1
Baigent, D. (2008) Group-think: Work in progress last updated 4-2-09
Baigent, D. (2008) Group-think: Work in progress last updated 30-8-08 ........................ 1
Groupthink and storming, forming, norming and performing ........................................... 3
Groupthink and psychology ............................................................................................... 3
Groupthink and research .................................................................................................... 4
Groupthink and the trade unions in the print industry ....................................................... 4
Groupthink applied to the industrial behaviour in the 1970’s and 1980’s ......................... 5
Groupthink applied to the fire and rescue service ............................................................. 5
Groupthink and the police .................................................................................................. 5
Groupthink analysed .......................................................................................................... 5
Fire Service Employers and groupthink ............................................................................ 6
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 6
Appendix One - Storming Forming Norming - My model (after Tuckmen) ..................... 7
A mode of thinking that people engage in when
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,
when the members' strivings for unanimity
override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action
(Janis 1972: 9)
At times emergency workers may need to follow orders but when they follow the culture just to
prove they are loyal, this type of group thinking can damage the individual and in outcome
allow toxic behaviour to continue.
This piece of work attempts to identify ‘groupthink’ (Janis 1972) as a problematic area associated
with team-working. First, there is some introduction to how teams might be led and then the concept
of groupthink is introduced. The paper includes arguments from psychology, sociology, research,
trade unions and some examples from public services.
Belbin (1981) argues that teams function because of the individual’s need to form up in a group.
Such a view is supported by Maslow (1987) who identifies the need to belong. Belonging implies
some form of shared understanding(s) and new teams will develop their joint norms, values and rules
as a guide to behaviour. Almost inevitably, storming, forming, norming and performing will be part
of this development (Tuckman 1965): a process that is also likely to establish a hierarchy within the
group. Individuals in the group then cooperate to prove that they belong. This social arrangement or
function is how groups develop and grow. In many organisations once a team has served its purpose
the team and often its members are ‘disgarded’(Capitalism or the ‘market’ has no sense of loyalty; its
only rationality is to make a profit). However, in public services teams can serve together for a long
time. In emergency services like the fire service, because people rarely leave and when they do they
are replaced, it can appear that teams continue for ‘ever.’
At work the development of formal groups (teams) is particularly powerful because individuals have
a need to belong (Maslow 1987). However, joining a team at work involves wider dynamics than
attending to the team member’s needs. From a management perspective the team only exists because
teamwork is a more efficient way of achieving the task set by the company or public service.
Taylor’s (1911) argument for breaking jobs down to the simplest action and using teams as a way of
performing a whole task, did provide a bonus for the individual. However, this had little, if anything,
to do with managers wanting to pay people more; Taylor thought that peace rates and bonuses would
make the employee work harder. Nonetheless there was the start of a recognition that individuals
2
were more than machines; people did have the ability to make rational choices (Giddens 1984) and
Taylor thought that by providing bonuses people would chose to work harder. And they did make
choices. To avoid the alienation that this form of deskilling produced, many of these employees
either left the companies that used these practices or found ways of controlling their work
environment to make it more fulfilling.
Mayo’s (1949) research was influential at this time and his analysis led to an understanding that once
workers basic needs were met they looked for something more than utility from their labour. Mayo
(1949) suggested that workers who were working on assembly lines appeared to lose motivation and
that this was occurring because they lost their sense of purpose/motivation. They were alienated and
this led to a sense of Anomie (Durkheim 1952). In discovering what is known as the ‘Hawthorne
Effect’ Mayo (1949) argued that work for most people was not only about money – it was also about
maintaining people’s own self-esteem – hence when his research team were talking and working with
employees they considered their status was raised and they worked harder to prove it – the
‘Hawthorn Effect.’ This recognition that ‘if a company paid attention to workers needs then they
were likely to work harder,’ was the start of Human Resource Management (HRM). This start of the
science of new management techniques continues today because managers realised that it is rarely
enough to just rely on the group achieving both the company’s needs and their own. Teams need to
be led and managed to prioritise company objectives, because one outcome of teamwork is that the
reward of belonging and loyalty that teams develop also increases the amount of control employees
have over what they do (Harley 1991); and their ability to resist (Baigent 2001).
