Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe
Author(s): Stanley Hoffmann
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, Tradition and Change (Summer, 1966), pp. 862-915
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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STANLEY
HOFFMANN
Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate
the Case ofWestern Europe
of the Nation-State
and
I
critical
issue for every student of world
order is the fate of
In the nuclear age, the
the nation-state.
of the world
fragmentation
into countless units, each of which has a claim to
is
independence,
for
and
for
The
welfare.
peace
obviously
dangerous
illogical
dy
are not
namism which animates those units, when
city
they
merely
or
states of limited expanse
states manipulated
dynastic
by the
Prince's calculations,
but nation-states
that pour into their foreign
and images
fears, prejudices,
policy the collective
pride, ambitions,
of people,
is particularly
of large masses
An abstract
formidable.1
theorist could argue that any system of autonomous
units follows
the same basic rules, whatever
the nature of those units. But in prac
as their
as much
their substance matters
tice, that is, in history,
is not
form; the story of world affairs since the French Revolution
one more sequence
in the ballet of sovereign
states; it is the
merely
A claim
story of the fires and upheavals
by nationalism.
propagated
to sovereignty
based on historical
tradition and dynastic
legitimacy
alone has never had the fervor, the self-righteous
assertiveness which
a similar claim based on the idea and
pre
feelings of nationhood
sents: in world politics,
is the
the dynastic
function of nationalism
or
constitution
of nation-states
and
by splintering,
by amalgamation
a formidable
con
its emotional
is the
function
of
good
supplying
science to leaders who see their task as the achievement
of nation
a
or
the
defense
mis
the
national
of the nation,
hood,
expansion of
The
sion.2
is at the same time
the drama Ues. The nation-state
This is where
in every brand
not
if
and?in
a form of social organization
practice
but
those who
international
factor of
of theory?a
non-integration;
862
The Fate of the Nation-State
either under more cen
argue in favor of a more
integrated world,
traUzed power or through various networks of regional or functional
that on ne
tend to forget Auguste
Comte's
old maxim
agencies,
d?truit que ce qu'on remplace:
the new "formula" will have to pro
in
vide not only world order, but also the kind of social organization
at
is
citizens
There
and
feel
which
home.
leaders, ?lites,
currently
no agreement
on what such a formula will be;3 as a result, nation
ram
states?often
absurd, administratively
inchoate,
economically
in
and
international
shackle,
impotent yet dangerous
politics?remain
the basic units in spite of all the remonstrations
and exhortations.
in
their alleged obsolescence;
They go on faute de mieux despite
man
s
not
to
about
do
from
deed,
they profit
incapacity
only
bring
a better order, but their very existence
to
obstacle
is a formidable
their replacement.
If there was one part of the world
in which men of good wiU
it was Western
could be superseded,
thought that the nation-state
on
international
Europe. One of France's most subtle commentators
us of E. H. Carr's bold
has
of
reminded
recently
prediction
politics
1945: "we shaU not see again a Europe
of
of twenty, and a world
more than sixty
in
Statesmen
have
states."4
sovereign
independent
schemes for moving Western
vented original
"beyond the
Europe
and political
scientists have studied their efforts with
nation-state,"5
a care from which emotional
involvement was not missing. The con
ditions
seemed ideal. On the one hand, nationalism
seemed at its
lowest ebb; on the other, an adequate
for build
formula and method
been devised. Twenty
ing a substitute had apparently
years after
the end of World War
II?a period as long as the whole
interwar
have had to revise their
era?observers
judgments. The most opti
mistic
still harbor,
the future may
put their hope in the chances
rather than in the propelling
the
of
the
less optimistic
power
present;
ones, like myseU,
try simply to understand what went wrong.
own conclusion
is sad and
is still
My
simple. The nation-state
new
and
the
has
been
because
the na
here,
Jerusalem
postponed
tions inWestern
Europe have not been able to stop time and to frag
ment
Political
unification
could have succeeded
space.
if, on the
one hand, these nations had not been
in
the
of
caught
whirlpool
different concerns, as a result both of
different
internal
profoundly
circumstances
and of outside
and if, on the other hand,
legacies,
had
or
been
able
to
on
concentrate
they
obliged
"community-build
to
the
all
exclusion
of
situated
either outside
their
ing"
problems
area or within
each one of them. Domestic
differences
and different
863
STANLEY HOFFMANN
views obviously mean
the involve
diverging
foreign policies;
in issues among which
of the policy-makers
"community
a
one has meant
not a decrease,
is merely
of
building"
deepening,
those divergencies.
the unification movement
The reasons follow:
world
ment
has been the victim, and the survival of nation-states
the outcome,
of three factors, one of which
international
characterizes
sys
every
tem, and the other two only the present system. Every international
to the diversity
of
system owes its inner logic and its unfolding
and
aims
domestic
outside
determinants,
situations,
geo-historical
its units; any international
among
system based on fragmentation
if
of unevenness
tends, through the dynamics
(so weU understood,
to
to
economic
di
unevenness,
by Lenin)
reproduce
applied only
there is no inherent reason that the model
of the
versity. However,
out
two
de
rule
international
should
itself
system
fragmented
by
in which
their
critics
the
the
of
nation-state
have
put
velopments
it
bets or their hopes. Why must it be a diversity of nations? Could
not be a diversity of regions, of "federating" blocs, superseding
the
state had replaced
nation-state
the feudal puz
just as the dynastic
fed by hos
zle? Or else, why does the very logic of conflagrations
not
to
exhausted
of
the
kind
unification
lead
of
tility
catastrophic
us
out
Let
remember
sketched
Kant?
nations,
yet interdependent
by
an attempt
at
in Europe was precisely
that the unity movement
re
a
its
its
and
and
that
springs
origins
creating
regional entity,
on the reduced
the process
scale of a haff-continent,
sembled,
dreamed up by Kant in his Idea of Universal History.6
The answers are not entirely provided
by the two factors that
self
of national
One
come to mind
is
the
immediately.
legitimacy
all blocs and
transcends
the only principle which
determination,
the foundation
since aU pay lip service to it, and provides
ideologies,
for the only "universal actor" of the international
system: the United
Nations. The other is the newness of many of the states, which have
a nationalist
their independence
wrested
upsurge and are there
by
to throw or give away what
fore unlikely
they have obtained
only
does not
the legitimacy
of the nation-state
too recently. However,
in the international
survival
the nation-state's
by itself guarantee
as an
state of nature, and the appeal of nationalism
emancipating
re
must
not assure that the nation-state
everywhere
passion does
in a world
in which many
main the basic form of social organization,
of the nation-state
nations are old and settled and the shortcomings
features
are obvious. The real answers are provided by two unique
is
it
first
the
international
of the present
One,
truly global
system.
864
The Fate of the Nation-State
a reduced
system: the regional subsystems have only
the "relationships
the whole
of major
tension" blanket
autonomy;
are dominated
so much
not
the domestic
planet,
by the
polities
s
as
region
problems
by purely local and purely global ones, which
to divert
af
from the internal
the region's members
conspire
an
treatment
of
their
of
fairs
isolated
area, and indeed would make
those affairs impossible. As a result, each nation, new or old, finds
itseff placed
in an orbit of its own, from which
it is quite difficult
to move away: for the attraction
of the regional forces is offset by
of
all
the
other
those
the puU
forces. Or, to change the metaphor,
a
in
same
that coexist
nations
the
separate "home" of
apparently
region find themselves both exposed to the smells and
geographical
noises that come from outside through all their windows
and doors,
is
and looking at the outlying houses from which
the interference
sues.
from
diverse
diverse
moved
tempers,
Coming
pasts,
Uving
by
in different parts of the house,
yet differently
subjected
inescapably
and attracted to the outside world,
react unevenly
those cohabitants
to their exposure
and calculate
how
they could either
conflictingly
or affect in turn aU those who live elsewhere.
reduce the disturbance
of their own relations within
The adjustment
the house becomes
international
subordinated
to their
the "re
about the outside world;
divergences
a stake in the
becomes
its
of
members
gional subsystem"
rivalry
about the system as a whole.
the coziness of the common home could still
However,
prevail if
the inhabitants were forced to come to terms, either
one of them,
by
or by the fear of a
the
threatening neighbor. This is precisely where
second unique
feature of the present
situation
intervenes. What
tends to perpetuate
the nation-states
in a system whose
decisively
seems to
is
universality
sharpen rather than shrink their diversity
the new set of conditions
that govern and restrict the rule of force:
a
Damocles'
sword has become
the ideological
boomerang,
legiti
of
the
nation-state
is
macy
protected
by the relative and forced
tameness of the world
in the nuclear age is stiU the
jungle. Force
"midwife
of societies"
war either breeds
insofar as revolutionary
new nations or
in
shapes regimes
existing nations; but the use of
force along traditional
for
and expansion?the
lines,
conquest
very
use that made
the "permeable"
feudal units not only obsolete but
states often built on "blood
collapse and replaced them with modern
too
and iron"?has
become
The
dangerous.
legitimacy of the feudal
unit could be undermined
in two ways:
brutally,
by the rule of
force?the
small fish by national
big fish swaUowing
might;
subtly
865
STANLEY HOFFMANN
or
so to
legitimately,
speak, through self-undermining?the
logic of
or
that consolidated
acquisitions
dynastic weddings
larger units. A
self-determination
rules out the latter; a
system based on national
once
in
which
find
force a much blunted
nations,
established,
system
out
or
former.
rules
the
Thus
weapon
agglomeration
by conquest
out of a fear of conquest
fails to take place. The new conditions
tend even to pay to national borders the tribute of vice
of violence
to virtue: violence which dons the cloak of revolution rather than of
interstate wars, or persists
in the form of such wars
they
only when
or
in divided
revolutions
conflicts
countries, perversely
accompany
respects borders by infiltrating under them rather than by crossing
them overtly. Thus all that is left for unification
is what one might
or
caU "national self-abdication"
the eventual will
self-abnegation,
of
nations
to
but
in
else;
try
ingness
something
precisely
global
volvement hinders rather than helps, and the atrophy of war removes
a nation-state
incentive. What
cannot
the most
pressing
provide
can
or
alone?in
defense?it
stiU provide
economics,
through means
far less drastic than hara-kiri.
two features give its solidity to the
These
of national
principle
as weU as its resilience to the U.N.
self-determination,
They also give
to
its present,
and quite unique,
the
of major
shape
"relationship
East and West.
tension": the conflict between
This conflict is both
and universal?and
to the survival
both aspects contribute
muted
As the superpowers
find that what makes
of the nation-state.
their
also makes
it less usable, or rather usable only
power overwhelming
to deter one another and to deny each other gains, the lesser states
under the umbreUa of the nuclear
discover
that they are
stalemate
to death, and that indeed their nuisance
not condemned
is
power
when
the kind of violence
in
that prevails
impressive?especially
over the
circumstances
favors the porcupine
present
elephant. The
own
in
their
the
of a rebel
backlash
camps
superpowers
experience
that enjoys broad
and
cannot
Uon against domination
impunity,
coax or coerce third parties
into agglomeration
under
their
easily
means
to
Yet
retain
the
other
from
powers
prevent
they
tutelage.
away from their clutches. Thus, as the superpowers
agglomerating
over the
be
compete, with filed nails, aU
globe, the nation-state
new
use
to
comes the universal
the
of
of
salience,
point
language
common denominator
in
the
lowest
competition.
strategy?the
were
conservative
of diver
international
Other
systems
merely
conservative
of the
system is profoundly
sity; the present
diversity
features. The dream of
of nation-states,
despite all its revolutionary
866
The Fate of the Nation-State
of the general will
concerned both about the prevalence
Rousseau,
?that
about peace, was the creation of
is, the nation-state?and
communities
insulated
from one another.
"the
In history, where
essence and drama of nationalism
is not to be alone in the world,"7
states has tended to breed both nation
the clash of non-insulated
states and wars. Today, Rousseau's
ideals come closer to reality, but
in the most un-Rousseauan
in peace,
the nation-states
way:
prevail
a
remain
Kant
the
because
fragile peace keeps
they
unsuperseded
ian doctor away, they are unreplaced
their very involve
because
in the world,
ment
from
their very inability to insulate themselves
one another, preserves
their separateness. The "new Europe" dreamed
could not be established
by force. Left to the w?ls
by the Europeans
of its members,
the new formula has not jelled be
and calculations
not agree on its role in the world. The fa?ure ( so
they could
an
tried in apparently
tells us a
ideal conditions
of
far)
experiment
the
about
world
about
chances
of
deal
contemporary
politics,
great
movements
and about
the functional
unification
elsewhere,
ap
can faU not
to unification.
For it shows that the movement
proach
in one important part,
there is a surge of nationalism
only when
in assessments
there are differences
of the national
but also when
on the
on the world role
that rule out agreement
and
interest
shape
of the new, supranational whole.
is notoriously
I suggest is
The word nationalism
slippery. What
in
threefold distinction, which may be helpful
the following
analyz
interaction
the
the
between
nation-state
and
the
international
ing
cause
system:
is national
consciousness
1. There
call senti
(what the French
sense of "cohesion and distinctiveness,"8
ment national)?a
which
sets one off from other groups. My point is that this sense, which
relations as long as
tends to have important effects on international
is rather
it is shared by people who have not achieved
statehood,
that is, the exist
"neutral" once the nation and the state coincide:
ence of national consciousness
does not dictate foreign policy, does
not indicate whether
the people's
"image" of foreigners w?l be
seen as
or
be
else
w?l
friendly
(they
unfriendly
different?nothing
nor
or not the leaders will be
is implied),
does it indicate whether
to accept
sacrifices of sovereignty.
One cannot even
willing
posit
consciousness
that a strong national
will be an obstacle
for move
ments
for it is perfectly
conceivable
that a nation
of unification,
itseU that its "cohesion and distinctiveness"
convinces
will be best
867
STANLEY HOFFMANN
preserved
gory.
in a larger entity. Here,
we must
turn to the second
cate
2. For lack of a better phrase, I shall call it the national
situa
a strong "national con
whether
tion. Any nation-state,
with
pulsing
sciousness"
or
not?indeed,
any
state,
whether
a
true
nation-state
or a
to borrow
of unintegrated
coUection
disparate
groups?is,
Sartre's language, thrown into the world; its situation ismade up alto
in an individual, would
be
gether of its internal features?what,
in the world. The
and character?and
of its position
caUed heredity
in the nation is one, but
state of national
consciousness
only one,
of the elements
of the situation. It is a composite
of objective data
social structure and political
(inside:
system; outside:
geography,
and subjective
factors
formal commitments)
(inside: values, prej
one's own traditions and assess
reflexes; outside:
udices, opinions,
and approaches
ments
of others, and the other's attitudes
toward
are
some
its
and
others
flexible
of
intractable,
oneself);
components
a fervent
or not,
he
is
whether
statesman,
patriot
Any
changeable.
must define the nation's foreign policy by taking that situation into
of the obsolescence
of the nation
account; even if he is convinced
the steps he will be able and willing
be shaped by the fact that he
the nation
this time?for
de Gaulle's
borrow
language
speaks?to
as it is in the world as it is. He cannot act as if his nation-state
did
as
were
or
if
its
the
world
not exist, however
be,
sorry
shape may
situation may
fac?itate
unification
other than it is. The national
even when national
is strong. It may prove a
consciousness
moves,
is weak. The
formidable obstacle, even when national consciousness
move
even when
tries
to
is
that
the
poUcy-maker
"beyond the
point
its
he can do it only by taking along the nation with
nation-state"
its situation.
I do not
of
memories
and
problems?with
baggage
to suggest that the situation is a "given" that dictates policy;
want
limits that affect freedom of choice.9
but it sets compUcated
state (or of his nation-state),
to take in order to overcome
it w?l
for a specific meaning:
3. I w?l reserve the term "nationalism'
in
numerous
which
one
the
it is
of
ways
poUtical leaders and ?lites
or
the
of the national
rather
the
can interpret
dictates,
suggestions,
it
the
leaves.
one
Whereas
of
of the ways
situation,
margin
using
a con
a
situation
national
the
is
and
consciousness
national
feeling,
uses
a
or
one
a
broad
is
doctrine
dition, nationalism
definition)
(if
or ideology
that gives to the nation
in
an
doctrine
ideology?the
The
of
and
world affairs absolute value
consequences
top priority.
