2 Nephi 2 Seminar
January-April 2013
Participants
Rico Martinez
Jenny Webb
Joseph Spencer
Deidre Green
John Hilton III
Sheila Taylor
GUIDING QUESTIONS
1. What relationship does the sermon of 2 Nephi 2 bear to scripture
generally—whether in terms of its immediate setting, its reliance on other
scriptural texts, or its influence on other scriptural texts?
2. In what ways is audience important to the theological bearing of 2 Nephi
2? More specifically, how important are the details of Jacob’s life to the
theological interpretation of Lehi’s words, particularly in the first half of the
sermon?
3. What important structures can be identified in 2 Nephi 2, and how are
those structures theologically significant?
4. Is there a consistent or coherent theology developed in 2 Nephi 2—
particularly with respect to purpose, creation, freedom, law, opposition,
redemption, and agency? What can be said by of summarizing Lehi’s
theological position?
2 Nephi 2:1-3a – Some Preliminary Reflections
06
SundayJAN 2013
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It’s time, at long last, to get this discussion started. We’re tackling only the first two-and-ahalf verses of text this week, but that will be enough to keep us more than busy, I think.
Here is the text we’re dealing with this week, with my own punctuation (note that there are
no textual variants to be bothered about in these verses):
[1] And now, Jacob, I speak unto you. Thou art my firstborn in the days of my
tribulation in the wilderness, and, behold, in thy childhood thou hast suffered afflictions
and much sorrow because of the rudeness of thy brethren. [2] Nevertheless Jacob, my
firstborn in the wilderness, thou knowest the greatness of God, and he shall consecrate
thine afflictions for thy gain. [3] Wherefore, thy soul shall be blessed, and thou shalt
dwell safely with thy brother Nephi, and thy days shall be spent in the service of thy
God.
The first two of our four guiding questions seem to be focused heavily on these first verses.
If we’re to get a sense of the immediate setting of 2 Nephi 2, or of its reliance on other
scriptural texts, it’d be best to look for answers in assessing these first verses of the
chapter. Further, if we’re serious about the question of audience, as well as about how the
details of Jacob’s life bear on the interpretation of 2 Nephi 2, we’ve got to keep an eye on
these first verses. Also interesting to me are some details from these first verses that might
help us begin to answer our third question. As I hope to show, there’s a significant question
of textual structure in these first verses that should give us serious theological food for
thought. Only the fourth question will have to wait for further attention.
What follows, then, comes in three parts. In the first, I’ll say a few things about how these
first verses help to situate 2 Nephi 2 within scripture rather generally. In the second, I’ll see
if I can’t illuminate something about audience, as well as about the interpretive relevance of
Jacob’s past. In the third, finally, I’ll identify an important structure in these first verses and
say a bit about what it suggests theologically.
To work, then!
Scriptural Entanglement
It seems to me that there are two distinct sorts questions to be asked about
the scriptural setting of 2 Nephi 2: First, what can be learned from an analysis of
the position of 2 Nephi 2 within the larger text of the Book of Mormon? Second, what can be
learned by looking at scriptural echoes in and of 2 Nephi 2:1-3a? I’ll take these in turn.
Also, I want to be careful not to get carried away here, so I’ll try to be brief.
Nephi’s record, on my interpretation, plays a very determinate role in the larger structure of
the Book of Mormon. It introduces a covenantal theology—largely uninterested in questions
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of soteriology (narrowly defined)—that the Lehites for much of their history seem
intentionally (even inspiredly) to have disregarded (thanks to the intervention of a certain
Abinadi). It is only in Third Nephi, with the arrival in the New World of the resurrected
Christ, that there is a return of sorts to the covenantal interests of Nephi’s record and an
abandonment of sorts of the heavy focus on atonement that seems to have driven Lehite
theological interests from King Benjamin to Samuel the Lamanite.
But, clean as I want to make this cut between two rival theological interests, it’s messy in
certain ways. And one of the more important of those ways is Nephi’s inclusion in his record
of a certain thread of soteriological theological speculation. Interestingly, it’s never Nephi
who produces that speculation—it’s Lehi in 2 Nephi 2 and Jacob in 2 Nephi 9—but it’s
nonetheless he who decided to give it a place in his otherwise entirely covenantal record. It
was on this atonement theology, contained in Nephi’s book on covenant theology, that
Abinadi seems to have drawn in laying the foundations of the atonement theology that
saturates the books of Mosiah, Alma, and Helaman.
2 Nephi 2 thus, it seems to me, has a kind of unstable position in the Book of Mormon—
along with 2 Nephi 9, Jacob’s obviously-2-Nephi-2-inspired sermon. It’s a kind of knot in the
otherwise smooth grain of the record Nephi assembled. This is all the more apparent when
it’s compared with the chapters immediately surrounding and obviously connected with it.
The covenantal focus of 2 Nephi 1, of 2 Nephi 3, is unmistakable. We might well ask why
Lehi’s words to Jacob move in this decidedly non-covenantal direction, this more personalapplication-of-the-plan-of-salvation sort of direction.
I’m interested in what thoughts others may have on the uneasy place 2 Nephi 2 occupies in
the Book of Mormon. For my own part, I’ll be satisfied for the moment just to have
articulated its basic outlines—mostly so that I can get on to the next question.
There isn’t too much that needs to be said about echoes of biblical scripture in these first
verses. There don’t, in other words, seem to be any deliberate or extended allusions or
borrowings. That said, there are a few points that might be mentioned just because they
help to shed some light on the text.
In verse 1, again in verse 2, and then later in the chapter in verse 11, Lehi refers to Jacob
as his “firstborn” (first as his “firstborn in the days of [his] tribulation in the wilderness” and
then more simply as “firstborn in the wilderness”). Although the exact phrases Lehi employs
are unique to 2 Nephi 2, they might be seen as drawing on an important Old Testament
tradition, where “my firstborn” appears five times and where “firstborn” appears still more
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often (most frequently in the Pentateuch and the Chronicles). It is, for instance, of some
significance that “my firstborn” appears for the first time in the Hebrew Bible in Genesis
49:3, where Jacob is giving final blessings to his sons just before death—where, that is, he’s
doing exactly what Lehi is doing in 2 Nephi 1-4.
Of course, it’s of some importance that Jacob is not actually Lehi’s firstborn, but only his
firstborn in the wilderness. (It’s curious, though, that Lehi doesn’t refer to Laman as his
firstborn in 2 Nephi 1, when offering final words of counsel to him. He only calls Laman his
firstborn when he’s addressing Laman’s children in 2 Nephi 4.) Nonetheless, there’s
something of a precedent for Lehi’s complicated use of “firstborn.” Of the five instances of
“my firstborn” in the Old Testament, three are used non-literally. Exodus 4:22 thus speaks
of Israel as God’s firstborn, Psalms 89:27 of God making a king into God’s firstborn, and
Jeremiah 31:9 of Ephraim being Jehovah’s firstborn. In all this, we don’t exactly have an
allusion or even an echo, but we do have a bit of helpful clarification.
Turning to verse 2, we might say something about the idea of afflictions being “consecrated
for gain.” Outside of the Book of Mormon, consecration is attached to gain in only one
passage, Micah 4:13, and that passage happens to be quoted in 3 Nephi 20:19. I think I’d
like to assume some kind of connection between Lehi’s talk of consecration and Micah’s
eschatological claim. But I’ll postpone discussion of this until a little later, because I’m going
to address this matter of consecration at some length in the next part of my post.
Turning, then, to verse 3, there are a few brief things to say. First a point of difference from
other scriptural texts. Lehi speaks early in this verse of Jacob’s soul being blessed. This is
curious because, as it turns out, it is only (more or less) in the Book of Mormon that souls
are blessed (see Alma 28:8; 38:15; but cf. Psalms 49:18); in the Bible, it is souls that do
the blessing (see Genesis 27:4, 19, 25, 31; Psalms 103:1, 2, 22; 104:1, 35). I don’t know
what’s to be learned from that point of difference, but it’s interesting—and perhaps fruitful.
More obviously in line with Old Testament usage is Lehi’s talk of “dwelling safely.” There is a
heavy emphasis on dwelling safely in the Hebrew tradition, always connected—as Lehi’s
blessings are—to promises concerning land (see Leviticus 25:18, 19; 26:5; Deuteronomy
12:10; 33:12, 28; 1 Samuel 12:11; 1 Kings 4:25; Psalms 4:8; Proverbs 1:33; Jeremiah
23:6; 32:37; 33:16; Ezekiel 28:26; 34:25, 28; 38:8, 11, 14; 39:26). I think it’s safe to
assume that Lehi is following out this tradition, though I don’t know how much light this
connection sheds on anything either.
Of more importance, but not without its problems, is the way the Hebrew Biblemight help to
clarify the meaning of Lehi’s talk of Jacob spending his days in “the service of [his] God.”
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It’s possible to suggest that this phrase is a kind of abridgement (for a similar abridgement,
see Ezra 6:18) of the very frequent Old Testament phrase, “the service of the house of
God.” If this connection is of any worth, it would seem that Lehi is promising Jacob a certain
role in the temple and the priesthood—a role he did in fact subsequently take up. The
problem with such an interpretation, however, is that this phrase appears (with the
exception of Numbers 16:9) exclusively in post-exilic texts (see 1 Chronicles 9:13; 23:28;
25:6; 28:20, 21; 29:7; 2 Chronicles 31:21; Ezra 7:19; Nehemiah 10:32). Although the
Book of Mormon in English translation has no qualms about drawing anachronistically from
King James renderings of texts that would have been written after the Nephites left
Jerusalem, it’s difficult to argue that such specifically post-exilic usage can be drawn on in
making inferences about the meaning of the phrase in the Book of Mormon.
In short, there seems to be little in these first verses by way of allusion to or quotation of
other scripture. There is, however, good reason to look at how these first verses may have
influenced subsequent Nephite scripture—or, at least, one major subsequent Nephite figure:
King Benjamin.
How is a connection between these first few verses of Lehi’s words and King Benjamin’s
four-centuries-later sermon suggested? First, the phrase “the greatness of God” appears in
scripture only here in 2 Nephi 2:2 and in Mosiah 4:11. (Speaking more generally, it’s only
Jacob in 2 Nephi 9 and Benjamin in Mosiah 4 who ever in scripture associate the word
“greatness” with God.) Second and more importantly, the wording of Lehi’s statement, “thy
days shall be spent in the service of thy God,” is borrowed heavily by Benjamin in Mosiah 2
(see Mosiah 2:12, 16, 17, 19). There’s good reason to suspect that Benjamin was a close
reader of Lehi’s words to Jacob. He alone in subsequent Nephite tradition seems to have
drawn on the language of these first verses.
More word needs to be done on what these connections between Lehi and Benjamin might
mean (John, I’m looking at you!). For the moment, I think I’d just like to identify the
connection and ask others what sense is to be made of it—again, mostly so that I can get
on to other tasks I’d like to address in this already-getting-long post.
Complications of Audience
I can only hope I haven’t bored anyone with what I’ve done so far here. It’s all necessary
work, however preliminary. But now I want to get on to the kind of work in which I’m much
more at home—and which I find much more engaging: theological interpretation. And I’m
going to do this sort of work while addressing what at first can only appear to be a merely
exegetical concern, namely, the matter of audience.
5
This will come in two parts. First, I want to say something about the apparently simple
distinction between the identified audiences of the two halves of 2 Nephi 2. And then I want
to complicate that distinction by providing a bit of analysis of one detail in particular drawn
from Jacob’s life: this matter of consecrating afflictions for gain. There are, of course, other
details from Jacob’s life that might be relevant, though I’ll deal only with this one. Please
feel free—read: obligated!—to say something about other aspects of Jacob’s life that might
be important to the interpretation of 2 Nephi 2.
Generally speaking, it seems to be possible to divide 2 Nephi 2 up into two major parts. The
first half runs through verse 13, and the second half begins with verse 14. There are several
indications that these two “halves” should be regarded as distinct. For instance, note the
difference in style of discourse: in the first half Lehi speaks in the philosophical or
theological abstract, while in the second half he speaks narratively and concretely. Similarly,
note the difference in use of tenses, obviously connected with the difference in styles: in the
first half (with the exception of the first few verses, which I’ll try to explain in the third part
of this post) Lehi always employs the present indicative, while in the second half he almost
universally uses the simple past tense. Perhaps more complicatedly, we might note that
verse 13 brings all the themes of the first half of the discourse to a kind of point of
absurdity, with the very creation vanishing away, while verse 14 opens the second half of
the discourse by reversing that absurdity and marking a kind of new beginning.
More immediately relevant to us, however, is the fact that the two halves of the discourse
seem to have distinct audiences. It’s clear from these first verses that Lehi addresses
himself directly and, as it were, only to Jacob in the first half. This seems to be confirmed in
verse 11, when Lehi interrupts his theological talk with a reiteration of “my firstborn in the
wilderness.” It seems clear that right up through verse 13, Jacob is the unique audience
Lehi intends to address. But notice that verse 13 opens with an indication of a shift in
audience: “my sons.” This is confirmed again in verse 28 with another “my sons,” and then
again in verse 30 with yet another “my sons.” It thus appears that the second half of the
discourse is addressed not only to Jacob, but to all of Lehi’s sons. The abstract and more
obviously theological part of the discourse is something Lehi wants to tell Jacob about
specifically—all the talk of how the atonement functions, all the focus on the necessity of
preaching, all the complicated business of opposition and its connection with law, etc. The
narrative and more obviously didactic part of the discourse, however, is something Lehi
wants all of his sons to hear—all the talk of the actual story of Adam and Eve, all the careful
distinction-drawing between acting and being acted upon, all the discussion of being free to
choose life or death, etc.
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(I might note that paying attention to audience perhaps suggests that the two halves divide
between verses 12 and 13, rather than between verses 13 and 14. Does the “I speak unto
you these things for your profit” in verse 14 refer back to the content at least of verse 13,
suggesting that Lehi has already turned from Jacob alone to all of his sons? And does the
repeated “ye” of verse 13 perhaps mark that shift? We might do some work on trying to fix
exactly when this shift takes place.)
It isn’t hard to see why the didactics of the second half of the discourse might be meant for
Jacob’s brothers. They are, after all, the “rude” ones who have made Jacob’s life miserable.
And it isn’t hard to see why the theology of the first half of the discourse might be meant for
Jacob alone. He is, after all, the one who has to make sense of the redemption of his
miserable life. But I wonder if Lehi’s reference to consecration doesn’t complicate things. It
would be one thing if Lehi said something like: “Your brothers have been jerks and ruined
your life, but I’ll get to them in a moment. In the meanwhile, I want to tell you how the plan
of redemption works so that you can find happiness nonetheless.” But Lehi doesn’t say that.
He says, rather, something like: “Your brothers have been jerks and ruined your life, but
God will use the very ruins of your life—as ruins—to do something remarkable with you.
This is all, as it were, a part of the plan.”
That complicates things. Lehi finds himself having to tell one son that all the misery caused
by the other sons has been, in a sense, an integral part of God’s purposes, but he has to do
so without letting those other sons come to the conclusion that they’ve been merely passive
tools in God’s work. The shift in audience, it seems, is necessary. Lehi has to find a way to
weave an explanation of redemption for Jacob with a reprimand against continued
disobedience to Jacob’s oldest brothers. How’s that to be done?
But if we’re to get very far with this question, I think we need to assess much more
carefully the stakes of Lehi’s reference to consecration.
The most straightforward definition of “consecrate” is, as Webster’s 1828 dictionary makes
clear, is “to make or declare to be sacred, by certain ceremonies or rites,” thus “to set
apart, dedicate, or devote,” etc. A quick glance at the use of “consecrate” in scripture,
where it is most often used to refer to the consecration of priests or kings, bears this out. In
addition to this more common usage, however, there are references that can’t so easily be
made sense of, and it so happens that Lehi’s reference to consecration in 2 Nephi 2:2 is
among them. But even before dealing with the less common, I find myself asking whether
we’ve really ever thought through the implications of the common usage. What does it
mean to “devote” something, to “make or declare” something “to be sacred”?
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But isn’t it simple enough? Isn’t it just a matter of making clear that there are two distinct
realms—the sacred and the profane—and that consecration is the ritual procedure through
which we move an object from the one into the other? Of course, the distinction between
the two realms can’t be said to be a realone, because nothing about a consecrated object
can be said to be physicallydifferent after the act of consecration. We don’t believe, after all,
in transubstantiation—that is, in the idea that through the consecration of the host there’s a
transformation of the substance of the bread and wine even as the perceivable accidents
remain the same. So we’d want, it seems, to say that consecration amounts to a kind
of conventional transformation, a shift in how we regard the status of certain objects—
regardless of the fact that the laws of the conservation of energy and matter remain in
place. Of course, we’ll insist that there’s a little more than mere convention at work here,
since consecration is effected through authority, and God Himself guarantees whatever is
effected through proper authority. Consecration thus appears, on the usual account, to be a
kind of divinely guaranteed convention.
That’s the usual account. I’d like to complicate it.
Only once in the Bible is consecration connected with “gain”: in Micah 4:13 (a passage,
incidentally, that’s quoted in 3 Nephi 20:19). It’s interesting that in that text gain is what’s
consecrated, whereas here in 2 Nephi 2 something is consecrated for gain, but I’ll leave
further puzzling over that distinction for later. Is it significant that an unexpected Hebrew
word lies behind consecration in the Micah text? Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible,
“consecrate” translates one form or another of the root qdsh (to make holy) or a form of the
phrase ml’ yd(to fill the hand—a reference to an ordination ritual). In Micah, however, the
word translates the Hebrew khrm, the root generally used in connection with the ban on
goods acquired in holy war. Consecration there—and we shouldn’t overlook the fact that
it’s this use that lies behind all our talk of the law of consecration in our own dispensation—
is a matter less of what is sanctified than of what has been sanctioned, less of the awesome
than of the awful. There’s an obvious connection between these, as anthropologists have
been pointing out for a century (there’s a veritable history of folks grappling with the double
status of the holy, one Giorgio Agamben traces in a productive way inThe Sacrament of
Language, for anyone interested). Whether something is sanctioned or sanctified, it’s in
some sense subtracted from the economy of the everyday. And it’s this that should give us
to think carefully about what’s at stake in Lehi’s gesture.
Might we think about consecration in terms of a kind of potentialization, a kind of
deactualization? What is it we do in consecrating our gain in, say, D&C 42? To a certain
extent at least, the key to consecration as we’re to live it is transforming what
we possess into what we are stewards over. In Pauline terms, we replace “using up” with
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“use.” In a world ordered from top to bottom by ownership, consecration amounts to
deactualization, to a kind of “putting out of play” through a reorientation of the consecrated
to something “invisible,” so to speak, within the world’s economic order. In consecration, we
might say, we uncouple something from the ends the idolatrous order of the world assigns
to it. We make something endless by unbinding it from the telos that guarantees its
(economic) meaning. Thus stripping what we consecrate of its actuality—where actuality is
a function of the place something occupies in an economically defined order of things—we
return to it its potentiality or potentialities, at once its possibilities and its potency, at once
the variety of its possible uses and the power inherent to the thing but sapped in its being
harnessed to economic production.
How does any of this clarify Jacob’s situation or Lehi’s words? The Lord will consecrate
Jacob’s sufferings. Now we might read that as: The Lord will uncouple Jacob’s sufferings
from the ends assigned to them in the economy of Lehi’s family. The sufferings aren’t to be
gotten rid of, overturned, or overshadowed by something glorious. Rather, they’re to
be used. Jacob, we might say, will have the task of using them. Jacob, we might say, will
have togive them up, to relinquish ownership of them in order to be a steward over them.
Jacob, we might say, will recognize that they have, as products of sibling rivalry, etc., been
sanctioned. He’s not to employ them in constructing any self-identity, nor is he to make
them his own by taking over into his own projects the projects inscribed in those sufferings.
He’s to experience in those sufferings something endless, something gratuitous, something
graceful—the Lord’s own hand.
Or something like that.
This sheds light, I think, on questions of audience. Jacob’s brothers, if they understand this
properly, can’t hear in Lehi’s approbation of Jacob’s sufferings a kind of approval of their
actions. They’ll still be upbraided. And perhaps they’realready upbraided. Not only have they
done wrong in their rudeness, they’ve done wrong themselves by refusing to uncouple the
products of their actions from the actions themselves. Wedded as we usually are to thinking
that sin always lies in our choice of certain ends over others, there’s a hint here—
expounded at length in the Book of Job, of course—that sin lies rather in our choice of
ends at all. Redemption, for Jacob, is in part a question of rendering even suffering endless,
much more than it’s a question of bringing suffering to an end, however justifiable that end
appears economically.
Might this get us started in thinking about opposition later in the sermon?
Structure and Time
9
Finally, I want to assess the theological importance of a structure I’ve riddled out of the first
verses of 2 Nephi 2. It’s not unconnected to what I’ve just had to say about consecration,
but I’ll see whether I have much to say about that. At any rate, here’s a structure I see at
work in verses 1-4:
[past] thou hast suffered afflictions and much sorrow . . .
[present] nevertheless, . . . thou knowest the greatness of God
[future] and he shall consecrate thine afflictions for thy gain
[future] wherefore thy soul shall be blessed
[future] and thou shalt dwell safely with thy brother Nephi
[future] and thy days shall be spent in the service of thy God
[present] wherefore I know that thou art redeemed . . .
[past] for thou hast beheld that in the fullness of time he cometh . . .
[past] and thou hast beheld in thy youth his glory
[present] wherefore thou art blessed
[future] even as they unto whom he shall minister in the flesh
[present] for the spirit is the same
[past] yesterday
[present] today
[future] and forever
That there’s so much variation in tenses here is striking because right after the “yesterday,
today, and forever” business that clearly marks the culmination of the variations there’s an
almost complete disappearance of any variation through the remainder of the first half of
the sermon. The rest of the relatively abstract discourse directed solely to Jacob speaks in
the abstract present indicative, without any need to turn to past or future: “redemption
cometh,” “there is no flesh that can dwell,” “all men come unto God,” “it must needs be that
there is an opposition,” “if ye shall say, . . . ye shall also say,” and so on. It’s only here in
these first verses that there’s any strong variation in tense, and here it’s quite intense.
