SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
POLITICAL LAW
PROBABLE CAUSE; Reddish eyes and wobbling like drunk In a place where drug addicts
were reportedly roaming constitutpd probable cause to an experienced policeman.
FACTS: When the Anti-Narcotics Unit received information that drug addicts were roaming the area in
front of the Caloocan City cemetery, they conducted surveillance in said place and chanced upon
Manalili. The officers observed Manalili to have reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner. When
they asked Manalili what he holds in his hands, the latter tried to resist. When asked for the second time,
Manalili showed the wallet he was holding and allowed Patrolman Espiritu to examine the same. Espiritu
found marijuana residue inside. Manalili was charged with illegal possession of marijuana. He alleged
illegality of the search warrant for non-existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not probable cause for the search exists.
HELD: Yes. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companion observed during their
surveillance that the appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
cemetery which according to the police information was popular hang-out of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior
was characteristic of drug addicts who were high on drugs. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason
to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. [ManaIiIi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113447, October 9, 1997--- THIRD DIVISION; Panganiban J.]
ISSUANCE OF A VALID WARRANT OF ARREST; A judge must issue a warrant of
arrest after personally determining probable cause and not merely rely on the
recommendation of the prosecutor.
FACTS:A criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against the petitioners, Ho and
Narciso for alleged violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from
entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the latter, irrespective of whether the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Consequently, the said petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan and a warrant of arrest was
issued by the latter. Petitioners Ho and Narciso filed a Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the warrant, merely relied on the information
and resolution submit j ted by the Ombudsman without supporting evidence from the parties in violation
of the requirements of Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied said
motion via the challenged resolution, thus these petitions.
ISSUE: May a judge determine probable cause and issue warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the
resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation.
HELD: The petitions are meritorious. The determination of the probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is a reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the
report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is not
required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted
to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of the probable cause.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution commands the judge to
personally determine the probable cause in the issuance of warrant of arrest. [Ho and Narciso vs. People,
G.R. No. 106632 and 106678, October9, 1997--EN BANC; Panganiban, J.]
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT; Applications for search warrants even after court
hours are allowed by Administrative Order No. 13. Quick solutions of crimes and
apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights.
FACTS: An information was received that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu
City on board a vessel bringing with him marijuana; Because the information came late, the police were
not able to secure a search warrant. On the day of the arrival, they deployed themselves in the different
strategic points at the wharf to intercept Encinada. When they saw the accused walk down the gangplank
carrying two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand, they identified themselves as authorities and
found a bulky package in between the two chairs which were stacked together and tied with a piece of
string. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana by making a small tear in
the cellophane cover.
The RTC of Surigao City convicted Roel Encinada of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs under
Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. BIg. 179. The trial court emphasized that the accused was
caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search following his lawful arrest
was valid and the marijuana was admissible in evidence.
Upon conviction he appealed arguing that the search and his arrest without a warrant would not fall under
the doctrine of warrantless search as incident to lawful arrest. Further, he contended that the subject
marijuana leaves is not admissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search was valid.
HELD: The conviction could have been affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, the very evidence
implicating him- the prohibited drug found in his possession- cannot be used against him in this case, for
that matter, in “any proceeding.” There was a violation of the constitutional right of the accused enshrined
in Section 2, Article 3 of the 1 987 Constitution. Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is
legally inadmissible in evidence as a “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Even if the tip from an informant was
received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20 in his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant
of arrest, as the vessel was not expected to dock until 7 a.m. the following day. Administrative Order No.
13 allows applications for search warrants even after court hours.
The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal
traffic ot dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not
justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. [People vs. Encinada G.R. No. 116720, October 2,
1997--- THIRD DIVISION; Panganiban, J.]
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
FACTS: About a week prior to June 18, 1994, the Police Operatives from the drug enforcement unit of
WPDC had placed under surveillance the movements and activities of appellant Leonardo Dulay on
account of confidential and intelligence reports received in said unit about his drug trafficking around
Bambang St., Tondo, Manila.
Around 3:00 in the morning of June 18, the police informant spotted the approaching vehicle of Dulay
and immediately alerted the waiting policemen. The operatives tailed the subject jeepney and when the
latter stopped, they also stopped and accosted the passengers thereof. The team inspected the cylindrical
tin cans loaded in the vehicle and found out that they contained bundles of suspected dried marijuana.