868
The Fate of the Nation-State
nationalism may imply ex
such a preference may vary immensely:
at
the
the supremacy of one's
is,
(that
attempt
pansion
estabUshing
it may enta? the notion of a
nation over others) or merely defense;
universal mission
or, on the contrary, insulation. It may be peaceful
or
is less an imperative determinant
of choice than
It
pugnacious.10
a criterion of choice and an attitude which
the
choices made.
shapes
its manifestations,
But whatever
its varying content,
it always fol
lows one rule common to aU the former, it always pours the latter
into one mold:
the preservation
of the nation as the highest good.
the
the way in which
Nationalism
thus affects, at least negatively,
freedom of choice left by the national situation w?l be used; indeed,
or overcome,
the limits
it may collide with,
and try to disregard
the situation sets.
which
and the two other factors is
The relation between
nationaUsm
a
sense
the
NationaUsm
of the will to establish
(in
comp?cated.
con
in
turn
national
is
and
activates,
nation-state)
triggered by,
in colonial
sciousness
in oppressed
but nationalism,
nationalities;
can also be a substitute
areas as well as in mature nation-states,
for
a still weak or for a
consciousness.
In nation-states
national
fading
that are going concerns, national
consciousness
breeds nationalism
certain
in
situation
national
kinds
of
situations.
The
national
only
a
same
in
be
leader
the
nationalist
assessed
way
may
exactly
by
as
lead the
nationalism
one; however,
may
by a non-nationalist
former to promote poUcies
the latter would
have rejected and to
moves
the
former
have
That bane of
undertaken.
would
oppose
international
relations
theory, the national interest, could be defined
as follows:
N.I. = National
situation X outlook of the
foreign policy-makers.
It is obvious
that the same situation can result in different poli
or not there is a nationalist
in particular on whether
cies, depending
is
It
interests of different
obvious
also
that
national
policy-maker.
nations w?l not be defined
terms if those re
in easily compatible
are
even
outlooks
when
the
situations are not
nationalist,
spective
so different. But the same
may obtain, even if the
incompatibility
are not nationalistic,
outlooks
when
the situations are indeed very
different.11
II
Let
Europe
us now
look at the fate of the nation-states
in the part of
so-called
the
the
that
continental
Six,
is,
occupied
by
part
869
STANLEY HOFFMANN
of Western
first by examining
the basic features of their
Europe,
national
then
situations,
upon the process of uni
by commenting
some
later
its results, and
fication,
by discussing
finaUy by drawing
lessons.
Western
in the postwar years has been characterized
Europe
by
three features which have affected
aU of its nations. But each of
those features has nevertheless
in a
affected each of the six nations
different way because
of the deep differences
that have continued
to divide the Six.
one from the viewpoint
most hopeful
1. The first feature?the
In the
the temporary
demise
of nationalism.
of the unifiers?was
and
had
become
defeated
countries?Germany
Italy?nationalism
associated with the regimes that had led the nations into war, defeat,
and destruction.
The coUapse of two national
that had
ideologies
an al
and
been bellicose,
about
aggressive,
imperialistic
brought
na
in every guise.
most
total discredit
for nationaUsm
the
Among
were
on the AUied
tions of Western
most
that
the
side,
Europe
was that the terrible years of
remarkable
and re
occupation
thing
sistance had not resulted in a resurgence
of chauvinism.
Amusingly
it was the Communist
that gave the most
enough,
Party of France
on the whole,
tone to its
nationaUstic
the platforms
of
propaganda;
the Resistance movements
show an acute awareness
of the dangers
of nationalist
and national
in Western
celebrations
fragmentation
a
Resistance
itself
The
had
di
had
kind
of
Europe.
supranational
none of the national resistance movements
could have sur
mension;
vived without
outside
honor they had
support; the nations whose
saved had been hberated
rather than victorious. All this prevented
the upsurge
of the kind of cramped chauvinism
that had followed
the victory of World War I, just as the completeness
of the disaster
of putting
and the impossib?ity
the blame on any traitors crushed
revival in Germany
of the smoldering
nationalism
of
any potential
resentment
that had undermined
There was,
the Weimar
Republic.
in national
in other words,
situa
above and beyond
the differences
the general
tions between
indubitable
losers and dubious winners,
a common defeat, and also the
a common future:
hope of
feeling of
on the need
their
for the Resistance
often
put
platforms
emphasis
for a union or federation of Western
Europe.
the demise of nationalism
affected differently
the var
However,
On the one hand,
there were
ious nations
of the haff-continent.
significant
870
differences
in national
consciousness.
If nationalism
was
The Fate of the Nation-State
sentiment was extremely
in liberated France.
low, patriotic
high
The circumstances
in which
the hated Nazis were expelled and the
domestic
to what I have called else
collaborators
purged amounted
a
where
the
of
French
rediscovery
poUtical
community
by the
French:12
the nation seemed to have redeemed
its "cohesion and
On the contrary,
distinctiveness."
in Germany
the de
especially,
struction of nationalism
a
to have been
seemed
accompanied
by
as
in
was
was
national
consciousness
distinctive
well: what
drop
guilt and shame; what had been only too cohesive was being torn
zones of
but by partition,
apart not by internal poUtical cleavages,
The
blessed
occupation,
regional
parochialisms
by the victors.
French
national
had been
backbone
the
ordeal,
straightened
by
the pain had been too strong to tempt the French
to flex
although
nationalistic
to
the German
national backbone
muscles;
appeared
have been broken
with
the
and
fist
clenched
jaw
strutting
along
was in
of Nazi nationalism.
Italy
slightly better shape than Germany,
in part because of its Resistance movements,
but its story was closer
to the German than to the French.
there were
other elements
in the national
situa
However,
that also affected differently
tion, besides patriotic
consciousness,
the various nations'
to nationalism.
na
inclination
The defeated
in
in
on
the
of
tions?Germany
particular?were
position
patients
whom
drastic
were
had
been
and
who
surgery
performed,
lying
on the
for their every movement
prostrate, dependent
surgeons and
nurses. Even if one had wanted
to restore the nation to the
pinnacle
one could not have succeeded
of values and objectives,
except with
the help and consent of one's guardians?who
were not
likely to
the situation itself set
give support to such a drive; in other words,
the strictest limits to the
ex
of any kind of nationalism,
possibility
pansive or insulating. The lost territories were beyond recuperation;
a
to that which
had marked
healing period of "repli" comparable
the early foreign
policy of the Third Republic was not conceivable
either. One could not get
anything alone, and anything others could
to be
for.
limited, would be something
provide, while
grateful
On the other hand, France
and, to a lesser extent (because of
their much
smaller size), Belgium
were not so well
and Holland
inoculated. For, although
the prevalence
of the nation meant
little
in the immediate
a
it
meant
in
deal
the
context,
European
great
of the Liberation
national
imperial one: if the circumstances
kept
consciousness
from veering
into nationalism
in one realm, the same
circumstances
tended to encourage
such a turn with respect to the
871
STANLEY HOFFMANN
these nations were bound to
colonies. Cut down to size in Europe,
to redress
act as if they could call upon their overseas possessions
the balance;
their
nationalism
association
of
accustomed,
through
to equate chauvinism
with Nazi and Fascist
imperiaUsm,
only with
a nation
so
not
would
be
from
expansion,
they
easily discouraged
over
alism of defense,
the "national mission"
aimed at preserving
seas. The Dutch
to find
lost most
of their empire early enough
in this respect, not so different
and
from the German
themselves,
serene
not to
the Belgians
ItaUan amputees;
remained
long enough
to
fevers about the huge member
that seemed
have nationaUstic
no
it
trouble until the day when
broke off?brutally,
give them
but irremediably.
The French, however,
suffered almost
painfully,
at once from
and the long, losing battle they
dis-imperial
dyspepsia,
to nationalist
tantrums of frustration
fought gave rise continuously
was
and rage. Moreover,
the French
inclination
to nationalism
an
of
internal component
of the national
situation
higher because
as well:
one
was
in France
there was
force
that
clearly
poUtical
over the Liberation,
that had indeed presided
nationaUst,
given
whatever
and achieved
unity they had to the Resistance movements,
in the most impressive way a
of Jacobin
highly original convergence
and of "traditionalist,"
universalist
nationalism
defensive
right-wing,
nationalism?the
had
force of General
de GauUe. His resignation
meant, as Alfred Grosser suggests,13 the defeat of a doctrine that put
a
not only a priority mark on
priority claim
foreign affairs but also
on Notre Dame
la France. The incident that had led to his departure
?a
conflict over the m?itary
been symbolic
enough
budget?had
referred to above. But his durability,
of the demise of nationalism
to all and
first as a political
leader, later as a "capital that belongs
a
it was
to none," reflected
and
for nationalism;
lasting nostalgia
to
crisis
him
that
the
returned
which
power was
equally symbolic
a crisis over
Algeria.
national
2. The second feature common to all the West European
situations, yet affecting them differently, was the "poUtical collapse
such
lose power and wealth:
did not merely
of Europe." Europe
I had shown.
losses can be repaired, as the aftermath of World War
the heart of the international
system, the locus
Europe, previously
the fount of international
of the world organization,
law, fell under
The phrase
what de GauUe has called "the two hegemonies."
is,
one of those hegemonies
took
inaccurate
and
insulting:
obviously,
the
a
and prevented
highly
imperial form, and thus discouraged
872
The Fate
of the Nation-State
over
Europe of any regional entity capable of
to
is
how
be
rivalries.
national
coming
gained,
Nothing
that U.S. hegemony
has been a basic fact of life.
ever, by denying
ef
American
has indeed had the kinds of "domination
domination
in
fects" any hegemony
the
of
transfer
decision-making
produces:
to the dominator
vital matters
from the dominated
breeds a kind
creation
in Eastern
the prewar
in the latter, and irresponsibility
of paternalism
(either in the form
or in the form of
of abdication
in
the former. But
scapegoatism)
its nature. The
the consequences
to
of hegemony
vary according
nature
had
this
domination
has
also
of
unique consequences
peculiar
and worse
?better
than in the classical cases. One may dominate
one wants
because
to and can; but one may also dominate because
one must
of a
and does: by one's
and under the pressures
weight
its
he
situation.
This
has
been
America's
compelling
experience:
was
not
deUberate.
"situational,"
gemony
effects have been better than usual, insofar as such hegem
restricted
itself to areas in which European
nations had become
ony
either impotent or incapable of recovery by self-reliance.
It left the
with a considerable
dominated
of
and
indeed
freedom
maneuver,
them into recovery, power recuperation,
and regional unity;
prodded
it favored both individual and collective
But the ef
emancipation.
fects have been worse precisely because
this laxity meant
that each
common
react
to
could
this
feature
of
situations
the
national
party
to the distinctive
other
(that is, American
hegemony)
according
The
features of his national
situation, features left intact by the weight
and acts of the U. S.,
American
domi
by contrast with the U.S.S.R.
nation was only one part of the
the following para
picture. Hence
dox: both America's
and the individual
and collective
prodding
now
of
Western
to the con
reduced
nations,
impotence
European
dition of clients and stakes,
to
have
them
ought logically
pushed
into unity-for-emancipation?the
kind of process Soviet
policy dis
in
the
other
half
of
But
the
couraged
very margin of auton
Europe.
to
left
each
West
nation
U. S. gave it an array
the
omy
European
by
of choices: between
and
between
accepting
rejecting dependence,
as
a
as
a
for
and
weapon
unity
way to
emancipation
unity
merely
more comfortable.
make dependence
It would have been a miracle
if all the nations had made the same choice; the
diversity of national
situations has
To
define
one's
toward
preva?ed.
ultimately
position
the U. S. was the common
one
each
but
it
has defined
imperative,
in his own way.
At first, this diversity
of domestic
outlooks
and external
positions
873
STANLEY HOFFMANN
As
did not appear to be an obstacle
to the unification movement.
on
and
Ernst Haas has shown,14 the movement
grew
ambiguity,
as a
Euro
those who accepted American
lasting fact of
hegemony
as
dis
as
life
their
well
not
those
did
could
who
pean
submerge
a
in
be
the
that
construction
could
of
agreement
regional entity
re
as
to
the
most
for
the
effective
seen, by
former,
way
continuing
mission
ceive American
to
and
America's
protection
contributing
and, by the latter, as the most effective way to challenge American
there are limits to the credit of ambiguity.
However,
predominance.
once the new entity was asked to
The split could not be concealed
in
the purely
tackle matters
of "high politics"?that
is, go beyond
on
or
the
ternal economic
of little impact
dependence
problems
to the U. S.15 It is therefore no surprise that
external relationship
this split should have disrupted
at two moments?in
unification
rearmament was raised; and
the problem of German
1953-54, when
in 1962-65, when de GauUe's
of the U. S. became global.16
challenge
situations operated. First,
of national
This is how the diversity
those I would
it produced
the basic split between
(and produces)
resisters.
The re
call the
caU the resigned ones, and those I would
aware
of
ones were, on the one hand, the smaller nations,
signed
met
not
be
threat could
their weakness,
by
realizing that the Soviet
on external protectors,
to
accustomed
alone,
Europeans
dependence
and
features of its protection,
to America
for the unique
grateful
in
the
not
but
role for Europe
to an important
looking forward
a
as
act
to
in the past, tried
realm of high politics.
great
Italy had,
but
were
not
those
over,
days
power without
protectors;
yet
only
the
of American
also the acceptance
creaky
provided
hegemony
the
Italian political
system with a kind of double cushion?against
too
much
to
but also against the need
threat of Communism,
spend
on Italian rearmament.
For the smaller states
energy and money
was like an
of U. S. hegemony
as well as for Italy, the acceptance
to give pri
them
insurance policy, which protected
against having
de
accepted
ority to foreign affairs. On the other hand, Germany
as
as a comfort, but as a necessity
on the U. S. not merely
pendence
had
turned
vital as breathing. West Germany's
position
geographical
to imposing secur
it into the front line, its partition has contributed
of its leader
anti-Communism
ity as the supreme goal, the staunch
lines of neu
the
for security along
ship had ruled out any search
S.
U.
of
not only the acceptance
leadership
trality. There foUowed
in order to tie the United
but also the need to do everything possible
in West
States to Western
helpless
Germany's
Europe. Moreover,
874
The Fate of the Nation-State
position, the recovery of equality was another vital goal, and it could
of the
be reached only through cooperation with the most powerful
to
and
forces.
Defeat,
division,
occupying
making
danger conspired
nation
West Germany
switch almost abruptly from its imperialistic
alism of the Nazi era to a dependence
sub
which was apparently
status
also
and
under
missive,
(of security
yet
productive
gains)
Adenauer.
they, like the West Germans,
gave priority
not in the same perspective.
The French
foreign affairs?only
was
of
and
different.17
To
be
sure, the
history
reading
geography
was
the
need
Union
felt. But
for
Soviet
present
security against
there were two reasons that the "tyranny of the cold war" operated
in France. One, French feelings of hostility toward Russia
differently
were much
it may be too
lower than in Germany,
and, although
a
to
it is
for
the
wartime
of
strong
grand alliance,
speak
nostalgia
not false to say that the hope of an ultimate
for
d?tente allowing
a
return
to
of the Soviets
for
moderation,
reunification,
European
from its "two hegemonies"
and for an emancipation
of the continent
never died. The French time
dif
has been consistently
perspective
never
over
ferent from, say, the German:
the urgency of the threat
shadowed
the desire for, and belief
in, the advent of a less tense
As
for the resisters,
to
system. This may have been due not only to France's
in France's national
situation.
also to other elements
was
its
with
and
both
wrecked
continuity
past
Germany's
France
to
looked
back
the
when
(like
repudiated,
England)
days
Europe held the center of the stage and forward to the time when
Europe would
again be an actor, not a stake: the anomaly was the
not
the
present,
past. Also, on colonial matters, France
(more than
international
location,
Whereas
but
often found little to
America's
England)
distinguish
reprobation
from Soviet hostility.
to worry
not only
continued
Two, France
about possible
Soviet thrusts but also about Germany's
potential
threats: the suspicion
of a reborn German
consciousness
national
and nationaUsm has marked all French
reason
leaders. An additional
for fearing the perpetuation
of American
and
the
freez
hegemony
of
the
a
cold
for
for
that
would
d?tente
war,
ing
hoping
help
Europe reunite, was thus provided by the fear that any other course
would make Germany
the main
of America's
favors. Ger
beneficiary
some terror, but there was
looked
East
with
many
only one foe
the French
looked East, they saw two nations to fear;
there; when
each could be used as an ally
for the time
against the other?but
the
was
Soviet
the
be
being
danger
greater, and, should Germany
875
STANLEY HOFFMANN
built up too much against the Soviets,
in one respect would be compromised
There was a second way in which
the security
in another.18
gained
by France
situa
the diversity of national
situations
limit and affect but
tions operated. As I have suggested,
the cold
choices. A general desire for overcoming
do not command
on
not mean a general agreement
war and American
did
hegemony
was
it
so.
and
"the
to
I
have
What
called
resistance"
do
how
split,
an
the
decisive
that
has
become
of
obstacles
this
for
is
spUt
analysis
that the best
to European
unification. Had all the resisters calculated
a
was
to
construction
France's
the
of
reach
way
powerful
objectives
turn the
which
could
rival
America's
West European
entity,
might,
a
wrest
contest
into
and
from
both
advantages
bipolar
triangle,
a
movement
led
the
of
by re
"ambiguity"
extra-European
giants,
as well as
enter
not
forces
have
the
resisting
might
damaged
signed
a
was
over
later. However,
there
sharp division
prise until much
those who reasoned along the lines just described
between
methods
feared that the sacrifice of
?like
those who
Monnet?and
Jean
to supranational
institutions might
entail a loss
national sovereignty
The latter consisted
of control over the direction of the undertaking.
as
on the one hand, the nationalists who,
of two kinds of people:
indicated above, were
st?l very much
around, exasperated
by the
colonial battles, anxious to preserve
all the resources of French di
on the
in
in
and
the
order,
present, to concentrate
strategy
plomacy
fronts
overseas
and,
later,
to
promote
whatever
policies
would
be
a
on the other hand,
required, rather than let
foreign body decide;
were
men Uke Mend?s-France,
in the sense of
not
nationaUsts
who
construc
this paper, but who thought that the continental European
tion was not France's best way of coping with her situation?they
to go to more urgent tasks such as the
thought that priority ought
the reform of
search for a d?tente, the UberaUzation
of the Empire,
the
economy.19
of the European movement
required, first, that the
remain a minority?
