DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR
( BAHAGIAN DAGANG )
GUAMAN SIVIL NO: D1-22-1199-2000
ANTARA
1.
ORIX CREDIT MALAYSIA SDN. BHD
(Dahulunya dikenali sebagai UOL
Credit Sdn. Bhd)
… PLAINTIF
DAN
1.
MOHD IKBAL BIN ISMAIL
2.
LEE SIEW LENG
… DEFENDANDEFENDAN
ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN
The issue in this case is rather simple, namely was the Plaintiff
legally competent to give out the loan (non-revolving loan) to the 1st
defendant via the Term Loan Agreement (‘the TLA’)[P5]? Or
alternatively, if it was not so competent, whether there ought to be
restitution by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff for the advantage that
the former had obtained as the direct result of the purported
revolving fund that the Plaintiff had granted to him.
Page 1 of 22
The Plaintiff was at the material time of granting the loan to the 1st
Defendant, a money-lending company incorporated in Malaysia and
it also had obtained an exemption under section 2A(2) of the
Moneylenders Act 1995 to undertake money-lending activities.
2.
On the 15th October 1997, the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant
had signed a Non-Revolving Term Loan Agreement (‘the TLA’)
whereby the Plaintiff had agreed to lend to the 1st Defendant a loan
facility to the tune of RM4 million upon such terms as contained in
the said TLA. Among the terms of the TLA, it was provided that the
loan facility may be utilized by the 1st Defendant by him giving the
Plaintiff Drawdown notice within 3 months from the date of the said
TLA. As would be common to all loan agreements, there were also
provisions for interest charges to be payable on the principal sum at
rates as agreed by both parties. Like all agreements of such nature,
there were also a guarantee dated on the same date of the TLA
whereby the 2nd Defendant had agreed to guarantee, inter alia, the
repayment by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff of the loan facility
amount with interest, costs, expenses and all amounts payable to
the Plaintiff by the Defendant under the TLA. The 1st Defendant had
given the drawdown notices to the Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of
the TLA and the Plaintiff had obliged, also pursuant to the terms of
the said TLA and the whole loan facility of RM4 million was
disbursed in three separate tranches on three separate dates,
according to instructions given by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff.
Page 2 of 22
The 1st Defendant had paid part of the interest as outlined in the
repayment schedule sent to the 1st Defendant. Apart from that
payment, the 1st Defendant had failed to repay the Plaintiff the
balance of the loan facility amount still owing, which at the 31st
January 1999 had stood at RM4,565,898.55.
3.
Despite 2 notices of demand for the repayment of the loan
facility in the above sum having been sent to the 1st and the 2nd
Defendants, both of them had failed to deliver on their part of the
bargain under the TLA. Thus this action was instituted against both
of them by the Plaintiff to recover from them the balance sum with
interest and costs. The guarantor was one Lee Siew Leng, the 2nd
Defendant cited in this action. But action against him had been
discontinued by the Plaintiff as he had since, been declared a
bankrupt. But he did come to this Court to testify on behalf of the 1 st
Defendant, as SD2.
4.
The 1st Defendant had denied liability under the said TLA and
averred as the thrust of his defence that the Plaintiff was not in
possession of a valid license and legal exemption under the relevant
law to give out the kind of loan under which the TLA was
categorized. This was contained in paragraph 2 of the statement of
defence. It was also pleaded by the defence that the interest
charged were excessive and that the Plaintiff had failed to realize the
securities that had been deposited before embarking on this mode of
Page 3 of 22
recovery of the said loan facility. It was the stated case of the
defence that on account of this apparent illegality and breach by the
Plaintiff, the present claim by the Plaintiff ought to be dismissed with
costs.
5.
So in the scheme of things pertaining to this case, the issue
that had taken centre-stage in the trial must necessarily be whether
the Plaintiff was legally competent to issue the loan facility to the 1 st
Defendant on such terms as contained in the TLA. It would have
been competent to do so, if it had, at the material time in question
when the TLA was entered into, been issued with a valid moneylending license by the Ministry of Local Housing Government.
6.
In that regard, the Plaintiff had put in documents marked as
P3 and P4 to show that at the material time when it had given out the
said loan facility to the 1st Defendant, it was duly authorized to do so.