There are a variety of management styles that can be used to maintain a team’s direction. Adair
(1993) argues for a tripartite approach that recognises the relationship between the goal, the
individual and the group. However, Adair’s motives may be more inclined towards the task: a very
structural and macro approach. Action Centred Leadership is about the team and individual but
unlikely to be altruistic - more inclined to coercion than cooperation. Adair’s (1993) view, is the
view from the person at the top; the managing director, chief officer or Army commander, who is
more interested in strategy than implementation. At the point where the task needs to be delivered,
the team and the individual assume greater importance. In many ways these managers have to be
more flexible because they are dealing with the people who do the work; the people whose loyalty
may be shared between the company and their team. Managers here need to judge how teams and
individual may act and they can implement the task by adjusting their techniques along a scale
provide by Blake and Mouton (1964), which suggests a grid scaled from a more authoritarian task
orientated approach to a more laissez faire country club style. The chosen approach is likely to be
closely linked to the manager’s view on the type of employee they are dealing with - on a scale from
the compliant (type Y) to the resistant (type X) (McGregor 1985). In similar fashion, the type of
leader is likely to depend on the type of employee. Weber (1964) could be influential here, because
he recognises three types of leader – (bureaucratic, charismatic and traditional). Although Weber’s
(1964) ideal types should to be seen in context of the current times they still hold true if a degree of
context and flexibility is considered. Styles may need to change (almost by the minute) to fit with
circumstances in our ever-changing and dynamic world of work. Emergency service work can be a
real example of the need for different type of leadership/management, particularly when a manager at
the station has to change in seconds to become a leader when directive decisions need to be made at
critical incidents. Notwithstanding this, Weber’s (1964) arguments and the dynamic between them is
one of the perspectives that underpin most leadership styles. So too does Weber’s (1964) recognition
of transformational and transactional management long before others started to theorise about this
(Burke 2002).
The manager/leader may do well to recognise that team member’s have a variety of needs. Some of
these are work related and some personal. When team and organisational goals are in synergy, then
the team will function well (Collinson 1992; Owen 1996). However, few teams can achieve such a
dedicated work ethic. More likely groups will adopt a mix of goals - sometimes serving the
employers, sometimes themselves. If a team loose sight of the company goals, what may have been
an ‘acceptable’ balance can get out of kilter as they seek to serve themselves to the detriment of the
3
organisation. However, if a work ethic becomes too rational and the space for the individual is
taken away, then this too can have a detrimental outcome.
Notwithstanding this theoretical recognition, whenever you are dealing with people there is always
the possibility that they will use their agency to act differently (Giddens 1979). As a consequence of
the individual’s (and groups) ability to think (for themselves), management is far from an exact
science - even in disciplined organisations (Baigent 2001).
A Adair provides a system for managing organisations
•
This is more about the macro (although it can also work in the micro)
Think about Adair as the managing director he is creating organisational (formal)
policy – structural (the task).
Tuckman is more about the micro (small groups) - social context.
Think about this as a local manager’s job (the sergeant).
•
The person who is between a rock and a hard place and has to look at the
individual and the group (and might do well to consider Maslow and Mayo)
•
The sergeant’s task is to get the group to achieve the general manager’s task
•
To persuade the informal culture to adopt the new formal task
(Baigent 2008)
Groupthink and storming, forming, norming and performing
During early storming, forming and norming, when all teams test the boundaries by challenging the
manager and their objectives (Handy 1976 p165 see appendix 1). Individuals who want to set their
own agendas vie to lead the team (Tuckman 1965). As a result when the manager reacts to bring
order, the team can act together to make the manager the “common enemy” (Janis 1972: 165).