They seized the suspected contrabands and submitted the same to NBI for laboratory analysis. The test
confirmed that the stuff were marijuana.
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. At the trial, they assail the admission of the seized
marijuana as evidence against them, arguing that the same was “the fruit of an illegal search conducted
without any search warrant”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seized marijuana is admissible as evidence against the appellants.
HELD: The seized marijuana is admissible as evidence. The appellants are deemed to have waived their
rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures for the following reasons: (1) they had
voluntarily submitted to the search and seizure. They never protested when the authorities opened the tin
cans loaded in their vehicle nor did they protested when they, together with their cargo were brought to
the police station; and (2) they effectively waived their rights by their voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating
in the trial.
When one voluntarily submits to a.search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. [People vs. Dulay,
et.aL, G.R. No. 119246, January30, 1998---ENBANC; Martinez,J.]
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; Only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to
the exhaustion doctrine.
FACTS: Challenged here is the decision of the Philippine Coconut Authority to issue permits to certain
applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner Association of
Philippine Coconut Desiccators alleged that said decision is beyond the power of the PCA and prayed that
said administrative agency must be compelled to observe its mandatory duty under the provisions of
statutes reguating the desiccated coconut industry. The PCA contended however that the petition should
be denied on the ground that petitioner has a pending appeal before the Office of the President and the
latter is guilty of forum-shopping and that it failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal to the President must be made by the petitioner before judicial review
is taken.
HELD: The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek a judicial
review has obviously no application in the case at bar. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA
in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. It is settled that only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion
doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete. Petition is
granted. [Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No.
110526, February 10, 1998---EN BA NC; Mendoza, J.)
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION; The courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters.
FACTS: Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. entered into a contract of sale involving a parcel of land in
Butuan City. Pending the negotiation of the same, the former filed a Sale Application before the Bureau
of Public Lands with regard to the said property which was granted. He then executed a Deed of
Relinquishment of Right in the said real property in favor of the private respondent in the amount of P
5,000.00. After staying in Indonesia for almost thirty years, the petitioner filed an action in the Bureau of
Lands alleging that he was not paid by the respondent. The case was decided in favor of respondent
Nasipit Lumber Co. Inc. Villaflor filed a motion for reconsideration before the Minister of Natural
Resources which affirmed the appealed decision. Both the trial court and the appellate court dismissed the
appeal of the petitioner. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Bureau of Lands is binding before the Supreme Court.
HELD: The petition has no support of law. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to case involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies “where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play where enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.’ In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [Villaflor
Vs. Court Of Appeals, G.R.. No. 95694; October 9, 1997-- THIRD DIVISION; Panganiban J.]
ELECTION LAW; The Constitution expressly vests in the COMELEC the power and
function to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
FACTS:The COMELEC charged the respondents of having tampered with, in conspiracy with one
another, the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan
Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the election of May 8,1995. However, the case was
dismissed when Chief State Prosecutor Zuno, who had been designated by the COMELEC to prosecute
the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents request of the dismissal of the same. The
COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the court of Appeals by filing Notices thereof
but the judges denied due course to its appeal. The sole basis for the denials was the fact that the
prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand
against the COMELEC. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the nullification of the
said orders of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether the decision to appeal the order of dismissal is vested to the COMELEC or its
designated prosecutor.
HELD: The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art.
IX-C, Section 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power to and function to “investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses and malpractices.”
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their
authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State
Prosecutor Zuno to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was
no probable cause for proceeding against the respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the
COMELEC and awaited its instructions. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judges to rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuno as basis for denying due
course to the notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC. [Comelec vs. Silva, G.R. No. 129417, February
10, 1998---EN BA NC; Mendoza, J.]
MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT; While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary involves
public interest, there is no compelling reason to justify the President’s appointment of
judges made within the period of ban imposed by the Constitution.
FACTS: Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by President
Fidel Ramos under date of March 30, 1998 of Hons. Valenzuela and Vallarta as judges of the RTC of
Branch 62 and 24, respectively. Such appointments were done a month prior to the next presidential
elections. The referral was made in view of the serious constitutional issue concerning said appointments.
