Fournie's superb article provides us with
an excellent overview of the war, plus
two scenarios on significant actions.
Nonetheless, this editor finds the
perspective to be decidedly "Roman" (not
exactly a sin, given that all of our
primary sources are Roman), and could
not resist interjecting some alternative
interpretations (most of which are found
in the sidebar on page 8). You'll find a
few others in italics within the body of
this article. - S KT
The Second Punic War eclipsed
the First Punic War in the
magnitude of the forces involved
and the geographic scope of the
conflict. The first war had been
primarily a naval war for the
island of Sicily, with only brief
forays into Africa and Sardinia.
The second war was a massive
struggle for dominion of the
western Mediterranean waged
from the Pillars of Heracles to the
Bosporus, from the snowy Alps to
the edge of the Sahara.
example. Polybius tells us that
Rome had 330 galleys and
Carthage 350. He then estimates a
quinquereme crew at 300 rowers
and sailors and 120 marines per
ship. From this he calculated that
there were 140,000 Romans and
150,000 Carthaginians present at
the battle. Modern historians
believe he greatly overestimated
the number of quinqueremes
versus smaller vessels and the
average crew of each ship. Many
believe each fleet numbered only
about 200 to 230 quinqueremes
and assorted smaller vessels, with
no more than 80,000 men in the
Roman fleet and less then 60,000
in the Carthaginian fleet. So the
Roman navy of the second war
was not smaller than in the first;
it was dispersed into smaller
squadrons.
The Carthaginian navy had ruled
the Western Mediterranean
unchallenged for nearly three
centuries, ever since the Greek
threat had been turned back at
It seems strange then that the
Alalia in 535 BC (scenario soon to
recorded naval battles of the first
appear in C3i). Yet, in the First
war dwarf the naval combat of
Punic War, this proud maritime
the second -the Hannibalic War.
force had been repeatedly and
There are three main reasons for
decisively defeated by the upstart
this anomaly. First, the size of the
navy of Rome, with its corvus (the
naval battles in the first war was
"crow," a pivoting boarding
exaggerated by the methodology
ramp) and crack legionary
employed by Polybius. Second,
marines. The Carthaginians were
the fleets in the second war were
defeated at Mylae, Tyndaris,
dispersed in numerous theaters,
Ecnomus, Hermaeum and
unlike the earlier war (see Order
Aegates, and won only one major
of Battle Tables). Finally, the
Punic navy was broken in the first victory-at Drepanum.
war and never regained its former
PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS
fighting spirit and skill. [See the
In the long interwar period, 241
sidebar on page 8 for a
218 BC, Carthage apparently
"Carthaginian"
made little effort to reverse the
perspective on the anomaly.]
verdict at sea. The Carthaginian
navy entered the Hannibalic War
To explain the first factor, the
as a force already defeated, with
battle of Cape Ecnomus is the best
little stomach for a decisive naval
encounter. It is ironic that while
Hannibal is credited with a long
range plan for war with Rome,
the Roman fleet was far better
prepared for this war than the
navy of Carthage. Fleets were
very expensive to maintain, so
only a skeleton force was
normally manned in peacetime.
The Romans, as usual, were
favored by fortune. In 219, the
year before Hannibal crossed the
Alps, Rome's consuls conducted a
maritime campaign against the
Illyrian pirates. So Rome had a
fleet of 200 quinqueremes, fully
manned and equipped, when the
war began. Some 20 additional
ships were added to the fleet.
Carthage, on the other hand, was
able to man and deploy only 87
quinqueremes in 218, although
she had quite a few more ships in
dry dock. [Indeed, Carthage had the
money to hire crews for their many
drydocked ships-but perhaps lacked the
leadership and will to raise the naval
stak es . -SK T]
OPENING ACTIONS
The Roman war plan for 218 BC
allocated 160 quinqueremes and
twelve smaller galleys for the
invasion of Africa and 60
quinqueremes for the invasion of
Spain. Carthage struck first,
however. The home fleet split into
two squadrons. Twenty vessels
raided the Liparae and Vulcan
islands, between Sicily and Italy.
The raid was successful, except
that three ships were captured by
twelve quinqueremes of the royal
Syracusan navy, allied at that time
with Rome. The captured crews
revealed that a second, larger
squadron of 35 galleys was to
make a surprise assault on the
port of Lilybaeum.
