3d 1202.
Collective bargaining union is entitled to sanctions against employer under former FRCP 11 in form of reprimand
rather than attorney's fees and costs, where employer and union entered into collective bargaining agreement in 1975
which modifications employer refused to adopt in 1983 and where employer and union litigated over employer's wage
and benefit obligations under 1975 agreement resulting in arbitration award in favor of union on grounds that
employer's changes in wages and benefits in 1986 violated agreement between parties, because employer's motion to
vacate arbitration award is frivolous in light of clear and unambiguous terms of 1975 agreement, justifying sanctions
against employer's counsel but need to impose sanctions in order to deter future misconduct does not exist due to recent
settlement of issues between parties. Corporate Printing Co. v New York Typographical Union No. 6 (1995, SD NY)
886 F Supp 340.
Plaintiff's counsel is reprimanded for violating FRCP 11 in moving to remand disability-discrimination action, where
court noted violation sua sponte, found no bad faith, and did not suffer significant burden due to filing of motion,
because sanction of this nature renders it unnecessary to inquire into counsel's financial ability to pay monetary sanction
yet properly punishes counsel for making frivolous "law of case" argument. Thorpe v Alber's, Inc. (1996, ED Tenn) 922
F Supp 84, 16 ADD 365.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Attorney is given 14 days to remit past-due $ 1,000 sanction, amend 28 USCS § 2255 petition of his client, and
certify that he has read local Rules of Professional Conduct, Seventh Circuit's Rules of Civility, and cases cited in this
opinion and order, where attorney filed flawed petition on behalf of incarcerated client and did not respond to 2 court
orders to fix it, because court is obligated to enforce FRCP 11, even against award-winning attorney with 45-year
professional, legal, and judicial career. Bardney v United States (1997, ND Ill) 959 F Supp 515, 47 Fed Rules Evid Serv
46, 38 FR Serv 3d 159, post-conviction relief den (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 13756, post-conviction relief den
(1997, ND Ill) 982 F Supp 1272, subsequent app (1998, CA7 Ill) 1998 US App LEXIS 13036 and affd (1998, CA7 Ill)
151 F3d 1032.
264. Restrictions on discovery
Where defendants violated Code of Professional Responsibility and local rules of court during discovery, as result of
which financial sanctions will be imposed, plaintiffs' request that defendants be prohibited from deposing members of
plaintiff class is denied since such prohibition is not narrowly drawn response to defendants' improper conduct and
could severely prejudice defendants' trial preparation. Haffer v Temple University of Commonwealth System of Higher
Education (1987, ED Pa) 115 FRD 506.
Due to defendant's failure to make reasonable inquiries before responding to discovery requests, special master will
be appointed to supervise all further discovery, and defendant shall pay all fees and expenses of master which are
approved by court. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v Turnage (1987, ND Cal) 115 FRD 543.
265. Restriction on further lawsuits
Sanction ordering plaintiff to refrain from filing further suits against same defendants on same claims is drastic
remedy, but such injunction may be imposed where necessary to protect courts and innocent parties, as where plaintiff
repeatedly files same frivolous lawsuit against same parties. Farguson v MBank Houston, N.A. (1986, CA5 Tex) 808
F2d 358, 6 FR Serv 3d 825.
Where plaintiff, who had been fined for filing frivolous income tax returns, sought to have Sixteenth Amendment
and entire income tax system declared unconstitutional, and plaintiff had previously filed two similar unsuccessful law
suits, sanction consisting of $ 1500 fine and injunction against filing any further actions without leave of court was not
excessive. Miller v United States (1989, CA7 Ind) 868 F2d 236, 89-1 USTC P 9184, 63 AFTR 2d 695.
Where prisoner who had filed frivolous suit pro se was ordered to pay $ 10 in sanctions and enjoined from further
suit until sanction was paid, subsequent litigation filed by plaintiff was properly dismissed where sanction remained
unpaid. Gelabert v Lynaugh (1990, CA5 Tex) 894 F2d 746, 15 FR Serv 3d 1443.
Clerk of court is directed to refrain from accepting for filing any additional pleadings or lawsuits tendered by
plaintiff until $ 2,500 sanction imposed for filing numerous frivolous lawsuits against IRS is paid to clerk of court.
Moeller v United States (1990, CA8) 1990 US App LEXIS 11435 and cert den (1990) 498 US 855, 112 L Ed 2d 117, 111
S Ct 151, reh den (1990) 498 US 974, 112 L Ed 2d 429, 111 S Ct 447.
Sanction of $ 30 and injunction against further suit until sanction is satisfied are imposed on inmate who filed in
forma pauperis civil rights action alleging that during his detention in county jail sheriff unlawfully removed from
inmate's head silver dollar worth $ 126,000,000 and sent it to department of corrections which nefariously converted it
in violation of his constitutional rights. Jackson v Carpenter (1991, CA5 Tex) 921 F2d 68, 18 FR Serv 3d 1120.
Where pro se plaintiff has filed numerous frivolous actions in state and federal courts and consequently has been
prohibited from filing further complaints without leave of court, plaintiff is sanctioned $ 400 and plaintiff may file no
further appeal in forma pauperis until all monetary sanctions are paid, and then may do so only if appeal has been
certified by district court as filed in good faith. Mayfield v Klevenhagen (1991, CA5 Tex) 941 F2d 346, 20 FR Serv 3d
849.
Although it was proper to sanction inmate who filed second pro se in forma pauperis complaint which was dismissed
as frivolous, it was abuse of discretion to require plaintiff to obtain judge's permission before filing any further cases
where plaintiff had had no warning that his actions might result in sanctions, similar plaintiffs had not been punished so
severely, and punishment imposed was not least severe sanction adequate. Mendoza v Lynaugh (1993, CA5) 989 F2d
191, 25 FR Serv 3d 1069.
Where attorney repeatedly filed frivolous and vexatious lawsuits related to same subject matter, monetary sanctions
covering defendants' reasonable attorney fees and costs were warranted, but district court's permanent injunction
completely barring attorney from ever filing any civil lawsuit based on same legal or factual claims alleged in action at
bar was too broad and will be modified to enjoin such actions unless attorney first obtains certification from U.S.
magistrate judge that claims asserted are not frivolous and that suit is not brought for any improper purpose. Ortman v
Thomas (1996, CA6 Mich) 99 F3d 807, 1996 FED App 353P.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Pro se litigant who filed suit against multiple defendants alleging improprieties in foreclosure sale and enforcement
of tax liens on piece of real property is sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing frivolous action and subject to court's review
of subsequent complaints before summons and service proceed where (1) litigant who bid $ 23 in silver coin cannot
assert priority over approximately $ 25,000 credit to claim ownership to 6 acres of real estate and (2) litigant's assertion
that IRS employees disregarded constitutional mandates in enforcing lien failed to raise genuine issues of material fact.
Elmore v McCammon (1986, SD Tex) 640 F Supp 905, 86-2 USTC P 9668, 58 AFTR 2d 5520.
Prisoner's Freedom of Information Act (5 USCS § 552) suit seeking all records maintained by United States
Marshals Service in his name is dismissed where prisoner did not oppose motion to dismiss, same claim had been
dismissed by different judge six months previously; because prisoner has filed at least 60 such actions for purposes of
harassment, court imposes sanction, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, that any further claims by prisoner must have attached
thereto memorandum of law stating that claim has not been previously ruled upon. Crooker v United States Marshals
Service (1986, DC Dist Col) 641 F Supp 1141.
District Court imposes additional $ 1,000 Rule 11 sanction and enjoins habeas corpus petitioner from filing
additional frivolous documents or lawsuits, from filing any new action in federal court without first obtaining leave of
court, and from filing any action in federal court arising out of Peoples Bank's foreclosure on property securing his loan,
where petitioner has already had 3 previous frivolous lawsuits dismissed with Rule 11 sanctions of $ 250, $ 500 and $
1,000 imposed but not yet paid, because petitioner's current and previously filed pleadings, motions and other papers,
including self-manufactured documents purporting to (1) appoint new Master of district court, (2) order arrest of bank
employees and court clerks, and (3) usurp jurisdictional power of district court, are neither well grounded in fact nor
warranted by existing law. Hilgeford v Peoples Bank, Inc. (1986, ND Ind) 652 F Supp 230.
Plaintiff's 42 USCS § 1983 claim arising out of divorce and custody proceeding in Texas county court and related
activities is dismissed, because her claim fails to allege state action as to numerous defendants and is too vague to state
viable civil rights claim; furthermore, court orders plaintiff under Rule 11 to pay costs and attorney's fees incurred by
several defendants in defending this frivolous action and forbids her to file any further causes of action in this court
until monetary sanctions have been paid. Daniels v Stovall (1987, SD Tex) 660 F Supp 301.
Plaintiff's repetitive filing of frivolous lawsuits and his behavior in conduct of those suits lead to rather obvious
conclusion that plaintiff was acting in bad faith to harass defendant, and since filing of instant action against defendant
was not grounded in fact or law, Rule 11 sanctions are richly deserved to punish plaintiff's conduct, and in order to deter
future abuses against litigants and judicial process, plaintiff is enjoined from filing any further lawsuits based on same
claim involving this defendant. Dean v ARA Environmental Services, Inc. (1988, ND Ga) 124 FRD 224, 28 BNA WH
Cas 1594, 112 CCH LC P 35244, affd without op (1989, CA11 Ga) 890 F2d 1166.
Attorney who filed frivolous lawsuit against all persons who had opposed him in or had involvement with earlier
lawsuit, including attorneys, judges, court clerks, and reporters, is ordered to pay reasonable attorney fees of defendant
and is enjoined from filing further meritless lawsuits in federal courts. Anderson v Mackall (1988, ED Va) 128 FRD
223.
In addition to other sanctions, inmate who filed numerous fraudulent products liability actions is enjoined from filing
any new product liability cases without first seeking leave of court and attaching to first filing statement that he has
been enjoined from filing fraudulent claims. Williams v Revlon Co. (1994, SD NY) 156 FRD 39.
Disgruntled father and ex-husband is given pre-filing review sanction under FRCP 11 for filing fourth federal
lawsuit to review state family court decision in guise of alleging conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights, where
father sues judge, hearing examiner, and court clerk in connection with their actions in finding him in contempt of court
for failing to pay child support, because defendants all enjoy absolute immunity from suit, and federal court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, as well as further patience with this vexatious litigation. Fariello v Campbell (1994, ED NY)
860 F Supp 54.
After dismissal of plaintiff's action against IRS, alleging use of corporate name plaintiff acquired from Nevada
Secretary of State, government is not entitled to injunction barring plaintiff from filing future actions without leave of
court, where plaintiff filed several frivolous actions against government actors, because number of filings is not
necessarily determinative and because plaintiff's suit was nothing more than naked harassment; plaintiff is warned that
if he files another like suit, court will impose severe monetary sanctions and prevent further actions without leave of
court, pursuant to FRCP 11. Salman v Department of the Treasury-IRS (1995, DC Nev) 899 F Supp 473.
Prolific pro se plaintiff is barred from filing new actions without prior authorization from appropriate federal judicial
officer certifying that claims are not frivolous, where plaintiff filed "Syllabus to Create Clear Empirical Data Without
Exposing Plaintiff's Clones and Whistleblowers" which includes "Glossary of Plaintiff's Vernacular of Streets" after
being cautioned not to, because court was left with futile task of deciphering pleadings which pleaded nothing, because
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
plaintiff violated FRCP 11 obligation to investigate factual and legal basis of claim before filing. Cole-Hall Co. v
Malone (1997, ND Miss) 971 F Supp 1082.
Where relatives had filed several frivolous state and federal actions against a brother with respect to having himself
appointed as guardian over his deceased sister and making burial decisions for his sister's body, the court required the
relatives to obtain leave of court before filing any other federal court actions against the brother, but denied the brother's
request for monetary sanctions. Mazur v Woodson (2002, ED Va) 191 F Supp 2d 676.
District court had power pursuant to 28 USCS § 1651(a) to enjoin litigants who abused court system by harassing
their opponents; bankruptcy court imposed its own restrictions on debtor's frivolous litigation actions and imposed strict
criteria for any future litigation. In re Armstrong (2003, BC DC Utah) 297 BR 154.
Where pro se plaintiff brought frivolous lawsuit for improper purpose, plaintiff had been party to numerous other
lawsuits, and plaintiff did not have significant financial resources to pay monetary sanction, to deter future abuse of
civil litigation system, plaintiff is prohibited from bringing any further civil actions without benefit of counsel or prior
leave of court. Schramek v Jones (1995, MD Fla) 161 FRD 119, 9 FLW Fed D 4.