SP1 who had appeared before this Court had testified that by virtue
of P3 the Plaintiff was properly and legally clothed to give out loans
similar to the one that it had given to the 1st Defendant on 15th
October 1997.
7.
It was the evidence of SP1 in this Court that the Minister of
Housing and Local Government (‘the said Minister’) who was
empowered under the Moneylender’s Act 1995 (‘the MLA 1995’) had
granted the Plaintiff exemption under section 2A(2) thereunder, via a
Page 4 of 22
letter dated 2nd May 1996. The said section 2A(2) provides the said
Minister with the necessary power to exempt anybody including any
company or society from all or any of the provisions of the said MLA
1995 subject to such limitations, restrictions or conditions as the said
Minister may specify in the notification in the Gazette. The said letter
containing the exemption was marked as P3 and the exemption was
to be effective for 3 years with effect from the date that it was issued.
It was in the evidence of SP1 that the Plaintiff had construed that the
exemption as having exempted it from the operation of all the
provisions of the MLA 1995 including the giving out of loan or money
lending such as the one that the Plaintiff had given out to the 1st
Defendant in this case. SP1 was adamant on this score as could be
seen from the Notes of Evidence (‘NOE’) especially during crossexamination by learned Counsel En Siew, thus:
“Q:
Nowhere in this agreement was it mentioned that
the loan was for credit leasing and share financing?
PW1:
Yes.
Q:
Please look at clause 2.2 of the term loan (m.s 14
Ikatan B) it was given for ‘personal investment
’purpose?
PW1:
Yes.
Page 5 of 22
Q:
I put it to you that this personal investment term
loan, is not the exempted money lending condition
granted to the Plaintiff.
PW1:
8.
I disagree.”
Premised along that line of examination, the learned Counsel
En Siew then proceeded to put to the SP1 (PW1) the thrust of the 1st
Defendant’s case, as follows at page 7 of the NOE:
“Q:
I put it to you that the loan term agreement between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant no.1 was unlawful
and illegal, because it did not fulfill the conditions of
the exemption.
A:
9.
I disagree.”
As such, it would be appropriate at this stage to look at P3 to
see what really was exempted by the Minister, to the Plaintiff with
regard to the extent of the operation of the provisions of the MLA
1995. For that purpose, the operative words in P3 that must be given
due consideration must necessarily by the followings:
“…bahawa Yang Berhormat Menteri Perumahan dan
Kerajaan Tempatan setelah mempertimbangkan permohonan
tuan dan bersetuju memberi pengecualian kepada UOL
Page 6 of 22
Credit Sdn Bhd di bawah seksyen 2A(2) Akta Pemberi
Pinjaman Wang 1951 untuk tempoh tiga tahun mulai 17 April
1996 sehingga 16 April 1999 dengan syarat-syarat berikut:(a)
10.
Aktiviti:
(i)
Pemajak kredit; dan
(ii)
Pembiayaan syer.”
From the above, it was forwarded in this Court by the
Plaintiff’s witnesses that the exemption had covered activities such
as giving of personal loan such as the one that it had extended to the
1st Defendant in this case. In the course of his submissions the
learned Counsel had urged before this Court that the material
wordings of the said P3 as quoted above were different from the
words employed in the eventual Gazette that had appeared some 2
years down the road. To appreciate that point raised by the learned
Counsel, I would now reproduce the operative words in the Gazette
that had been tendered in this Court as P4. The said P4 reads, at the
material portion, thus:
“…the Minister exempts UOL Credit Sdn Bhd ,a company
incorporated in Malaysia, from the Act for a period of three
years with effect from 17th April 1996 to 16th April 1999:
Provided that -
Page 7 of 22
(a)
11.
Its activities of money lending shall be limited to (i)
Credit leasing; and
(ii)
Share financing.”
While the witnesses for the Plaintiff in their evidence, had
indicated that their interpretation of the P3 was wide enough to bring
the lending of personal loan under the umbrella of the exemption, the
learned Counsel En. J. Edwin Rajasooria in his submission had
pointed out that the Gazette P4 was more specific in terms of it
setting out the exact scope of the exemption in terms of the moneylending activities that the Plaintiff was allowed to carry out under the
exemption. In not so many words, he also seemed to imply that the
P3 was ambiguous in stating out what activities were prohibited. But
with due respect, such line of argument was not supported by the
evidence led before this court and ought therefore to be rejected.