King Hiero II of Syracuse quickly
relayed the warning to Marcus
Aemilius, the military governor of
Sicily. The main Roman fleet had
not yet arrived in Sicily, so
Aemilius had to fight with the
ships he had on hand, probably
about 20 quinqueremes. His
squadron did not have the best
crews, but Aemilius was able
provide each ship with a full
complement of legionary marines.
The Carthaginian fleet was
undermanned, both for crews and
marines. They relied on surprise
to carry the day.
Since surprise had been forfeited,
the Romans handily won the first
battle of the war, boarding and
capturing seven ships, and taking
1,700 men prisoner. The Roman
fleet suffered one galley holed,
but they were able to recover this
ship as well. Soon thereafter,
Consul Tiberius Sempronius
Longus arrived with the main
fleet. But the planned invasion of
Africa soon was canceled so that
the consul could hurry north to
face Hannibal (and receive a
trouncing at Trebia River).
OPERATIONS IN SPAIN
In the West, Hasdrubal Barca had
manned 32 quinqueremes and 5
triremes, but did not have the
strength to confront Gnaeus
Scipio's invasion fleet of 60 ships.
After securing a base at Tarraco in
northeast Spain, Scipio sent 25
galleys back to Rome. By the
spring of 217, Hasdrubal had
added ten ships to his fleet, which
he placed under the command of
his deputy, Himilco. [This
"expansion" was most probably achieved
by hiring the crews to man existing
ships. Evidence from the capture of New
Carthage indicates that Hasdrubal faced
a crew shortage more than a ship
shortage (a matter of cash allocation to
mercenaries). That reveals an overall
strategic preference for land action
certainly understandable in the context
of the geography of the Iberian
p en insu la . -SKT] Hasdrubal
advanced up the coast with his
army and fleet, to confront Scipio
on land and/or sea.
Gnaeus Scipio initially planned to
bring both his army and fleet out
to meet Hasdrubal. But a report
that Hasdrubal had levied a very
large force of Iberians caused him
to move only by sea. Scipio
boarded picked marines from his
army on his 35 quinqueremes,
and moved south, with a few
triremes from the allied city of
Massilia performing
reconnaissance. These Greek
sailors managed to scout out
Himilco's fleet at the mouth of the
Ebro River, and return
undetected. They reported that
the Punic fleet was drawn up in
the mouth of the river, completely
unprepared for action.
Scipio was only ten miles away.
He launched his fleet for an
immediate assault. No
Carthaginian vessels were posted
to detect the approaching enemy.
Hasdrubal's army scouts sighted
the Roman fleet first, and relayed
the warning back by fire signals
from watchtowers. Hasdrubal
sent messenger after messenger
galloping to the shore to get the
sailors and marines to man their
ships. It was a scene of absolute
confusion, as sailors and soldiers
struggled to board their ships and
prepare for action. The galleys
put out to sea, some half manned,
all in an uproar. The
Carthaginians emerged from the
mouth of the Ebro in total
disorder, even as the Roman fleet
was bearing down upon them.
The battle was decided quickly.
Four Carthaginian vessels were
rammed and sunk while two were
boarded and captured. The
Carthaginians remembered that
their army was strung along the
nearby beach and made for safety.
Most of their vessels ran aground,
the crews seeking safety with the
army. The Roman navy pursued
up to shoreline, grappling and
towing off an additional 23 ships.
It was a total naval victory.
Carthage never again challenged
Roman control of Spanish waters.
[The Romans likewise were complacent
enough with not challenging the
Carthaginians along the southern
coastline of Spain until 206 BC, before
which the Carthaginians had no trouble
shipping troops to and
from Africa. After the
Ebro, both sides were
satisfied with keeping their
own shipping lanes open
for supplies and
reinforcements. -SKT]
RAIDS, ESCORTS
AND PATROLS
There were to be no
major battles at sea for
the next two years.
However, the
Carthaginian home
fleet slipped into
waters off Cosa and
seized a merchant
convoy bound for
Spain in 217 BC. The
Roman main fleet of
120 quinqueremes,
commanded by
Consul Servilius
Geminus made its
first raid on Africa the
same year. This was to
become an annual event,
something akin to a massive
pirate raid. On this first
expedition, the foraging parties
stayed ashore too long and were
caught by Carthaginian cavalry.
