The Pre-embryo in Halacha
Rabbi Yitzchok Breitowitz
The development of new reproductive technologies over the past 15 or so years has offered great hope
to many infertile couples. Along with the blessings they bring, however, these technologies are also a
source of major ethical dilemmas. For the Jew whose every decision is guided by the Davar Hashem, it
is the halacha to which he or she must turn. The specific topic of this paper concerns the halachic status
of the pre-embryo, a particular configuration of human cells that did not really exist in externalised form
until the advent of in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) in the late 1970's.1
In-vitro fertilisation may exist in various forms but at its simplest, it involves the extraction of immature
eggs (oocytes) from a woman's ovaries, the placement of those eggs in a petri dish which is supplied
with nutrients, the obtaining of sperm from a donor, the fertilisation of the egg in the dish, the
transplantation of the fertilised ovum into the woman's uterus (usually at the 48-72 hour developmental
stage)2. If all goes well, the embryo will implant and a pregnancy will ensue and be detectable within
10-14 days after the transfer. Since the procedure was first introduced in 1978, over 25,000 IVF babies
have been born. The average take-home baby rate is 17%; 19% for women under 39, 66% for older
women. "Pre-embryo" is the term often used for a fertilised ovum that has not yet been transferred into a
uterus.
Although in the natural course of ovulation, a woman's ovaries release only one egg at a time, the
modern IVF procedure involves the extraction of multiple oocytes to raise the probability of successful
fertilization.3 As a consequence, there may be several eggs that are fertilised. Multiple eggs may be
transferred for implantation; cryopreserved for future use in another reproductive cycle; donated to other
infertile couples; used for experimentation and research; destroyed; allowed to thaw; or just kept in
storage which will effectively result in their destruction after the passage of time. At least under
American law, all of these options are legal possibilities though the locus of dispositional authority in
the event of disagreement has not been definitely identified.
The existence of literally thousands of pre-embryos in freezers raises difficult problems. What happens
if both or any one of the gamete (egg or sperm) donors die? What if they get divorced? Are frozen
embryos "children" subject to a custody determination or marital property? Do pre-embryos have
inheritance rights? In light of the Jewish restrictions on abortion, must all pre-embryos be implanted?
May they be donated? In the event of a donation (whether permissible or not), who does halacha regard
as the parents? Must thawed pre-embryos be buried? Are they considered "human life" for purposes of
chillul shabbos, etc.? What about yibum? A number of these issues have been discussed extensively;
some have not.
After briefly outlining the general principles governing IVF, this article will proceed to analyse seven
specific problem areas: (1) may "surplus" pre-embryos be destroyed; (2) may such pre-embryos be
utilised for experimentation and research and subject to what limitations; (3) may such pre-embryos be
donated to other infertile couples, Jewish or non Jewish; (4) may a Jewish couple utilise a donated preembryo of Jewish or non Jewish origin in their own IVF protocol; (5) does the halachic system
recognise a right of compensation to the gamete providers if pre-embryos are wrongfully destroyed
without their consent; (6) do pre-embryos have inheritance rights and do they "count" for purposes of
yibum, chalitza, and pidyon haben; (7) who has ultimate decisional authority over pre-embryos if
husband and wife are divorced, deadlocked, or dead. To facilitate comparison to the secular legal
system, an Appendix to this article describes the status of the pre-embryo under American law.4
Needless to say, no statements in this article are intended to be psak halacha.
I. General Considerations on the Use of IVF Technology
The halachic literature on assisted reproductive technologies is quite large and cannot be fully surveyed
here. Much of it concerns artificial insemination where either husband or donor sperm is inserted
vaginally or into the uterus.5 Many of the halachic concerns with AIH, particularly those involving the
methods by which sperm is procured, apply equally to in-vitro fertilization.6
Subject to careful supervision of the physician, waiting periods, and exploration of alternatives, AIH is
generally regarded as a halachically permissible procedure through which paternity can be established
and the mitzva of p'ru v'revu or at least lashevet can be fulfilled.7 By and large, most poskim have
assimilated IVF to AIH and have permitted its utilization subject to the same limitations.8 A notable
exception is Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg who maintains that IVF is an impermissible procedure and even
ex post facto one does not fulfil the mitzva of p'ru u'revu.9 He argues that IVF is more problematical
than AIH in a number of distinct respects: (1) Unlike AIH where all sperm is deposited into the vagina
or uterus, IVF only transfers the fertilised ova with the rest of the sperm discarded, thus violating the
edict against hashchatat zera; (2) One does not fulfil the mitzva of procreation where fertilisation occurs
outside of the womb. This independently creates a violation of hashchatat zera; (3) There is neither a
paternal or maternal10 relationship with an IVF-offspring. Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch11 also denies
paternal identity in cases of IVF and consequently, prohibits the practice as violative of hashchatat zera.