266. Striking of pleading
Unsigned pleading is not invalid, and striking pleading is within sound discretion of court. Holley Coal Co. v Globe
Indem. Co. (1950, CA4 W Va) 186 F2d 291.
District court erred in striking complaint signed by attorney in absence of evidence that attorney signed complaint
with intent to defeat purpose of Rule 11. Lau Ah Yew v Dulles (1956, CA9 Hawaii) 236 F2d 415.
Plaintiff is not entitled to dismissal or striking of pleading for failure of defendants to indicate address of attorneys
where plaintiff asserts no prejudice resulting from want of compliance. McCorstin v U. S. Dep't of Labor (1980, CA5
Ala) 630 F2d 242, 7 Fed Rules Evid Serv 30, cert den (1981) 450 US 999, 68 L Ed 2d 201, 101 S Ct 1705.
Court may consider facts beyond pleading in motion to strike pleading because without some facts, whether
judicially noticed or otherwise, court could not rule on motion to strike and every complaint would always be sufficient
under Rule 11 however patently false. Ellingson v Burlington Northern, Inc. (1981, CA9 Cal) 653 F2d 1327, 1981-2
CCH Trade Cases P 64235.
Where case does not involve issue of sanctions for filing unfounded motion, failure to sign will not cause motion to
be stricken unless adverse party has been severely prejudiced or misled by failure to sign. United States v Kasuboski
(1987, CA7 Wis) 834 F2d 1345, 9 FR Serv 3d 870.
Under Rule 11, pleading should not be stricken merely because it is argumentative; pleading should be stricken as
sham and false only when it appears beyond peradventure that that is so and that its allegations are devoid of factual
basis; otherwise it would deprive party of his right to trial of issues posed by his complaint. Murchison v Kirby (1961,
SD NY) 27 FRD 14, 4 FR Serv 2d 92.
Motion to strike does not test legal sufficiency of claim stated, but rather, whether attorney who signed pleading met
standards delineated in Rule 11. Freeman v Kirby (1961, SD NY) 27 FRD 395, 4 FR Serv 2d 100.
Certification of complaint by plaintiff's attorney will not, on motion, be stricken where court does not find that, to
best of attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, there was not ground to support complaint. Brand v Tisch (1966,
SD NY) 253 F Supp 122, 10 FR Serv 2d 683.
Answer may be stricken and action may proceed as though answer had not been served where answer is signed by
counsel with intent to defeat purpose of Rule 11 that counsel's signature is certificate that, to best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support each defense. Arney v Bryant Sheet Metal, Inc. (1982, ED
Tenn) 96 FRD 544, 35 FR Serv 2d 1594.
Under Rule 11, failure of attorney to sign complaint warrants striking of complaint. Stewart v Chicago (1985, ND
Ill) 622 F Supp 35, 3 FR Serv 3d 582.
Complaint which attorney prepared but refused to sign and which was signed only by plaintiff will be stricken.
Schaffer v Chicago Police Officers (1988, ND Ill) 120 FRD 514, 11 FR Serv 3d 481.
Where plaintiff's attorney omitted his signature from complaint and failed to remedy defect after notice from
defendants, complaint will be stricken and dismissed without prejudice. Hadlock v Baechler (1991, WD Ark) 136 FRD
157.
267. --Particular applications
Answer which denies plaintiff's allegation of notice of intent to arbitrate and defendant's refusal to arbitrate followed
by defendant's attempt to enjoin plaintiff from enforcing arbitration provision of agreement must be stricken as
impertinent under either Rule 12(f) or Rule 11 where defendant's attempt to enjoin enforcement of arbitration provisions
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suggests that it does not wish to comply with the provision. Econo-Car International, Inc. v Antilles Car Rentals, Inc.
(1973, DC VI) 61 FRD 8, revd on other grounds (1974, CA3 VI) 499 F2d 1391.
In action brought to recover damages claimed to have been sustained as result of purchase of corporation's stock
pursuant to alleged false and misleading prospectus and registration statement, where defendants moved pursuant to
Rule 11 to dismiss complaint or strike particular allegations on ground that plaintiff's counsel did not have "good
ground" to support allegations contained in complaint, review of pleadings and affidavits submitted by plaintiff's
counsel outlining basis of claims convinced court that defendants' motion to strike complaint had to be denied.
Cornaglia v Ricciardi (1974, ED Pa) 63 FRD 416, 18 FR Serv 2d 1323.
In appeal by licensee from Magistrate's finding for licensor in action for royalties under licensing agreement, all
passages in licensee's memorandum that make personal attack upon Magistrate beyond parameters of legal argument
and analysis will be stricken under Rule 11. Skil Corp. v Lucerne Products, Inc. (1980, ND Ohio) 489 F Supp 1129,
206 USPQ 792, affd (1982, CA6 Ohio) 684 F2d 346, 216 USPQ 371, cert den (1982) 459 US 991, 74 L Ed 2d 387, 103
S Ct 347.
Pleading must not be stricken pursuant to Rule 11 unless it appears beyond doubt that it is sham and false because
otherwise party would be deprived of right to trial of issues posed by complaint and would be tried by affidavits instead.
S. L. Kaye Co. v Dulces Anahuac, S. A. (1981, SD NY) 524 F Supp 17, 214 USPQ 283.
Document captioned "Plaintiff's Traverse in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
Reconsideration of Forma Pauperis Status" is properly stricken where it is signed by unlicensed jailhouse lawyer,
notwithstanding that individual's contention that he is "counselor" as that term is generally defined. Valiant-Bey v
Morris (1985, ED Mo) 620 F Supp 903, dismd without op (1986, CA8 Mo) 786 F2d 1168.
Court strikes reference in government's pleading to rival commuter airline's "obtaining all or virtually all of"
bankrupt commuter airline's assets as sanction for violation of Rule 11, where government trying to recoup loss from
guaranteed loan bankrupt airline defaulted on has sued rival airline for conversion, fraudulent conveyance, civil
conspiracy and tortious interference with contractual relations, because at time pleading was filed government had
already seized bankrupt airline's aircraft, engines and numerous spare parts and thus was on notice that rival airline
could not have obtained "all" of bankrupt airline's assets. United States v Excellair, Inc. (1986, DC Colo) 637 F Supp
1377, 2 UCCRS2d 1148.
Investor's securities fraud claim survives motion to dismiss as sham, despite investor's and attorney's improper and
unethical conduct and witness's severe credibility problem, because Rule 11 as amended does not permit striking
complaint as sham and there is some indication of validity in investor's claims. Wagner v Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb,
Inc. (1986, ND Ill) 646 F Supp 643.
Trademark infringement defendant will be sanctioned under Rule 11 by striking of its motion to dismiss, even
though personal jurisdiction and venue would be lacking in this case, where affidavits of defendant concerning poster
sales at issue have been proven to be either untrue or less than forthright, because frivolous and improper affidavits
costing both court and plaintiffs time and money were part of motion to dismiss and both personal jurisdiction and
venue defenses can be waived. Curtis Management Group, Inc. v Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences (1989,
SD Ind) 717 F Supp 1362, 14 USPQ2d 1011.
268. Miscellaneous
District court did not abuse its discretion in holding defendant in civil contempt for submitting to court document
which was deliberately improperly labeled in apparent attempt to deceive court. United States ex rel. SBA v Torres
(1998, CA7 Ill) 142 F3d 962, 40 FR Serv 3d 841.
District judge's sanctions for filing frivolous claim--having been intentionally discriminated against on account of
religion by having employee pay $ 1,000 and write letter of apology to employer and not to file any further lawsuits
until he complied with rest of order--was reversed; sanction would have been affirmed if sanction had consisted merely
of monetary penalty for filing frivolous claim. Reed v Great Lakes Cos. (2003, CA7 Wis) 330 F3d 931, 91 BNA FEP
Cas 1639, 84 CCH EPD P 41411, 55 FR Serv 3d 850, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2003, CA7 Wis) 2003 US App LEXIS
12878.
Penalty of Rule 11 does not embrace that of declining to adjudicate subsequent cause upon its legal merits. King v
Stuart Motor Co. (1943, DC Ga) 52 F Supp 727.
Sanction of default or granting of new trial is not warranted under Rules 11, 26(g), and 37(b) where 2 previous trials
in personal injury litigation resulted in verdicts for defendant, and defendant and defendant's counsel have been
sanctioned with award of costs for blatant discovery abuses. Perkinson v Houlihan's/D.C., Inc. (1985, DC Dist Col)
108 FRD 667, 4 FR Serv 3d 219.
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Since financial sanctions available to courts under Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 USCS §
1927 are unavailing to deal with pro se litigant's continuous filing of duplicative causes of action which are frivolous,
vexatious and without legal merit where litigant has effectively shielded himself from these controls by protesting that
he is indigent, it is necessary under Rule 11 to enjoin litigant from filing or appearing in any civil action in district,
without representation by licensed attorney, in order to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action. Colorado v Carter (1986, DC Colo) 678 F Supp 1484.
Where plaintiff's attorneys failed to adequately investigate issues before filing case by neglecting to question key
witness about pertinent issues, sanctions must be imposed, but since no evidence is present which indicates that counsel
knew that filing was frivolous or that counsel intended to harass or punish opposing parties, and since defendants failed
to take certain mitigating steps such as notifying plaintiff's counsel of possibility of claim of Rule 11 violation, only
light sanction is called for, and therefore plaintiff's attorneys are hereby formally cautioned in future to be conscious of
and strictly abide by provisions of Rule 11. American State Bank v Pace (1987, DC Neb) 124 FRD 641.
Removing party is ordered to forfeit removal bond and pay $ 1,000 in attorney's fees, where party filed removal
petition after it was time-barred, petition clearly indicated court had no original or diversity jurisdiction, and removal
appeared to have been done for improper purpose of causing unnecessary delay. In re Estate of Sellers (1987, WD
Wash) 657 F Supp 168.
Rejected medical school applicant and her attorney husband are cited for civil contempt for failing to comply with
citations to discover their assets and for filing additional case against rejecting medical schools in direct violation of
injunction, where assets were sought to pay Rule 11 sanction of attorneys' fees and costs of 7 medical schools forced to
defend against couple's frivolous suits over 10-year period, and court fines rejected applicant is fined $ 100 per business
day until she voluntarily dismisses 1987 case which violates injunction and disqualifies attorney husband from in any
way assisting wife in any proceeding arising out of her rejected applications to medical schools. Cannon v Loyola
University of Chicago (1987, ND Ill) 676 F Supp 823.
Anti-abortion activists are sanctioned under FRCP 11 in form of temporary restraining order against certain
protesting activities of organization pending hearing in state court on state's motion for temporary restraining order,
where activists' removal of action was baseless and solely to delay further proceedings in action in state court, because
sanction, which gives state what it requested in its state-court motion for temporary restraining order, is necessary to
deter such abuse of process in future. Wisconsin v Missionaries to Preborn (1992, ED Wis) 796 F Supp 389, 22 FR
Serv 3d 1250.
Although plaintiff's attorney committed flagrant violations of Rule 11 causing defendant to incur attorney fees in
excess of $ 4100, sanction of $ 2700 will be imposed since this should be sufficient to punish attorney, who has limited
resources and little experience, and to deter him from similar filings in future; in addition, court recommends that
attorney send letter of apology to defendant's counsel. Redd v Fisher Controls (1993, WD Tex) 147 FRD 128, 25 FR
Serv 3d 1502.
Where plaintiffs' counsel included in pleadings unsubstantiated allegations of serious misconduct by defense
attorneys, offending pleadings are stricken, plaintiffs' counsel are ordered to write formal letters of apology to
defendants' attorneys, future pleadings will be reviewed before filing, and sanction of $ 1,000 will be imposed. Nault's
Auto. Sales, Inc. v American Honda Motor Co., Acura Auto. Div. (1993, DC NH) 148 FRD 25, 26 FR Serv 3d 46.
Where defendant's attorney filed notice of removal in case which was not removable, in order to educate attorney
concerning federal removal law, appropriate sanction will be to require attorney to copy out in his own handwriting text
of specified volume dealing with relevant law. Curran v Price (1993, DC Md) 150 FRD 85.
