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1
Iran nuclear deal negotiated last night, but Congress will still try to push sanctions – political
capital is key to overcome their efforts
Dennis 11/24 [Steven, Roll Call, “Obama Faces Skeptical Congress as Iran Nuclear Deal Reached (Updated),”
11/24/2013, http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/obama-announces-iran-nuclear-deal/]
President Barack Obama
has a sales job to do with Congress after he announced an interim deal Saturday night that
will halt Iran’s nuclear program — although not dismantle it — in return for a partial rollback of sanctions .¶ Obama said in a
statement from the White House that the agreement would “cut off Iran’s most likely paths to a bomb” and said Iran must work
toward a comprehensive solution over the next six months or the full sanctions would resume.¶ “The burden is on Iran that its nuclear program will be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes,” Obama said.¶ He
urged Congress to hold back on plans for a new round of sanctions, which
lawmakers in both chambers have been pushing and could receive a vote after Thanksgiving .¶ “We will comtinue
to work closely with Congress,” he said. “However, now is not the time to move forward on new sanctions, because
doing so would derail this promising first step, alienate us from our allies and risk unraveling the coalition that enabled our sanctions to be
enforced in the first place.Ӧ Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking from Geneva, said that while the deal is a serious first step, it is not a triumphal
moment and there is much work yet to do . But he said that he expects to be able to convince Congress to give the
administration’s strategy a chance to work.¶ “ I have great confidence in my colleagues in the Congress ,” he said.
Anything positive action toward Cuba links
Ayuso and Risco, 13 – are writers for the Havana Times (Silvia and Isaac, “Cuba/USA to Resume Immigration
Talks”, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94992)
The remark mirrors one made earlier this week, when the
U.S. State Department confirmed that a new 2-day bilateral meeting would
be held in Washington to explore the possibility to re-establishing direct correspondence channels between Cuba and the United
States, eliminated over fifty years ago.¶ The fact of the matter is that any gesture towards Cuba that Washington essays is often
vehemently condemned by a sizable group of legislators who are opposed to any kind of rapprochement with the
island.¶ Ileana Ros-Lehtinen¶ Cuban-born Republican Congresswoman for Florida Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who condemned this last meeting
before it was even held, is one case in point.¶ “The regime is once again manipulating the US administration in this game because
they want us to lift the blockade and make further concessions,” the legislator stated.
Global nuclear war in a month if talks fail – US sanctions will wreck diplomacy
Press TV 11/13 “Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail”,
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/
A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail
to reach a nuclear deal with Iran , an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried
there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran
before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the
importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find
itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation
and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a
global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the
forward and implemented, then
United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons ,” he warned. ¶The warning came one day after
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the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran
could lead to war .¶White House press secretary Jay Carney called on Congress to allow more time for diplomacy as US
lawmakers are considering tougher sanctions. ¶ "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to
this issue," Carney said. "The American people do not want a march to war." ¶ Meanwhile, US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to meet with the Senate
Banking Committee on Wednesday to hold off on more sanctions on the Iranian economy. ¶ State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Kerry "will be clear
that putting
new sanctions in place would be a mistake."¶ "While we are still determining if there is a diplomatic path
forward, what we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause in sanctions. We are not taking away sanctions. We are not
rolling them back," Psaki added.
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2
Interpretation – “Engagement” requires increasing economic contacts in trade or financial
transactions --- that excludes sanctions
Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining
Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco
Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of
post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastnerdefine engagement as the attempt to integrate a
target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions." (n21) However,
limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that
were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic , military and cultural arenas.
Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and
the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential
effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.¶ Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively
evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives.Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security
implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the
effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to
acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals
involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.¶ A
REFINED DEFINITION OF
ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that
we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the
comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e.
diplomatic , military , economic , cultural ). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts
might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic
relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and
other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and viceversa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and viceversa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and
security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶
Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural
treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated
process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations"
characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige
and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or
foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For
instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can
achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by
manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting
preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three
necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender
and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent
relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan
in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement
derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be.
For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the
near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential
source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions
of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This
reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It
considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged,
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explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any
given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive
sanctions .
Violation—visas aren’t exclusively economic—extra topicality is an unpredictable research
burden for the negative
Rosenblum, 2008 - The Regional Migration Study Group [Marc R U.S.–Mexican Migration Cooperation: Obstacles
and Opportunities . www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/pubs/.../rosenblum.pdf 1/18/2008
Migration policy also differs from other issues on the bilateral agenda because of the high degree of interdependence within the U.S.–
Mexican migration system. U.S. efforts to regulate migration flows are inherently vulnerable to changing conditions within Mexico—for example, when changing Mexican economic
conditions affect emigration pressures. And the migration relationship is structurally bound by a shared border and 500-year-old social and cultural networks, meaning that in
contrast with other bilateral policy issues such as trade or investment , the United States has limited ability to opt
out of bilateral migration relations by shifting its focus to other partners. As a result, migration relations are quintessentially characterized by
complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977; Manning 1977), rather than by the asymmetric bargaining dynamics characterizing other dimensions of the bilateral relationship. In
migration is multidimensional in its substantive
implications, sitting at the nexus of security, economic, and cultural policy, and potentially responsible for large-scale demographic
addition to interdependence, migration relations are characterized by multidimensionality. On one hand,
changes. On the other hand, migration is also multidimensional in its policy implementation.
Limits – their definition of engagement opens the floodgates for all affs that unilaterally act –
destroys indepth education and clash
Ground – they will spike out of our disads that have engagement links – destroys predictability
and fairness
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3
Text: The National Science and Technology Council should reestablish a committee on
international science and engineering to coordinate the activities of the Department of State,
the United States Agency for International Development and prepare a composite budget
including all non-classified science, engineering and technology activities sponsored by the
United States in foreign countries.
The counterplan solves for international S&E efforts.
