Innate and Social Characteristics of Language Capacity
(Chomsky, Searle and beyond)*
Martin Potschka,
Porzellangasse 19, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
martin.potschka@univie.ac.at
A main concern and widespread source of mutual misunderstanding [that has not
been resolved in the exchange between Searle, Bromberger, Pinker and Chomsky
in the New York Review of Books in 2002]1 are the innate vs. social
characteristics of language capacity and its constitutive rules. Hence, whether we
approach the foundations of mind in the manner of natural sciences (as Chomsky
prefers)2 or whether they belong to the Humanities, specifically – are matters for
the social sciences (as Searle insists).3 This dichotomy follows the tradition of C.
P. Snow’s “two cultures”.4 Hence the topic expressed in the title line has two
dimensions: firstly the fields of study that one may consider appropriate to explore
the subject; it is this matter that then often substitutes for a second more
fundamental question concerning differences between social and genetic modes of
determination.
My arguments are guided by the ideas raised in this exchange and do not claim to
exhaust the subject of language capacity. Specifically, particulars of Chomsky’s
transformational grammar and the unifying aspects of language are beyond my
scope. Instead I shall introduce some medical terminology that is new to the field
of linguistics. A tripartite scheme will be presented which illustrates that a binary
dichotomy of innate vs. social falls short of reality. Before doing so, however, let
me review the agenda.
Chomsky equates the term “innate” with “genetically-determined element” and argues that
such innate determinants do exist in language capacity but that language capacity cannot be
reduced to them. Searle then appropriated the term innate for the sake of the argument to
characterize Chomsky’s position in language debate, but Chomsky himself rejected the
detailed position ascribed to him. Not everything that we consider innate is truly rooted in a
genetic base, however. Furthermore our notions of genetics emerged recently (during the past
50 years) – earlier authors could not have held such notions. Thus the term innate capacities
probably means different things to different people, and this depends in part on the particular
notions attached to the constitutive terms of debates on matter-and-mind or nature-andculture (sic!), and on the limitations of such binary oppositions.
For the Marxist view of social determination (“humans are the totality of their social
relations”) the word innate refers to the non-social realm that is amenable to mechanical
interpretation and later on became identified with molecular biology.5 If, in this frame, social
language acquisition refers to imitation and practice then the non-social realm is epitomized
by the sphere of instinct. There is a social character of ‘mind’ on one side and the res extensa
of body and matter on the other. But what is matter: we often speak of matters that matter
(sic!). This is not how Searle uses the term but it is quite an intelligent use.
*
The paper has been presented at the conference “The Unifying Aspects of Culture”, Vienna, 7.-9. November
2003, and published in the electronic proceedings. Copyright is with the author.
1
Often but quite erroneously molecular biology then is further reduced to genetics – not
because of Marxism but for being a widespread research paradigm. Hence it comes at no
surprise that a number of contemporary authors in the field of language actually do reduce
innate characteristics to genetic determinism – e.g. Aitchison;6 Pinker and Bloom7 with their
particular genes-first evolution of the mind that is genuinely disliked by Chomsky;8 even
Deacon9 for whom language is not an instinct and who is critical of the formers genetic model
but cannot do without his own genetic assimilation hypothesis (namely that socially acquired
innovations of the brain, i.e. cultural inventions, turn into genetically determined brain
structures). While indeed there may have been some co-evolution, such as neurotransmitter
pathways, it is only the molecules that are genetically encrypted and not the timing and
performance of such regulatory processes. No grammar gene has been identified thus far, as
Pinker conceded some years ago.10 The preferable alternative to genetic encryption obviously
is that mental activity of the brain itself shapes and maintains the connective structure of the
brain.
Conversely, Latin Christianity has never reduced nature to biology. Scholastic theology rather
considered the civilizational realm of man-made social relations a fictio imitatur naturam, but
obviously not an imitation of the biological and genetic. Evidence for this position is varied,
one instance is the Council of Lyon of 1245 when pope Innocent IV declared that societies –
being social institutions created by man – cannot be excommunicated, and that the act of
excommunication is limited to natural persons; legal persons in this document are referred to
as fictions that imitate nature.11 A binary opposition of social and genetic thus excludes
essential aspects of a Christian concept of nature. Instead we are often left with an equally
problematic opposition of nature vs. culture.