R. Yehuda Gershuni12 agrees with Rabbis Sternbuch and Waldenberg that there is no paternal bond
between a sperm donor and an externalised embryo even if later brought to term but he nonetheless
permits the procedure; since IVF does in fact result in the creation of a physical human being albeit one
that is not halachically related to the genetic parents, it is a fulfilment of the prophetic statement, "He
did not create the world to be void but he formed it so that it would be settled" [lashevet yatzara] (Isaiah
45:18). R. Gershuni argues that even the mere fulfilment of lashevet is enough to prevent the emission
of the seed from being levatala.
As noted, Rabbis Waldenberg, Sternbach, and Gershuni are decidedly in the minority. Virtually all
contemporary poskim have concluded, first, that the egg and sperm providers do have a parental
relationship with an IVF - generated offspring; second, that the procedure if undertaken for procreation
by an otherwise infertile couple13 does not violate the prohibitions against hashchatat zera; third, that
one may fulfil from any resulting offspring either the mitzva of p'ru u'revo or at the very least, the
"lesser" mitzva of lashevet.14 These will be the assumptions on which this paper is predicated.
II. May Surplus Pre-embryos Be Destroyed?
In the early days of IVF, this was an especially pressing concern. Before the development of freezing
techniques, there was no way to store pre-embryos for future use. Whatever ova were not implanted
during this particular cycle would inevitably be discarded. As a result, some halachic authorities
permitted IVF procedures only if all fertilised eggs were implanted. Since, however, the implantation of
five, six, or seven pre-embryos could severely jeopardise the prospects of a successful pregnancy, this
also meant that only a small number of eggs could be extracted (typically no more than four). This
sharply reduced the prospects of successful fertilisation in the dish necessitating repetitive IVF attempts.
Insurance plans commonly did not cover IVF after two or three attempts, thereby rendering IVF a less
effective procedure for Orthodox Jews.
Two technological developments have rendered these concerns less pressing. First, the development of
pre-embryo freezing means that fertilised ova can be stored for use at a future date. Second, use of
specialised ova penetration techniques (such as drilling) allows for a greatly increased probability of
fertilisation even with a smaller number of eggs. Nevertheless, while the practical issues are less
pressing, they have not gone away; the theoretical problems of alternative disposition remain: must a
fertilised egg be transferred in an attempt to achieve a pregnancy?
a) Abortion
Issues concerning the destruction of embryonic or foetal life fall within the halachic strictures against
abortion. The basic guidelines concerning abortion have been detailed in a number of places and will
not be repeated here.16 Briefly, however, a number of principles bear repeating:
1. The killing of a foetus is not a capital crime, at least for a Jew.
2. Notwithstanding its exclusion from the death penalty, the vast majority of halachic authorities regard
killing a foetus as a violation of Torah law. A small minority views the prohibition as purely rabbinic.17
3. The violation of feticide is committed not only by the person actually performing the procedure but,
according to R. Auerbach, also by the woman who hires the physician and makes herself available for
the operation. At the very least, making oneself available for an abortion would violate the prohibition
of lifnei ivair - aiding and abetting a transgression whether the physician is Jewish or not.18
4. The source of the Torah prohibition is subject to disagreement.
Some opinions view abortion as form of murder [retzicha], albeit one that does not carry the death
penalty similar to the case of killing a tereifah where there is a transgression of lo tirtzach without its
corresponding punishment. Others view abortion as falling within the prohibition of hashchatat zera
(destruction of seed) in that it wastefully destroys that which could potentially blossom into life. A third
view treats "abortion" as an unjustified act of chavala ("wounding"). Within this view, there are some
that regard the "chavala" in terms of the mother and others that regard the prohibited chavala as being
done to the foetus. A final view would prohibit abortion as being inconsistent with the affirmative
obligations to protect and preserve life and well-being, an obligation derived from "lo taamod al dam
rayecha" or "hashavat aveida".