Strauss et al 08 (Jon Strauss is the interim dean of engineering at Texas Tech University, chairman of the National Science Board Task Force,
February 2008, International Science and Engineering Partnerships: A Priority for U.S. Foreign Policy and Our Nation’s Innovation Enterprise,
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2008/nsb084/nsb084_3.pdf)
No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S. agencies
that do S&E work have explicit missions in international relations.31 Fewer still are committed to assisting developing countries. Thus, responsibility falls to
individual agencies to establish their own international S&E research priorities and policies. These
agencies, however, have varying latitude in
how they fund international institutions and partnerships between U.S. and non- U.S. researchers. In particular, some
U.S. Federal agencies are unable to supplement international researchers and institutions from developing
countries, where even very modest funding could make a tremendous difference, or to build creative mechanisms
to support international S&E partnership programs. Fortunately, some inter-agency coordination is accomplished through information
exchanges through various roundtables and panels; however, more needs to be done. For example, the National Academies could organize an annual
conference to make on-going international efforts more transparent and better aligned, and to cooperatively work out duplicative efforts.32 Among Federal
leadership bodies, the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), a cabinet-level council to coordinate S&T policy across the Federal
reestablish an inter-agency committee on
international S&E in order to develop a coherent, integrated, national S&E strategy. This committee must strengthen government
S&E missions and advance national economic, security, and sustainability goals. This committee should also prepare a composite budget
including all non-classified science, engineering, and technology activities sponsored by the U.S. Government in
foreign countries. Budget development would help to coordinate and focus international S&E efforts supported
by the U.S. Government. To ensure that policymakers consider both policy concerns and scientific excellence, it is important to ensure active
participation by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Department of State, and USAID. Recommended Action: The National
Science and Technology Council should reestablish a committee on international S&E to coordinate the activities
of the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and various Federal mission agencies
and to develop a coherent, integrated, national S&E strategy. With guidance from the Department of State, this committee should
work with peer governments to establish coordinated programs across international boundaries.
R&D enterprise, has the most critical role regarding international S&E cooperation. NSTC should
S&E partnerships solve science diplomacy.
Strauss et al 08 (Jon Strauss is the interim dean of engineering at Texas Tech University, chairman of the National Science Board Task Force, February
2008, International Science and Engineering Partnerships: A Priority for U.S. Foreign Policy and Our Nation’s Innovation Enterprise,
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2008/nsb084/nsb084_3.pdf)
As previously discussed, there
are tremendous possible benefits for the U.S. if it invests in international S&E
partnerships. In this day and age, however, simply partnering with other individuals, organizations, and agencies is not sufficient. There must be a
proactive effort on the part of the U.S. Government to utilize these international S&E partnerships as tools to
strengthen diplomacy and capacity building around the world. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have used the term
“transformational diplomacy” to describe their vision for the U.S. to use its diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their lives, build their nations, and
transform their futures. Secretary Rice defined the objective of “transformational diplomacy” as “work[ing] with our many partners around the world to build
and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people – and conduct themselves responsibly in the international
system.”20 International
S&E partnerships are essential to advancing “transformational diplomacy,” because they
can lay the groundwork for achieving the goals cited in this definition by creating apolitical connections among
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people to build trust and communication. This will then facilitate future diplomatic endeavors. International S&E
partnerships should therefore be a high priority of the U.S. Government.
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4
Be skeptical of their scientific evidence – The privileging of science is corrupted by social,
political, and economic imperatives that complicate its claims to truth – It is elitist
Cambell 9 (Nancy, Fronteirs: A journal of womens studies, vol 30, 2009, p. 1-29, Muse, da: 6-23-2011, lido)
Embracing partisanship and struggle as they do, reconstructivists have taken to heart various critiques of
objectivity, among which feminists figure prominently. Quoting Harding’s Science and Social Inequality (2006), Woodhouse and
Sarewitz get the point that privilege is both a material advantage and an epistemological disadvantage: that “those advantaged by
the status quo tend to operate in a state of denial about the maldistribution of costs and benefits of
technoscience.”24 Taking “science-policy influentials” to task for failing to mention inequality except in toothless and conventional
ways, Woodhouse and Sarewitz call for greater recognition of social conflict in the tussle over who gets what, when, and how that is
science and technology policy and politics. They share with feminists the intention to “move equity considerations higher on science-policy
agendas.” They share the suspicion that the social organization of technoscience exacerbates social inequality and
consistently rewards the already affluent, while hurting the persistently poor. They call for refocusing R&D on “poor
people’s problems” yet do not call upon feminist scholarship to explain precisely how welfare states and labor markets are structured to
reproduce gendered and racialized poverty.25 How can it be that well intentioned and well informed scholars seeking to
refocus technoscientific R&D on the needs of the poor, broaden participation in research priority-setting, and reorient
technoscientific innovation toward the creation of public goods miss the feminist point that addressing inequity requires
attending to how gender and power relations structure the world? How can those who set out to “level the playing field
among diverse social interests so that all are represented fairly” miss the point that forms of “fairness”
inattentive to power differentials lead to unfair processes and outcomes?26 The reconstructivist agenda is too
important to be dismissed by feminists as not “getting it,” and thus it seems important to understand how reconstructivists propose to
reshape inquiry by encouraging scholars to adopt projects that incorporate “normative, activist, or reconstructive intentions” into their
research.27 Feminist activists and scholars have much to contribute to the analysis of phenomena on which
reconstructivists work: trade liberalization, nanotechnology, stem cell research, climate change, agricultural biotechnology, oil and
coal dependency, water rights, hunger, global health equity, environmental justice, and myriad other substantive arenas.