Attention was drawn to Sec. 15 of Art VII of the Constitution which provides that a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term. On the other hand, Sec. 4 of Art. VIII of the same Constitution states that any
vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety-days from the occurrence thereof. Also
pertinent is Sec. 9 of the same Art. VIII which provides that the President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission of the list prepared by the Judicial Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may be allowed to fill vacancies in the judiciary during the period
of the ban on appointments.
HELD: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art.VII of the Constitution, the President is neither required
to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the Courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VIII. It appears that there is conflict between these provisions. To resolve
the conflict, the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and restriction on
the President’s power of appointment should be considered. Thus, the former should yield to the latter.
The appointments were held unjustified as tney come within the prohibition relating to appointments. [In
Re Appointments, Administrative Matter No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998 --EN BANC; Narvasa, J]
ELECTION LAW; Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the
voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itseIf.
FACTS: Petitioner Cipriano “Efren” Bautista, a mayoralty candidate in Navotas petitioned the
COMELEC to declare a certain Edwin “Efren Bautista, a nuisance candidate. The latter was accordingly
declared a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. However, because a motion for reconsideration was
filed by Edwin Bautista, his disqualification did not become final until three clays after elections. In view
thereof, the name of Edwin was excluded from the list of candidates for Mayor. But on election day, his
name was included again in the list. Later that same day, such name was again stricken off the list. Thus,
as per petitioner’s request, the COMELEC ordered that the votes cast for “Efren”, “Efren Bautista”, and
“Bautista” be declared stray votes but to segregate such stray votes into a separate improvised tally sheet
in order to count the total stray votes. When the canvass of the election returns was commenced, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioners the “stray
votes” or the sepaUate tallies of votes. In view of this refusal, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to declare such proceedings illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers is illegal.
HELD: A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter.
This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Factual circumstances and logic dictated that the
“Bautista” and “Efren’ votes which were mistakenly deemed as ‘stray votes” refer to only one candidate,
herein petitioner. True it is, the disqualification of Edwin Bautista was not yet final on election day.
However, it is also true that the electorate of Navotas was informed of such disqualification. The voter
had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as
a candidate for mayor. [Bautista vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998—-En Banc; Me/o,
J.J
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN OF LGU’S; A local government unit cannot authorize
an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. It
must be done through passage of an ordinance.
FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, petitioner Municipality of Paranaque
offered V.M. Realty Corporation to enter into a negotiated sale over the latter’s two parcels of land. The
offer was not accepted. Thus, by virtue of another resolution, a complaint for expropriation was filed by
the petitioner against the Corporation over the said land. RTC of Makati authorized the petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of
the land’s fair market value based on current tax declaration.
ISSUE: Whether or not an expropriation could be effected merely by virtue of a resolution.
HELD: A local government unit can expropriate private property by virtue of an ordinance and not
merely through a resolution. According to Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160, the following are the essential requisites
that must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1) An “ordinance” is enacted
by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent
domain; 2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless; 3) The payment of just compensation; and 4) A valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner of the property but said offer was not accepted.
It is clear therefrom that the first requisite was not complied with. A municipal ordinance is different from
resolution. An ordinance is a law, possesses a general and permanent character and needs a third reading
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment .or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter, temporary in nature and does not need a third reading, unless decided otherwise by a majority of
all the Sanggunian members. [Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corp, G.R. No. 127820, July 20,
1998---First Division,- Panganiban, J]
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; The rule prescribing the ten-day period for filing an
election protest is a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which
would deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo Roquero and private respondent Reynaldo Villano were candidates for
mayor during the local elections held on May 8,1995.
On July 19,1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers EMBC] proclaimed petitioner Roquero as the duly
elected Mayor. Respondent Villano filed a motion for reconsideration to annul or suspend the
proclamation. The same was denied. A petition for certiorari was also denied. A motion to reconsider
such denial was also denied, copy of which was received by Villano on May
7,1996.
On May 17, 1996, Villano filed an election protest before the Malolos RIO. Petitioner Roquero however,
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the election protest was filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period for filing the same.
The COMELEC denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the revision of the ballots.
ISSUE: Whether or not election protest of private respondent Villano was filed on time.