Group loyalty, rather than the company objective can then became the team goal. Team bonding
may be a safe haven in a new environment, but can develop to the point where loyalty to the team
overrides individual’s and the company’s views. The team can then serve its cohesiveness first and
refuse to think outside the box (Appendix 2).
When this type of thinking develops to the point where rationality is put to one side as people try to
show they belong, this type of behaviour is indentified as groupthink (Janis 1972).
“When the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of action”
(Janis 1972: 9).
This mode of thinking also develops when people are deeply involved in a cohesive group.
Particularly when they work together for a long time (Baigent 2001). Groupthink can apply in a
whole range of organisations, and can include an unquestioned belief in their moral correctness –
religious (God is right), political (Nazi Germany), for groups of men (masculinity) or for public
servants (who believe they know best). When the desire for unanimity overcomes a group’s ability
to make rational assessments using all the available information, (or to consider anyone who puts an
alternative view is being disloyal), then this reduces team effectiveness because it can remove the
ability/need to question or validate.
Groupthink and psychology
4
Groupthink may be even more common when a group consists of people with similar views and
psychological approaches to work. Belbin (1981) argues that individuals are “monitors, shapers,
plants” and Mumma (1991) makes a similar argument about “evaluators, finishers, leaders,
managers, creators and innovators” (see appendix 2). Both writers recognise how some people’s
talents put them in almost natural opposition to others. Alternatively, if a team of people have very
similar traits then they may act together to defend their position. For example if a team consisted of
evaluator/finishers with a need to be absolutely certain about where they are going, they would be
likely to resist an innovator/leader. Evaluator/finishers need to be certain before they change
direction and any attempt to implement new ideas entrepreneurially could threaten their sense of
belonging and understanding (These two groups of people are recognised as being in opposition see
Belbin, 1981; Mumma 1991, Handy 1976).
Groupthink and research
Similar outcomes can occur during research. Action researchers require very different skills to
traditional researchers. One ongoing critique made by feminists (Jackson 1987; Jackson 1990; Wolf
1998) is that academics too frequently set out to collect safe data to achieve academic kudos rather
than affect change. This can mean that feminists who set out to identify and make visible the hidden
outcomes of men’s action (Giddens 1979), were not only in direct conflict with masculine beliefs, but
the more structural (malestream) methods that underpin masculinity (and of course society).
Therefore, if a team leader were to adopt a feminist methodology and the research team were to
favour more positivist methods, then the team would likely act against any entrepreneurial
methodology that seeks out new ideas. In this way researchers who look for security in safe methods
of data collection, could then bond during their early storming, forming and norming to disrupt any
entrepreneurial approaches that challenged their sense of security.
I have a direct experience of this, when leading a major research project1. The research team were
interviewed to join a project that was designed to push at the boundaries of research methodology in
the hope of coming up with some answers on a problem that had to date not been solved by
traditional management or research. However, the methodology the team came up with was
traditional to the extent that ‘answers’ were predictable. At a meeting to decide on the way forward
the researchers stormed, formed and normed to the extent that they excluded me as part of the team.
Groupthink may then have set up a resistance amongst the team to deny any possibility of an
alternative view. They continually asked for clear objectives and aims to the extent that their appetite
was impossible to quench. Their so called rigor could then be seen as a mask for a lack of
imagination or understanding and an excuse to force (yet again) sterile facts into an already known
answer (Bourdieu 1992). They were putting old wine into new bottles (Hammersley 1993). In such
an environment people can develop blind spots to their own behaviour: the oracle effect (Bourdieu
1992) whereby someone who (mis)represents the group publicly can lead to a group signature on that
argument – the groups silence then signifies compliance. Group loyalty (groupthink) then creates a
comfort zone and a goal that overrides the reason why the employer brought the group together in the
first place.
