Sociology 3301: Sociology of Religion
Lecture 10: Conversion and Switching I
While some people are socialized into a religion and practice it to some extent
throughout their lives, others get involved in an unrelated religion through a process of
personal change or transformation. Today we begin investigating this change of
worldviews that is often expected, even anticipated by various religions: the conversion
process. This is an important topic as, today, with globalization, a recent analysis of 40
countries finds that those with greater religious pluralism have higher overall rates of
conversion.
Conversion, Brainwashing, and the New Religious Movements:
Conversion refers to a process of “turning around” or changing direction in life,
specifically to a change in worldview. Often viewed as a sudden crisis event, it may also
be a more gradual process. Either way, it represents a transformation in a person’s
identity or self-image. This can be symbolized by a change of name (e.g. Saul to Paul).
Part of the problem in understanding conversion in mainline groups is that
religious rhetoric can often be misleading. Sometimes what is called conversion is often a
ritualized reaffirmation of a worldview that is already held. Many adolescent “converts”
at revivals and crusades do not really change their worldviews so much as publicly affirm
the faith in which they have been socialized since infancy. It may be a significant
experience, but it is not necessarily conversion. What such people are experiencing is
rather an intensification of their existing faith.
Sociological research on conversion flourished between the 1960’s-80’s,
coinciding with the rise in prominence of various New Religious Movements. This is
hardly surprising, as conversion to a faith that reaffirms the basic values of the dominant
society hardly seems as interesting as that to a so-called cult. People who move from one
type of Christianity to another have not typically engaged in terribly unconventional
behavior. Even a Christian who converts to Reform Judaism may not be seen as more
than a bit of a curiosity. Yet someone who gives up everything they own to join a
religious commune may raise a few eyebrows. Such behavior can be both puzzling and
frightening to many, call out for an explanation, even raise claims of brainwashing.
The public is often attracted to the brainwashing thesis, yet most people have little
idea what it actually is. To the social psychologist it refers to a process by which people
are involuntarily caused to adopt a belief system, set of behaviors, or worldview. To force
a person to make such a change, one must have total physical control over them. Captors
must control all of the necessities of life, even life and death itself. The captive must have
no alternatives. Yet, even in such total control situations, only small numbers of
American soldiers yielded to the brainwashing techniques of the North Koreans in the
1950’s. Moreover, most of the acquiescence to the North Korean and Chinese torture
procedures was only verbal. The inmates were eager to return home once freed. Only
1
about a dozen men were permanently converted out of thousands experiencing such
extreme treatment. It is even less likely that cults will be successful as they simply do not
have such total physical control over adherents, and there is clearly much movement in
and out of membership.
When most people use the word brainwashing, they often have in mind some sort
of hypnotic trance or mysterious form of mind control, implying that the new religious
groups manipulate the minds of potential recruits so that they are unwitting and passive
victims of the process. Actual studies of conversion and commitment suggest otherwise
as the recruit is usually actively involved in choosing to be converted in the day to day
actions of living, acting, and experiencing it. Indeed, rather than passive victims,
researchers find that recruits are often active seekers who want the conversion experience
and go to considerable effort to see that it happens. In sum, the new religions have not
induced people into some sort of hypnotic trance. Yes, while there have been strange
beliefs, odd group dynamics, even some tragic outcomes, by no means can we readily
conclude that brainwashing was part of the process.
So what has there been so much talk of this? Some like Bromley and Shupe
(1981) have argued that this reflects a conflict over resources. New religious movements
(NRMs) are recruiting members who will expend time and energy on their behalf.
Conventional religious organizations lose these resources. As well, due to the total
commitment demanded, recruits have little time or energy to devote to their families. In
fact, the NRM comes to be an alternative family unit, with emotional ties to the group
replacing family ties.