Is there a sense or even a structure here? Lehi begins with the past (afflictions, etc.),
moves to the present (Jacob’s knowledge of God’s greatness), and then shifts to the future
(a set of four consequences bound up with Jacob’s knowledge: consecrated afflictions, a
blessed soul, safety in dwelling, and days given to God’s service), from there back to the
present (Jacob is redeemed), and again back to the past (Jacob’s has already seen that
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Christ would come). Here there’s a kind of obvious chiasm: from a past of affliction and
sorrow through a present knowledge to a blessed future, then back through a redemption
for the present to a knowledge had in the past. This chiasm is followed by two quick
past/present/future sequences that are obviously structured intentionally in that way (the
first: Jacob beheld glory in the past, and so is blessed in the present, precisely as those who
will behold the same glory in the future; the second: yesterday, today, and forever), which
are separated by a statement about the absolute sameness (and hence presence) of the
Spirit.
All of this, it seems to me, says something about the temporality of Jacob’s relationship to
the teachings Lehi will go on to spell out. We’ll be looking at more of verses 3 and 4 next
week, of course, so we’ll see better how the last parts of this structure play out, but I think
we can already begin to think about the basic stakes of Lehi’s gesture here. There is, in the
discourse he’s about to give, a kind of collapse of past and future into an eternal present.
It’s as if Lehi wants from the very beginning to problematize any belief that things have
ever been different, or that they will ever be different. The principles, in short, areeternal,
unchanging. And that’s to be made fully clear. (This is something Nephi takes up elsewhere.
Take a look at the last verses of 1 Nephi 10, for instance.)
What might all this imply about the texts we’ll be working on over the next weeks? I’ll leave
that an open question for now, as I’ve left other questions open. Now, I’ll leave to you all
the task of giving shape to the discussion I’m trying far too hard to start.
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20
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:1-3A – SOME
PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS”
1.
jennywebbsaid:
January 8, 2013 at 4:04 am
Nice work Joe—you’ve provided plenty to ponder, and I’m sure I’ll be
returning to this post multiple times over this week.
11
Right now, I want to think about the questions you bring out regarding the
position of 2 Ne 2 with regards to other scripture. I think you’re right to
suggest that 2 Ne 2 presents something of a theological alternative in its
focus on atonement compared to the surrounding chapters. Thinking through
how this shift might (or might not) be signaled textually, I went back and
looked at the end of 2 Ne 1, where Lehi addresses his other sons and then
Zoram.
I find it interesting that structurally, the addresses here all begin the same:
“And now, [identity of person being addressed]” (2 Ne 1:28, 1:30, and 2:1).
Read together without the chapter break, there’s a kind of rhythm present in
this address; the repetition of the “and now”s suggests a kind of turning, as if
Lehi is slowly circling around, addressing each in turn.
However, there are some fairly sharp contrasts between the addresses in 2
Ne 1 and that of 2 Ne 2. First, note that in 2 Ne 1:28, Lehi addresses all his
sons (sans Nephi—I’m going to not talk about the hows and whys of that;
Grant Hardy has some interesting ideas about it in his “Understanding the
Book of Mormon”), by birth and by marriage, who are traditional Jews, born
and raised in Jerusalem, familiar with its customs and culture. Next, he
addresses Zoram in verse 30; Zoram is characterized as a more liminal
identity, associated with the culture of Jerusalem since that’s where he is also
from, but explicitly not part of Lehi’s sons—Lehi explicitly identifies him as a
“servant” and then a “friend.” Finally, he turns to Jacob, who is identified,
twice, as *not* being part of the Jerusalem culture, but rather as from the
“wilderness.”
I think there’s something significant in this move from Jerusalem sonship
through Jerusalem not-sonship to a new Wilderness sonship—it’s like Lehi is
marking a break not only in his family, but in his descendants as well as being
not only geographically but culturally, socially, and scripturally (and
doctrinally?) separate from Jerusalem.
Another way that this break is marked in the text has to do with the
substance of Lehi’s words to these three groups. In 2 Ne 1:28, he identifies
his sons/sons-in-law, and then leaves them a conditional blessing (if you
hearken to Nephi, I’ll leave you my first blessing; if not, it’s his). In 2 Ne
1:30, he identifies Zoram, notes his faithfulness, and then gives another
conditional blessing (your seed will dwell in the land with Nephi’s seed as long
as they keep the commandments).
But in 2 Ne 2:1-3, the pattern is markedly different. Lehi identifies Jacob, but
then provides not a conditional blessing, but rather an unconditional
declaration of Jacob’s multiple, non-land-nor-inheritance-based blessings:
“and he *shall* consecrate thine aafflictions for thy gain. 3 Wherefore, thy
soul *shall* be blessed, and thou *shalt* dwell safely with thy brother,
Nephi; and thy days *shall* be spent in the service of thy God.” (Note: the
12
lack of land is significant—Jacob is identified as the one from no-land, the
wilderness, the non-place.)
I wonder if the differences in these three sequences then help to mark a shift
away from what might be termed an “Old Testament” understanding of
blessing and covenant (conditional) towards a different (“wilderness”?)
understanding of blessing and covenant (unconditional). Wouldn’t such a shift
foreshadow the theological importance of the universality of the atonement
and unconditionality of grace?
So, none of this really comes any closer to the “why” you ask (why is Lehi
shifting in this direction), but I do think it helps further establish grounds for
such a shift; it also then raises for me the question of audience—as in, would
those listening have noticed such a shift? And if they did, would they for any
reason then be paying more attention to what Lehi says to Jacob, even
though they are not explicitly addressed, simply because they are picking up
on the fact that he’s doing something different here from the beginning?
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
January 8, 2013 at 3:09 pm
Nice, Jenny. I particularly like the way you’ve made sense of
Zoram’s place in the series of “blessings” Lehi gives (although
I’m now wondering why Sam comes last of all, in 4:11!). I think
this detail especially strengthens the case you’re making that
there’s something “progressive” or “directed” about the ordering
of the blessings. I want to think about that further.
As for the bit about unconditionality—very nice point. To what
extent is this unconditionality pinned on Jacob’s having already
beheld his Redeemer, etc.? Joseph in chapter 3, incidentally,
gets neither a conditional nor an unconditional blessing, but gets
a series of third-person imperatives (“may the Lord consecrate,”
“may the Lord bless,” etc.). How does adding that detail
complicate the story you’ve already begun to uncover here?
REPLY
jennywebbsaid:

January 11, 2013 at 4:23 pm
Joe and John (below), I wonder if what Joe calls the
imperative and John describes as a combination
(simultaneous?) of both the conditional and the
non-conditional elements are there for Joseph in 2
Ne 3 is related at all to Joseph’s young age? That
is, as a child he is “moldable” to a certain degree. It
reads almost like Lehi is directing or even
commanding the shape of Joseph’s future.
13
That would then contrast with Jacob’s nonconditional blessings, indicating that Jacob (who
also must be fairly young) has somehow reached
an age of accountability, an ability to make and
follow his own spiritual decisions. To me, this
indicates that our ability to be spiritually selfdirected and responsible begins much earlier than
we may culturally consider.
jennywebbsaid:

January 11, 2013 at 4:25 pm
Oh, and Joe, regarding Sam, it’s interesting to note
that he is also included by name in the blessing
Lehi gives in 2 Ne 1. So the blessing in 2 Ne 4 is
somehow a return, a revision, or a repetition, no?
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 10, 2013 at 3:25 pm
The conditional – non-conditional pattern is interesting. In 2
Nephi 3, Lehi seems to give both conditional and non-conditional
promises to Joseph. He states, “may the Lord consecrate also
unto thee this land, which is a most precious land, for thine
inheritance and the inheritance of thy seed with thy brethren, for
thy security forever, if it so be that ye shall keep the
commandments of the Holy One of Israel
(2 Nephi 3:2, conditional)” and “may the Lord bless thee forever,
for thy seed shall not utterly be destroyed” (v.3, seems not to be
conditional; however v. 25 in some ways could make everything
he says conditional.
REPLY
2.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 8, 2013 at 2:37 pm
There is a lot to ponder here; for the moment, I want to confine myself to
textual connections between King Benjamin and Lehi (since you looked at
me!) It seems like you have covered the most significant ones, particularly as
relates to 2 Nephi 2.
One other 2 Nephi 2 connection I found comes when Lehi says, “I speak unto
you these things for your profit and learning; for there is a God, and _he hath
created all things, both the heavens and the earth_, and all things that in
them are, both things to act and things to be acted upon….But behold, all
things have been done in the wisdom of him who knoweth all things” (2 Nephi
2:14, 24).
14
King Benjamin may have been echoing these words when he said, “Believe in
God, believe that he is, and that _he created all things, both in heaven and in
earth_; believe that he has all wisdom, and all power, both in heaven and in
earth; believe that man doth not comprehend all the things which the Lord
can comprehend” (Mosiah 4:9).
Perhaps the most interesting connection I found (and this doesn’t really
connect with the present effort) is between these two verses:
“Wherefore, I, Lehi, have obtained a promise, that inasmuch as those whom
_the Lord God shall bring out of the land of Jerusalem_ shall _keep his
commandments_, they shall prosper upon the face of this land; and they shall
be kept from all other nations, that they may possess this land unto
themselves. And if it so be that they shall _keep his commandments_ they
shall be blessed upon the face of this land, and there shall be none to molest
them, nor to take away the land of their inheritance; and they shall dwell
safely forever” (2 Nephi 1:9)
“And moreover, I shall give this people a name, that thereby they may be
distinguished above all the people which _the Lord God hath brought out of
the land of Jerusalem_; and this I do because they have been a diligent
people in _keeping the commandments_ of the Lord” (Mosiah 1:11)
Given that King Benjamin faced the difficult task of unifying different people,
it’s interesting that he should connect here with Lehi’s inclusive words –
namely that all righteous people brought to this land could receive the
blessings associated with it. Such words could have potentially been unifying
for Nephites, Mulekties and others hearing King Benjamin’s words.
It’s worth mentioning, at least in passing, that the textual parallels between 2
Nephi 9-10 and King Benjamin’s speech are much stronger than those
between Lehi and King Benjamin (which is not to say that those between
Benjamin and Lehi are insignificant).
I haven’t yet had the chance to exhaustively examine connection, but for
those who are interested, here are all the exact four-word phrase matches
between Lehi’s words and King Benjamin’s (acknowledging of course that the
most important connections could be 2-3 words or non-exact matches):
you for behold I
ye should remember to
will not suffer that
which the Lord hath
which I have spoken
were it not for
to be judged of
things which I have
things that ye may
the words which I
the things which I
15
the Spirit of the
the Lord will deliver
the greatness of God
the goodness of God
the glory of God
the end of the
the devil who is
that ye should remember
that thou art a
that the Lord will
stood before me And
Spirit of the Lord
people of the Lord
of the thing which
of God and your
of God and his
of a just God
land of Jerusalem and
keeping the commandments of
in the service of
in keeping the commandments
in a state of
if ye shall keep
greatness of God and
God and your own
go down to my
from the beginning and
favored people of the
eternal life through the
down to my grave
devil who is the
desire that ye should
created all things both
children of men and
by which ye are
and eternal life through
a knowledge of the
ye shall keep the
would that ye should
which the Lord God
to that which is
the Lord God hath
the land of Jerusalem
16
sons I would that
shall keep the commandments
out of the land
of the Lord that
of the land of
now my sons I
my sons I would
keep the commandments of
hath commanded me that
commandments of the Lord
by the hand of
brought out of the
And now my sons
according to that which
the hand of the
the commandments of the
hand of the Lord
I would that ye
the children of men
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
January 8, 2013 at 3:17 pm
John, this is helpful. It’s interesting that 2 Nephi 9-10 seems to
be particularly connected to Benjamin’s speech. Given the
obvious connections between 2 Nephi 2 and 2 Nephi 9—Lehi to
Jacob, Jacob to the Nephites—it seems appropriate that
Benjamin draws on both texts. What do your resources suggest
about the connections between Benjamin and other small plates
texts? Are these two sermons (Lehi’s and Jacob’s) clearly the
most significant source in the small plates for his wording?
I’ve toyed before with the possibility that the small plates would
have played a particularly important role in Benjamin’s thinking.
After Nephi’s death, the small plates passed from the royal to
the prophetic line (from Jacob to Amaleki), while the large plates
remained with the royal line—effecting a kind of kings-versusprophets split in Nephite ruling power. That split came to an end
when Amaleki, having no heir and the small plates being full,
delivered the prophetic record to Benjamin, reuniting for the first
time since Nephi the large and the small plates and healing a
kind of breach (remember the animosity between Jacob and
Nephi’s successor!). It would seem likely that Benjamin would
have given a good deal of attention to the small plates as a
17
result, and I had my suspicions that the small plates play a role
in the shape of his sermon (at least in its basic organization:
after some preliminaries, his sermon follows Nephi’s
creation/fall/atonement/veil pattern in interesting ways), but I’d
not look at specifically textual (as opposed tostructural)
connections. I’m fascinated by what’s being unearthed here, and
I’m eager to see where it goes.
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:

January 10, 2013 at 2:15 pm
I haven’t done enough comprehensive study to
definitively state where the majority of the
connections come from. But it does seem clear that
there are 2 or 3 times more textual connections to
Jacob than Lehi. Interestingly some of the (more
non-interesting) allusions fall into the “basic
organization” you mentioned above.
After Jacob quoted Isaiah 50-51, he began the
main body of his address by explaining why he had
read the words of Isaiah. He said, “I have read
these things that ye might know…I speak unto you
these things that ye may rejoice” (2 Nephi 9:1, 3).
Similarly, after explaining how he had labored as
their king, Benjamin said, “I tell you these things
that ye may know…I tell you these things that ye
may learn wisdom” (Mosiah 2:15, 17).
Later, both say they have spoken the words which
God had commanded them to say (2 Nephi 9:40,
Mosiah 3:23). Finally, both have breaks in their
discourses (Jacob’s at the end of 2 Nephi 9, King
Benjamin’s at the end of Mosiah 3). Jacob prefaces
his break by saying, “On the morrow I will declare
unto you the remainder of my words,” and King
Benjamin resumes his address saying, “I would
again call your attention, that ye may hear and
understand the remainder of my words” (2 Nephi
9:54, Mosiah 4:4).
But those are trivial and starting to take us away
from our main purpose. I’m going to go back to
your original post and pick up a different thread…
o
jennywebbsaid:
January 11, 2013 at 4:32 pm
18
John, I really appreciate the point you make about Lehi’s words
being “inclusive”, and that that inclusivity is potentially why
Benjamin, as a uniter, would be drawn to study them. And the
textual work you’ve provided above is fascinating—I had no idea
the connection was both as subtle and as strong as that. Yes, 2
Ne 9-10 is more clearly connected, but the textual tone and
register Benjamin utilizes (perhaps unconsciously) here, for me
at least, underscores the themes of family in connection with
covenant that was so important to both Lehi and Benjamin.
Thanks.
REPLY
3.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 10, 2013 at 3:52 pm
Joe you state, “I’m interested in what thoughts others may have on the
uneasy place 2 Nephi 2 occupies in the Book of Mormon. For my own part, I’ll
be satisfied for the moment just to have articulated its basic outlines—mostly
so that I can get on to the next question.”
I know you’ve carefully developed an argument about the Nephi-Abinadi split
elsewhere, and at the same time as you say, it’s “messy in certain ways.”
While 2 Nephi 3 certainly has a covenant focus, it’s less-strong in 2 Nephi 1.
Verses 13-32 seem much more application-oriented. That’s a small quibble,
I’m just saying that 2 Nephi 2 isn’t the _only_ passage that turns toward the
personal.
I’m really interested in the connection between “service of thy God” and “do
the service of the tabernacle of the Lord” (Number 16:9). This relationship,
along with the lack of land that Jenny points out may be indicators of Jacob’s
priestly role.
REPLY
4.
ricosaid:
January 12, 2013 at 7:10 pm
Lehi’s usage of “first born” is interesting for the reasons you point out. Lehi
does use the term “first blessing” to mean something perhaps close to “birth
right” when he speaks to Laman and Lemuel in 2 Ne 1:28-29. The phrase
doesn’t seem to appear anywhere else. It would appear that Lehi’s language
of “first born” as well as “first blessing” function to advance Nephi and Jacob
into favored positions. In a sense we get a kind of trilogy of positions with
Lehi as prophet, Jacob as priest, and Nephi as king.
Hardy (Understanding the Book of Mormon, 39) explores Nephi’s usage of
“rudeness” in the context of 1 Ne. 18:9. He suggests this non-biblical term
means something akin to “inappropriate levity” when used by Nephi to paint
Laman and Lemuel in a less than flattering way, but that Nephi is unable to
charge them with any specific crime. That interpretation seems to make sense
19
to me in terms of Nephi’s usage there. Here, however, Lehi (recognizing that
Nephi has some editorial control) seems to point to something more serious.
Webster’s 1828 dictionary lists the word “violent” as one meaning of
“rudeness.” Something along those lines may be more apropos, in terms of
Lehi’s language, as a reasonable cause of Jacob “suffering affliction and much
sorrow” to such an extent that God would need to consecrate those
“afflictions” (also note Lehi’s focus on Jacob “dwell[ing] safely” in verse 3). I
wonder if there may also be an attempt, albeit minor, to characterize Jacob as
a kind of Christ-figure whose suffering and affiliations are transformed.
I like the idea that Lehi is struggling with audience and trying to say
something to one son that other sons are also hearing. To the extent that the
speaker is always part of the audience, I like to think that perhaps Lehi is
speaking to himself as he speaks to Jacob, hoping that his own tribulations
(he uses the term “my tribulation in the wilderness”) will likewise work for his
good in some sense.
You suggest that Lehi is saying to Jacob “Your brothers have been jerks and
ruined your life, but God will use the very ruins of your life—as ruins—to do
something remarkable with you. This is all, as it were, a part of the plan.” I
think this is an important articulation or distinction to make and I’m glad you
raise it here. For God to consecrate an affliction that occurred to Jacob, seems
to be different from God intending from the beginning that an affliction occur
to Jacob (unbeknownst to him), a planned event that always had the telos of
being a gain for him even though he was not aware of it. I may be restating
(and hopefully not misstating) your explanation by saying that Lehi is
suggesting that God will imbue Jacob’s suffering with a new telos after the
fact, but Lehi is not suggesting that God secretly had given these acts such a
telos from the beginning (that they were actually the plan). That latter view
would seem to suggest that Laman and Lemuel’s acts were in a way
sanctioned or intended-the very problem you raise by audience. Now, I’m
tempted to see Lehi advancing that paradigm all the way through his
discourse even including his discussion on the fall.
REPLY
o
jennywebbsaid:
January 15, 2013 at 2:09 am
Rico, I like the formulation of Lehi as prophet, Jacob as priest,
and Nephi as king. I hadn’t thought of it that way before, but it’s
a useful way of looking at things.
Also, I don’t think Joe was advocating the idea that God
intended Laman and Lemuel’s rudeness / disobedience etc.
(Correct me if I’m wrong Joe, and please explain.) Rather, in
“God will use the very ruins of your life—as ruins—to do
something remarkable with you” I see the advancement of the
20
enactment of the atonement in all lives. As in, all of our lives are
in ruins to some degree or another, sometimes due to our own
sins, sometimes due to the sins of others, sometimes due to
chance, and the grace and work of the atonement is to work in
these ruins and, rather than erase them, work in them as ruins
to do God’s work and build the kingdom.
REPLY
5.
shltaylorsaid:
January 16, 2013 at 10:00 pm
Another quick thought on that question of God’s role in human afflictions, and
them being consecrated for one’s gain–there are passages later in the chapter
that I think could be read as a theodicy, particularly the notion of opposition
in all things. This question seems to be a particular concern of Lehi/Jacob,
and I’m interested in thinking more about how this notion, that God can bring
good out of evil, might fit into Lehi’s broader theological worldview.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
January 17, 2013 at 1:58 pm
I’ll be most interested to see where you go with these kinds of
questions, Sheila. I’m quite nervous about reading a theodicy
into verse 11, though it’s often been done (sloppily, usually—
hence my interest in where you’ll go). I suspect that the
motivation is, as you intimate here, an apparent implicit
connection between (a) Lehi’s mention of Jacob’s sufferings and
their consecration and (b) the whole business of opposition
taken up in both halves of the discourse. It’s that apparent
connection that I think I’m interested in contesting—at the very
least on the grounds that “opposition” doesn’t seem to mean
anything like “affliction” or “suffering” when verse 11 is read
closely. Of course, that’s not to say that it can’t be read that
way, just that I’m a bit nervous about it. So I’d be thrilled to see
some actually-responsible work done on this question.
(I should note that Dennis Potter’s essay in the David Paulsen
festschrift is a sustained critique of verse-11-theodicies.)
REPLY
shltaylorsaid:

January 20, 2013 at 10:31 pm
Thanks for letting me know about Dennis Potter’s
work–I’ll definitely need to look that up. I’m
actually suspicious of theodicies in general, at least
partly for ethical reasons, so it will be interesting to
21
play around with this more as we work through the
chapter.
o
ricosaid:
May 20, 2013 at 2:26 am
I should note that Dennis Potter’s essay in the David Paulsen
festschrift is a sustained critique of verse-11-theodicies.
Some useful quotes from Potter’s presentation: “This paper
will notattempt to discover what Lehi actually had in mind” and
in the Q&A he explains in response to a question by David
Paulsen that what he calls the “Opposition Theodicy” is the
theodicy that he gets from UVU students (mostly LDS students)
when presenting the problem of evil in his class (but he didn’t
get this theodicy when he taught at Notre Dame). This is the
reason that “I started exploring it as a theodicyseparate from
what I think Lehi actually means by it. I don’t think he means it
to be this kind of answer to the problem of evil.” To this Paulsen
in the audience agreed. Another exchange in the Q&A is
particularly relevant (from some one who sounds very familiar):
Question: For my own selfish reasons I want to read your paper
is that an argument that Lehi does get [inaudible], for instance,
Hegel, and Marx. I would add Freud or Kant. Would you read
your paper in that way really? You make the comment at the
beginning that you don’t want to analyze what Lehi himself has
in mind, but isn’t that really what your paper amounts to then
that in order to get at what the text is actually saying, the
intention of the text itself, we’ve got to move in a
[philosophical?] direction?
Potter: Well, in so far as it would be an argument for that, it’d be
a poor argument for that, it’s just a philosophical argument
thatone position doesn’t work very well, and this other position
works better. That’s some reason to accept what someone says,
but it’s not a lot of—I mean, the principle of charity is an
important principle in interpreting what people say. It’s certainly
not—if you always do that and always interpret people as
charitably a possible, if I were to do that with my students, I
would usually get them wrong. They don’t have the best
arguments in mind necessarily.
And so, I think that the principle of charity is an important part,
that would be an important part of it, but I think there would
have to be more to deciding how to interpret what Lehi is doing,
and I think that would involve a lot of textual criticism in terms
of the Book of Mormon.