Groupthink and the trade unions in the print industry
Janis (1972) explains “groupthink” as a form of behaviour where bonding, solidarity or harmony
becomes more important than anything else. Teams involved in ‘groupthink’ are liable to act to
defend their collective will or to prove they belong regardless of circumstances (see also Collinson
1992). For decades such behaviour worked well for the trade unions and many of them were able to
exert considerable control over their industry. For example, compositors in the print industry held
their prime location through their solidarity. That is until Eddie Shah started a neo-liberal
modernisation aimed at disempowering the workforce through deskilling. Cockburn (1996) writes at
1
Although what follows is my view of what happened, it may not be that of others
5
length about how the print industry’s informal cultural had for decades organised printing
(compositors held an elite working class identity – a masculinity formed through work). Shah’s
challenge was to introduce computer driven technology in favour of hot metal production as a way of
printing newspapers (Celebrities 2005). Rather than following what was the ‘writing on the wall,’
and seeking a compromise, compositors made a last stand. As with the miners the compositors lost.
The ensuing modernisation completely changed the process by which the UK’s newspaper industry
was organised. The print unions were not part of this, nor of the redundancies or wage reductions
that followed. Such behaviour, where solidarity overcame rational decision making, is often
recognised as blinkering those who take part in it from the reality.
Groupthink applied to the industrial behaviour in the 1970’s and 1980’s
This loss of perspective may have been one explanation for why industrial behaviour around the
1970’s and 1980’s created such a threat to the UK’s economy (Thatcher 1993). Trade unions almost
seemed to be running the country for the benefit of their own members. Whilst this Marxist ideal
may have been good in the short term. However trade unions were so blinkered to the world outside,
especially the considerable threat from Japan where new ways of production were providing cheaper
and better goods. British manufacture of motorbikes, electrical goods and cars and the associated
trade unions failed to recognise how much their behaviour and lack of entrepreneurialism was
damaging their markets. Faced with an uncertain future or facing a threat to their beliefs, individuals
avoided (or did not recognise) the message from the economy and difficult debates and (blindly)
followed their union leaders. It was not until Thatcher that action by the employers and government
then led to the wholesale modernisation of UK industry (Cockburn 1991).
Groupthink applied to the fire and rescue service
Throughout the 1990’s the fire and rescue service continually tried to modernise by refocusing their
aims and objectives towards prevention. At the same time, (presumably to encourage new ways of
thinking) there was also a push towards employing more women and ethnic minority firefighters.
Firefighters (a predominantly masculine workforce who created an identity through their action
packed job) objected to this change.
In 2001 the FBU started a campaign to increase wages by 40%. Firefighters followed this call to the
point where they actually believed they were worth a 40% rise and that they could achieve this by
striking. Few, if any of them, considered the possibility that they might lose and the strike took
place. The anger of firefighters increased as government took a stand against them and they refused
to recognise that they were fighting a losing battle. Had firefighters stood back and held a debate at
stations (that considered all the messages being sent by government and the history of the previous
national strike) they could hardly have failed to recognise that they could not win. But they
convinced themselves that they could win – the rest is history (Bain 2002; ODPM 2003; Seifert and
Sibley 2005).
Groupthink and the police
This is not to say that group think is always unsuccessful. Groupthink remains successful until the
team’s resistance meets a more powerful line of thinking (one that may equally adopt a similar
refusal to think differently). To date groupthink in the police about racism remains a powerful and
largely successful opponent to the formal law of this country and to natural justice. How long this
remains the case is unclear.
Groupthink analysed
The outcome of when members of a group/team fail to think as individuals can result in a blinkered
view. This is particularly dangerous if the individuals start to sift the evidence to the extent that they
only recognise arguments that support their own ideas. By avoiding the type of reflexivity that
6
individuals are capable of, almost putting to one side their own rationality as they enter the
workplace, prevents individuals from improving the decision making process. Stopping themselves
from speaking out (Forbes and Milliken 1999) when contrary evidence is available and not ‘seeing
the writing on the wall’ can then be catastrophic.