Robbins and Anthony (1978) note that “brainwashing” has been used as a
rhetorical weapon to suppress NRMs. Shupe and Bromley (1978) even insisted that anticult movements have distorted information to the point that their attacks parallel the
witch-hunts of earlier times (e.g. the sensationalism surrounding so-called “Satantic
cults”). The fact is that stigmatization of new and growing religious movements by
established forces has been common throughout history (e.g. pagans accused Christians
of atrocities such as cannibalism). Hence, the charge of brainwashing is primarily a way
of discrediting NRMs and making them appear illegitimate and dangerous.
Yet stigmatizing unconventional groups makes them appear more dissimilar from
conventional religions than they often are. As we will see, the processes by which people
convert to NRMs are fundamentally social and do not involve any forms of recruitment
or socialization that we would not also expect to find among more mainstream groups.
Fortunately, the emergence of a large number of NRMs in the late 20th century provided a
unique opportunity to study conversion and recruitment at the critical juncture when a
group is just getting started.
Process Models of Conversion:
For much of the 20th century, conversion was seen by sociologists as a single
event that brought radical change in the orientation of an individual. Yet, more recently,
2
analyses have tried to identify a process or series of steps involved in conversion. In the
first real process model, based on Lofland’s (1977) study of the Moonies, a sequence of
factors was identified that operate to move someone from nonmember status to
committed devotee. Based on Smelser’s “value added” model, it maintains that a social
movement or process may best be understood by identifying “successively accumulating
factors.” Thus, it is the cumulative effect of many different factors that gives rise to
specific types of behavior.
According to Lofland, only those who experience all of the conditions are likely
to convert to a NRM. Thus, these conditions help determine who will convert and who
will remain uninvolved. The sequential arrangement of conditions may be seen as a
funnel, gradually winnowing down the number of people available for recruitment. Each
step may find some people amenable to moving on; others not. Thus, the number of
converts, and who those converts are, is largely a function of the proper combination of
events in the lives of individuals. Lofland maintained that there are 3 predisposing
conditions (prior dispositions, attitudes, and outlooks) and four situational factors that
must be present for someone to be susceptible to influence by NRMs.
Predisposing Conditions:
Tension: it is commonly thought that personal change is generally the result of
some felt need for change – dissatisfaction with the current situation. In societies like
ours undergoing great change, people often experience anomie or normlessness. They
feel that they are without roots. Anomie creates a great deal of stress in people, but it is
but only one of many sorts of stress today that can cause personal discontent. Lofland
saw tension or dissatisfaction as one predisposing condition that can, but not alone, lead
to religious conversion. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Besides, it may be
worked out in various ways, such as in a therapist’s office, in a political campaign
designed to change social conditions, or in numerous other ways.
Religious Problem-Solving Perspective: The second predisposing condition is that
the person has an inclination to solve problems by turning to religious leaders or methods
rather than, say, political or psychiatric ones. Only when the person begins to attach
religious or spiritual meaning to events do they become amenable to the messages of
religious groups. Otherwise, one will more readily seek political, psychiatric, or other
resolutions to problems. Without a pre-existing spiritual outlook, one will simply not take
seriously the message of a religious group.
Religious Seekership: Lofland noted that among the Moonie converts he studied
there was dissatisfaction with conventional religious groups and a feeling of being a
religious seeker. Most had drifted from one religious group to another, long having
concluded that the worldview of the religion in which they were raised was inadequate.
Many saw themselves as seekers of truth. Nevertheless, not all seekers were converted.
There had to be a certain degree of “cultural conduciveness” between the recruit’s
worldview and that of the Moonies. Uniform congruence of beliefs was not required, but
3
a general compatibility of outlook was necessary for a potential recruit to become an
actual convert.
Situational Contingencies:
If the above predisposing conditions are operative, then situational contingencies
become relevant. These are circumstances that influence the social interaction between a
potential convert and a recruiter to a religious group.