22
Actually, I don’t, I’m not even sure what—because it would have
to be Lehi and not what also what also Mosiah says or Alma
or. They might be different thinkers and they might have
different views and so if they do have different views then what
they say might not even be relevant to what Lehi
says. Sometimes we approach the Book of Mormon as if it’s a
theological whole, there’s all one theology in it and that and
Mosiah and Alma and Amulek and Lehi, all the ones who do
theology in there, and that they all agree. I don’t see that so I
would be really careful if I were to interpret Lehi. I don’t even
know where to start, because there is not even very much that
he says, so I would just have to look only at that text. And then,
of course, if Blake’s right it could just be Joseph Smith talking
through Lehi, and actually I’m very sympathetic to Blake’s view
and so then all of a sudden all of these other things would be
relevant, what Joseph Smith has to say about opposition in other
places and so on, would be relevant to the textual interpretation
of what Lehi is supposedly saying.
I find this exchange quite interesting. First, Potter is more
interested in critiquing not what Lehi is actually saying but an
argument that he gets from students that he subsequently dubs
“opposition theodicy.” Second, he outlines what one would need
to do in order to examine what Lehi actually has in mind (which
he is not doing), and also the methodological issues implicated.
I agree based on the language of the text, Lehi is not using the
term“opposition” to mean “affliction” or “suffering.” However,
this association is not necessary in order to read Lehi as
intending to present a theodicy of some sort. Lehi explicitly
discusses “bad” and “misery” in connection with the existence of
God (and in the context of speaking to Jacob about affliction and
sorrow). My question is why Lehi raises his arguments here and
now in the narrative and not any other place along the
way. What is on the minds of his audience that Lehi feels the
need to present this argument? For those reasons, it
does seem that Lehi could be seeking to offer some sort of
explanation or argument for why we suffer, why there is
wickedness, or why we must be tempted, and how this is not
contrary to God’s wisdom and justice.
REPLY
6.
shltaylorsaid:
January 16, 2013 at 10:33 pm
23
Joe, I’m really intrigued by your thoughts on consecration. One of the things
that occurred to me in thinking about it is that, as you note, it’s often thought
in terms of taking something out of the profane and into the sacred. But what
if there isn’t ultimately a distinction between the two? I don’t quite know how
to think about this in terms of contemporary LDS theology, given that we
have clearly demarcated sacred space, but also the teaching that all things
are spiritual, both in that they are spiritually created, and also the ultimate
lack of difference between spirit and matter. (I’m also thinking of Teryl
Givens’ work here, in People of Paradox, about the blurring of sacred and
secular.) So back to consecration, I like what you’re doing because it doesn’t
seem to rely, if I’m reading it right, on that sort of split. It strikes me as a
narrative move: to approach something in the context of a new narrative is to
change its telos, and to orient yourself to it in a different way.
Speaking of narrative, I’m also thinking about the differences you mention
between the first and second halves of the chapter, in terms of the first being
more philosophical and the second being more narrative. Narrative
theologians point out that one of the advantages of narrative is that it
engages people in a way that pure theological discourse doesn’t. (There might
be people who are converted solely by encountering theological ideas, but
they are few and far between.) It would make sense, then, if Lehi is shifting
to preach to a broader audience, and one that isn’t necessarily converted,
that he would adopt a more narrative mode of discourse.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
January 17, 2013 at 2:13 pm
Sheila – Yes, the troubling of the distinction between the sacred
and the profane in Mormonism (and Terryl’s discussion in People
of Paradoxis exactly what I’d cite as well) is largely what’s
behind my attempt to rethink the issue of consecration. I think
you’ve understood me perfectly. I have the same questions,
however, about the existence of sacred space in Mormonism—
temples in particular, with the post-Nibley FARMS material
articulating the OT priestly maintenance of the boundaries of the
sacred being the scholarly thorn in my side. Frankly, we need a
new theology of temples, one that recognizes fully the
uncoupling of temple and state, of temple and law, of temple
and exception. But that’s, of course, a different project. :)
Getting back to your more immediate point, I like your framing
of consecration in narrative terms. The trick, of course, is that
the consecrating narrative is one whose beginning point is
undecidable (from within the parameters of the collection of
narratives whose weave make up the world we know), whose
24
narrator is indiscernible (again: from within the parameters of,
etc.), whose appeal is genuinely universal rather than
determined by the interests of a specifiable party (again: from
within, etc.), and whose telos can’t be identified or must remain
open (again: etc.). In short, we’d have to be careful not to
confuse a consecrating narrative with any narrative already on
offer—and its this imperative that, generally speaking, leads us
to posit a kind of simplistic sacred/profane distinction. Or so I
suspect.
As for your other point about narrative: that’s very helpful. You
have only my thanks in response!
REPLY
Deidre Greensaid:

January 20, 2013 at 2:04 pm
Response to First Post
2 Nephi 2 and Jacob 5
In his discussion of Jacob’s afflictions being
consecrated for his gain, Joe comments that Jacob
may ”experience in those sufferings something
endless, something gratuitous, something
graceful—the Lord’s own hand.” Sheila suggests the
possibility of 2 Nephi 2 offering a theodical account,
and it could be argued that the entire chapter is a
way of making sense of Jacob’s life, and this theme
may continue in Jacob’s own discourses. Lehi
attunes him to the importance of making
theological sense of his own existence.
Significantly, many years later, when Jacob is
drawing on Zenos in the allegory of the Olive Tree
found in Jacob 5, that he highlights a providential
relation to one planted in adversity, yet nurtured by
the hand of God. Here, Jacob quotes Zenos thus :
“And it came to pass that the servant said unto his
master: How comest thou hither to plant this tree,
or this branch of the tree? For behold, it was the
poorest spot in all the land of the vineyard. And the
Lord of the vineyard said unto him: Counsel me
not; I knew that it was a poor spot of ground;
wherefore, I said unto thee, I have nourished it this
long time, and though beholdest that it hath
brought forth much fruit.”
Perhaps Jacob himself can identify with this, that
25
through the adversity he has faced at the hands of
his family members and by living in a liminal state,
he has nevertheless been nurtured and guided by
God. He brings forth much fruit through preaching,
temple service, and maintaining the scriptural
record. Not unlike Joseph Smith translating the
plates and reading prophecy about himself in 2
Nephi 3: 7-15, perhaps Jacob finds in the words of
Zenos illlumination of his own spiritual standing
before God: God does something remarkable with
Jacob’s life not in spite of the rudeness of his
brethren, but precisely because of it. It is because
of his precarious standing in his family life—the
particular way in which he has experienced
opposition in all things—that God nurtures him
directly and prepares him for his life’s tasks. Lehi
ends the discourse by telling his sons that he has
“no other object save it be the everlasting welfare
of your souls.” Not only by listening to his father’s
teachings, but by subsequently taking and keeping
the record, he is able to see who he is, how
providence has worked in his own life, and make
sense of his sufferings, adversity, and opposition.
In this sense, the theodical account is not given in
the text alone, but is performative and enacted.
joespencersaid:

January 20, 2013 at 3:14 pm
Interesting thoughts, Deidre. I wonder, in light of
this, how Jacob would have regarded Zenos’ words
about the branch planted in a good spot of land.
Might he have found it significant that that branch
was the first to be corrupted? Perhaps there are
echoes here with Jacob 2 as well, where Jacob
watches the Nephites settle into a goodly land, only
to begin immediately to pursue corruption….
Discussion Summary: 2 Nephi 2:1-3a
13
SundayJAN 2013
POSTED
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We’ve ended up with a rather rich discussion of the opening of 2 Nephi 2. Let me see if I
can’t distill from it a few of the most salient points.
The first point of discussion concerned the place of 2 Nephi 2 in 2 Nephi 1-4. There seems
to be a difference between Lehi’s words to those born in Jerusalem (addressed first in 2
Nephi 1) and his words to those not born in Jerusalem (addressed next in 2 Nephi 2-3), a
difference Lehi seems to emphasize given that he organizes his final exhortations by
birthplace ratherthan biological relation. The difference, at least in part, is that
betweenconditional and unconditional blessings—comparing the if-then structure of what
appears in 2 Nephi 1 to the straightforward shall’s of 2 Nephi 2. (All this is complicated by
the weaving of conditionality and unconditionality in 2 Nephi 3, but perhaps this
complication can be bracketed if one insists just on looking at the respective blessings given
to Lehi’s firstborns, Laman and Jacob.) There may be reason to think that this difference
between conditionality (associated, it seems, with the foreclosed Old World of destruction)
and unconditionality (associated, it seems, with the potentiated New World of promise)
marks a shift toward a full realization of (the unconditionality of) grace.
The next point of discussion concerned the relationship between 2 Nephi 2 and King
Benjamin’s centuries-later sermon. It appears that there are a few quite remarkable textual
connections between the two texts, though there’s reason to think that Benjamin was more
intensely focused on what might be gleaned from 2 Nephi 9, Jacob’s own subsequent
expansion on Lehi’s words in 2 Nephi 2. These connections are perhaps suggestive of a
deeper interest on King Benjamin’s part in the small plates—a record that he, uniquely
among Nephite kings to that point, had uninterrupted access. It may be significant, though,
that he, like his contemporary Abinadi, was interested chiefly—perhaps exclusively—in 2
Nephi 2 and 2 Nephi 9, ready to leave off the more Isaianic parts of the record to which
Nephi gave the most attention. Perhaps these connections suggest more generally that it’s
through the sermons of King Benjamin and Abinadi that Lehi’s and Jacob’s teachings
regarding the plan of salvation passed into general Nephite knowledge. That may be
important for understanding the basic significance of 2 Nephi 2 and 2 Nephi 9 for Nephite
thought.
A further point of discussion concerned the matter of consecrating affliction for gain, an
issue that raises question of God’s justice. Lehi’s mention of “rudeness” and “afflictions,” as
well as of these kinds of things being “consecrate[d],” might suggest that subsequent parts
of Lehi’s sermon of sorts be regarded as a theodicy—though there are certain problems with
such a view. There are reasons, though, to suggest that Jacob had a longer-term interest in
questions of theodicies, something that might be reflected in his interest in the olive-tree
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allegory he takes over from Zenos. However we might think about Lehi’s and Jacob’s
respective investments in constructing a theodicy, though, it seems that Lehi’s focus in the
first verses of 2 Nephi 2 is principally on redemption and consecration—themes that proves
to be theologically complex. Is the consecration of affliction a matter of providing nasty
experiences with a new telos? Of disengaging them from every telos? Of revealing that
they’ve had a hidden telos all along? There are reasons to be nervous about each of these
possibilities, but there’s also good reason to pursue them.
A final point of discussion concerned the relevance of narrativity to the study of 2 Nephi 2.
It’s possible, perhaps, to think the act of consecration in terms of narrativity, though it may
prove rather complicated to do so. Speaking more generally, there seems to be much to
learn from narratology about the apparent division of 2 Nephi 2 into two halves—a first,
more emphatically atemporal-because-doctrinal half, and a second, more ephatically
temporal-because-narrative half. What motivates the shift to narrative, and how might such
motivations shed light on the apparent shift in audience (from Jacob alone in the first half of
the sermon to all of Lehi’s sons—and perhaps Laman and Lemuel in particular—in the
second half of the sermon)? It might further be asked how questions of narrativity here
might be clarified or complicated by the structures indicating temporal concerns that run
through the first four verses of 2 Nephi 2. But these are questions we’ll be asking as the
seminar continues.
It was a good week, and I, for one, am eager to see where we go next!
2 Nephi 2:3b–4
14
MondayJAN 2013
POSTED
BY JENNYWEBB IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 13 COMMENTS
Tags
atonement, Book of Mormon, fall of man,Lehi, nephi, religion,theology, Vision
I really enjoyed the beginnings of our discussion last week—Joe always has a way of looking
at things that startles me into new thoughts. My approach, while not as rigorous as Joe’s
(unfortunately!), will hopefully spark a fruitful continuation of the discussion. Onward!
The Text
28
Wherefore, I know that thou art redeemed because of the righteousness of thy redeemer.
For thou hast beheld that in the fullness of time he cometh to bring salvation unto
men, and thou hast beheld in thy youth his glory—wherefore, thou art blessed even as
they unto whom he shall minister in the flesh. For the spirit is the same—yesterday,
today, and forever—and the way is prepared from the fall of man; and salvation is free
3b
4
Wherefore
Let’s start with the “wherefore.” As a conjunction and in this context, it is perhaps best read
as “because of which” or “as a result of which”—something more akin to our modern usage
of “therefore.” It’s important to remember that the “which” referred to here is found back in
verse 2: “thou knowest the greatness of God, and he shall consecrate thine afflictions for
thy gain.” Here, Lehi describes Jacob’s knowledge and then gives him a promise. Verse 3
includes two sentences, each beginning with “wherefore.” The first: “Wherefore, thy soul
shall be blessed, and thou shalt dwell safely with thy brother Nephi, and thy days shall be
spent in the service of thy God.” And then the second: “Wherefore, I know that thou art
redeemed because of the righteousness of thy redeemer.”
I put all this out there because I think it’s important to realize how much Lehi pins on
Jacob’s knowing “the greatness of God” and his promise of the consecration of Jacob’s
afflictions. Put another way, because Jacob knows the greatness of God, and because God
will accept Jacob’s afflictions to Jacob’s gain, Jacob’s soul will be blessed, he will dwell safely
with Nephi, he will live a life of service to God, and Lehi knows the righteousness of Christ
redeems Jacob. That’s quite a list, but when we put them all together it highlights why Lehi
broke it into the two “wherefore” sections. The first “wherefore” indicates a kind of cause
and effect: testimony and consecration result in blessing, safety, and service to God (put
this way, I think it strengthens to argument that Lehi is setting Jacob apart for temple
service here). The second “wherefore,” however, is not as straightforward. It seems to
indicate, rather, Lehi’s witness that because of Jacob’s testimony and the promise of the
consecration of his afflictions, Lehi himself knows of Jacob’s redemption through the
righteousness of the Savior.
So we have a scenario in which a father’s witness and testimony of the efficacy and power
of the atonement and the righteousness of the atoner himself are strengthened by, if not
perhaps even due to, his knowledge of his son’s testimony and his prophetic promise that
his son’s afflictions will be consecrated. Which, to me, darkly underscores the potency of
Jacob’s afflictions—as a parent, I desperately want to believe (and often do) that the
afflictions of my children will somehow ultimately be changed from damaging them to
building them. Read this way, this second “wherefore” is not just a straightforward
testimony regarding Jacob’s redemption through the righteousness of Christ, but also a
29
heartfelt acknowledgment of Jacob’s suffering: my son, I know how bad things have been,
and they have been bad enough that I know that the only power capable of changing these
experiences from fundamentally damaging to eternally redeeming is a power that comes
through the rectitude, perfection, and passion of Jesus Christ and his atonement.
Beheld
Lehi then echoes the two-part structure of the previous “wherefores” with the repetition of
another phrase: “thou has beheld.” “For thou hast beheld that in the fullness of time he
cometh to bring salvation unto men, 4and thou hast beheld in thy youth his glory.” A quick
note on the conjunction “For” here: clearly, it echoes the “because of which” sense of the
previous “wherefores”; Lehi seems to be offering a sort of explanation as to how or why he
knows of Jacob’s redemption. But what is interesting is that Lehi, the visionary man, does
not claim that he has seen Jacob’s redemption or even his Redeemer. Rather, Lehi’s
knowledge rests on Jacob’s own capacity as a seer.
For Lehi, Jacob is a son who sees. Jacob is the son who has received visions from heaven.
At some point he shared their contents with at least Lehi, although it is likely that the
rudeness and afflictions Jacob suffered were due in part to a negative reaction from Laman
and Lemuel at having yet another visionary younger brother. It’s easy to imagine that they
might have sought to “shut down” Jacob with greater vehemence since they already felt
they had let Nephi “get out of hand” so to speak. But Lehi is not about to let Jacob, nor his
brothers, forget Jacob’s visionary experiences.
In identifying Jacob as someone who receives visions from God, Lehi subtly underscores
Jacob’s visionary inheritance. Jacob’s identity as someone who has seen, who has beheld,
overlaps with that of Lehi himself. It is interesting that Lehi, in some sense, seems to be
marking Jacob as his visionary heir rather than Nephi. Why Jacob and not Nephi? Or why
not both? I don’t have a good answer.
And what, exactly, are the things that Jacob has beheld? Again: “that in the fullness of time
he cometh to bring salvation unto men, and … in thy youth his glory.” When and what is this
fulness of time? (Do we have some sort of super-saturated moment here, where time is
exceeded in the completion of the atonement and its eternal effectiveness?) Is there
anything to be made of the contrast of this fullness of time with the discrete time period
known as Jacob’s youth? (Jacob can’t be that old, but note that Lehi speaks of Jacob’s youth
as a thing past and gone; again, a possible indicator of a loss of innocence resulting from
his afflictions?) Does “thou has beheld in thy youth his glory” necessarily refer to a vision of
the Savior? If not, what does it mean to behold his glory? Could Jacob’s vision here refer to
30
a type of insightfulness or reflective quality that allows him to perceive things as they really
are such that in his youth he came to understand the nature and reality of God’s glory? (If
so, what is this nature?)
As you can see, I don’t have any clear-cut answers regarding what, actually, Jacob has
seen. But I think this interpretive flexibility actually strengthens Jacob’s identity as another
visionary man following Lehi—the important thing here is not necessarily what Jacob has
seen, but rather the fact that he has seen it, witnessed it, and at some point shared these
things with his father, allowing his father in turn to remind Jacob of his visionary
inheritance.
Minister
Again, due to the things that Jacob has beheld, Lehi reiterates the idea that Jacob is
blessed. But this time he provides an oddly specific, embodied blessing: “thou art blessed
even as they unto whom he shall minister in the flesh.” Which begs the question: what is
the blessing of those unto whom Christ ministered in the flesh? How is that blessing
substantively different from the blessing received by those unto whom Christ did not
minister in the flesh? And what, exactly, is it to minister in the flesh?
I think it’s easy to look at this phrase and assume (as I think it does, at least in part) that it
refers to the blessing of being in the physical presence of Christ during his mortal ministry.
But I really think there’s a bit of a catch here: how does Christ minister to any one except in
the flesh? Put another way: we are here, embodied, and in that flesh fallen. We don’t want
our spirits saved; we want our souls saved—we want to bring both spirit and flesh before
the Father, and the only way we can do so is to receive the ministrations of Christ with our
whole soul.
Our modern temple rituals emphasize the fleshiness of Christ’s ministrations, and they do
so, I think, deliberately in order to impress upon us the physical reality of the atonement,
and as such, the physical reality of our own corporeal salvation. The resurrection, while
eminently practical (the only way to have eternal life is through the salvation and
resurrection of the body and spirit), is also immanently poetic: it’s not just that Christ lives,
but that he’s brought his body with him, and he will (literally) raise ours to him as well.
Later on, when Lehi says that “salvation is free,” it’s easy to interpret his words in terms of
grace; salvation as the graceful gift freely given by Christ. And yet, recalling this emphasis
on Christ’s ministry as both enfleshed and as for the flesh, it’s possible to also read these
words as saying that salvation as resurrection is free, is freely given, is graciously gifted to
all.
31
*Reigns self in.* Ok, the point here is that I think it’s possible to read Lehi hear as again
affirming Jacob’s priestly role and his dedication to the temple rites. Who would better come
to understand the relationship between Christ, flesh, and ministry than his priest in the
temple, sacrificing in the service of God?
I need to wrap this up, or I won’t get it posted in time, but we cannot simply skip that last
sentence. So I’m going to cheat and urge you to return to the final section of Joe’s post,
“Structure and Time.” This section didn’t really receive much commentary in the discussion
last week, but I think Joe’s on to some really interesting readings of what’s going on
temporally in the end of verse 4. I’m also going to throw a few additional questions below;
basically sections I wanted to work out more fully, but haven’t yet (i.e., I’m hoping
something might spark someone’s thoughts so they can do the work and I can just read and
enjoy :)
Additional Questions
When Lehi says “I know that thou art redeemed because of the righteousness of thy
Redeemer, is he saying that he knows Jacob is redeemed due to the righteousness of Christ
(and his atonement), or is he saying that his knowledgeof Jacob’s redemption is dependent
on the righteousness of the Redeemer?
What is “the righteousness of thy Redeemer”? Is this a reference to a specific aspect of
Christ, or is it a more general reference? I think there’s a lot going on in this phrase, but I
want to try and unpack it more together.
What does “he cometh to bring” mean? Why doesn’t Lehi just say “he brings”? Is there
something significant in both the fact that Christ comes to earth and the fact that he brings
salvation? We would normally, I think, hear the second part of that phrase as “he bringeth
to pass salvation,” but that’s not what Lehi says. The image of bringing suggests some sort
of physical work, some sort of carrying or bearing. Does this word choice emphasize the
physicality of the atonement?
Which spirit does “For the spirit is the same” refer to? The Holy Ghost? Or is this spirit
meant to contrast with the ministering Christ does to the flesh of mankind? By that I mean,
is Lehi acknowledging that our spirits are eternal, but that our bodies can only become so
through Christ?
How does “from” function in the phrase “the way is prepared from the fall of man”? As “the
way is prepared since the time of the fall of man”? As “the way is prepared due to the fall of
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man”? Both? Something different? This seems like a fairly interpretively vague way to
introduce the theme of the fall into the discourse.
How does the constancy of the spirit relate to the preparations for salvation as related to
the fall? What is Lehi saying about the fall and atonement and why is he pairing it with a
discussion on the eternal nature of (the) spirit?
Why is it significant that salvation is free? Is it free for everyone, and if so, what do we
make of Lehi’s shift from his specific, tight focus on Jacob’s redemption to this broad,
universalized understanding of salvation?
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About jennywebb
Mom, wife, editor. Not much time left over at the moment.
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13
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:3B–4”
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 14, 2013 at 2:05 pm
Jenny – Great insights, there is lots to discuss here. One thing that intrigued
me in my first reading of your post concerns the word “beheld” and Jacob as
Lehi’s visionary heir. Lehi uses the words “behold” or “beheld” 51 times, and
the two you point out are the only two times in which he speaks of somebody
besides himself seeing something. He uses the word “see” and its derivatives
13 times and only once refers to somebody other than himself “seeing”
something (Joseph of Egypt in 2 Nephi 3:5). He uses the word “vision” 3
times (and “visionary” once) exclusively in describing his own experiences. All
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of this is to say that his focus on Jacob’s “beholding” is unique, and
consequently perhaps quite important.