People who are this selective about what they see in order to avoid conflicting with the group are
potentially giving up their whole free will (agency) to a point where individuals prime aim can be to
fit-in. Subtle pressures (both from within the individual and from others in the group) can then
reinforce collective decision making to the extent that individual doubts can be (self) screened.
Such groups are then open to exploitation by peer leaders as the more people want to prove
they belong the less likely they are self-criticise. Resulting in a greater subjectivity (and emotional
reasoning) and the marginalisation of the reality. This type of behaviour could explain why it was
that the compositor lost both their identity and influence in the print industry; why car manufacture,
coal mining and steel working are no longer a prime industries in the UK.
Fire Service Employers and groupthink
It also could explain why it was that the FBU almost went through a similar loss of authority in 2002
and placed in jeopardy firefighter’s identity. Had it not been for the employer’s own form of
groupthink when they implemented change by pushing firefighters into a corner, they may not have
provided the need for the firefighters (who had lost faith in their union) to once again form up under
the union’s umbrella to resist modernisation.
In a more micro sense it may provide a framework for identifying why some research projects fail. If
a team so thinks that they are right that they stereotype their manager as always being wrong, (as in
all the other cases discussed) the thought then becomes true in its consequence (Janowitz 1966).
This type of behaviour can result in the group believing their own arguments to the point that they
feel invulnerable – lack of sensitivity/reflexivity results in a failure to recognise the danger of their
strategy – success in their terms then results in the project being shut down or providing the predicted
outcome.
Bibliography
Adair, J. (1993). Effective Leadership. London, Pan.
Baigent, D. (2001). One More Last Working Class Hero: a cultural audit of the UK fire service.
Cambridge, Fitting-in. Available at http://www.fitting-in.com/baigent/baigent.pdf.
Bain, G. (2002). The Future of the Fire Service: reducing risk, saving lives, available on
http://www.frsonline.fire.gov.uk/publications/article/17/306. London, ODPM.
Belbin, R. (1981). Management Teams: why they succeed or fail. Oxford, Butterworth-Heinnemann.
Celebrities, M. (2005). " Industry, Commerce & Business Entrepreneurs, download on 13-4-07 from
http://www.manchester2002-uk.com/celebs/commerce/commerce4.html."
Cockburn, C. (1991). Brothers: Male dominance and technological change. London, Pluto.
Forbes, D. and Milliken, F. (1999). 'Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of
directors as strategic decision making groups
', Academy of Management Review 24(3): 257-82.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in
Social Analysis. London, MacMillan.
7
Harley, B. (1991). 'Team Membership and work in Britain', Work Employment and Society 15(4):
721-42.
Jackson, A., Ed. (1987). Anthropology at Home. London, Tavistock.
Jackson, D. (1990). Unmasking Masculinity. London, Unwin Hyman.
Janis, I. (1972). (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Houghton, Mifflin Company.
Janowitz, M., Ed. (1966). W. I. Thomas on Social Organisation and Social Personality. Chicago,
University Press.
Maslow, A. (1987). Motivation and Personality. New York, Harper and Row.
Mayo, E. (1949). The Social Problems of Industrial Civilization, Routledge and Kegan Paul,.
ODPM. (2003). "Our Fire and Rescue Service, downloaded from
http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1123887 on 10-8-06." from
http://www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1123887.
Seifert, R. and Sibley, T. (2005). United they Stood: the story of the UK Firefighter's dispute 20022004. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Thatcher, M. (1993). The Downing Street years. London, Harper Collins.
Tuckman, B. (1965). 'Developmental sequence in small groups', Psychological Bulletin 63(6): 384399.
Weber, M. (1964). The theory of social and economic organization. London, Free Press.
Wolf, D., Ed. (1998). Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Boulder, Colorado, Westview.
Appendix One - Storming Forming Norming - My model (after Tuckmen)
Forming
Storming
Norming
Group Structure
Time of considerable anxiety as people establish
their identity in the group/set an impression and
try to identify the task and test appropriate
behaviour.
Individuals reveal their own agendas.