Reconstructivists attempt to “counteract the skewing of technoscientific negotiations” toward those whose
disproportionately greater access to financial resources and expertise grant them control over research
agendas and an infrastructure within which to pursue questions relevant to the social groups from which they
come. Skewed so that profits from technoscientific investment accrue largely to participants in the corporate sectors of the economy
while shifting costs to overburdened populations who have little or no voice in decisionmaking processes, these negotiations and
maldistributions nevertheless negatively affect upper- and middle-class people as well.28 Links between those who bear the
costs and those who reap the benefits of R&D are broken by its corporate structure, state failure to provide
any but the most technocratic regulatory oversight, institutional capture of governance by corporate interests,
and many other asymmetries of information and influence that add up to socially irresponsible R&D. While the
reconstructivists know all this, they don’t always spell it out with enough detail and nuance as they would if they had started from a
grounding in feminist standpoint epistemology.
Elitism causes extinction
Epler 7 (Christopher, blogger, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=103x312764, dw: 10-7-2007, da: 6-282011, lido)
The time has come to seriously examine the biological consequences of rampant immorality. If an alien life
form was observing human civilization (and perhaps they are!), probably they would classify "disease" not only biologically, but socially.
This would make sense if disease was defined as a "force of nature" which had the potential to lead to civilization death, if not species extinction. With
such a definition in mind, elitist greed could certainly be the number one candidate for the death of human
civilization and/or the extinction of the human race. We really don't have good definitions for such dynamics
(even though we critically need them!), but clearly some variation of elitist greed could manifest in any "advanced" life form. A homey image is the choking
of a dynamic ecosystem such as a country pond when it is steadily taken over by moss. It is a sad thing to behold, since the moss gradually suffocates the
environment and a dead and stagnant pond is the result. The astrophysicist Carl Sagan used to worry about such things, fearing the discovery of atomic
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energy would be the inevitable beginning of the end of advanced civilizations in this or any other galaxy. He felt
the universe was teeming
with life, but that few if any of these civilizations could survive the combination of devastating atomic
weaponry with the raw stupidity of the life forms. The jury is still out on Sagan's speculations, but perhaps he didn't live long enough to
see that the limitless immoral greed of the planet’s elites is almost certainly far MORE dangerous than the morally neutral discovery of atomic energy.
Consider the facts (and please forgive the general outline as this is not the place for a properly worked out monograph). The
"elites" make up one
percent or less of the human population, and yet they absolutely dominate the entire planet. This ratio also
exists in America which a textbook example of a Dictatorship of the Rich. "Democracy" is a fairly tale on this
planet. We love to talk and dream about it and even write "Constitutions" to support it, but this is like getting so carried away by a brain-dead television
sitcom that you think it's actually happening. Well, the sitcom is NOT actually happening and neither is human Democracy. Many of you have probably had
the experience of being in a company or university in which much ado was made in the construction of a "Mission Statement", which meant ABSOLUTELY
NOTHING. It's construction made everyone feel wise and good, but its an empty paper game not even the walls pay any attention to. The same thing is true
for Democratic Constitutions. Utterly, utterly, meaningless documents (however well intentioned), because the Greek God like elites are the true brains,
sinus, and muscles of all major countries. Hence, if
you want to know where the buck stops that completely explains the
plummeting disintegration of human civilization and ballistic destruction of the human ecosystem, it is (of
course) grounded in the ultimate power and control centers of human civilization, i.e., the vampire elites. And
yes, the "vampire" elites, because they are literally draining the blood of our one and only planet, even though they
make up a tiny percentage of humankind. Another take on the elites is that they are incarnations of humanity
AT ITS WORST. Note that we're talking about the perennial have and have not distinction which has been the constant horror of human existence.
Much, much more could be said about all this, but the theory argued for in this piece is that human civilization and even human existence may well be
biologically doomed by our "evil deeds". In
short, morality isn't just a religious preoccupation ("heaven", etc.), but a species
survival necessity. Sagan's concerns also factor into this and the increasingly exploding human population, but
the core survival truth is "how we behave", and the exponential greed repercussions of the planet's multi
millionaire and multi billionaire elites are steadily pushing the human species into the eternal abyss of extinction.
The alternative is to reject the aff as resistance to scientific privilege – That creates a space to
rehumanize knowing and decenter scientific privilege
Smith 5 (Steven, University of San Diego, “Legal Scholarship as Resistance to ‘Science’” Pg. 5-7, 9-10 JF)
So here’s my thought. As academics today, we live in the imposing shadow of “science.” Science means many things, and
nearly all of us admire and appreciate some of those things. And some of science’s effects on legal scholarship are probably beneficial as
well. But I don’t think all of them are. On what might seem a trivial level, I think that not science, exactly, but what we might call the
“image of science” or perhaps the “scientific aura” has had an unfortunate influence on the way legal scholarship is
written. That is, I suspect that the tendency of law review editors to discourage personal or idiosyncratic styles in favor of a numbing standardization
reflects a sense that the more homogenized and impersonal prose is somehow more objective and scientific. And the editors’ intermittent insistence that
every sentence capable of being contradicted be burdened with a footnote mirrors the “scientific” understanding that propositions need to be supported
by evidence. We all know that these norms are enforced in erratic and sometimes silly ways: the editors who won’t let me assert my own naked opinion in
an article will usually be perfectly happy if I drop a footnote to an article in which a junior colleague expressed the same opinion, or even to an earlier article
in which I myself expressed the opinion. But the overall effect of this attempt to make legal scholarship look scientific is that the actual human interest
tends to get squeezed out. On a more substantive level, I believe that science (or the image of science) powerfully affects legal scholarship by sponsoring a
sort of worldview within which we live and write--usually without paying much attention to it. In simple terms, that worldview goes something
like this: the world is composed of particles and forces (which are studied by physicists), and these particles and forces
interact and combine in complicated ways (which are studied by physicists and chemists), and over time some of these
particles have combined to form complex systems that through processes of natural selection (which are studied
by biologists, among others) have evolved into amazingly complicated creatures– including, of central concern to
ourselves, us--with abilities to talk, think, plan, and produce all of the remarkable things you can see if you walk into a Barnes & Noble or
a Circuit City. There is no particular point to our being here: we weren’t “put on earth” (as I put it a moment ago) for
any “purpose.” Rather, our existence is (for us) a sort of happy, or sometimes unhappy, accident. Still, here we are,
constituted as we are with “interests”– things we happen to want– including an interest in survival. So the sensible thing is to devote
ourselves to surviving and to satisfying our interests as fully and efficiently as possible. And in this spirit legal scholars should do
what we can to contribute to that enterprise of satisfying human interests with maximum efficiency. I’m not
sure what to do about this situation, but my thought is that there is some value in trying to maintain a resistance– not to
science, exactly, but to the domination of science and especially of the naturalistic worldview so often associated
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with science. There’s value in resisting the scientific worldview in favor of some other overarching view in
which persons (of various sorts) have ontological primacy over particles. Just how legal scholarship can serve to resist the
scientific worldview, and to preserve a more personalist worldview, presents a complicated question, which I can’t explore here (in part
because I don’t know the answer). It’s a question that calls for experimentation. Sometimes the resistance may be
direct and affirmative, but often, I suspect, it will be critical and oblique. Second, in this matter, substance and style may not be wholly
separate. My own thought is that every time a law professor writes a book or article that some other person might actually want to read– might actually
enjoy reading, and might think he or she actually benefitted from reading– that is a small victory for the resistance, and for
persons. If that thought is right, then it poses a challenge that may provide us with at least a modest motive
for caring about writing–even after we’ve been granted tenure.