In action involving numerous defendants, where there was no evidence to support naming of dismissed defendants,
their inclusion in complaint violated Rule 11, but sanction of attorney fees is not appropriate since little work was done
solely on behalf of dismissed defendants, so attorneys will be required to pay fine of $ 200 for each dismissed
defendant, plus they will be required to attend seminar regarding Rule 11 sanctions and to file proof of attendance with
court. Martin v Brown (1993, WD Pa) 151 FRD 580, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98145, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P
8438, subsequent app, remanded (1995, CA3 Pa) 63 F3d 1252, 33 FR Serv 3d 551 (criticized in Satcorp Int'l Group v
China Nat'l Silk Import & Export Corp. (1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 3, 36 FR Serv 3d 463).
Where inmate who filed numerous fraudulent products liability actions would not be deterred from such conduct in
future by threat of finding of contempt or by imposition of monetary sanctions which he could not pay, reasonable and
appropriate sanction is to order inmate to forfeit to United States any computer, monitor, printer, typewriter, or word
processor and any accessories to such instruments that he presently has in his possession; further, inmate is enjoined
from filing any new product liability cases without first seeking leave of court and attaching statement that he has been
enjoined from filing fraudulent claims; additionally, inmate must inform attorneys representing defendants in other
cases he has pending of this order; inmate must also state on outside of any envelope mailed by him that he has been
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enjoined from asserting fraudulent personal injury claims; finally, inmate is ordered to pay monetary sanction of $ 5,000
to clerk of court. Williams v Revlon Co. (1994, SD NY) 156 FRD 39.
In civil suit, where pro hac vice defense counsel had violated Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct and all
defense counsel had violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 USCS § 1927 in their pursuit of motion for recusal, local rule
authorized court to revoke nonresident attorneys' pro hac vice status, and did not require referral of matter to
disciplinary panel before court revoked that status; thus, court revoked their pro hac vice status and ordered all defense
counsel to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs' attorney fees. Obert v Republic Western Ins. Co. (2003, DC RI) 264 F
Supp 2d 106.
Rule 11 sanction consisting of warning is imposed upon District Attorney, who alleged in motion to dismiss
petitioner's habeas corpus petition that petitioner did not assert cognizable grounds for relief because he did not claim
that any of factors appearing at 28 USCS § 2254(d)(1)-(8) were applicable and that petitioner "conceded" that he had
not exhausted his available judicial remedies, where (1) argument regarding habeas corpus factors was meritless, (2)
cursory reading of documents should have demonstrated that petitioner had exhausted his remedies, and (3) District
Attorney's conduct, while not demonstrating willfulness warranting monetary damages, indicates misconception of
proper federal habeas corpus procedure. Taylor v Pennsylvania (1988, MD Pa) 686 F Supp 492.
IX. DEFENSES
269. Laches
Court is not estopped from enforcing Rule 11 simply because 8 months passed after plaintiff's attorneys committed
violations before defendants filed motion for sanctions. Lyle v Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc. (1986, ND Ga) 112
FRD 392, 6 FR Serv 3d 228, revd without op, remanded without op (1987, CA11 Ga) 822 F2d 64, subsequent app
(1989, CA11 Ga) 893 F2d 347.
Delay of over 2 years between filing of complaint and defendants' filing of their motions for summary judgment,
followed by delay of almost 8 months after entry of judgment in favor of defendants before defendants filed motion for
sanctions, does not prevent consideration of defendants' motion. Ezell v Lincoln Electric Co. (1988, SD Miss) 119
FRD 645, affd without op (1988, CA5 Miss) 863 F2d 880.
Manufacturer's failure to bring claim immediately for infringement of trade dress was excusable where battle for
ownership of company and eventual sale preoccupied corporate counsel and made investigation of possible claims
impossible for a period of time after which prompt attention was given to the matter. DAP Prods., Inc. v Color Tile
Mfg., Inc. (1993, SD Ohio) 821 F Supp 488, 27 USPQ2d 1365.
270. Mistake
Sanctions were properly imposed on attorney who claimed he meant to file notice of appeal, but instead renoticed
motion that had already been denied, where attorney admitted he did not read renoticed motion which was baseless, and
attorney is not excused by pleading that it was just "stupid mistake," since counsel can no longer avoid sting of Rule 11
sanctions by operating under guise of pure heart and empty head. Smith v Ricks (1994, CA9 Cal) 31 F3d 1478, 94
CDOS 6130, 94 Daily Journal DAR 11208, 1994-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70679, 29 FR Serv 3d 1446, cert den (1995)
514 US 1035, 131 L Ed 2d 287, 115 S Ct 1400, subsequent app (1996, CA9 Cal) 1996 US App LEXIS 26853.
Mistake can be defense to motion for sanctions under Rule 11 where moving party concedes that mistake has
occurred; thus, District Court properly declines to impose sanctions against plaintiffs' attorneys, notwithstanding
contention that they violated Rule 11 when they signed amended complaints asserting claims which they should have
known were time-barred under state law, where plaintiffs' attorneys assert that this was inadvertent drafting mistake,
they acted immediately to correct error once it was discovered, and they informed court that they had no objection to
entry of judgment for defendant. Baranski v Serhant (1985, ND Ill) 106 FRD 247, 1 FR Serv 3d 1396.
271. Motion to withdraw
Attorney's motions to withdraw as plaintiff's counsel do not insulate him from liability where he first moved to
withdraw more than two years after he signed complaint and thereby violated rule. St. Amant v Bernard (1988, CA5
La) 859 F2d 379, 48 BNA FEP Cas 510, 48 CCH EPD P 38426, 12 FR Serv 3d 1199.
Amended "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11 provides that attorney or party who has filed pleading which violated
rule shall be given 21 days after service of motion for sanctions to withdraw that pleading, and where pleading was
voluntarily withdrawn prior to filing of motion for sanctions, counsel was immunized from sanctions. Photocircuits
Corp. v Marathon Agents (1995, ED NY) 162 FRD 449, 33 FR Serv 3d 780.
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Ultimate and practical effect of 15 USCS § 78u-4(c)(1) of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which requires
court, upon final adjudication of action, to include in record specific findings regarding compliance by parties with
requirements of FRCP 11(b), and which requires court to impose sanctions if court finds violation of FRCP 11, is that
21-day safe harbor of FRCP 11 does not apply to federal securities actions brought under Act. Smith v Smith (1998, SD
Fla) 184 FRD 420, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9674, 42 FR Serv 3d 1274.
272. Need for discovery
Rule 11 is designed to insure that allegations in complaint are supported by sufficient factual predicate at time that
claims are asserted; thus, it is no answer to motion for Rule 11 sanctions for plaintiffs to suggest that they needed
discovery to ascertain whether claim they asserted was well founded. Yonkers v Otis Elevator Co. (1985, SD NY) 106
FRD 524.
Attorneys were subject to $ 25,000 fine for asserting claims and defenses for purpose of delay, where attorneys
asserted defenses of fraud, lack of consideration, and lack of authority without requesting discovery to support their
opposition to summary judgment on asserted defenses. MHC Inv. Co. v Racom Corp. (2002, SD Iowa) 209 FRD 431.
273. Neophyte attorney
District Court's imposition of sanction was unrealistic and unjust and will be reversed due to its failure to consider
that attorney was very junior associate working on her first case for firm, who entered case near end of discovery and
who was merely following directions of senior partner in charge of case, and who was left in untenable position of lead
counsel on massive discrimination case for which background factual investigation and corroboration had never been
done. Blue v United States Dep't of Army (1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 525, 54 CCH EPD P 40260, 17 FR Serv 3d 737,
cert den (1991) 499 US 959, 113 L Ed 2d 645, 111 S Ct 1580, 56 CCH EPD P 40798 and (criticized in In re Tutu Wells
Contamination Litig. (1997, CA3 VI) 37 VI 398, 120 F3d 368, 27 ELR 21494).
274. Prompt dismissal
Plaintiff who initiates civil action in violation of Rule 11 and then quickly dismisses it does not insulate himself from
sanctions, he merely limits costs which may be imposed for violating rule. Portnoy v Wherehouse Entertainment Co.
(1988, ND Ill) 120 FRD 73.
275. Time pressure
Where circumstances require immediate action by counsel, reliance on declarations of client which were made under
penalty of perjury should be sufficient to constitute reasonable investigation for purposes of Rule 11. Hamer v Career
College Ass'n (1992, CA9 Cal) 979 F2d 758, 92 CDOS 9140, 92 Daily Journal DAR 15156, 24 FR Serv 3d 9.
Where one of defendants called to plaintiffs' counsel's attention inaccuracy in complaint against it, and counsel, after
some disagreement, removed inaccuracy short time later from complaint which had been prepared under extreme time
pressures, no abuse of discretion appears in trial court's refusal to impose sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney. Adams v
Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1987, App DC) 264 US App DC 174, 828 F2d 24, 1987-2 CCH Trade Cases P
67686, cert den (1988) 485 US 934, 99 L Ed 2d 270, 108 S Ct 1109 and cert den (1988) 485 US 961, 99 L Ed 2d 425,
108 S Ct 1225.
Attorney is not exempt from requirements of Rule 11 because he perceives that statute of limitations problem exists
and that if action is not filed soon it will be barred. Ginther v Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. (1986, SD Tex) 111 FRD
615, 4 FR Serv 3d 1356.
Plaintiff's sincere belief in his suit is irrelevant to whether Rule 11 was violated, but consideration will be given to
fact that plaintiff had little time to assess his position before filing suit and that he was operating under emotionally
charged conditions. Hammonds v Board of Election Comm'rs (1986, ND Ill) 112 FRD 33.
Fact that suit was filed under severe time constraint imposed by statute of limitations does not excuse counsel from
obligations imposed by Rule 11 before filing claim or from obligation to continually re-evaluate his litigation position
as facts come to light. Golemi v Creative Food Design, Ltd. (1987, DC Dist Col) 116 FRD 73.
Although time constraints will be considered in determining whether attorney's investigation into factual foundation
of filing is reasonable, no time constraints so impeded attorney that he could not conduct reasonable fact investigation
where there was no actual deadline for filing, attorney could have asked court for additional time, and attorney's actions
showed that he was not overly concerned with time constraints. Painewebber, Inc. v Can Am Financial Group, Ltd.
(1988, ND Ill) 121 FRD 324, 12 FR Serv 3d 18, affd without op (1989, CA7 Ill) 885 F2d 873.
Rule 11 violation occurred where defense counsel asserted numerous affirmative defenses which she could show no
evidence to support, although she stated that she was "concerned" that defenses might be applicable to certain
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
allegations in case and that she feared that affirmative defenses might be waived if they were not asserted in first
responsive pleadings. Gargin v Morrell (1991, ED Mich) 133 FRD 504.
276. Miscellaneous
Attorney's subjective good faith no longer precludes imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 since amendment in
1983. Eastway Constr. Corp. v New York (1985, CA2 NY) 762 F2d 243, 1985-1 CCH Trade Cases P 66634, 1 FR Serv
3d 849.
Defendant airline may not recover sanctions under Rule 11, which it sought on grounds that plaintiff passenger's
counsel had failed to make reasonable inquiry into factual and legal basis of complaint before its filing, where airline
had removed second largely superfluous complaint to federal court instead of allowing it to be consolidated with first
complaint in state court and had thus bifurcated what should have been single action, thereby increasing costs for
everyone. Brown v Capitol Air, Inc. (1986, CA2 NY) 797 F2d 106, 5 FR Serv 3d 1002.
Litigant need not, in all instances, use least expensive alternative to resolve dispute and to bring Rule 11 violation to
court's attention, and failure to use least expensive alternative does not per se bar imposition of sanctions. Harmony
Drilling Co. v Kreutter (1988, CA5 Tex) 846 F2d 17, 11 FR Serv 3d 651.
District court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose sanctions on plaintiff and his attorney, although
plaintiff's deposition testimony contradicted his earlier allegations in first complaint, where plaintiff's attorney provided
affidavit detailing reasonable pre-filing inquiry which had formed basis for plaintiff's allegations. Savino v Computer
Credit (1998, CA2 NY) 164 F3d 81, 42 FR Serv 3d 1154.
Where defendant's attorney had in his possession documents which should have alerted him to jurisdictional
problem, but he failed to raise jurisdictional issue until after pretrial order was signed and parties had incurred expenses
of trial, defendant's motion for sanctions is denied due to violation by Rule 11 by both parties. Williams v Northern
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (1990, ND Ind) 131 FRD 677.
It is no defense to violation of "well-grounded in fact" requirement that signing counsel acted in ignorance or was
merely careless or negligent. Bergeson v Dilworth (1990, DC Kan) 132 FRD 277, vacated on other grounds, remanded
(1990, DC Kan) 749 F Supp 1555.