5. The halachic theory for the prohibition would determine which extenuating circumstances may
amount to a proper justification, ie., if the issur is retzicha, abortion can be sanctioned only if the foetus
qualifies as a rodef. General considerations of pikuach nefesh would not suffice. At the other extremes,
considerations of chavala may be set aside by lesser concerns. Hashchatat zera and hatzala can be
arguably set aside for pikuach nefesh even where the foetus does not qualify as a rodef but nothing short
of pikuach nefesh would suffice.
6. The foregoing refers to abortions performed by Jews (whether to Jewish or non-Jewish foetuses).
Abortion performed by non-Jews (whether to Jewish or non-Jewish foetuses) is a capital offence under
the Seven Laws of Noach. There is considerable discussion and debate whether Noachides may perform
abortions even where there is pikuach nefesh or the baby is a rodef.
b) Abortion Prior to Forty Days
The Talmud records in a number of instances that foetal development prior to the 40th day is considered
"mere water". Thus, a miscarriage within 40 days carries no tumat leidah nor does it necessitate the
bringing of a korban. A widowed bas cohen who was married to a yisrael is allowed to eat the terumah
in her father's house for forty days following her husband's demise because even if she is pregnant, the
ubar doesn't count as an entity of disqualification. Based on those teachings, some poskim have
concluded there is no issur of hapala within 40 days.21
To the extent there is an absolute heter to abort a pre-40 days embryo, there would certainly be a
dispensation to destroy or discard a pre-embryo (regardless of how many days may have passed from
fertilisation) since its development has certainly not progressed to the 40-day point. In truth, however,
the 40-day limit is subject to much disagreement. The argument that an embryo of less than 40 days is
"mere water" is relevant to the abortion issue only if abortion is predicated either on its being murder,
ie., the taking of existing life or on its being chavala of the embryo - arguably, one cannot "wound" that
which does not have the status of an existing person. The forty-day cut off is clearly irrelevant insofar as
chavala of the mother is concerned. It is equally irrelevant on hashchatat zera grounds - after all,
destruction of sperm is prohibited even prior to fertilisation.
Moreover, the affirmative obligations of hatzala based on "lo taamod al dam rayecha" and "hashavat
aveida" may apply at all stages of embryonic development. There is a disagreement among the rishonim
if one is permitted to desecrate shabbat or otherwise violate the Torah in order to save or prolong the
life of a foetus where the mother's life is not endangered.22 According to some authorities, the
dispensation of "V'chai Bahem" applies only to autonomous lives. The Baal Hilchot Gedolot seems to
concede that the verse "V'chai Bahem" does not cover a foetus but maintains that the potential for life
and future observance of mitzvot triggers the rationale of "Better that one shabbat be violated so that
many other shabbatot (may) be kept." The Behag apparently utilizes this concept as a justification for
pikuach nefesh independent of the verse "and they shall live by them." Ramban makes clear that
according to Behag, no distinction should be drawn between pre-40 day and post. It is the potential for
human life, not its actualisation, that justifies the dispensation of pikuach nefesh. The final decision is in
accordance with the Behag. Moreover, even according to those who dispute Behag, it is arguable that
there may indeed be a mitzva of "lo taamod" and "hashavat gufo" even towards a foetus and even before
the fortieth day but this obligation does not fall within the parameters of pikuach nefesh when such
obligations conflict with other prohibitions such as shabbat. In the absence of such a conflict, all might
concede the duty of hatzala. Be it as it may, however, according to the Behag, one can clearly be
mechallel shabbat for a foetus less than 40 days old. It would be incongruous and illogical to permit and
apparently mandate the violation of shabbat in order to save a life that one is in fact permitted to
extinguish. Thus, unless chillul shabbat be termed optional, a right to chillul shabbat for life
preservation should inescapably lead to a prohibition against the taking of such life.23 Note, however,
that most assuredly the converse is not necessarily true; the inability to be mechalel shabbat does not
automatically suggest that active termination is permitted.
Conceding, however, that abortion within 40 days is not retzicha or chavala of the child does permit
consideration of other factors and mitigating circumstances that would otherwise be ignored. Thus,
genetic defects or medical reasons falling short of rodef or pikuach nefesh, such as serious genetic
conditions (e.g.,Tay-Sachs), may justify abortion. (What about rape, incest?)
c) Abortion Prior to Forty Days Under Noachide Law
The source of the Noachide ban on abortions is the verse "Shofeich Dam HaAdam B'Adam Damo
Yishafech" (Genesis ____) which is interpreted as meaning, "He who spills the blood of a man [person]
within a man [person], his blood shall be spilled." As the Talmud points out, a "person within a person"
aptly describes a fetus.24 Since, however, the Noachide prohibition is premised on there being a
"person" and an embryo less than 40 days does not have the status of "personhood", some poskim have
concluded that there is no Noachide ban on feticide within 40 days;25 Noachides are enjoined only
against the taking of actual life (even foetal), not potential life. The latter could be proscribed only
under hashchatat zera, a nullification of p'ru u'revu, chavala of the mother or as a violation of the
affirmative duty to "desecrate one Sabbath so that he may keep many Sabbaths." None of these
obligations pertains to non Jews.
