ThessISMUN 2005
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1st Committee - Disarmament and International Security
Study Guide
Establishment of a nuclear free zone in the region of Middle East
March 2005
The concept of Nuclear Weapon-free Zones
Introduction
The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), as it has developed from the political
deliberation since the mid-1950s, does today cover a spectrum of arrangements, geographically
ranging from whole continents like Latin America to a corridor in Central Europe, and functionally
serving purposes of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as well as avoiding nuclear war. The
expansion of the NWFZ concept to include all weapons of mass destruction has been proposed.
The zone issues should, therefore, be studied both in historical and conceptual terms.
The first proposal on regional limitation of nuclear weapons, introduced by the Soviet Union in the
United Nations, was tabled in 1956. It referred to Central Europe and was proposed by one
superpower directed to its adversary superpower. One year later Polen proposed the so called
Rapachi-plan on permanent absence of nuclear weapons from the entire territory of several states
in Central Europe. The latter proposal was thus made by one of the states within the prospective
zone region.
At that time two different approaches to military denuclearisation were pursued in parallel. One
was the open ended and global non-proliferation approach which started with the "Irish" resolution
and finally led to the adoption, in 1968, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). The purpose of that treaty was to prevent the number of nuclear weapon states to
grow beyond the five existing at the time. It was recognized that the risk of outbreak of nuclear
war would grow dangerously larger, if the number of "fingers on the trigger" would be permitted
to increase.
The other approach was the regional or zonal. An important difference between the two
approaches is that while the NPT prevents non-nuclear-weapon parties to "control" nuclear
weapons but permits them to host nuclear weapons of others on their territories, zonal agreements
prescribe the absence of all nuclear weapons from the territories of a defined region whoever
controls them.
Although significant strides have been taken—the cornerstones of the disarmament regime are the
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 1996 Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)—nuclear disarmament is still in its early stages. It has not been
completely successful thus far because nuclear-weapon States wish to retain their weapons for
reasons of security and prestige, and aspiring nuclear States wish to obtain these weapons to
become more powerful. The most promising disarmament mechanisms to date have been the socalled “nuclear-weapon-free Zones” (NWFZs). An offshoot of Article VII of the NPT, which gives
regions the right to make treaties establishing NWFZ, these progressive alliances may hold the
answer to the future success of nuclear non-proliferation and, perhaps, total disarmament.
The rationale behind NWFZ is that there is a direct correlation between denuclearisation and
peace. Most States seek nuclear weapons for their deterrent qualities, often pursuing them because
they fear that their neighbours are developing such weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are
intended to fix this security dilemma because they prohibit the possession, testing, transporting and
stationing of nuclear weapons within a specific area. Without the presence of nuclear material in a
region, no country should feel insecure enough to seek or develop such weapons. At its
foundation, NWFZs are confidence-building measures aimed at improving trust and transparency
among
neighbouring
countries.
Contributing to the understanding of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept have been two United
Nations comprehensive expert studies of the subject. Both studies were initiated on the initiative of
Finland engaged in the issue of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. The
first report was prepared in 1975, the second report was almost but not entirely finalized in 1985.
In 1990, President Mubarak of Egypt proposed the establishment of a zone free of all types of
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This proposal expanded the scope of earlier
NWFZ concepts to include "all weapons of mass destruction without exception", i.e. "nuclear,
chemical and biological, etc".
A number of areas have been established as demilitarised zones according to treaties concluded
long ago, most of them before the atomic bomb was invented. Among such areas are a number of
islands in the Mediterranean as well as in the Baltic and Arctic seas. By implication such areas
should today be considered nuclear weapon free as well.
Over the years, local authorities in various countries have declared cities, towns, counties or other
sub national areas as nuclear-weapon-free zones. Generally, such authorities have no legal
competence for decisions of this kind and would have no possibility to get their "zones"
internationally recognized. Such "zones" should therefore be considered expressions of opinion
rather than arms control measures.
Reference should finally be made to the possibility envisaged in the humanitarian laws of war to
establish by agreement temporarily demilitarised zones.
These developments now proceed in the general direction of a nuclear-weapon-free world. But a
development schedule has only vaguely been defined in various documents.