In this vein and indebted to Rousseau’s idealization of nature Oswald Spengler’s very concept
of Zivilisation is a networking which he calls “humanities self inflicted social ills”.12 More
realistic in comparison is Thomas Hobbes who contends that the relations human beings
create in order to escape the misery of their natural condition are subject to nothing but the
laws that produced this misery in the first place; the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations
share the same precepts.13 Indeed, the qualitative difference between “civilizational” and
“natural” and hence of sociology proper and a psychology guided by theology remains to be
explained.
Not surprisingly then there is a third view besides social science approaches and a preference
for natural science. According to papal perspective mind is a subject of philosophical
interpretation guided by theology and not a subject of scientific inquiry – neither of material
nor of social sciences.14 Only the future will tell if the wording of the quoted text was inspired
enough to stand up to the times and its intellectual progress. Quite ironically indeed, the
statement dates from a speech that intended to overcome the church antagonism towards
Darwin.15 But there can be no doubt that language capacity cannot be reduced to social and
genetic categories alone.
Aristotle provides a different perspective about the difference between science and the
Humanities. He distinguished poíesis (the instrumental production of facts by manual labor
based on empirical analysis – téchnē) vs. prãxis (the result of actions, genitum non factum,
and methodologically subject to historic-hermeneutic communication and introspection).
Habermas criticizes Marx for having reduced both poíesis and prãxis to the category of labor,
and hence the Humanities (the historic-hermeneutic interests) to (natural) science (and its
analytic-technical interests).16 The Aristotelian difference thus includes an ethical critique of
technocratic reason (namely the commodification of linguistic knowledge and of
manipulating the human psyche). The logic of business oriented research (the zeal for
products that sell, e.g. language translators, human-computer interfaces, expert systems,
artificial intelligence) reminds of the dangers that not only Heidegger perceived in modern
technology.17 Searle may have had this in mind, but it remains unaddressed.
2
Searle, who presents three criteria (observer-dependence, the role of forces, and the status of
laws) that supposedly distinguish science from the Humanities, never spells out what really
matters. Indeed he goes through pains to talk about something he does not really want to
mention and which the exchange left between the lines in perfect dialectical opaqueness.
What Searle talks about are criteria supposed to define natural science and distinguish it from
social sciences and the Humanities. His criterion of distinction for one is rooted in observerdependence: matter is what it is, everything else depends on the mind… This is poor
terminology considering 20th century physics with its debate over the observer-dependent
nature of quantum events. Besides terminology, some of his detailed arguments are
epistemologically questionable as well. Indeed, speech acts don’t exists by themselves but
only qua interlocutor (as Searle points out), but he overlooks that this is also true of
neurotransmitter substances and protein function in general. Their message depends on a coevolutionary network of chemical species that provides a normative standard of interpretation
(a criterion Searle reserves to the mind). Furthermore the chemistry of a cell not only observes
its environment but “computes” its response to multiple external stimuli according to its
chemical circuitry, sometimes graduated but often yielding state-transitions. This chemical
“language” is not only studied by contemporary biological sciences, but doing so scientists
largely ignore any underlying forces (supposedly a key paradigm of natural sciences).
In his attempted classification, Searle altogether ignores recent postmodern theory and its turn
to textualization. Everything nowadays is being treated as text and methods formerly limited
to philological disciplines hence become universally applied. An increasing number of
phenomena in biology and physics no longer are reduced to forces but are treated like
semiotic relations.
Searle’s third criterion (besides observer-dependence and forces) is the quality of laws in
science and Humanities. Hempel for one distinguishes nomothetic laws from statistical
laws.18 However, all of modern molecular physics only provides statistical statements and as
such is not different from social sciences or the Humanities (only classical physics is
nomothetic – or rather applies nomothetic methods – in the Hempelian sense). To distinguish
nomothetic science from idiography, like human history, won’t do either. The supramolecular
organization of the brain is the idiosyncratic product of natural history and not uniquely
determined by the underlying forces of physics. Similarly there is a vast combinatorial
potential in the design of the immune system, but the actual kinds of molecules (an incredibly
small fraction of all possible ones) are realized in response to life events. In other words: the
impact of initial and boundary conditions by far exceeds the impact of the laws themselves.
The same is true of genetic information. The number of actually realized codes is negligible
compared to all combinatorial possibilities. Genetic evolution is the idiographical history of
how information emerges from an ever coincidental set of materialized codes.
Innate capacities, though universal in character, are highly individual in actual circumstances.
