http://www.i-sis.org.uk/full/BrokenPromisesFull.php
ISIS Report 12/05/04
Broken Promises
Will GM crops really help developing
countries? Lim Li Ching looks at some
telling examples in Kenya, Indonesia
and India.
GM sweet potato project turns sour
"Monsanto's showcase project in
Africa fails", runs the headline in the
magazine, New Scientist,
pronouncing the project to develop
genetically modified (GM) sweet
potatoes a flop [1].
The GM sweet potatoes, modified to
be resistant to the feathery mottle
virus, had undergone three years of
field trials. However, the Kenya
Agriculture Research Institute (KARI)
had to report that the GM sweet
potatoes were as vulnerable to the
virus as ordinary varieties, and
sometimes their yield was lower.
"There is no demonstrated advantage
arising from genetic transformation
using the initial gene construct," KARI
researchers Drs. Francis Nang'ayo
and Ben Odhiambo were quoted as
saying [2]. The national newspaper,
Daily Nation, wrote: "The transgenic
material did not quite withstand virus
challenge in the field". Furthermore,
"all lines tested were susceptible to
viral attacks." And, control (non-GM)
crops yielded more tuber compared to
the GM sweet potato.
The poor performance of the GM
sweet potato may come as a surprise,
as it had been much touted as an
example of how GM crops could help
African agriculture. The GM sweet
potato project was launched in Kenya
in 2001 by the US special envoy,
Andrew Young, who had flown into
the country for the occasion. "With
biotechnology, we are going to make
a green revolution in Africa," he had
said [2].
Kenyan biotechnologist Florence
Wambugu had been involved in the
early stages of the GM sweet potato
project, and has been travelling the
world promoting it. Media reports
have been giving the impression that
the GM sweet potato was already in
commercial use and bringing real
benefits. A typical report said: "While
the West debates the ethics of
genetically modified food, Florence
Wambugu is using it to feed her
country" [3]. It went on to claim that
the GM sweet potato yields "are
double that of the regular plant" and
that the potatoes were bigger and
richer in colour, with more nutritional
value.
1
A recent report by the Nuffield Council
on Bioethics cited the project as
evidence of the potential benefits of
GM crops to developing countries,
saying of the GM sweet potato, "it is
expected that yields will increase by
approximately 18-25%" and that,
where sold, "the increased income will
be between 28-39%" [4]. And, "the
use of GM virus-resistant sweet
potatoes could prevent dramatic and
frequent reductions in yield of one of
the major food crops of many poor
people in Africa". This report is what
the UK government turns to when
questioned about impacts of GM
crops on developing countries.
But the yield claims are difficult to
verify, as there have been little field
data. In fact, early descriptions of the
GM sweet potato project had
overstated the potential gains from
GM by under-reporting the average
yield in conventional production.
Aaron deGrassi of the Institute of
Development Studies at the
University of Sussex has said [5],
"Accounts of the transgenic sweet
potato have used low figures on
average yields in Kenya to paint a
picture of stagnation. An early article
stated 6 tons per hectare - without
mentioning the data source - which
was then reproduced in subsequent
analyses. However, FAO statistics
indicate 9.7 tons, and official statistics
report 10.4."
Thus, if as Wambugu has been
claiming, the GM sweet potato
produces 10 tonnes per hectare, then
rather than increasing yields, it is
performing no better than the
conventional crop [6], as the recent
reports on the field trials confirm.
The technology was imported from
Monsanto, where Wambugu had
carried out the initial genetic
engineering research. Over a period
of nine years, Monsanto isolated a
viral coat protein responsible for virus
resistance, and donated it to KARI,
royalty free, to use in its sweet potato
improvement programme.
However, the researchers had erred
in concentrating on resistance to an
American strain of the virus [1]. In any
case, the GM sweet potato introduced
in Kenya did not address the crop's
major problem " weevils " and the
virus in question was only one small
factor among many that constrain
production [5]. Furthermore, there are
virus-resistant local varieties that
farmers already use. In short, the GM
sweet potato does little to address
Kenyan farmers' needs.