"resisters" suspicious
of European
integration
in
not only throughout
the six but
the leadership of every one of the
the prime
in the Executive,
not
six,
only in ParUament but above aU
was met
a
which
in
state:
force
every
requirement
decision-making
for
E.D.C.
not
in
months
crucial
the
in 1950-53 and in 1955-58, but
The
success
after
in 1953-54, and no longer after 1958. The movement
proceeded
a
was
there
of ambiguity;
1958 because
of the dialectic
however,
success:
truth"?when
of
that the "minute
second requirement
for
about
the European
?Utes would have to ask themselves
questions
876
The Fate of the Nation-State
of their community?be
direction
the ultimate political
postponed
in
as
as
the cold war remain sufficiently
that
that
is,
possible;
long
tense to impose even on the "resisters" a priority for the kind of
over
priority for the urgent
security that implied U. S. protection?a
was
saw it. This is
as
what
the long-term
important
they
precisely
nervous
de
of
the
brief
shaken
if
already,
period
by
temporarily,
that followed Stalin's death, in 1953-54, and then grad
mobilization
uaUy undermined
postwar
by the third basic feature of Europe's
in
situation. But before we turn to it, one remark must be made:
pre
by European
integration"
foreign poUcy, "resistance
as France was
as
over "resistance by seff-reliance"
only
long
in colonial wars;
it was this important and purely
down
bogged
in France's national
situation whose ups and downs
French element
the method
of "resistance."20
affected quite decisively
French
va?ed
above were sharp
described
divisions and contradictions
common
in the mid-1950's
ened by the third
feature, which emerged
since:
the nuclear
effects have developed
and whose
progressively
the
"balance of
the superpowers.
The impact of
stalemate between
so
on
Western
often and
the
alUance has been analyzed
terror"
is
to
needed
that
what
is
be added here; but
well21
nothing needs
a brief explanation
two
have
of how the
splits already discussed
of the uncertainties
been worsened
by Europe's
gradual discovery
nuclear protection
of America's
(now that the U. S. could be dev
some
new
to the extent
and
how
astated too),
splits appeared. For
a
the
to which
stalemate has loosened up
very tight situa
previously
because
of the threat from the East and the ties to the
tion?tight
in national
U. S.?it has altogether
sharpened previous differences
situations and increased the number of alternatives made
ava?able
to ?lites and statesmen. Greater
meant
has
indeterminacy
greater
3. The
confusion.
"resistance" and German
First, the split between French
"resig
The
dominant
nation" has become
deeper.
poUtical ?lites in Ger
the new national
situation created by the
many have interpreted
balance of terror as merely adding urgency to their previous calcula
stalemate was, given Germany's
tion of interest. The nuclear
posi
to
increase
the
for the West:
the U. S. was
deemed
tion,
danger
less strong, the Soviet Union
stronger, that is, more of a
relatively
threat. Indeed, the SociaUsts switched from their increasingly more
to an outright endorsement
furtive glances at neutrality
of the Chris
was broken,
tian Democratic
If
America's
interpretation.
monopoly
877
STANLEY HOFFMANN
if America's
in a world
guarantee was weakened
thereby, what was needed?
that was not
to
rearm with nuclear
let
Germany
wiUing
a
in
continent
that
not
a nuclear force
could
weapons,
reaUy develop
of its own capable of
and
America's
of
Russia's
replacing
matching
?was
a German
so
of
America's
main
concerns,
policy
respectful
and also so
that the U. S.
vigilant with respect to the Soviet Union,
would
to
both feel ob?gated
over
of protection
keep its mantle
not
and
be
a
into
at
d?tente
Ger
Germany
tempted
negotiating
be the condition
expense. German
doc?ity would
many's
for, and
American
The
German
to a
reaction
of,
counterpart
entanglement.
that
if
were
General
GaUois'
could,
development
followed,
logic
lead to the prevalence
of "polycentrism"
at
expense was
bipolarity's
the search for ways
of exorcising
the former and
the
preserving
latter. On the whole,
the smaller nations and
not at
Italy, wh?e
all fearful about the consequences
of polycentrism
(on the con
were
not
out
shaken
nevertheless
of
their
the
trary),
"resignation";
mere appearance
of parity of nuclear
was not
peril
enough to make
them anxious to give, or to make them
capable of giv
domestically
ing, priority to an active foreign policy.
on the contrary, the balance
In France,
of terror reinforced
the
attitude of resistance: what had always been a
goal?emancipation
?but
had in fact been no more than a hope,
given the thickness of
the iron curtain, the simple rigidity
of the superpowers'
in
policies
the days of Mr. Dulles,
and Europe's
inabiUty to affect the course
of events, now became a possibility;
for the giants' stalemate meant
increased
for
the
less
security
(however much
great
they might
about
American
the
decrease
of
and use it as
complain
protection
a pretext,
their lament coexisted with a heightened
feeling of pro
saw as a liabiUty
tection against war in general ).What
the Germans
was an opportunity
to the French. Germany's
its low na
situation,
incited most German
tional consciousness,
leaders to choose what
a
of the new situation;
interpretation
might be called
"minimizing"
its
national
France's
consciousness
situation,
and, after 1958,
high
the doctrine of its leader, incited French political
?lites to choose a
The increasing costs of the use of force
interpretation.
"maximizing"
less likely, American
this use by the superpowers
made
protection
less certain but also less essential, Europe's
recovery of not merely
and possible?possible
since the
but power more desirable
wealth
for
could
be
without
excessive
risk
of
sanctions
power
quest
pushed
two
the
desirable
since
while
remains
transformed,
by
power,
giants,
force and ultima ratio of world poUtics. This recovery
the moving
878
The Fate of the Nation-State
of power would help
of
bring about the much desired prevalence
over
polycentrism
bipolarity.22
as this feud shows, the balance
of terror heightened
Secondly,
the spUt over method
it
On
the one hand,
the
"resisters."
among
new
for
those
who
that
provided
arguments
emancipation
thought
could be achieved
the uniting
of Western
Europe:
only through
to
individual
national
remain too ridiculously
weak
efforts would
amount
a waste
to
in resources;
a collective
but
effort,
anything
a
could exploit the new situation, make Western
however,
Europe
true partner of the U. S., and not
an economic partner and
merely
a
On the other hand, those who feared that
military
aide-de-camp.
a
the "united way" could become
deviation
reasoned
frustrating
that the theory of graduated
deterrence
the
of
justified
acquisition
a
nuclear weapons
resources
middle-size
with
limited
and
power
by
that this acquisition would
increase considerably
the political
influ
ence as weU as the
of
nation.
costs
the
The
increased
of
prestige
force ruled out, in any case, what had in the past been the most
disastrous
effect of the mushrooming
of sovereign states?a warlike,
nationalism?but
refloated
the
they
expansionist
simultaneously
no
value of small or middle-sized
condemned
nations,
longer
by the
war
to
or
look
for
to
cold, bipolar
bigger protectors
agglomerate
in order to assure their
the "united way" would
security. Moreover,
since some, and not
be a dead-end,
of
exactly the least significant,
the associates
had no desire for collective
at
the
power
European
of American
Not the least significant
expense
possible
protection.
reason for the
of the second line of
over the first
prevalence
thought
has been one important element of the national situation?the
army:
almost destroyed
it had to be "recon
by its Algerian
experience,
verted." In the circumstances
a con
of 1962, this meant
inevitably
version to French
atomic concerns.
Its success builds up in turn a
interest in the preservation
vested
of the new establishment?and
increases the difference
in national
situations between
France
and
a non-nuclear
Germany.
the new situation affected European
unification
Thirdly,
nega
not
in
those
two
but
other ways as
by
tively
only
sharpening
spUts
well. On the one hand, until then, opposition
to a
supranational
come
a
had
from
of
fraction
the
in the
"resisters";
entity
only
early
1950's the U. S. had strongly?too
the
establishment
strongly?urged
of a European
defense
system which was not considered
likely to
own
America's
in
the
area.
In the
challenge
predominance
military
to build such
1960's, the U. S. no longer urged the West Europeans
879
STANLEY HOFFMANN
a system.
a
concern
American
for
has developed
leadership
deep
over
that
control
the forces of the alliance,
centralized
maintaining
and a growing realization
that Europe's
is, for preserving
bipolarity,
a result, some
not
would
nuclear
As
short
of
weapons.
stop
appetite
of the "resigned ones," instead of endorsing European
integration
as unreservedly
as when
in a
the situation of a dependent
Europe
to entertain
world
did not allow Europeans
cold-war-dominated
of
with
the
U.
S., now for
genuine military
thoughts
"partnership"
were
of two minds?they
the first time showed themselves
wiUing
to pursue
in
economic
and
social
but
much
less
fields,
integration
so in matters
of defense,
lest NATO
be weakened.
It is significant
that the Dutch
resisted de GauUe's
to include
efforts, in 1960-62,
in his confederal
defense
scheme and that the German
leaders, in
their quest for security, put their hopes in the MLF?a
scheme that
ties European
nations one by one to the U. S.?rather
than in a
revised and revived E.D.C.
mental
reservations
of
such
Inevitably,
those who had been among the champions
of supranationaUty
could
of those "resisters" who had distrusted
only confirm the suspicions
since the
the "Monnet method"
situa
Thus, the national
beginning.
own
tion of Germany
in particular?a
situation
in which America's
as the anchor of U. S. influence on
on Germany
of
reUance
policy
the continent plays a large role?damaged
the European movement:
in their drive to
the German
leaders were largely successful
entangle
the U. S., but found that the price they had to pay was a decreasing
and
ab?ity to push for European
integration. European
integration
on the U. S. were no
automatically
dependence
longer
compatible.23
of German
leaders who
On the other hand, even that minority
not reaUy
interest
national
did
to
read
Germany's
differently
began
the
ardor.
of
the
for
majority's
integrating
compensate
weakening
to 1965, suspicions about the value of the pol
in
1963
Increasingly,
were voiced
a group of Christian
by
icy of dociUty-for-entanglement
and Strauss. They
still read the Ger
led by Adenauer
Democrats,
man situation in terms of
but
faith in America's
their
first;
security
it was shaken, and they saw that Germany
had
to
aptitude
provide
not
to
to
America's
have
from
behave
support
sufficiently
gained
as a minor any
nickname
is how
of German GaulUsts
longer. Their
ever totally unsuitable.
To be sure, these men are "resisters" in the
sense of turning away from America;
they are close to the French
a
as
insofar
defense
resisters,"
European
they propose
"integrationist
a
nuclear policy
than
effort and a joint European
(rather
purely
their foreign policy goals are quite dif
German one). Nevertheless,
880
The Fate of the Nation-State
or na
ferent from those of aU the French
resisters,
integrationist
leaders
tionaUst. The national situation of France made most French
a common vision, described
above, that can be summed
agree on
a continent
war
as
reunited with a Ger
and
end
the
the
cold
of
up
common
vision coexists with
That
certain
under
wraps.
many placed
discussed?the
the spUt on policies
(in
already
"European" policy
the wraps are organic, that is, the net and bonds of integra
which
the wraps are contractual).
tion) vs. the "national" poUcy (in which
has made most German
situation of Germany
The national
leaders,
vision
after the Social Democratic
switch,24 agree on a common
of the cold war,
French?a
perpetuation
deeply different from the
tantamount
a
to
reunification
for
the hope
the Soviet Union,
hostility
to its disinte
but
not merely
to the thawing of the Eastern
"camp"
as
as few concessions
Since 1963, this
possible.
gration, and with
two
the
different
has
vision
coexisted with
majority policy
policies:
a strong,
of reliance on the U. S., the minority
policy of substituting
an
d?tente
less reliable, increasingly
for
increasingly
tough Europe
on
are
not
methods
thus split
only
happy U. S. At present, "resisters"
vs. French
but also on
(French
integrationists
anti-integrationists)
vs.
(French
German).
objectives
situa
This long discussion
of the different responses to common
to
in reaction
to the dominant
tions has been necessary
approach
on process.
The
self
which
has
focused
European
integration
asso
power of the process is severely constrained
by the
propelling
In order to go "beyond
ciates' views and spUts on ends and means.
one will have to do more than set up
the nation-state,"
procedures
in adequate
For a proce
and "process conditions."
"background"
dure is not a purpose, a process is not a policy.
Ill
that is
since it is the process of European
However,
integration
its most original feature, we must examine it also.25 We have been
set up
a kind of race, between
the logic of integration
witnessing
ana
and
the
of
Monnet
and
diversity,
logic
analyzed by Haas,
by
neces
to
the
double
the
of
above.
former,
pressure
lyzed
According
of the social fabric, which w?l
oblige
sity (the interdependence
left uncoordinated)
statesmen
to integrate even sectors originally
and of men
(the action of the supranational
agents) w?l gradually
restrict the freedom of movement
of the national governments
by
In such
situations into one of total enmeshing.
turning the national
881
STANLEY HOFFMANN
a m?ieu,
and
in anachronism,
w?l be a futile exercise
nationalism
the national
consciousness
itself wiU, so to speak, be impregnated
of the higher interest in union. The logic of diver
by an awareness
to which
the "spiU-over"
sity, by contrast, sets limits to the degree
can
it re
limit
the
freedom of action of the governments;
process
stricts the domain
in which
the logic of functional
op
integration
erates to the area of weffare;
indeed, to the extent that discrepancies
over the other areas
begin to prevail over the laborious harmoniza
even issues
tion in weffare,
to the latter sphere may be
belonging
come infected
areas.
the
which
reigns in those other
by
disharmony
a
The logic of integration
is that of
the
blender which
crunches
most
overcomes
diverse products,
tastes and per
their different
delicious
fumes, and replaces them with one, presumably
juice. One
one expects a finer
lets each item be ground because
that
synthesis:
each "ingredient"
is, ambiguity
helps rather than hinders because
can
taste will
at the end. The
hope that its
prevail
logic of diversity
to the
is the opposite:
it suggests that, in areas of key importance
or the self-controlled
national
interest, nations prefer the certainty,
of national self -reliance, to the uncontrolled
uncertainty
uncertainty,
a part of the
one
carries
of the untested
blender;
only
ambiguity
assumes that it is
to fool each
way. The logic of integration
possible
one of the associates
some of the time because his over-aU gain will
turn out
still exceed his occasional
losses, even if his calculations
on a vital
wrong here or there. The logic of diversity
implies that,
on other (and
issue, losses are not compensated
by gains
especially
not on other less vital) issues: nobody wants to be fooled. The logic
of the supranational
function
of integration deems the uncertainties
sees them as destructive
process creative; the logic of diversity
past
a certain threshold: Russian
roulette is fine only as long as the gun
con
is filled with blanks. Ambiguity
lures and luUs the national
into integration as long as the benefits are high, the costs
sciousness
arouse
and
considerable.
low, the expectations
may
Ambiguity
are
consciousness
into nationaUsm
if the benefits
stiffen national
slow, the losses high, the hopes dashed
could be won only
gration's gamble
a
excess
to
permanent
potency
promise
over frustrations. TheoreticaUy,
hopes
It is not true of political
integration.
or deferred. Functional
inte
had sufficient
if the method
of gains over losses, and of
be true of economic
(in the sense of
integration
this may
"high politics").
de
The success of the approach
by Jean Monnet
symboUzed
a
on his
on
and depends
still,
winning
gamble:
triple
goals,
pended,
882
The Fate of the Nation-State
on results. As for goals, it is a gamble on the possibility
on methods,
on ends.
as an end in itself, for agreement
of substituting motion
not
did
?lites
a
fact that the trans-national
It is
agree
integrationist
on whether
the object of the community-building
enterprise
ought
to be the construction
of a new super-state?that
is, a federal poten
size and resources
more
its
of
able
because
tial nation, ? la U.S.A.,
nations of
game of power than the dwarfed
that
was to demonstrate
whether
the
object
Europe?or
com
and
overcome
power poUtics could be
through cooperation
to build the first example of a radically new kind of unit,
promise,
in the scale of the
to achieve a change in the nature and not merely
on
this
himself has been ambiguous
score; Hallstein
game. Monnet
has been leaning in the first direction, many of Monnet's
public rela
in the second.26 Nor did the integrationists
tions men
agree on
a
was
the creation of
the main
whether
"security
regional
goal
a former hotbed of wars,
the
of
that
is,
pacification
community,"27
or whether
the main goal was the creation of an entity whose posi
affect the course of the cold war
could decisively
tion and might
it is per
in general. Now,
of international
relations
in particular,
a
on
to
its harboring
continental
feed
for movement
fectly possible
as well
as
nationaUsts
idealists,
anti-power
politi
inward-looking
as
as there is
cians and outward-looking
politicians-^but
only
long
on tariffs did not
no need to make a choice. Decisions
require such
on
raise
basic
of
choices. Decisions
already
problems
agriculture
on
orientation.