HELD: The COMELEC, in ruling that the election protest was filed on time, merely reckoned the
10-day period from the time of the receipt of Supreme Court resolution dismissing his petition to the date
when he filed his election protest [i.e from May 7 to May 17]. In computing the 10-day period, the
COMELEC did not consider the running of the period from the date of proclamation of the petitioner
candidate to the date the pleading was filed with the COMELEC to annul or suspend the proclamation;
and from the time private respondent received the ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition, to the
time he filed the petition before this Court questioning the COMELEC’s ruling.
Under Sec. 248 of the Omnibus Election Code the filing of a petition to annul the proclamation of any
candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest. Petitioner
Roquero was proclaimed by the MBC as the duly elected mayor on July 19,1995. Five days later, or on
July 24,1995, private respondent Villano filed with respondent COMELEC a pre-proclamation motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, only five [5] days of the ten [10] day reglemeritary period to file an
election protest remained. The ten [10] day reglementary period was suspended during the pendency of
the pre-proclamation case in the COMELEO and in this Court, until private respondent Villano received a
copy of this Court’s Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on May 7, 1996. Verily, on May
7,1996, the five-day remainder of the reglementary period to file an election protest resumed to run again
and expired on May 12, 1996. Private respondent Villano therefore belatedly filed his election protest on
May 17, 1996, five [5] days after the deadline for filing the same. [Roquero vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
128165, Apr11 15, 1998----EN BANC; Kapunan, J.]
EXERCISE OF OFFICIAL POWERS; Official powers cannot be merely assumed by
administrative officers, nor can they be created by the courts in the exercise of their
judicial functions.
FACTS: The Region X Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board issued Wage Order No. RX-01 and
RX-01-A increasing the minimum wage rates in Northern Mindanao. Thereafter, petitioner applied for
exemption from the said wage orders as distressed establishments. The RTWPB, on the basis of
Guidelines No. 3 granted the’application for exemption. Private respondents-unions lodged an appeal
with the NWPC [National Wages and Productivity Commission] which reversed the decision of grant for
exemption. In this petition, the petitioners contended that the NWPC gravely abused its discretion in
overturning the RTWPB’s approval of their application for exemption from Wage Orders RX-01 and
RX-01-A.
They argued that under Art. 122[c] of the Labor Code, RTWPB has power “to receive, process and act”
on application for exemption from prescribed wage rates as may be provided by law or any wage order.
They also maintained that no law expressly requires the approval of the NWPC for the effectivity of
RTWPB’s Guideline No. 3.
ISSUE: Whether the NWPC gravely abused its discretion when it overturned the exemption granted to the
petitioners by RTWPB.
HELD: It is clear under Art. 121 of the Labor Code, powers of NWPC and Art. 122, powers of RTWPB,
that the NWPC, not the RTWPB, has the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of
minimum wage and productivity measures. While the RTWPB has the power to issue wage orders under
Art. 122 [b] of the Labor Code, such orders are subject to the guidelines prescribed by the NWPC.
It is important to note that Guideline No. 3, the basis upbn which the grant for exemption was issued was
never assented to by NWPC. The guideline therefore is inoperative and cannot be used by the RTWPB in
deciding a petitioner’s application for exemption. Under the NWPC’s Rules of Procedure on Minimum
Wage Fixing issued on June 4,1990—which was prior to the effectivity of RTWPB Guideline No. 3, an
application for exemption from wage orders should be processed by the RTWPB, subject specifically to
the guidelines issued by the NWPC.
Art. 122 [c] of the Labor Code cannot be construed to enable the RTWPB to decide applications for
exemption on the basis of its own guidelines which were not reviewed and approved by the NWPC, for
the simple reason that a statutory grant of ‘power” should not be extended by implication beyond what
may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. Official powers cannot be merely assumed by
administrative officers, nor can they be created by the court in the exercise of their judicial functions.
[Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. and PhiIippine Wallboard Corp. vs. National Wages and Productivity
Commission, G.R.. No. 113097, April 27, 1998 FIRST DIVISION ; Davide, J,, J.]
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HEARING; The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to
those elected ones.
FACTS: Private respondents, Vice-Governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva
Ecija, filed a complaint with the President against their governor petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson,
charging him with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. The President instructed the Secretary of
DILG to conduct an investigation. Consequently, the parties submitted their position papers. On the basis
of the same, the petitioner was found guilty as charged.
The petitioner contended that the denial of his motion to conduct a formal investigation violated his right
to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not in an administrative case filed against an elective official, decision may be
rendered based solely on position papers.