Over 1,000 sailors and marines
were slain before the fleet escaped
with its booty.
In 216, naval operations were
overshadowed by the battle of
Cannae. After this Roman
disaster, the praetor Marcellus
was pulled from command of the
fleet to bring his marines inland
to reinforce the garrison of Rome.
A second raid on Africa also met
heavy resistance ashore, and the
praetor Publius Furius Philus was
badly wounded. Carthage also
raided Syracusan lands. The pro
praetor Otacilius was unable to
come to his aid, as a second
enemy fleet threatened
Lilybaeum.
In 215, the Roman navy scored
three notable successes. The army
of Manlius Torquatus was
escorted to Sardinia where the
crews were pressed into service as
infantry. Another fleet of 100
ships under Titus Otacilius
Crassus meanwhile raided Africa,
and caught Hasdrubal the Bald's
escort squadron of 60 galleys
returning from Sardinia. In the
largest naval battle to date, the
Romans boarded and seized
seven ships, and the remainder of
the Carthaginian fleet scattered
and fled. But the Roman navy's
greatest coup was the capture of
Hannibal's envoys to King Philip
V, then sending back confirmation
of a Macedonian-Carthaginian
treaty. The diligence of the Roman
patrol ships under Valerius
Flaccus at Brundisium delayed
Macedori s entry into the war by a
full year. Meanwhile, Bomilcar,
the commander of the
Carthaginian home fleet slipped
through to Locri to bring
Hannibal some badly needed
reinforcements-4,000 Numidian
cavalry and 40 elephants.
SICILY AND GREECE
The following year, 214 BC, naval
operations picked up when
Syracuse under new leaders
defected from Rome to Carthage,
and Macedon entered the war.
Rome reinforced its fleet in Sicily
to 100 ships. Bomilcar nonetheless
was able to land Himilco's army
of 25,000 foot and 3,000 horse at
Heraclea Minoa, and maneuvered
around Syracuse with his 55
ships.
Philip V of Macedon invaded the
Roman protectorate in southern
Illyria with a fleet of 120 lembi.
Marcus Valerius Laevinius, with
50 quinqueremes and one legion,
defeated the Macedonian army at
Oricum. With his fleet trapped
upriver, Philip burned his ships
and retreated overland. Laevinius
remained in Greek waters and
later formed an alliance with the
Aetolian League.
By 212, Bomilcar amassed the
largest Punic fleet of the war, 130
quinqueremes, and sailed to Sicily
in an attempt to break the
blockade of Syracuse. With
Tarentum now in Hannibal's
hands, there was a real
opportunity to open up lines of
communication between
Carthage, Syracuse, Tarentum and
Greece. At Cape Pachynum, near
Syracuse, Marcellus offered battle
with his 100 ships, but Bomilcar
declined. This Carthaginian
admiral never fought a recorded
battle, and his passivity went a
long way towards ruining
Carthaginian prospects in this
war. Bomilcar passed on to
Tarentum and then Corcyra-two
places where the main Roman
fleet was not. Very little was
accomplished by this fleet over
the next four years, though Philip
V was certainly happy to see it.
During 214-207, the Roman
squadron in Greece remained
active in thwarting Philip V. Both
Rome and Macedon
gathered more allies,
King Attalus of
Pergamon contributing
35 ships to Rome while
the Achaean League and
King Prusias of Bithynia
supported Philip with
ships. A Carthaginian
squadron was also active
in Greek waters in 210
207. Yet, no major naval
battles developed. The
war was finally decided
on land, and the result
was generally beneficial
to Macedon.
Nonetheless, the Roman
navy had neutralized a
serious threat at a
critical juncture.
The Carthaginian navy
continued operations off
Sicily through 211, but
no major naval battle
ensued. Syracuse fell
after a two-year siege,
and the final
Carthaginian stronghold
at Agrigentum was
betrayed in 210. Another
Carthaginian fleet of 40
quinqueremes under
Hamilcar raided
Sardinia in 210.