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5
Reject engagement with human rights abusers, like Cuba — moral duty to shun until it’s
resolved
Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in
Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in
Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University,
1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” Public Affairs Quarterly, Volume 3,
Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)
A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by
identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of
yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. ¶ But how
can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest,
e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For
shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not
bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer
when we note that there
is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that
goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting
the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which
unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating
the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order .¶ Consider that the moral order itself
contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral
behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually
reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to
disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation
of people's rights . Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶
Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order . When the violation of human rights is
flagrant , willful , and persistent , the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting
it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually
undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral
order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing."
The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide
and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and
persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is
the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order.
When someone flagrantly , willfully , and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral
order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order . How
does shunning do this?¶ First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for
the moral order and backs up the announcement with action . This action reinforces the commitment to the
moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this
argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further,
shunning may have a moral effect on the
shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person
thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing
herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what
cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose
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appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for
violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order , of "purifying the
community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above,
we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a
reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's
wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and
actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as
a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can
also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it
is not that we have a duty to shun because
failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when
we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful , persistent , and flagrant
immorality .
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I-Law
International law is already part of our law, precedent since 1900
Dodge 05Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law The Story of The Paquete Habana: Customary International Law as Part of
Our Law 11/14/05 www.csb.uncw.edu/people/eversp/classes/BLA361/Intl%20Law/Required%20Readings/3.Story%20of%20the%20Paquette%20Habana.pdf
“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”1 These lines from Justice Gray’s majority opinion in The Paquete Habana have become the classic statement of the incorporation of
customary international law in the U.S. legal system and the courts’ duty to enforce that law.2 There was nothing new in this declaration itself, or in The
Paquete Habana’s statements about consulting the works of scholars and the evolving nature of international law .
Each of these principles dates
back to at least the eighteenth century. But in the meantime, the underlying conception of international law had
changed from a foundation in natural law to a positivism based on state practice and consent.3The Paquete
Habana reflects this transition, but it also stands for continuity—reiterating eighteenth-century principles in an
age of legal positivism. It teaches that, despite significant changes in the international and domestic legal orders
over more than two hundred years of U.S. history, courts should respect and accommodate the original
understanding of customary international law as part of the domestic legal system. That teaching is just as relevant at the start
of the twenty-first century as it was at the start of the twentieth.
Plan Doesn’t Solve – Allowing Scientists to leave is not a fundamental right to develop
I-law kills heg
Delahunty, 5 – Associate Professor of Law @ University of St. Thomas School of Law and John Yoo, Professor of
Law @ UC Berkeley School of Law and visiting scholar @ AEI
(Robert J, “Against Foreign Law,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 29.1, Fall)
Not only do their histories differ, but
the U nited S tates and Europe face social and political circumstances so different as to
counsel against any attempt to transplant constitutional values
years turning away from great power conflict
but
rather supranational institutions,
Europe has spent
the last
sixty
and forging a cooperative enterprise that has solved the problem of German ambition and
melded former enemies into a broad economic common market.(n158)
conquest,
from one to the other.
The tools
for this amazing integration
have not been military power
and
international law , and diplomacy. As Robert Kagan explains, "Europe is turning away
from power , or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and
cooperation."(n159)
The U nited S tates, on the other hand, relies on power rather than international law , employs
military force
as much as persuasion,
and sees a world threatened by terrorist organizations ,
rogue nations,
and
the
prolif eration of weapons of mass destruction.(n160)¶ The difference between European and American attitudes has promoted the integration of Europe and
permitted Europeans to attempt a new experiment in political organization.(n161)
animosities and
The ability of European nationsto
engage in integration may be the result of an American security guarantee.
O rganization and heavy American military presence in Western Europe deterred the Soviet Union and allowed
European
The
put aside their historical
N orth A tlantic T reaty
integration to proceed.
As Lord Ismay, the first secretary general of NATO, famously quipped, the purpose of the Atlantic alliance was "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and
the Germans down."(n162) Existing
disparities in defense spending have only grown
since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Europeans
discussed increasing collective defense expenditures from $150 billion to $180 billion a year while the United States was spending $280 billion a year.(n163)
Ultimately, the Europeans could not, and had no political desire to, emulate high U.S. defense spending.
The U nited S tates has become the
"indispensable nation," without which Europe cannot handle even civil wars
along its borders.