Despite the reported failures of the
GM sweet potato, Monsanto said it
2
plans to develop further varieties.
KARI has apparently reverted to
working with gene constructs based
on a Kenyan strain of the virus [2].
And Wambugu now says that, far
from being a failure, the trials were
merely meant to develop a specific
genetic transformation system, and
that more research is being
conducted on a second generation
product [7].
Over the last ten years, Monsanto,
the World Bank and the US
government have poured an
estimated $6 million into the project,
which has yet to fulfil its promises. In
contrast, conventional breeding in
Uganda has produced a variety of
virus-resistant sweet potato in less
time, at a small fraction of the cost,
and reported yield gains of 100% [5].
"Bt cotton planting has given us
more harm than good"
In December 2003, the Indonesian
Minister of Agriculture announced that
Monsanto had pulled out of South
Sulawesi [8]. In fact, Bt cottonseeds
were no longer supplied to farmers as
of February that year. Monsanto said
that its cotton business there was no
longer economically viable. After two
years of planting, Indonesia, the first
Southeast Asian country to
commercially approve Bt cotton, was
pulling the plug on that GM crop, and
switching to a locally-developed nonGM cotton variety.
Monsanto's entry into the region in
2001, through its Indonesian
subsidiary PT Monagro Kimia, rode
on a concerted campaign of
promotion of Bt cotton among
farmers. The company had claimed
that Bt cotton was environmentally
friendly, used less pesticide, and
would ensure an abundant harvest
and increase farmers' welfare.
The reality was very different. In the
first year of planting, during which the
government aimed to assess the
crop's performance before deciding
on whether to allow further
commercialisation, there were
reported failures of Bt cotton - the
crop succumbed to drought [8] and
hundreds of hectares were attacked
by pests [9]. The drought had led to a
pest population explosion on Bt
cotton, but not on other cotton
varieties. As a result, instead of
reducing pesticide use, farmers had
to use a different mix and larger
amounts of pesticides to control the
pests [10]. Furthermore, the Bt cotton
- engineered to be resistant to a pest
that is not a major problem in
Sulawesi - was susceptible to other
more serious pests.
3
Bt cotton did not produce the
promised yields [8, 10], which
Monsanto had boasted to be as high
as 3 tons per hectare. Some farmers
were even promised 4-7 tons per
hectare. The average yield was only
1.1 ton per hectare, and 74% of the
total area planted to Bt cotton
produced less than one ton per
hectare. Some farmers only
harvested about 500 kg per hectare,
others even less, about 70-120 kg per
hectare. About 522 hectares
experienced total harvest failure.
Despite the problems, the
government extended its approval for
Bt cotton commercialisation by
another year, with equally dismal
results.
The poor yields trapped farmers in a
debt cycle [11]; some 70% of the 4
438 farmers growing Bt cotton were
unable to repay their credit after the
first year of planting [10]. Branita
Sandhini, a subsidiary company of
Monsanto's Indonesian subsidiary,
had provided farmers with the
transgenic seeds and fertilisers on
credit schemes, and bought the
harvests so that farmers could repay
their debts to the company [8]. But as
the yields were poor, many farmers
were caught out. Research conducted
by various Indonesian institutions
clearly showed that, in the year 2002,
farmers planting Bt cotton had lower
income compared to farmers planting
non-GM cotton [12].
To make matters worse, the company
unilaterally raised the price of the
seeds. According to Konphalindo, the
National Consortium for Forest and
Nature in Indonesia, the initial
agreement between the farmers and
the company set the price of the seed
at Rp 40 000/kg; but this increased to
Rp 80 000/kg in the second planting
season [12]. Furthermore, the
company initially bought the cotton
from the farmers for Rp 2 600/kg, but
this later decreased to Rp 2 200/kg.
Because the company could refuse to
buy the farmers' cotton harvest, many
had no choice but to agree to the
higher seed prices, by signing a letter
of agreement with the company.