REPLY
jennywebbsaid:
o
January 15, 2013 at 2:16 am
John, this is really useful, thank you! While I’ve been working on
this section, I’ve been struck repeatedly at how odd and even
difficult in some ways this must have been for Nephi. After all,
Nephi is the one who believed his father initially, and who of his
own initiative sought and received visions (the visions of his
father, to be more specific). So why wouldn’t Nephi be named as
Lehi’s visionary heir? I wonder if it’s important that, while we
have very detailed accounts of Nephi’s visions, we lack such
accounts of Jacob’s early visions. Could this indicate somehow
that Jacob received a distinct vision experience from that of Lehi
and Nephi? Did Jacob’s experience somehow go beyond that of
Lehi’s, and thus mark him as Lehi’s visionary heir (the son going
beyond the father rather than repeating the father?). I’m
obviously just hypothesizing here, but it seems like there must
be something about Jacob that would lead Lehi to make this
specific identification.
REPLY
2.
ricosaid:
January 14, 2013 at 10:59 pm
What if there is a concern or perhaps a regret among Jacob and others that
they will not be alive when the redeemer comes in the fulness of time?
(Whatever time this “fulness of time” points to, it is clearly not the time of
Lehi or Jacob). Lehi states that Jacob beheld “the glory” of the redeemer but
this could also be viewed as implicit admission that Jacob did not behold
Christ in the flesh. In other words, “glory” here might be partially functioning
as a somewhat painful reminder for the fact that Jacob beheld the redeemer
but not in the same way as those who would see him in the flesh. If we
introduce that kind of anxiety in the mind of Jacob, unstated in the narrative
but one that seems to be lingering in the background, then Lehi’s ideas may
seem to have a logic to them. Lehi’s language may be trying to answer that
anxiety by stressing that it doesn’t matter that the fulness of time has not yet
come, Jacob is blessed as if the redeemer had already come and ministered in
the flesh or body (2 Ne. 9:5). Lehi stressing that the spirit is the same
regardless of temporal sequence, can also take on the same strategy. Thus,
Lehi may be trying to ease Jacob’s unstated lament (if we can try to
anticipate that anxiety although there does seem to be echoes of it in the
record, Helaman 16:18) by stressing that Jacob’s “beholding” is not
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qualitatively different from what it would be were he to be alive during the
fulness of time because the spirit is the same. As if to say to Jacob, times
may change it is true, and you will not live to see the redeemer in the flesh,
but your vision is not a second-best consolation prize, because the Spirit is
the same.
REPLY
jennywebbsaid:
o
January 15, 2013 at 2:33 am
Rico, thank you for your thoughts here. I’ve been thinking about
them, and have a kind of rambling question-y reply. You say
that the “fulness of time … is clearly not the time of Lehi or
Jacob.” Of course, when you put it that way, my first thought it
to question that and ask why or how it’s clear that it’s not Lehi
or Jacob’s time. That is, if we look at time sequentially, it is
historically clear that Lehi and Jacob did not live at the same
time as Christ. But I wonder if “the fullness of time” is somehow
explicitly not sequential. I keep associating fullness with images
of ripeness, the moment when the thing has come to full fruition
or is fully realized. In this view, fullness would then be nonsequential (not associated with maturation or growth) but rather
experiential (the state of being full/complete/ripe etc.) I think
it’s possible to argue that Christ comes in the fullness of time
every time he is recognized as the Savior and his grace, his
atonement, his gift, is accepted. So Christ comes in the fullness
of time the moment we accept him as Christ, and in doing so
transcend the sequential (and thus consequence-oriented)
nature of our temporal reality; the fullness of time would then
cut across sequence via grace to enter the eternal. Or something
like that. Ok, I have more thoughts, but I have children to tuck
in bed …
REPLY
3.
ricosaid:
January 15, 2013 at 5:16 pm
Jenny, thanks for the question. I suppose I should be more careful with
adjectives like “clearly.” As I read your description of having an experience
with Christ in the moment of accepting his gift of grace, I keep thinking that
this is very similar to Alma’s born again experience. It is something that all
should and even must experience. It is an experience that is not contingent
on any specific timeline. I guess the question for me then is whether Lehi is
using “fulness of time” in that sense.
When I look at how the phrase is used by Lehi it seems to refer to a future
event that one can see in a vision: “thou hast beheld that in the fulness of
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time he cometh to bring salvation unto men.” (2 Ne. 2:3). “And the Messiah
cometh in the fulness of time, that he may redeem the children of men from
the fall” (2 Ne. 2:26). Later, Nephi will repeat this statement with a variation
that seems to further delineate this time: “But there is a God, and he is
Christ, and he cometh in the fulness of his own time.” (2 Ne. 11:7).
This aligns with Paul’s usage in Galatians 4:4 “But when the fulness of the
time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the
law.” For these reasons I see the term situated within the context of salvation
history. Along those lines, I think the association of “the fulness of time” with
ripeness or maturation or completion is very appropriate. The “fulness” then
refers to salvation history coming to fruition in the advent of the Messiah. In
other words, God’s purposes will build and eventually culminate in the
redeemer coming into the world in the flesh. That he will come in the flesh is
an added qualifier that for me, that places this event within a timeline that
not everyone will live within. It’s precisely that asymmetry that triggered my
thought experiment where Lehi’s statement is a response to that anxiety of
Jacob’s.
We tend to imagine that Lehi or Nephi or Jacob would treasure and value their
revelations and visions, and no doubt they do, and Nephi even tells us as
much. But visions of the future can also serve as a source of pain (Nephi’s
vision of the destruction of his seed, for example). Just as one could be
excited to see the future coming of the Messiah, that vision could equally be a
reminder that one will not live to see it. One could then imagine Jacob
perhaps having mixed feelings about the vision of his youth, or not being
particularly comforted by it. As if Jacob is feeling: “Not only have I suffered
much sorrow and affliction because of my brothers, but on top of it all, I was
born at the wrong time. What good is it to see all these great things that will
only happen in a future I will never experience? Would that I could live in the
fulness of time where I could be one of those to whom the Messiah will
minister to in the flesh.” One could then imagine Lehi trying to console Jacob.
“You saw a vision. You know you did and I know you did, and it doesn’t
matter that you are not living in the time the Messiah will minister in the
flesh, you are blessed exactly as those to whom he will minister in the flesh
are blessed. The spirit is the same. You are not missing out on the Messiah.”
It’s as if Lehi wants to point Jacob to his vision of the Messiah, but that vision
is also a source of pain for Jacob. I think this, in part, can serve as possible
answers to both your questions about what “in the flesh means” and what
“the spirit is the same means.” Lehi seems to be trying to respond to the the
asymmetry of salvation history with the temporal symmetry of the spirit that,
to borrow your words, “transcends the sequential.”
Perhaps I’m trying transfer or reconstitute your idea of the non-sequential
into the phrase “the spirit is the same” rather than in the phrase “fulness of
time.” Because if Jacob understands “fulness of time” to mean “every moment
36
in time” then there is no anxiety of missing out of the Messiah when he
comes, and then I’m at a loss for what purpose is served by Lehi stressing
that Jacob will be “blessed even as they unto whom he shall minister in the
flesh” and I also still do not know what function is served for Lehi to state that
the “spirit is the same.”
REPLY
4.
jennywebbsaid:
January 16, 2013 at 4:51 am
Rico, thanks for the response. I should have prefaced my earlier response
with “What I really want to talk about is the concept of anxiety you bring up,
because I think that’s really interesting and I’ll return to it later, but here’s a
tangential response in the meantime.” And I •am* going to think through it
more—hoped to get there today, but it will be tomorrow at this point.
Ok, that said, I think what I would say regarding the fulness of time
discussion is that I don’t think that either usage in 2 Ne 2 necessarily
precludes the reading I offered above, but I would qualify that reading by
saying that I don’t think one reading excludes the other either.
Nephi’s later usage of the phrase is interesting in that I’m not sure it’s as
easy or possible to have the simultaneous interpretations of the phrase
there—I think it’s easier to argue that Nephi understands Christ’s coming as a
temporally specific event in the future. And I wonder if that understanding
would shape or bias the presentation of Lehi’s blessing here. (That’s a more
general question I have for this chapter as a whole—is there evidence here
that Nephi is modulating Lehi’s discourse, or does this appear as a direct
quotation, possibly from Lehi’s original record [and thus would could this
potentially have appeared in the 116 pages]?) But I think we have to be
careful using New Testament texts to contextualize Lehite-era usage.
But I think thinking through all this is productive—I really liked where you
ended up trying to “reconstitute your idea of the non-sequential into the
phrase ‘the spirit is the same.’” And I think that ultimately for what Lehi’s
trying to say here to Jacob, that that’s the right direction to be thinking in.
REPLY
5.
joespencersaid:
January 16, 2013 at 2:45 pm
I want this morning just to respond to the fascinating discussion regarding
“the fullness of time.”
The phrase would seem to be drawn from the writings of Paul. Rico noted
Galatians 4:4 (the KJV for verses 3-5: “Even so we, when we were children,
were in bondage under the elements of the world: but when the fulness of
the timewas come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under
the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the
adoption of sons”). Equally important, though phrased slightly differently in
37
the KJV rendering, is Ephesians 1:10 (the KJV for verses 9-12: “Having made
known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which
he hath purposed in himself: that in the dispensation of the fulness of
times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in
heaven, and which are on earth; even in him: in whom also we have obtained
an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who
worketh all things after the counsel of his own will: that we should be to the
praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ”). These two references are
made to serve rather different purposes in Restoration scripture. Galatians,
with its singular “time,” is taken up by the Book of Mormon (in Second Nephi,
of course) and applied specifically to the time when Jesus came in the flesh.
Ephesians, with its plural “times” and its talk of a specific “dispensation,” is
taken up by the Doctrine and Covenants (nine times!) and applied specifically
to the eschatological “last days.”
The relationship between the Ephesians text and the Galatians text is already
complex and most interesting independent of such appropriations, as well.
Ephesians, it is almost universally agreed among scholars, is post-Pauline, the
work of a disciple, while Galatians is unquestionably the work of Paul himself.
Whatever the difference in authorship, though, the passage in which the
Ephesians reference to “the fullness of times” appears is one of the richest
summaries of Pauline apocalypticism on offer in the New Testament. (On this,
I highly recommend Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical exposition. The
attention he gives to Ephesians 1:10 is particularly rich.) All that said, there’s
a crucial difference between the two phrases as they appear in the two
letters. In Galatians, it translates to plērōma tou chronou, while in Ephesians
it translates to plērōma tōn kairōn. It’s not just that “time” is singular in the
one and plural in the other; there are different Greek words being translated
as time. The one from Galatians has reference to what might be called
“chronological time,” to time as an undifferentiated succession of “nows.” The
one from Ephesians, however, has reference to what might be called
“seasonal time,” to time as a kind of rhythmic unfolding of events with
greater and lesser weight. Further, as the larger context of each passage
makes clear, there’s an important difference between what each means to
indicate. The Galatians text seems pretty clearly to have reference to the
culminating event of “secular” history, the event that brings secular time to
an end. The Ephesians text, though, has reference to what is experienced in
the messianic time that follows after the saturation of secular time, the “time
that remains” when time has, in a certain sense, reached its end.
All this, it seems to me, might help us to think about exactly what’s at stake
in Lehi’s “even as.” Lehi’s discussion here, it seems to me, at once affirms
both diachronicity and a synchronicity. He asserts both that there is an
ongoing history with its peculiar rhythm—its ebbs and flows, its punctuation,
its foci—and that there is nonetheless a sense in which that history is nothing
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more than the surface play of much deeper non-historical structures. Fall and
atonement: events that punctuate the history of the world, and yet structures
that function independently of that history.
In a speculative vein, I wonder whether the play between history and
structure here might not help us to think about the historicity of the Book of
Mormon. It’s a matter at once of a series of events that, we generally affirm,
took place in a concrete setting in the ancient world. It matters that there was
a Nephi who read brass plates, that there was a tower on which Benjamin
spoke, that there were Nephite-Lamanite wars, that there was a visit from the
resurrected Christ, that a set of gold plates was buried. At the same time,
whatever could theoretically be learned from the ancient artifact itself (the
gold plates), we haven’t any access to it because we’ve been given a
translation that re-casts that history in strongly ahistorical terms—drawing on
the language of the KJV, speaking in the theological terms of our own era,
bearing the stamp of Joseph’s lack of learning, outlining a messianism
projected back to the foundation of the world.
Reading the Book of Mormon, we’re all so many Jacobs, no? We behold what
has happened in times we can’t experience, and yet we’re blessed for it.
We’re, in a certain sense, blessed even as they who experienced the history in
question were blessed—if blessed they were! The fullness of time was
elsewhen, and yet it’s precisely what I experience when I read. The fullness of
time is a ripeness that characterizes every moment even as it punctuated
history at one time and one time only. It’s not the fullness itself that
interrupts sequentiality with grace; it interrupted a particular sequence with a
particular manifestation of grace. Rather, then, it’s the possibility of the “even
as” that allows that singular interruption to interrupt at every moment, to
undo sequentiality at every moment. The great irony is that we can only
dispense with sequentiality through our emphatic affirmations of a sequence
that was interrupted in a specific way and at a specific time. The Book of
Mormon again: we can only give ourselves to the richness of its a-historical
theological gestures by affirming its historicity. Of course, it’s equally true
that we’re only likely to gain a conviction of its historicity if we give ourselves
to the richness of its a-historical theological gestures.
Or so it seems to me.
REPLY
o
shltaylorsaid:
January 21, 2013 at 9:15 am
Wow, great discussion. You’ve gotten me thinking a lot about
what it means to talk about the “fullness of times” I’m wary of
conceptualizing it in ahistorical terms, because I think you risk—
getting back to one of Jenny’s points—losing touch with the
importance of the physical, the concrete, which plays such a
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significant role in Mormonism. At the same time, I like the idea
that it’s also ever-present, in a sense, given that all of us who
don’t directly interact with Christ in mortality still encounter the
question of how we respond to him. So I guess I’m agreeing that
both of these ways of thinking can be valuable. It’s connected, I
think, to the need to balance the particular and the universal—
Christ comes to earth at a specific time, but his mission is a
universal one. Which is parallel to Jenny’s question about the
link between a specific blessing to a specific person, and an
understanding of salvation in universal terms. There’s a tension
between those two, and it’s an important tension.
This might be re-hashing what people have already said, but
thinking more about the fullness of time, the coming of Christ
can be seen as something genuinely new breaking into history.
As Joe says, it interrupts sequential time. Because of Christ—
whether you live before his mortal ministry, or after—history is
no longer what it was. It now has the potential to be
redemptive. Another way to approach that, perhaps, is to talk
about the relationship between time and eternity. The latter is
often conceptualized in LDS thinking as endless time. But what if
the two are qualitatively different? D&C 19, with its clarification
that “eternal punishment” doesn’t mean endless punishment,
but rather God’s punishment seems relevant here—suggesting
that to live in eternity is more than to live forever, but
specifically to live in a way that’s like God. Which is possible
because of Christ, who lives out a mortal life in history, but who
also connects historical time with eternity. Thus historical time,
as several people have said, comes to fruition with Christ.
And I might be getting a little far afield here. So back to verse 3,
what is the salvation that Christ brings? One possibility is that
there’s an intrinsic connection between salvation and the fullness
of time. It’s not just that Christ shows up in the fullness of time,
in other words, and brings salvation—it’s that the fullness of
time is itself something salvific.
REPLY
6.
ricosaid:
January 19, 2013 at 1:46 am
Okay, so I have more thoughts on different questions raised in this post.
There is still a lot to discuss.
Jacob as visionary heir and our second guiding question. Joe and Jenny have
pointed out that Jacob will later fulfill a priestly role in the temple. In terms of
his visions, Jacob plays a crucial role in further developing the “doctrine of
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Christ.” It is noteworthy that it is Jacob, and not Nephi, who first learns the
name of the redeemer from an angel. Jacob will state later: “Wherefore, as I
said unto you, it must needs be expedient that Christ—for in the last night the
angel spake unto me that this should be his name—should come among the
Jews.” (2 Ne. 10:3). I also would point out that prior to 2 Ne 10, nowhere
does anyone refer to the Messiah or redeemer as Christ. For example, 2 Ne.
9, is Jacob’s great discourse but the name of Christ is notably absent from the
text. And only after 2 Ne. 9, does Nephi employ the term Christ, and he
seems to do so with great frequency.
Bracketing the issue of how Jacob’s declaration makes sense if indeed
Messiah and Christ are the same word in two different languages (since
Jacob’s statement in 2 Ne. 10:3 appears to be a case where these terms are
not interchangeable), here we have Jacob as the one visited by the angel. It
is true that Nephi will repeat this kind of language in 2 Ne. 25:19b:
“according to the words of the prophets, and also the word of the angel of
God, his name shall be Jesus Christ, the Son of God.” It is somewhat
ambiguous whether Nephi is pointing to Jacob’s angel who declared the name
of Christ (and Jacob failed to mention the name Jesus), or whether a different
angel visited Nephi who supplied the name Jesus.
There is a problem with the reading I suggest. The original manuscript for 1
Ne. 12:18 reads “sword of the justice of the Eternal God and Jesus Christ,
which is the Lamb of God.” (emphasis mine). The text reads this way in the
1830 edition. For the 1837 edition, Joseph Smith changed Jesus
Christ to Messiah. I believe Royal Skousen argues the original text is the
better reading and that Nephi’s the angel in 2 Ne. 25:19 refers to 1 Ne. 12:18
in the original. That certainly seems reasonable and might explain where
Nephi learned the name “Jesus.” The response I would have to Skousen’s
position (if I understand it correctly) is that we have to posit that Nephi never
shared this knowledge with Lehi or Jacob, which is not explained, and I’m not
sure how to account for Nephi’s reticence or how to explain why this
significant name completely disappears from the text for only to explode onto
the scene after Jacob’s angelic visitation is recorded. Nephi certainly acts as if
he had never heard the name before Jacob’s vision and Jacob’s assumes this
knowledge is new. Joseph Smith’s emendation, therefore, would preserve a
progressive understanding of the nature of the Messiah as the group received
visions and angelic visitations. It would also explain why the characters in the
Book of Mormon act as if they are hearing it for the first time from Jacob. In
fact, it may be slightly anachronistic to use the term Christ in 2 Ne 2 since it
has not yet been revealed, although it certainly makes sense to use it in our
discussions for pragmatic reasons.
While one might argue that Nephi could have been recording his history years
after the fact and therefore we cannot expect or rely on his record to display
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this progressive understanding, still I’m quite impressed how much the text
does display this progression.
Nephi would later explain “And my brother, Jacob, also has seen him as I
have seen him; wherefore, I will send their words forth unto my children to
prove unto them that my words are true. Wherefore, by the words of three,
God hath said, I will establish my word. Nevertheless, God sendeth more
witnesses, and he proveth all his words.” (2 Nephi 11:3). Certainly Nephi had
great revelations of the Messiah whether Nephi knew the name of Christ
before the angel’s declaration to Jacob or not, and they both serve as
witnesses. Yet, the way that the text is saturated almost immediately
following the angelic declaration with the name Christ indicates to me the
degree this knowledge was valued.
REPLY
7.
shltaylorsaid:
January 21, 2013 at 9:21 am
I really like the point about vision and visionaries—I hadn’t thought about that
before. My first thought was to wonder how that might connect to Mosiah 8,
in which the king of Zarahemla proposes that a seer is greater than a
prophet, and Ammon responds that a seer is also a revelator and a prophet. I
realize that’s in the specific context of being able to translate particular
records. But perhaps it can be thought about more broadly: to behold the
glory of God is to be a prophet as well as a seer. It’s an approach to the
prophetic that is less about seeing the future (as it’s often conceptualized)
and more about about beholding the reality of God. Jacob himself later
proposes a connection between prophecy and seeing things as they really
are: “he that prophesieth, let him prophesy to the understanding of men; for
the Spirit speaketh the truth and lieth not. Wherefore, it speaketh of things as
they really care, and of things as they really will be.” (Jacob 4:13) Though I
shouldn’t neglect the fact that he is also specifically referencing a knowledge
of the future, the knowledge that Christ will come—so there is perhaps is a
more traditional sense of seeing the future as well.
REPLY
8.
ricosaid:
January 23, 2013 at 1:35 am
“For the spirit is the same—yesterday, today, and forever—and the way is
prepared from the fall of man; and salvation is free.”
We do have Nephi writing something similar in an earlier passage:
“And it came to pass after I, Nephi, having heard all the words of my father,
concerning the things which he saw in a vision, and also the things which he
spake by the power of the Holy Ghost, which power he received by faith on
the Son of God—and the Son of God was the Messiah who should come—I,
Nephi, was desirous also that I might see, and hear, and know of these
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things, by the power of the Holy Ghost, which is the gift of God unto all those
who diligently seek him, as well in times of old as in the time that he should
manifest himself unto the children of men. For he is the same yesterday,
today, and forever; and the way is prepared for all men from the foundation
of the world, if it so be that they repent and come unto him. For he that
diligently seeketh shall find; and the mysteries of God shall be unfolded unto
them, by the power of the Holy Ghost, as well in these times [in this time,
1830] as in times of old, and as well in times of old as in times to come;
wherefore, the course of the Lord is one eternal round.” (1 Nephi 10:17-19).
The language is quite similar “yesterday, today, and forever” and “the way is
prepared” to suggest some sort of connection. It seems that “Holy Ghost” or
“he” is changed to “spirit” in 2 Nephi 2:4.
In addition, here we have another phrase (in times of old, times to come) that
deals with the concern of time, stressing that the same power of the Holy
Ghost operates in all times.
Incidentally, I’ve been looking for other places in the Book of Mormon text
that hit upon this concern with time period, thinking that perhaps this was
such a common concern that speakers developed strategies for addressing
such concerns. Various places refer to the “this time” compared with the
“time of his coming.” A good example is “is not a soul at this time as precious
unto God as a soul will be at the time of his coming?” (Alma 39:17; Alma
39:19; Alma 13:24). Jarom, King Benjamin, and Abinadi, use the phrase
“even as though he had already come among them” or a variant. (Jarom
1:11; Mosiah 3:13; Mosiah 16:6).
REPLY
joespencersaid:
o
January 23, 2013 at 1:50 pm
These are all crucial passages, I think. I’ve had a fair bit to say
elsewhere about Nephite messianism as reflected in these
passages (I have a piece shortly forthcoming in SquareTwo that
deals with the idea). But the passage I’ve not yet dealt with
much is the one in 1 Nephi 10, though I’ve thought a fair bit
about it. I need to do some further thinking, but I think you’re
exactly right….