Although complaint named as plaintiff corporation which had been dissolved number of years earlier, Rule 11
sanctions will not be imposed since plaintiff, when notified of offending pleading, undertook steps to correct matter.
Automated Info. Processing v Genesys Solutions Group (1995, ED NY) 164 FRD 1, 34 FR Serv 3d 257.
District court denied software buyer's motion to recover costs and attorneys' fees that it incurred in responding
seller's motion for reconsideration of order directing that issues relating to liability be tried separately from issues
related to damages because district court accepted seller's motion that it was confused by order's reference to liability
being tried first and damages being tried later. Am. Trim, L.L.C. v Oracle Corp. (2002, ND Ohio) 230 F Supp 2d 803,
judgment entered (2002, ND Ohio) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 22801.
X. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. In General
277. Generally
Where motions to dismiss are converted by court to motions for summary judgment, court should wait until after 10
day period given counsel to submit material in opposition to converted motions before deciding whether to impose Rule
11 sanctions. Donaldson v Clark (1987, CA11 Ga) 819 F2d 1551, 8 FR Serv 3d 1 (ovrld in part on other grounds by
Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank N.A. (1989, CA7 Ill) 880 F2d 928, 14 FR Serv 3d 385).
Where parties entered into stipulation of dismissal and defendant's attorney gave no indication that sanctions would
be sought, and plaintiff subsequently filed similar suit in another district, it was improper for defendant to then seek
sanctions in original district. Barr Lab. v Abbott Lab. (1989, CA2 NY) 867 F2d 743, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P
68443, 13 FR Serv 3d 238 (criticized in Leiching v CONRAIL (1997, ND NY) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 3561).
It was abuse of discretion for magistrate to summarily impose sanctions on plaintiff's attorney for filing motion to
sanction defendant's attorney for engaging in misconduct, where magistrate described plaintiff's attorney's motion as
"uncalled for and highly improper" although magistrate failed to investigate allegations. Mylett v Jeane (1990, CA5
Tex) 910 F2d 296, 18 FR Serv 3d 215.
Where plaintiff filed petition for bankruptcy while appeals were pending regarding dismissal of plaintiff's earlier
lawsuit and imposition of sanctions on plaintiff, proceeding to impose sanctions under Rule 11 should be treated as
separate judicial unit and as suit against debtor, but it is exempt from automatic stay since litigant should not be allowed
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to delay imposition of sanctions indefinitely by declaring bankruptcy. Alpern v Lieb (1993, CA7 Ill) 11 F3d 689, CCH
Bankr L Rptr P 75624, 27 FR Serv 3d 606.
Where plaintiff government filed motion for sanctions, and defendant filed cross-motion for sanctions on grounds
that government's motion had not identified any pleading or motion or other paper signed in violation of Rule 11, and
government subsequently filed brief in support of its motion identifying papers signed in violation, court acted within its
discretion by considering government's motion and brief together and concluding that motion thus was filed within
parameters of Rule 11. United States v Berg (1994, CA7 Ill) 20 F3d 304, 94-1 USTC P 50175, 73 AFTR 2d 1684, 94
TNT 73-15.
Although magistrate judge may recommend sanctions, power to award sanctions, like power to award damages,
belongs in hands of district judge. Alpern v Lieb (1994, CA7 Ill) 38 F3d 933, 30 FR Serv 3d 509, reh, en banc, den
(1994, CA7 Ill) 1994 US App LEXIS 33656.
Survival of action after Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not prevent imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Runfola &
Assocs. v Spectrum Reporting II (1996, CA6 Ohio) 88 F3d 368, 1996-2 CCH Trade Cases P 71465, 35 FR Serv 3d 434,
1996 FED App 198P (criticized in Ridder v City of Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288,
1997 FED App 94P).
Court cannot impose Rule 11 sanctions on its own initiative where plaintiff has already voluntarily moved to dismiss
its claims. Aerotech, Inc. v Estes (1997, CA10 Colo) 110 F3d 1523, 37 FR Serv 3d 867.
Rule 11 sanctions must be sought by motion in pending case, and independent cause of action cannot be brought for
purpose of seeking sanctions under Rule 11. Handeen v Lemaire (1997, CA8 Minn) 112 F3d 1339, RICO Bus Disp
Guide (CCH) P 9271.
District court's judgment against defendant did not constitute sanction under Rule 11 and was not imposed merely to
punish defendant for motions he may have filed. Klingman v Levinson (1997, CA7 Ill) 114 F3d 620, 97-1 USTC P
50441, 32 UCCRS2d 1218, 79 AFTR 2d 2729, reh den (1997, CA7 Ill) 1997 US App LEXIS 14180, reh den (1997, CA7
Ill) 1997 US App LEXIS 26576.
Trial court erred in imposing sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against plaintiff's attorney; defendant failed to
file motion for sanctions in separate motion, and failed to allow plaintiff required 21 days to withdraw motion for
default judgment. Gordon v Unifund CCR Partners (2003, CA8 Mo) 345 F3d 1028, 56 FR Serv 3d 783.
Court properly defers consideration and imposition of appropriate Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff until claims
against defendant have been resolved. Foster v Michelin Tire Corp. (1985, CD Ill) 108 FRD 412.
Because plaintiff is being allowed to replead his complaint, imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is premature. Beck v
Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co. (1985, ND Ill) 621 F Supp 1547, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92455.
Defendants' request for sanctions under Rule 11 is dismissed, where corporation and individual sued for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract and fraud counterclaimed for Rule 11 sanctions and defamation, because (1) Rule 11
procedurally permits attorney to raise claim for sanctions only through motion, normally at end of litigation, and (2)
Rule 11 was not adopted as basis for hybrid of bad faith tort. Lenoir v Tannehill (1986, SD Miss) 660 F Supp 42.
Decision on motion to impose sanctions on basis of amended complaint which deleted some of allegations in original
complaint need not be deferred until end of trial since plaintiff is taking position that deleted allegations are not material
to his claim and will not be further developed. Bannon v Joyce Beverages, Inc. (1987, ND Ill) 113 FRD 669.
Power utility's counterclaim against investors seeking sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 USCS § 1927 is dismissed
with leave to reassert its claim as motion for sanctions, because its contentions are inappropriate for counterclaim.
Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co. (1988, ND Ill) 688 F Supp 331, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94068, affd (1989, CA7
Ill) 892 F2d 509, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94809, 15 FR Serv 3d 412, 119 ALR Fed 639.
Motion for sanctions must be made separately from other motions, and therefore, motion for sanctions which was
included in motion to dismiss is denied since it is not in compliance with Rule 11. Voice Sys. Mktg. Co., L.P. v
Appropriate Technology Corp. (1994, ED Mich) 153 FRD 117, 28 FR Serv 3d 1119.
Sanctions against plaintiff are denied but issue of FRCP 11 sanctions may be revisited if it becomes obvious at trial
that plaintiff misrepresented to court that majority of his material witnesses will be from Ohio, where accusation is that
plaintiff misled court in order to maintain venue of his choice, because LaCroix v American Horse Show Ass'n (1994,
ND Ohio) 853 F Supp 992.
No sanctions will be imposed under FRCP 11, even though tax protester has filed some 24 motions, briefs, notices,
and demands in addition to videotape and several booklets regarding his political and other personal views, none of
which have any objectively reasonable legal basis, because government did not follow FRCP 11(c)(1)(A) procedure that
sanctions motions be made separately from other motions or requests and that describe specific conduct alleged to
violate FRCP 11(b). United States v Schiefen (1995, DC SD) 926 F Supp 877, 79 AFTR 2d 1926, judgment entered
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(1995, DC SD) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 15388, affd without op (1996, CA8 SD) 81 F3d 166, reported in full (1996, CA8
SD) 1996 US App LEXIS 6232.
In claimant's action for review of decision of Commissioner of Social Security denying him old age benefits, court
refused to grant sanctions against defendants as claimant failed to follow procedural requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(1)(A). Atkin v Lewis (2002, ND Ohio) 232 F Supp 2d 770, 85 Soc Sec Rep Serv 302.
278. Jurisdiction
Because defendants filed their Rule 11 motion 2 days before appellate court's mandate issued, District Court had
jurisdiction to entertain sanctions request, particularly as it was collateral to appeal on merits. Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc.
v Lingle (1988, CA3 Pa) 847 F2d 90, 1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68028, 11 FR Serv 3d 255, 99 ALR Fed 553.
Although District Court dismissed frivolous petition to remove case from state court, federal court retained
jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Unanue-Casal v Unanue-Casal (1990, CA1 Puerto Rico) 898 F2d 839, 16
FR Serv 3d 160.
Magistrate had jurisdiction to order Rule 11 sanctions since sanctions imposed were nondispositive, and since
District Court had referred all discovery motions to magistrate, thereby implicitly authorizing magistrate to impose Rule
11 sanctions for discovery motions when appropriate. Maisonville v F2 Am., Inc. (1990, CA9 Hawaii) 902 F2d 746, 16
FR Serv 3d 383, cert den (1991) 498 US 1025, 112 L Ed 2d 666, 111 S Ct 674 and (criticized in Retired Chicago Police
Ass'n v City of Chicago (1996, CA7 Ill) 76 F3d 856, 34 FR Serv 3d 267).
Although district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over complaint, that does not preclude court from imposing
Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff for filing frivolous complaint. Branson v Nott (1995, CA9 Cal) 62 F3d 287, 95 CDOS
5994, 95 Daily Journal DAR 10312, cert den (1995) 516 US 1009, 133 L Ed 2d 491, 116 S Ct 565.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 differs from civil contempt citation in that Rule 11 sanctions are enforceable
in absence of subject matter jurisdiction, while civil contempt citation is not. Olcott v Delaware Flood Co. (1996, CA10
Okla) 76 F3d 1538, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99059, 35 FR Serv 3d 248.
"Safe harbor" provision of Rule 11 is not jurisdictional and may be waived. Rector v Approved Fed. Sav. Bank
(2001, CA4 Va) 265 F3d 248, 50 FR Serv 3d 359.
Where district court had not yet determined amount that attorney was liable to pay as sanction under Rule 11,
decision imposing sanctions was not final, and therefore, court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over appeal. View
Eng'g v Robotic Vision Sys. (1997, CA FC) 115 F3d 962, 42 USPQ2d 1956, subsequent app (1997, CA FC) 1997 US
App LEXIS 16458.
In light of general rule divesting District Courts of jurisdiction over issues involving merits of appeal and prudential
considerations that support this rule, District Court has no jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion for sanctions
under Rule 11, where motion is brought almost 2 years after District Court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment and 2 months after Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Duane Smelser Roofing Co. v Armm
Consultants, Inc. (1985, ED Mich) 609 F Supp 823, 1 FR Serv 3d 1131.
Following defendant's successful motion to transfer action to another district due to total lack of connection between
asserted causes of action and original forum, first court retains jurisdiction to decide Rule 11 motion. Laine v Morton
Thiokol, Inc. (1989, ND Ill) 124 FRD 625.
Despite its dismissal of all of investor's claims in "best price rule" case and entry of final judgment on merits, court
retained jurisdiction for purpose of holding hearing on investor's motion for sanctions before ruling on motion. Katt v
Titan Acquisitions, Inc. (2003, MD Tenn) 244 F Supp 2d 841.
Where defendants' motion for attorney fees was filed 2 days before court of appeals issued its mandate affirming
grant of summary judgment, District Court has jurisdiction to entertain motion. Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v Lingle
(1987, MD Pa) 115 FRD 233, 1987-1 CCH Trade Cases P 67532, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1988, CA3 Pa)
847 F2d 90, 1988-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68028, 11 FR Serv 3d 255, 99 ALR Fed 553.
279. --After dismissal or final judgment
Although original action had been dismissed pursuant to plaintiffs' request, court had authority to impose sanctions
on plaintiffs, based either on court's inherent authority over cases and parties before it or on fact that before plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed their action, defendants filed motions to dismiss which were treated as motions for summary
judgment, thereby making inapplicable automatic dismissal provisions of Rule 41. Kurkowski v Volcker (1987, CA8
Neb) 819 F2d 201, 7 FR Serv 3d 1297 (criticized in Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v Norfolk S. Corp.
(1997, CA4 SC) 109 F3d 993, 154 BNA LRRM 2940, 37 FR Serv 3d 413).