HELD: The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly
different from appointive officials. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG applies to appointive officials.
Governor Joson cannot be held liable based only on position papers.
In the case at bar, the governor was denied of his procedural due process upon the rejection of the
petitioner’s motion to conduct a formal investigation. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the investigating authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they
desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the investigating authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.
The local official has the [1] the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; [2] the right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and [3] the right to compulsory attendance of
witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Local Government
Code and in A.O. No. 23. [Joson vs Torres, G. R..No. 131255, May20, 1998 -SECOND DIVISION;
RegaIado,, J.]
DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; Public employees whose acts prejudice public
service should be meted with dismissal with forfeiture of benefits.
FACTS: Edilberto Ho worked as Clerk II at the RIO, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran. He was sent a letter
requesting him to report to office immediately due to voluminous work to be done; later, he was sent a
memorandum requiring him to explain in writing within 72 hours why no administrative sanction should
be imposed on him for his failure to report to office. Ho ignored both the letter and the memorandum. It
has been found that from Dec. 15, 1995 until the early part of 1996, Ho has been absent from work
without any authorization. There were also several instances when he would register on the logbook and
would went out and would never return for work. Thus, an administrative complaint was filed against him
for absenteeism, insubordination, misconduct and nonobservance of office directives.
Ho was found guilty of the charge,s and was meted with suspension from office for a minimum of 6
months to a maximum of 1 year. On the other hand, the Office of the Court Administrator affirmed the
factual findings but ordered Ho be dropped from service without prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ho should be dismissed.
HELD: Ho’s offense warrants his dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits. His frequent absences
without authorization prejudiced public service. Moreover, Ho is guilty not only of habitual absenteeism
but also of dishonesty. The Court will not tolerate such dishonesty committed by a court employee
because every official and employee of the judiciary, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. [EamigueI vs. Ho, A.M. No. 98- 1263-P.
March 6, 1998 EN BANC; Per Curiam ]
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EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER; An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative Qperation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
FACTS: Administrative Order No. 308 entitled ‘Adoption ot a National Computerized Identification
Reference System” was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos and was published in four newspapers of
general circulation. It aims to establish a decentralized Identification Reference System among the key
basic services and social security providers. There shall be a Population Reference Number (PRN) for
each individual and all basic and social security transactions shall be regulated by the PRN with the use of
Biometrics Technology. The funding shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned
agencies like GSIS, SSS, NSO and others.
Petitioner Bias Ople assailed the Administrative Order and prayed for its nullification on two important
constitutional grounds: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizen’s protected zone of privacy. The petitioner claims that AO No. 308
is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. On the
other hand, the respondents maintain that the President has merely exercised his administrative power in
implementing the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987 and that A.O. No. 308 is not a
law for it confers no right,imposes no duty, affords no protection and creates no office.
On the right of privacy, claims that A.O. No. 308 will infringe on the people’s right to be let alone while
respondents deny such allegation.
ISSUES: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 encroaches on the law-making power of the legislative
department; whether or not A.O. No. 308 infringes the people’s right of privacy.
HELD: A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government, It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. It cannot be simplistically argued
that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987 for the former establishes for the
first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Nor is it correct to argue that A.O.
308 is not a law for it confers no right, imposes no.duty, affords no protection, and creates no office.
Under the assailed administrative order, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies
delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. Thus, without the ID,
a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Regarding the right of privacy, it is a right recognized and enshrined in the several provisions of our
Constitution, and in our laws. Hence, it is the burden of government to show, that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. To note, what is not arguable is
the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No 308 which if implemented will put our people’s
right to privacy in clear and present danger.
It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does riot state what specific biological characteristics and what
particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage; it does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes; and it
does not state in clear and categorical terms how theses information gathered shall be handled. The A. 0.
speaks of computer linkage which will give other governmental agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometric and computer technology cannot be downplayed. [Ople vs Torres et.al.; G.R. No.
127685, July23, 1998 EN BANC; Puno, J.]
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APPOINTMENT; An appointment illegally made does not vest any title or authority to the
appointee. The power to appoint or designate an employee in cases of temporary absence
or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office resides in the President of the Philippines or
the Secretary of Finance and not in the Provincial Governor.