12.
Having looked at the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses on
this issue, I had found that they could not articulate under which of
the 2 stated activities listed down in P3, namely credit leasing and
share financing, would the money-lending activity of giving out of a
personal loan such as the one which it had extended to the 1st
Defendant would fall under.
Page 8 of 22
13.
Having considered the evidence so led, to my mind, in so far
as the exemption order by the Minister is concerned, the activities as
listed down there in both in P3 and P4, are specific activities with
peculiar implications attaching to them. As alluded to by me earlier,
no attempts were made by the Plaintiff’s witnesses to explain to this
Court how a giving out of a personal loan for investment of the
nature of the loan given to the 1st Defendant could be categorized
under any one of the 2 stated activities in the exemption order
appearing in both P3 and P4. I therefore would find as a fact that the
Plaintiff had failed to establish by way of evidence that the TLA it had
entered into with the 1st Defendant was one that was allowed under
the exemption. It is clear that the exemption order was not a
complete exemption that would have the effect of exempting the
Plaintiff from all the operative provisions of the relevant Act. In fact, it
was one that was a limited exemption order to allow the Plaintiff to
do the activities of credit leasing and share financing. The SP1 had
agreed during cross-examination when put by the learned Counsel
for the D1st Defendant that nowhere in the TLA was it ever
mentioned that the said loan facility extended to his client was for
credit leasing and share financing ( page 6 of the NOE). Therefore
premised on that finding by me, I would rule that the TLA was not a
legally binding document between the parties as it was entered into
when in fact the Plaintiff was not properly and legally clothed to
execute such an agreement. In other words, I would agree with
learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant that the TLA was illegal and
was of no legal effect and everything that was provided under it was
Page 9 of 22
also of no effect. As such, by virtue of section 15 of the MLA 1995,
repayment of the money so lent shall not be enforceable under the
terms of the said TLA. So, the Plaintiff could not enforce the TLA as
a basis to recover the loan facility that it had extended to the 1st
Defendant when it was not empowered to do so, as the exemption
order P3 and P4 was limited in nature and did not allow nor permit
the Plaintiff from lending out the loan as in TLA.
14.
However, be that as it may, is the Plaintiff left without any
relief? At the outset, I agree with the stand taken by the Plaintiff’s
learned Counsel that section 15 of the MLA 1995 does not prohibit
nor does it curtail restitution or compensation under section 66 of the
Contracts Act 1950 to be pursued by a lender in the position of the
Plaintiff. But whether the Plaintiff could succeed through that avenue
for its remedy is yet another matter which this Court ought to
determine on due consideration of the evidence in the light of the law
in force.
15.
The learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant had objected to
this course of action be even considered and he had submitted, not
without basis I must say, that the matter of restitution was not
specifically pleaded by the Plaintiff in its Statement of Claim against
his client. The Order 18, Rules of the High Court 1980 was and
indeed must be referred to. Rule 7 of Order 18 1980 provides that
facts not evidence must be pleaded. Rule 8 then states the matters
Page 10 of 22
that must be pleaded but it does not state that law must be
specifically pleaded. Rule 11 of the same Order 18 does say though,
that points of law may be pleaded. Having considered the
submissions I am of the view that the rules as contained under Order
18 do not provide as a mandatory requirement that points of law
must be pleaded in the pleadings. I agree with the submission of the
plaintiff’s learned Counsel that a party does not have to expressly
plead restitution (which is a point of law) as the statement of claim is
meant to contain only facts, not the evidence or the law. In fact, it
was impressed upon this Court by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff,
that an analogy could be drawn with the legal issue of estoppel
which was not pleaded in the case of Masjaya Trading Sdn Bhd v
Kedah Cement Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 18. The Court of Appeal in
that case had held in that case that “Although the plaintiff’s pleaded
case did not expressly raise estoppel, all relevant facts on which an
estoppel might arise were pleaded. That was sufficient and an
express plea was not necessary.” I agree that such attempt at the
stated analogy was valid. Likewise in this case before this Court, the
same circumstances had obtained and as such what the appeal
Court had said in the Masjaya Trading case [supra] must therefore
apply in full force here as well. Premised upon that consideration, I
would dismiss the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the 1st
Defendant in that regard.
Page 11 of 22
16.