Court has power to impose sanctions even after plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their action. Muthig v Brant
Point Nantucket, Inc. (1988, CA1 Mass) 838 F2d 600, 10 FR Serv 3d 512, 98 ALR Fed 417.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District Court had jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions after plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed action pursuant
to Rule 41. Schering Corp. v Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1989, CA3 NJ) 889 F2d 490, 14 FR Serv 3d 1421.
District Court had jurisdiction over defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanction filed 6 weeks after voluntary dismissal
with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2), even though defendants failed to notify plaintiffs or court before dismissal of intent
to file motion, and due process does not require evidentiary hearing before sanctions are imposed. In re Kunstler
(1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990,
CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
Stipulated dismissal under Rule 41 did not deprive district court of jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Fox v
Acadia State Bank (1991, CA11 Ga) 937 F2d 1566, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96177, 20 FR Serv 3d 557.
Notice of voluntary dismissal did not deprive district court of requisite jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Rule
11. Bolivar v Pocklington (1992, CA1 Puerto Rico) 975 F2d 28, 23 FR Serv 3d 723.
District court retained jurisdiction over Rule 11 sanctions motion following voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).
Dunn v Gull (1993, CA7 Ind) 990 F2d 348, 25 FR Serv 3d 512.
Where complaint improperly alleged federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, and plaintiffs filed notice
of voluntary discontinuance after defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, District Court retains jurisdiction
to impose sanctions. Solloway v Ellenbogen (1988, SD NY) 121 FRD 29.
Although District Court has dismissed case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction to impose
sanctions where abuse has occurred. Connecticut v Insurance Co. of America (1988, DC Conn) 121 FRD 159.
Court retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 after it has rendered its final judgment or after case
has been voluntarily dismissed. Sauls v Penn Virginia Resources Corp. (1988, WD Va) 121 FRD 657, 12 FR Serv 3d
74.
Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 does not deprive District Court of jurisdiction over defendant's Rule 11
motion. Cambridge Prods. v Penn Nutrients (1990, ED Pa) 131 FRD 464.
Motion for sanctions may be filed with court after judgment as long as moving party has first served motion for
sanctions on offending party 21 or more days prior to final judgment. Hamil v Mobex Managed Servs. Co. (2002, ND
Ind) 208 FRD 247.
280. --After notice of appeal
District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorney's fees as sanction after judgment is entered and notice of appeal
is filed. Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v Southern Fuels Co. (1987, CA4 Md) 813 F2d 1327, 7 FR Serv 3d 321, cert
den (1987) 484 US 829, 98 L Ed 2d 60, 108 S Ct 99.
Where plaintiff filed notice of appeal of imposition of sanctions and then moved District Court to reconsider and
vacate award, motion before District Court was itself violation of Rule 11 since competent reading of rules and
precedent would have clearly shown that appeal divested District Court of jurisdiction to reconsider. Townsend v
Holman Consulting Corp. (1991, CA9 Cal) 929 F2d 1358.
District court retains jurisdiction to entertain motion for Rule 11 sanctions even after filing of notice of appeal.
Val-Land Farms, Inc. v Third Nat'l Bank (1991, CA6 Tenn) 937 F2d 1110, 20 FR Serv 3d 236.
Where defendants filed notice of appeal from denial of their first motion for sanctions, filing of notice of appeal
conferred jurisdiction on court of appeals and divested district court of its control over that aspect of case which was
involved in appeal, and therefore district court did not have jurisdiction over defendants' second motion for sanctions to
extent that it dealt with same sanctionable conduct, although district court had jurisdiction over allegation of new
sanctionable conduct. Trulis v Barton (1995, CA9 Cal) 67 F3d 779, 95 CDOS 7528, 95 Daily Journal DAR 12915, CCH
Bankr L Rptr P 76674, reprinted as amd, remanded (1995, CA9 Cal) 107 F3d 685, 97 CDOS 1296, 97 Daily Journal
DAR 1915, 36 FR Serv 3d 1422.
District court did not have jurisdiction over defendants' second motion for sanctions since defendants had already
filed notice of appeal from denial of their first motion for sanctions, thus conferring jurisdiction on court of appeals and
divesting district court of its control. Trulis v Barton (1995, CA9 Cal) 107 F3d 685, 97 CDOS 1296, 97 Daily Journal
DAR 1915, 36 FR Serv 3d 1422.
District court improperly denied inmate's motion for sanctions against parole board official on ground that it lacked
jurisdiction because appeal was pending from dismissal of inmate's action pursuant to 42 USCS § 1983; district court
retained jurisdiction over motion because it raised issues that were collateral to appeal. Mahone v Ray (2003, CA11 Ga)
326 F3d 1176, 16 FLW Fed C 476.
Filing of notice of appeal prior to defendants' motion for sanctions did not divest District Court of jurisdiction to
consider propriety of Rule 11 sanctions. Ezell v Lincoln Electric Co. (1988, SD Miss) 119 FRD 645, affd without op
(1988, CA5 Miss) 863 F2d 880.
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Filing of notice of appeal does not deprive District Court of jurisdiction to award sanctions under Rule 11. Cedar
Crest Health Center, Inc. v Bowen (1989, SD Ind) 129 FRD 519, 16 FR Serv 3d 1242.
District court maintains jurisdiction to entertain motion for FRCP 11 sanctions even after filing of notice of appeal.
In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig. (1999, SD NY) 187 FRD 124, 1999-1 CCH Trade Cases P 72543.
281. Standing
Nonparty lacks standing and may not intervene in action for purpose of moving for Rule 11 sanction against parties
to action even though nonparty claimed to have personal knowledge that complaint contained baseless allegations which
defamed nonparty. New York News, Inc. v Kheel (1992, CA2 NY) 972 F2d 482, 141 BNA LRRM 2075, 122 CCH LC P
10326, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8065, 23 FR Serv 3d 317.
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review award of Rule 11 sanctions imposed on plaintiff's attorney where appeal
was brought only by plaintiff, since plaintiff lacked standing to appeal order imposing sanctions against his attorney.
Cabrera v City of Huntington Park (1998, CA9 Cal) 159 F3d 374, 98 CDOS 7814, 98 Daily Journal DAR 10864, 41 FR
Serv 3d 1223.
Generally, non-parties to case in litigation cannot bring FRCP 11 motions for sanctions, and non-party cannot
intervene in case in order to pursue imposition of FRCP 11 sanctions against party to litigation. Hochen v Bobst Group
(2000, DC Mass) 198 FRD 11.
Attorney for party in case cannot bring motion for FRCP 11 sanctions on his or her own behalf. Hochen v Bobst
Group (2000, DC Mass) 198 FRD 11.
Parties to action and certain other participants have standing to move for sanctions under FRCP 11. Hochen v Bobst
Group (2000, DC Mass) 198 FRD 11.
282. Notice (pre-1993 amendment cases)
Although plaintiff's attorney did not have explicit notice that court would consider imposing costs and fees against
him at hearing, he knew that court would consider generally imposition of penalties, and such notice was sufficient
under circumstances of case; having voluntarily chosen not to attend hearing, plaintiff's attorney will not be heard to
complain that he is entitled to additional process. Lepucki v Van Wormer (1985, CA7 Ind) 765 F2d 86, cert den (1985)
474 US 827, 88 L Ed 2d 71, 106 S Ct 86.
Evidentiary hearing is not required before imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, although due process requires
notice and opportunity to be heard. Oliveri v Thompson (1986, CA2 NY) 803 F2d 1265, 5 FR Serv 3d 761, cert den
(1987) 480 US 918, 94 L Ed 2d 689, 107 S Ct 1373 and (criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo
1995-76, RIA TC Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM 1916, 95 TNT 33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner
(1995) TC Memo 1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577, 70 CCH TCM 1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Sanction of order to clerk of District Court prohibiting clerk from filing complaint for plaintiff without first obtaining
approval of Court of Appeals, which was intended to prevent plaintiff from filing further frivolous lawsuits, should not
have been imposed on plaintiff without giving him notice and opportunity to respond. Gagliardi v McWilliams (1987,
CA3 Pa) 834 F2d 81, 9 FR Serv 3d 925.
Imposition of sanction of $ 5,000 against law firm without affording firm prior notice and meaningful opportunity to
be heard violates due process, and subsequent hearing was also insufficient to provide due process. Tom Growney
Equip. v Shelley Irrigation Dev. (1987, CA9 Ariz) 834 F2d 833, 10 FR Serv 3d 215.
Where District Court imposed sanctions upon its own initiative for filing frivolous motion but failed to provide
attorney with notice and opportunity to be heard, due process rights of attorney were violated, and furthermore, judge
neglected to explain why motion was not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law, and therefore order
imposing sanctions is vacated. Sanko S.S. Co. v Galin (1987, CA2 NY) 835 F2d 51, 1989 AMC 304, 9 FR Serv 3d
1118, 100 ALR Fed 549.
District Court need not, in all instances, give offending party notice of Rule 11 violation before applying sanctions;
however, notice should be given by court which is presented with obviously defective paper, generally filed in initial
stages of litigation, which court believes subjects violating party to possible sanctions. Harmony Drilling Co. v
Kreutter (1988, CA5 Tex) 846 F2d 17, 11 FR Serv 3d 651.
District Court's sua sponte imposition of sanctions on attorney constituted abuse of discretion because of violation of
attorney's due process rights where attorney was given neither notice that court was considering Rule 11 sanctions nor
opportunity to respond either before or after their imposition. G.J.B. & Assoc. v Singleton (1990, CA10 Okla) 913 F2d
824, 17 FR Serv 3d 1083 (criticized in Cleveland Hair Clinic v Puig (1997, CA7 Ill) 104 F3d 123, 36 FR Serv 3d 1146).
Where attorney files court papers with no basis in fact, due process does not require any more notice than that which
is provided by existence of Rule 11 before sanctions are imposed; however, when attorney's conduct involves
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
submission of dilatory argument or one without basis in law, there must be specific notice of reasons for contemplating
sanctions. Spiller v Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr. (1990, CA5 Tex) 919 F2d 339, 57 BNA FEP Cas 99, 55 CCH EPD P
40460, 18 FR Serv 3d 768 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Shaw v Housing Auth. (1993, WD La)
158 BR 400, 62 BNA FEP Cas 1521).
District Court erred in imposing sanctions on party immediately after motion was made, since due process
requirements were not met where party was not provided with adequate notice and opportunity to prepare written
response, although party was given opportunity to speak. 1488, Inc. v Philsec Inv. Corp. (1991, CA5 Tex) 939 F2d
1281, 20 FR Serv 3d 643, reh den (1991, CA5) 1991 US App LEXIS 25063.
Where there was no dispute that complaint lacked effectual basis, District Court had no obligation to afford plaintiff's
attorney procedural safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard. Mike Ousley Productions, Inc. v WJBF-TV
(1992, CA11 Ga) 952 F2d 380, 21 FR Serv 3d 1329.
Procedure followed by court in imposing sanctions under Rule 11 must comply with requirements of due process,
and where court issued notice stating that it would consider whether sanctions should be imposed under Rule 11 and
held hearing regarding documents in question, due process was satisfied. American Airlines, Inc. v Allied Pilots Ass'n
(1992, CA5 Tex) 968 F2d 523, 23 FR Serv 3d 847, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA5 Tex) 977 F2d 576.
Due process requires at least notice and opportunity to be heard before imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, and therefore
district court acted improperly when it raised and decided issue on its own without any warning to counsel.
Rounseville v Zahl (1994, CA2 NY) 13 F3d 625.
Sanction imposed on defendant and her attorney for violating Rule 11 is vacated where record contains no indication
that district court notified defendant or her attorney of its intention to sanction them or offered them opportunity to
explain their allegedly improper motion. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v Codispoti (1995, CA9 Wash) 63 F3d 863, 95
CDOS 6485, 95 Daily Journal DAR 11097, 95 Daily Journal DAR 11143, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8870.
In Rule 11 context, due process demands only that sanctioned party be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard,
and evidentiary hearing and opportunity for discovery are not always necessary since what constitutes sufficient process
depends on circumstances of each case; consequently, where defendant's attorney repeatedly informed plaintiff's
attorney that claims were time-barred and that Rule 11 sanctions could and would be sought, plaintiff's attorney had
sufficient notice of possibility of sanctions and ample opportunity to withdraw claims or otherwise respond, particularly
as court waited two years after granting sanctions before it issued order setting amount. Merriman v Security Ins. Co.
(1996, CA5 Tex) 100 F3d 1187, 36 FR Serv 3d 833.