Decisions
and
de
and
membership
foreign policy
fense cannot be reached unless the goals are clarified. One cannot
be aU things to aU people aU of the time.
there was a gamble on the irresistible rise of
As for methods,
sover
It assumed,
functionalism.
first, that national
supranational
could
be
chewed
leaf
up
eignty, already devalued by events,
by leaf
It assumed,
that
the
dilemma
of
Uke an artichoke.
second,
govern
an integration
that ties
ments having
to choose between
pursuing
that benefits
their people
their hands and stopping a movement
in favor of integration by men representing
could be exploited
the
common
endowed
with
the
of
superior expertise,
advantages
good,
a set of deadlines,
and using
against
initiating proposals,
propped
of package
it was as
deals. Finally,
for their cause the technique
to play
Western
the traditional
sumed that this approach would both take into account the interests
of the greater powers and prevent the crushing of the smaller ones.
The troubles with this gamble have been numerous. One, even an
remains intact after the leaves have
artichoke has a heart, which
883
STANLEY HOFFMANN
It is of course true that a successful
economic and social
Umit the freedom governments would
would
integration
considerably
stiU enjoy in theory for their diplomacy
and strategy; but why
should one assume that they would not be aware of it? As the arti
choke's heart gets more and more denuded,
the governments'
vigi
lance gets more and more alerted. To be sure, the second assump
tion impUes that the logic of the movement
them
would
prevent
save
to
the
from doing anything about it: they would be powerless
never
true
heart. But, two, this would
be
put
only if governments
interests of the nation above the par
what
they consider essential
been
eaten.
ticular interests of certain categories
if superior exper
of nationals,
or the solution
tise were always either the Commission's
monopoly
were
in every argu
effective
of the issue at hand, if package deals
were
al
ment,
and, above aU, if the governments'
representatives
a
as
as
to behave
ways determined
"community
organ" rather than
a
are
not willing
to accept
the agents of states that
community under
functional
any conditions. Finally,
integration may indeed give last
it is for
to the smaller powers,
because
ing satisfaction
precisely
to
is highest,
them that the ratio of "weffare poUtics"
high poUtics
and that the chance of gaining benefits
through intergovernmental
that reflect rather than correct the power differential
be
methods
tween
the
the big and the small is poorest; but this is also why
as
to satisfy the bigger powers
is not
?
la
method
longue
Ukely
their
civil servants, for aU
skill
much:
facing them, the supranational
are a bit like
into
and legal powers,
Jonases trying to turn whales
move
an
essen
to
from
Of
the
course,
idea?ultimately?is
jellyfish.
in which
civil servants
supranational
tially administrative
procedure
to a truly federal one in
enter a dialogue with national ministers,
a federal cabinet
to a federal parliament;
is responsible
but
which
as a linear progress may
turn out to be a
is thus presented
what
hold the key to the transformation,
vicious circle, since the ministers
and may refuse it unless the goals are defined and the results already
are
achieved
satisfactory.
of
about results as well. The experience
There was a gamble
entail net benefits
for aU, and bring about clear
would
integration
formation.
Such progress
could be
toward community
progress
in
the
of
interstate
realm
the
measured
foUowing yardsticks:
by
new
common
to
an
the
of
transfer
relations,
agen
power
increasing
inter
the common
of solutions "upgrading
cies, and the prevalence
in
realm
of
transnational
the
over
kinds
of
other
est"
compromises;
in the area of national
an increasing flow of communications;
society,
884
The Fate
of the Nation-State
is important both for interstate relations, be
it may set limits to the statesmen's discretion,
it affects the scope and mean
and for transnational
society, because
the
of
communication
would
be measured
ing
by
flows?progress
views
of
external
The results
issues.
about
increasing compatib?ity
so far are mixed:
on the last count (see below),
achieved
negative
on the first by features that the
limited on the second, and marked
of intergration
did not expect. On the one hand, there
enthusiasts
has been some strengthening
of the authority of the Commission,
and in various areas there has been some "upgrading
of common
s unfortunate
interests." On the other hand, the Commission
attempt
to consofidate
in the spring of
those gains at de GauUe's expense,
1965, has brought about a startling setback for the whole
enterprise;
in their negotiations,
the members
have conspicuously
moreover,
interest in some vital areas
failed to find a common
(energy, Eng
in
land's entry), and sometimes
succeeded
"in
reaching apparently
most
decisions
after
the
traditional
kind
only
ungainly,
tegrating"
as threats,
in which
such uncommunity-like
of bargaining,
methods
were
moves
In
and
used.
other
ultimatums,
words, either
retaliatory
the ideal was not reached, or it was reached in a way that was both
consciousness?which
cause (as seen above)
its destroyer.
the opposite
of the ideal and ultimately
If we
look
as an
at the institutions
of the Common Market
incipient political
remains
limited, its
system for Europe, we find that its authority
structure weak,
its popular base restricted and distant.28
if the uncertainty
It is therefore not surprising
about results al
to
achieved
contributes
about
future prospects.
ready
uncertainty
For the very divisions
of integration make
it
among the partisans
hard to predict where
the "Monnet method" would
lead, if the proc
ess were to continue
so
along the lines
fondly planned by the French
an effective
Would
the
become
federation,
"inspirator."
enterprise
or
into
the
it lead to a mere
would
one,
many
turning
gradually
all the divergences
con
and rivalries would
fa?ade behind which
tinue to be played out? It is at least remarkable
that Gaullist
and
American
in one respect: de GauUe has con
fears should converge
that the application
of the supranational method
sistently warned
to the area of
not to a
would
lead
high politics
strong European
a d?ution of national
to
but
whose
entity,
responsib?ity
only bene
a
would
the
be
U.
of
coherent
S.; incapable
ficiary
defining
policy,
the "technocrats" would
leave the decisions
in vital areas to the
U. S., at least by default. On the contrary, many Americans
have
come to beUeve, on the basis of some of E.E.C.'s actions in the realm
885
STANLEY HOFFMANN
of tariffs and trade, that a united Europe would be able to challenge
U. S. leadership much more effectively
than the separate European
states ever could. The truth of the matter
is that nobody knows: a
a process
method
is not a policy,
is not a direction;
the results
so far are too
in
achieved
and
which
the
they have
way
specialized,
one to
been reached is too
and
to
allow
project
extrapolate
bumpy,
a united
to emerge; there
safely. The face of
Europe has not begun
are
a few Unes, but one does not know whether
the suprana
just
tional
of a
the features
technique would finaUy give toWestern
Europe
or those of a Fourth
writ
concern,
going
large?the
RepubUc
ambitions
of a world power, or the
of parochialism.
complacency
are so extreme,
The range of possib?ities
is so broad, the alternatives
that the more the Six move
into the stormy waters of high poUtics,
the less not only they but also the outside powers, such as the U. S.,
which may be affected by their acts are wiUing
to extend the credit
of hope and to make new wagers:
neither Gaullist France nor the
to risk a major
is wiUing
loss of control.
present U. S. leadership
to
in
French
the
the
of
functional
Contrary
process
integra
proverb,
tion, only the first steps do not cost much.
lessons one can draw from a
There are two important general
the limits of
The
first concerns
of
of
the
process
study
integration.
success in the relatively
its very (if relative)
the functional method:
area in which
lifts the participants
it works relatively well
painless
it does not apply well any more?like
to the level of issues to which
skill at moving
swimmers whose
quickly away from the shore sud
are stormiest and
to
the waters
the
where
them
denly brings
point
none
a time when
at
and
of the ques
is
setting in,
deepest,
fatigue
swim
has been
of
and
tions about ultimate
length
goal, direction,
answered. The functional process was used in order to "make Eu
once Europe
coUided with
the process
began being made,
rope";
is like a
The
what
for?"
the question:
process
"making Europe,
it
can work only if someone keeps giving
that
machine
grinding
and stop pro
the users start quarreling
to
When
something
grind.
a wh?e,
the machine worked because
stops. For
viding, the machine
to integrate
it a common determination
into
the governments
poured
their
wealth
with
but
in order to maximize
their economies
wealth;
it was going to arise: a
to do with
what
of
the
question
increasing,
means
does not ipso facto provide
capable of supplying
technique
the ends, and it is about those ends that quarrels have broken out.
if the situation had been more com
They might have been avoided
the Six had been so cooped up that each one's horizon
pelling?if
886
The Fate of the Nation-State
would have been nothing other than his five partners. But this has
never been their outlook, nor is it any more
Each
their necessity.
one is
to Uve with the others, but not on terms too different
wiUing
from his own; and the Six are not in the position of the three mis
a
erable prisoners of No Exit. Transforming
"subsystem"
dependent
one
to aU other subsystems
to
its
relations
be
proved
thing; defining
to be quite
and to the international
system in general has turned out
a
as
transforma
matter
to
the
so
formidable
another?indeed,
keep
relations can be de
in
tion of the subsystem
abeyance until those
fined.
a substitute
The model
for the kind
of functional
integration,
to
not
of instant federation which
had
been
governments
prepared
in
it
is
its
shows
essentially
important respects. One,
accept,
origins
an administrative
for
relies on bureaucratic
model, which
expertise
a
and
the
the promotion
defined
of
authorities,
by
political
poUcy
are tech
for the definition of a poUcy that poUtical decision-makers
like
French
of
nically incapable
shaping?something
planning under
The hope was that in the interstices of polit
the Fourth Republic.
but
the administrators
ical bickering
could bu?d up a consensus;
a
was
to
that
within
formula
well
the mistake
works
beUeve that
certain limits is a
that even within
the limits of "wel
panacea?and
can
overcome
the disastrous
fare poUtics" administrative
skill
always
or
the
effects of political
(cf.
mismanagement
impact of
paralysis
on
or
the
balance
of payment
inflation,
troubles,
Two,
planning).
to be prepared
model assumes that the basic poUtical decisions,
and
pursued by the civ? servants but formally made by the governments,
would be reached through the process of short-term bargaining,
by
is empirical muddling
politicians whose mode of operation
through,
of the kind that puts immediate
above long-term pur
advantages
suits: this model
to
nature
well
the
of parliamentary
corresponds
a weak Executive,
with
for
the
of the
politics
example,
politics
Fourth RepubUc,
but the mistake was to beUeve
that all political
regimes would conform to this rather sorry image, and also to ignore
the disastrous
results which
the original example produced when
ever conflicts over values and fundamental
choices made mere em
or
worse
useless
than
useless
(cf. decolonization).29
pirical groping
The second lesson is even more
for the advocates
discouraging
of functionaUsm.
To revert to the analogy of the grinder, what has
is that the machine,
happened
piqued by the slowing down of sup
users
to
its
that in the future the
suggested
ply, suddenly
supplying
of grinding material
be taken out of their hands and left to the
887
STANLEY HOFFMANN
The institutional
tends to become an actor with
machinery
same
in its own survival and
expansion. The
thing happens
often enough within a state whose political
system is ineffective. But
here we deal not with one but with six
systems, and the
political
reason for the ineffectiveness
of the Six
of the Council
of Ministers
not the weakness,
the national
of
may be the excessive
toughness,
systems involved. In other words, by trying to be a force,
political
the bureaucracy
itself even more of a stake
here, inevitably, makes
that the nations try to control or at least to affect. A new
complica
tion is thus added to aU the substantive
issues that divide the par
machine.
a stake
that provides
them with a whole
trunkful of screens
ticipants?one
one that could have
and masks. Thus, the agricultural
is
problem
been solved "technicaUy,"
had previously
since the governments
reached basic compromises,
and more or less agreed on the relations
in
But the way
between
Common Market
and outside agriculture.
which
these accords had been reached left scars, and the nature of
over another
the agreement meant a victory for one state (France)
not to the
due
The
whole
been
issue
has
(Germany).
reopened,
states' but to the Commission's
initiative.
In the crisis of 1965,
a common
the Commission's
overly bold proposal of
agricultural pol
cum
lines)
icy (along pro-French
supranationality
(against French
on
one
some
of the Six, hos
the
aUowed
has,
hand,
determination)
in fact to the substantive
to endorse the Commission's
proposals,
as
while knowing
and
stand
of
up
plan
supranationaUty,
champions
that the French would block the scheme; the French have been able
to use the Commission's
rashness as a pretext for trying to k?l supra
a German
not too kindly dis
government
altogether;
nationality
a Commission
economic
initiatives
and
toward
whose
inspira
posed
tion were hardly in Une with Mr. Erhard's views has found itself
whose head, now under French attack,
the Commission,
defending
a French government
anxious to get its partners com
is a German;
to postpone
has preferred
to a protected
market
mitted
agricultural
auton
the reaUzation of this goal rather than let the Commission's
more to disagree about,
states
found
have
The
omy grow.
something
to push the car out of the bog,
in an attempt
and the Commission,
To be sure, the Commission's
for months.
the motor
has
stopped
d?emma had become acute: either its members
resigned themselves
and
to their quarreling
brokers
to being merely
clients,
patient
set the pace; or else they tried to behave both accord
them
letting
and as if a genuine
of the Monnet
method,
ing to the ideal-type
if prudence meant
but
had
been
estabUshed;
already
community
tile
888
The Fate of the Nation-State
has meant delay. In the immediate
future,
anticipation
sluggishness,
the settlement
of
of the various
issues?"the
substantive
uniting
Six
to
what
the
be
wh?e
for?"?is
try to
Europe,
likely
postponed
a
the
kind
in
the
about
way, haggling
repair
damaged machinery;
to want
to
is a polite method
of grinder one wants
for appearing
on what
while
keep grinding together,
really disagreeing
completely
one wants to put in and
get out.
IV
ex
come now to the balance
sheet of the "European
most
is
nations.
the
the
To
survival
The
visible
of
aspect
periment."
be sure, they survive transformed:
first, swept by the advent of the
mass
in an apparently
inexorable
of
"age
caught
consumption,"
of
and democratization,
industrialization,
urbanization,
they
process
and social poli
become more aUke in social structure, in economic
there is a spectacular
break be
cies, even in physical
appearance;
tween a past which
so many monuments
constant memory,
bring to
and a rationa?zed
future that puts these nations closer to the prob
lems of America's
industrial society than to the issues of their own
are
these sim?arities
Second,
history.
promoted
by the Common
no
it
mean
Market
is of
of a
itself:
that the prospect
consequence
in
should have brought anguish to various
coUapse of the Market
terest groups, some of which had
trans
its
establishment:
the
fought
national
and farmers are part of the trans
linkages of businessmen
formation. Third, none of the Western
nations is a world
European
power any longer in the traditional sense, that is, in the sense either
of having physical
in var
establishments
backed by military might
ious parts of the globe, or of
in Europe
armed forces
possessing
superior to those of any non-European
power.