In the post-cold-war era, several factors have impeded nuclear disarmament. These issues include
the standstill in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the
Russian Federation, the uncertainty as to the success of the CTBT, as well as the NPT, missile
defence systems that threaten the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the new
incentives
for
strengthening
nuclear
technologies
for
nuclear-weapon
States.
While the NWFZ initiative has so far been a great success in its five application zones, there are
nonetheless very real obstacles for it. These challenges include gaining full ratification of treaties
and protocols—the inability to do so is the reason the Pelindaba Treaty has not yet come into
force—as well as continuing the verification of compliance. Additionally, the framers of NWFZ
have struggled with the question of transporting nuclear materials: should NWFZ be able to
prevent nuclear materials from being transported in their seas? Though the Treaty of Tlatelolco
specifies a nuclear-free region in Latin America, for instance, there has been debate among nations
in the region over whether fissile material should be allowed to be transported through the zone by
nuclear-weapon
States.
Other challenges facing NWFZ arise from the shortcomings of the NPT. In January 1992, for
instance, North Korea and South Korea signed a declaration that would end all nuclear activities
on the Korean Peninsula, aside from peaceful nuclear research. However, the agreement was
frozen when North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, and no progress has since been
made.
A core problem of the NPT is that it allows some nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear devices
while it prohibits others from doing so. Though it requires nuclear States to negotiate “in good
faith” to relinquish their weapons in the future, there has been no effective enforcement
mechanism to guarantee compliance with this demand. The only way to achieve substantial
disarmament is if nations have the will to disarm. The progress made by the NWFZ treaties is due
largely to the sentiment that all States parties want to live in a nuclear-free zone. At the 2000 NPT
Review Conference at UN Headquarters in New York, Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted
the deficiencies associated with the NPT, noting that the existing 35,000 nuclear weapons, many of
which are on hair-trigger alert, have not yet been dismantled because “much of the established
multilateral disarmament machinery has started to rust—a problem due not to the machinery itself
but
to
the
apparent
lack
of
political
will
to
use
it”.
Until States are willing to live without these weapons and the nuclear disarmament regime adopts
measures such as NWFZ, which completely prohibit them, there will be no guarantee of nuclear
safety.
Considering the scope of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the absolute character of the
zone concept, further pursuance of the zone concept would be a powerful means for gradually
achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Such an effort would include
Enhancing remaining entry into force processes of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones,
Strengthening the provisions of existing zonal regimes and
Establishing new zones, until the whole world will become such a zone
The provisions and implementation machinery of the non-proliferation régime would be a
dominating basis for negotiating such zones in the future. Whenever a new nuclear-weapon-free
zone will be discussed, all or most potential zonal states would thus already be parties to the NPT.
Indeed, the NPT itself foresees that role in its Article VII also indicating that participation in a
nuclear-weapon-free zone would define extended commitments for NPT parties.
On 30 September 2002, a resolution put forth by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to establish a Central Asian Nuclear-Free Zone was adopted by
consensus by the General Assembly. On 19 December 2003, the Assembly proposed a resolution
for the Middle East to become nuclear-weapon-free, and will try to pass it in its fifty-ninth session
or beyond and create new regional NWFZs in South Asia, Northeast Asia and Central Europe. In
addition, the Assembly has supported a declaration between existing regions.
The NWFZ experience so far
A discussion of a further implementation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone instrument for nuclear
arms control should be based on the experience of the concept so far.
The first nuclear-weapon-free zone was established in 1967 in Latin America and the Caribbean
under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. All 33 Latin American countries, are parties to the Treaty, which
bars nuclear material from the area except for peaceful purposes. A nuclear-free region symbolizes
more than just advancement in nuclear disarmament; it is a major step towards general
disarmament as well. In the Treaty, it is established that “militarily denuclearised zones are not an
end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later
stage”.
After the success of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NWFZ initiative achieved global recognition in
1975 when the United Nations adopted a formal definition for NWFZ. According to United
Nations General Assembly resolution 3472 B, these zones must: correspond only to those nations
within the clearly specified application regions; recognize the full and complete absence of nuclear
materials in the application zone; establish a verification and control system for their nuclear
facilities;
and
be
formally
recognized
by
the
General
Assembly.
To date, four more NWFZs, consisting of 110 countries, have been created. The first region
established since the one in Latin America was in the South Pacific. The initiative, proposed by the
South Pacific Forum, opened for signature in 1983 and was adopted in 1985 as the Treaty of
Rarotonga. The zone includes Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand,
Nieu, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.
Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Rarotonga Treaty prohibits nuclear States from carrying out
nuclear tests, even for peaceful purposes, in the application zone. The next to be signed was the
Bangkok Treaty in 1995, creating a NWFZ in Southeast Asia. Arising from cold-war security
concerns and a perception of Asian unity, the seven members of the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Viet Nam—as well as the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Cambodia and
Myanmar,
decided
to
collectively
forego
nuclear
aspirations.
The spread of NWFZs continued into Africa in 1996, with the signing of the Pelindaba Treaty. The
call for an African regional agreement on denuclearization originated when France conducted its
first nuclear tests in the Western Sahara desert in November 1961. Leaders at the Organization for
African Unity (OAU) Summit in 1964 concluded that a prohibition on the production and control
of nuclear material was necessary for the entire continent. However, the agreement could not be
feasibly attained until 1991, when South Africa—the only African nation to have ever developed
nuclear technology—decided to relinquish its nuclear programme and join the NPT as a nonnuclear State, thereby obliging the country not to seek or attain nuclear capability in the future.
Although the Pelindaba Treaty is still awaiting ratification—so far, only 19 of the necessary 28
nations have ratified—and has not yet entered into force, it is nonetheless a landmark agreement
since a former nuclear-weapon State is part of the zone. A total of 54 African nations could
potentially be included in this NWFZ. Rounding out the five current zones is Antarctica, where
nuclear explosions and radioactive waste disposal were outlawed in 1959 under the Antarctic
Treaty.
The mechanics of the treaties involve more than the ban on nuclear material. Aside from
prohibition, the treaties include a protocol by a nuclear-weapons State that lays out negative
security assurances for that particular NWFZ, guaranteeing that these States will neither use nor
threaten to use their nuclear weapons against States parties. In addition to reinforcing trust between
the nuclear-weapons States and the NWFZ States, the treaties increase transparency among the
NWFZ States. NWFZs permit the United Nations nuclear-monitoring branch, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to conduct regular ad hoc and special inspections of the region’s
nuclear
activity.
The strength of the NWFZ initiative lies in its commitment to cooperation and trust. It recognizes
that confidence-building is the most important ingredient for the future of nuclear safety.
Specifically, the nuclear-free regions provide concrete evidence that participating States are
fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which requires non-nuclear States to
remain as such, and nuclear States to negotiate “in good faith” to relinquish their nuclear
programmes. The intrusive inspection measures established in the NWFZ provide valuable
supplements to the verification structure of the NPT and inhibit States from opting for nuclear
weapons
in
response
to
future
security
needs.
Under the umbrella of nuclear disarmament initiatives but not fitting into the nuclear weapon-free
“zones” are individual States which have agreed to remain non-nuclear and are subject to the same
rules and regulations as those nations which are part of the five official zones. Examples of singleState zone are Austria and Mongolia, which announced their non-nuclear posture in 1999 and
2000, respectively.
Τhere are also authoritative reports on two nuclear-weapon-free zones proposed in the past but
which have not been established, i.e. in the Middle East (1990) and in the Nordic area (1991).
Τwo United Nations expert studies have contributed to establish the scope and the frame of the
concept. The UNDC deliberations on nuclear-weapon-free zone issues that began in 1997 would
certainly produce additional UN documents of principal importance in due course.
The Theory of NWFZs - Definitions
"Nuclear-weapon-free zone" is a summary concept describing regimes for regional security,
independently or as a complement to other arrangements, global as well as regional. The concept
has been relatively well researched. Geographical, political and other regional specifics related to
nuclear-weapon-free zones would make different zones different. No such zone would be an exact
copy of another. The term nuclear-weapon-free zone would, however, usually imply the fulfilment
of certain objectives and the implementation of certain measures of arms control.
The general objective for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be to relieve a zonal area
from the threat of being involved in mass destruction war. The fulfilment of this objective would
usually require cooperation both among prospective zonal states and between them and nuclear
weapon states or other extra-zonal states.
But there may be a variety of further objectives for the establishment of such zones in specific
cases. Regarding proposed zones in Europe, the objective of geographical separation of the nuclear
weapons of the major military blocks during the Cold War has been referred to as such a
secondary important objective.