REPLY
9.
Deidresaid:
January 28, 2013 at 10:35 am
Lehi says that Jacob is blessed as those to whom Christ manifests himself in
the flesh.
I want to highlight how faith leads to seeing. In Ether 3, Christ shows himself
to the Brother of Jared after he has affirmed his knowledge that what Christ
says is true—this knowledge, prior to seeing Christ, redeems him, brings him
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back into Christ’s presence, and Christ shows himself unto him (v.11-15).
Because of belief Christ manifests himself to the Brother of Jared. Of course,
this idea recurs in the New Testament where Christ blesses Peter for affirming
that he is the Messiah and the Son of God: “Blessed are you, Simon…for flesh
and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven (Matt 16:1318). Thomas is of course chastised for believing because he saw Christ:
“blessed are those who have not seen me, yet have come to believe” (John
20:28-30). In the passage below, Kierkegaard discusses the importance of
faith for seeing—that faith in Christ makes those who are not contemporary
with Christ equal with the witnesses that were. This is likewise what Christ
establishes in the Book of Mormon and the NT. In response to comparisons
made between Jacob and Nephi: one similarity is that Nephi becomes a
visionary because of his a priori faith in Lehi’s vision: “And blessed art thou,
Nephi, because thou believest in the Son of the most high God; wherefore,
thou shalt behold the things which thou has desired” (see 1 Nephi 11: 2-6).
As Nephi’s faith in his father’s vision leads him to his own vision, Jacob’s faith
in Christ allows him to be a special witness of Christ, one who is just like
those who have seen him in the flesh. The following passage is relevant to
discussion both of what is meant by “fullness of time” and what is meant by
Jacob having beheld Christ’s glory in his youth, highlighting the role of faith.
Christ’s coming is the fullness of time and in a sense is ahistorical because in
order to truly manifest faith in Christ and behold his glory, one must become
contemporary with him, i.e. have the faith to accept him in his lowliness and
abasement.
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus offers an invocation in Practice in
Christianity: “It is indeed eighteen hundred years since Jesus Christ walked
here on earth, but this is certainly not an event like other events, which once
they are over pass into history and then, as the distant past, pass into
oblivion. No, his presence hereon earth never becomes a thing of the past,
thus does not become more and more distant—that is, if faith is at all to be
found upon the earth; if not, well, then in that very instant it is a long time
since he lived. But as long as there is a believer, this person, in order to have
become that, must have been and as a believer must be just as contemporary
with you in this way, might see you in your true form and in the surroundings
of actuality as you walked here on earth, not in the form in which an empty
and meaningless or a thoughtless-romantic or a historical-talkative
remembrance has distorted you, since it is not the form of abasement in
which the believer sees you, and it cannot possibly be the form of glory in
which no one as yet has seen you. Would that we might see you as you are
and were and will be until your second coming in glory, as the sign of offense
and the object of faith, the lowly man, yet the Savior and Redeemer of the
human race, who out of love came to earth to see the lost, to suffer and die,
and yet, alas, every step you took on earth, every time you called to the
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straying, every time you reached out your hand to do signs and wonders, and
every time you defenselessly suffered the opposition of people without raising
a hand—again and again in concern you had to repeat, ‘Blessed is the one
who is not offended at me.’ Would that we might see you in this way and that
we then might not be offended at you!”
REPLY
2 Nephi 2:5-6
21
MondayJAN 2013
POSTED
BY
JOHN HILTON III
IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 25 COMMENTS
Let’s start with the text of 2 Nephi 2:5-6. (Note – there are no textual variants in these
verses (nor any in 2 Nephi 2 until verse 10)).
The Text
And men are instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil. And the law is given
unto men. And by the law no flesh is justified; or, by the law men are cut off. Yea, by
the temporal law they were cut off; and also, by the spiritual law they perish from that
which is good, and become miserable forever. Wherefore, redemption cometh in and
through the Holy Messiah; for he is full of grace and truth”
The First Guiding Question
I’d like to start by addressing a portion of our first guiding question:
“What relationship does the sermon of 2 Nephi 2 bear to scripture generally—whether in
terms of its immediate setting, its reliance on other scriptural texts, or its influence on other
scriptural texts?”
As I read the text for this week, a phrase that jumped out at me was “full of grace and
truth.” Clearly this phrase is related to John 1:14, what surprised me was that the phrase
also appears five times in the Book of Moses (1:6, 32, 5:7, 6:52, 7:11). Is it possible that
the book of Moses was a key part of Lehi’s message in 2 Nephi 2?
This led me to a very interesting article by Noel B. Reynolds called “The Brass Plates Version
of Genesis.” In this article Reynolds argues that the Book of Moses was closely related to
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the brass plates and that a series of textual connections between the Book of Mormon and
Moses are present because of the influence of the brass plates on Nephite thought.
He states that 2 Nephi 2 is “the chapter that reminds us most strongly of the Moses texts.”
While Reynolds does not mention “Full of grace and truth” in his article he does provide
other examples that may demonstrate a relationship between 2 Nephi 2 and Moses.
Reynolds writes:
“The doctrine of divinely given free agency is implicit in all of scripture, but is only taught
explicitly as a fundamental concept in the book of Moses and the Book of Mormon. In Moses
we learn that “Satan . . . sought to destroy the agency of man” (Moses 4:3), that God “gave
unto man his agency” (Moses 7:32; 4:3), and that men are therefore “agents unto
themselves” (Moses 6:56). Lehi picks up these same themes in a major discourse on
freedom of choice or agency and teaches that “God gave unto man that he should act for
himself” (2 Nephi 2:16); that by the redemption “they have become free forever, knowing
good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon” (2 Nephi 2:26); and that
men “are free to choose liberty and eternal life, . . . or to choose captivity and death,
according to the captivity and power of the devil” (2 Nephi 2:27)….
One sentence from Moses seems to have spawned a whole family of formulaic references in
the Book of Mormon: “And he became Satan, yea, even the devil,the father of all lies,
to deceive and to blind men, and to lead them captive at his will, even as many as would
not hearken unto my voice” (Moses 4:4). This language is echoed precisely by both Lehi and
Moroni, who, when mentioning the devil, add the stock qualification: “who is the father of all
lies” (cf. 2 Nephi 2:18; Ether 8:25).”
There are several other phrases in 2 Nephi 2 that may come from Moses. Consider these
two:
“And after Adam and Eve had partaken of the forbidden fruit they were driven out of the
garden of Eden, to till the earth” (2 Nephi 2:19) – compare “Therefore I, the Lord God,
will send him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken”
(Moses 4:29).
“For he gave commandment that all men must repent; for he showed unto all men that they
were lost, because of the transgression of their parents” (2 Nephi 2:21) – compare “But God
hath made known unto our fathers that all men must repent” (Moses 6:50).
There’s more that can be done here, but I’ll leave this point for now. At the end of this post
I’ll provide a list of 53 four-word phrases that 2 Nephi 2 shares with the Book of Moses (of
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course some of the most important connections could be thematic or have fewer connected
words).
The Second Question
Next, a thought on the 2nd question: “In what ways is audience important to the theological
bearing of 2 Nephi 2? More specifically, how important are the details of Jacob’s life to the
theological interpretation of Lehi’s words, particularly in the first half of the sermon?” While
preparing this post, I went back to the 1830 text of the Book of Mormon. What I found
probably belongsthis comment thread, rather than this post, but here goes. I noticed that
there is no chapter break between 2 Nephi 1-2 in the original text of the Book of Mormon.
Here is how it appears in the 1830 text (structurally, for convenience I’m using the current
text). I’m starting with 2 Nephi 1:28:
And now my son, Laman, and also Lemuel and Sam, and also my sons who are the
sons of Ishmael, behold, if ye will hearken unto the voice of Nephi ye shall not perish.
And if ye will hearken unto him I leave unto you a blessing, yea, even my first blessing. But
if ye will not hearken unto him I take away my first blessing, yea, even my blessing, and it
shall rest upon him. And now, Zoram, I speak unto you: Behold, thou art the servant of
Laban; nevertheless, thou hast been brought out of the land of Jerusalem, and I know that
thou art a true friend unto my son, Nephi, forever. Wherefore, because thou hast been
faithful thy seed shall be blessed with his seed, that they dwell in prosperity long upon the
face of this land; and nothing, save it shall be iniquity among them, shall harm or disturb
their prosperity upon the face of this land forever. Wherefore, if ye shall keep the
commandments of the Lord, the Lord hath consecrated this land for the security of thy seed
with the seed of my son. And now, Jacob, I speak unto you: Thou art my first-born in the
days of my tribulation in the wilderness. And behold, in thy childhood thou hast suffered
afflictions and much sorrow, because of the rudeness of thy brethren. Nevertheless,
Jacob, my first-born in the wilderness, thou knowest the greatness of God; and he shall
consecrate thine afflictions for thy gain. Wherefore, thy soul shall be blessed, and thou
shalt dwell safely with thy brother, Nephi; and thy days shall be spent in the service of
thy God. Wherefore, I know that thou art redeemed, because of the righteousness of thy
Redeemer; for thou hast beheld that in the fulness of time he cometh to bring salvation
unto men…
And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is
no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness there be
no happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness there be no punishment nor
misery. And if these things are not there is no God. And if there is no God we are not,
neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to be
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acted upon; wherefore, all things must have vanished away. And now, my sons, I speak
unto you these things for your profit and learning; for there is a God, and he hath created
all things, both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them are, both things to
act and things to be acted upon….
To me this softens contrasts between 2 Nephi 1 and 2. In the original text there is a break
between what we have as 2 and 3 and also 3 and 4. So 2 Nephi 1-2 constitute one unit and
2 Nephi 3 a separate unit. 2 Nephi 2 and 2 Nephi 3 both end with “Amen,” 2 Nephi 1 does
not, again arguing for a continued discourse. Viewed as one continuous block of text it
seems like Lehi is going around circle, (as his family is in the tent) speaking with different
individuals. Thus what we have as 2 Nephi 2:14 may not be the “big shift” back to
everybody. If all are present, Lehi’s eye contact could have shifted the focus even before
verse 14. Perhaps this is a conversation we can pick up at a later point.
Now this post is already growing long, and we haven’t addressed perhaps the most
important question, at least as it pertains to these verses: “Is there a consistent or coherent
theology developed in 2 Nephi 2—particularly with respect to purpose, creation, freedom,
law, opposition, redemption, and agency?”
2 Nephi 2:5-6 focuses on several of these issues. Knowledge of good and evil and law are
both connected agency. Elder Paul V. Johnson stated: “There are several things necessary
to make agency operative: eternal law, opposition or opposites, including enticement to the
good and the evil, a knowledge of good and evil, sometimes referred to as knowledge of
good from evil, and the freedom or ability to choose. Without each of these elements
agency and the accompanying personal accountability for our choices would not function”
(Elder Paul V. Johnson, Satellite Broadcast to Seminaries and Institutes, August 2003).
Commenting on these two verses, Brandt Gardner states:
“The eternal law itself cannot exalt us because violating any portion of that law places us in
a position of nonjustification. Lehi acknowledges that this is exactly what he means, for his
second sentence defines the first: ‘by the law no flesh is justified; or, by the law men are
cut off.’ The law cuts us off from God. It does not bring us closer—again because we will,
perforce, violate the law.
“Lehi’s next sentence further defines our predicament: ‘By the temporal law they were cut
off; and also, by the spiritual law they perish from that which is good, and become
miserable forever.’ While he does not define ‘they’ at this point, they are Adam and Eve, to
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whom he returns later in the discourse. In the context of the Garden of Eden and the law,
Lehi’s two types of separation are understandable. The ‘temporal law’ is the Fall’s physical
impact on their daily lives—e.g., difficulties in earning their daily bread. The ‘spiritual law’
with its spiritual fall separated them from all that was good—by definition, God’s presence.
Therefore, the effect of the spiritual fall was eternal misery.
“As I read Lehi’s sermon, he is constructing his case in dramatic extremes: the world’s
condition had there been no Atoning Messiah. Lehi is showing the darkness of despair before
the Messianic hope brightens our lives.” [Gardner,Second Witness, 2:37-39]
So a simple construction of these verses could be as follows:
Men know right from wrong, and there is a law that clearly designates what the right
choices are. There is no way a person can comply with the law in such a way that they are
saved by the law alone. Because of this redemption can only come through the Messiah.
I know there are a lot of loose ends here, so I’ll sign off with a couple of questions in hopes
that together we can together work through a few of these issues this week.
1. Does eliminating the chapter break between 2 Nephi 1 and 2 alter in any way our
conception of the setting in which this discourse took place, or our understanding of the
context of this pericope?
2. How do connections between 2 Nephi 2 and the Book of Moses inform our understanding
of 2 Nephi 2? Could 2 Nephi 2 provide a lens of “Lehi reading Moses” as 2 Nephi 26-27
illustrates Nephi reading Isaiah?
3. How can we develop the theological connections between verse 3 (“thou art
redeemed because of the righteousness of thy Redeemer” and verse 6 “Redemption
cometh in and through the Holy Messiah for he is full of grace and truth”). Thus in both
of these verses the emphasis on redemption through Christ, not through man, and not
through the law. How does this interchange with agency and other focal points that Lehi
will emphasize?
Last note: four-word phrases shared by the Book of Moses and 2 Nephi 2.
all men must repent
all the children of
and all things are
and the fowls of
And the days of
49
beasts of the field
behold all things have
bring to pass the
by the power of
children of men and
children of men were
Eden to till the
father of all lies
for he is full
fowls of the air
full of grace and
good and evil And
he is full of
in the days of
in the end of
in the last days
in the presence of
inhabitants of the earth
is full of grace
know good from evil
knowing good and evil
of all the earth
of Eden to till
of God and he
of God that they
of grace and truth
of the air and
of the children of
of the field and
that all men must
50
that they may know
the beasts of the
the children of men
the earth And the
the father of all
the fowls of the
the inhabitants of the
the power of the
the presence of God
the things which I
the tree of life
there is no God
these things are not
they were created and
to till the earth
unto the children of
unto the inhabitants of
ye shall be as
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25
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:5-6”
joespencersaid:
January 22, 2013 at 3:06 pm
I’ll be saying more soon, but this morning just a couple of thoughts on the
Moses-Lehi connection.
51
First, thanks for bringing all this out. It’s most helpful and incredibly
provocative. It raises a number of questions and points in fruitful directions.
That said…
I wonder if we shouldn’t be rather careful about the direction of influence
here. There are good and faithful arguments suggesting that Joseph’s “New
Translation” was less a restoration of ancient material than a reworking of the
biblical text in light of the Book of Mormon’s reorienting claims. At the same
time, there are good and faithful reasons to believe that it also, or at least at
places, gives us a window onto very ancient material—as, for instance, in
Moses 1 or the whole Enoch cycle. It’s difficult to know exactly what we’re
dealing with. I wonder if it might be most important just to look at the
connections and how they inform each other, and not to move too quickly into
any particular claims that Lehi had a source in the Book of Moses. Maybe a
stronger case can be made, but I guess my point is that it would have to
be made. So, at any rate, it seems to me.
Further, I wonder—and I haven’t had time to look—whether these
connections are complicated at all by a comparison with just the earliest
manuscript of the Book of Moses. There are two manuscripts for Joseph’s
work on the Old Testament. The earlier is by far the more interesting, and it
is much more creative, on the whole, than the later one. Since that earlier
manuscript heavily reworked all of Genesis 1-24, moreover, I wonder whether
there might be connections to be found between 2 Nephi 2 and the larger text
to be found in that earlier manuscript. Are there thematic connections
throughout it, or just in the excerpt that has become our Book of Moses? Or is
that to bark up the wrong tree, because the connections are mostly with the
later, revised manuscript?
All this just to say that any work on intertextuality with the Book of Moses is a
tricky affair!
REPLY
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 26, 2013 at 12:23 am
I agree that it is a tricky issue and that care is required. I found
Reynold’s article to be extremely insightful in this regard.
Reynolds states, “The foregoing discussion of Book of Mormon
parallels to a number of book of Moses passages constitutes
substantial evidence that the two texts are in some way
dependent on one another or some common source. The
question that follows next concerns the direction of influence.”
From what I gather though his article doesn’t address the
possibility that parallel portions are the result of inspired
additions as opposed to original text.
52
I agree that the textual connections are interesting in and of
themselves but more work is needed.
REPLY
2.
joespencersaid:
January 23, 2013 at 2:42 pm
Okay, getting back to this….
Very nice points about the relationship between 2 Nephi 1 and 2 Nephi 2, as
well as between 2 Nephi 1-2 and 2 Nephi 3. This is undoubtedly a major step
in the right direction, though it still has to be said that there’s a certain
undeniable privileging of the words to Jacob, as well as a clear sense in which
the second half of 2 Nephi 2 repeats the first half of 2 Nephi 2, though in
narrative form and with a different audience. I’ve got to do some more
thinking about all this, but you’ve brought out exactly the right complications.
I’ve got a whole set of questions concerning the theological claims made in
verses 5-6, but I’ll have to sort these out before I ask them. In short, I’m
struck by how much these verses scream for interpretation, but at the same
time by how much they resist interpretation….
REPLY
3.
joespencersaid:
January 24, 2013 at 2:58 pm
Okay, the more I work on these verses with an eye to theology, the more I’m
left just with a series of interpretive questions. As obnoxious as it might be to
do so, I’ll just ask a load of questions.
To whom does “men” refer at the beginning of verse 5 (as well as
subsequently, whether in the form of “men” or in the form of “they”)? Is it
significant that in this passage, every reference to “men” disappears once
Lehi turns to the Messiah (not “wherefore, they are redeemed in and through
the Holy Messiah,” but “wherefore, redemption cometh in and through the
Holy Messiah”)? How might all this have been different—say, if “children of
men” appeared instead of “men”?
Why is there an emphasis on sufficiency of instruction? Does this suggest that
“men” are given just enough to be blameworthy? Or does this suggest that
“men” are fully informed on this matter? And the passive construction of “are
instructed” leaves us in the dark: Who undertakes this instruction, and under
what circumstances? Are to understand simply that the fruit of the forbidden
tree effects this instruction, or are we being referred to actual teaching? Is it
of any significance here that torah, the Hebrew word for law, would be more
appropriately rendered as “instruction”—i.e., is it the law that does the
instructing in question here?
Should we put any weight on the construction of “know good from evil”? Is
the idea that one can tell good from evil (one can distinguish the two), or is
the idea that one can know good from evil (one can only develop an
53
acquaintance of the one through acquaintance with the other)? Could the
order of the opposed terms be reversed without a change in meaning (“know
evil from good”)? Should we read much into the word “evil”? How might the
meaning be changed if the word were “bad,” for instance?
Do we have a new thought or a mere repetition when we’re told that “the law
is given unto men”? What is “the law”? Is this word general or specific? That
is, are we being told that “men” are confronted with some kind of generalized
normativity just by being human, or are we being told that a specific law was
given to “men”? Do we have reference here to the Mosaic law? If so, how
would that change our interpretation of “men”? Whether the law is general or
specific, what does it do? Does it merely forbid? Does it prescribe as well?
Does it just draw distinctions? Does it provide a generalized picture of what
one should be like?
How would we read “by the law no flesh is justified” if it were ordered as
follows: “no flesh is justified by the law”? What does justification mean here?
Should it be taken in its juridical sense (declared innocent in a kind of court
setting)? Should it be taken in its more strictly Pauline sense (made-righteous
or made-just)? Should it be taken in its more logical sense (provided with an
explanatory reason)? And what’s to be made of the emphasis on the flesh
here? Why not just “by the law no one is justified” or “by the law no man is
justified”? Is there some kind of privileged relationship between the law and
the flesh?
Does the “or” that follows “justified” suggest that we’re now getting just
another way of saying what’s just been said, or does it suggest that we’re
now getting a corrected or more accurate version of what’s just been said?
Again, what if “by the law men are cut off” were rendered as “men are cut off
by the law”? How would that change our interpretation? How is meaning
altered when we shift from the negative construction of “no flesh is” to the
positive construction of “men are”? And how are we to think about the
disappearance of “flesh” in this second formulation? What does “cut off” mean
here—cut off from what (from God? from the earth? from the community?
from Eden?)?
What’s the status of the “yea” that comes next? How is it different from the
“or” that preceded the last bit? Is the second formulation of the “by the law”
business being affirmed here, or are both formulations being affirmed? And
what’s the status of the “and also” that comes a few words later? Does it
suggest that “the temporal law” has a certain privilege here, “the spiritual
law” being a kind of secondary concern? Or does it simply connect the
discussion of the temporal law and the spiritual law to each other, on equal
terms, we might say?
What on earth is “the temporal law”? And how on earth does it differ from
“the spiritual law”? Does “temporal” mean “pertaining to the flesh” or does it
mean “pertaining to time”? Does “spiritual” mean “pertaining to the spirit” or
54
does it mean “pertaining to eternity”? Are there two distinct laws here, or are
there two ways of relating to one and the same law (as in when one speaks of
“spiritual interpretation”)? Would it be even remotely right to take “the
temporal law” to refer to the law of Moses? If so, would it be even remotely
right to take “the spiritual law” to refer to what comes with Christ? How would
such historical distinctions hold water in light of the “even as” of the
preceding verses?
How do we think about the change from present to past tense here (“men are
cut off” is replaced now with “they were cut off”)? Does the past tense
suggest anything about the identification of the temporal law? Is it of any
significance that when Lehi turns from the temporal law to the spiritual law,
he returns from past tense to present tense (“by the temporal law
they were cut off,” but “by the spiritual law they perish from that which is
good”)? Why is “cut off” replaced with “perish from” when Lehi turns from the
temporal to the spiritual? Is this a clarification of “cut off” or a replacement of
it? Might this shift suggest that we punctuate this sentence and the one
preceding it differently: “By the law men were cut off—yea, by
the temporal law they were cut off—and also, by the spiritual law they perish
from that which is good”? How would such a reworking, where talk of the
temporal law is just a clarification of the preceding bit, change our
interpretation more generally?
What is “that which is good”? Why such a complicated formula (and not
simply, say, “they perish from the good”)? How does one “perish from that
which is good”? Should we even entertain the outlandish possibility that
“perish from” is being used in something like the way we say “die from” (“he
died from lead poisoning”) and not in something like the way we say “die to”
(“he’s dead to me”)? If so, what on earth would it mean to say that someone
dies from what’s good? Why is perishing here doubled with “becom[ing]
miserable forever”? And how seriously should we read that “forever”? Does it
mean what it says? Or is the forever cut short by what follows in verse 6?