And yet they survive as nations. Let us go back to the criteria
of integration
listed above. On
foreign and defense policies, not only
has no power been transferred
to common European
organs, but
France has
taken
from
NATO,
and, as shown
power away
actually
in part two, differences
in the calculations
of the national
interest
We
must
have, if anything,
of terror. As for
broadened
ever
since
the advent
of the balance
research
shows
communications,
intra-European
solid economic network of E.E.C. has not been
indubitably
of social and cultural
communica
complemented
by a network
the
some
links
between
of those societies and the U. S. are
tions;30
stronger than the links among them. Indeed, even in the realm of
that the
889
STANLEY HOFFMANN
the Common Market
for goods has not been
relations,
a
enter
of
enterprises:
system
completed
by
pan-West
European
to
that
find
rivals
within
with
themselves
unable
prises
compete
E.E.C. often associate
firms rather than
themselves with American
with
external
such
views
about
rivals.
issues, far
Finally,
merge
as
as to
more
from
to
weU
reflect
appear
becoming
compatible,
interest
the
definitions
of
national
the
support
divergent
by the
statesmen. French
ahead of the North
??te opinion puts Europe
Atlantic
is overwhelmingly
deems bipolarity
obsolete,
partnership,
indifferent or even hostile to the U. S., and is st?l highly suspicious
a
comes out in favor of a genuine
of Germany;
minority
polit
only
ical federation of Western
Europe and thinks that U. S. and French
interests coincide. German
?lite opinion puts the North Atlantic
entente ahead of
is
is stiU bipolar,
believes
that the world
Europe,
to
U.
S.
German
the
deems
U.
and
favorable
S.,
overwhelmingly
interests in agreement,
is either favorably
inclined toward France
or at least not hostile, and shows a
in favor of a European
majority
federation. There is no common European
outlook. Nor is there a
common
a common
role in
of either Europe's
"project,"
conception
world affairs or Europe's possible
to the solution of the
contribution
of aU industrial societies.
problems characteristic
economic
It is important to understand
where
the obstacles Ue. To some
in
lie
the
condition
of national
consciousness.
extent, they
present
I mentioned
earlier that there were at the start considerable
differ
ences from country
to country.
In two respects,
similarities
have
in
recent
na
a
has
There
been
German
rebirth
of
years.
emerged
tional consciousness,
at
because
the
bold
attempt
largely
fastening
a new
one
shattered consciousness
Germany's
European
directly to
did not succeed:
the existence
situation has
of a German national
a German
reawakened
national
and thus re
awareness,
gradually
area. More
in
duced the gap between
France
this
and
Germany
are aUke in
in Western
consciences
over, all the national
Europe
are not like Rousseau's
a combination
one sense:
they
general w?l,
of mores and moves
that define with a large degree of inteUectual
the purposes of the national com
involvement
clarity and emotional
in Europe
is negative
rather
consciousness
national
munity. Today's
collectif."
than positive. There is st?l, in each nation, a "vouloir-vivre
It is, in some parts,
But it is not a "da?y plebiscite"
for something.
on
a
than on common
a
rather
habit
based
community
daily routine,
an
than
is
rather
that
received
tasks,
shaped. Thus Ger
identity
is the inevitable result
sense
and
distinctiveness"
"cohesion
of
many's
890
The Fate of the Nation-State
of the survival and recovery of a West German
state in a world of
rather than a specific willed
set of
In other
imperatives.
a
a
national
is
consciousness
refusal
rather
than
parts,
daily
daily
a
a
desire
to
certain
creation,
preserve
(however waning,
heritage
and less because
it is
it is one's own)
meaningful
today than because
rather than a determination
to define a common destiny, an identity
that is hollow rather than fuU and marked more
by bad humor to
ward foreign influences than by any
contribution.
positive
or hoUow character of national
To be sure, the negative
con
sciousness need not be a
the
for
of
integration:
champions
Uab?ity
could be formidable
to any
obstacles
general wiUs ? la Rousseau
fusion of sovereignty.
the
obstacle
resides
However,
partly in the
common nature of the
state
of
national
consciousness,
present
partly
in the
that survives
remaining differences. A patriotic consciousness
in a kind of nonpurposive
may not be a barrier to
complacency
efforts at
a
it
is
but
it,
transcending
drag: it does not carry forward
or
statesmen
in
an intense and
in
the
which
way
push
positive
on
w?l"
act
leaders
behalf
of national goals, or
who
"general
prods
in the way
in which European
federaUsts have sometimes
hoped
that enUghtened
national patriotisms would
propel Europe's national
a new
leaders into
into which
those
community,
European
building
would
two
and
enlightened
patriotisms
converge
merge. Moreover,
of the "national consciences"
have raised obstacles:
the French one
it remains too
because
one because
it remains
strong, the German
too weak. The French
a
sense
not
have
of
national
may
purpose,
their patriotism has been tested so often and
but, precisely because
so long, because
the pressures of the outside world have continued
the
postwar era to batter their concerns and their con
throughout
now
and even desired,
ceits, and because modernization,
accepted
also undermines
traditional
values
stiU cherished
and traditional
stiU
French
national
consciousness
enforced,
authority patterns
op
resistance to any suggestion
of abdication,
poses considerable
resig
so that the
much
themselves
have
nation,
repli?so
"Europeans"
had to present integration as an opportunity
for getting French views
shared by others instead of
side of the
stressing the "community"
national
on
the
other
consciousness,
enterprise.31 Germany's
hand,
a
remains marked
for or
toward what
by
genuine distaste
timidity
on the
might be called the power activities of a national community
a
world
hence
to
the
from
of
stage;
tendency
shy away
problems
a
which
united
would
to
have
face
and
whose
"high poUtics"
Europe
avoidance
to refuse to
only delays the advent of unity; a tendency
nations,
891
STANLEY HOFFMANN
make policy choices and to pretend
that
(to oneself and to others)
no such choices are
no
that
is
there
be
required,
incompatibiUty
tween a
an Atlantic
one
In
and
"European Europe"
partnership.
excess of self-confidence
makes unity on terms other
case, a defensive
than one's own difficult,
and obUges integrationist
leaders to use
and
and
deceit
often
lamentable
results?
flattery
(with
cunning
an
like the E.D.C.
in
the
other
lack
defensive
case,
crisis);
equaUy
of self-confidence
into
itself
external
the
the
of
projects
undertakings
nation and weakens
enter
the foundations
of the common European
prise.
And yet, if the "national consciousness"
could be isolated from aU other elements
one would,
I think, conclude
that the main
of the nation-state
Ue elsewhere.
lie, first of aU, in the differences
They
nations
of the European
of the national
situation,
reasons for the resistance
in national
situations, ex
the
interaction
of
between
each
the Six and the present
by
international
instances
system. EarUer, we have looked at concrete
of such differences;
let us return to them in a more analytic way.
com
One part of each national
situation
is the purely domestic
a
In
modern
the
of
the politi
nation-state,
very importance
ponent.
cal system, in the triple sense of functional
and
scope, authority,
a
is
to
It
formidable
is
obstacle
popular basis,
akeady
integration.
overcome
a
to
easier
the
of
comparatively
parochiaUsm
political
a
system which,
variety, has only
being of the night-watchman
slender administrative
consists
of
whose
structure,
power
punishing,
rather than rewarding, with
the help of a tiny budget, and whose
transmission belts to the mass of the people are few and narrow, than
rests on
it is to dismantle
the fortress of a political
system which
and
mobilized"
and
groups,
pressure
parties
"socially
mobilizing
services
an enormous variety of social and economic
and handles
To be sure, it was the hope and tactic of
with a huge bureaucracy.
to dismantle
the allegiance
of
Monnet
the fortress by redirecting
new
toward
the
central
and
institutions,
pressure groups
by
parties
the national
the ability to compete with
the latter with
endowing
the
in the setting up of social services. In other words,
governments
as
its
new European
would
the
of
deepen
poUtical system
authority
success of
The
its
basis
and
broadened
expanded.
scope
popular
their
at drying up the national
this attempt
ponds by diverting
on three prereq
into a new, supranational
waters
pool depended
uisites which have not been met: with respect to popular basis, the
with
and pressure
of parties
groups over Executives;
prevalence
acerbated
892
The Fate of the Nation-State
and expanding
respect to scope, the self-sustaining
capacity of the
new central
with
to
both
scope and popular
respect
bureaucracy;
issues of interest
of transnational
basis, the development
political
to all
across
and
The modern
lines.
forces
political
boundary
pubUcs
Executive
feature: it owes much
establishment
has one remarkable
to the support of popularly
based
of its legitimacy
and its might
a
and
it
of
but
also
autonomy
pressure groups,
parties
enjoys
degree
to manu
to manipulate
that aUows it to resist pressures,
opposition,
facture support. Even the weak Fourth Republic
has evaded pres
sure toward "transnationalism"
and diluted the dose of "bargaining
The civil servants' careers are
Unes.
politics"
along supranational
still made and unmade
in the national capitals. Above all, each na
to be dominated
tion's poUtical life continues
by "parochial" issues:
or
a
each political
is
that keeps warm,
like
bottle
thermos
system
has
The
the
inside.
lukewarm,
process
European
political
liquid
never come close to
that of any Western
European
resembling
it has been starved of common and distinctive
because
democracy
common man,
the
issues. It is as if, for the mythical
European
nation-state were still the most satisfying?indeed
the most rewarding
it can no
in existence.32 As for what
?form
of social organization
can
it with
state
still
him
with
the
by itself,
longer provide
provide
or
can go
out
citizens
the
suicide, through cooperation,
committing
to
need
transfer
their
al
and find it across borders, without
any
no
else
there
that
form
in
is,
any
any event,
legiance^?or
guarantee
state could
other than a still Utopian world
of social organization
it. If we look at the issues that have dominated
provide
European
we find two distinct blocs. One
is the bloc of problems
poUtics,
to each nation?Italy's
or its
battle of Reds vs. Blacks,
peculiar
concern
for the Mezzogiorno;
clashes; Ger
Belgium's
linguistic
"social
con
and
of
the
France's
many's
liquidation
economy"
past;
stitutional
troubles
and miraculously
party splintering.
preserved
the transnational
Here, whatever
party and interest group align
ments
in
na
the dominant motifs have been
Luxembourg,
purely
tional. The other bloc of issues are the international ones
(including
the external component
of the
European
unity). But here is where
situation has thwarted
national
the emergence
of a common Euro
to that of each nation.
pean political
system comparable
It is here that the weight
of geography
and of history?a
history
of nations?has
the
in
nation-states
their
kept
compart
watertight
It is no accident
ments.
if France,
the initiator of the process, has
also been its chief troublemaker:
for in those two
respects France's
893
STANLEY HOFFMANN
differed
from everyone
else's in the community,
and was
in
to
closer
first:
for
actuaUy
Germany,
HistoricaUy
England's.
re
a
meant
to
and
from
impotence,
tegration
leap
opprobrium
ex
it meant
and equal rights;
for the smaUer powers,
spectability
a very modest
a
in
dose
for
of
autonomy
participation
changing
not
and
rich
could
France
strong
potentially
grouping.
help being
on the one hand an
for integration meant
much more ambivalent,
avenue
for leadership
and the shaping of a powerful
bloc, but it
on the other the
restrictions
also meant
of
acceptance
permanent
to an autonomy
in the late 1940's,
that was indeed quite theoretical
but whose
For a once-great
loss could not be deemed
definitive.
is
whose
national
and
therefore
used to rise
power,
history
long,
and fall, inherits from its past a whole
set of habits and reflexes
it conduct
its poUcy as if it were
which make
stiU or could again
a
become
and
those
habits
reflexes have been
(unless
great power
as
as
and
smashed, at least for a while,
completely
compellingly
were
as
for
this
described
showed,
power
once-great
Germany's);
often the more virulent
above, a still vigilant national consciousness,
for the international
for aU its negativism;
system itself seemed to
position
to middle-sized
states. In
in
improvement
it could be a
for France
no better
than
example
the nuclear problem:
here
for
meant,
France,
integration
giving up
of having a force of her own, perhaps never even
the possibility
a united
on strategy
(with no agreement
being certain that
Europe
at best
create a common deterrent,
in sight) would
and diplomacy
a
in the
to
which
force
would
put Germany
European
contributing
same
to pursue
as France;
the
the
French
decision
but
position
a
own force, has also made
her
while
her
of
diversity,
giving
logic
more
and
France's
solution
difficult
increased
nuclear
European
a
has
difference
from Germany.
distance
Moreover,
geographical
the historical one: France had lasting colonial involve
corroborated
con
ments.
Not only did they, on the whole,
intensify national
to France's
toward
ambivalence
also
contributed
sciousness;
they
one hand, as indicated
the
above,
integration. On the
European
was
overseas
the more
worse France's
became,
integration
plight
as a kind of compensatory
mechanism.
But, on the other
preached
had to be given a "national"
that integration
this meant
hand,
as a new career
rather than a "supranational"
color, to be presented
con
it meant
that the French
rather than as a common
leap;
open vistas of increased freedom of action
an almost
other words,
integration meant
the national
situation of the other five, but
or an adventure.33
deterioration
There
is
894
certain
The Fate of the Nation-State
to tie their partners
to the
of France's
prevalence
much
these
better
concerns,
against
judgment;
partners'
above all, it meant
that there was a competition
for public attention
and for official energies, between
and the
the "load" of integration
burden of the overseas mission.
The great power
reflex and the
colonial
with
today in the policy of cooperation
legacy combine
the former imperial possessions,
costs:
its
is
cooperation
despite
as
a
a
the
manifestation
and
of
of
presented
legacy,
transfiguration
the reflex.34
sistently
overseas
tried
the national
situations have multiplied
the effects of dif
consciences.
between
the shapes of the various national
resistance of the nation-state
is not due only to the kind of
life that its inevitable
in international
affairs
entanglement
idle motion
left by its past provide even to nations with a
low national
It is due also to the impact of the
consciousness.
revival of nationalism
in France. Even without
de Gaulle
the dif
ferences analyzed
above would have slowed down integration
and
some fire in the nation's stoves. But the
contribution
kept
personal
of de Gaulle to the crisis of integration has been enormous. Not
only
has he raised questions
in the long run,
that were
inescapable
earlier and more
than they would have been otherwise,
pungently
but he has also provided
and tried to impose his own answers. His
of
impact is due to his style as well as to his policies. The meaning
de Gaulle has been a
in French
change
policy from ambivalence
toward supranational
to
from a re
integration
outright hostility;
luctance to force one's partners to
of "united
dispel the ambiguities
to
out
Europe" to an almost gleeful determination
bring differences
into the open; from a
to interpret the national
situation
tendency
as
to a herculean
difficult
effort at improving
all its
oppressively
in
to
order
back
limits
and
maximize
components
push
opportunities.
The meaning
of de Gaulle has also been a
change in the national
situations of the others,
a
and
leading to
sharpening of antagonisms
to a kind of cumulative
retreat from
one
Each
of
those
integration.
must be
meanings
briefly examined.
Insofar as France
is concerned,
the
is provided
key
by de
Gaulle's
a
of
Greatness
is
mixture
of
concept
grandeur.35
pride and
ambition?the
nation shall not at any
leave
the
control
of its
point
to
others
not
mean
does
that
he
not
does
acknowl
(which
destiny
of irresistible waves with which
the ship of
edge the existence
state must roll, lest, precisely,
it fall in the hands of others who
rescue or to a
would
rush to a predatory
of the wreck).
plunder
Thus,
ferences
But the
loan of
and the
895
STANLEY HOFFMANN
The nation must try at any point to play as full a role in the world
as its means
are clear: First, the kind of
allow. The consequences
on vital
which
would
leave decisions
supranational
integration
issues to majority
votes or to executive
of the
organs independent
even if the interests and
states is out of the
of
question;
policies
a while
to
did
France
should happen
indeed
for
(as
they
preva?
as
as the Commission,
in its drive for economic
integration,
long
remained very close to French
ideas), there would be no assurance
a sudden and disastrous
reversal. Second, extensive coopera
against
tion is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation w?l
as it
as
to and enhances
benefit all participants
corresponds
long
interests. Third, however,
it is part of the very ambition of
mutual
not merely
grandeur that in such schemes of cooperation which aim
at exchanges
of services but at the definition
of common policies,
and carry out her views:
France will
try to exert her leadership
be measured
the degree of French
wiU
cooperativeness
by the de
of
of
the
others.
gree
responsiveness
It is true that the General
and that his analysis
is an empiricist,
could
of the European
situation is to a large extent irrefutable. What
nation-states?
be more sensible than starting from what exists?the
to act as if what does not yet exist?a
united Europe?had
refusing
of the
to
been
and
established,
forget that each
already
refusing
in an international
nations
is
compe
European
w?ly-nilly
engaged
is
tition that entails a fight for rank and power? But pragmatism
a
of
or
not
definition
at
of
the
service
ends, explicit
(the
always
at the
uses rigid means
bad foreign policy could be: that which
service of explicit ends, as well as that whose flexible means are not
is a
ends). De Gaulle's
empiricism
serving
clearly-thought-out
a
on
of
behalf
but
of
skill,
thoroughly non-empirical
superb display
It is obvious that his distrust of supranational
doctrine.
integration,
interests to the dictates
could submit French
which, within Europe,
to the dictates of the "hegem
of others, and could expose Europe
as a starting point,
it
is
while
onists,"
comprehensible
perfectly
results in a kind of freezing of integration and perpetua
nevertheless
If his chief foreign policy objective were
tion of the nation-state.
of a European
the creation
power, his
entity acting as a world
But
a most unreaUstic method.
be
would
"empirical" starting point
and
is not his supreme objective,
the fact is that such a creation
not his supreme value.