The fulfilment of such objectives shall also be considered as a process in time. History has shown
that so far, establishment of zones is a process over decades rather than years. In addition, the
creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would always be considered a temporary step and a
contribution to a process eventually leading to general nuclear disarmament.
Zone: States participating in a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction are free to decide what régime they consider appropriate to fulfill the requirements in
their specific region. Indeed, each zone established or proposed so far has been intended to serve
purposes specific to each case and that will probably be so in the future as well
The UN General Assembly in 1975 and 1978 have shaped the overall characteristics of NWFZs,
e.g., arrangements freely arrived at amongst the states of the relevant region involving, inter alia:
I. Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon -free zone
1. A nuclear-weapon-free zone shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as
such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free
exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:
The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the
procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;
An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the
obligations deriving from that statute.
II. Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear weapon States towards nuclear-weaponfree zones and towards the States included therein
2. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General
Assembly, all nuclear weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international
instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the
following obligations:
To respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or
convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;
To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the
zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;
To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the
zone.
Nuclear weapon is among the specific terms that may require a specific definition in a treaty
establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. None of the multilateral treaties of global application
concluded so far contains a definition of nuclear weapons. The regional Treaty of Tlatelolco,
containing such a definition in its article 5, is the only treaty to do so. While there may be a
general understanding of what a nuclear weapon is, the countries seeking to establish a nuclearweapon-free zone may wish to define the scope of the nuclear weapon concept, in particular,
whether the agreed measures would relate to nuclear warheads, to all nuclear explosive devices as
is the case in the non-proliferation treaty, or whether to include the delivery vehicles carrying
nuclear warheads. The South East Asian Treaty defines nuclear weapon in its article 1(c) as "any
explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner", thus including
nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.
The term nuclear-weapon state may also require an explicit definition in a treaty seeking to
establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as such states may be requested to assume obligations
specific to them. The term was defined in article IX:3 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a state
having manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1
January 1967. The purpose of setting a date was to prohibit a race for acquiring nuclear weapon
power status before the entry into force of the NPT. This definition does not, however, cover a
new country acquiring nuclear weapons after the stated date beyond the five established at the
time. Nor does the NPT formula covers the case that a nuclear-weapon state abandons its nuclear
arms to become non-nuclear.
A related problem would be to refer to and accommodate potential zonal states which de facto are
nuclear weapon states but which have not officially established themselves as such. They may
have access to nuclear weapons through an alliance with a nuclear weapon state or have made
advanced preparations necessary for independent acquisition of nuclear weapons.
There seems to be a growing interest in expanding the scope of the NWFZ concept to cover all
weapons of mass destruction requiring a definition of this category of weapons. The concept of
weapons of mass destruction was defined by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments
already 13 August 1948 as "atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal
chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have
characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons
mentioned above" or expressed in modern terminology as nuclear, biological, chemical, and
radiological weapons, or weapons with similar effects. In recent years, long range missiles have
frequently been considered related to weapons of mass destruction both as carriers of warheads of
mass destruction and as instruments of long distance surprise attack.
Geographical viewpoint of the NWFZ
No precise requirements can be set as regards the suitable size of nuclear-weapon-free zones or
other arms control zones, which could range from whole continents to small areas. Sometimes a
zone may be initially established in a limited area and later extended as other countries agree to
join in. If large parts of the world are to be kept free from nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction, extending such zones to whole continents would provide the natural way to
achieve that aim.
The geographical extent of a zone would depend on the specific characteristics of the region and
the precise arms control objectives to be realized.
A single state could declare itself a zone. One example is Mongolia which acted to establish itself
as nuclear-weapon-free zone. Normally, however, a zone would comprise the national territories of
two or several neighbouring states including their territorial waters and airspace and established by
agreement among those states. It would also be possible for states separated from each other by
high sea areas or otherwise to form a zone.
Sometimes the circumstances are such that only part of a state will be considered for inclusion in a
zone. One clear category is when a considerable part of a state is denuclearised while other parts
are not, an example being the territory of the former German Democratic Republic now nuclearweapon-free and part of unified Germany.
Another case refers to dependencies of states being part of a zone while the mainland belongs to
other regions. Protocols of the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba treaties apply to this case.