Perhaps it would be useful at this stage to see what the state
of the law is regarding the invocation of section 66 of the Contracts
Act 1950. A short reference to a few decided cases of high authority
maybe helpful as they are hardly controversial. The case that would
readily come to mind on section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 must
be the Privy Council case of Menaka v Lim Kum Chum (1977) 1
MLJ 91 which effectively held that the respondent moneylender who
had contravened section 8 of the Moneylenders Ordinance and who
therefore could not enforce his illegal contract with the appellant on
account of the illegality, was entitled to recover the same sum that
was lent to the appellant under section 66 of the Contracts Act as the
respondent was not aware of the illegality of the transaction at the
time of the execution of the documents and that the illegality was
discovered subsequent thereto. Similarly in the case of Ahmad bin
Udoh & anor v Ng Aik Chong (1970) 1 MLJ 82 the Federal Court
had ruled in favour of the respondent by invoking section 66 of the
Contracts Act 1950 as the parties were ignorant that they were in
fact executing an illegal agreement, thereby entitling him to be
restituted by the appellant of the advantage which the appellant had
derived from him.
17.
From these cases, it has become clear that the determining
factor that tilted the balance in favour of both the respondents there
had been the act that the parties were unaware of the illegal
character of the agreement at the time when they executed the said
Page 12 of 22
agreement. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff had urged this
Court to find likewise. Having looked at the evidence again, I have to
agree with him. To my mind, it was clear that the Plaintiff had lent the
RM4 million to the 1st Defendant on the strength of the exemption
order P3that was issued by the Minister concerned. It could be a
mistake or out of sheer ignorance on the part of the Plaintiff as to the
true ambit or scope of the said exemption, but what is clear has been
that the Plaintiff was ignorant of the illegality of the transaction
involving the TLA (P5) with the 1st Defendant. It was also clear from
the evidence of the 1st Defendant that he had not entered into the
TLA with the Plaintiff for an illegal purpose. His evidence on that
matter reads:
“Q:
Setuju dengan saya tujuan pinjaman P5 itu adalah
sah?
A:
Saya tidak faham soalan. Sekarang saya kata saya
setuju setelah P/B terangkan maksud soalan itu, iaitu
bukan
untuk
tujuan
haram
seperti
judi
dan
sebagainya.” ( See NOE at page 36 )
18.
Now let us then see whether the1st Defendant had obtained
an advantage from the Plaintiff pursuant to the said TLA. A narration
of how the 1st Defendant had obtained advantage from the impugned
TLA (P5) can be clearly seen below, essentially from a scrutiny of his
own evidence recorded in this Court.
It was in the evidence of the
Page 13 of 22
1st Defendant Mohd. Iqbal bin Ismail (SD3) that he had admitted to
having signed the TLA [P5] with the Plaintiff and that he was the
principal borrower of the same loan but that he was not responsible
to repay for the same loan because the proceeds from the said loan
were purportedly used to finance the so-called CN Gallery project
and that the repayment for the same loan was to be made by
Syarikat Metro Jelita Sdn Bhd. In his own words, at page 32 of the
NOE, the Defendant had said on being questioned by learned
Counsel for the plaintiff En. J. Edwin Rajasooria:
“Q:
Berpandukan P5, setuju dengan saya bahawa kamu
adalah
bertanggungjawab
untuk
membayar
balik
pinjaman berkenaan dengan P5 ini?
A:
Tidak, sebab wang dari pinjaman ini adalah untuk
membiayai projek CN Gallery dan pembayaran balik
adalah dibuat oleh Syarikat Metro Jelita Sdn Bhd.
Q:
Saya cadangkan jawapan kamu tadi adalah tidak
benar, kerana terma-terma P5 tidak ada berkata
demikian.
A:
19.
Saya tidak pasti.”