We are facing idiographic facts, but so does the human genome project that sequences the
DNA.
Moreover, in natural evolution genes are generated from other genes but never made (genitum
non factum) – a case of Aristotelian prãxis that supposedly requires hermeneutic methods.
This has not prevented human technical reason to invent molecular biology, a scientific
methodology and technique (Aristotelian poíesis). Life, historically a subject of the
Humanities, today is an accepted topos of natural science. What prevents humans to do the
same with language – except perhaps moral reasons that suggest we better refrain? Why not
expand a natural bottom up approach of evolution to include top down activities of the mind.
All done with methods drawn from both science and the Humanities. There is no reason why
both, linguistics and genetics, can not be made a subject of scientific methodology. And to do
so does not necessarily mean to reduce one to the other.
What if linguistic capacities are neither social nor genetic but something else, not even
philosophy but for example software code? Chomsky distinguishes a minimum of two
3
language generating modules that interact, a conceptual system with aitiational structures
(typified by a “telegraphic style” found already in higher animals and small children) and a
linguistic system with computational rules (grammatical competence). Searle rejects this
possibility based on a very narrow concept of computability (Turing machine19). He concedes
that there may be several roots to language, possibly with different brain locations. His focus
is on two: an older purely associative and empirical mode (connectionist computing; parallel
distributed processing), and a rational axiomatic mode (algorithmic akin to serial computing).
This is the core idea of Steven Pinker and is reviewed by Searle (see ref.1). It has been
claimed that Chomsky’s transformational grammars (a system of unifying principles with
parameters fixed by experiencing actually spoken language) are equivalent to automata
theory,20 and this aspect seems to worry Searle. Chomsky himself considers the assertion to
be completely false and claims on his part that Searle only follows his personal concept of
“rule”, unrelated to the study of language to which he is referring.2, 21 It is legitimate to have
second thoughts about strong AI (Artificial Intelligence). This, however, is not a matter of
science vs. Humanities, but one of addressing very particular research paradigms.
Searle concludes that human minds are different from computer programs. Even if
performance of a human being and a computer program were indistinguishable, there is
something essentially human missing (causal powers, consciousness, intentions and possibly
more). He argues that software lacks semantic competence and indeed most software does not
comprehend what it formally does, it would need to be programmed to do so. But this might
be achieved, hence eventually some computer programs may qualify while most don’t. The
argument also involves the epistemologic separability of form and content, taken for granted
by Searle; a controversial subject that remains an issue on its own. Searle further argues that
the mind does not operate algorithmically, such a determinism supposedly violates the
principle of free will. This alone does not rule out that language be put into some
mathematical terms, but other arguments already mentioned may. Is algebra indeed
fundamentally incompatible with semantics? Then there is a fundamental critique of the
computer metaphor itself: the hardware - software analogue simply may not hold up to the
features of the mind. For one, minds are embodied and cannot be reduced to a software that
exchangeably runs on any hardware. But again, rejecting the software analogue is not itself
evidence in favor of genetics or sociology. There still may be a tertium of kinds?
Yet for Searle there are apparently only two sets of methodologies, one for matter, the other
for everything else. Such criteria of classification are bound to fail times of increasing
methodological pluralism and transdisciplinary paradigms. To start with, there is more than
one manner in which natural science can be conducted. Just think of behaviorism (Skinner)
and its inductive leaning-by-conditioning that was the target of Chomsky’s revolution in the
1960ies. Chomsky’s psycholinguistics marks the rationalist turn against Machian empiricism
and shaped modern cognitive science and its hypothetico-deductive method of learning. The
differences between Skinner and Chomsky could not be greater but both are versions of
natural science. Sociology is just as complex. Talking of sociology Searle obviously tries to
assert a social dimension of language capacity. But in putting it in an opposition to science he
considers sociology a part of the Humanities, which it is not. With all its emphasis on
statistical methods sociology has turned science in the course of the 20th century.
Mathematics, after all, is the benchmark for science. And if lately there is renewed talk of
qualitative methods, this very paradigm shift also affected particle physics and the sciences in
general. The transdisciplinary impact of postmodernism and its textual turn has already been
mentioned. A transdisciplinary information science could well be a “third culture” that
bridges the gap between science and the Humanities.4, 22 But – are there unique scientific
methodologies at all or are methods rather global: when a new idea comes around it is simply
tested in any conceivable application and retained if it brings benefit.