FACTS: In November 1992, Petitioner Zozimo Dimaandal was then a Supply Officer Ill when he was
designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by Governor Vicente Mayo of
Batangas. Pursuant to the designation, he filed a claim for the difference in salary and Representation and
Transportation Allowance LRATA] of Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply Officer Ill for the whole
year of 1993. The Provincial Auditor disallowed in audit P52,908 of the claim. What was allowed was
only the amount of P8,400 which corresponds to the difference in the allowances attached to the
designation and the position he occupied. The disallowance was premised on reasons that Governor Mayo
is bereft of power to fill the position of Assistant Provincial Treasurer because the power rests on the
Secretary of Finance; and that the designation made by Governor Mayo is temporary in nature and does
not amount to the issuance of an appointment as could entitle the petitioner Dimaandal to receive the
salary of the position to which he is designated. Thus, he was required to refund the amount which was
disallowed.
On appeal to the Commission on Audit, the latter sustained the stand of the Provincial Auditor. It was of
the view that the petitioner was merely designated as an Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration
in addition to his regular duties and as such not entitled to an additional salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the difference in salary between his regular position
and the higher position to which he is designated.
HELD: Petitioner is not entitled to the difference claimed. The law applicable is RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code. It did not authorize the Provincial Governor to appoint nor even designate one
temporarily in cases of temporary absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office. That power
resides in the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance. The designation made by Gov.
Mayo being defective, it confers no right on the part of petitioner to claim the difference in the salaries
and allowances attached to the position occupied by him.
Moreover, what was extended to petitioner by Governor Mayo was merely a designation and not an
appointment. Appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office. Designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or additional duties on the officer or employee and
does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position. [Dimaandal vs. COA, G.R. No. 122197, June26, 1998--- EN BANC;
Martinez, J.]
JUDICIAL INQUIRY; Existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
legal right susceptible of judicial determination is an essential requisite for judicial inquiry.
FACTS: Sometime in 1989, Forest guards Panadero and Rabino intercepted two dump trucks loaded
with narra, tanguile and lauan lumber belonging to petitioner Tan. In both instances, no documents
showing legal possession of the lumber were presented to the guards upon demand. Thus, the pieces of
lumber were confiscated. Having found to have violated the provisions of PD 705 or the Forest Reform
Code, the trial court convicted the accused which the CA affirmed. On appeal, petitioner averred that said
law is unconstitutional for being violative of substantive due process since it penalizes failure to present
certain legal documents to justify “mere possession’ of forest products which includes, among others,
firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, the associated water or fish.
Moreover, Tan contended that lumber is not considered timber or forest product under the Forest Reform
Code. The law, he argued only provides for the prohibition of cutting, gathering and possessing timber
and other forest products without licepse. Hence, the logs found in his possession were not covered by
said law.
ISSUES: Whether not Forest Reform Code is unconstitutional; whether or not lumber is considered
timber or forest product.
HELD: One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is
the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination. As the lower court pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the [unlawful]
possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish. Thus,
the inclusion of any of these enumerated items is absolutely no concern to petitioner. They are not
asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did
not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would
justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional. And one who
attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.
With regard to the second issue, lumber is included in the term timber. In fact, it simply means that
lumber is a processed log or processed raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. Indeed, the term ‘forest
products’ is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. [Tan vs.
People, G.R. No. 115507; May 19, 1998---FIRST DIVISION; Panganiban, J. ]
SEPARATION OF POWERS; Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevents the Supreme Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate.
FACTS: Senator Marcelo Fernan was elected senate president over Senator Francisco Tatad by a vote
of 20 to 2, respectively during the first regular session of the Eleventh Congress. Senator Tatad thereafter
manifested, with the agreement of Senator Santiago that he was assuming the position of minority leader.
He explained that those who voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while only those who voted
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. No consensus was arrived at until after the Senate
met in caucus in the third session day. The majority leader received a letter from the seven Lakas senators
that they had elected Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Sen. Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo
warranto against Guingona and Fernan alleging, among others, that Sen. Fernan violated the Constitution
in recognizing Senator Guingona as the Senate minority leader. They maintain that ‘majority refers to
group of senators who voted for the winning senate president and those who accepted committee
chairmanships while those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no committee chairmanships
comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of the Constitution when Sen. Fernan recognized Sen. Guingona
as the minority leader.