Turning Point in Life: Many Moonie converts had reached important turning
points in their lives. Many had come to a point when old lines of action were complete,
had failed, or were about to be disrupted, when they were faced with the opportunity or
necessity of doing something different with their lives. Thus, many had recently
migrated, had lost or quit a job, completed or dropped out of college. Interestingly,
however, Lofland found that marital dissolution and illness didn’t seem to fit in here.
Apparently, some types of turning points stimulate the meaning and belonging needs
more profoundly than others. Still, people who are not at turning points in their lives are
less likely to be responsive to religious proselytization – especially by nonconventional
groups. Turning points are times of new beginnings when personal investment in the
status quo is minimal.
Close Intragroup Affective Bonds: In Lofland’s study, almost all recruits were
gained through preexisting friendship networks. The Moonies learned that cognitive
appeals to ideology (with a focus on moral commitment) did not win converts, gradually
modifying their recruitment strategy. They learned to start conversion at the emotional
level, as affective commitment precedes cognitive and moral commitment.
Weakening of Extra-Group Affective Bonds: Because of migration or disaffection
from one’s family, a person can experience isolation, alienation, or loneliness. They can
be more in need of emotional support as they face a turning point compared to someone
who has a close network of friends and family. In response, Moonie recruiters looked for
signs of transiency (backpacks, people who were alone). Someone who has no other
immediate reference group is less likely to have someone oppose or intervene in the
conversion process. Without someone to offer an alternative explanation, the person is
more likely to be drawn into the group. Moreover, this makes the process of renouncing
“outsiders” less complicated.
Intensive Interaction: Lofland maintained that some Moonies were only verbally
committed (i.e. they were not yet totally committed). The 7th condition is thus meant to
solidify commitment to the group through intensive interaction among members. Thus,
“moral level commitment” is enhanced by providing “communion” with the group. Once
the intensive interaction provides a sense of unity and oneness, devotees actually want to
believe the ideology. By consciously working on strengthening their faith, they come to
believe the ideology, to feel a sense of awe about the leader, and to uphold the group’s
values. The conversion becomes total, and engagement becomes intense in all 3 modes of
commitment.
4
Even members of some more recent groups who have gone to their deaths for the
sake of the group – an act that requires extreme commitment – seem to have been
motivated by these processes. Studies of Heaven’s Gate and the Branch Davidians
indicated that these same processes of intense bonding were at the core of the
movements.
Critique and Evolution of Lofland’s Process Model:
Some have expressed reservations about the applicability of Lofland’s process
model to all groups. Thus, Snow and Phillips (1980), in a study of American Buddhist
converts, found that several of the stages may not be universal, even among NRMs. First,
there is no hard evidence that personal tension is necessarily higher for converts than for
the general population, where it is also reportedly high. Next, much of the reported
tension of religious converts may be a retrospective interpretation based on their new
ideology. It is also possible that religious conversion actually creates the increased
tension (e.g. belief in the immanent end of the world, and that all outsiders including
family are evil, may cause great stress).
Having a religious problem solving perspective was not a prerequisite to persons
becoming members of some religious communities. Similarly, the question of whether
someone was at a turning point in life is often a matter of interpretation, of retrospective
reporting.
The importance of weak extra-group emotional bonds may depend on the extent
to which the group’s values represent a break from the values and perspectives of one’s
family. If they are not radically different, then alienation from family becomes
unnecessary. If the group is not stigmatized, this also renders family alienation
unimportant.
Several studies have found that while many of Lofland’s factors are present in
conversion, they seem to vary independently. They do not appear to be cumulative in all
cases as suggested by his funnel concept. Nevertheless, emotional bonds and intensive
interaction seem to be central to religious conversion, while the lack of intensive
interaction has been linked to deconversion or apostasy. While the idea of a sequential
cumulative process seems to be a fruitful way to think about conversion, with various
factors contributing, currently there is no consensus about which factors might be
necessary ones or what precise sequence might be most typical.