This psak gives rise to two questions: Could a Jew perform an abortion on a Noachide if the embryo is
less than 40 days? Could a Jewish woman procure such an abortion by the expedient of utilising a non
Jewish physician?
The answer to the first question appears to be in the affirmative. While a Jew may not take the life of a
non Jew, there is no positive duty of protecting future life. Nor is there the problem of lifnei ivair in
aiding and abetting the woman in obtaining the abortion since the non Jew herself is not commanded
with the affirmative obligations of hatzala. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that a Jewish physician could
normally not abort the foetus of a non Jew, he would be permitted to abort a Noachide foetus of less
than 40 days even according to the authorities that prohibit such an abortion for a Jew.26
The answer to the second question, however, is in the negative. It is indeed true that insofar as the non
Jew is concerned, aborting any embryo within 40 days is halachically permissible whether the embryo is
Jewish or non Jewish. However, given the fact that the abortion prohibition is triggered not only by the
one performing the procedure but by the woman who makes herself available and hires the physician,
the obligation to preserve and protect even potential Jewish life would preclude her acquiescence in the
procedure.
In short, whatever leniency’s may exist under Noachide law for the termination of a pregnancy less than
40 days old would not extend to a Jewish woman enlisting the assistance of non Jews. [At the very
least, this would also be prohibited rabbinically under the rubric of amira l'akum but in all probability
would involve a direct violation of "lo taamod" and "hashavat gufo", certainly according to the Behag
and possibility even according to those who differ with the Behag concerning chillul shabbat.]
d) Pre-embryo Disposition
A pre-embryo should certainly be entitled to no more halachic protection than a pre-40 day implanted
embryo and there are logical grounds to afford it less. Thus, if genetic testing uncovers a defect which
would justify abortion of a pre-40 day embryo, destruction of the pre-embryo may be similarly
permitted. A number of contemporary poskim have gone further and have allowed the virtual
indiscriminate discard of "surplus" embryos even where actual abortion of a transplanted "less than 40
day" embryo would not be justified.27
Without in any way intending to issue a psak, it would appear that the validity of this leniency should
depend on the reasons why abortions are generally prohibited. Because a pre-embryo is outside a
woman's body, there is obviously no issue of chavala of the mother. Since the pre-embryo is not in an
environment in which it will be able to be brought to term and live, it arguably does not have the status
of a living being even according to those who might accord such status to an implanted embryo before
40 days. Thus, neither retzicha nor chavala of the embryo would be implicated. It is not likely that
destruction of a pre-embryo could be regarded as a chavala since there is no existing living being which
is being "wounded." It has also been suggested that regardless of the 40 day rule, until there is
implantation within a human being, no human life can be said to exist.28 (It might also be added that
since the pre-embryo is microscopic, not visible to the unaided human eye, the Torah does not invest its
existence with any halachic significance.)29
To the extent abortion restrictions rest on hashchatat zera considerations, however, those concerns
should apply equally to the pre-embryo. As noted, many authorities refuse to equate abortion of any
embryo or foetus with the sin of hashchatat zera arguing that the latter is violated only at the time of
seminal emission and not after an ovum has been fertilised.
The fundamental question is not whether there is a sin to destroy pre-embryos which at best may only be
life in potential not actualisation but rather whether there is a mitzva to preserve them. What about
considerations of "lo taamod", "hashavat gufo", "vechai bahem", "mutav sheyechallel shabbat achat v'al
yechallel shabbatot harbai"? Do these concepts impose an affirmative obligation to sustain the "life" of
a pre-embryo and compel its implantation? Assuming there is no hashchatat zera issue, the matter is not
clear. I have already mentioned the halachic view of the Behag and the argument of Chavot Yair that
whenever there is a dispensation for chillul shabbat, there is a duty to affirmatively sustain life and a
corresponding prohibition not to diminish it.