The Roman navy
suffered its only defeat
of the war in 210, but not
at the hands of the
Carthaginians. The tiny
navy of Tarentum, allied
with Hannibal, shattered
a Roman squadron in a
hard fought contest off
nearby Sapriportis. Both
opponents had only 20
ships. (This battle will be
featured in an upcoming issue of
C3i.)
THE BATTLE OF CLUPEA, 208
It was the Roman practice of
dispatching her main fleet on
massive raids of Africa that
finally produced major naval
battles. Fleets of 100-120 galleys
struck the African coast nearly
every year of the war. These raids
provided intelligence, harrassed
the enemy, and most especially
brought in booty. For a decade,
their opponent made no move in
the face of this provocation. By
208 Carthage had a new admiral.
We don't know for certain, but it
may have been the Hamilcar who
raided Sardinia in 210, or the
Hasdrubal who commanded the
home fleet in 203. Whoever he
was, his conduct clearly set him
apart from Bomilcar.
In 208, Laevinius led 100
quinqueremes to pillage the
African coast at Clupea. When his
ships were nearly full of booty,
Laevinius received the alarming
news that a large Carthaginian
fleet was fast approaching. The
Romans hastily put to sea, just as
the enemy's fleet of 83 galleys
appeared. The greatest naval
battle of the Second Punic War
ensued.
The Roman fleet was
overburdened with booty-and,
as a result, slower and less
maneuverable than usual. The
Carthaginian fleet was manned
well for once and launched an
immediate attack. The
Carthaginians had regained their
fighting spirit, but in the battle
that ensued, the Romans boarded
and captured 18 ships. No Roman
losses are recorded, but they may
well have lost a number of ships
to ramming.
In the following year, another
Roman raid of 100 galleys under
Laevinius was again intercepted.
The Romans had pillaged the area
around Utica, and once again
were returning with booty-laden
ships. The Carthaginian home
fleet sallied forth once again.
However, the Punic navy had
been able to replace only a few of
the lost vessels and crews. This
time 70 Carthaginian galleys
attacked the larger Roman fleet.
The results were much the same,
as Rome captured 17 ships and
rammed and sank four more. [This
second action raises a serious question
regarding Livy's report of the results of
the one in the previous year. If so beaten
badly in the first action, why were the
Carthaginians so eager to fight at worse
odds on the next occasion? It is quite
probable that the Romans "got as good as
they gave" at Clupea, but Livy's
patriotism led to an omission of that fact.
Given the overall number of losses of
Roman war galleys during the course of
the war, we must allow for the fact that
Livy overlooks losses frequently. -SKT]
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
That was the last open sea battle
of the war. Interestingly, in the
final years of the war a number
of
armies crisscrossed the Western
Mediterranean without hindrance
by any enemy fleet. Mago sailed
from the Balearic Islands to
invade the Ligurian coast of Italy
in 205 BC. Mago transported
12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry
with a small escort of 30
quinqueremes. Mago retained ten
ships and sent the other 20 back
to Carthage, as Scipio' invasion
was anticipated. In 204, Mago was
reinforced by sea with an
additional 6,000 foot, 800 cavalry
and 7 elephants escorted by 25
galleys. (If only Hannibal had
received such support earlier in
the war, the war's outcome might
have been different!)
Scipio crossed from Sicily to
Africa with an army of 25,000 foot
and 2,500 horse escorted by a
mere 40 quinqueremes! Compare
this to the reported armada of 330
ships that had escorted Regulus
in the First Punic War.
Sempronius' planned invasion of
218 BC had 172 galleys for escort.
Scipio's invasion was surely at its
most vulnerable while at sea, but
the Carthaginian fleet made no
move. Scipio obviously did not
expect a naval battle, or he would
have obtained a larger fleet. It still
seems strange that Rome could
send 100 galleys to raid Africa
every year, yet could spare only
40 ships for this decisive invasion.
[The Senate opposed giving Scipio a fleet,
so a private fund drive was required even
to raise most of the 40 galleys he did
have. Yet, it is an overstatement to think
Scipio expected no opposition. Rather, he
had little choice-being under the
scrutiny of the censors regarding
incidents at Locri, he feared losing his
office, and set sail abruptly (at an odd
time of year at that). After landing, he
immediately sent the fleet back to Sicily,
indicating that he didn't think he could
control the coast of Africa in the face of
the Carthaginian fleet. - SKTI
However, the Carthaginian navy
was not the only one to miss
opportunities to destroy enemy
armies at sea. The armies of
Hannibal and Mago were
transported by sea from Bruttium
and Liguria to Africa in 202
without the least interference
from the superior Roman navy.
