Objective Notes: W300 – Agreements, rights & responsibilities UNIT 25 - MANUAL FOUR VICARIOUS/ JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY 1 Distinguishing employees & independent (ind) contractors 2 Employer/ employee relationship = vicarious liability (vic liab) pre-requisite – traditionally, master/ servant but employer/ employee more common phrase today & essential to distinguish between employee (contract OF service) where employee performs service for one person, his employer, (e.g. teachers, factory workers, office/ retail workers etc) & ind contractor (contract FOR services) where selfemployed worker/ business provides services to several (e.g. taxi divers, selfemployed building trade contractors); Initially, test = ‘control’ where ‘master’, commanded manner in which work done but now employers not have expertise to supervise/ control how skilled employees work & also inadequate re workers part time, homeworkers, agency/ contract suppliers & trainees so no longer of prime importance & absence not conclusive evidence that contract is for services; In Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v Macdonald & Evans [1952], integration test used - worker employed as part of business & does work as integral part of it whereas ind contractors not part but accessory – but this considered too vague & from Ready-Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister Pensions & National Insurance [1968] pragmatic test - contract of service exists where (i) employee agrees provide his own work/ skill in perf of service to employer in return for wage/ other remuneration & expressly/ impliedly subject to another’s control sufficient to make that other be employer & (ii) all other contract provisions consistent with being of service including (a) whether worker provides materials/ tools or employs helpers; & (b) degree of financial risk worker assumed personally; Where employer temporarily loans employee to another, general permanent employer has burden of proof in showing vic liab passed to special employer which only discharged in ‘quite exceptional circumstances’ taking into account (i) who pays wages/ has power of dismissal; (ii) period of loan; & (ii) machinery employed so crucial who at time able to tell employee what to do & how to do it so insufficient employee’s work to be under special employer’s control &, whilst relevant if employers agreed who employer is, not conclusive (Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v Coggins & Griffiths Ltd [1946]). Where employee commits tort in course of employment (ICE) Employer vic liab for (i) acts authorised; & (ii) unauthorised acts so closely connected with ones authorised = modes, albeit improper, of so doing but where act less connected not mode but independent act for which employer not liab since employee not acting ICE & no single ICE determination test –always turn on facts – but crucial factor = was, at time, employee doing what employed to do &, if so, albeit carelessly/ mistakenly (Century Insurance Co Ltd v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [1942]), then acting ICE (Salmond & Hueston) but where acting outside employment scope employer not vic liab (Beard v London General Omnibus Co [1902] – not employed to drive buses); Whether contravening express instructions takes employees outside course depends on whether instructions are to manner where breach is ICE (London County Council v Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953]) or scope which is outside (Iqbal v London Transport Executive [1973]) &, in regard to unauthorised lifts, driver not acting within scope if doing something prohibited (i.e. giving lift to unauthorised person), so was as much ‘on frolic of own’ as if unauthorisedly driving somewhere for own benefit (Twine v Bean’s Express Ltd [1946]) but whether prohibited act is ICE Page 1 Objective Notes: W300 – Agreements, rights & responsibilities 3 depends on purpose for which done & if for employer’s business, usually ICE even if prohibited (Rose v Plenty [1976]); Where goods entrusted to employee for safe keeping or to carry out work on, he acts ICE because duties include taking care of goods & theft/ dishonesty = dishonest method of perf duty but where employee uses employment as opportunity to steal, act not ICE (Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1965]) & where employer held out that employee authorised to act for them but acted fraudulently (whether for employer’s benefit or not), this ICE (Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912]); Where employee assaults person during course of work (e.g. night club bouncer responsible for maintenance of order, injures someone whilst ejecting them), employer may be vic liab but where assault totally unconnected with duties not acting ICE but employers vic liab for intentional wrongful acts (e.g. sexual abuse) where very close connection between tort & employment’s nature (Lister & others v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001]) taking into account whether act capable of being categorised as being so closely connected with employment that fair & just to make employer vic liab - turns on facts & depends on (i) claimant/ employer relationship; & (ii) whether act can be seen as way of carrying out authorised work, albeit most improperly; Employees outside scope if tort committed not on employer’s business but whilst on ‘frolic of own’ (Joel v Morrison (1834)) & this relates mainly to drivers/ those driving as part of work whilst deviating from authorised routes, taking into account (i) extent