A recent responsum of R. Shmuel Wozner of B'nai Brak has ruled that even according to the Behag, one
may not be mechallel shabbbat on behalf of a preembryo.30 Since the justification of chillul shabbat is
based not on the presence of actual human life (since mayim be'alma) but only on its potential, where
the potential for realisation is very remote or improbable (as is the present percentage of successful IVF
pregnancies brought to term), the dispensation for chillul shabbat or other transgression of the Torah is
not present. If we understand this ruling to suggest that there are no affirmative obligations to sustain
pre-embryo life, the surplus embryos may indeed be discarded with impunity for any reason. If,
however, as is more likely, R. Wozner's ruling is limited to conflicts with other prohibitions but in the
absence of such conflict, there would indeed be an obligation to protect potential life, then one could
not automatically assume the unlimited right to discard unwanted preembryos.31
I would suggest, however, an alternative basis of leniency. It must be kept in mind that what is involved
in pre-embryo disposition is not necessarily active destruction but simply allowing them to thaw out or
disintegrate in storage. Thus, we are not dealing with active homicide (retzicha b'yadaim) but simply
omitting to affirmatively act - the sin is shev v'al taaseh on hatzala. Moreover, for reasons of meyim
bealma, even active destruction would at worst be violative only of the affirmative duty to protect
potential life, ie., under no circumstances would it be retzicha. Certainly, from the perspective of the
husband and wife, they are at worst authorising the cessation of affirmative activity that would
culminate in embryo transfer and implantation.
Assuming that in the abstract there is a mitzva to sustain life based on "lo taamod", "hashavat gufo",
"vechai bahem", or "mutav sheyechallel", at what cost? The halacha is very clear that one need not
endanger one's life in order to preserve or protect even the existing life of another.32 While it is
permitted and perhaps encouraged to do so, there is no duty.33 It is also clear that pregnancy and
parturition are life-threatening conditions that justify chillul shabbat. Thus, a woman should not be
halachically compelled to receive a fertilised ovum in order to possibly preserve its life because through
that process she would be endangering her own. Accordingly, fertilised eggs do not have to be
implanted.
Admittedly, this argument might prove too much. After all, it is a crystal clear that a healthy woman
may not abort a viable pregnancy merely because pregnancy and childbirth per se are life threatening
experiences. Because these experiences are normal, common and natural and the risk of danger in
ordinary course is low, the life of the foetus must be respected. Moreover, although a woman is
technically not obligated in the mitzva of pr'v u'revu, she certainly could not insist on contraception or
abstinence on the grounds that pregnancy per se is a dangerous condition. The obligations and
responsibilities of the marital bond including onah, lashevet yatzara, and the duty to facilitate the
husband's mitzva of pru v'revu all combine to negate the elements of sakkana which at best is remote
and infrequent. Similarly, the existence of a concrete nefesh (embryo or foetus after 40 days) precludes
such reliance. Where, however, the prospects of hatzala are in themselves extremely remote, perhaps
even remote dangers may justify inaction. Insofar as onah and lashevet are concerned, these obligations
do not require consent to an IVF procedure nor would it require her to complete the procedure once
begun. [Onah can also be waived by mutual consent.] In the absence of countervailing concerns,
therefore, the woman's claim of sakkana at least in the context of a pre-embryo should be given
credence. (What about within 40 days? Is this only an argument for not implanting but not to destroy?)
The conclusions that emerge from this analysis are a bit unusual:
(1) all extracted eggs that are fertilised should be implanted;
(2) the wife would have the right to refuse implantation;
(3) if the wife is willing, the husband would have no right to abort the process;
(4) if wife says no, it is questionable whether the embryos must be discarded or whether they can be
donated. While logic would support the latter, the alternative of donation is not accepted by most
poskim addressing the matter.
e) The Propriety of Initiating the Procedure
A final question: given the fact that a woman has the right to refuse the receipt of fertilised eggs on
grounds of sakkana, is it proper to perform or authorise an IVF procedure which may result in more preembryos than the woman is willing to receive either now or later? Must the IVF protocol be structured
so that only a very limited eggs are retrieved to guarantee that all fertilised eggs will be "rescued"?
While freezing for later implantation minimises the problem, it does not eliminate it. If, for example,
twenty eggs are retrieved and six are fertilised, a woman may be unwilling to have all the embryos
implanted even over a period of several years.