A third case refers to states belonging to a nuclear-weapon-free zone but a far away dependency
does not.
A fourth case refers to the case where a separate part of a country is a denuclearised or a
demilitarised entity and the mainland is not. An example is the demilitarised Spits Bergenarchipelago, a dependency of Norway not party to a zone.
A final combined zonal and non-zonal case is when an extra-zonal state has a military base in a
zone, but the host country has no responsibility for the base. An example is the US base of
Guantánamo in Cuba.
Delimitation of a zone would generally depend on two concepts: the zonal outer perimeter and the
territory for which the zone agreement is in force. Both concepts were applied in the Tlatelolco
and Rarotonga treaties while no specific perimeter was defined for the Pelindaba and Bangkok
zones.
The perimeter is a line encircling the entire area of the zone within which all states would be
eligible to join the zone agreement. The perimeter may encompass international areas as well. To
avoid confusion, the perimeter should, if possible, not cut through the interior of individual states.
States outside the perimeter would be considered extra-zonal, but may be invited to assume
responsibilities related to the zone and regarding dependencies they may have inside the perimeter.
The area of application of a zone would be the territory, including land areas, internal, territorial,
and archipelagic waters, and air space, of parties for which the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty
and related protocols are in force. Zonal commitments could also be applied to international areas
such as Antarctica or parts of the high seas upon entry into force of special legal instruments. The
area of application would grow in size as more states adhere to the zone agreement but could by
definition not extend beyond the perimeter.
While a zone could thus come into force with a limited number of parties rather early, the addition
of further states within the perimeter may (but must not necessarily) go on for a considerable time.
The Tlatelolco Treaty was agreed in 1967, and today all but one of the eligible states are parties.
The last one, Cuba, is in the process of completing its accession procedure. The Rarotonga Treaty
was agreed in 1985 and the entry into force process is still going on.
One element of a zone arrangement could be "thinning-out", i.e. withdrawal or other measures
regarding weapons, military forces or military activities in an area adjacent to the zone, the
purpose being to enhance the security of the zonal states and the credibility of the assurances
extended to the zone by extra-zonal states.
Such security areas adjacent to the zone could be both land and sea areas. They would have to
conform to specific conditions in each case and could be based upon agreements reached among
the countries directly concerned. Measures of this kind could also be defined in functional terms,
that is, in terms of the relations that relevant weapons, forces and military activities could have to
the zone. In the latter case the extension of the "adjacency" would implicitly be related to the
ranges of these weapons, forces and activities.
With more and more nuclear-weapon-free zones established in the world, it sometimes happen, for
geopolitical and other reasons, that proposed zones overlap each other. One example is the
proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, two thirds of which will overlap the
African zone according to current proposals. Another example is the politically more vague idea
that Iran, an obvious member of a Middle East zone - and indeed the country which first proposed
the Middle East zone - could also be a member of a future Central Asian zone. Such overlap is
certainly possible and could politically be very desirable but would require legal harmony between
the treaties establishing the overlapping zones.
Standards and commitments
There would be three measures of central operative importance for the achievement of the
objectives of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction or a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
general case. These are
Non-possession of prohibited weapons by zonal States,
Non-stationing of prohibited weapons by any State within the geographical area of application of
the zone, and
Non-use or non-threat of use of prohibited weapons throughout the zone or against targets within
the zone
The meaning of these measures might seem clear enough. However, their legal representation
could be complicated, as shown e.g. by the definition of "nuclear weapon" in the Tlatelolco Treaty
(Art. 5).
The non-possession measure would apply to zonal states. Its codification could be much simplified
if relying on the concepts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Article II). If the zone encompasses
only territories of states parties to the NPT, most of the non-possession requirement would be
fulfilled. If the zone is to encompass states which are not parties to the NPT or states which are
nuclear weapon states, a special regime must be defined. The same would be true in the special
case that only a part of a state will be included in the zone. If the whole of a nuclear weapon state
is to be included, a procedure for abandonment of all its nuclear weapons must be prescribed.