Conflict occurs as team set out to challenge
things which don’t fit with their agendas
Testing of authority takes place.
Group adopts an identify to make the project
work
Task activity
Finding out the task
Team seek to identify how the task will
be achieved
The group experiences unity around a set of
goals.
Establishes when and how it will work, how
decisions are made and what level of work is
Co-operation on the task begins
Plans are made
Work standards are set
Communication of views and feelings
The value and feasibility of the task is
questioned.
8
appropriate.
develop
Individuals test each other and mutual support Hierarchy is set
develops.
Alternatively
Opinions polarise.
Cohesion becomes paramount
Leaders attempts to control the group are
resisted.
Performin
g
Having established the relationship between work
and individual needs the group structures itself to
achieve them.
Alternatively
Questioning the leadership and/or the objective
can become disruptive.
What appears to be positive behaviour is a
shadow for people who are so intent in
maintaining cohesion that they loose sight of the
original agenda
Constructive work on the task surges
ahead; progress is experienced as more
of the group’s energy is applied to being
effective in the area of their common
task.
Alternatively
The group bond around disrupting the
project/challenging the leader
Adair, J. (1993) Effective Leadership. London: Pan.A
Baigent, D. (2001) One More Last Working Class Hero: a cultural audit of the UK fire service.
Cambridge: Fitting-in. Available at http://www.fitting-in.com/baigent/baigent.pdf.A
Bain, G. (2002) The Future of the Fire Service: reducing risk, saving lives, available on
http://www.frsonline.fire.gov.uk/publications/article/17/306. London: ODPM.A
Belbin, R. (1981) Management Teams: why they succeed or fail. Oxford: ButterworthHeinnemann.A
Blake, R. and Mouton, J. (1964) The Managerial Grid. Houston TX:: Gulf.A
Burke, W. (2002) Organization Change: Theory and Practice. London: Sage.A
Celebrities, M. (2005) Industry, Commerce & Business Entrepreneurs, download on 13-4-07 from
http://www.manchester2002-uk.com/celebs/commerce/commerce4.html, downloaded on
Cockburn, C. (1991) Brothers: Male dominance and technological change. London: Pluto.A
Durkheim, E. (1952) Suicide: a study in sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.A
Forbes, D. and Milliken, F. (1999) 'Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of
directors as strategic decision making groups
', Academy of Management Review 24 (3): 257-82.
Giddens, A. (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in
Social Analysis. London: MacMillan.A
9
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge:
Polity.
Hammersley, M., Ed. (1993) Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice. London: Sage.
Harley, B. (1991) 'Team Membership and work in Britain', Work Employment and Society 15 (4):
721-42.
Jackson, A., Ed. (1987) Anthropology at Home. London: Tavistock.
Jackson, D. (1990) Unmasking Masculinity. London: Unwin Hyman.A
Janis, I. (1972) (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Houghton: Mifflin Company.A
Janowitz, M., Ed. (1966) W. I. Thomas on Social Organisation and Social Personality. Chicago:
University Press.
Maslow, A. (1987) Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper and Row.A
Mayo, E. (1949) The Social Problems of Industrial Civilization: Routledge and Kegan Paul.A
McGregor, D. (1985) The Human Side of Enterprise,: McGraw Hill.A
ODPM. (2003) Our Fire and Rescue Service, downloaded from
http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1123887 on 10-8-06, downloaded from
http://www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1123887 on
Seifert, R. and Sibley, T. (2005) United they Stood: the story of the UK Firefighter's dispute 20022004. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.A
Taylor, F. (1911) The Principles of Scientific Management, available online at
http://melbecon.unimelb.edu.au/het/taylor/sciman.htm, downloaded on
Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street years. London: Harper Collins.A
Tuckman, B. (1965) 'Developmental sequence in small groups', Psychological Bulletin 63 (6): 384399.
Weber, M. (1964) The theory of social and economic organization. London: Free Press.A
Wolf, D., Ed. (1998) Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.