Europe
his supreme political
His supreme value remains the nation-state;
the "two hegemonies"
in which
is the creation of a world
objective
896
The Fate
of the Nation-State
will have been replaced by a multipolar
international
system, whose
"first floor" would be the numerous nations, endowed with and en
"second
and whose
titled to political
integrity and independence,
floor" would be inhabited by the nuclear powers, in a role compara
are
concert. Again, the implications
ble to that of the late European
that is, he
is a "universalist nationalism,"
clear: de GauUe's doctrine
sees France's mission
as world-wide,
not local and defensive;
but
is
is just one corner of the tapestry; Europe
this means
that Europe
to
is
a means,
it
not an end. "Things
better
what
they are,"
being
is undoubt
of freedom
have separate nation-states
(whose margin
so
use
was
not
the
force
smaller
than
when
of
edly
costly, whose
if their size,
to
Umited
is
also
capacity
undoubtedly
shape history
resources are mediocre,
but
whose
and
ab?ity to behave
population,
as self-determined
actors on the stage is enhanced precisely by the
to other instru
of force and by the opportunities
opened
blunting
ments
than it is to have a larger entity,
of power and influence)
in the world's
more able to act as a forceful competitor
undoubtedly
contests
to
be
but more
should it be coherent,
incoherent,
likely
and the leverage interested out
of its members
given the divisions
siders possess over some of the insiders. The size of the unit is less
for its effective
than its "cohesion and distinctiveness,"
important
ness is not merely
resources:
a function of its material
if the unit
has no capacity to turn these to action, because of internal cleavages
and strains, the only beneficiaries
would
be its rivals. In a contest
is better than a disturbed Goliath.
giants, a confident David
on
is a choice that reflects a doctrine;
the refusal to gamble
con
on
a
to
the
with
European
unity goes along
gamble
wilUngness
to
of the French
the determination
nation-state;
tinuing potency
writ
France
the
kind
of
that
would
be
accept only
Europe
large36
to a conviction
to
could be made
that French policies
corresponds
or
whether
its
not:
Eu
"with
contributes
support
Europe
prevail
is just a
if they do not," Europe
rope if they follow, without Europe
an
card in a global game. Schumpeter
had defined
imperiaUsm as
a
is
de
nationalism
kind
Gaulle's
of
quest;
objecdess
permanent
quest with varying content but never any other cause than itself.
As I suggested
leader is one whose
above, a nationalist
reading
situation
is likely to be quite different
of the national
from the
reading other leaders would
give. De Gaulle's brand of nationalism
it
what
aimed at overcoming
the "two he
is?universaUst,
being
both
of
the
somewhat
trends
contradictory
gemonies,"
exploiting
that dominate
the present world
as
conservation
the
of
nation
(the
with
This
897
STANLEY HOFFMANN
its basic unit, the concentration
of what one might call "final power"
is not
nuclear
the
that he has alto
states)?it
among
surprising
a colonial burden
that
France
away from
gether
liquidated
kept
one
routes
of
the
to
it with
he
wanted
and
every
travel,
replaced
an ambitious
of
In a
with
the
"Third
World."
cooperation
policy
as
some
it
is
critics
have
that
this
is a
true,
way,
charged,
policy
kind of self-consolation
for
the
fa?ure
of
his
prize
European
policy;
but in another sense it conforms deeply to his most vital
designs and
to his most
constant habit of never
on one line of
relying
policy
In
the
first
manifests
France's
universal
only:
cooperation
place,
in the second, it aims at
a
destiny;
system of inde
consolidating
if
in
it
the
tries to use the
nations;
third,
pendent,
cooperating,
an elevator to the floor of the
as
thus
prestige
gained
"big five," to
which access has been denied so far by the
"big two." It is clear that
on
the first two missions
rule out a concentration
Europe alone, that
case
the second prevents
in any
his putting any passion
into over
in
a sub
that the third is precisely
coming the nation-state
Europe,
stitute for the "elevator" Europe has failed to
a result,
provide. As
aU that has made France's historical
and
posi
heritage
geographic
tion distinctive
has been strengthened.
in
flaw, since this is a world
is the
prophecy.
self-fulfiUing
Distrustful
of any Europe but his own, his acts have made Europe
anything but his. Here we must turn to the impact of his policy on
France's partners. First of aU, there is a matter
of style: wanting
not integration,
to treat the
de Gaulle
has refused
cooperation
as
to force his
organs
organs; but, wanting
Community
Community
on partners
views about cooperation
to
still attached
integration,
and attempting
to impose his views about a "European Europe" on
associates
who might
have
settled
for cooperation
but only on
behalf of another poUcy, de GauUe has paradoxically
had to try to
in a way
achieve
that smacked
for a common policy
cooperation
not compromise.
of conflict not cooperation,
of unilateralism
Thus
we have witnessed
not just a retreat from the Monnet method
to,
that marks O.E.C.D.,
say, the kind of intergovernmental
cooperation
but to a kind of grand strategy of nonmiUtary
conflict, a kind of
war of maneuver
and "chicken." With
cold
compromises
political
concessions
obtained not through package
wrested
by ultimatums,
it is not surprising ff even
deals but under the threat of boycotts,
ended
the
General's
Commission
the
by playing
game instead of
was left; its
cheek
1965
other
whatever
spring
agricultural
turning
Every great leader has his built-in
roses have thorns. De Gaulle's
which
898
The Fate of the Nation-State
as
as de Gaulle's
a
veto
to de Gaulle
plan was
outright
challenge
an
of January 1963 had been
affront to the Community
spirit. Just
as de Gaulle had tried to force Germany
to sacrifice her farmers to
the idea of a European
tried to call de
entity, the Commission
to
French
bluff
farmers'
between
Gaulle's
choose
by forcing him
interest in a "European Europe"
interests and the French national
on the one hand, and his own
to suprana
for agriculture,
hostility
seen
in the
interest
and
the
French
national
by him)
(as
tionality
on
use
of
French
his
the other. Playing
free
resources,
game, the
to
Commission
also played
into his hands, allowing him
apply the
not
tactic of "if you do
do what I ask, I will blow up my
Schelling
his return at
brains on your new suit," and in the end buying
a
the price of
In other words,
sacrifice of integration.37
he has
as an end in
no
to treat the Community
forced each member
longer
still
bodies, which
itself; and he has driven even its constituted
insist it is that, into
bringing grist to his miU.
Second, his impact on his partners is a matter of policy as weU.
relations. As long as he
examine Franco-German
Here we must
the
and provide
follow his guidance
that Germany would
hoped
basis for the "European Europe" of his design, his attitude toward
to
West Germany was one of total support of her intransigence
As soon as the increasing clarity of his own
ward the Communists.
ordeal and his
until the end of the Algerian
(half-veiled
policy
of
October-November
battle
in
constitutional
the
1962)
triumph
as soon as the U.S.,
in
German
and
reticence,
suspicion
provoked
a
its
ties
to
stiU
with
consolidated
his
response
loyal
challenge,
and even promised her substantial rewards for her loyalty,
Germany
to Germany
he applied
the shock tactics so effectively
used on
own
Britain and the U.S. during World War
II: he made his
open
shifted away from the kind of celebra
ing to the East and gradually
tion of a "new Germany"
in her past but now
(heir to her greatness
as France's
new
to
in
take
her
aide
the
place
"European
w?ling
so characteristic
in
German
of
his
visit
the
fall of 1962.
Europe"),
to the Germans
He now resorts to carefuUy worded
reminders
of
their loyalty to the U.S. en
of the risk which
their past misdeeds,
and of the interest France
tails for their reunification,
and the
states (including Russia)
Eastern
share in keeping Germany
under
restrictions. Had Germany been
permanent
wiUing to follow France,
he would have given priority to the construction
of a "half-Europe"
as
thereafter have been a magnet
that would
( well as a guarantee
to
German
the
East.
of
refusal leads him
harmlessness)
Germany's
899
STANLEY HOFFMANN
to the
to put the gradual emergence
of a "Europe from the Atlantic
not ahead
from the British Isles to the Urals38?if
Urals"?indeed
of the "European
of at least on the same plane as the development
no
in the West;
containment
the
of
for
Germany,
longer
Europe"
assured in a disunited Western
still
be ob
of
the
Six,
may
Europe
are
tained in a much
The implications
impor
larger framework.
tant. First, there is a considerable
in
national
change
Germany's
situation. On the one hand, its external component
has been trans
formed. Whereas
for more
than fifteen years both the U.S. and
carried out tacitly Robert
Schuman's
recommendation?
to herself"?the
"never leave Germany
Franco-American
competi
tion for German
to
the GauUist
refusal to tie Germany
support,
so to
in a federal Europe
France
the
for
knot's
sake
(that is,
speak
unless Germany
follows France),
America's
emulation
disastrous
of the sorcerer's apprentice
in titillating Germany's
interest in nu
in the beUef, or under the pre
clear strategy or weapons-sharing,
her appetite,
aU of these factors have con
text, of anticipating
to
tributed to loosen the bonds between Germany
and the West:
France
the European
because of the slump in integration,
part of the West,
and even to the U.S., because of America's
fa?ure to follow up after
not
in
that
should
have been raised, but
Germany
raising
hopes
are
once
raised
and
which,
frustrated,
unUkely to fade. On the other
the domestic
of Germany's
hand, and consequendy,
component
national
situation has also been affected:
StiU concerned with secu
but less and less capable of be
rity as well as with reunification,
to
that
the Ger
their
w?l
deliver any goods,
alUes
loyalty
Ueving
man leaders and ?Utes may weU come to feel less
and less
dependent
remain
constrained.
Of course, objectively,
the external constraints
a
an
not
lead
of
self-assertion
may
anywhere;
compelUng:
policy
at
Paris
the
the
restrictions
of
nuclear
agree
attempt
bypassing
ments
is not likely to make the East Europeans
and the Soviets any
more
to let East Germany
go; and the price the Soviets may
wiUing
to exact for reunification
is not likely to increase German
want
are
ties to Western
powers
security. But the fact that Germany's
test those
to
means at least
the
that
capacity
weakening
potentiaUy
constraints
action may well be used. To be in a cell
by un?ateral
liberated
with a chain around one's ankles and the hope of being
one
in
To
cell
without
that
situation.
be
is
kind
of
one's
by
jailers
such a chain and with such hopes gone is another situation, although
the ceU has not changed.
on
the impact of de Gaulle
In other words,
Germany
although
900
The Fate of the Nation-State
a rebirth of German nationalism,
it has been a
some
to nationalism
that gives
the situation
if not of external success, given the nature of the
chances?chances
to use one's
at least "tried." The temptation
cell, then of being
in order to reach one's
economic power and potential m?itary might
so far has not been
transformation
of
for accommodation
goals and the example of one's aUies competing
if one's past is
with one's foe are not resistible
forever, especially
full of precedents.
To be sure, a nationalist Germany may weU find
itself as unable to shake the walls or to escape through the bars as
is unable to
GauUist France
forge the "European Europe." But the
a revisionist France,
of
trying to change the international
paradox
to
her
lack of "traditional"
system
despite her complete
advantage
and so forth),
discrimination,
(lost territories, m?itary
grievances
next to a Germany
fuU of such grievances,
in fact like
yet behaving
a status quo power, may not last
Of
course, a less ag
eternally.
not
France
ambitious
have
gressively
Germany
might
prevented
from trying to follow her own path one day: the possib?ity
of
someone else's imitative ubris is no reason for one's own effacement;
are
because
the "essence and drama" of nationaUsm
but precisely
with others, the risk of contagion?a
the meeting
risk that is part
be discarded.
of de GauUe's gamble?cannot
Thus
the nation-state
survives, preserved
by the formidable
as manifested
of politics,
in the resilience
of poUtical
autonomy
systems, the interaction between
separate states and a single inter
national
system, the role of leaders who beUeve both in the primacy
of "high politics" over the kind of managerial
politics
susceptible
to functionalism,
and in the primacy of the nation,
in the
struggling
world
of today, over any new form, whose
painful establishment
from the pressing and exalt
require one's lasting withdrawal
might
ing dafly contest.
V
This long balance
sheet leaves us with
two sets of questions:
are the
in
What
Western
prospects
Europe? What
generaUzations
can one draw from the whole
experience? As for the prospects, what
reads perhaps
too much
like a post-mortem.
Is there no
precedes
chance for the European
Is it condemned
to be, at
Community?
realm but a fiasco in
best, a success in the economic
"high poUtics,"
like a hydra with one
of
something
single body but a multitude
heads?
901
STANLEY HOFFMANN
It would
be presumptuous
indeed to read hope out of court.
of the decisive
elements
in the movement's
"spiUback," de
GauUe's nationalism, may not outlive him. His successors may have
a less
vision and may make
sweeping
exactly the opposite
gamble
from his?that
is, prefer the risks of the common enterprise, whose
rewards might
be high if it works,
to the dividends
of national
to revive the Monnet
action; they could indeed attempt
concept
of Europe,
and even to overcome
the deficiencies
of functionaUsm
a
more
institutions.
federal
Moreover,
by
leap into
genuinely
whereas
de Gaulle has had the
a
of
majority
backing
parliamentary
to
hostile
and has exerted
the kind of
supranational
integration
rule that parties and pressure groups do not affect much
anyhow,
his successors may
for domestic
depend
support and survival pre
on those
had started to
cisely
parties and pressure
groups which
a transnational
weave
fabric. Should this be the case, the "Europe
of the Six," instead of
as close as it now is to the traditional
being
model
move
of interstate relations,
again toward the other
might
that
of
so well described
ideal-type,
poUtical community-building,
by Ernst Haas, who sees in it the wave of the future.39
in the case of a revival of German
Whereas
the
nationalism,
an
not
to
of
fa?ure
be
deter
here
I
may
attempt,
propect
enough
not be tantamount
to suc
that an attempt would
would maintain
cess. In the first
(not even the Common Mar
place, wh?e nothing
no
event
is
leaves the world unmarked,
irreversible,
ket)
important
and after the event one can never pick up the pieces as if nothing
is true
is true of the Common Market,
had happened:
this, which
de Gaulle.