As well, Lofland has since offered a modification, now suggesting that there
appear to be several conversion processes and that different types of groups tend to
employ different processes. Lofland and Skonovd (1981) discussed 6 different motifs,
each involving a slightly different series of factors. Thus they assert that some
conversions are induced by nonrational experiences, others involve a more intellectual
process of study, and still others stress affective ties and belonging. They also suggest
that different modes of conversion may be more common in different epochs of history
(e.g. the emphasis on nonrational experience in the early 20th century gave way to
5
affective ties between the 1960’s-80’s. It is interesting to note, though, that of the 6
conversion motifs outlined, 4 stress belonging and group participation prior to belief.
Intense emotional involvement normally precedes total conversion. In the case of
contemporary sects and cults, this sequence seems to be nearly universal.
Religious Choices and Commitments: A Rational Choice Model:
In the past 2 decades, a new paradigm has emerged: rational choice theory.
Evolving from micro-focused social exchange theory, in the sociology of religion it has
come to draw heavily on macro and microeconomic theories as well.
The Convert and Active Choice:
Historically, many social scientists have explained conversion using a rather
passive model of human behavior. It happened to people due to unconscious
psychological processes or compelling social tensions not far removed from the “mind
control” logic above. Lofland’s process model represents a break from this determinism,
suggesting a series of events in which the individual has some choice and ability to make
decisions. Yet, some believe even such process models have too passive a view of the
convert, that they depict conversion primarily as the result of various social pressures
outside the individual.
Thus, several sociologists have put forth a perspective on conversion in which the
individual is an active agent purposefully making choices and seeking conversion. They
stress that people are seeking meaning in life, and that they consciously join groups that
they believe will fulfill their needs. To give the faith a fair chance, they thrust themselves
into the roles and behaviors of the group.
One major version of this perspective focuses on role theory. As people play the
role of convert, sometimes they find the role rewarding. They make an investment in the
group, they gain certain ego satisfactions for playing the role well, and they come to
believe in the ideas that justify and explain those roles. In effect, the new converts
convert themselves. Nevertheless, some who join do not find rewarding roles of find that
the faith does not meet their meaning needs, so they drop out. Still others find the roles
fulfilling for a time, then find that as role partners change and the organization evolves,
their roles become unsatisfying – falling away from the group.
Religious Choices: Costs and Benefits in a Supply and Demand “Market”:
The rational choice model stresses economic principles of behavior: “What will
the benefits be, and what will it cost me?” “Do the benefits outweigh the costs?” Here, of
course, the benefits are nonmaterial (sense of meaning, assurance of an afterlife, sense of
closeness to God, etc). Yet, religiously engaged people are nevertheless seen as
consumers who are out to meet their needs or obtain a “product.” Churches, Mosques,
and Temples are seen as entrepreneurial establishments trying to compete in a supply and
demand market. Converts are thus regarded as active and rational agents pursuing self-
6
interests, and growing religious communities are seen as those who meet “consumer
demand.” All religious decision making is seen as governed by cost/benefit calculations,
either fully conscious or semi-conscious in nature, whether we are talking about
individuals or the actions of groups themselves.
Under this model, like other commodities, religious “merchandise” is produced,
chosen, and enjoyed by consumers. In the cost/benefit weighing, many benefits are
supernatural compensators for things that cannot be satisfied by other economic
processes – and these hoped-for benefits cannot be disproved with conventional empirical
methods. Thus, groups with very high commitment and greater certainty about their
claims to Truth would offer more benefits. Such groups would be expected to grow more
quickly and to lose fewer members.