Notice and hearing are not required before sanctions may be imposed since rule itself gives attorneys notice of their
obligations and possibility of sanctions and since scope of sanction proceedings is limited to record. Rowland v Fayed
(1987, DC Dist Col) 115 FRD 605.
283. Notice (post-1993 amendment cases)
Where plaintiffs did not serve their motion for sanctions on defendants and defense counsel prior to filing, thus
failing to comply with procedural prerequisite of Rule 11 which was intended to give parties such as defendants
opportunity to withdraw or correct offending document, sanction and payment of costs and attorney fees which had
been ordered by district court cannot be upheld. Elliott v Tilton (1995, CA5 Tex) 64 F3d 213, 32 FR Serv 3d 728, reh
den (1996, CA5 Tex) 1996 US App LEXIS 1763 and reh den, motion den (1996, CA5 Tex) 1996 US App LEXIS 20427.
Before acting sua sponte to impose sanctions under Rule 11, court must first issue order to allegedly offending party
to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed and give party opportunity to respond before imposition of
sanctions, and granting party's Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider sanctions award was insufficient to correct court's failure
to properly apply required procedures of Rule 11. Johnson v Waddell & Reed (1996, CA7 Ill) 74 F3d 147, 33 FR Serv
3d 1093.
Although full evidentiary hearing was not required, imposition of sanctions on attorney was abuse of discretion
where attorney was not given notice and opportunity to be heard before sanctions were imposed. Stein v Ulster Sav.
Bank (In re Stein) (1997, CA2 NY) 127 F3d 292, 38 CBC2d 1426, CCH Bankr L Rptr P 77531, corrected (1997, CA2
NY) 1997 US App LEXIS 39329.
Award of sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorneys must be vacated where district court did not give counsel for
plaintiffs notice or opportunity to respond before imposing sanctions. Larsen v City of Beloit (1997, CA7 Wis) 130 F3d
1278, 39 FR Serv 3d 987.
Where district court itself initiated sanction proceedings and entered show cause order that failed to describe specific
conduct for which it proposed sanctions, court did not afford sanctioned attorney adequate notice to allow him
opportunity to respond to charges, as required by Rule 11. Thornton v GMC (1998, CA5 La) 136 F3d 450, 40 FR Serv
3d 343.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Party seeking sanctions and court which imposed them failed to comply with procedural safeguards of Rule 11,
where plaintiff included request for sanctions in letter requesting Rule 54(b) certification rather than in separate notice
as required by Rule 11, plaintiff did not identify provisions under which sanctions were being sought, and court did not
require plaintiff to serve motion that would have complied with Rule 11 or enter order to show cause or otherwise give
defendant's attorney notice as to provisions under which sanctions were being considered. L.B. Foster Co. v America
Piles, Inc. (1998, CA2 NY) 138 F3d 81, 40 FR Serv 3d 332.
District court erred in sanctioning attorney without giving him proper notice of conduct alleged to be sanctionable,
standard by which that conduct would be judged, and particular factors that attorney must address in order to avoid
sanctions. Ametex Fabrics v Just in Materials (1998, CA2 NY) 140 F3d 101.
"Safe harbor" provision of Rule 11 requires that party seeking sanctions serve opposing party with motion for
sanctions, and other written warnings that sanctions will be sought are insufficient. Barber v Miller (1998, CA9 Cal)
146 F3d 707, 98 CDOS 4489, 98 Daily Journal DAR 6192, 47 USPQ2d 1055, 40 FR Serv 3d 1245 (criticized in Fink v
Gomez (1999, CD Cal) 39 F Supp 2d 1225).
District court's sua sponte imposition of sanctions without giving party notice describing offending conduct and
allowing him opportunity to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed constituted abuse of discretion. Goldin v
Bartholow (1999, CA5 Tex) 166 F3d 710.
District court improperly imposed sanctions without giving counsel adequate notice and reasonable opportunity to
respond, where court failed to apprise counsel of particular conduct for which court was considering imposing
sanctions, and during sanctions hearing, court did not address specific instances of conduct for which it later sanctioned
counsel. Nuwesra v Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1999, CA2 NY) 174 F3d 87, 9 AD Cas 537, 43 FR Serv 3d
1208.
Where district court imposed sanctions on its own initiative without entering order to show cause, it denied plaintiff
notice and opportunity to respond and thus erred. Baffa v Donaldson (2000, CA2 NY) 222 F3d 52, CCH Fed Secur L
Rep P 91056.
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides strict procedural requirements for parties to follow when they move for sanctions under
Rule 11; consequently, defendants were not entitled to sanctions where they failed to serve Rule 11 motion on plaintiffs
with demand for retraction of allegedly offending allegations and further failed to allow plaintiffs at least 21 days to
retract pleading before filing motion with court. Radcliffe v Rainbow Constr. Co. (2001, CA9 Cal) 254 F3d 772, 2001
CDOS 4864, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 5959, 167 BNA LRRM 2525, 143 CCH LC P 11022.
Party defending Rule 11 motion need not comply with separate document and safe harbor provisions when
counter-requesting sanctions. Patelco Credit Union v Sahni (2001, CA9 Cal) 262 F3d 897, 2001 Daily Journal DAR
9178, 26 EBC 2060, 50 FR Serv 3d 1237.
Where district court found that plaintiff bank had proceeded to litigate in bad faith and awarded insurer sanctions
under its inherent power, ample evidence supported district court's exercise of its inherent authority to award attorneys
fees; FRCP 11, rather than Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.51, governed award of sanctions for frivolous conduct, since Ohio
statute was procedural in nature, but FRCP 11 sanctions were not available, since defendant insurer had failed to notify
bank with "safe harbor" letter. First Bank of Marietta v Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2002, CA6 Ohio) 307 F3d 501,
2002 FED App 356P.
Magistrate erred in failing to consider merits of defendants' request for sanctions in 42 USCS § 1983 case, as
"letter" or "demand" sent to plaintiff's attorney rather than "motion" substantially complied with Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(1)(A); defendants made plaintiff aware of problems with plaintiff's claims and gave plaintiff more than 21 days to
desist before turning to court. Nisenbaum v Milwaukee County (2003, CA7 Wis) 333 F3d 804.
In domain-name registrant's suit against trademark owners seeking to demonstrate lawful use of domain name,
district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against trademark owners for certain factual contentions
because trademark owners did not receive requisite notice. Storey v Cello Holdings, L.L.C. (2003, CA2 NY) 347 F3d
370, 68 USPQ2d 1641.
Letter sent by defendant's counsel to plaintiff's counsel, which requested that plaintiff consider withdrawing lawsuit,
was not equivalent of compliance with FRCP 11's safe harbor provision (FRCP 11(c)(1)(A)), since letter was devoid of
any indication that defendant intended to seek FRCP 11 sanctions, and plain language of rule expressly requires serving
of formal motion. Lancaster v Zufle (1996, SD NY) 170 FRD 7.
Motion for FRCP 11 sanctions is barred where moving party fails to provide other party with 21-day window within
which to withdraw allegedly offending papers. Martins v Charles Hayden Goodwill Inn Sch. (1997, DC Mass) 178 FRD
4, 41 FR Serv 3d 364, affd without op (1998, CA1 Mass) 134 F3d 361, reported in full (1998, CA1 Mass) 1998 US App
LEXIS 1277.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Sanctions will not be imposed on plaintiffs under FRCP 11, even though defendants seeking sanctions were all
dismissed or exonerated of wrongdoing in case brought by physician and his wife against antiabortion activists who
protested and harassed them, where certificates of service show motions for sanctions were served on opposing counsel
either day they were filed with court or shortly before, because defendants did not comply with FRCP 11(c)(1)(A) "safe
harbor" provision. Tompkins v Cyr (1998, ND Tex) 995 F Supp 689, affd (2000, CA5 Tex) 202 F3d 770.
Twenty-one-day period under FRCP 11(b), during which counsel accused of filing frivolous document could take
curative action by withdrawing or amending document, was not triggered by letter to plaintiffs' counsel demanding that
defendants be dismissed from securities fraud suit, since defendants' counsel was required to serve plaintiffs' counsel
with sanctions motion to trigger period. Harding Univ. v Consulting Servs. Group, L.P. (1999, ND Ill) 48 F Supp 2d
765.
Plaintiff's motion requesting imposition of sanctions must be denied without discussion of merits, where it filed
sanction motion with court only one day after its service on defendants, because plaintiff failed to comply with
mandatory "safe harbor" provision of FRCivP 11. ESI, Inc. v Coastal Corp. (1999, SD NY) 61 F Supp 2d 35.
Court's failure to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard is grounds for reversal of order imposing
sanctions. Ping He (Hai Nam) Co. v Nonferrous Metals (U.S.A.) Inc. (1999, SD NY) 187 FRD 121.
Court reprimanded plaintiffs' counsel for ignoring notice requirement contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A),
choosing instead to mail Rule 11 motion to opposing counsel and filing that motion with court following day, three days
prior to scheduled hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss. Waters v Walt Disney World Co. (2002, DC RI) 237 F
Supp 2d 162.
Appellate court vacated order imposing sanctions against plaintiff estate representative because trial court failed to
provide due process notice that it was considering imposing sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Satterlee v Northside
Developers, Inc. (2003, DC VI) 216 FRD 330.
Rule 11 sanction imposed by district court on its own initiative must be reversed where court failed to comply with
proper procedures which required issuance of show cause order and reasonable opportunity for sanctioned party to
contest sanction. Hutchinson v Pfeil (2000, CA10 Okla) 208 F3d 1180, 46 FR Serv 3d 179.
District court was not required to give plaintiffs' attorneys notice of grounds for sanctions where basis for seeking
sanctions was clearly expressed in defendants' Rule 11 motion papers. Margo v Weiss (2000, CA2 NY) 213 F3d 55, 54
USPQ2d 1769.
284. Timeliness of motion
Application for attorneys' fees is collateral and independent claim and need not be filed within 10 day time period for
motions under Rule 59(e). Lupo v R. Rowland & Co. (1988, CA8 Mo) 857 F2d 482, 12 FR Serv 3d 281, cert den
(1989) 490 US 1081, 104 L Ed 2d 662, 109 S Ct 2101.
Rule 11 does not establish deadline for imposition of sanctions, and time limit for filing Rule 11 motions is governed
by local rule or lies within discretion of trial judge. Levine v FDIC (1993, CA2 Conn) 2 F3d 476, 26 FR Serv 3d 802.
Where decision whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions is based on question of whether complaint was well-grounded
in fact, motion for sanctions can be timely even when filed well after original pleadings, since it often will not be clear
whether or not case was well-grounded in fact until after plaintiff has had chance to conduct discovery. Runfola &
Assocs. v Spectrum Reporting II (1996, CA6 Ohio) 88 F3d 368, 1996-2 CCH Trade Cases P 71465, 35 FR Serv 3d 434,
1996 FED App 198P (criticized in Ridder v City of Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288,
1997 FED App 94P).
Since purpose of "safe harbor" provision is to give offending party 21 days to withdraw offending pleading and
thereby avoid sanctions, motion served after complaint has been dismissed defeats purpose of rule, and therefore, party
cannot wait until after summary judgment to move for sanctions under Rule 11. Barber v Miller (1998, CA9 Cal) 146
F3d 707, 98 CDOS 4489, 98 Daily Journal DAR 6192, 47 USPQ2d 1055, 40 FR Serv 3d 1245 (criticized in Fink v
Gomez (1999, CD Cal) 39 F Supp 2d 1225).
There is no jurisdictional time limit for filing Rule 11 motion for attorney's fees in civil rights action, and, in absence
of local rule establishing time limit, such claim would be untimely only if there was showing by party against whom
motion was filed that timing of motion caused prejudice or unfair surprise; further, since Rule 11 motions are collateral
to action, they are not barred if filed after dismissal order or after entry of judgment, although such sanctions will
normally be determined at end of litigation. Baker v Alderman (1998, CA11 Fla) 158 F3d 516, 41 FR Serv 3d 1484.
Requests for sanctions must be made by separate motion rather than as additional prayer for relief, and motion for
sanctions must not be filed with court for 21 days to allow opposing party time to withdraw or correct
misrepresentation, and request for sanctions which does not comply with revised Rule 11 is improper and must be
denied. In re VMS Sec. Litig. (1994, ND Ill) 156 FRD 635, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98444, 30 FR Serv 3d 1092.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Party may not wait until judgment is entered against opposing party and then file its FRCP 11 motion for sanctions.