It will not be easy to sweep under the
also of General
it w?l
in the sunlight;
rug the curls of dust he has willfully
placed
not be easy to ignore the kinds of questions
he has asked, even if
because
his answers are rejected, precisely
they are the questions
sooner
or later. Second,
have
faced
would
any European
enterprise
even the
not
the na
transform
of
his nationalism
passing
might
so
situations
that
all
nation-states
of the European
tional
deeply
here would
discussed
the cleavages
For, even
suddenly disappear.
once
leaders of Western
had
if all the political
Europe
again the
same non-nationaUst
the
in
differences
the
national
situa
approach,
still lead to divergent definitions of the national interests.
tions would
In particular,
the problem of nuclear weapons
control and command
in a grouping
divided
between
nuclear
"have-nots"
and nuclear
"haves" may prove to be as intractable,
and to raise as much of an
as in
to community-formation
obstacle
among Western
Europeans,
One
902
The Fate
of the Nation-State
for the resump
the Atlantic alliance. The ideal conditions not merely
tion but for the success of a forward march would be a transforma
one.
tion of Germany's
external situation and of France's domestic
If the search for a d?tente should lead the U.S. to put a rapproche
and
ment with the U.S.S.R.
ahead of its bonds to West Germany,
as
a
that
in
West
both
it
clear
if became
result,
Germany,
security is
nor
most
neither the
entirely provided
any more by
urgent problem
from and
cannot
be
that
obtained
and
reunification
the U.S.,
with
the U.S.
in
such
addition,
disappointment
through the U.S.; if,
a
to
nationalist
follow
not
West
German
does
encourage
leadership
to obtain for itself from
or if an attempt
West Germany
by
path,
to
for her should end in
its
allies had fa?ed
Moscow what
provide
to ac
be w?ling
then?at
last?West
frustration,
Germany might
a
to
Gaulle's
close
de
"European Europe" with
cept
foreign policy
its
of the cold
to
its indifference
repudiation
regimes and ideologies,
to the East, and its cautious promise
its opening
of
war outlook,
arms
limitations
and
at
cost
border
of
reunification
the
eventual
on the German
be
In other words,
restrictions.
side, what would
the
a
of
reading
required would be
"polycentric," yet non-nationalist,
if at the same
situation. This would
external
be likely to happen
of "poly
time France had given up her nationaUst
interpretation
more
to
trust the
more
humble,
centrism," and become again
w?ling
more
in need of adopting European
Community
integration
organs,
exist if, domestically,
the
as a
in itself. Such a possibility would
goal
to
were
not
be
replaced
stability of de GauUe's regime
impervious
a
would
lean on an
whose Executive
with
system
political
merely
kind
of
the
that
but with
instability
party majority,
"integrationist"
on
from
the
world
leaders
both prevents
stage as
acting
political
a Eu
were
its
them
into
and
if they
pressures
managers
seeking
as
or
for
their
difficulties.
alibi,
Germany's
ropean solution,
Europe
as the best compensation
for
least frustrating
framework, Europe
a
Monnet's
domestic
France's
troubles,
approach
Europe
following
it may
it
like a dream;
toward de Gaulle's
appear
objectives:40
essen
it has a chance depends
But whether
cannot be dismissed.
on when
the General's
nationaUsm will pass from the scene,
tially
on what degree of cooperation
Eu
among the nations of Western
a
new
on
at
whether
w?l
that
there
be
time,
attempt
rope
by
com
to join the Community
introduce
would
additional
Britain
on what
in Europe will be; the chance
the U.S. policy
plications,
on the
to be
of too many variables
timely convergence
depends
counted on.
903
STANLEY HOFFMANN
such a chance,
Against
is where
Here
the European
is too big a range
is of
experience
general
there
of obstacles.
significance.
1. A first set of remarks deals with
the
the conditions which
national
in an attempt to integrate
situations of the units engaged
must meet,
lest the attempt be unsuccessful.
Those situations ought
to be similar; but a
kind
is almost worthless:
of
this
generalization
is the nature of the
what matters
sim?arity.
a.
as
Insofar
domestic
are
circumstances
concerned,
two
con
are essential.
less
ditions
The first one is obvious at first sight, much
not in
so upon reflection:
the units must be political
communities,
a substantive
sense (common values and
? la Rousseau)
but
goals,
and of
in a formal one (the existence
of intense communications
as well
as
common
differences
habits
and rules across regional
or
in
across the borders of ethnic
other
classes);41
groups, tribes,
transnational
These units
words,
units.*
*
The
distinctions
I suggest
are
cooperative
arrangements
there
the
integration within
in the sense of com
integration presupposes
need not be nation-states,
are
like marks
whose
on
a continuum.
institutions
have
no
1. At one end,
from
autonomy
Such arrange
in most
the U.N.
(O.E.C.D.,
respects).
governments
in turn range
to hegemonial,
that is, from repre
from truly cooperative
the will
of
the
and
all
members
to
the
domination
extending
senting
asserting
institutions
endowed
one of them. 2. Then
have
central
there are entities which
the various
ments
with
some
legal power
communities
munications
within
effective
sense of
and
from the components
legal autonomy
are not
but which
of the entity,
territory
political
in com
discontinuities
of drastic
the formal
because
sense,
or because
the cleavages
transactions
the components,
among
or of much
institutions
in fact the central
of autonomy
deprive
or certain
Latin
American
such as the Congo
is, states
(that
authority,
all over
in
and
the entity
power
in the
the
the limits of effective
entities
like the E.E.C.,
and, within
resilient
if
be astonishingly
entities
Such
N.A.T.O.)
may
integration,
institutions
that
and
are states,
with
endowed
international
personality
they
internal
of force over
a formal
of force or at least a superiority
have
monopoly
when
are
but
entities
if
these
(and
they
especially
supranational
challenges;
a way
of one of the component
are not merely
of disguising
the hegemony
because
are likely
to be highly
unstable
(see below)
members),
precisely
they
are
to be constantly
institutions
"central"
the entity's
chaUenged
by the
likely
external
with
endowed
institutions
of the component
central
states,
sovereignty
entities
w?l
tend
In other words,
as with
as weU
force.
supranational
superior
come
or to progress
3. 3. Next
toward
1
to retrogress
toward
either
stage
stage
are
in the formal but not in the substantive
communities
which
entities
political
are
there
and power,
institutions
have
sense:
that is, their central
autonomy
across
are enforced
internal
common
and the rules that come from above
habits,
are not endowed
all over
with
institutions
the central
but
legitimacy
barriers,
con
on common
values
and rules are not based
and the habits
the territory,
states;
m?itary
904
supranational
The Fate of the Nation-State
international
under
external
with
endowed
sovereignty
a shell
is
state
a
if
but
law;
conversely,
newly
merely
independent
that divide
there is no community
within which
yet, the cleavages
into separate communities wiU prove to be a decisive
the population
is a pre
domestic
to trans-state
obstacle
integration
integration:
and of ideas which
to the kinds of flows of transactions
requisite
be the primary
of
and
will
trans-state
necessity
requires
integration
of
more
the
than
tries
to
who
be
leader
of
representative
any
goal
the dominant
sect, class, tribe, or ethnic group. This explains why,
Latin American
countries
of Latin America,
for so many
integra
in
it has been so difficult
and also why
tion remains a chimera,
munities
in many cases,
the nation-state:
Africa and in Asia to move beyond
the state is there, but not yet the nation.
concerns
the structure of society and of
The second condition
are
The
communities.
in
units
that
the political
system
poUtical
the importance
of
stressed
have rightly
of integration
students
structures and ?lite groups in the units that try to
social
pluralistic
success
on more
than a sim?arity of such
depends
integrate. But
in the Executive
structures:
It requires the simultaneous
presence
those sections of the ?lites that advocate
of leaders who represent
union and whose power depends on the support of the integrationist
?lites and groups. To the extent to which many of the new states?
is most dubious
those whose
capacity to become viable nation-states
?are
states
with
charismatic
so-called
(or should one
single-party
is
for
condition
unification
this
internal
leaders,
say authoritarian?)
missing.
b.
as
Insofar
external
conditions
are
what
concerned,
matters
similar situations at the time
is not that the units be in "objectively"
it
matters
and
while
is
when
integration
begins
proceeds. What
not the scholar's asser
is
that
similarity?a
sim?arity
"subjective"
The impUcation, which
is
conviction.
tion, but the policy-maker's
crucial, is that one must examine more than the relation of each unit
to the international
Even if this relation is
system at the moment.
the polity;
cerning
but
consciousness"
fer
to nation-states
this
is the
are not
whose
political
central
and legitimate,
tively powerful
are
the polity.
These
political
to say, they
a difference
to states
case
of many
nation-states,
in the
communities
institutions
and whose
communities
which
last
"national
4. Here
I re
are
effec
autonomous,
altogether
has shared values
society
concerning
sense. Needless
in the substantive
are not
3 and
in the
reserve
in those
have
sense.
between
stage
legion. The difference
I would
level and scope of consensus.
two stages.
stage 4 is largely
the term nation
905
STANLEY HOFFMANN
the same for aU the units involved, one must
go beyond: One must
also determine whether
the units come to this moment
and place
from similar origins and
through similar itineraries, whether
they
are
from this moment
and place toward similar
likely to proceed
destinations.
is disembodied?removed
from
"Objective"
similarity
time and space. The similarity
is a similarity
in the
that matters
in which
a whole
different
statesmen
and
historical
way
interpret
and outline
the future in the light of this
geographical
experience
a common
choice of a common
fu
experience.
Integration means
ture. Success presupposes
one about the past,
two sets of conditions,
one about the
present.
As for the past,
is likely to be more successful when
integration
ex
the voyagers'
is
light. If the units' past international
baggage
or
have been long and heavy?long
the state
periences
heavy?if
over decades and centuries,
if the state has,
apparatus has developed
on the world
scene
existence
quite simply, enjoyed an autonomous
a
an accident
for
if the
long time, integration wiU not be easy. Is it
in
unification
the
of
modern
voluntary
only successful
example
world is that of the U.S.?the
fusion of units that had been colonies,
not states, and in which neither the machinery
of the state nor tradi
tions of foreign policy had had the time to develop?
In a sense, the
commitments
of overseas
such as France
by countries
shedding
as we have
and Britain
should make
their luggage
lighter. But,
seen in the case of France,
tend to be replaced by
the old burdens
new ties, the old imperium
leaves lasting concerns, and the old re
a sense of respon
do not disappear without
leaving
sponsibilities
are less
even
nations
Western
if
of
the
Europe
sibility. Moreover,
remains
down
the
the
than
dis
before,
present
past
by
weighed
tracting enough.
in the present concerns
The kind of similarity required
the re
A
lation of the units to the international
first
to be
system.
question
the sim?arity
in the na
asked is the degree of involvement. When
or insulation
is one of distance
tional situations
from the interna
states and to a
tional system, as was the case of the American
large
extent the case of Switzerland
after the Reformation,
concentration
on the difficult job of unification becomes possible. A capital obstacle
in the world
to integration
today is the loss of such dis
anywhere
in the echo chamber of
of
such
the
tance,
insulation,
impossib?ity
oc
This
obstacle
international
the present
can, however,
system.
a
is
second
For
there
the
cancelled.
be
casionally
question:
degree
the national
of the international
of "compellingness"
system; when
906
The Fate
of the Nation-State
threat
external
of an overwhelming
similar because
case with the Swiss cantons and the Ameri
the
originally
can ex-colonies),
unification
for survival or security may become
can make up for different pasts,
an
A
threat
imperative.
compelUng
about
all divergencies
when
and impose a common
destination,
to the preservation
of a
ultimate destinies have to be subordinated
chance for any destiny at all. One can argue that this was Western
in the first ten years after the end of World
condition
Europe's
War
II. But the counterva?ing
of the
force was
the combination
different puUs of different pasts, with the different kinds of involve
ments
in the international
from the East, the
system: All threatened
situations
(as was
are
nations of Western
the de
assessed differently
Europe nevertheless
interna
to
which
threat
other
of
this
every
gree
aspect
superseded
tional politics. It is not an accident if the nation that deemed the men
ace
was
divided and literally thrown
Germany,
entirely compelling
face to face with
the threat at the exclusion
of almost everything
overseas
else. It is not an accident
if France and Britain, entangled
and heirs to Europe's past, never let the threat from the East com
their entire foreign policy in the present42 or assumed that it
mand
their future. Moreover,
would
inevitably dominate
Europe
today is
no
the
threat:
international
by
longer compelled
system is
Today's
a perverse
seducer to diversity.
It inflates each national
situation,
some of
a way, the relative
it removes
while
In
sovereignty's
sting.
of the minute
of truth, should
impotence of force, the postponement
reduce the significance
in national
of all differences
situations: The
cannot use all the muscles
can
the
mighty
they flex;
weakly
safely
boast of more muscle
in
than
another
have.
But,
they
way,
strength
since this is still a competitive
states, Rous
system of fragmented
seau's iron logic applies: Each state tries to
exploit whatever margin
of difference
it has; each state, even when
its objective position
in
the world is not so different from its neighbor's,
stresses the marginal
differences
above the similarities;
matters
and, since it ultimately
in order to
less than before, the incentive to unification
much
"pull
more
in the nature of usable power,
is slim. The changes
weight"
in the relation between
the uses and the achievements
of power,
even
to the weakest
unit one asset in the contest?the
give
power of
its mere
existence.
The breakdown
of the two polar camps,
the
on force endow the
with which
restrictions
kind of weightlessness
actors in the new international
the proliferation
of
system, encourage
different visions of the future or the
to live in the hazards
tendency
and chances of a fascinatingly
diverse present rather than
planning
907
STANLEY HOFFMANN
for an inscrutable future. The rational observer, outside the
can
because
the stakes of the contest
contest,
preach that precisely
are more
a holocaust
than real?barring
that would
symboUc
to
through annihilation?nation-states
ought to be w?ling
equalize
even
a
at
cost
unite
the
of transferring
for wh?e
their energy from
the intoxicating but disappointing
stage of world politics to the real
for the outcome would be the appear
job of community-building;
ance of a new actor whose power, by contrast with that of each old
could really be sufficient to make a difference.
But the
component,
to
it
the
of
other
conforms
exact?y
way;
operates
competition
logic
more
one
two
is
worth
the French proverb:
than
thing possessed
na
In the immediate
system, European
postwar
things promised.
to choose only between
tions seemed obliged
separate
insecurity
and the Atlantic
shelter. The "halfway house" of Western
Europe
far enough before
the advent of
got started, but did not progress
started to smile
the temptation
the era in which
of separateness
was a seat in the U.N.
the
reward
for
and
separateness
again,
and unity
It is the dialectic
of fragmentation
(a single inter
national system, whose members may well be kicking and screaming
of excess violence,
that is, in
but have an interest in the avoidance
to
the
drama
which
than
of
less
asocially
before)
gives
behaving
one hand, in a "finished world"
so much of its
the
On
Europe
pathos.
a crowded world
resistant to the
dominated
singularly
by giants, in
is
there
absurb and
universal
of
mission,
anyone's
sweep
something
in the tenacious persistence
of separate European
national
pathetic
because most
of the dif
w?ls. On the other hand, it is precisely
them have taken refuge in the realm of foreign
ferences between
is so difficult, despite
affairs that integration
(or perhaps because
more
a
of) the fact that international
stage on
today is
poUtics
a
one's
one
can
that
seals
fate.
battlefield
which
parade than
too much
set of remarks concerns
the meaning
of integration.
is
for scholars to argue both that integration
become possible
is more
than ever the basic
and that the nation-state
proceeding
of in
each other, for recent definitions
unit, without
contradicting
not
the
toward
nation-state"
the
emergence
point
tegration "beyond
toward an "ob
but merely
of a new kind of poUtical community,
the system of international
between
of] the boundaries
scur[ing
states."43
the
environment
and
by member
provided
organizations
There are two important impUcations.
2. A second
It has
a. The
908
first
one
is, not
so
paradoxically,
a vindication
of
the
The Fate of the Nation-State
as the basic unit. So far, anything
that is "beyond" is
nation-state
are
with a varying
that
there
"less":
is,
arrangements
cooperative
has been no
there
but
and
of
autonomy,
power,
legitimacy,
degree
their
and
their
toward
transfer of aUegiance
institutions,
authority
is
There
and reversible.
remains
limited, conditional,
dependent,
functional
more than a kernel of truth in the FederaUst
of
critique
at best, like a spiral
tends to become,
functionaUsm
integration:
ex
that co?s ad infinitum. So far, the "transferring
[of] exclusive
some
to
nation-state
of benefits from the
larger entity"44
pectations
and as
both as the main focus of expectations,
leaves the nation-state
of
the
and often destroyer
the initiator, pace-setter,
supervisor,
arena
state
is
stiU
the
in the international
the
high
larger entity: for
com
est possessor of power, and wh?e not every state is a political
more
as
no
inclusive than
there is
munity
yet
poUtical community
is in
function of the nation-state
the state.45 To be sure, the military
to
nuclear
is "permeable"
crisis; but, insofar as the whole world
face the same horror, and,
any new type of unit would
weapons,
insofar as the prospect of such horror makes war more subdued and
its
less likely, the decline of the state's capacity to defend
conquest
itself
is neither total nor sufficient to force the nation-state
citizens
is proven not only
of the nation-state
into decUne. The resistance
both the promise
frustrations
but
the
of
functionaUsm
also
by
by
offers
On the one hand, Federalism
and the failure of Federalism.
a way of
in build
consists
it
the
but
nation-state,"
going "beyond
a new and
The scale is new, not the story,
ing
larger nation-state.
to
the gauge not the game. Indeed,
model
the Federalist
applies
the "making of Europe"
the Rousseauistic
scheme for the creation
a unit marked
it aims at
of a nation:
establishing
by central power
and based on the general w?l of a European
people. The Federalists
are
in
that
Western
best
chance of being an
right
insisting
Europe's
but
be not to go "beyond the nation-state,"
effective
entity would
a
in
to become
in
formation
and
nation-state
the
of
process
larger
the business of world politics: that is, to become a sovereign poUtical
in the formal sense at least. The success of Federalism
community
a
its failure
would be
tribute to the durability
of the nation-state;
so far is due to the irrelevance of the model. Not
is
there no
only
a
as
there is
of now no
general will of
European
people because
but the institutions
that could gradually
(and
one
are
not
the
nations
into
separate
theoretically)
shape
people
are
the most Ukely to do so. For the domestic
of
problems
Europe
matters
for technical decisions by civil servants and ministers
rather
European
people,
909
STANLEY HOFFMANN
than for general w?ls and assemblies
is
(a general will to prosperity
not very
are matters
The
external
operational).
problems of Europe
for executives and diplomats. As for the common organs set up by the
national governments,
when
executive
they try to act as a European
are
and parUament,
in
to
both
condemned
the fog
operate
they
maintained
around them by the governments
and slapped down if
In other
they try to dispel the fog and reach the people themselves.
cannot be what some of nations have been: a peo
words, Europe
some of the oldest
its state; nor can it be what
ple that creates
states are and many of the new ones
a
to
be:
aspire
people created
by the state. It has to wait until the separate states decide that their
are close
a
to
state
peoples
justify the setting up of European
enough
whose
task wiU be the welding
into one; and we have
of the many
such a joint decision
has been missing.