There are two major approaches to rational choice theory at the macro level:
supply-side and demand-side explanations. Supply-side theorists stress the way religious
communities produce religious commodities (rituals, meaning systems, sense of
belonging, symbols, etc) to meet the “demand.” They believe that preferences for
religious goods remain fairly stable, so the interesting issue is how “firms” (religious
groups/denominations) operate through their “franchises” (congregations) led by the local
entrepreneurs (clergy). Firms generally develop a specific kind of “product”
(theology/style of worship) that appeal to people of a certain socioeconomic status,
ethnicity, geographic identity, etc. People of certain backgrounds and upbringings will be
drawn to some “firms” over others. If a person has “religious human capital” (knowledge
and familiarity with hymns, myths, creeds, and insider language), then s/he is in a
position both to produce and to benefit from collective actions that foster this outlook.
Since demand for religion is assumed to be stable, it is the production of these religious
commodities that is of interest. Moreover, if people do switch “firms,” it is likely to be to
other “companies” that are quite similar so that their capital is still relevant and useful. In
short, people are committed because they benefit by the production of a religious
enterprise. They use their own resources to collectively meet their own needs.
Demand-side theorists, on the other hand, argue that prior socialization and early
religious experiences help to create a need – a demand – for religious products. However,
consumers remain open to various styles and types of products. Preferences are shifting
and variable. Thus, it is innovators – aggressive entrepreneurs – who reap the benefits of
large constituencies and loyal customers. The focus is on organizations as competitive
enterprises, and it is they that must make the investments worth the effort, time and
resources. Supply is stable in that there are many religious entrepreneurs out there
seeking to meet the need; the challenge is for the various firms and franchises to beat the
competition by meeting the demand of the current marketplace. In other words,
commitment is variable, and congregations and denominations must earn it each week,
each month, each year or lose their place in the marketplace. Commitment becomes the
issue: how to elicit it and how to sustain it.
Rational choice theorists insist that when there are more choices, market activity
is stimulated. Similarly, when there are more religious groups vying for the hearts and
7
minds of members, concern about spiritual matters is invigorated and commitment is
heightened. Religious pluralism and spiritual diversity should increase rates of
conversion as each group seeks its “market share” and as more types of individual needs
are met in the society (compared to religious monopolies/established state religions
where clergy do not have to sell their product to survive). On this view, religious
competition creates vigor. Thus, the spiritual “business climate” of a society influences
the religious marketplace and the level of participation in faith communities.
This is consistent with the “open systems model” of religion discussed early in the
course. The outputs of a religion can influence society. The “supply” of religious options
or “products” can influence how highly religious a society becomes. Conversely,
characteristics of society, such as how pluralistic it is and how competitive its faith
marketplace, can shape the nature of religious “firms,” the behavior of clergy and local
congregations.
Interestingly, rational choice models emerged largely because theorists felt
religious people and commitment were not being taken seriously. Nevertheless, this
strictly utilitarian/economic analysis of religion seems to run counter to the way most
religious people understand their own behavior. Many would argue that analysis of a
covenantal relationship with a purely contractual set of concepts confuses very different
kinds of relationships. The former stress interpersonal commitment, self-sacrifice,
personal caring, bonding with others, and negotiation. Yet many economists and social
exchange theorists flatly maintain that there are no altruistic or self-sacrificing human
behaviors and reject the above distinction as illusory. Meanwhile, many religious people
view their commitments as covenantal.
Needless to say, rational choice theory is very controversial these days (we will
dig into these in a future class). Nevertheless, it has clearly generated a new approach and
an active research agenda that makes contributions to both the micro and macro levels of
analysis.
As well, the activist perspective offered need not be entirely incompatible with
the reference group, process models discussed earlier. It simply serves as a corrective. It
is a mistake to view religious converts as passive participants, almost the unwitting
“victims” of social processes beyond his/her control. The recruit is a participant in the
definition of his/her situation. Most sociologists do not view humans as robots totally
controlled by outside stimuli, but as active agents who help shape their environments.
Still, reference groups and social processes serve as both resources and powerful
influences in any person’s interpretation of experience. The person may have some
choice over their reference group, but it in turn helps them define norms and make sense
of experience. If theorists lose sight of either side of this, their theories will be simplistic
and disjointed.
8