Only the U nited S tates
has the ability to project power globally. (n164)¶ Without the United States's willingness to engage in power politics, Europe would not have had
the luxury to integrate. If this is correct, then
European constitutional values are inappropriate for the U nited S tates. These values
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were developed because European governments enjoyed a different tradeoff between national security and individual liberties and economic prosperity.
U nited S tates, which has greater responsibility for keeping international peace and
for
guaranteeing stability
The
in Europe,
faces a different balance between the demands of national security and constitutional liberties.
US Hegemony is necessary to prevent global nuclear warfare
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13
(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank
Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the
Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,”
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents theemergence of a far more dangerous globalsecurity
environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners
from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations
to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive
to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention
that engaged U.S. power dampens thebalefuleffects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory.
Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John
Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear
proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony
and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their
arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent
dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest .
Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual
(what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is
nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international
relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high
expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that
Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment
would be a bet on this
scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional
linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause
before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region,
there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt
European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result
might be a Europe that is
incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region
and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might
want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a
substantial military presence? Regarding
the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently
backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that
would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is
pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a
nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It
is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a
still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that
undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much
dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism
vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference,
with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely
solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning
research across
the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for
security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they
define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may
nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign
postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the
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degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security
environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive
realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regionalmultipolarity
complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for
regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case
would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war) . Hence it is unsurprising that
retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a
U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of
the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure
security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall
higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military
competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of
competitive regionalproxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster
diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades , as states
such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of
these actors would be the end of the game: they
would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth
Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the
security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation
optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are
inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the
temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic
assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states . In addition, many of
the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and
the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the
number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also
higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world
with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a
second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between
retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained
regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do
the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail
and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth
century. The problem is that China’s
rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the
United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its
Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is
medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The
likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action
that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the
formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to
Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the
argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is
countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for
U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity
that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing
together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the
case for retrenchment misses the
underlyinglogic ofthedeep engagementstrategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management,
the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a
hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage
to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current
great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match topend U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most
modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the
gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
Environment is resilient
Easterbrook, 03
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senior fellow at the New Republic, 03 (“We're All Gonna Die!”,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set=)
If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure
up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge
in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental
collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice
ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era,
might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the
Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.
No disease can kill us all – it would have to be everything at once
Gladwell, 95
(Malcolm, The New Republic, 7/17/95 and 7/24/95, “The Plague Year”, Lexis)
What would a real Andromeda Strain look like? It would be
highly infectious like the flu, spread through casual
contact. But it would also have to be structured in such a way as to avoid the kind of selection bias that usually
exists against virulent strains. For that reason, it would need to move stealthily through its host, infecting so
silently that the victim would not know to take precautions, and so slowly that the victim would have
years in which pass on the infection to someone else. The Andromeda Strain, in short, the virus that really could kill 80 or 90
percent of humanity, would be an airborne version of HIV. In fact, doomsday types have for years been conjuring up this
possibility for the end of mankind. The problem, however, is that it is very difficult to imagine how such a
super-virus could ever come about. For a start, it is not clear how HIV could become airborne and still be lethal. (This was the argument
of Howard Temin, the late Nobel Prize-winning virologist.) What makes HIV so dangerous is that it seeks out and selectively kills the key blood cells of
the human immune system. To be airborne, it would have to shift its preference to the cells of the respiratory system. (Ebola, which is not nearly so
selective, probably doesn't need to change personality to become airborne.) How, then, could it still cause aids? Why wouldn't it be just another cold
virus? Then there is the problem of mutation. To become airborne, HIV would have to evolve in such a way as to become more durable. Right now the
virus is highly sensitive to changes in temperature and light. But it is hardly going to do any damage if it dies the moment it is coughed into the air and
exposed to ultraviolet rays. HIV would have to get as tough as a cold virus, which can live for days on a countertop or a doorknob. At the same time HIV
would have to get more flexible. Right now HIV mutates in only a limited manner. The virus essentially keeps changing its clothes, but its inner workings
stay the same. It kills everyone by infecting the same key blood cells. To become airborne, it would have to undergo a truly fundamental transformation,
switching to an entirely different class of cells. How can HIV make two contradictory changes at the same time, becoming both less and more flexible?
This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument. Every infectious agent that has ever
plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost,
and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to
spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can
all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpoxis extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very
durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is
almost invariably lethalbecause its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but
the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious.
Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as
durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it
would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot
do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out
the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.
ILaw kills deterrence
Boyle 09(Francis A., professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law, “The Criminality on
Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/08/20_boyle_criminality_deterrence.php)
The use of nuclear weapons in combat was, and still is, absolutely prohibited under all circumstances by both conventional and
customary international law: e.g., the Nuremberg Principles, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the International Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol I of 1977, etc. In addition ,
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the use of nuclear weapons would also specifically violate several fundamental resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly that have repeatedly condemned the use of nuclear weapons as an international
crime. Consequently, according to the Nuremberg Judgment, soldiers would be obliged to disobey egregiously illegal orders
with respect to launching and waging a nuclear war. Second, all government officials and military officers who might
nevertheless launch or wage a nuclear war would be personally responsible for the commission of Nuremberg crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1, and genocide, among other international crimes. Third, such
individuals would not be entitled to the defenses of superior orders, act of state, tuquoque, self-defense, presidential authority, etc. Fourth, such
individuals could thus be quite legitimately and most severely punished as war criminals, up to and including the imposition of the death penalty,
without limitation of time. THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter of 1945 prohibits
both the threat and the use of force except in cases of legitimate self-defense as recognized by article 51 thereof. But although the
requirement of legitimate self-defense is a necessary precondition for the legality of any threat or use of force, it is certainly not sufficient. For the
legality of any threat or use of force must also take into account the customary and conventional international laws of humanitarian armed conflict.
