Defining “Supervisor” in Title VII Cases
In Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011), the Seventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment to Ball State University in a hostile work environment case. Among
other claims, Maretta Vance, a black catering assistant, alleged that her white co-workers
and supervisors engaged in racial harassment. Vance argued that one of her co-workers
was a supervisor because she directed Vance’s work. The Seventh Circuit failed to find
supervisory status, given the co-worker’s inability to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer,
or discipline other workers. The Seventh Circuit declined to join other circuits in holding
that the authority to direct an employee’s daily activities establishes supervisory status
under Title VII. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling due to
the fact that Ball State investigated Vance’s complaints, thereby removing the basis for
finding employer liability in a hostile work environment case.
Vance has petitioned for U.S. Supreme Court review due to a circuit split regarding the
definition of “supervisor” for Title VII purposes. The question presented to the U.S.
Supreme Court in the petition for certiorari is whether, as the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits (and the EEOC) have held, the “supervisor” liability rule established in Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998) applies to harassment by individuals who have the authority to direct and
oversee their victim’s daily work, or as the First, Seventh, and Eight Circuits hold, is
limited to harassers who have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or
discipline their victims. While Ball State acknowledges that a split exists among the
circuit, they argue that, in Vance’s case, the individual at issue would not meet either
definition of supervisor.
On February 21, the U.S. Supreme Court invited the solicitor general to file a brief
expressing the government’s view on the definition of “supervisor” for purposes of
imposing vicarious liability on an employer for harassment under Title VII.