Also prescribed should be the right or non-right of zonal states to acquire and operate nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Because of the technological similarity of nuclear
weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, the possession of such devices by
some zonal states would significantly weaken a zonal regime. As the peaceful nuclear explosion
technology now seems generally unfeasible, sacrificing the right to possess them would harm the
parties very little while enhancing the effectivity of the zone very much. As the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty prohibits all nuclear explosions, the adherence of the zonal states to the CTBT
would automatically complement the zonal regime.
The non-stationing measure would primarily apply to the territories of zonal states and must be
specified in the founding treaty as such stationing is not prohibited by the NPT.
There is the exception that zonal states could not by agreement among themselves restrict or
prohibit innocent passage (or transit passage) by vessels of nuclear-weapon states and other extrazonal states with nuclear weapons onboard in their territorial and archipelagic waters. Nonstationing measures applying to such waters and to international land and sea areas would require
special legal arrangements.
The founding legal instrument of the zone must also define whether it would be only the warheads
that should not be present in the zone or if the prohibition should also include all or some of their
delivery vehicles and installations being integral parts of weapon systems.
The non-use measure would be a commitment by nuclear-weapon states. Legally, this provision
has been given the form of a separate protocol to existing zone agreements. Reservations to the
guarantee-protocol could not be avoided in the Latin American case.
Consideration of the non-use measure should be made against the background of ongoing
negotiations on general negative security assurances at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
All five nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral declarations that they would not attack or
threaten to attack with nuclear weapons states that do not possess such weapons themselves or host
those of others on their territories. These declarations are not coordinated and include some
conditions and reservations. The reservations are linked to the question whether a state can be a
member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and also of a military alliance with a nuclear-weapon state
simultaneously. That is certainly possible provided, however, that the two sets of commitments are
not contradictory.
Linked to the non-use measure has been the idea mentioned above that this measure should be
complemented by a "thinning-out" arrangement in areas adjacent to the proposed zone where
nuclear weapons are deployed. The "thinning-out" idea implies that such weapons should be
withdrawn that are targeted against the zone or that have short ranges and are deployed very close
to the zone, thus making them usable primarily against the zone. If such weapons are not
withdrawn, non-use commitments would be less credible 70.
Inspection and compliance issues
It is traditionally recognized that effective implementation of an agreement on a nuclear-weaponfree zone or on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction would require a system of verification
to ensure that all states involved, zonal as well as extra-zonal, comply with their obligations.
The precise scope and nature of such a system would vary from zone to zone and depend upon the
nature of the obligations prescribed. Generally, a zonal treaty would have to include provisions
both for verifying compliance and a complaints procedure for settling issues of suspected noncompliance, should such cases arise. As relevant, the zone verification system could for its
implementation be based on verification enforced according to the NPT.
In general, subject to verification under a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty should be:
(a) All activities of zonal states related to nuclear weapons to ensure that peaceful activities are not
diverted to the manufacture of weapons;
(b) the commitment that no nuclear weapons are present within the zone; special regimes would be
required for sea areas;
(c) the removal of nuclear weapons that may be present within the zonal area at the time of entry
into force of the zone agreement, possibly also requiring an account of the nuclear history of
participating zonal states;
(d) the implementation of other measures associated with the zone agreement.
Most verification related to peaceful nuclear activities of zonal states could be entrusted to the
safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is now
operating safeguards in very many states, including the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. This traditional safeguards system could require extension and
reinforcement for the purpose of verifying a specific zone agreement by additional procedures
especially defined and described in that agreement. The provisions of the current NPT-related
safeguards system was agreed as a compromise at the time of conclusion of the negotiations of the
NPT in 1968, i.e. during the Cold War. Still the system has been considered adequate and has
worked well for long time. But recent experiences primarily in Iraq and North Korea have
provoked a revision of the system to make it more effective.
In some regions, the zonal parties may prefer to establish standing organs or special bodies for
carrying out verification. In regions where sharp conflicts exist, entrusting the task of verification
to an international organization, perhaps supplemented by bilateral arrangements, might be
preferred.
IAEA could assume responsibility for safeguards subject to special agreements. However, to
entrust all verification activities referred to above to IAEA may go beyond the Agency's current
practices, although its statute gives the Agency considerable possibilities in that respect.