employee deviated - major (new journey) or minor (new route); & (ii) purpose of deviation & if still engaged in employer’s business not on frolic so where journey’s primary/ main purpose = further employer’s business ICE as is getting meal if fairly incidental to work in which employee engaged (Harvey v R G O’Dell Ltd [1958]) but where new/ independent journey with no connection to employment entirely for his benefit, rather than employer’s beyond ICE (Storey v Ashton (1869)) which may include additional journeys (e.g. going for tea - Hilton v Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd [1961]) so question of degree on facts whether departure from authorised routes suffices to place employee in ‘frolic’ situation taking into account geographical divergence & departure from set tasks – greater degree of deviation from either or both, more likely that employee on frolic. Why vic liab exists & policy role Moral grounds – accident prevention encouraged as employers given financial incentive in encouraging employees to take care of others’ safety & as employers profit from employees’ activities so should bear losses resulting from these. Practical grounds – employers normally more able to bear losses whilst employees may not be worth suing financially & employers in better position to arrange insurance protection (e.g. motor insurance on business vehicles) which costs they pass on to customers via higher prices; These reflect social policy premised on (i) loss distribution – those who benefit from employees’ work should equally meet losses/ damage resulting therefrom; & (ii) importance of losses being met by solvent defs – employers best placed to distribute losses through insurance & product prices. Where employers are liab for ind contractor’s torts 4 Basic rule = employer not vic liab for ind contractor’s torts since (i) lacks control over way ind contractor carries out work, especially where hasn’t necessary expertise; & (ii) ind contractors normally businesses more likely to have insurance than employee & usually more ‘substantial’ so in better position to meet claims; But employer liab where (i) work involves extra hazardous acts, impliedly something inherently dangerous (e.g. use of explosives); or (ii) dangers created in/ Page 2 Objective Notes: W300 – Agreements, rights & responsibilities on highway (Rowe v Herman [1997]) & where (i) employer has common law nondelegable duty for employees’ safety; or (ii) absolute duties imposed by stat – responsibility for perf cannot be delegated; Employers may be liab under Nuisance for (i) withdrawal of support from neighbouring land; & (ii) escape of fire & substances (e.g. explosives) brought on to land likely to cause damage (Alcock v Wraith [1991]) &, where nature of work involved special danger of creating nuisance, harm became inevitable unless proper care & reasonable precautions taken so these situations (rather than ordinary building works), fell within exceptions for which employer liab (Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd [1936]); Employers may be personally liab for (i) choice of neg contractor; (ii) engaging insufficient workers; (iii) providing inadequate instructions; or (iv) authorising contractor’s tort but not for ind contractor’s collateral/ casual neg (= not committed in course of carrying out very work delegated & unrelated to any dangerous element) (Padbury v Holliday & Greenwood [1912]). 5 Joint & several tortfeasors 6 Where more than one person liab for same damage, tortfeasors joint if either (i) all act in concert in furtherance of common enterprise/ design; or (ii) A authorises B to commit tort; or (iii) A vic liab for B but where parties liab for same damage but not fall within joint classifications = several or concurrent tortfeasors (e.g. 2 drivers individually neg resulting in damage/ injury to 3rd party); Where liab is joint & injured party agrees to release A from liab, this releases B (& any others) but where several & claimant releases A, not release other defs & injured party can sue any or all &, irrespective of whether liab joint or several, innocent party can elect to sue any or all but cannot recover losses more than once. Rights between tortfeasors Common law: Where employer found vic liab & paid out damages (or, more usually in practice, insurer has), employees, having breached contractual duty to carry out work with reasonable care & skill, employer entitled to recover damages (Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957]) but where employer at fault itself or through another employee, cannot claim indemnity (Jones v Manchester Corporation [1952]); Statutory: By s.1(1) Civil Liability (Contributions) Act 1978 def may recover contribution from other def(s) liab for same damage, irrespective of (i) whether others joint/ several; & (ii) type of action claimant sues – not material that A tortiously liab & B contractually By s.2 courts award contribution amounts considered just & equitable, having regard to extent of each party’s contribution to damage (s.2(1)) taking into account (i) each def’s degree of blame & (ii) extent to which caused damage &, by s.2(2), discretion re sum defs have to contribute so may completely indemnify def (e.g. where A technically liab but in fact totally blameless); Apportionment between defs & does not impact on claimant’s enforcement of judgment so where damages awarded but held, say, def A liab for 80% & def B 20%, claimant can enforce against either leaving that def to obtain ordered contrib. from other. 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