THE END OF THE
CARTHAGINIAN NAVY
There was one unusual naval
battle during Scipio's African
campaign. After Scipio's victory
at the Great Plains in 203 BC, the
Carthaginian navy roused itself
for a surprise attack on the
Roman fleet. The admiral was
Hasdrubal, previously unknown.
Scipio's galleys were in port at his
fortified base camp, the Castra
Cornelia, near Utica. Roman
infantry scouts spotted the enemy
fleet sailing out of the harbor of
Carthage. Scipio raced back and
found his fleet completely
unprepared for battle.
Thinking creatively, Scipio
blocked the harbor with a row of
merchant ships. He had the ships
lashed together, and filled the
decks with marines and missile
troops. The Carthaginian fleet
arrived and drew up in battle
order, awaiting a disorganized
sortie by the Roman fleet. When
the Romans didn't come out, the
perplexed Hasdrubal finally
attacked the wall of merchant
ships. Sixty of these transports
were grappled and towed off by
the Carthaginians. The fleet sailed
home with a hollow victory, little
being accomplished, as Scipio's
fleet remained intact. The
Carthaginians made no further
attacks. After Zama, the entire
Carthaginian navy was
surrendered to Rome for burning,
save a small squadron of 10
triremes.
The Roman navy maintained its
overall superiority in the Second
Punic War. Rome was never really
challenged, and the lackluster
Carthaginian navy never won a
single victory in this war (other
than the unusual battle at Castra
Cornelia). In five recorded naval
actions Carthage suffered a total
loss of 77 ships captured and
eight sunk. Rome's total recorded
loss was one ship damaged! Of
course, Rome wrote the history
books which may have glossed
over many losses. Nevertheless, it
was a remarkably one-sided
result. This disappointing
performance by the once great
Carthaginian navy contributed
greatly to their eventual loss of
the Second Punic War.
issue's counter insert. Hamilcar can
The counters for Gn. Scipio, Himilco be represented by his grandfather (?)
and Laevinus are included on this from the First Punic War.
Leader Counters
Maps
The game uses the "land" map.
All land, both A & D, is in play.
The area between A and the D
coast is the mouth of the Ebro.
The D islands are sandbars in the
estuary. The Ebro River empties
into the Mediterranean in
northeast Spain. It was the
boundary between the
Carthaginian and Roman spheres
of influence before the Second
Punic War. Carthaginian side is
hexrow 60xx (South). Roman side
is hexrow 10xx (North).
Balance
This is a surprise raid on the
unprepared Carthaginian fleet.
Carthaginian seamanship will
only come into play if Himilco
can deploy. The Romans are
favored here.
Playing Time and Difficulty
This battle should take 3-4 hours
to finish. Difficulty Rating is 2.5.
Ship Scale
1 counter = 2 galleys
Initial Deployment:
Romans
The Roman player receives the
following Red ships:
ƒ 18 Quinqueremes (ID 50-67)
ƒ 3 Cataphracted Trireme (ID 1
3, Massilian Greeks)
The Roman receives the following
Squadron Commanders: Gn.
Scipio (Admiral), *Fabius,
*Drusus.
The Roman fleet is deployed as
follows:
Scipio's Squadron: (line astern) 6
quinqueremes from 4014 to
2906 and 1 trireme at 4215
4114.
Fabius' Squadron: 6
quinqueremes from 4022 to
2916 and 1 trireme at 4223
4122.
Drusus' Squadron: 6
quinqueremes from 4006 to
2900 and 1 trireme at 4207
4106.
clambered onto the beach to get
their ships. Something like 12,000
men scurrying around gave the
appearance of a disturbed ant hill.
Initial Deployment:
Carthaginians
The Carthaginian player receives
the following Green ships.
ƒ 20 Quinqueremes (ID 11-30)
ƒ 1 Quadreme (ID 8)
ƒ 3 Cataphracted Triremes (ID 1
3)
On turn 1, all Carthaginian ships
are individual squadrons. If
activated:
1. Anchored ships may only
raise anchors, as in Actium.