Santi, one of the farmers said, "The
company didn't give the farmer any
choice, they never intended to
improve our well being, they just put
us in a debt circle, took away our
independence and made us their
slave forever. They try to monopolize
everything, the seeds, the fertilizer,
the marketing channel and even our
life" [8].
She and her fellow farmers burnt their
cotton fields in protest and refused to
sign the letter, although others had no
choice but to agree to the unfair deal,
4
and continue planting Bt cotton to try
and escape the vicious debt cycle.
Eventually, many farmers refused to
pay the outstanding credit, resulting in
the ousting of Monsanto from the
region.
It is farmers - those whom GM crops
supposedly benefit - who have had to
bear the consequences of the poor
harvest and unfulfilled promises of Bt
cotton. In contrast, the company
abandoned the region, without being
held liable for the problems it caused
[10].
"Bt cotton unfit for cultivation and
should be banned"
The Indonesian experience is
mirrored by that of many farmers in
India, where three varieties of Bt
cotton were commercially planted for
the first time in 2002 in the central
and southern parts of the country.
Mahyco-Monsanto, a joint venture
between an Indian seed company and
Monsanto, promoted Bt cotton as
environmentally safe and
economically beneficial, claiming it
would reduce pesticide use and
cultivation costs, while resulting in
increased yields.
But reports from state governments,
academic researchers, NGOs and
farmers' organisations indicate that, in
many areas, Bt cotton performed
poorly, and at times failed completely
in the 2002/2003 growing season [1316]. So much so that a panel set up
by the Gujarat government under the
Joint Director of Agriculture (Oilseeds)
said that Bt cotton "is unfit for
cultivation and should be banned in
the State" [17].
There were reports of failure to
germinate, damage in drought
conditions in Madhya Pradesh [18],
susceptibility to root-rot in
Maharashtra (where over 30,000
hectares of Bt cotton were damaged)
[19] and leaf curl virus [20], and
increase in non-target pests. Bt cotton
was reported to be attacked by pests
it is supposed to resist; at the
Anandwan College of Agriculture,
bollworms ate more than 80% of yield
[21].
In Andhra Pradesh, farmers
experienced economic losses overall,
due to the higher price of Bt
cottonseed, little savings in pesticide
use and lower total yields [22]. Non-Bt
plants were productive for two months
longer than Bt cotton, allowing non-Bt
farmers to reap an average harvest of
6.9 quintals per acre, compared to the
4.5 quintals per acre average harvest
of farmers who planted Bt cotton, who
suffered a net 35% decrease in the
yield per acre. Pesticide use showed
marginal differences, as while there
5
was some reduction in the incidence
of bollworm, there was an increase in
sucking pests on Bt cotton. Bt farmers
also had to pay considerably more for
Bt seeds and for labour costs.
Moreover, Bt cotton fetched a lower
price in the market, due to its smaller
boll size and staple length.
Overall, a non-Bt farmer obtained Rs
6 663 more per acre than the Bt
farmer. The study further revealed
that 71 % of Bt farmers experienced
losses compared with only 18% of
non-Bt farmers. And 50.7% of the Bt
farmers surveyed categorically said
that they would not plant Bt cotton
again.
The Andhra Pradesh government
confirmed the poor performance of Bt
cotton in the state, saying that
farmers weren't getting the yields
promised and that the poor quality of
the crop commanded a lower market
price [23]. It pledged to compensate
farmers for their loss. A follow-up
study found similar experiences for
the 2003/2004 growing season [24].
In spite of better weather conditions,
Bt cotton's performance did not live
up to its promises.
Despite these negative experiences,
the Indian regulatory authority has
approved another variety of Bt cotton
for cultivation in central and southern
India [25]. The same company
supplying this variety, Rassi Seeds, a
sub-licencee of Monsanto, was also
given permission to conduct largescale field trials for Bt cotton varieties
developed for cultivation in northern
India. A further 12 varieties of Bt
cotton hybrids have just been
approved for large-scale field trials
and seed production [26].
How many more broken promises will
have to be borne by farmers?
References
1. 'Monsanto's showcase project in
Africa fails', New Scientist, 181,
2433, 7 Feb. 2004.