Pendleton v Central N.M. Correctional Facility (1999, DC NM) 184 FRD 637, 44 FR Serv 3d 1255.
Whatever source of claimed sanctions may be (whether FRCP 11, 28 USCS § 1927, or inherent powers of
judiciary), motion for sanctions should be filed as soon as practicable after discovery of sanctionable violation.
Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v Glaverbel, S.A. (2000, ND Ill) 194 FRD 633.
Where town filed motion for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions one day after motion was served on plaintiff, court denied
motion for sanctions since bank had deprived plaintiff of 21-day safe-harbor found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
Puccio v Town of Oyster Bay (2002, ED NY) 229 F Supp 2d 173.
Defendants' motion for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions failed for procedural reasons because there was no evidence that
defendants served plaintiff with their motion for sanctions 21 days before filing it. McCormick v City of Lawrence
(2003, DC Kan) 218 FRD 687.
Motion for Rule 11 sanctions must be denied for failure to comply with 21-day rule, where motion was filed after
trial had concluded, thereby denying plaintiffs reasonable opportunity to correct their complaint, and where plaintiffs'
counsel was served with sanctions motion on the same day it was filed or before filing. Tomkins v Cyr (2000, CA5
Tex) 202 F3d 770.
285. --Particular applications
Timeliness of Rule 11 motion rests within judge's discretion, and since defendants filed within 30 days of entry of
judgment, which was time required to request attorneys fees, court below did not abuse its discretion in considering
motion. Community Electric Service, Inc. v National Electrical Contractors Ass'n (1989, CA9 Cal) 869 F2d 1235, 131
BNA LRRM 2408, 111 CCH LC P 11110, 1989-1 CCH Trade Cases P 68475, 13 FR Serv 3d 743, cert den (1989) 493
US 891, 107 L Ed 2d 187, 110 S Ct 236 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by Townsend v Holman Consulting Corp.
(1990, CA9 Cal) 914 F2d 1136, 91 Daily Journal DAR 4058, 17 FR Serv 3d 801) and (ovrld in part on other grounds by
Townsend v Holman Consulting Corp. (1991, CA9 Cal) 929 F2d 1358).
Where defendant's attorney filed motion for sanctions without having previously served motion on plaintiff, thereby
failing to comply with 21-day "safe harbor" period mandated by revised Rule 11, magistrate judge abused his discretion
in awarding sanctions; further, by waiting until after entry of summary judgment to file motion, plaintiff forfeited any
opportunity to receive Rule 11 sanctions, since motion must be filed at least 21 days before entry of final judgment to
allow sufficient opportunity for opposing party to withdraw or cure offensive material before court disposes of
challenged contention. Ridder v City of Springfield (1997, CA6 Ohio) 109 F3d 288, 36 FR Serv 3d 1288, 1997 FED App
94P, cert den (1998) 522 US 1046, 139 L Ed 2d 634, 118 S Ct 687 and (criticized in Powell v Squire, Sanders &
Dempsey (1999, CA6 Ohio) 1999 US App LEXIS 16854).
Rule 11's cure provision prevents defendant from seeking sanctions where defendant waited until after plaintiff had
moved to dismiss its claims against him before defendant filed motion for sanctions. Aerotech, Inc. v Estes (1997, CA10
Colo) 110 F3d 1523, 37 FR Serv 3d 867.
In keeping with "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11, motions for sanctions must be filed before conclusion of case so
that allegedly offending party will have opportunity to withdraw frivolous claim prior to imposition of sanctions;
consequently, defendant's motion for sanctions which was filed after jury verdict was returned was properly dismissed
as untimely, regardless of degree of frivolity of plaintiffs' claim. Morganroth & Morganroth v DeLorean (1997, CA6
Mich) 123 F3d 374, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9408, 48 Fed Rules Evid Serv 121, 38 FR Serv 3d 348, 1997 FED
App 241P, cert den (1998) 523 US 1094, 140 L Ed 2d 793, 118 S Ct 1561.
Where defendant waited for fourteen months after summary judgment award in its favor was affirmed to initially
move for Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney, defendant failed in its obligation to notify its opponent and court
of its intention to pursue sanctions at earliest possible date, and such delay was inexcusable and deprived sanctions of
their value as educational tool. Hunter v Earthgrains Co. Bakery (2002, CA4 NC) 281 F3d 144, 87 BNA FEP Cas 1788.
Motion for sanctions for filing groundless removal are denied as untimely where motion was filed one year after
removal and almost 8 months after case was remanded. Connecticut v Insurance Co. of America (1988, DC Conn) 121
FRD 159.
Where no set time limit for filing motion for sanctions has been adopted by circuit, such motion will not be denied as
untimely when filed nearly 90 days after action was dismissed on merits. Lind-Waldock & Co. v Caan (1988, ND Ill)
121 FRD 337.
Motion for sanctions filed within 90 days of judge's written entry dismissing complaint was timely filed. Cedar
Crest Health Center, Inc. v Bowen (1989, SD Ind) 129 FRD 519, 16 FR Serv 3d 1242.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
Motion for FRCP 11 sanctions filed three months after summary judgment was awarded to employer was reasonably
timely, since plaintiff did not claim to be prejudiced by delay in filing motion and motion did not unduly interfere with
court in disposing of case. Williams v Edsal Mfg. Co. (1990, ND Ill) 1990 US Dist LEXIS 7670.
Where filing of Rule 11 motion prior to court's entry of final judgment would have been futile, and where plaintiff
filed no notice of appeal, motion for sanctions filed less than 30 days after entry of final judgment was not time-barred.
Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v Frost (1992, ED Pa) 143 FRD 77, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8176, 24 FR Serv 3d
489, affd without op (1993, CA3 Pa) 998 F2d 1004.
Motion for sanctions filed after motion to dismiss was granted was untimely. Young v West Coast Indus. Relations
Ass'n (1992, DC Del) 144 FRD 206.
Motion seeking sanctions under Rule 11 which was filed in district court after summary judgment was granted and
affirmed on appeal and mandate was issued was not filed within reasonable time and is therefore denied as untimely.
Forcucci v United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. (1994, DC Mass) 153 FRD 484.
Defendant trust counsel's FRCP 11 motion for sanctions was timely, even though it came 14 days after dismissal of
plaintiff trust beneficiary's complaint, where counsel complied with "safe harbor" provision by serving plaintiff's
counsel with copy of proposed motion almost 4 months prior, because there is no language in new version of FRCP 11
which requires that motion be filed before entry of judgment. Powell v Squire, Sanders & Dempsey (1998, SD Ohio)
990 F Supp 541, 40 FR Serv 3d 672, vacated on other grounds (1999, CA6 Ohio) 1999 US App LEXIS 16854.
Defendants are denied sanctions under FRCP 11(c), even though they point to warning letters sent to plaintiffs'
counsel, where plaintiffs were not served with formal motion, but with notices of intent after case had already been
dismissed, because language and intent of Rule 11 preclude party from bringing motion for sanctions after offending
party has voluntarily dismissed suit. VanDanacker v Main Motor Sales Co. (2000, DC Minn) 109 F Supp 2d 1045.
In action in which employee filed suit against his former employer alleging breach of contract and discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USCS § 2000e et seq., to extent that employee
sought sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, court overruled his request because he did not wait 21 days after service of
request for sanctions before filing motion with court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Zhou v Pittsburg State Univ. (2003,
DC Kan) 252 F Supp 2d 1194.
Sanctions are to be assessed against female attorney for including certain individuals and other entities as defendants
in pregnancy discrimination suit, even though more than a year passed between filing of parties' joint stipulation
dismissing those defendants and filing of motion to award sanctions, because delay should not be barrier to award of
FRCP 11 sanctions since often non-movant's illegitimate objectives may be understood only after period of time spent
acquiring additional facts. Sussman v Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A. (1993, MD Fla) 818 F Supp 1510, 65 CCH EPD P
43361, 26 FR Serv 3d 1054, 7 FLW Fed D 162, corrected (1993, MD Fla) 7 FLW Fed D 196 and reh den (1993, MD
Fla) 150 FRD 209, 7 FLW Fed D 304.
286. Discovery
Although appellant asks, as alternative to its attorneys' fee request, that court remand for discovery related to its fee
claims under Rule 11 and 28 USCS § 1927, in order to garner evidence of appellee's motivation in filing claim, further
discovery would be contrary to policy urged in Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 and would be inappropriate in
view of determination by District Court, which closely followed case at both trial and appellate levels, that appellee did
not have improper purpose. Indianapolis Colts v Baltimore (1985, CA7 Ind) 775 F2d 177, 3 FR Serv 3d 51.
Court denies civil rights plaintiff's argument that summary judgment is inappropriate because discovery is
incomplete, where Rule 56(f) affidavit is appropriate means by which to avoid summary judgment if unable to present
specific facts opposing summary judgment motion, but plaintiff refuses to file specific discovery plan and plaintiff's
attorney's affidavit here states only bare assertions without showing how or why additional time will permit rebuttal of
movant's assertions, because either (1) plaintiff's Rule 11 affidavit claiming that he interviewed several judges and
investigated factual basis for case is misleading, or (2) plaintiff's Rule 56(f) plea for more discovery lacks candor.
Bryant v O'Connor (1986, DC Kan) 671 F Supp 1279, 51 BNA FEP Cas 181, affd (1988, CA10 Kan) 848 F2d 1064, 51
BNA FEP Cas 187.
Discovery will proceed on conspiracy and concerted scheme allegations in global class action, and court orders
special master to monitor discovery, where court is concerned about certifying broad class of 2,920 investors in 40
partnerships which allegedly were to profit from new "enhanced oil recovery" technologies, because either (1) plaintiff
investors may push ahead with conspiracy/concerted scheme allegations under threat of paying defendants' attorney's
fees, costs, and expenses should master report "fishing expedition" as opposed to legitimate effort to flesh out details of
unified scheme, or (2) plaintiff investors may dismiss conspiracy/concerted scheme allegations within 21 days in order
to avoid potential Rule 11 sanctions and court will then revise class certification order accordingly. Roberts v Heim
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
(1987, ND Cal) 670 F Supp 1466, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93291, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds (1988,
CA9 Cal) 857 F2d 646, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 94028, 12 FR Serv 3d 810, cert den (1989) 493 US 1002, 107 L Ed 2d
556, 110 S Ct 561.
287. Hearing and argument (pre-1993 amendment cases)
Although hearing would be required if sanctions imposed on attorney were based on bad faith, no hearing is required
where sanctions are based on counsel's incompetent handling of matter by making frivolous and worthless claims
without first making proper inquiry into relevant law and facts. Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. (1985, CA7 Ill)
771 F2d 194, 2 FR Serv 3d 1414 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Parmelee v True (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US
Dist LEXIS 17314) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Marliere v Village of Woodridge (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US
Dist LEXIS 4379).
Evidentiary hearing is not required before imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, although due process requires
notice and opportunity to be heard. Oliveri v Thompson (1986, CA2 NY) 803 F2d 1265, 5 FR Serv 3d 761, cert den
(1987) 480 US 918, 94 L Ed 2d 689, 107 S Ct 1373 and (criticized in Murphy v Commissioner (1995) TC Memo
1995-76, RIA TC Memo P 95076, 69 CCH TCM 1916, 95 TNT 33-15) and (criticized in Matthews v Commissioner
(1995) TC Memo 1995-577, RIA TC Memo P 95577, 70 CCH TCM 1496, 95 TNT 236-21).
Imposition of sanction of $ 5,000 against law firm without affording firm prior notice and meaningful opportunity to
be heard violates due process, and subsequent hearing was also insufficient to provide due process. Tom Growney
Equip. v Shelley Irrigation Dev. (1987, CA9 Ariz) 834 F2d 833, 10 FR Serv 3d 215.
Imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 does not require evidentiary hearing. International Shipping Co., S.A. v
Hydra Offshore, Inc. (1989, CA2 NY) 875 F2d 388, 1989 AMC 1701, 13 FR Serv 3d 1134, cert den (1989) 493 US
1003, 107 L Ed 2d 558, 110 S Ct 563.
Where plaintiff's brief and support of its motion for summary judgment contained requests for attorney's fees,
defendant had fair warning that District Court was under obligation to impose sanctions if court found them warranted,
and due process does not require District Court to conduct additional hearing on issue of sanctions when sanctions are
based on counsel's incompetence in handling matter, rather than finding of bad faith, and when record is adequate to
determine whether sanctions were necessary. Teamsters Local No. 579 v B & M Transit, Inc. (1989, CA7 Wis) 882
F2d 274, 132 BNA LRRM 2255, 112 CCH LC P 11422, 14 FR Serv 3d 803.