There is also the possibility that an agreement on a zone would provide to any party a right to
undertake verification activities in other states parties to the zonal agreement, including on-site
inspection. One model for such a system could be the verification system laid down in several
arms control agreements adopted within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), i.e. the Stockholm and Vienna Documents on confidence-building measures and the CFE
Treaty. These treaties give each party the right to undertake inspections in the territory of any other
party, subject to annual quotas, and oblige every party to receive and accommodate on short notice
such inspections in its own territory.
The creation of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East
Introduction
The Middle East today is perhaps the foremost powder keg for regional violence on the face of the
planet, an area marked by deep conflict and mistrust. Ongoing conflicts in that region threaten not
only the states that are immediately involved but also the rest of the world. The devastation of
nuclear weaponry has only been seen twice in the history of the world, and the only thing that
remains more clearly understood than the total destruction that they bring is the danger that they
pose in the wrong hands. In the Middle East more that any other region there are a diverse array of
diametrically opposed interests operating in a small area. The conflicts that result are often the
most dangerous because of it, and for that reason, the United Nations has proposed in the past that
the Middle East become a nuclear free zone.
The implications for proliferation in this region are obviously massive. The instability that already
exists is likely to be augmented by the presence of nuclear weapons, which provide states with
rather dangerous alternatives for diplomacy and the ongoing negotiations between feuding states.
Furthermore, the possibility that these weapons might fall into the hands of non-state actors such
as terrorists are also a chief concern. The precedent for establishing a nuclear weapon free zone is
there: they already exist in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Iran initiated the idea of a NWFZ in the area in 1970’s. On December 9 1974, Egypt and Iran cosponsored a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly that called upon all nations in the region to
reciprocally agree not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore it called for adherence
to NPT as a prerequisite for a Mideast NWZ.
In the period that followed multiple meetings of the United Nations bodies as well as independent
boards of scientists and disarmament experts have all called for a NWFZ in the Middle East. Most
recently, at the 2000 NPT review conference, the member states passed a resolution calling for non
member states to sign and ratify the NPT, brought attention to the poorly regulated weapons sites
in the Middle East that are suspectible to terrorist infiltration, pointed to the NPT as the
cornerstone of all international safeguards against nuclear weapons, and called on Middle Eastern
states to take a more proactive role in taking the necessary political steps toward creating a NWFZ.
However these efforts continued to be hamstrung by the political deadlock between Israel and its
neighbours over the NPT.
In 2003, the Secretary General submitted a Report to the General Assembly that relayed findings
about Israel’s position on the NWFZ. While positively assessing the international “Road Map” for
peace as confidence building measure that might foster greater cooperation in the development of
a Middle East NWFZ, the report also seemed to emphasize Israel’s non-committal stance toward
both NPT and the NWFZ. The reasoning contained therein complicated the matter greatly. Among
the foremost of concerns are the need for mutual recognition among states, and the understandable
refusal o negotiate during times of conflict.
Most recently on November 2004 a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations once more calling upon all states to make all necessary steps for the creation of a NWFZ
in the Middle East.
Towards a nuclear Weapon Free Zone
The goal of establishing a Middle East nuclear free zone has been a goal of the United Nations
since the 1970s. However the political instability in the area as well as the continued debate of the
Non- Proliferation Treaty between Israel and Arab States in the Middle East has seemed to hamper
efforts towards reaching that goal. Several factors nonetheless, now more than ever, show that it
could become true. The ongoing bilateral peace negotiations between Israel and Palestinians have
shaped a balance, delicate and easily shaken no doubt, but surely a positive step towards the
establishment of peace in the region.
The adherence of the Non- Proliferation Treaty is a prerequisite for a Middle Eastern NWZ. With
the exception of Israel, every country in the region has joined the NPT. Since its 1970 inception,
the NPT has come under review twice, once in 1995 to assess its progress towards eliminating the
global nuclear threat and again in 2000 for further evaluation.
The Non- Proliferation Treaty figures so importantly in this debate because the development of a
nuclear free zone in the Middle East hinges upon its universally binding agreements. If one state
refuses to sign on, it will be difficult to coax other states in the region as well as their allies to
agree on the conditions for a nuclear free zone. Further more Israel’s reluctance to join the NPT
has been pointed out as a key factor for the debate by most of the countries of the area as well as
several European countries. While assessing the role of certain countries policy towards a nuclear
free Middle East, it cannot be excluded the case of Iran. Iran’s reluctance to comply with the
NPT’s regulations and the impediment of IAEA inspections have raised suspicions for the
existence of a nuclear weapon program. Such cases prove without any doubt the compliance
problems the NPT faces.