None of Searle’s criteria adequately differentiate topics and methods as either belonging to
science or the Humanities. And neither are such criteria expected to exist. The disciplinary
4
canon emerged historically from coincidental developments of research schools, and it is the
historical evolution of research schools that is responsible for disciplinary jurisdictions and
not unique and selective paradigms.
Reading the exchange in the New York Review of Books, however, gives the impression that
ultimately none of what has been debated (which mostly concerns the first part of the title
subject) is the real issue. There may be a purpose behind it in that the subject proper (the
second part of the title subject) escapes precise language and may only be treated in dialectic
allusions. This, though, reminds me of Wittgenstein who claimed that everything that can be
said at all, can be said so in simple terms.23 Freud’s foundational paradigm of Sprachkur
points in the same direction. On the other hand I don’t want to fall pray to John Salisbury’s
illusion concerning manualized wisdom, which he pursued with his Polycraticus-project – a
text written to shortcut the education of Thomas Becket and replace more time consuming
conventional methods of training.24 Let me therefore limit my present scope to better focusing
the controversy and provide common ground, if not resolving mere terminological
misunderstanding.
To this end let me differentiate the possible roots of language capacity by means of a tripartite
scheme based on organic, endogenous and social modes of inheritance. Incidentally, this
resembles a fundamental taxonomic distinction of mental disorders included in the Center for
Disease Control’s manual of medical diagnosis,25 which refers to organic (anatomical, hence
chemical and sometimes specifically genetic in origin), endogenous (variably called nonorganic or of unknown or unspecified aetiology, without obvious external cause), inductive
(e.g. “folie a deux”) and reactive (e.g. “shell shock”) causation. It is, after all, the same brain
that psychiatrists and linguists look at, and intend to decipher.
What are the notions attached to the term endogenous? We may presume that “endogenous”
refers to a psychic substrate, to the subject of psychoanalysis proper. It refers to intrinsic
processes and structures distinct from extrinsic environment and experience yet not genetic or
biological in kind. Such endowments are dispositions established before birth though
developed in part later (hence they may be called innate), but they represent a kind of
inheritance different from the genetic.
We may also speculate that these structures, or certain aspects of it, relate to a complex
considered by Christian faith to be immediately created by God and not inherited from ones
parents.26 This idea is prominently expressed in the dogma of original sin. It is an inheritance
that propagates in a manner different from imitation (propagatione, non imitatione transfusum
omnibus) and against which the act of baptism can intervene.27 In Asia this idea has been
specified as dependent origination (pratīyasamutpāda) from a continuity of mind
(cittasantana), which is shaped by karman, the actions taken during life (a Lamarckian
inheritance).28 This path and continuity of rebirth again is superadded to the inheritance from
the biological parents and is independent from them. The same idea is what Sigmund Freud
has in mind when he talks about an ID from which an EGO resurrects earlier accumulated
ego-formations.29
The concept most often comes by the label anima – spiritual soul – and unfortunately means
different things to different people besides of being ideologically charged; unqualified usage
of such mentalist terms only has added to the prevailing confusion. The most prominent
critique of the concept of soul comes, of course, from Buddhism. Its teachings consider soul
to be a mere reification of a deconstructable complex of features.30 For Ryle soul is not
something materially existing but a conceptual construct from which certain properties may
be deduced. Thus Ryle criticizes Cartesian dualism31 whereas Chomsky32 defends Descartes’
concept of soul, ingenium, supposed to be a uniquely human quality that sets itself apart from
the “mechanical” instinct of the animal (this binary opposition again is rather debatable). The
mechanical machine paradigm of La Mettrie33 since has been replaced by modern system
theory that better accommodates the “organic” twist. Chomsky’s critique of Ryle is one of
many indications that he is not the “organic” reductionist that Searle wants to make of him. It
5
is true, however, that Chomsky studies the Geist of language also with methods of natural
science, and that he does not reduce it to “social” relations alone.
Last, not least, it needs to mention Rupert Sheldrake. Sheldrake presents his theory of
morphic resonance, besides other reasons, to explain language capacity as a phylogenic
endowment that is not genetic in origin.34 This does not mean that his concept of morphic
fields and the endogenous order as described here are one and the same, but both descriptions
at least share a common interest and attempt to describe similar matters.