The
just examined why
the Federalist
to na
model
irrelevant
very obstacles which make
tions too diverse and divided
also make aU forms of union short of
FederaUsm
is too unstable
FunctionaUsm
for the task
precarious.
of complete
It
unification.
but
may
economies,
poUtical
integrate
a fuU
either the nations w?l then
to
(which
proceed
political merger
economic
that case the federal
integration does not guarantee)?in
model w?l be vindicated
at the end, the new unit will be a state
own
its
consent and
of
forging
people by
through the abdication
the previous separate states, but the conditions
for success described
above wiU have to be met?or
situations w?l re
else the national
a way
main
too divergent,
and functionaUsm
w?l be merely
of
common
areas
the
in
nations
of
deemed
tying together
preexisting
interest. Between
the cooperation
of existing nations and the break
ing in of a new one there is no stable middle
ground. A federation
a nation; one that fails leads to secession;
that succeeds becomes
must
either
like supranational
functionaUsm
attempts
half-way
snowball or roU back.
as the basic unit,
survives
b. But the nation-state,
preserved
men
see
in "national sovereignty"
the
the
who
transformed. Among
in
the
those who put their hopes
Nemesis
of mankind,
development
are
in
their hopes
who
those
of regional
put
superstates
?logical,
are
state
the estabUshment
of a world
Utopian, those who put their
more
in
communities
in the
functional
of
poUtical
growth
hopes
un
to
are too optimistic. What
has
be
clusive than the nation-state
more
than has been done, and cer
and studied now?far
derstood
rather than the
tainly far more than this essay was able to do?is,
of "national sov
the transformation
creation of rival communities,
910
The Fate of the Nation-State
it has not been superseded,
but to a large extent it has
ereignty":
and yet
been emptied of its former sting; there is no supershrew,
of the nation
the shrew has been somewhat
tamed. The model
state derived
law and relations of the past,
from the international
there was a Umited number of players on a stage that was
when
less risky, appUes only
less crowded
and in which
violence was
to
The
basic
situation
the
of
unit,
having proliferated,
fitfully
today.
the stage has shrunk,
has also become much more heterogeneous;
forces each one to
and is occupied
by players whose very number
scares them from pushing
nevertheless
strut, but its combustibiUty
a new wine
in old
their luck too hard. The nation-state
today is
a
imitation
mediocre
bottles, or in bottles that are sometimes
only
is
of the old; it is not the same old wine. What must be examined
state, but the de facto
just the legal capacity of the sovereign
how
its
the
at
scope of its authority,
capacity
disposal:
granted
results? There are many
much of it can be used, and with what
the sub
and some modify
ways of going "beyond the nation-state,"
new forms. To be sure,
or
stance without
form
the
creating
altering
as the nation-state
is the
as the old form is there, as
as
long
long
a
is
and
for
for
there
weffare;
peace
supreme authority,
danger
can
rather than crushed by Titans
tied by L?Uputians
GulUvers
wake up and break their ties. But GulUvers tied are not the same
as GulUvers untied. Wrestlers
who slug it out with fists and knives,
a chain
are all men; yet their freedom of action
in
gang,
prisoners
is not the same. An examination
of
of the international
implications
as
as
and
is
at
least
"nation-statehood"
today
important
yesterday
the ritual attack on the nation-state.
3. A final remark concerns
the future of integration. Prospects
if the international
of genuine unification
would
system
improve
na
created the conditions
and incentives
for moving
"beyond the
on the one hand, many more units
In a world
in which,
tion-state."
not
in
struc
succeeded
genuine nations with pluraUstic
becoming
on the other hand, a return to
had
tures, in which,
multipolarity
resulted both in greater autonomy
for the subsystems
and in a res
urrection of interstate war (in the form of limited conventional war
or even geographically
limited nuclear conflicts),
of
the conditions
a less
unification would be met, at least in some parts of the world:
a more
universal and intense involvement,
threat, greater
compelfing
internal harmony might
to
allow the nation-state
itself.
supersede
But even so, the result might
be
the
of
many
simply
agglomeration
smaller nation-states
into fewer, bigger ones; and there are more
had
911
STANLEY HOFFMANN
things in the heaven
than in any
ph?osophy
and earth of possible
international
of international
relations.
futures
References
1.
See
Pierre
Renouvin
relations
2.
In a way,
shriller
the
3. On
et
this
assertions
see
point,
1962),
Mass.,
are
the weaker
Ch.
the
on which
foundations
a l'histoire
Introduction
DuroseUe,
Jean-Baptiste
(Paris,
1964).
internationales
nation
the
des
rests,
the
become.
From
Emerson,
Rupert
Empire
and Raymond
Paix
XIX;
Aron,
to Nation
(Cambridge,
entre
les Na
et Guerre,
tions (Paris, 1962), Ch. XI.
4.
E.
H.
Nationalism
Carr,
Pierre
and
(London,
1965),
After
et relations
internationales,"
"NationaUsme
Hassner,
51.
p.
in
Quoted
Revue
fran?aise
de science politique, Vol. XV, No. 3 (June 1965), pp. 499-528.
5. See Ernst B. Haas' book by this tide (Stanford, Calif., 1964).
6.
See
on
War
7.
this point
P. Hassner,
8. Karl
my
on War
"Rousseau
essay
and
Peace,"
State
of
cit., p. 523.
op.
Nationalism
Deutsch,
and
Social
Communication
more
Mass.,
(Cambridge,
1953), p. 147.
9. A
in The
(New York, 1965).
to discriminate
and
exhaustive
would
have
analysis
the various
of the national
if the
situation;
among
components
one understand
is to help
of the analysis
the relations
between
purpose
the nation-state
and
the
it would
be particularly
international
system,
to assess
is
the degree
to which
each of these
(1)
necessary
components
an
over a
of
(or a given
unchangeable
given
unchangeable
long period
or on the contrary
an element
that can be transformed
time)
by wiU and
the hierarchy
of importance
that
and
the order
of urgency
action;
(2)
systematic
rigorously
?htes
poUtical
10.
See Raoul
science
be
12.
See
"Antour
op.
In Search
detected
by political
"Paradoxes
cit.,
more
stated
difference
experienced
decision-makers
Girardet,
politique,
11. As w?l
tive"
and
of
of France
estabUsh
the components.
among
Revue
de
nationaliste,"
l'id?ologie
and P. Hassner,
423-445;
pp.
PoUtical
(Cambridge,
Mass.,
but
Community,"
eu.,
is not
matters
in part V, what
explicitly
or outsiders,
by scholars
?lites and decision-makers.
the French
op.
the
de
fran?aise
pp. 516-19.
the
"felt"
in S. Hoffmann,
"objec
difference
et al.,
1963).
13. La politique ext?rieure de la Y R?publique
(Paris, 1965), p. 12.
14. The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif., 1958).
15.
912
See my
discussion
in "The
European
process
of Atlantic
cross-purposes,"
The Fate of the Nation-State
Journal of Common Market Studies
(February 1965), pp. 85-101. The
success
economic
of internal
very
integration
far earlier
than many
(Cf. Britain's
expected.
the problem
of external
commercial
)
poUcy.
16.
The
latter
case
was
primarily
mans
over
the
was
more
tinent
with
was
would
17.
freeze
There
was,
those
external
issues
for membership,
is seff-evident;
the first, less so, since the crisis over E.D.C.
the French
and the Ger
spUt, between
"intra-European"
return
to arms and
of the latter
there
However,
soldiery.
an
to
that
thought
demanded?that
E.D.C.
raised
appUcation
was
it than
this: E.D.C.
those who
accepted
mostiy
by
not refuse
to do what
and should
could
the U.S.
had
Europe
in order
to share
the defense
of the half-con
is, rearm
the U.S.,
to remain
its primary
and to incite
the U.S.
defender;
rejected
by
existing
power
however,
those
who
feared
in France,
a
that
the Defense
Community
forever.
relationships
minority
of
"resigned
ones,"
like
Paul
Reynaud.
is an
18. There
in French
the difference
efforts to preserve
impressive
continuity
France's
and
from
the
and proto
position
Germany's:
pr?alables
to Mend?s-France's
cols to E.D.C,
to de GauUe's
Brussels
op
proposals,
to any nuclear
role for Germany.
position
between
19.
France's
like
not
of
resisters,"
"intergrationist
to stress the "resistance"
aspect
less aimed
of
the U.S.
vision
never
at
ultimately
establishing
but a "second
force"
the nation
Jean Monnet
their long-term
in Western
Europe
in
the West.
himseU,
often
chose
but neverthe
vision,
not a
junior partner
Mend?s-France's
political
on
of values;
in
however,
top of the hierarchy
1954
in his iU-fated
for a revision
demands
at the
of E.D.C.
(especially
as well
Brussels
in August)
as in 1957
he voted
meeting
(when
against
the Common
his
actual
did put a
on national
Market),
poUcies
priority
over
reform
external
entanglements.
20.
It
put
is no
was
if E.D.C.
six weeks
coincidence
after
the end of the
rejected
in Indochina,
was
if the Common
war
Market
in
signed wh?e
raged
if de Gaulle's
on the "Monnet
attack
method"
followed
Algeria,
sharpest
the Evian
The
of the situation
and
affected
inflected
agreements.
weight
the course
a leader as de Gaulle,
of even as nationaUst
between
1958 and
1962. Even
he went
the "Monnet method,"
however
along with
grudgingly,
the end of the
It is not a coincidence
War.
either
if the
right unt?
Algerian
French
leaders most
of the imprisoning
of the community
effects
suspicious
of the Six from France
were
the ones who
at
labored
hardest
improving
the national
situation
the colonial
burdens
(Mend?s-France,
by removing
de Gaulle)?and
if those French
rulers who
foUowed
Monnet
and tried to
the pride
a
of a nation
with
but
sense
wounded
in
place
sharp
patriotic
its
of a united
were
the men
to
who
failed
leadership
Europe
improve
the national
situation
overseas
one French
The
(the M.R.P.,
Mollet).
who
both
and
politician
sought
European
integration
imperial
"disengage
was Antoine
ment"
Pinay.
war
21. Especially by Henry Kissinger in The Troubled
Partnership (New York,
1965).
913
STANLEY HOFFMANN
22. One should not forget that the
original decisions that led to the French
de frappe were
taken before
or that the French
de Gaulle,
opposition
a national
came
deterrent
from men
did not at all object
who
to his
force
to
about
the need
as a whole
for Europe
to stop
a client
argument
being
the U.S.,
and who
America's
nuclear
that,
indeed,
thought
monopoly
was obsolete.
the alliance
23.
Hence
the
Action
or embarrassed
vague
for the United
States
rather
Committee
in the
past
case
24.
The
25.
See my
two
formulas
used
of Europe
with
by
of
in
Monnet's
Jean
to defense
regard
years.
of Erich
Mende's
Free
in "Discord
discussion
previous
is more
Democrats
in
compUcated.
in F. W?cox
Community,"
and
H. F. Hav?and, Jr. (eds.), The Atlantic
Community (New York, 1963),
pp. 3-31; "Europe's Identity Crisis," D dalus (FaU 1964), pp. 1244-97,
and
26.
the article
for
See,
in reference
Usted
Max
instance,
15.
Kohnstamm's
"The
Tide,"
European
in
27.
See
K. W.
Area
28.
Under
et
Political
al.,
the North
and
Community
I include
authority,
act
three
Along
sim?ar
the
of
independently
see Francis
Unes,
Atlantic
1937).
J.,
distinct
notions:
autonomy
and particularly
governments,
over acts of others),
and legitimacy
(control
power
capacity),
as the
center
of action).
cepted
"rightful"
to
29.
Deutsch,
N.
(Princeton,
R.
Stephen
Graubard (ed.), A New Europe? (Boston, 1964), pp. 140-73.
Rosenstiel,
Le
pr?ncipe
de
(the
the
capacity
financial
(being
ac
"Supranationalit?"
(Paris, 1962).
30.
I am
using
by Donald
31.
On
this
point,
feats EDC
32.
33.
here unpublished
J. Puchala.
See Rupert
see
Raymond
studies
Aron
done
under
and Daniel
Karl
Lerner
Deutsch,
(eds.),
especially
France
De
(New York, 1957).
Emerson,
refusal
op.
cit., Ch.
XIX.
to
not fa?
could
before
1961,
join European
integration,
for integration
with
Ger
thus meant
reticence,
equality
and a clear-cut
difference
between
France's
and England's,
many,
position
that
on
of French
and
has
traditions.
is, a reversal
aspirations
England
as a result,
the whole
the "resignation-resistance"
d?emma?and
rejected
both
the aspects
of its foreign
that appeared
to U.S.
like resignation
policy
England's
to increase
French
con
and the aspects
that impUed
resistance
to decline
have
predominance
to the crisis of
tributed
in
for France's
veto
European
integration:
January
a French
1963 meant
a power
refusal
to let into Europe
that had
just
its m?itary
ties to the U.S.,
confirmed
but Britain's
to play
desire
previous
a world
to
into Europe"
role and aversion
France's
"fading
encouraged
own
about
integration.
misgivings
34.
914
See AKred
Grosser,
op.
cit., Ch.
IV.
The Fate of theNation-State
35.
For
a more
see my
"De Gaulle's
article:
of this concept,
analysis
as History,"
1 (October
World
Vol. XIII, No.
Politics,
deta?ed
The
Memoirs:
Hero
1960), pp. 140-155.
36.
Grosser,
op. cit., pp.
statement:
"France
role
of
to Prime Minister
attention
draws
112-113,
is condemned
and history
by geography
Pompidou's
the
to play
Europe."
37. See Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).
38.
See
de GauUe's
reference
to England
in his
press
conference
of
September
9, 1965.
39.
See
his
40.
Pluralism
"Technocracy,
op. cit., pp. 62-88.
essay
Graubard
and
the New
in Stephen
Europe,"
R.
(ed.),
of
out in his book and the
election
campaign
points
presidential
even
to de Gaulle's
the opposition
confirmed,
accepts
foreign
poUcy
his notion
of a "European
and rejects American
(with
"hegemony"
Europe"
or
the exception
There
like Reynaud
of a very few men
Lecanuet).
perhaps
is disagreement
than on objectives.
about methods
and style rather
As Grosser
1965
41. I find Ernst B. Haas' definition of a political community in his Uniting of
show
in which
and individuals
groups
specific
institutions
than to any other political
poUtical
severe domestic
not very
in the case of states marked
authority")
by
helpful
more
to any other
center
to
there
the
than
be
cleavages;
might
loyalty
and
there is no other political
because
authority,
authority
political
merely
stiU not be in the presence
like an integrated
of anything
yet one would
Europe,
more
5,
p.
loyalty
("a condition
to their central
society.
42. Witness
France's
European
43. Haas,
44.
army
strength
commitments.
troop
Reyond
the Nation-State,
Ernst
B. Haas
and
terns
of Political
Philippe
Integration,"
in Algeria
until
1962,
and
Britain's
extra
p. 29.
C.
Schmitter,
International
"Economics
4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 705-737, and p. 710.
Organization,
and Differential
Pat
Vol.
No.
XVIII,
as its functional
the entity
of the Six, insofar
scope
a
is certainly
which
is, the realm of welfare,
significant
sense.
is a
own
of politics)
in the formal
part
poUtical
My
community
of political
realities
with
the law of the treaties
that
analysis
(by contrast
the three communities)
established
is more
I admit
pessimistic;
although
that because
of the Commission's
role the entity
to
of the Six came
close
a
in
un
the
recent
formal
events
have
sense,
being
political
community
derlined
the precariousness
of the Commission's
and power.
autonomy
45. One
could
is concerned
argue
that
(that
915