District Court need not hold hearing before imposing sanctions so that attorney can present evidence regarding his
good faith since whether attorney acted in good faith is not material if his conduct was objectively unreasonable, and
where sanctionable conduct occurred in presence of court, there are no issues that hearing could illuminate, and thus
hearing would be pointless. Kapco Mfg. Co. v C & O Enters. (1989, CA7 Ill) 886 F2d 1485, 14 FR Serv 3d 1332.
Although District Court must afford defendant's attorneys procedural protections before levying sanctions under Rule
11, where plaintiff notified defendant's attorneys both orally and in writing that she was requesting additional damages,
and attorneys addressed this issue in briefs to District Court, fact that attorneys did not have opportunity to respond
orally did not constitute deprivation of due process since parties were given full opportunity to respond in writing.
Hudson v Moore Business Forms, Inc. (1990, CA9 Cal) 898 F2d 684, 52 BNA FEP Cas 479, 52 CCH EPD P 39704, 16
FR Serv 3d 205.
District Court had jurisdiction over defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanction filed 6 weeks after voluntary dismissal
with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2), even though defendants failed to notify plaintiffs or court before dismissal of intent
to file motion, and due process does not require evidentiary hearing before sanctions are imposed. In re Kunstler
(1990, CA4 NC) 914 F2d 505, 17 FR Serv 3d 1215, reh den, en banc, motion den, in part, motion gr, in part (1990,
CA4) 1990 US App LEXIS 22983 and cert den (1991) 499 US 969, 113 L Ed 2d 669, 111 S Ct 1607.
District Court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions without hearing where sanction consisted of fine in
addition to attorney fees, no motion for sanctions had been filed beforehand to give attorney notice and opportunity to
present any relevant information, and attorney was not even present in court when sanction was imposed. Media
Duplication Services, Ltd. v HDG Software, Inc. (1991, CA1 Mass) 928 F2d 1228, 19 FR Serv 3d 20 (criticized in
Satcorp Int'l Group v China Nat'l Silk Import & Export Corp. (1996, CA2 NY) 101 F3d 3, 36 FR Serv 3d 463).
There is no requirement that evidentiary hearing be held prior to imposition of sanctions, absent disputed facts or
issues of credibility. Chemiakin v Yefimov (1991, CA2 NY) 932 F2d 124, 19 FR Serv 3d 937.
In determining whether Rule 11 has been violated, need for full evidentiary hearing depends upon seriousness of
alleged violation and probative value of further personal testimony. Eisenberg v University of New Mexico (1991,
CA10 NM) 936 F2d 1131, 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 330, 20 FR Serv 3d 99.
District Court should not have decided motion for sanctions against plaintiff and his attorney simultaneously with
merits without allowing any reargument where critical question was plaintiff's credibility and where sanctions motion
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
placed in question attorney's right to rely on his client's representation and client's right to rely on his lawyer's advice.
Healey v Chelsea Resources, Ltd. (1991, CA2 NY) 947 F2d 611, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96289, 21 FR Serv 3d 139.
Procedure followed by court in imposing sanctions under Rule 11 must comply with requirements of due process,
and where court issued notice stating that it would consider whether sanctions should be imposed under Rule 11 and
held hearing regarding documents in question, due process was satisfied. American Airlines, Inc. v Allied Pilots Ass'n
(1992, CA5 Tex) 968 F2d 523, 23 FR Serv 3d 847, reh, en banc, den (1992, CA5 Tex) 977 F2d 576.
Under facts of case, district court abused its discretion in not holding hearing to determine whether Rule 11 sanctions
were appropriate where pro se defendant requested hearing and relevant facts were in dispute. Didie v Howes (1993,
CA11 Fla) 988 F2d 1097, 25 FR Serv 3d 1057, 7 FLW Fed C 243.
Where defendant's attorneys did not respond to plaintiff's motion for sanctions, district court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to hold evidentiary hearing that had not been requested. International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v SGS
Control Servs. (1994, CA2 NY) 38 F3d 1279, 1995 AMC 944, 30 FR Serv 3d 492, cert den (1995) 515 US 1122, 132 L
Ed 2d 280, 115 S Ct 2276 and (criticized in United States v Jackson (2000, CA7 Ill) 2000 US App LEXIS 4498).
Where plaintiff failed to respond to defendants' motion for sanctions which alleged that complaint was frivolous,
district court properly imposed sanctions since local rule provided that by his failure to respond, plaintiff had conceded
that he had violated Rule 11, and plaintiff cannot argue merits of his Rule 11 defense on appeal. Geller v Randi (1994,
App DC) 309 US App DC 269, 40 F3d 1300, 23 Media L R 1401, 30 FR Serv 3d 1304.
Court may impose sanction under Rule 11 without hearing and without inquiring into lawyer's state of mind,
particularly where court can determine from face of pleading itself that it was not based on plausible view of law.
Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. (1984, ND Ill) 596 F Supp 13, 40 FR Serv 2d 703, affd (1985, CA7 Ill) 771 F2d
194, 2 FR Serv 3d 1414 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in Parmelee v True (1995, ND Ill) 1995 US Dist LEXIS
17314) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Marliere v Village of Woodridge (1997, ND Ill) 1997 US Dist LEXIS
4379).
Because it was unreasonable to read complaint as setting forth claim under statute cited, since it was obvious from
language of complaint that another statute was intended, defendant's motion to dismiss on ground of inapplicability of
statute cited to facts alleged will be deemed to have been imposed for improper purpose in violation of Rule 11, and
court will call for memoranda from defense counsel, detailing any justification or mitigating factors for their conduct,
and from plaintiffs' counsel, detailing damage inflicted by counsel's frivolous argument, in order to impose appropriate
sanction on defendants' counsel. Miller v Affiliated Fin. Corp. (1984, ND Ill) 600 F Supp 987, 40 FR Serv 2d 563
(criticized in NOW v Scheidler (1995, ND Ill) 897 F Supp 1047, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8892).
Notice and hearing are not required before sanctions may be imposed since rule itself gives attorneys notice of their
obligations and possibility of sanctions and since scope of sanction proceedings is limited to record. Rowland v Fayed
(1987, DC Dist Col) 115 FRD 605.
Due process does not require evidentiary hearing before court can decide to impose sanction, and fee request that
proves unreasonably excessive does not trigger complete denial of request. Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co.
(1989, ND Ill) 127 FRD 135.
Where during course of proceedings plaintiffs were given adequate notice that court was considering imposition of
penalties, due process did not require additional hearing before sanctions were imposed. R.W. Int'l Corp. v Welch
Foods (1990, DC Puerto Rico) 133 FRD 8, revd on other grounds, remanded (1991, CA1 Puerto Rico) 937 F2d 11, 19
FR Serv 3d 1353, summary judgment gr, dismd, on remand (1993, DC Puerto Rico) 1993-2 CCH Trade Cases P 70433,
affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, remanded, in part (1994, CA1 Puerto Rico) 13 F3d 478, 1994-1 CCH
Trade Cases P 70488, subsequent app (1996, CA1 Puerto Rico) 88 F3d 49.
Where defendant requested that attorney's fees be assessed as sanctions under Rule 11 against plaintiff, whose
allegations were found to either fail to state cause of action, or to be wholly without merit, further argument and
supplemental briefs were required since defendant argued only that some of plaintiff's claims were frivolous when filed
and others should not have been pursued when it became clear that they lacked merit, but defendant failed to
particularize its arguments as to each claim made. Krushinski v Roadway Express, Inc. (1985, MD Pa) 110 FRD 11.
288. Hearing and argument (post-1993 amendment cases)
Although due process generally requires notice and opportunity to respond before Rule 11 sanctions are imposed,
since plaintiff had history of bad faith litigiousness and deceit and had previously been enjoined from filing further suits
not in compliance with Rule 11, plaintiff knew consequences that would result from filing additional actions in bad
faith, and therefore district court properly dismissed case and imposed sanctions without providing hearing. Attwood v
Singletary (1997, CA11 Fla) 105 F3d 610, 37 FR Serv 3d 257, 10 FLW Fed C 699.
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USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11
District court did not violate due process by imposing sanctions without full evidentiary hearing where sanctioned
parties were notified well in advance that opposing party would be seeking sanctions against them individually and
against their attorneys, and sanctioned parties filed written response to request for sanctions, which constituted
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Union Planters Bank v L & J Dev. Co. (1997, CA6 Tenn) 115 F3d 378, 1997 FED
App 169P, reh den (1997, CA6) 1997 US App LEXIS 19259.
"Safe harbor" provision does not apply when court awards sanctions on its own initiative; rather, sua sponte award of
sanctions requires issuance of show cause order with reasonable opportunity to respond. Laurino v Tate (2000, CA10
Kan) 220 F3d 1213, 2000 Colo J C A R 4682.
Court's failure to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard is grounds for reversal of order imposing
sanctions. Ping He (Hai Nam) Co. v Nonferrous Metals (U.S.A.) Inc. (1999, SD NY) 187 FRD 121.
289. Burden of proof
Burden of proof of violation of Rule 11 falls on defendants, and where they failed to prove that manufacture did not
have legitimate claim when he filed his complaint, defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions for filing frivolous
complaint will be denied. Rich Art Sign Co. v Ring (1988, ED Pa) 122 FRD 472, 13 FR Serv 3d 420, affd without op
(1989, CA3 Pa) 875 F2d 311 and affd without op (1989, CA3 Pa) 875 F2d 311.
In general, burden of proof is on party seeking sanction. Phinney v Paulshock (1998, DC NH) 181 FRD 185, 42 FR
Serv 3d 244, affd (1999, CA1 NH) 199 F3d 1.
Client's motion for sanctions, which was based on attorney's alleged failure to provide client with client's answers to
discovery requests, was denied where it was determined that nothing in client's reply supported motion for sanctions.
Hinton v Stein (2003, DC Dist Col) 278 F Supp 2d 27.
290. Findings and conclusions (pre-1993 amendment cases)
In determining whether a plaintiff has violated Rule 11, where defendant argued that plaintiff has violated Rule in
several different ways, each of defendants' claims must be specifically and separately analyzed by District Court, and
failure of court to do so makes remand necessary. Fred A. Smith Lumber Co. v Edidin (1988, CA7 Ill) 845 F2d 750, 11
FR Serv 3d 155.
Although District Court is not routinely required to make findings and conclusions in Rule 11 cases, record must
reflect some reason for court's denial of requested Rule 11 sanctions when face of record appears to warrant rule's
application. Corpus Christi Taxpayer's Asso. v Corpus Christi (1988, CA5 Tex) 858 F2d 973, 11 FR Serv 3d 1394, cert
dismd (1989) 490 US 1032, 104 L Ed 2d 400, 109 S Ct 1928 and cert den (1989) 490 US 1065, 104 L Ed 2d 629, 109 S
Ct 2064.
In imposing sanctions on defense counsel, District Court need not make detailed factual findings and legal
conclusions on every item of evidence presented to it. EEOC v Milavetz & Associates, P.A. (1988, CA8 Minn) 863 F2d
613, 48 BNA FEP Cas 1143, 48 CCH EPD P 38524.
District Court need not make explicit findings to support Rule 11 award of sanctions. Lloyd v Schlag (1989, CA9
Hawaii) 884 F2d 409, 11 USPQ2d 1623, 14 FR Serv 3d 476.
Where circumstances and record do not clearly reflect reasons for District Court's disposition of Rule 11 motion,
case will be remanded with instructions that District Court make findings of fact concerning frivolousness of
nonmovant's action. Miltier v Beorn (1990, CA4 Va) 896 F2d 848, 15 FR Serv 3d 1248.
District Court's warning to plaintiffs' counsel that he had followed "dangerous path along the outer limits of Rule 11"
was inadequate disposition of defendant's Rule 11 motion since it was unclear whether court had even found violation
of rule; and although District Court need not make findings and give explanations every time party seeks sanctions
under Rule 11, when reason for decision is not apparent from record, some such statement is required. Figueroa-Ruiz v
Alegria (1990, CA1 Puerto Rico) 905 F2d 545, 16 FR Serv 3d 1146.
Although District Court failed to specify for which papers it was imposing sanctions, since court held plaintiffs
responsible for all of defendant's expenses and attorney fees, it apparently concluded that all of plaintiffs' actions were
tainted by their failure to make reasonable inquiry or to