Thereunder, the threat to use nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear deterrence/terrorism) constitutes ongoing
international criminal activity: namely, planning, preparation, solicitation and conspiracy to commit Nuremberg crimes against peace,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, as well as grave breaches of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol I of 1977, the
Hague Regulations of 1907, and the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, inter alia. These
are the so-called inchoate crimes that under the Nuremberg Principles constitute international crimes in their own right. The conclusion is
inexorable that the design, research, testing, production, manufacture, fabrication, transportation, deployment,
installation, maintenance, storing, stockpiling, sale, and purchase as well as the threat to use nuclear
weapons together with all their essential accouterments are criminal under well-recognized principles of
international law. Thus, those government decision-makers in all the nuclear weapons states with command responsibility for their nuclear
weapons establishments are today subject to personal criminal responsibility under the Nuremberg Principles for this criminal practice of nuclear
deterrence/terrorism that they have daily inflicted upon all states and peoples of the international community. Here I wish to single out four
components of the threat to use nuclear weapons that are especially reprehensible from an international law
perspective: counter-ethnic targeting; counter-city targeting; first-strike weapons and contingency plans; and the
first-use of nuclear weapons even to repel a conventional attack.
Deterrence is accurate and solves war
Moore 4 — Director at the Center for Security Law at the University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential Appointee and
Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law (John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond
the Democratic Peace, pp. 27-31)
As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the
effect of external factors on the decision to go to war,
is the missing link in the war/peace equation . In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the
principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the
war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks
predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack
on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union
that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain
air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became
known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attack on South Korea and Hussein’s attack on
Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually
all principal wars in the twentieth century, at
least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded by what I refer to as a " double deterrence absence ."
That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic
power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are
flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of
British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World
War I absence of
effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the later robust NATO alliance and absence of World
War III. 14¶ Considerable
other
evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of
deterrence . Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in
1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book he conducts a detailed examination of the
Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading
of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each
occurred in the absence of such deterrence.16 Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition
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that appropriate deterrence can prevent war . For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma,
which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17
Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much
of the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic
peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between
war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military
achievability of aggression in many such settings.¶ It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to
war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for
"Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a
reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of
war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association
between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important
bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common
membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war
between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war,
impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic
study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but
expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it
importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or
other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather
obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations
through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of
such organizations.¶ These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their
freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that
aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both
external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising
that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the
founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these
arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully
predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations
(at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace.¶ In
assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 indexes. I am unaware of any comparable
index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion
about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In
order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a
rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative
weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the
methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic
and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of
the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an
overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high
deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing
a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in
the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North
Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to
attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German
decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an
impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the
Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred.
Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of
World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4;
Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack
Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even
knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their
impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring
deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters
and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war.¶ Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of
deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a
second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility
multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the
scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf
War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The
study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was
"no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to
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aggressive military action and yet attacked."32¶ Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in
certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring
deterrence. ¶ That is, newer
studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain
perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise
affect their decisions.33 It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and
fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals
evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in
settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.34 The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling,
trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based
"prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our
consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies.¶ In the war/peace
setting, "prospect
theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action
leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir
Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait,
as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to
deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have
prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria
may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet
Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of
NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase
of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.35 One can only surmise whether the killing
in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing
deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would
emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it
made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a
"Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately,
unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess
NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective
deterrence. "Prospect
theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are
necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam
Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a
Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable
experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein
took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of
compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention.¶ One should also be
careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great
Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is
also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic
peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have
more to lose.¶ In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may
be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his
Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a
losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and
producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the
enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be
another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such
settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true
in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does
not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or
Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy
comes close to a necessary condition in
generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for
war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and
relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocratic regime is present
and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become
crucial.
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Science
Status quo solves –laundry list (Obama, Clinton, bilateral science and technology cooperation agreements, fellowships
for scientists to work in the State Department)
Gumbiner 10 (Larry Gumbiner is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Space & Health in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, July 29, 2010, Promoting Science and Technology as Tools of Diplomacy, http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/science_diplomacy)
Science and technology are very important tools and vehicles for diplomacy. Science diplomacy opens doors, establishes lasting bonds, solves problems, and
promotes democratic values. For these reasons and others, it is being employed by the U.S. government, both from Washington and internationally, through
embassies around the world. The
emphasis on science diplomacy comes from the top down -- from President Obama,
notably in his speech in Cairo in June 2009, and from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose Strategic Dialogues often have
a science and technology component. But science diplomacy is driven by demand as well as by supply; there is a push for science and
technology collaboration with the United States from all corners of the globe. The U.S. Department of State uses a
number of methods to engage in science diplomacy. We have negotiated some 47 bilateral science and
technology cooperation agreements to advance collaboration and find creative ways to develop new sources of energy, create green
jobs, digitize records, clean water, and grow new crops. The Science Envoy program selects senior scientists, many of them Nobel
Laureates, to travel to countries around the globe and report back to the President on ways to deepen our science
collaboration. We also have a number of fellowships -- Jefferson, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and
Franklin, to name a few -- by which young scientists and academics work in offices throughout the State Department and
USAID to integrate science into day-to-day foreign policy decisions. The Embassy Science Fellows program uses the expertise of
scientists who are already working throughout the Federal government to deploy to our embassies overseas to work directly with foreign counterparts. The
State Department continues to expand its corps of Environment, Science, Technology and Health (ESTH) officials overseas, guaranteeing that our Ambassadors
have key S&T advisors at their sides at all times. With all of these tools at our disposal, the interest in, and commitment to, science
in our embassies is
at an all time high -- and growing.
Impact inevitable – population size of other countries and outsourcing.