HELD: Senator Fernan committed no violation. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is however silent on the manner of electing the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Supreme Court. To accede
then to the interpretation of the petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach
of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Moreover, the term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times as the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. It may also refer to the group, party, faction with the larger number of
votes not necessarily more than one half. Minority is a group, party or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority. [Senators Miriam Santiago and Francisco Tatad vs Senators
Teoifisto Guingona and MarceIo Fernan, G.R. No. 134574 November 18, 1998-- En Banc; Panganiban,
J.]
SEPARATION OF POWERS; Administrative agencies have no authority to review final
decisions of courts hence the remedy of the losing litigant is to appeal to the proper court.
FACTS: Florencio Guevarra filed a case for unlawful detainer against Celendro before the
MCTC-Lanao del Sur which ruled in favor of Guevarra. The decision was affirmed by the RTC on
appeal. Celendro did not challenge this decision of the RTC. Two years later, the MCTC issued a writ of
execution. Upon learning of such issuance, Celendro filed a petition before the Provincial Agrarian
Adjudicatory Board (PAAB) alleging that his landholding is not part of Guevarra’s property. PAAB
rendered a judgment in favor of Celendro and reversed the MCTC and RTC decisions. PAAB’s decision
was later on affirmed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative agency has the authority to review/reverse the decisions of
courts.
HELD: Administrative bodies such as PAAB or DARAB cannot reverse! review a court’s ruling that
has long become final. Under the Doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgment, which is also known as
“preclusion of issues’ or “collateral estoppel,” issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
Celendro’s recourse should have been an appeal of the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals and then, if
necessary to the Supreme Court and not to a quasi-judicial body. More significantly, final judgments can
“no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of the government. This particular
injunction against the administrative bodies is based on the principle of separation of powers, which
presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. The DARAB which
is under the Department of Agrarian Reform in the executive branch must accord due respect to the
MCTC and the RTC, which are both instrumentalities of the judiciary. [Domingo Ce/endro vs. CA, G.R.
No. 131099, July20, 1999; Panganiban, J.]
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PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong before a public officer pending investigation may be preventively suspended is left to
the sound determination of the Ombudsman.
FACTS: SEC Chairman Perfecto Yasay, Jr. is charged with estafa before the office of the Ombudsman.
Allegedly, petitioner refused to execute the contract of lease on the ground that the subject condominium
units are common areas, which cannot be appropriated. Private respondent on the other hand, claimed
ownership by virtue of the title issued by the Registrar of the Province of Rizal. On the basis of the
evidence presented, the Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension for a period of 90 days
against Yasay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension was proper.
HELD: Under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman may preventively suspend an employer or employee
under his authority pending investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct oe neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that the essential elements exist. Whether the evidence of
guilt is strong, is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before
him. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter unless there
is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner failed to show such grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Ombudsman. [Perfecto A. Yasay, Jr. vs Ombudsman, G.R. No. 134495, Dec.
8,1998; Kapunan, J.]
ELECTION PROTEST; Where a senatorial candidate has already been proclaimed
winner, the petitioner’s proper remedy is to file a regular election protest which under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
FACTS: Private respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta was proclaimed as the the 12 winning candidate in the
May 1998 elections. Petitioner Santanina Rasul questioned the said proclamation. She argued that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when,
acting as a National Board of Canvassers, it declared that the remaining uncanvassed certificates would
no longer affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the twelve (12) winning candidates. She contends
that if the number of registered voters who have yet to cast their votes where special elections have been
suspended is combined with the uncanvassed votes from other areas of the country, there is a
possibilitythat the 12 rankin~ senatorial candidate, Teresa Aquino-Oreta could be dislodged by the l3~
placer, Roberto Pagdanganan. The petitioner submits that the inclusion of Aquino-Oreta among the
winning candidates was premature and based on incomplete canvass. Thus, she filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court is proper.
HELD: Petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy for the petitioner. Inasmuch as she is contesting the
proclamation of Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning candidate, her proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code pertains to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.
Under the Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The word “sole” therein underscore the
exclusivity of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. [Santanina Rasul
vs. COMELEC and Teresa Aquino-Oreta, G.R. No. 134142, Aug24, 1999---EN BANC; Gonzaga-Reyes,
J.]