Why does verse 6 begin with “wherefore”? How is that word functioning here?
Is the previous verse meant to be a kind of theological motivation for this
verse, and that’s what the “wherefore” signals? Or is the point more direct—
perhaps that the Holy Messiah has to be introduced because the law can
never effect redemption? Does the wherefore set up a disjunct or a conjunct,
then? Similarly, is redemption here to be roughly equated with justification
from the preceding verse? Are these two distinct operations? How are we to
understand redemption at all? Should we look to Old Testament models,
where redemption means to be purchased back out of slavery? Or are there
other ways we should think about this? What relationship does redemption
have to “salvation”?
What does it mean to say that “redemption cometh”? Is this a statement just
of how redemption is effected (it comes in and through the Messiah), or is it
55
an announcement of an event (the Messiah, bringing redemption, comes!)?
And why is “cometh” divided between coming in and coming through? How
does redemption come in the Messiah? How does it come through the
Messiah? Are these distinct operations? Where does this language of “in and
through” come from? Why is the Messiah specifically described as “Holy”
here? Would it have made a difference if that had not been added to the title?
What’s going on with the “for” that introduces the last clause? Does the
grace-and-truth bit explain “holy”? Does it explain the possibility of
redemption? Does it explain the Messiah’s ascendency over the law? And why
is there an emphasis on fullness? Why did Lehi not say just that the Messiah
is graceful and true? What’s the meaning of pairing grace and truth? How is
the Gospel of John relevant to this? Is grace here meant to be positioned
opposite the law from the preceding verse? But then what’s truth doing here?
And how are we to understand truth more generally here? What does it mean
to be full of truth?
A few questions that are plaguing me….
REPLY
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 26, 2013 at 6:51 pm
Great questions. I’ve spent a little time working on the question
“What on earth is “the temporal law”? And how on earth does it
differ from “the spiritual law”?” Obviously each of those phrases
only appear in 2 Nephi 2:5, so we have to look elsewhere to
determine the meaning.
First I think it’s interesting that this is the only time Lehi refers
to the “temporal law” or even uses the word “temporal.” The fact
that he gives no explanation makes me think that there must
have been a commonly shared understanding with his family
members as to what he meant.
The first time a “temporal” (or a derivative) appears in the Book
of Mormon is 1 Nephi 14:7: “For the time cometh, saith the
Lamb of God, that I will work a great and a marvelous work
among the children of men; a work which shall be everlasting,
either on the one hand or on the other—either to the convincing
of them unto peace and life eternal, or unto the deliverance of
them to the hardness of their hearts and the blindness of their
minds unto their being brought down into captivity, and also into
destruction, both temporally and spiritually, according to the
captivity of the devil, of which I have spoken.” It seems to me
that in this sense temporal _could_ be referring to mortal life
and _spiritual_ refers to eternal life.
56
The next time we see the word “temporal” comes when Laman
and Lemuel as Nephi about the vision he had. “And they said
unto me: Doth this thing [possibly the justice of God in v. 30 or
the awful gulf in v. 28] mean the torment of the body in the
days of probation, or doth it mean the final state of the soul
after the death of the temporal body, or doth it speak of the
things which are temporal? And it came to pass that I said unto
them that it was a representation of things both temporal and
spiritual; for the day should come that they must be judged of
their works, yea, even the works which were done by the
temporal body in their days of probation” (1 Nephi 15:31–32).
I’m interested in the distinction that L&L make here between
“the days of probation” and “the things which are temporal.” Or
are they using these terms synonymously? (Is it A or B or A?)
Nephi’s answer in verse 32 again seems to intimate that
“temporal” refers to things of this life.
Nephi’s next two references to “temporal” again seem to refer to
things pertaining to mortality:
“Wherefore, the things of which I have read are things
pertaining to things both temporal and spiritual; for it appears
that the house of Israel, sooner or later, will be scattered upon
all the face of the earth, and also among all nations. And behold,
there are many who are already lost from the knowledge of
those who are at Jerusalem. Yea, the more part of all the tribes
have been led away; and they are scattered to and fro upon the
isles of the sea; and whither they are none of us knoweth, save
that we know that they have been led away. And since they
have been led away, these things have been prophesied
concerning them, and also concerning all those who shall
hereafter be scattered and be confounded, because of the Holy
One of Israel; for against him will they harden their hearts;
wherefore, they shall be scattered among all nations and shall
be hated of all men. Nevertheless, after they shall be nursed by
the Gentiles, and the Lord has lifted up his hand upon the
Gentiles and set them up for a standard, and their children have
been carried in their arms, and their daughters have been
carried upon their shoulders, behold these things of which are
spoken are temporal; for thus are the covenants of the Lord with
our fathers; and it meaneth us in the days to come, and also all
our brethren who are of the house of Israel” (1 Nephi 22:3–6).
This section can be contrasted with with the latter-end of
chapter 22 in which Nephi seems to be speaking of a “spiritual”
or eternal gathering and scattering of Israel.
57
After Lehi’s discourse we only hear the word “temporal” once
from the first generation of Nephites. Jacob uses the word
“temporal” it is said in reference to death and seems to have the
meaning of “temporary.”
With the foregoing in mind, I wonder if “temporal law” refers
simply to mortality. So by temporal laws we perish (I age, get
sick, eventually die) and by spiritual laws (eternal issues such as
choosing between good and evil) I perish spiritually.
Joe, you asked, “Would it be even remotely right to take “the
temporal law” to refer to the law of Moses? If so, would it be
even remotely right to take “the spiritual law” to refer to what
comes with Christ? How would such historical distinctions hold
water in light of the “even as” of the preceding verses?” What
are your answers to this question?
I’d love to hear others insights as to the possible meanings of
“temporal law” and “spiritual law.”
REPLY
joespencersaid:

January 26, 2013 at 9:46 pm
My answers? Did I have any answers? ;)
For the moment, I’ll just express my thanks for
your review of the relevant texts. It’s most helpful.
I’ll do some more serious thinking about this, and
then I’ll see if I have anything helpful to say
myself!
4.
ricosaid:
January 24, 2013 at 6:57 pm
Concerning the chapter divisions. Certainly, the way original chapters of the
Book of Mormon are subsequently parsed can seriously impact the way we
read the text. I certainly feel this was well illustrated by the Alma 32 seminar
where one can see that dividing the original Alma 16 (1830) chapter into 6
chapters significantly disrupted the narrative. Relatively speaking, dividing up
2 Nephi 1 (1830) into two chapters doesn’t seem to disrupt the narrative to
the same extent. As Joe mentions, 2 Nephi 2 doesn’t hide the fact that it is
connected to 2 Nephi 1. Having said that, I think the what has been fruitful to
me is to recognize that everyone appears to be present and listening to the
words of Lehi, whether Lehi is directly addressing them in speech or not. In
that view, Lehi is able to communicate ideas to a particular audience member
indirectly. Or to put it another way, it isn’t clear what logical reason Lehi
needs to direct verses 5 and 6 to Jacob alone. It certainly feels like something
he would want to say to everyone.
58
Read in that light, “And men are instructed sufficiently” might be Lehi’s way
of addressing Laman and Lemuel without addressing them directly. In the
past Laman and Lemuel have claimed ignorance of the ways of the Lord: “for
the Lord maketh no such thing known unto us.” (1 Ne. 15:9). Perhaps this is
Lehi’s way of saying that no one has an excuse. Lehi tends to speak in a
juridical sense here that ignorance of the law is no excuse because no one
claim ignorance. His whole argument would break down if one could be
ignorant of the law. I’m reminded by Paul’s arguments for why Gentiles are
are without excuse, even though they are “without the law.” I want to come
back to this later.
In terms of the text (2 Ne. 2:5-6) and the relationship to scripture generally,
you suggest Lehi may be reading the Book of Moses as translated by Joseph
Smith. My sense is that this is a larger argument that would entail a distinct
set of questions and tools. I agree with Joe that there are faithful arguments
for not taking the position that Reynolds does. Just as one example, the first
Book of Moses manuscript (OT1) contains several references to the names
Christ and Jesus Christ. If the Book of Genesis contained on the brass plates
is OT1, then how do we explain how Lehi and Nephi do not obtain this
information about Christ from the plates of brass? The story Nephi tells is that
they get these names from angels. Modifications to OT1 in OT2 does eliminate
a few of these references to Jesus Christ (or substituting them for “only
begotten” or “son of god”), but not all of them. If, on the other hand, the
argument is not that OT1 is the plates of brass version of Genesis, but only
indicative that Lehi had an intermediate version with affinities to OT1, then it
would be difficult to examine influence. This, of course, does not preclude a
connection being made. The Book of Mormon manuscript and OT1 are
produced within a relatively close time period so that taking into account OT1
could prove fruitful, and perhaps we can explore that along the way.
I think there are internal Book of Mormon texts we might also consider that
are related to verses 5 and 6, namely, Alma 12 and Alma 42 (listed in the
internal commentary file). Of course, nothing precludes Alma from using
Lehi’s discourse in novel ways or in ways that Lehi did not intend, but may be
fruitful to explore Alma’s understanding of Lehi, especially in how he
interprets “temporal law” and “spiritual law.” I’d like to come back to this
later.
Finally, I think you raise a crucial tension between agency (although not a
term used in the Book of Mormon “act for himself”) and redemption. I think
this foreshadows a complex issue that we should see coming up again,
especially in later as Lehi’s discourse unfolds.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
January 25, 2013 at 1:47 pm
59
Great stuff here, Rico.
Thanks for pointing out the potential (thematic) connection
between Lehi’s “men are instructed sufficiently” and Paul’s
argument in Romans 1. I’ll be interested to hear your further
thoughts on that.
Thanks, also, for your careful note on the use of “Christ” and
“Jesus Christ” in OT1. That’s a very straightforward piece of
evidence, I think. In my view (I’ve argued this in an essay that’ll
appear in a collection of essays due out this year from Kofford
Books), the New Translation is best viewed as a systematic
reworking of the Bible on Joseph’s part in light of two themes
uniquely brought out by the Book of Mormon: (1) a new sort of
messianism (in which the Messiah has always already come, and
in which this idea is supposedly taught by “all the prophets”) and
(2) a systematic theology of writing (in which texts and their
circulation play a determinate role from the beginning of
history). I’ve no particular commitments to most of the
translation project being a restoration of actually historical
documents, but all the commitment in the world to it being a
kind of theological reworking, an attempt to rethink the biblical
text in light of what the Book of Mormon suggests. Hence, I’m
inclined to see the direction of influence flowing from the Book of
Mormon to the Book of Moses, rather than the other way
around, and I’m most interested in asking how 2 Nephi 2 gives
shape to the reworking of the Genesis text.
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:

January 26, 2013 at 12:32 am
Echoing Joe’s thanks. I hadn’t full thought through
the implications of Jesus Christ’s name appearing in
Moses but then being a new revelation to Jacob and
later Nephi. To Joe’s point about the direction of
influence, I think Reynold’s argument is still
important: “It is clearly Moses that provides the
unity and coherence to a host of scattered Book of
Mormon references. It is the story of creation and
subsequent events that supplies meaning to Book
of Mormon language connecting (1) the
transgression, fall, and death; (2) explaining the
origins of human agency; (3) describing the
character and modus operandi of Satan; (4)
explaining the origins and character of secret
60
combinations and the works of darkness—to
mention only a few of the most obvious examples.
The Book of Mormon is the derivative document. It
shows a number of different authors borrowing
from a common source as suited their particular
needs—Lehi, Nephi, Benjamin, and Alma all used it
frequently, drawing on its context to give added
meaning to their own writings.”
joespencersaid:

January 26, 2013 at 2:29 pm
I’ve just finished giving Reynolds’ article a re-read
(it had been a few years since I’d read it). I like
what he’s doing for the most part, but I’m surprised
he doesn’t draw exactly the opposite conclusion. If
it’s the case—and I agree with him—that “it is
clearly Moses that provides the unity and coherence
to a host of scattered Book of Mormon references,”
and if it’s the case—and I agree with him—that “it
is the story of creation and subsequent events that
supplies meaning to Book of Mormon language
connection (1) the transgression, fall, and death;
(2) explaining the origins of human agency; (3)
describing the character and modus operandi of
Satan; (4) explaining the origins and character of
secret combinations and the works of darkness,”
then I’d want to say, rather precisely, not that “the
Book of Mormon is the derivative document” but
that the Book of Moses is the derivative document.
Why?
All the details Reynolds assembles suggest to me
that Joseph Smith, newly acquainted with the richbut-largely-unsystematized theological ideas laid
out in the Book of Mormon, takes what he’s
discovered to the Bible, and begins to experiment
with a theological re-writing of the text in light of
the Book of Mormon. In the course of doing so, he
does a lot of synthesizing and systematizing,
sorting out and thinking through things. At the
same time, he does a lot of flattening and dehistoricizing: where the Book of Mormon presents a
history of development of all these ideas (barely
surfacing in the small plates, subsequently worked
61
up into a kind of system at the time of Benjamin
and Abinadi, and then heavily worked over by
Alma’s generation), the New Translation provides
all the details as a more or less completely worked
out theological picture—but one projected back into
a narrative rather than presented as a set of ideas
expounded in a sermon.
Thus, rather than seeing the Book of Mormon as
presenting “a number of different authors
borrowing from a common source as suited their
particular needs,” I can’t help but see the Book of
Mormon as presenting a complicated tradition of
theological development with clearly-traced
beginnings in Lehi’s reflections, a tradition whose
development is largely governed by historically
contingent needs but which draws not on a stable
and always ready source but on itself precisely as a
tradition. The ties with the Book of Moses are
crucial and illustrative (I’m more than intrigued!),
but their significance may lie elsewhere than in
mere source identification.
Are there costs in regarding the New Translation as
something other than the restoration, pure and
simple, of a more-original biblical text? Certainly.
And I feel the pinch when I shell out to cover those
costs. But what I get in return is, I think, well
worth what I paid: a theological interpretation of
the biblical text offered in full militant fidelity to
what the Book of Mormon brings to light—one done
fully under the sway of the Spirit and by the
prophet of prophets. It gives me a model for
thinking about what it means to read scripture with
the spirit of prophecy, and it gives me a strong
sense for why I might not need to bother much
with discovering historically-inaccessible “originals”
when what matters is the set of eternally true ideas
that, once developed, can change lives. And I trust
that in the mix of working on the biblical text in the
way Joseph did, I’m likely to stumble—as I trust he
did—on some actual (though perhaps indiscernible)
restorations of the original. But what matters
isn’t that but what emerges in its truth along the
way.
62
Maybe I could put the point this way, a bit more
provocatively: Why should I be inclined to think
that Joseph’s prophetic gift is a kind of divine tool
for accomplishing what secular scholars aim at: the
historically original, the objectively knowable, the
responsibly accurate? Shouldn’t I be much more
inclined to think that Joseph’s prophetic gift works
in an entirely different register—indeed, that it calls
the aims of secular scholarship quite directly into
question? I can’t help but worry that Reynolds in
this article, despite his careful work on the text,
gives in to a temptation, granting too much
importance to the desire to out-secular-scholar-ize
the secular scholars through divine means. I can’t
help but worry that this model grossly misinterprets
the scriptural formula “by study and also by faith”
(ironically the title of the book in which the essay
appears!), which doesn’t, I think, mean to suggest
that secular study can be takenfurther in its secular
aims when one doesn’t discount what can be
learned by faith (faith as supplement to study), but
means to suggest, rather, that secular study can be
helpful for those who are serious about faithfully
pursuing truth (study as supplement to faith).
But I’d better put an end to this sermon! Yikes!
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
January 26, 2013 at 12:36 am
Rico I appreciate our idea about Lehi perhaps using this as an
opportunity to indirectly provide messages to his children
(maybe the idea resonates with me because it’s a technique I
use all the time!) :)
I need to go back and read it with this lens in mind.
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:

January 26, 2013 at 6:28 pm
Joe – thanks for your thoughts. Your paradigm
deserves careful consideration. In light of the
textual connections we’ve considered this week. I’m
wondering what implications it would have for our
study if the textual connections flowed from the
Book of Mormon to a prophetic interpretation of the
Bible. Would there still be significance in specific
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textual connections? Or would it be more of just
commonly shared language? How foundational is
the text of 2 Nephi 2 for later understanding, both
in the Book of Mormon and in the restoration?
joespencersaid:

January 26, 2013 at 9:43 pm
These are very good questions. I guess it seems to
me that even to get started:
First, it’d be necessary to take six different texts
into account here: (1) 2 Nephi 2 itself; (2) any
subsequent BoM texts that draw on 2 Nephi 2; (3)
the Genesis account of the Fall; (4) the OT1 version
of the Fall story; (5) the OT2 version of the same;
and (6) D&C 29, received at about the same as and
clearly related in important ways to Moses 4, etc.
Second, we’d have to find answers to a set of
deeply complicating questions: (a) Is there a
clearly traceable history of thinking about 2 Nephi 2
within subsequent Nephite history? (b) How is
what’s decipherable of that history—whether in its
beginnings in 2 Nephi 2 or in its subsequent
developments—related to the KJV text of Genesis?
(c) What kind of a relationship should be
established between OT1 and OT2 (i.e., is the
former the only text to be taken seriously as a
“source” text, or are there places where the latter
gives us a better reading?)? (d) What relationship
does the determined Book-of-Moses text sustain to
Genesis, regardless of the Book of Mormon? (e)
What relationship does D&C 29 have to Genesis, if
there’s any directly traceable influence on its
shape? (f) What is the relationship between the
determined Book-of-Moses text and D&C 29, and
how does that complicate the picture? (g) With all
of that established, what do we begin to find when
we set 2 Nephi 2 side by side with the determined
Book-of-Moses text? (h) Are there any other
sources that might provide these two texts with
any phrasing or wording common to them but not
to Genesis or D&C 29, which might simply have
functioned in the working formulaic vocabulary of
the translator?
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That’s a ridiculously tall order, for sure.
Nonetheless, it could be undertaken
without too much trouble if the scope is limited to a
particular potentially productive phrase common to
2 Nephi 2 and Moses 4. Then it’d be necessary just
to (i) investigate any echoes later in the Book of
Mormon of the phrase or its immediate context, (ii)
look at how the phrase may or may not be related
to Genesis, (iii) look at how the phrase is used in
the Book of Moses when both OT1 and OT2 are
taken into consideration, (iv) glance at how the
phrase might be connected with D&C 29, (v)
consider whether there might be an independent
source-in-terms-of-translator’s-vocabulary, and
then, finally, (vi) decide what might be implied by
the relationship between Lehi’s and Moses’
respective texts.
And doing this with a few really promising
connections might well give us a clear sense of
what we’d find if we went about the ridiculous
program I outlined above!
5.
jennywebbsaid:
January 28, 2013 at 4:30 am
John (and Joe and Rico!), this is really interesting. I’m so sorry to be so late
coming to the conversation—I just want to let you know that I’ve got a lot to
mull over and that I’ll be chiming in soon. (Also hoping to encourage others
who, like me, may be a bit behind for one reason or another to join in, even
late!)
REPLY
6.
ricosaid:
January 28, 2013 at 11:43 pm
I’m gonna try to take a stab at the issue of temporal law and spiritual law. I
like the direction Joe and John have taken to explore the issue.
The more I think about it, the more I feel the better parsing of the text might
be the following:
“And the way is prepared from the fall of man, and salvation is free. And men
are instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil. And the law is given
unto men. And by the law no flesh is justified; or, by the law men are cut off.
Yea, by the temporal law they were cut off; and also, by the spiritual law they
perish from that which is good, and become miserable forever.”
Lehi’s instruction of “the fall” colors the rest of his language. His language of
“know good from evil” seems to be intended to invoke the Garden of Eden
65
story. In which case, it sounds like Lehi is suggesting because of the events of
the fall, men have been sufficiently instructed.
This would also suggest that the reason “by the temporal law they were cut
off” is placed in past tense because this event already occurred to Adam and
Eve. Certainly, this is how Jacob and Alma seem to interpret Lehi.
Interestingly, Jacob and Alma also seem to feel the need to create new
language to clarify Lehi’s words. They do not repeat the phrase “temporal
law” but rather Alma uses the term “temporal death” and Jacob uses the term
“death of the body.” Of course, it could be the case that both Jacob and Alma
misunderstand Lehi but I don’t see that here. Thus, the “temporal law” seems
to be pointing to Genesis 2:17, not quoted by Lehi, but partially quoted or
paraphrased by Alma: “If thou eat thou shalt surely die.” (Alma 12:23).
Under this interpretation, the law cannot point to the law of Moses, as Adam
and Eve precede the law of Moses.
Similarly, in terms of “spiritual law” it seems this is the law that relates to
what Jacob calls “death of the spirit” and both Jacob and Alma call “spiritual
death.” This could point to any law, the transgression of which results in the
death of the spirit. Thus, in an odd way, none of us have the opportunity to
be obedient to the temporal law anymore, although this implication doesn’t
seem to be discussed in the Book of Mormon. The inevitability of physical
death has already been decided for us. Our choices ultimately come down to
either eternal death or eternal life.
But there is another reason why it doesn’t seem that Lehi is referring to the
law of Moses. This law seems to be universal. In 2 Ne. 2. Lehi makes no
accommodations for the possibility that there is no law, or that some men
may not be sufficiently instructed in that law. Lehi states “men are instructed
sufficiently that they know good from evil” suggesting that no one can claim
ignorance. Indeed, under Lehi’s view, a world without law is a world where
God does not exist (2 Ne. 2:13).
Yet, I see Jacob somewhat diverging from Lehi here. Jacob does seem to
think that the law refers to a specific law that one possesses or that one can
be without. (2 Ne. 9:25-27). Jacob makes accommodations for “all those who
have not the law given to them.” Alma seems to ignore Jacob’s interpretation,
or if not ignoring, finds Lehi’s view better suited for his needs and goes back
to Lehi’s logic. (Alma 42:17-22). Thus, for Lehi and Alma, saying there is no
law ultimately throws a wrench into everything and leads to the conclusion of
no God. Alma writes: “if there was no law given, if men sinned what could
justice do, or mercy either, for they would have no claim upon the creature.”
For Jacob, however, not having law only means there is no condemnation and
“where there is no condemnation the mercies of the Holy One of Israel have
claim upon them.”
I think we have some interesting divergence occurring in these sections.
Jacob is making some accommodations that I don’t see being made in Lehi’s
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discourse. Jacob’s view does get adopted later by Mormon in the debates
about the baptism of little children (Moroni 8:22) who are described as
without the law.