2. Beached ships may attempt
to free themselves, by
rolling a D6:
1-2: The ship is freed and
may move one hex.
3-4: The ship is freed and
may move one hex,
BUT it is only half
crewed. Replace the
C3 / M3 quinquereme
with a C1 / M2 (ID 53
85).
5-6: The ship remains
beached.
The Carthaginian receives the
following Squadron
Commanders: Himilco
(Admiral), *Barbax, *Gisgo.
The Carthaginian fleet is
deployed with all bows facing
north or east as follows:
A. 14 quinqueremes (11-24)
beached'al from 5914-6015 to
5927-6028.
B. 6 quinqueremes anchored at
5727-5828, 5725-5826, 5723
5824, 5721-5822, 5719-5820,
5717-5818.
C. 1 quadreme anchored at 5714
5715.
D. 3 triremes anchored at 5308 to
5313.
Note:
a Ships are beached with bows
pointing seaward. This was
apparently standard practice in
ancient galley fleets, to protect
the ships from unexpected
rough weather and to prevent
water-logging of the hulls. It is
therefore quite different than
being run aground.
On turn 2, Himilco, Gisgo and
Barbax may be placed with any
ship, and play progresses
normally. But anchored ships still
require one turn to weigh anchor,
and beached ships must roll to be
set free, as above.
Victory
The Roman player wins when he
has at least 65 VP, and that
number is at least twice that of
the enemy. The Carthaginian
player wins when he has at least
55 VP, and that number is at least
twice that of the enemy. If neither
of the above happens, and/or the
players halt play by mutual
agreement, a minor, indecisive
victory goes to he who has the
most VP.
Squadron Commanders begin on
shore. For color, you can place
Hasdrubal Barca at hex 3726 (the
big 'A') to watch the proceedings.
He is not pleased.
Special Rules
Surprise!
The Carthaginian fleet was totally
unprepared for action. The crews
are resting ashore. Most of the
quinqueremes are beached. When
Hasdrubal Barca sent the
warning, pandemonium set in as
all the crews and marines
Maps
The game uses the "sea" map.
Carthaginian side is hexrow xxOO
(North). Roman side is hexrow
xx28 (South).
Balance
This is another classic match-up
of Carthaginian seamanship
versus Roman marines. The
Romans have numbers on their
side and are favored here.
Playing Time and Difficulty
This battle should take about 2-3
hours to finish. Difficulty Rating
is 2.0.
Ship Scale
1 counter = 4 galleys
Initial Deployment:
Romans
The Roman player receives the
following Red ships:
ƒ
25 Quinqueremes (ID 50-74)
The Roman receives the following
Squadron Commanders: V.
Laevinius (Admiral), *Metellus,
*Fabius.
The Roman fleet is deployed in
line astern, entering the map as
follows:
V. Laevinius' Squadron: 9
quinqueremes from 3527.
Metellus' Squadron: 8
quinqueremes at 4527.
Fabius' Squadron: 8
quinqueremes at 2527.
Initial
Deployment:
Carthaginians
The Carthaginian player receives
the following Green ships:
ƒ
21 Quinqueremes (ID 31-51)
The Carthaginian receives the
following Squadron
Commanders: Hamilcar
(Admiral), *Hanno, *Gisgo.
The Carthaginian fleet is
deployed as follows:
Left Wing: Hanno with 7
quinqueremes from 4000-4001
to 4600-4601.
Center: Hamilcar with 7
quinqueremes from 3200-3201
to 3800-3801.
Right Wing: Gisgo with 7
quinqueremes from 3000-3001
to 2400-2401.
Special Rule
Booty
The Roman fleet was encumbered
with plenty of booty and treasure.
This extra weight tires out the
crew. When rolling for fatigue, the
Roman player adds one (+1). (If
the Roman player wants to
jettison his booty before the
battle, on a D6 roll of 1-5, his crew
makes him walk the plank.)
Victory
The Roman player wins when he
has at least 60 VP, and that
number is at least twice that of
the enemy. The Carthaginian
player wins when he has at least
65 VP, and that number is at least
twice that of the enemy. If neither
of the above happens, and/or the
players halt play by mutual
agreement, a minor, indecisive
victory goes to he who has the
most VP.