A Mideast NWZ requires the resolution of at least seven issues: geography, prohibitions,
verification, the role of outside powers, duration and withdrawal, relationship to other agreements
and requirements for entry into force.
Concerning geography what has to be clarified are the limits of the NWFZ and the countries that
will be included (the 22 members of the Arab League plus Iran and Israel).
Speaking of a nuclear weapon free zone, all nuclear weapons, weapons technology, weapons
usable material and machinery that could produce such material should be prohibited. The history
of NWFZs has shown that the regulations concerning the prohibitions can vary, depending the
willingness of the countries to commit themselves.
Outside powers should be prohibited from the area and dual-use technology will be subject to
IAEA safeguards. The effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards are a
crucial factor for the zone, especially if taken under consideration the fact that NPT’s
ineffectiveness can be put down to its failure to include a successful compliance mechanism.
States of the region agree in principle on the need to apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material
and facilities in the region. But of course differences remain on whether this should precede or be
part of a NWFZ agreement. As for the development of model verification agreements, these hinge
on the material obligations to be verified. In this context, the agency is actively seeking to better
acquaint the relevant states with the wide range of material obligations available, and the
verification modalities and scenarios that could flow from them.
In addition to the visits already mentioned the IAEA has organized specific activities relevant to
verification modalities, such as the Middle East verification workshop in Vienna and, with the
European Atomic Energy Community, presentations and a demonstration of nuclear verification
techniques covering cooperation agreements between the IAEA and regional verification systems.
The IAEA still needs further clarity from some of the Middle East states about their preferences
with regard to material obligations and, without such clarity, cannot meaningfully embark on
preparing the model verification agreements foreseen.
But what is already clear is that, for the Middle East, the IAEA global verification arrangements
will have to be supplemented by very stringent and intrusive regional arrangements. These could
involve, for example, regional inspectors working additionally to, or in parallel with, IAEA
inspectors. The IAEA’s statutory mandate to apply safeguards leaves considerable room for
flexibility to accommodate fresh tasks and challenges.
Nuclear power should not be excluded from the region but what has to be ensured is that each
plant will have the appropriate monitoring for its safe operation. The mechanism that will have the
responsibility of ensuring the above –whether it will be IAEA or another agency-has to be agreed
between the states parties.
Although freestanding, all parties in the zone should be subject to the NPT. Apart from the NonProliferation Treaty there are also other agreements that could be related to the establishment of a
NWFZ in the area.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) starts to establish a monitoring network in the
Middle East. Israel has signed the CTBT. The New Protocol which has the purpose of
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of nuclear safeguards allows for
environmental monitoring. A number of Arab states expressed their objection as long as it does not
apply to Israel. It could be signed by Israel without a fundamental change in its policy, because it
is not restricted to full scope safeguards, but can also be applied to facility related safeguards
which are in force in Israel.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) has been in force since 1975. However,
initially it did not include effective provisions for verification. In 1986 a major step forward was
made in openness and verification when the five-year review conference reached agreement on
exchanges of information about all high-containment biological research facilities and all unusual
outbreaks of disease or toxin-related illness. In the past, a number of mock inspections have been
conducted to gain experience and to demonstrate their effectiveness.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) entered into force on 29 April 1997. By the
end of 1997 Iran was the only state in the Middle East which had ratified the CWC. Israel has
signed it, but not yet ratified.
The chemical industry has obligations for declaration and will be subject to verification
inspections on a basis of managed access. The CWC has an extensive Verification Annex and the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is in the process of establishing
its work. Remote verification is of minor importance for the CWC. Environmental measurements
have some significance in investigating an allegation of the use of chemical weapons in a war.
The fraying of the non-proliferation regime calls for and ambitious proposal. Not only is there the
dimension of long-standing hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbours, but also problems
between some of those neighbours themselves, and between states in the Arab-Israeli sub-region
and others outside. The proximity of adversaries, the intensity of political differences and a
growing tendency toward unconstrained terrorism makes the abolition of nuclear weapons- along
with the means to fabricate them- a regional imperative.
What those arrangements will actually consist of is for the parties of a future nuclear weapon free
zone to decide.