REPLY
o
shltaylorsaid:
January 29, 2013 at 10:34 pm
Fascinating thoughts, Rico. I’m especially intrigued by that
contrast you note between Lehi and Jacob in their approach to
the law, and how it touches on the problem of, what do you do
with the potential that some might not get the message due to
no fault of their own? One way of dealing with that question that
some theologians have adopted is to start with the premise that
God wants to save all (usually based on 2 Peter 3:9) and then
work backwards—if God wants to save all, and x is required for
salvation, then x must be universal (x might refer to—possibly
implicit—knowledge of the law and/or of Christ).
Lehi proposes some kind of universal knowledge, I think, but
he’s not using that sort of logic. He here describes the current
situation of humankind: we know good from evil (presumably as
a result of the fall), and we are given the law. It’s interesting
that he doesn’t entirely follow the common chronology in which
you set up the problem (humans are fallen) and then go to the
solution (Christ). Rather, he first says that the way is prepared
from the fall and that salvation is free, then comments on the
human condition, and then brings up the Messiah. In other
words, he adds a bit at the beginning, which I think points to the
idea that the fall isn’t a mistake but is part of a broader plan.
I’m also thinking about the implications of this for missionary
work. One of the problems of any sort of universal knowledge is
that it can call into question the value of evangelizing. Briefly
jumping ahead, v. 8 gives the injunction to tell the world that no
flesh can dwell in the presence of God except through the grace
of Christ. Do we preach both the law and Christ—or is the former
already known? At the very least, knowledge of Christ is
evidently non-universal (or we wouldn’t be told to share it).
On a bit of a tangent from this, in past attempts to tackle the
LDS position on natural knowledge of God, I’ve been interested
in what the Lectures on Faith have to say, which that it comes
exclusively through revelation (as opposed to something innate):
“Without the revelations which he has given to us, no man by
searching could find out God.” (3:7) Adam taught “his posterity;
and it was through this means that the thought was first
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suggested to their minds that there was a God.” (2:31) Humans
wouldn’t even ask the question of God without it being sparked
by an external source: “from human testimony, and human
testimony only, that excited this inquiry, in the first instance, in
their minds.” (2:56)
But coming back to Lehi and the law, I’m wondering whether the
law is something we know implicitly, in a kind of Light-of-Christ
way—not a set of rules, but an innate sense of right and wrong—
or is it something we are taught from external sources? Does
that differ depending on whether we’re talking about temporal or
spiritual? Also, noting the tenses: humans “are instructed” and
the law “is given”—it sounds like an ongoing thing, something
dynamic. And what is the purpose of the law? It seems more like
a curse than a gift, since not only does it fail to justify us, but it
also cuts us off. It’s interesting that Lehi doesn’t talk about any
benefits of the law per se (e.g., it’s a schoolmaster, as in Paul’s
writings); his argument later in the chapter is that if there is no
law, ultimately, there is no God. Law isn’t simply a moral good
to help us along the way; it’s a necessary aspect of the fabric of
the universe.
REPLY
7.
studyyourscripturessaid:
January 29, 2013 at 2:22 pm
Great thoughts Rico. I think the point you and Joe make about the past tense
of “temporal law” is important. The word “law” appears 5 times in 2 Nephi 2:5
and it is only used in the past tense once (as you point out, explicitly to the
temporal law).
I’m not sure what to add next, but I will keep thinking on this.
REPLY
8.
ricosaid:
January 30, 2013 at 4:14 am
I really appreciate your follow up Sheila. There is a lot to ponder here. It’s
also tempting to speculate the reasons why Jacob entertains this additional
theological concern where Lehi does not. Perhaps this has to do with the fact
that by Jacob is writing at least 40 years after Lehi’s family has split up (2 Ne.
5:34) and there are others that Jacob can describe as “all those who hath not
the law given to them” as distinguished from those “that hath all the
commandments of God, like unto us.” (2 Ne. 9:27). Who are these people?
Interestingly, I think by introducing this theological novelty, Jacob creates a
problem. If “the mercies of the Holy One of Israel hath claim upon” those who
do not have the law, then what is the benefit for giving people the law?
(Assuming that Lehi is talking about the law of Moses). I think you are right
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that the law seems much more like a curse than a gift here. Any benefits of
the law Lehi highlights deals with how the law structures reality.
Perhaps, this leads Nephi and Jacob to feel the need to provide justifications
for why they still “keep the law of Moses” (2 Ne 25:24-25; Jacob 4:5). As a
tangent, these justifications for the law of Moses seem to be replete all
through the Book of Mormon (quite a fascinating line of thought on its town).
Suffice it to say, I find these explanations interesting because of Lehi’s
arguably negative take on law “by the law no flesh is justified…by the spiritual
law they perish from that which is good and become miserable
forever.” Incidentally, I wonder what Nephi thought of this. He returned to
Jerusalem for the plates of brass based on his reason “they could not keep
the commandments of the Lord according to the law of Moses, save they
should have the law.” (1 Ne. 4:15).
I like your discussion about the topic of evangelization. As you suggest,
despite the assertion that “men are instructed sufficiently that they know
good from evil” there are still things that Lehi says must be made “known
unto the inhabitants of the earth.” I get the sense that knowing good from
evil does not equal knowing the law of Moses and neither of those two equal
knowing about the Holy Messiah.
I’m skeptical that Lehi is saying the fall is not a mistake or that there is even
a concern whether the fall is intended by God or not. It is true that he states
“And the way is prepared from the fall of man, and salvation is free” but I
don’t read this as saying that the fall is part of the plan (although I may need
to unpack what I mean by that).
This relates to Jenny’s question about this language, but I would read Lehi to
be saying something along the lines “And the way is prepared [that man may
be redeemed] from the fall of man.” I would read this verse in light of Lehi’s
reiteration in verse 26: “And the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that
he may redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they are
redeemed from the fall they have become free forever, knowing good from
evil.”
King Benjamin phrases the relationship this way: “I say, that this is the man
who receiveth salvation, through the atonement which was prepared from the
foundation of the world for all mankind, which ever were since the fall of
Adam, or who are, or who ever shall be, even unto the end of the world.”
(Mosiah 4:7) “And Aaron did expound unto him the scriptures from the
creation of Adam, laying the fall of man before him, and their carnal state and
also the plan of redemption, which was prepared from the foundation of the
world, through Christ, for all whosoever would believe on his name.” (Alma
22:13).
I know that within broader development of Mormon thought on the fall that
several Mormon thinkers consider God to have intended and planned the fall
(this becomes a concern), taking an expansive definition of the plan of
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salvation to include the fall, but I see that as a later theological
development. I see the plan of redemption as articulated in the Book of
Mormon to be the response to the fall. At least, I’m skeptical that the Book of
Mormon entertains or anticipates the concern whether God intended the fall
or not, whether it is a “mistake” or not.
In a related vein, we haven’t really discussed the idea that Lehi appears to
have a concept of “the fall” but it isn’t clear where he is getting this idea or
what background we should assume about it, if anything. Biblical scholars
argue that the fall concept isn’t inherent in the Genesis text and that it is part
of a Christian exegetical tradition (although this is debated and others point to
later Jewish writings like 2 Esdras). For our purposes, I’m not sure whether
this is pertinent to our discussion, or whether it is more fruitful to just
examine what Lehi explicitly says about the fall, but I thought I mention it.
REPLY
9.
joespencersaid:
January 30, 2013 at 4:26 pm
Fantastic discussion of the law and some related themes here. Most
instructive. A few thoughts in response from me, mostly to Rico’s first
comment on this business:
If I’m understanding Rico’s reading correctly, he’s suggesting that “the
temporal law” refers specifically to the commandment given to Adam and Eve
in Eden regarding the fruit of the forbidden tree: “Don’t eat it. In the day
you do eat, you’ll die.” What Lehi here calls “the temporal law” would then be
exactly equivalent to what Alma, in Alma 12:31, calls “the first
commandments, as to things which were temporal.” Consequently, “the
spiritual law” refers specifically to the instructions given to Adam and Eve
after being banished from the Garden, instructions about which Alma has
much to say in the same “sermon” at the end of Alma 12 (and into Alma 13).
Yes?
I like that interpretation, at the very least because it makes for a rather direct
theological inheritance—one that Rico and Sheila in particular have been
discussing in some detail. However that inheritance is received, however, I
want to think about what this interpretation suggests about what Lehi himself
has to say.
First, this interpretation makes for a certain potential inconsistency in Lehi’s
first two claims in verse 5: “men are instructed sufficiently that they know
good from evil” and “the law is given unto men.” If the latter refers as much
to “the temporal law” as anything else, and hence to something originally
given in Eden, it would seem strange to couple it with the claim that “men are
instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil,” since that arguably
wasn’t the case until after Eden was lost. It would seem that the position of
Lehi’s statement that “the law is given unto men” would either equate it with
70
or indicate its historical subsequence to the sufficient instruction he mentions
at the opening of the verse.
How to deal with this potential inconsistency?
Perhaps we should read verse 5 as laying heaviest emphasis on the events
that take place immediately after the ejection from Eden—the events that
Alma (again in Alma 12) outlines in terms of (1) angels being sent to instruct
Adam and Eve to call on God’s name and (2) Adam and Eve then being
privileged to converse with God rather directly in order to receive “the
spiritual law” or the “second” commandments with their associated promises
and penalties. If we read verse 5 this, we’d hear the whole passage as
follows:
“And men [that is, all human beings, as the descendants of Adam and Eve]
are instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil [because they inherit
the teachings that have been passed down since Adam and Eve, who had
specific, divine instruction regarding what to do and what not to do after their
ejection from Eden]. And the law [meaning, specifically, "the spiritual law";
we're to think of the instructions just described as coming in the form of an
actual law, hence with penalties and the like] is given unto men. And by the
law no flesh is justified; or, by the law men are cut off [the problem, in other
words, is that the law---even the spiritual law, where our focus is so far---can
only inflict punishment, can onlycut off]. Yea [i.e., I'm about to tell you the
whole story again, but now starting from the Garden itself and then progress
to what we've just been talking about], by the temporal law they were cut off
[this is how they arrived in the position of being able to be instructed at all
regarding good and evil]; and also, by the spiritual law they perish from that
which is good, and become miserable forever [trapped within the
consequences of the broken temporal law---oriented to death and so to their
own pathetic passions and fantasies---human beings generally find
themselves cut off in a much more depressing and eternal sense: they fail
with regard to the spiritual law]. Wherefore [that is, because the temporal law
has always already been broken for us, thanks to Adam and Even, and
because that fact leaves us always in a problematic position---self-focused
and death-obsessed---with regard to the spiritual law that we've all been
given and are expected to obey], redemption cometh in and through the Holy
Messiah [in and through, that is, the one who comes to overturn the effects of
the broken first ortemporal law through the resurrection---an action that frees
us from our death obsessions and so makes it possible for us to obey the
spiritual law]; for he is full of grace and truth.”
I like this, and I think it’s probably the best interpretation.
The difficulty, of course, is that of universality, as Rico and Sheila have begun
to discuss. It’s fascinating that Lehi doesn’t seem interested in qualifying this
“sufficiently” business at all, while subsequent Nephites are. Lehi is Pauline in
that regard, for sure. However others soften the blow, then, how do we think
71
about Lehi’s inflexible claim? I suspect there’s much to be learned from his
formulation….
REPLY
10.
ricosaid:
January 30, 2013 at 10:43 pm
Joe, thanks for articulating this. I want to answer yes to your first paragraph!
As to potential inconsistencies, my initial reaction is to say that I feel good
about allowing Lehi to be inconsistent or to offer points that simply are
inconsistent with other points no matter how we look at it. This realization
coming, of course, after rigorous inspection and exploration of as many
potential solutions as possible, as I think you are doing above and that I hope
we continue.
As an aside, I suppose that I have an underlying suspicion that any doctrinal
exposition can be perfectly and logically consistent with each moving part
perfectly corresponding to every other moving part, where all intended
messages find complete and final expression in speech, which have absolutely
no leftover side-effects or unintended consequences, with no doctrinal
remainders so to speak. Or to put it another way, I don’t want to force Lehi to
be consistent if that does violence to his message, or if that sacrifices his
message.
But let me try anyway, hopefully in a way that does not do violence! What I’m
about to do is probably convoluted and annoying but I think it will probably be
the best way for me to make sure I understand your rephrasing of the text. I
think I agree with you but perhaps this will help clarify any points of
divergence.
You enumerate at least three claims that Lehi makes: 1) men are instructed
sufficiently that they know good from evil; 2) and the law is given unto men;
and 3) by the law no flesh is justified or by the law men are cut off. Lehi then
cites the temporal law and the spiritual law, presumably to support his claims.
One question I have is whether he intends to support all, some, or only one of
those claims by those specific examples. (Complicating this is whether claim 2
is actually being offered to support claim 1, but anyway). Let’s see what
happens if we try to support each claim by both the temporal law and the
spiritual law, starting with claim 3, closest in proximity.
Claim 3. I think it is easy to see that the examples of being cut off by the
temporal law and being cut off by the spiritual law, are specifically offered to
support his claim that “by the law no flesh is justified or by the law men are
cut off.” Both examples provide good support for that particular claim and all
are related by the “cut off” language, and these are also closest in proximity.
I see strong intent in this case. I feel good about this one.
Claim 2. I’m almost thinking this is not so much a claim but a fact (“the law is
given unto men”) being used to support claim 1, or I suppose it can function
72
as both. At any rate, we could say that the temporal law was given to men
when God said (using Alma’s gloss) “If thou eat thou shalt surely die.” (Alma
12:23). I had suggested earlier that perhaps the spiritual law “could point to
any law, the transgression of which results in the death of the spirit”
recognizing the ambiguity that we still aren’t exactly sure whether this is the
law of Moses or something else. Alma’s discussion of the commandments that
God provided Adam and Eve after their expulsion certainly seem to fit this:
“Therefore God gave unto them commandments, after having made known
unto them the plan of redemption, that they should not do evil, the penalty
thereof being a second death.” (Alma 12:32). Interestingly, Alma never
characterizes these commandments as the law of Moses. He doesn’t seem to
interpret Lehi as referring to the law of Moses here. In fact, he doesn’t
elaborate what they are in any great amount of detail (other than don’t do
evil, which is as simple a commandment as one could imagine).
Still, I can’t tell whether by “the law” Lehi only means this spiritual law. What
other law could he be referring to? Is this Alma’s way of making sense of
Lehi’s universal law motif, that man is always with a spiritual law because God
makes sure to hand it down? Again, this seems to diverge from Jacob who
seems to be comfortable with the notion that some do not have the law
handed down (yet as I think about it, is Jacob simply making a
maddening distinction between two kinds of law: “he has given a law; and
where there is no law given”? How can there be no law given when he has
given a law? Does he just mean he gives to some but not others?).
Claim 1. “Instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil.” Now there is
a relationship between “the temporal law” (“If thou eat thou shalt surely die”)
and “knowing good from evil.” And one could see a connection between
knowing good and evil and being instructed sufficiently. However, you
suggest there is potential inconsistency, because Adam and Eve can only be
sufficiently instructed after they eat of the fruit and not before. Here, I think I
may agree in part but perhaps differ in part from your solution.
One could see the result of the temporal law as the vehicle for providing
knowledge of good and evil. This certainly seems to be the case as Alma
articulates it: “having first transgressed the first commandments as to things
which were temporal, and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil” (Alma
12:31). And, at least in this case, as I read Alma, this knowledge of good
from evil doesn’t seem to arise from any subsequent instructions by God or
angels, or by revelations or sacred texts. The implication is that this makes all
men responsible without any additional knowledge. That could work, in a
sense, to support his claim that men are instructed sufficiently. Or in other
words, because of the temporal law, Lehi’s audience is sufficiently instructed
to know good from evil. Under that view, it doesn’t look like such an odd
coupling.
73
Incidentally, I’m very reluctant to think that Lehi (or anyone else in the Book
of Mormon) is concerned with the dilemma of prelapsarian
knowledge/culpability because I don’t know that this is ever an issue in the
text itself. This definitely becomes a very serious issue later down the
waterfall of theological development within Mormonism, but I see this as
driven by later theological concerns that are not inherent in the Book of
Mormon text itself.
But let’s move to the example of the spiritual law. My initial assessment is
that it is very difficult to see an intended relationship here. Can we say that
the result of the spiritual law is that eyes have been opened to know good
and evil or that the result of the spiritual law is that men and women are
instructed sufficiently? That doesn’t seem to work. Therefore, I see a break in
symmetry and doubt whether Lehi intends his statement about the spiritual
law to be used to support his claim that men are instructed sufficiently.
However, if I understand you correctly, you suggest that perhaps we can read
“instructed sufficiently” to refer to what Alma discusses in Alma 12:28-32,
that God sends angels to men to make “known unto them the plan of
redemption.” If so, I wonder if this may pose some potential challenges. For
one, if men are sufficiently instructed as a result of the temporal law to know
good from evil, then isn’t it redundant to send angels to them to instruct
them sufficiently that they know good from evil after the fall? Secondly, it
would seem that what they are instructing men isn’t to know good from evil,
but the plan of redemption, or how to repent and call upon God, how to get
out of their predicament. I’m almost tempted to think that being instructed
sufficiently can only make a person culpable, this isn’t saving knowledge, it’s
what cuts everyone off. Lastly, even though Alma discusses God conversing
with man after the fall, I don’t see him linking this up with Lehi’s language of
being “instructed sufficiently.”
In conclusion, I’m somewhat ambivalent whether Lehi intends both the
spiritual law and temporal law to support all his claims. I think he clearly
appeals to them to show how man is cut off, but whether he intends that they
both perform the same persuasive work for his other claims, I’m still
somewhat undecided.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
January 31, 2013 at 2:11 pm
Just to make sure I’m interpreting you correctly, Rico: If you’re
right (and I think you likely are), all that would need to be
changed in the inserted commentary I provided would be that
“instructed sufficiently” would refer not to the event of the
angelic instruction (or the subsequent divine instruction), but
simply to the immediate consequence of eating the forbidden
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fruit. The giving of the law would still refer to those events of
instruction, but the “instructed sufficiently” bit would be a prior
and, so to speak, simpler event. Yes?
REPLY
ricosaid:

January 31, 2013 at 3:23 pm
Yes, I think that’s what i have in mind.
joespencersaid:

January 31, 2013 at 10:57 pm
Then, yes, I definitely think you’re right. I might be
happily settled on a basic interpretation of this text!
11.
jennywebbsaid:
February 5, 2013 at 5:48 am
The discussions on this post have been fascinating; I am sorry to have been
so absent the past two weeks. I wanted to add two quick thoughts /
questions, mostly as notes to myself since the discussion has shifted already.
1. Regarding the spiritual and the temporal law: I wonder if another way to
look at this issue would be to ask what this distinction tells us about the
nature of law itself as understood by Lehi (theologically). That is, what is it
about what law is that necessitates (or permits) this division / distinction?
These laws cut us off both ways, so why not talk about law as a single entity
that cuts off completely rather than divide it into spiritual law and temporal
law? Especially since in modern Mormon theology we have such an emphasis
on laws (and ordinances) being held up both in time and in eternity / both on
earth and in heaven ? An ordinance enacts on earth an embodied relationship
to laws that have force in the past, present, and future. Is there something
different in Lehi’s understanding of law given his division?
2. Regarding the justification of the flesh: having the flesh justified could be
seen as a recasting of the atonement (and plan of salvation) as struggle to
*raise* flesh—to reverse the pull of entropy. So the emphasis on the
justification of the flesh itself points towards an orientation toward the body in
Lehi’s theology. An understanding of creation, fall, atonement, and veil as
centered on the encarnation of spirit, the reality of entropy, the stop and
reversal of decay, and the carrying of the flesh on into a degree of glory.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 7, 2013 at 2:05 pm
Nice points here, Jenny. I don’t know where to go with your first
point, but I’m eager to hear more. As for your second point, I
take it this (that the flesh itself has to be transformed) is
precisely what Jacob argues in 2 Nephi 9—arguably on the basis
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of what he’s learned in the course of Lehi’s teachings in 2 Nephi
2….
REPLY
2 Nephi 2:7-8a
30
WednesdayJAN 2013
POSTED
BY JOESPENCER IN
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≈ 12 COMMENTS
[From Deidre!]
7 Behold, he offereth himself a sacrifice for sin, to answer the ends of the law unto all those who
have a broken heart and a contrite spirit—and unto none else can the ends of the law
be answered. 8a Wherefore, how great the importance to make these things known unto the
inhabitants of the earth! That they may know that there is no flesh that can dwell in the presence
of God save it be through the merits and mercy and grace of the Holy Messiah
The idea of Christ answering the law is significant—he is responding to a question, a demand
“unto none else can the ends of the law be answered”—the preposition “unto” is strange here:
why not use the word “by”? What does it mean to say the law is answered untoChrist, rather
than by Christ?
“save it be” a beautiful wordplay, nothing can take place regarding the salvation of human
persons except through the Savior, save it be through the Savior
Cross-References
a) TG Jesus Christ, Atonement through; Sacrifice, self-sacrifice
It is significant that the Topical Guide uses “Jesus Christ, Atonement through” as a topic
heading rather than, for example, “Jesus Christ, Atonement of” highlighting that Christ
makes reconciliation between human beings and God possible, but not inevitable or in a way
that does not require the appropriate, agentic response of human beings
b) 1 Samuel 2:2 (1-10) Hannah praises Lord after giving Samuel to the Lord; “There is none holy
as the Lord: for there is none beside thee: neither is there any rock like our God”
It is notable that Hannah speaks of Christ in the context of sacrificing her own son
c) Romans 10:4 “For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth”
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Again here the preposition “to” strikes me as odd, why not “for”?—what is significant about
“to/unto” instead of “for”? “To/unto” implies to me setting something at its limit, on a
boundary, so that it is not given by reaching over that boundary but offered and must be
received. It impresses me as establishing a meeting place, a point at which two distinct
entities come together, they do not cross over, but come together both bringing their own
offering
8) a) 2 Nephi 25:20 And now, my brethren, I have spoken plainly that ye cannot err. And as the
Lord God liveth that brought Israel up out of the land of Egypt, and gave unto Moses power that
he should heal the nations after they had been bitten by the poisonous serpents, if they would cast
their eyes unto the serpent which he did raise up before them, and also gave him power that he
should smite the rock and the water should come forth yea, behold I say unto you, that as these
things are true, and as the Lord God liveth, there is none other name given under heaven save it
be this Jesus Christ, of which I have spoken, whereby man can be saved.