Lempert 08 (Richard O. Lempert is the Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology at The University of Michigan Law School and a
Research Professor in the George Washington Institute of Public Policy, Maintaining U.S. Scientific Leadership, March 3, 2008,
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/03/maintaining-us-scientific-leadership/)
If these advantages were not enough, the competition for science leadership was weak thanks to the devastation that Europe suffered in two world wars and
the slow rebuilding of European economies in the post-war era. The upshot: U.S.
science leadership is not natural and inevitable, but
the loss of that leadership may be. Countries much larger than the United States, most notably India and China,
are experiencing economic growth that outstrips ours, and as they grow in wealth they are rapidly improving their
educational systems and basic science infrastructures. Moreover, as globalization leads companies born in the United
States to move research and production capacity abroad, market demand for trained scientists and engineers is
increasing elsewhere while it is being dampened here. Even if the United States retains a per capita education and
investment advantage over India and China, population differences alone mean that the number of trained
scientists and engineers in these countries will soon dwarf the number in America, with differences in the quantity and quality
of science innovation likely to follow. Added to the Asian challenge is a Europe that can no longer be seen as a set of discrete countries when it comes to
science. Rather, cross-border research teams are being encouraged, and European Union-wide funding mechanisms are being established.
Biotech inevitable
D'Haeze, ‘7
(Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical
Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory
Board, http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html)
Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is still
expanding – booming– in the United States and Europe, but also in major Asian countries such as India,
China, and Japan. A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a
major location in the United States or Europe while branching elsewhere in the United States, Europe,
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and/or Asia. Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the
drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed.
Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and
Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of
the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but multinational companies have been or are
stepping on land in countries throughout Asia as well. Reasonsfor the latter development may include
substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce
medicines close to the market place. During recent years, India, for example, has become the home of a
few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5
producers of pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g., production of diphtheria, tetanus,
pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis
Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced
Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai,
Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more
than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create
a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing
one million jobs by roughly three years from now. The government tries to achieve this goal in part by
facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing
the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery
proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up
companies.
Economic ties make instability inevitable
Petras 09 – a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University (James, “Rising Militarism: US-Latin American
Relations”, Palestine Chronicle, 14 May 2009,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/432417012?accountid=14667)
Latin America faces a rising tide of US protectionismas the Obama regime reacts to the domestic economic
depression by forcing Latin America to seek new trading partners, to protect their internal markets and to seek new sources for trade
and credit.¶ Latin America Faces the World Crisis¶ Throughout Latin America, the economic depression is wrecking havoc on the
economy, the labor market, trade, credit and investment. All the major countries in the region are headed toward negative
growth, and experiencing double digit unemployment, rising levels of poverty and mass protests. In Brazil in late March and early April, a
coalition of trade unions, urban social movements and the rural landless workers movement convoked large scale demonstrations - including participation from
the union confederation, CUT, which is usually allied with Lula`s Workers Party.¶ Unemployment rates in Brazil have risen sharply, exceeding 10%, as massive
lay-offs hit the auto and other metallurgical industries. In Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, strikes and protests have begun to spread in protest over
rising unemployment, the increase of bankruptcies among exporters facing world-wide decline in demand and unable to secure financing.¶ The
more
industrialized Latin American countries, whose economies are more integrated into world markets and have
followed an export growth strategy, are the ones most adversely affected by the world depression. This includes Brazil,
Argentina, Colombia and Mexico. In addition, countries dependent on overseas remittances and tourism, like Ecuador, the Central
American and Caribbean countries and even Mexico, with their 'open' economies, are badly hit by world recession.¶ While the US financial
collapse did not have a major and immediate impact on Latin America- largely because the earlier financial crashes in
Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador and Chile led their governments to impose limits on speculation - the indirect results of the US crash, especially
with regard to the credit freeze and the decline of world trade, has brought down productive sectors across the
board. By mid-2009, manufacturing, mining, services and agriculture, in the private and public sector were firmly in the grip of a recession.¶ The
vulnerability of Latin America to the world crises is a direct result of the structure of production and the
development strategies adopted the region. Following the 'neo-liberal' or empire-centered 'restructuring' of the
economies which took place between the mid-1970s through the 1990s, the economic profile of Latin America was
characterized by a weak state sector due to privatization of all key productive sectors. The de-nationalization of strategic
financial, credit, trading and mining sectors increased vulnerability as did the highly concentrated income and property
ownership held mainly by small foreign and domestic elite. These characteristics were further exacerbated by the primary commodity
boom between early 2003 until the middle of 2008. The regimes' further shift toward an export strategy relying on primary products set the stage for a crash.
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As a result of its economic structure Latin America was extremely vulnerable to the decision taken by US and EU policy
makers in charge of key economic sectors. De-nationalization denied the state the necessary levers to meet the crisis by
reversing the direction of the economy.
Water forces cooperation, not wars
Wolf et al, 06
(Aaron T., Ph.D. in environmental policy analysis, professor of geography in the Department of Geosciences at
Oregon State University, *AND Annika Kramer, Senior Project Manager for Adelphi, *AND Alexander Carius,
Co-Founder and Managing Director, Adelphi, *AND Geoffrey D. Dabelko, director of the Environmental Change
and Security Program, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2006, “ Water Can Be a
Pathway to Peace, not War,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NavigatingPeaceIssue1.pdf, Hensel)
These apocalyptic warnings fly in the face of history: no nations have gone to war specifically over water
resources for thousands of years. International water disputes—even among fierce enemies—are resolved
peacefully, even as conflicts erupt over other issues. In fact, instances of cooperation between riparian
nations outnumbered conflicts by more than two to one between 1945 and 1999. Why? Because water is
so important, nations cannot Afford to fight over it. Instead, water fuels greater interdependence. By
coming together to jointly manage their shared water resources, countries can build trust and prevent
conflict. Water can be a negotiating tool, too: it can offer a communication lifeline connecting countries
in the midst of crisis. Thus, by crying “water wars,” doomsayers ignore a promising way to help prevent
war: cooperative water resources management.