2. 'GM technology fails local
potatoes', by Gatonye Gathura,
Daily Nation (Kenya) 29 January
2004.
3. 'Millions served', by Lynn J Cook,
Forbes, 23 Dec. 2002,
http://www.forbes.com/global/200
2/1223/064.html
4. Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The
use of genetically modified crops
in developing countries, 2004
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fil
elibrary/pdf/gm_crops_paper_final
.pdf
5. deGrassi A. Genetically Modified
Crops and Sustainable Poverty
Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa:
An Assessment of Current
6
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Evidence, 2003,
www.twnafrica.org/docs/GMCrops
Africa.pdf
See
http://www.gmwatch.org/profile1.a
sp?PrId=131 for a deconstruction
of the hype around the increased
yield claims of the GM sweet
potato.
'Kenyan genetic scientist defends
GM sweet potato', 8 March 2004,
www.ahbfi.org
Friends of the Earth International.
Genetically modified crops: A
decade of failure [1994-2004].
February 2004.
'Pests attack genetically modified
cotton', The Jakarta Post, 29 June
2001,
www.thejakartapost.com/yesterda
ydetail.asp?fileid=20010629.A06
Jhamtani H. 'Bt cotton in
Indonesia: A case for liability',
Konphalindo. Paper presented
at the Third World Network side
event Liability and Redress:
Lessons from Real Life during
the First Meeting of the Parties
to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, 26 February 2004,
Kuala Lumpur.
'GMO brings hardship to S.
Sulawesi, farmers claim', The
Jakarta Post, 1 June 2002,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/ye
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
sterdaydetail.asp?fileid=2002060
1.L03
'Bt transgenic cotton a total
failure', Konphalindo Press
Release, Jakarta, 27 Mar.2002.
'Bt cotton failed in giving expected
results say seed breeders' UNI,
18 December 2002.
'Mahyco's Bt cotton variety 'not up
to the mark', The Hindu, 18
December 2002,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/storie
s/2002121902041700.htm
'Bt cotton dashes hopes of ryots',
The Hindu, 30 December 2002,/
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehin
du/2002/12/30/stories/
'GM crops under fire after cotton
venture fails', Bangkok Post, 12
November 2002.
'A lesson from the field', Asha
Krishnakumar, Frontline Vol. 20
(11) May 24-June 06, 2003,
http://flonnet.com/fl2011/stories/2
0030606005912300.htm
'Bt cotton - bitter harvest', The
Hindu, 24 August 2002,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehin
du/2002/08/24/stories/200208240
0081000.htm
'Bt cotton failed to give results in
Vidarbha', The Hitavada, 4
September 2002.
'Bt cotton prone to leaf curl virus
in North India', Business Line, 20
August 2002.
7
21. 'Bollworm eats into Bt cotton's
pride', The Hitavada, 10 October
2002.
22. Abdul Qayum & Kiran Sakkhari.
Did Bt Cotton Save Farmers in
Warangal?
A season long impact study of Bt
Cotton - Kharif 2002 in Warangal
District of Andhra Pradesh. AP
Coalition in Defence of Diversity &
Deccan Development Society,
Hyderabad, 2003.
23. 'Bt cotton proves a failure in
Andhra Pradesh', 3 March 2003,
Sun Network,
www.sunnt.com/news/regional/an
dhra/andhra.asp?id=7242
24. Press release from PV Sateesh,
Andhra Pradesh Coalition in
Defense of Diversity (APCIDD),
30 April 2004, sent by GM Watch,
'New study nails Monsanto's lies
over GM cotton in India', 1 May
2004, www.gmwatch.org
25. 'Rassi seeds receives nod for
cultivation of Bt cotton', by Ashok
B Sharma, Financial Times India,
4 April 2004
www.financialexpress.com/fe_full
_story.php?content_id=56343
26. 'Bt cotton hits more fields: Trials,
seed production of 12 varieties
developed by Monsanto get goahead from GEAC', by Ashok B
Sharma, Indian Express, 15 April
2004,
http://www.indianexpress.com/full
_story.php?content_id=45127
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