“Endogenous” disturbances of the mind leave traces among organic matter, like changing
neurotransmitter levels, and pharmaceutical intervention may or may not facilitate actual
treatment, but their causes are not chemical (i.e. organic) in the first place. Conversely the
endogenous realm is set apart not only from social action but also from social induction. To
the extent that the endogenous realm is supra-individual, it depends on a definition of terms
whether we still refer to its systemic dimension as something social (differently social);
scholastic theology would rather call it natural. Instead of splitting hairs one may simply
accept that binary distinctions fall short of real phenomenology and that the terms of debate
are poorly defined.
Innate capacities then – to my mind – are endogenous endowments, and are neither
genetically determined nor socially transmitted. They do, however, evolve in the environment
of social processes and organs that are genetically co-engineered. Performing language is
more than an interplay of genetically determined principles and a course of (social)
experiences. It crucially depends on endogenous functions and non-genetic inheritance as
well.
Innate capacities include what is called inner speech, a term used summarily to describe a
plethora of processes, some related to a stream of semantic complexes, others more verbose
and language specific (“telegraphic style”!), but elementary in grammar and vocabulary. They
actively monitor external speech production, and in one of their functions even duplicate
external speech (so well that it is usually difficult to discern it behind the external
vocalization). There is great variation from person to person (in part different transformations
of common root functions), and details often are poorly described in the literature.35
Innate capacities are a faculty available to the infant child yet not a mere product of ongoing
socialization. Did this faculty evolve contingent to certain properties of neuronal architecture,
idiographically so to speak? Possibly. Is there an interplay with the “environment” in social
acts? Yes, certainly. Does it store actual concepts? Likely some of those that have emerged
during cultural phylogenesis.
Does it perform algebraically? Well, algebra is more than number crunching. And while
algebraic manipulation of symbols is entirely formal, it may not be bare of semantic
specifications. Indeed, mathematicians, too, become increasingly concerned about the
epistemological separability of form and content.
For the larger part science is an endeavor to find suitable and differentiated terms of debate.
Hence, if my comments do not satisfy the varied concerns of both Chomsky and Searle, they
at least introduce some language to further discussion.
1
Searle, John R. [2002] “End of the Revolution”, a review of Chomsky, New York Review of Books 49 # 3: 3336. Searle, John R. [2002] “’Sneaked’ or ‘snuck’?”, a review of Pinker, New York Review of Books 49 # 4: 3739. Bromberger, Sylvain [2002] “Letters: Chomsky’s Revolution”, with a reply by John Searle, New York
Review of Books 49 # 7: 60-61. Pinker, Steven [2002] “’Words and Rules’: An Exchange”, with a reply by John
Searle, The New York Review of Books 49 #11: 49-52. Chomsky, Noam [2002] “Chomsky’s Revolution: An
Exchange”, with a reply by John Searle, New York Review of Books 49 # 12: 64-65. Chomsky, Noam [2002]
New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, New York: Cambridge UP. Pinker, Steven [1999] Words and
rules: the ingredients of language, New York : Basic Books; Wörter und Regeln: die Natur der Sprache,
Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag 2000.
6
2
Chomsky, Noam [1980] “Rules and Representations”, Target Article and open peer Commentary (by Andor, J.;
Cromer, R. F.; Cummins, R. and Harnish, R. M.; Dennett, D. C.; Ghiselin, M. T.; Gottlieb, G.; Harman, G.;
Hudson, P. T. W.; Lakoff, G.; Marshall, J. C.; Matthews, R. J.; McCawley, J. D.; Moravcsik, J. M.; Morton, A.;
Morton, J.; Rachlin, H.; Rollin, B. E.; Rosenthal, D. M.; Sampson, G.; Schank, R. C.; Searle, J. R.; Sober, E.;
Stich, S. P., Van Gulick, R.), (The) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 1-61, in particular p. 15, 37.
3
Searle, John R. [1995] The construction of social reality, London: Penguin 1996. Searle, John R. [1969]
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nolte, Reinhard
B. [1978] Einführung in die Sprechakttheorie John R. Searles, Freiburg-München: Verlag Karl Alber. Dahlbom,
Bo [1993] “Mind is Artificial”, in: Dahlbom, Bo, Ed.: Dennett and his Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 161-183.
4
Snow, Charles Percy [1959] The two cultures and A second look: an expanded version of The two cultures and
the scientific revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2R1964; Die zwei Kulturen, Stuttgart: Klett
1967.