Without coming to a definitive conclusion, this question may be connected to a well-known dispute
between the Ramban and the Baal HaMaor. In Talmudic times, babies needed warm water after
circumcision. If the brit was taking place on Shabbat the water had to be prepared before Shabbat
because it is only a machshir milah - something necessary for the brit but not part of the actual
ceremony. If one did circumcise a baby and then the water spilled, it is clear that one would be allowed
to boil water for pikuach nefesh. But what if the water spilled before the milah? Is one allowed to
perform the brit knowing that a situation of sakkana will thereby be generated necessitating the
desecration of Shabbat or is it preferable to defer the milah until the next day? Baal HaMaor rules the
milah should be postponed while Ramban rules that the mitzva that is incumbent to be performed
should be performed even with the knowledge that a situation of pikuach nefesh will be generated.34
While the precise dispute of Ramban and Baal HaMaor is not explicitly addressed in the Shulchan
Aruch, the halachic consensus follows Baal HaMaor and necessitates that the milah be deferred.35
If we may extrapolate from shabbat to other areas, the governing principle appears to be that one is not
allowed to engage in conduct [which may be permissible in and of itself] with the knowledge that a
situation of pikuach nefesh necessitating transgression will be thereby generated. Applying this to the
disposal of surplus embryos, while the in vitro fertilisation may be halachically permissible in and of
itself - donation of eggs is not problematical and the emission of sperm was for procreative purposes
and not levatala - it would be halachically improper to utilise the procedure in such a manner that there
are likely to be surplus fertilised eggs that will then have to be discarded. Even if halacha permits those
eggs to be discarded once they are generated (because of considerations of maternal health and pikuach
nefesh), it would be improper to generate them. In effect, therefore, unless the mother is willing to have
fertilised ova cryopreserved for future use, oocyte extraction would have to be limited to the number of
eggs that the mother is able and willing to have implanted.
The analogy to brit milah and shabbat may not be exact. Circumcising on shabbat in the absence of
warm water will inevitably necessitate chillul shabbat by virtue of pikuach nefesh; because of this
certainty, Baal HaMaor rules that the milah should be delayed. By contrast, the extraction of multiple
eggs will not necessarily result in transgression. Presumably, even according to Behag the mitzvot of
hatzala, lo taamod, hashavat aveida etc. come into effect only upon fertilisation. It is quite possible that
out of a total of eight, ten, or twelve eggs, only one or two (or none) may be fertilised. It is possible, of
course, that multiple fertilisations may occur thereby necessitating their disposal, but since this is only a
possibility, not a certainty, the parties are permitted and indeed encouraged to proceed in any way that
will enhance the efficacy of the procedure regardless of what the later consequences might be.
This conclusion - distinguishing between certainty and possibility - finds support in another law of
milah on Shabbat. Chazal had a tradition that for the first three days following milah (according to
some, only the third day) the child's health may be especially precarious permitting the violation of
Shabbat because of pikuach nefesh. Some poskim have concluded that it is improper to perform a milah
on Thursday or Friday (unless it is a bris performed on eighth day) since this may necessitate chillul
shabbat.36 The majority of poskim rule, however, that Thursday or Friday milah is permitted and it is in
fact improper to delay the performance of a mitzva.37 While it is indeed true that purely elective
surgery should not be performed after Wednesday because of the mere possibility of shabbat having to
be violated,38 such possibilities carry no weight where a mitzva is being performed.
As between a mitzva like milah where only the certainty of desecration warrants postponement and an
optional medical procedure where even the possibility of chillul shabbat necessitates rescheduling, IVF
falls somewhere in the middle. On one hand, the obligations of p'ru v'revu and lashevet have never been
understood as compelling resort to any type of surgical procedure to achieve procreation. At the same
time, most poskim do consider the offspring produced from IVF as having a familial bond to the
biological parents. The father either fulfils p'ru v'revu or at least the prophetic injunction of lashevet. As
such, the kiyum hamitzva that one may attain, by analogy to milah shelo bizmana, may be sufficiently
great that one may be permitted to pursue whatever avenues carry the greatest prospects of success even
if there is a possibility (not a certainty) that pikuach nefesh will be invoked to violate prohibitions, ie.,
disposal of surplus eggs.
In fact, one might argue that to the extent IVF is permissible only because the sperm is procured for
purposes of reproduction, the prohibitions of hashchatat zera require, not only permit, that IVF be
implemented in a manner most likely to produce a successful pregnancy and minimise the need for
repetitive semen procurement. Since multiple egg retrieval greatly increases the chances for success, its
utilization may actually be preferable notwithstanding the "risk" of surplus embryos that will not be
implanted.