Now, as evidenced from the answers given by SD3, the 1st
Defendant in this case, his understanding of his contractual
obligations pursuant to an agreement was shown to be totally
Page 14 of 22
misconceived. It is clear that the obligations under a contractual
agreement are based on the principle of privity of contract between
the contracting parties alone. P5 is clear as regards who the
contracting parties were. They were the Plaintiff as the giver of the
RM4 million loan and the SD3 as the principal borrower to whom the
loan was granted to upon conditions as stipulated in the P5
pertaining, among others, to its repayment. P5 did not state that the
said loan would be repaid by the Syarikat Metro Jelita Sdn Bhd, as
alleged by the SD3. On the contrary, it was SD3 who had the
obligation to repay the said loan. The fact that SD3 was not even
sure, when it was put to him that the P5 did not state such a
stipulation to the effect that the said loan was to be repaid by the
Syarikat Metro Jelita Sdn Bhd, had put the credibility of the SD3 to
be in great doubt. If he was not sure of his above quoted statement,
which was clearly intended to exonerate him from liability under the
said loan, it was made without basis whatsoever and his feigned
‘ignorance’
on
that
critical
issue
had
bordered
on
being
contemptuous. In fact, when he was cross-examined by the learned
Counsel for the Plaintiff, his answers were mostly non-committal nor
conclusive. At page 31 of the Notes of Evidence, he had answered
when he was asked by learned Counsel En. J. Edwin Rajasooria
thus:
“Q:
Kamu ada baca terma-terma perjanjian dalam P5
sebelum kamu tandatanganinya?
Page 15 of 22
A:
20.
Saya tidak pasti, sebab perkara ini sudah lama.”
Somehow it made this Court to ponder why and how did the
1st Defendant (SD3) agree to sign on P5 as the principal borrower for
such a substantial sum of money over which he had illustrated to this
Court, through his answers that he had little interest in. It must be
borne in mind that the SD3 was no simpleton. In fact, he was the
Financial Controller in the employment of Syarikat Metro Jelita for 1
year in 1997. His answers were littered with “saya tidak pasti” or
“saya tidak tahu” must therefore be viewed as suspect. This case
might be old, but the involvement of SD3 in the scheme of things
relating to the said loan had been such that, as a reasonable person,
he ought to be constantly appraising himself of the development of
the matter relating to the said RM4 million loan. But that apparent
lackadaisical attitude on his part as shown throughout his evidence
before this Court had shown to this Court his attitude towards the
whole thing and that can only be viewed as a negative.
21.
It was also in evidence before this Court that the 1st
Defendant had given the necessary instructions to the Plaintiffs who
had acted on the same and had released and drawn-down the RM4
million loan facility in 3 different tranches. This was admitted to by
the 1st Defendant during his cross-examination by learned Counsel
for the Plaintiffs. This can be clearly seen at page 33 of the Notes of
Evidence as follows:
Page 16 of 22
“Q:
Sila lihat muka surat 35,38 dan 41 Ikatan ‘B’. Setuju
dengan saya bahawa kamu telah arahkan plaintiff
untuk keluarkan wang pinjaman seperti tertera dalam
muka surat 2 tersebut ke dalam akaun bank Lee Siew
Leng dan Leong Kok Chengdi BBMB?
A:
Saya setuju.
Q:
Sila lihat m.s. 36, 39 dan 42 dalam ikatan ‘B’. Setuju
dengan saya jumlah RM4 juta telahpun dimasukkan
dalam akaun tersebut atas arahan kamu kepada
Plaintiff?
A:
22.
Setuju.”
The 1st Defendant had also agreed that he had received from
the Plaintiffs the repayment schedules as appear on pages 37, 40
and 43 of Bundle ‘B’ for the loan in between October and November
of 1997. It is to be borne in mind that the 1st Defendant had also
agreed that the loan that he had obtained from the Plaintiff had been
a loan that was not for an illegal or an unlawful purpose. At page 3536 of the Notes of Evidence, the followings had appeared:
“Q:
Setuju dengan saya apabila kamu tandatangani P5
dengan
plaintiff,
kamu
beranggapan
pinjaman
tersebut adalah satu pinjaman yang sah?
Page 17 of 22
A:
Saya tidak pasti.
Q:
Setuju dengan saya tujuan pinjaman P5 itu adalah
sah?
A:
Saya tidak faham soalan. Sekarang saya kata saya
setuju setelah P/B terangkan maksud soalan itu, iaitu
bukan
untuktujuan
haram
seperti
judi
dan
sebagainya.”
23.
So, from the above, 2 things are clear. First, if the TLA (P5)
had been valid, the 1st Defendant would have been liable under it to
suffer the full brunt of the said TLA. Secondly, it is clear that the 1st
Defendant benefitted financially from the Plaintiffs in relation to the
RM4 million loan facility. It was the Plaintiff’s submission that
because the 1st Defendant had given the instructions for the release
of the monies and that the Plaintiff had so released it on such
instructions, it would matter not who finally dealt with the monies so
released. For all intents and purposes, it was the 1st Defendant who
had benefitted from release of the said loan facility. The learned
Counsel for the 1st Defendant did not agree. How would the law deal
with such a situation?