Empirically, there will be no resource wars. Even if they win a risk of their impact, it stays
localized
Salehyan, 8
Idean Salehyan (Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas) May 2008 “From Climate
Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet*” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, no. 3,
http://emergingsustainability.org/files/resolver%20climate%20change%20and%20conflict.pdf
First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every
potential example of an
environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counterexamples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do
not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and
ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but
similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
food shortages and malnutrition Affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the
Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown
civil war andstate failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent
occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property,
flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to
provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most
migration flows do not lead to
conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short,
resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental
conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to
resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and statecollapse. While interpersonal violence is
more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond &
Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these
conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and
population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions.
Both of these studies
emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions– not just the response of
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central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the
importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps.
Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so. Third, states often bear
responsibility for environmental degradation and resource shortfalls, either through their own projects and initiatives or through neglect of the
environment. Clearly, climate change itself is an exogenous stressor beyond the control of individual governments. However, government policies and
neglect can compound the effects of climate change. Nobel Prizewinning economist Amartya Sen finds that, even in the face of acute environmental
scarcities, countries with democratic institutions and press freedoms work to prevent famine because such states are accountable to their citizens (Sen,
1999). Others have similarly shown a strong relationship between democracy and protection of the environment (Li & Reuveny, 2006). Faced with global
warming, some states will take the necessary steps to conserve water and land, redistribute resources to those who need them most, and develop
disaster-warning and -response systems. Others will do little to respond to this threat. While a state’s level of income and technological capacity are
certainly important, democracy – or, more precisely, the accountability of political leaders to their publics – is likely to be a critical determinant of how
states respond to the challenge. Fourth, violent
conflict is an inefficient and sub-optimal reaction to changes in the
environment and resource scarcities. As environmental conditions change, several possible responses
are available, although many journalists and policymakers have focusedon the potential for warfare. Individuals
can migrate internally or across borders, or they can invest in technological improvements, develop
conservation strategies, and shift to less climate-sensitive livelihoods, among other adaptationmechanisms. Engaging
in armed rebellion is quite costly and risky and requires large-scale collective action. Individuals and households are
more likely to engage in simpler, personal, or smallscale coping strategies. Thus, organized violence is inefficient at
the individual level. But, more importantly, armed violence against the state is used as a means to gain leverage over governments so as to gain some
form of accommodation, namely, the redistribution of economic resources and political power. Organized armed violence rarely (if ever) arises
spontaneously but is usually pursued when people perceive their government to be unwilling to listen to peaceful petitions. As mentioned above,
rebellion does not distribute resources by itself, and protracted civil wars can have devastating effects on the economy and the natural environment,
leaving fewer resources to bargain over. Thus, organized violence is inefficient at the collective level. Responsive, accountable political leaders – at all
levels of government – are more likely to listen to citizen demands for greater access to resources and the means to secure their livelihoods. Political
sensitivity to peaceful action can immunize states from armed insurrection.
No Arctic conflict – cooperation, lack of tension
Wired 11 (“War For the Arctic: Never Mind” 6-8. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/war-for-the-arcticnever-mind/)
It wasn’t long ago that the press was running wild with hyperbolic claims of the U.S. losing out in an impending
Arctic conflict . After all, global warming is freeing up access to large deposits of oil, gas and minerals right in the backyard of the Russians. But the
press forgot to tell other polar nations to freak out. Indeed, at a forum convened on Wednesday by the Center for Strategic and
International Security, ambassadors from four polar nations, including some traditionally menaced by Russia, were sanguine about
the future of polar exploration. “We actually think we handled these areas for decades during the Cold War rather well,” said Wegger Strommen,
Norway’s man in Washington. The U.S Geological Survey assesses that the North Pole holds about 13 percent of the world’s untapped oil supplies.
Companies and nations are champing at the bit to expand exploration as the ice caps melt. The Russians have an advantage: a fleet of six nuclear powered
icebreakers on its northern shore. By contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard has just one, the cutter Healy. But no one’s sweating it. Should
there actually
be an arctic sea conflict, the U.S. submarine fleet is second to none, as my colleague David Axe has pointed out. And a massive
Arctic oil rush is “years off,” Strommen added, since the “climate is harsh, the conditions are difficult and it’s incredibly
expensive.” Beyond that, the Russians are warm in the Arctic. Russia finalized a maritime border with Norway on Tuesday that took 30
years to negotiate. Strommen’s colleagues from Greenland, Canada and Sweden gave high marks to a meeting last month of
the Arctic Council , the diplomatic contact group of arctic nations, in which Russia signed onto an accord for search and rescue
missions in the cold waters. Think of it as a diplomatic thaw.
Leadership loss inevitable – population size of other countries and outsourcing.
Lempert 08 (Richard O. Lempert is the Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology at The University of Michigan Law School and a
Research Professor in the George Washington Institute of Public Policy, Maintaining U.S. Scientific Leadership, March 3, 2008,
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/03/maintaining-us-scientific-leadership/)
If these advantages were not enough, the competition for science leadership was weak thanks to the devastation that Europe suffered in two world wars and
the slow rebuilding of European economies in the post-war era. The upshot: U.S.
science leadership is not natural and inevitable, but
the loss of that leadership may be. Countries much larger than the United States, most notably India and China,
are experiencing economic growth that outstrips ours, and as they grow in wealth they are rapidly improving their
educational systems and basic science infrastructures. Moreover, as globalization leads companies born in the United
States to move research and production capacity abroad, market demand for trained scientists and engineers is
increasing elsewhere while it is being dampened here. Even if the United States retains a per capita education and
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Niles West Debate 2012-2013
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investment advantage over India and China, population differences alone mean that the number of trained
scientists and engineers in these countries will soon dwarf the number in America, with differences in the quantity and quality
of science innovation likely to follow. Added to the Asian challenge is a Europe that can no longer be seen as a set of discrete countries when it comes to
science. Rather, cross-border research teams are being encouraged, and European Union-wide funding mechanisms are being established.
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