5
Ponzio, Augusto [1973] Produzione liguistica e ideologia sociale: Per una teoria marxista del linguaggio e
della comunicazione, Bari: De Donato 1973; Production linguistique et idéologie sociale, Candiac, Québec:
Éditions Balzac, 1992.
6
Aitchison, Jean [2000] The seeds of speech: Language origin and evolution, Cambridge: Canto Cambridge UP,
p.36.
7
Bloom, Paul, Ed. [1993] Language acquisition: core readings, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Pinker,
Steven; Bloom, Paul [1987] Natural language and natural selection, Occasional paper # 39, Cambridge, MA:
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York: W. Morrow 1994; Der Sprachinstinkt: wie der Geist die Sprache bildet, München: Kindler 1996.
8
Turner, Mark [1998] “Poetry for the Newborn Brain”, Bostonia, Spring 1998, Number 1: 72-73.
9
Deacon, Terrence W. [1997] The Symbolic Species, New York: W.W. Norton.
10
Pinker, Steven [1994] The language instinct: how the mind creates language, New York: W. Morrow 1994;
Der Sprachinstinkt: wie der Geist die Sprache bildet, München: Kindler 1996, p. 46.
11
Kantorowicz, Ernst H. [1957] The King’s two bodies. A study in medieval political theology, Princeton:
Princeton UP 2R1966, chapter 6, in particular p. 193; Die zwei Körper des Königs, München: dtv 1990, p. 309310.
12
Spengler, Oswald [1918/23] The Decline of the West, complete edition in one volume, translated by Charles
Francis Atkinson, New York: A. Knopf 1932; Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der
Weltgeschichte, München: dtv 1986; The decline of the West, an abridged ed. by Helmut Werner and Charles
Francis Atkinson, New York: Oxford University Press 1991.
13
Hobbes, Thomas [1640] The elements of law natural and politic, Oxford: Oxford UP 1994, Chpt. 29. Hobbes,
Thomas [1642/47/51] Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia: De Cive, Parisiis: 1642; De cive: the English
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14
John Paul II [1996] “Message to pontifical academy of sciences: Magisterium is concerned with question of
evolution, for it involves conception of man”, delivered 22 October 1996, L’Osservatore Romano, edizione
quotidiana, 31 October 1996.
15
Potschka, Martin [1996] „Darwin und der Papst“, Weg und Ziel 54(5): 51-52.
16
Habermas, Jürgen [1968] Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 1968; Knowledge and human
interests, translated from "Erkenntnis und Interesse" and a section of "Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie"
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17
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³1967, p. 5.
18
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19
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20
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21
Chomsky, Noam [1980] Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia UP. Searle, John R. [1980] “Minds,
Brains, and Programs”, Target Article and open peer Commentary (by Abelson, R. P.; Block, N.; Bridgeman, B.;
Danto, A. C.; Dennett, D.; Eccles, J. C.; Fodor, J. A.; Haugeland, J.; Hofstadter, D. R.; Libet, B.; Lycan, W. G.;
McCarthy, J.; Marshall, J. C.; Maxwell, G.; Menzel, E. W.; Minsky, M.; Natsoulas, T.; Puccetti, R.; Pylyshyn, Z.
W.; Rachlin, H.; Ringle, M.; Rorty, R.; Schank, R. C.; Sloman, A. and Croucher, M.; Smythe, W. E.; Walter, D.
O.; Wilensky, R.), (The) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 417-457. Searle, John R. [1990] "Is the Brain's
Mind a Computer Program?", Scientific American 262 (January 1990): 20-25. Churchland, Paul M.; Churchland,
Patricia Smith [1990] „Could a Machine think?“, Scientific American 262 (January 1990): 26-31.
7
22
Brier, Søren [2004] “Third Culture: Cybersemiotic’s inclusion of a Biosemiotic Theory of Mind”, Axiomathes,
in the press.
23
Wittgenstein, Ludwig [1921] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, English: London: Routledge 2001; German:
Kritische Edition, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 1989.
24
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25
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26
Pius XII [1950] “Encylclical Humani generis”, Acta Apostolica Sede 42: 575.
27
Concilium Tridentinum [1545 – 1563] Des hochheiligen, ökumenischen und allgemeinen Concils von Trient
Canones und Beschlüsse: nebst den darauf bezüglichen päpstlichen Bullen und Verordnungen <Sacrosancti
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