24.
Now, from a perusal of the evidence adduced before this
Court, it had become clear to me that when both parties had signed
and entered into this agreement as in P5 both parties had acted in
Page 18 of 22
good faith. There was proper documentation of the P5 and its related
attendant documents. This had not been a case where both of them
had illegally entered into P5 ab initio or for an illegal purpose or for
an unlawful consideration. All the while the Plaintiff had been acting
under the belief that it had been so exempted to lend money under
the exemption order P3 based on its interpretation of P3 as could be
seen clearly from the evidence of SP1. But what has also become
clear is that the 1st Defendant had benefitted from P5. He had got
what he wanted from the P5 but he was not repaying it despite
acknowledging that he had instructed the Plaintiff to release the
money totaling RM4 million and despite having received the demand
notices sent by the Plaintiff.
25.
In this kind of situation, section 66 of the Contracts Act 1956
would of necessity apply to remedy an injustice that could be
occasioned to the Plaintiff when the P5 was subsequently found to
be unenforceable by virtue of section 15 of the Moneylenders Act
1995. As could be seen from the evidence of the 1st Defendant
himself (SD3), this has not been a contract that had been entered
into by both parties in pari delicto for if that had been the case, this
Court, like any other Courts in this country would have just let
everything that had got to do with the TLA(P5) lie wherever it may be
and the Court will not intervene and lend its hands to either of the
parties in such illegal contracts which are unlawful ab initio. Such
has not been the factual matrix concerned with this case. In this
Page 19 of 22
case, the Plaintiff had disbursed the RM4 million to the various bank
accounts on the instructions of the 1st Defendant on account of the
purportedly legally competent contract in TLA (P5). As such, it had
become clear that the 1st Defendant had received an advantage
under the said P5 for which the Plaintiff must be restituted. It would
appear therefore that the Plaintiff would be on firmer ground to
succeed against the 1st Defendant on the ground that under the
circumstances, it would be unconscionable to allow the 1st Defendant
to be unjustly enriched as a direct result of getting the money from
the said loan facility from the Plaintiff which subsequently had
become unenforceable by law. Under such circumstance, it is the
law too that there ought to be restitution by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. But as the
Plaintiff was not exempted under the Money Lending Act 1995, they
could not charge any interest for the same, from the date of the
disbursement of the said loan to the 1st Defendant. So, the sum
recoverable under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 must
necessarily be lower than the sum which the Plaintiff was claiming
on the basis that the TLA (P5) was enforceable.
26.
As such, I enter judgement in favour of the Plaintiff, not on
the premise that the TLA was enforceable against the 1st Defendant
but rather on account of the fact that the circumstances of this case
had convinced this Court to rule in favour of the Plaintiff that there
ought to be restitution by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff for the
Page 20 of 22
advantage that the Defendant had obtained pursuant to the
impugned TLA(P5) under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. As
such, there shall be judgement entered in favour of the Plaintiff for
the sum being the balance of the RM4 million loan still not paid back
by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiffs, namely RM3,720.959.00
together with interest from the date of judgment till full payment.
Each party to bear own costs.
27.
Order accordingly.
………………………………………………….....
( ABANG ISKANDAR BIN ABANG HASHIM )
JUDGE
HIGH COURT OF MALAYA
KUALA LUMPUR.
Dated: 08th January, 2010.
Counsel For the Plaintiff:
Mr. J. Edwin Rajasooria from Tetuan K S Ong & Co,
Advocates and Solicitors
Page 21 of 22
Counsel for Defendant:
En. Daniel Siew and En. C.M. Tan for 1st Defendant
From Tetuan Joseph Ting & Co
Advocates and Solicitors
Cases referred to:
1.
Masjaya Trading Sdn Bhd v Kedah Cement Sdn Bhd [2004] 4
CLJ 18.
2.
Menaka v Lim Kum Chum (1977) 1 MLJ 91
3.
Ahmad bin Udoh & anor v Ng Aik Chong (1970) 1 MLJ 82
Page 22 of 22