2 Nephi 31:21 And now, behold, my beloved brethren, this is the way; and there is none
other way nor name given under heaven whereby man can be saved in the kingdom of God. And
now, behold, this is the doctrine of Christ, and the only and true doctrine of the Father, and of the
Son, and of the Holy Ghost, which is one God, without end. Amen.
Mosiah 4:8 And this is the means whereby salvation cometh. And there is none other
salvation save this which hath been spoken of; neither are there any conditions whereby man can
be saved except the conditions which I have told you
Mosiah 5:8 And under this head ye are made free, and there is no other head whereby ye
can be made free. There is no other name given whereby salvation cometh; therefore, I would
that ye should take upon you the name of Christ, all you that have entered into the covenant with
God that ye should be obedient unto the end of your lives.
In light of my discussion above about the preposition “to” and the idea of a boundary and a
meeting point, I want to highlight here the verb “take”—it is something we choose to
receive, it is not bestowed against our will. It is not merely given; rather, it is offered and is
something we actively take up should we choose to do so.
Alma 21:9 Now Aaron began to open the scriptures unto them concerning the coming of
Christ, and also concerning the resurrection of the dead, and that there could be no redemption
for mankind save it were through the death and sufferings of Christ, and the atonement of his
blood
Alma 38:9 And now, my son, I have told you this that ye may learn wisdom, that ye may
learn of me that there is no other way or means whereby man can be saved, only in
and through Christ. Behold, he is the life and the light of the world. Behold, he is the word of
truth and righteousness.
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Again, here, it is only through Christ that we are not saved—not by Christ, butthrough.
Jacob 2:10 is not referenced, but bears comparison here: When Jacob decries men who are
erroneously living in polygynous relationships, he expresses regret that he has to rebuke them in
front of their wives and children, but feels impelled to do so anyway. He states, “notwithstanding
the greatness of the task, I must do according to the strict commands of God, and tell you
concerning your wickedness and abominations, in the presence of the pure in heart, and the
broken heart, and under the glance of the piercing eye of the Almighty God.”
Other scriptures that bear comparison:
2 Nephi 10:23-25 Therefore, acheer up your hearts, and remember that ye arebfree to cact for
yourselves—to dchoose the way of everlasting death or the way of eternal life.
24 Wherefore, my beloved brethren, areconcile yourselves to thebwill of God, and not to the
will of the devil and the flesh; and remember, after ye are reconciled unto God, that it is only in
and through the cgrace of God that ye are dsaved.
25 Wherefore, may God araise you from death by the power of the resurrection, and also from
everlasting death by the power of the batonement, that ye may be received into
the ceternal kingdom of God, that ye may praise him through grace divine. Amen.
Note that we must be reconciled unto God—bring ourselves to the meeting point by our own acts
of willing repentance, by our own broken hearts and contrite spirits and then it is through grace,
the atonement of Christ, that we are saved
Returning to 2 Nephi 2:7, the use of the preposition “unto” instead of “by” in verse 7: “and unto
none else can the ends of the law be answered.” First we read that Christ answers the end of the
law, but now it seems that the law is answered unto Christ. Why is not answered by Christ? For
Christ to answer the law would connote something that is complete, but if the law is answered
unto Christ, just as in the cross-reference Romans 10:4 where “to” is used instead of “for”: “For
Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth”—these prepositions
strike me as significant in two ways—they imply something that is temporally incomplete, that
cannot be merely unidirectional; moreover, they seem to imply spatially the establishment of a
boundary, a borderline—the law is answered unto Christ, and the end of the law is Christ to
every one that believeth; the Atonement is not merely something given, but is something that is
offered—it is set before us, but it must be received, it must be appropriated by the believer. Free
agents must receive it, appropriate it, make it efficacious; the individual must meet the
Atonement where it lies—must make personal effort, must traverse the distance between herself
and the Atonement, it is not merely bestowed, it must be taken up by each individual
This idea is illuminated by the use of the preposition “through” which Jacob himself uses to
depict the relationship between the Atonement of Christ and individual agents: “Wherefore,
beloved brethren, be reconciled unto him through the atonement of Christ, his Only Begotten
Son, and ye may obtain a resurrection” (Jacob 4:10)—we are not reconciled by the Atonement,
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but through the Atonement, this implies that the atonement is not something efficacious prior to
our active response and reception of it
The preposition “for” in connection with the atonement recurs in Helaman 5:9, where Helaman
implores his sons to remember the words of Benjamin that “man can be saved, only through the
atoning blood of Jesus Christ, who shall come” and in Moroni 10:33, where Moroni states “if ye
by the grace of God are prefect in Christ, and deny not his power, then are ye sanctified in Christ
by the grace of God, through shedding of the blood of Christ, which is in the covenant of the
Father unto the remission of your sins, that ye may become holy, without spot”
Perusing “Jesus Christ, Atonement through” in the Topical Guide, I found some representative
examples of the preposition “for” versus the preposition “unto”
FOR
Luke 22:19 19 ¶And he took abread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying,
This is my bbody which is cgiven for you: this do in dremembrance of me.
John 6:51 I am the living abread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he
shall live for ever: and the bbread that I will give is my cflesh, which I will dgive for the elife of
the world.
John 10:15 As the Father knoweth me, even so aknow I the Father: and I lay down
my blife for the sheep.
1 John 2:2 And he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins
of the whole world.
1 John 4:10 Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he aloved us, and bsent his Son to
be the cpropitiation for our sins.
UNTO
Philippians 2:8 And being found in afashion as a man, he bhumbled himself, and
became cobedient unto ddeath, even the edeath of the cross.
Hebrews 5:9 And being made aperfect, he became the bauthor of eternalcsalvation unto all them
that obey him;
AMBIGUOUS EXAMPLES
Romans 3:25 Whom God hath aset forth to be a bpropitiation through faith in his cblood, to
declare his righteousness for the dremission of sins that are past, through the eforbearance of
God;
Romans 5:11 And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom
we have now received the aatonement.
Broken Heart and Contrite Spirit
What is the significance of this?
McConkie and Millet write, “Salvation is not promised to those glib of tongue but rather to those
with a back bent by the burdens of the kingdom (see Matthew 24:46-51). As there is no salvation
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without truth, so there is no salvation without obedience—without a ‘broken heart and a contrite
spirit.’” (1:193).
Nibley highlights that keeping the law is not enough, but a broken heart and contrite spirit are
necessary on tops of this (Nibley, 1:264)
Christian philosopher Søren Kierkegaard pseudonymously writes about the unhappiest person:
this person is the one who is furthest from herself (EO1, 222). One who is absent to herself is the
most unhappy—employing the language of 2 Nephi 2, she is “miserable” like the devil. We are
estranged from ourselves through sin and our own fundamental brokenness. It is through the
Atonement, through making it efficacious by bringing forth a broken heart and contrite spirit that
we can know the joy of realizing God’s intention for our individual lives.
As we humble ourselves, and repent of our brokenness we can be reconciled through the
Atonement. What motivates us to do this? What motivates us to actualize the healing effects, the
unifying effects of the Atonement in our lives? Perhaps it is the Atonement itself; perhaps it is
the picture, the image of Christ’s literal, physical brokenness (the abject) that highlights our own
spiritual brokenness. We are motivated by Christ’s suffering to be willing to break our own
hearts. As Christ breaks himself to fulfill the law, fulfill his destiny and provide the atonement
for humanity, each individual Christian must break themselves to receive and make the
atonement efficacious and be enable to fulfill our own divinely appointed destinies.
For Kierkegaard, the most common form of despair—the sin we are guilty of when we fail to be
the self God created us to be—in the world is ignorance of it (SUDP, 75). I suggest that it is not
our own state of sin, but beholding the broken and suffering Christ that can help us wake up to
the reality of our own fundamental brokenness. In Christ’s abjection we recognize our own.
Theologian Anne Joh develops Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject: “As a compromise between
‘condemnation and yearning,’ the abject marks the boundaries and the borders of the self.
Transgressing borders, the abject is a witness to society’s precarious hold over the fluid and
disorderly aspects of individual and collective psyche. As Kristeva brilliantly observes,
‘abjection is above all ambiguity.’ Thus, the abject haunts the subject at its inner boundary,
which unwillingly gets transgressed so that the abject is ‘something rejected from which one
does not part.’ The return of the abject is thus a constant reminder that we are fragmented and
furthermore that our problem of the abject is not the Other but within ourselves” (The Heart of
the Cross, 90)
It is through the vision of the abject, the horror of the suffering Christ, that awakens us to our
own sinful state, that moves us to compassion with his suffering, gratitude for his suffering, and
renders our own hearts broken, knowing his suffering is intended only to alleviate ours.
As theologian Wendy Farley puts it, “Compassion…begins where the sufferer is, in the grief, the
shame, the hopelessness. It sees the despair as the most real thing. Compassion is with the
sufferer, turned toward or submerged in her experience, seeing it with her eyes. This communion
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with the sufferer in her pain, as she experiences it, is the presence of love that is a balm to the
wounded spirit. This relationship of shared, sympathetic suffering mediates consolation and
respect that can empower the sufferer to bear the pain, to resist the humiliation, to overcome the
guilt” (Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy, 81; quoted on p.88)
As we behold the suffering Christ, knowing that the suffering of the Atonement is intended for
us, we experience compassion. His brokenness motivates our broken hearts.
Returning to Kierkegaard, it is through Atonement that one becomes a unified self. As the
prototype, Christ is a promise: by continually coming to resemble the prototype by holding fast
to God, the Christian moves beyond self-effacement to become herself more and more (CD, 4042).
On this trajectory, the Atonement works as we submit to God. As we imitate Christ in
submission and humility, we become willing to be ourselves, reconciled to ourselves, and realize
ourselves. For Kierkegaard, this means that we rest transparently, faithfully in Christ (SUD, 82).
As Anti-Climacus defines it, “the formula for faith: in relating to itself and in wanting to be
itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power that established it” (SUDP, 79). Such faith
requires utter submission of the will to God, just as the act of the Atonement did for Christ: “In
the relationship to God…it is the case both for the man and for the woman that self-abandonment
is the self, and that the self is acquired through self-abandonment” (SUDP, 81, footnote). It is
a willing submission: “Faith is: that the self in being itself and in wanting to be itself is grounded
transparently in God” (SUDP, 114)
Anti-Climacus quotes Romans 14:23 “whatsoever is not of faith, is sin” and underscores that
“the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith” (SUDP, 115).
What is true for Christ is true for each individual, that utter obedience and utter willingness are
necessary for fulfillment of the divine intention in our lives: A writes in EO: “The identity of an
absolute action and an absolute suffering is beyond the powers of aesthetics and belongs to
metaphysics. This identity is exemplified in the life of Christ, for His suffering is absolute
because the action is absolutely free, and His action is absolute suffering because it is absolute
obedience” (EOP, 149). Here, Kierkegaard highlights agency and that is where I want to go next.
Connecting 2 Nephi 2:7-8 to 2 Nephi 2:3 and 2:10
In verse 3, Lehi says he knows that Jacob is redeemed because of the righteousness of his
Redeemer—there is a causal relationship and temporal relationship being expressed: Christ’s
righteousness and obedient atonement precede ours. In verse 10, we read thatbecause of the
intercession for all, all men come unto God—Christ’s intercession enables our reconciliation to
God. Arguably, both 3 and 10 imply a degree of passivity in the relation of human individuals to
Christ and God vis-à-vis the Atonement.
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This language is helpful in illuminating the way in which the Atonement is a gift that is offered
to us as human agents. That Christ gives the gift of death is enough to humble us and break our
hearts.
2 thoughts on Atonement as gift:
Kierkegaard characterizes the atonement as sheer gift. He reflects, “The suffering and death of
Christ has been made pure gift; by letting all obligations and commitment be removed,
all Notabenes have been disposed of, and thus Christianity has become utterly and outrightly an
outright gift, a present” (Journals and Papers 3:224 entry 1855 (Pap XI3 B 115 n.d., 1855).
Jacques Derrida further illuminates how the infinite gift presents us with our own finitude.
Asking what makes one tremble in the mysterium tremendum and answers that it is “the gift of
infinite love, the dissymmetry that exists between the divine regard that sees me, and myself,
who doesn’t see what is looking at me; it is the gift and endurance of death that exists in the
irreplaceable, the disproportion between the infinite gift and my finitude, responsibility as
culpability, sin, salvation, repentance, and sacrifice” (The Gift of Death, 2nd ed., 2008, 56-57). In
the face of Christ’s suffering, we see the paltriness of our offerings, this helps us to become even
more broken and contrite.
Returning to the text of 2 Nephi, we find that by contrast, verse 7 highlights our agency in
accepting and utilizing the Atonement: Christ’s offering being made efficacious is contingent on
our action, our free choice to make our own offering of a broken hear and a contrite spirit—as
we offer our hearts, our souls, then His offering for sin facilitates and enables our reconciliation
The Atonement is contingent on us and this stands out in verse 7; in verse 10 we read that Christ
acts so as to “to answer the ends of the atonement.” Human agency reflects Christ whose
Atonement answers the law; as Christ is confronted with the law and answers to it, we are
confronted by the crucifixion and must answer to it.
Human agency and its parallel to Christ’s action is illuminated when we read this verse in light
of Doctrine and Covenants 59:8, “Thou shalt offer a sacrifice unto the Lord they God in
righteousness, even that of a broken heart and a contrite spirit.” Christ’s sacrifice is the
Atonement, ours is our own broken heart and contrite spirit. We have to meet each other. Both
Christ and each individual must offer their offering. They meet at the boundary line. And one
cannot cross the other—one cannot do Christ’s part in Christ’s stead and Christ cannot wrest
from us a broken heart and contrite spirit. They are demarcated from one another, distinct in their
inability to do the other’s task, yet the tasks and the agents who perform them are able to reach
each other and meet one another. According to Martin Heidegger, the boundary “becomes the
place from which something begins its presencing” (Poetry, Language, Thought, 141-60). As
individuals we become present to the Savior and the Savior becomes present to us as we offer
our distinct, yet equally necessary, sacrifices to one another.
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As we become present to one another, we enter into real relationship with one another which
entails unpredictability, doubt and risk. Muslim Feminist Fatima Mernissi in her semiautobiographical novel, Dreams of Trespass writes about the frontier, the liminal or ambiguous
realm outside her control. She observes, “Anxiety eats at me whenever I cannot situation the
geometric line organizing my powerlessness” (3). The dynamic relation between Atoner and the
one Atoned for is rife with risk but neither is able to control the other. It requires trust in the
unknown on both sides, not just the human side. In fact, arguably, the relation is much more
risky for Christ than for us (Helaman 12:7-8). Out of deference to human freedom, Christ risks
the Atonement being made inefficacious. He further risks the damnation of the beloved if they
choose to respond to it by rejecting it. Yet there is the possibility that we will meet Him. That
when confronted with the horror of the crucifixion, when we realize that Christ gave everything,
gave himself on our behalf, that we will meet him, we will come unto Him, meet his offering
with our own offering. We give ourselves by bringing forth broken hearts and contrite spirits and
meet Christ at the boundary line. There we find that although divine love asks for everything, it
does so only for our own salvation, only to empty ourselves sufficiently to receive the gift of
Atonement, the gift of Christ, the gift of salvation.
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12
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:7-8A”
ricosaid:
January 30, 2013 at 7:40 pm
I’m still digesting the post, much to ponder here, but I want to make a brief
comment about the “unto” in verse 7.
What if we read the text this way:
“Behold, he offereth himself a sacrifice for sin, to answer the ends of the
law untoall those who have a broken heart and a contrite spirit—
and unto none else [other than all those who have a broken heart and a
contrite spirit] can the ends of the law be answered.”
Under this reading, the second unto performs the same role as the first unto.
Thus, the sacrifice of the Holy Messiah answers the ends of the law, but it is
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being answered unto or toward a particular group of persons, namely those
who have a broken heart and contrite spirit. Thus, the “none else” is a
placeholder for the beneficiaries to whom the law is answered, rather than
“none else” being a placeholder for the benefactor who answers the law (i.e.
no one else other than the Holy Messiah could answer the ends of the law).
REPLY
2.
ricosaid:
January 31, 2013 at 3:28 am
Connected with my comment above, I think the “none else” in 2 Ne. 2:7 is
akin to the “none else” in Alma 11:40: “And he shall come into the world to
redeem his people; and he shall take upon him the transgressions of those
who believe on his name; and these are they that shall have eternal life, and
salvation cometh to none else.”
Therefore, we have this kind of specificity of who will be saved (“none else” in
2 Ne. 2:7; Alma 11:40) but also specificity of who will do the saving as you
have pointed out (“no other” or “none other” in Mosiah 4:8; Mosiah 5:8; 2
Nephi 31:21; 2 Nephi 25:20; Alma 38:9; Mosiah 3:17; Helaman 5:9).
I really like your discussion about the sacrifice that God offers in relation to
the sacrifice that man is commanded to offer: a broken heart and contrite
spirit. (Psalms 34:18; 51:17; D&C 59:8; 97:8 and 3 Ne. 9:20). We get Christ
himself repeating this when he visits the Nephites:
“And ye shall offer up unto me no more the shedding of blood; yea, your
sacrifices and your burnt offerings shall be done away, for I will accept none
of your sacrifices and your burnt offerings. And ye shall offer for a sacrifice
unto me a broken heart and a contrite spirit.” (3 Ne. 9:19:20; see also
12:19).
This may be a tangential point, but I wonder what happens to Lehi’s teaching
about offering a broken heart and contrite spirit as a sacrifice. It
doesn’t seem to play a major role. Nephi alludes to this in a somewhat
indirect way. (2 Nephi 4:32). Jacob discusses “broken heart” but in a very
different sense. (Jacob 2:10, 35). Again, its interesting Lehi’s view of the law
is very negative, and yet the Nephites continue to find a role for the law of
Moses (2 Ne. 25:; Jacob 4:5).
Conceptually similar to sacrifice of spirit and heart is offering of soul (I know
you use this language above) and we do see this language being used in the
texts: “offer your whole souls as an offering unto him” (Omni 1:26). Although
not directly on point, Nephi says “worship him with all your might, mind, and
strength, and your whole soul” (2 Nephi 25:29). Abinadi reverses this when
talking about the Son and his soul being an offering for sin. (Mosiah 15:10,
Mosiah 14:10, Isaiah 53:10). I’m really trying to resist using the word
“reciprocal” for some obvious reasons, but I like what you are saying about
relationship, that there is a kind of mutual relationship, where God makes an
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offering and we make an offering, God makes a sacrifice and we make a
sacrifice. Perhaps a kind of imitatio Christi life is what I’m thinking about.
Does this idea get muted by King Benjamin’s rhetoric? “I say, if ye should
serve him with all your whole souls yet ye would be unprofitable servants.”
(Mosiah 2:21).
REPLY
3.
joespencersaid:
January 31, 2013 at 4:38 pm
Deidre –
I’ve got to wind my way from the text—really, from the difficulties the text
presents me with in terms of basic interpretive issues—to the fascinating
discussion you offer regarding the mirroring relation between human and
divine sacrifice. How to get from the set of questions plaguing me (in
particular: Does Lehi accept a strictly sacrificial interpretation of the
atonement? and What on earth is meant by this “answering the ends of the
law” business?) to the chiastic intertwining of two broken hearts?
If I don’t quite get to the latter in this comment, recognize that I’m on the
road that leads there.
All –
There are several reasons I’m nervous about how to interpret Lehi’s use of
the word “sacrifice.” First, none of Lehi’s theological heirs presents a sacrificial
interpretation of the atonement. Indeed, the only subsequent Nephite to
present something like a sacrificial (or penal-substitutionary) view of the
atonement is Amulek, and I’m convinced he has a problematic place in the
development of Nephite thinking about atonement. Second, there are
theological reasons to worry about a sacrificial view of the atonement (what
to say about a God who is bound to violent sacrifice by an inflexible law that
supposedly stands outside His own power?). All this makes me ask whether
Lehi really means sacrifice in a strong sense when he uses the word.
As for my other major question, that regarding “the ends of the law,” it’s just
a question of trying to figure out what on earth the text itself means. I
wonder if it isn’t crucial to sort this out in order to get to what Lehi really
means when he speaks of “sacrifice.”
How to get at that phrase, “answer the ends of the law”? I took the liberty of
using Google Books to see if it appeared in literature that would have been
available to the translator of the Book of Mormon, and I found some
fascinating results (see here, here, here, and here). The language of
“answering the ends of the law” seems to have been in relatively accessible
circulation at the time Joseph translated the Book of Mormon, so I think it’s
probably best to assume that such usage would help us understand what Lehi
means, at least as those words are directed, through translation, to their
nineteenth-century readers.
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If I’m reading rightly (it’s taken me a fair bit of work to decide I’m
understanding all these texts), it looks like “the ends of the law” refer to the
purpose of the law in creating a certain conviction. (Note that “the ends of
punishment” refer, instead, to the purpose of balancing justice or some such
thing. It’s fascinating that Lehi never speaks of the ends of punishment, only
of the ends of the law and the ends of the atonement.) If this is right, then it
seems that Lehi describes Christ as offering Himself “a sacrifice” precisely in
order to ensure that the law serves its convicting purpose, something that, it
would seem, only happens for those who have a broken heart and a contrite
spirit.
Trying to make sense of all this, I think I’d suggest the following. Contrary to
the idea that Christ offers Himself a sacrifice to satisfy the ends of
punishment (that is, to balance some sort of abstract offended justice that
has, cosmically, to be balanced), Lehi claims that Christ offers Himself a
sacrifice to satisfy the ends of the law (that is, to ensure that the law doesn’t
lose its affective force). The law is put in place, and by it all are cut off. That’s
less than satisfactory, so God arranges to remove that consequence. But a
simple removal of that consequence without further ado would undo the
original purpose of the law (I’m beginning to see a gesture in the direction of
verse 13 here). Rather than simply removing the law—forgiving the law’s
offenders by dispensing with the law—God arranges for a certain enforcement
of the law but without that enforcement effecting a punishment for the law’s
offenders. The law remains in force even as it is rendered inoperative. The
real force of the law remains for anyone who sees what Christ has done, but
the sting of its punishment has no way of afflicting them. Orienting to the
self-sacrificing one, those with broken hearts and contrite spirits feel the force
of the law but are free from its paralyzing sting.
I think I’m not explaining any of this well enough.
At any rate, I think all this allows for a rereading of Lehi’s reference to
“sacrifice.” Rather than Christ being made a sacrifice (i.e., by the Father) in
order to meet some kind of transcendent demand (i.e., abstract justice), Lehi
speaks of Christoffering himself as a sacrifice (i.e., by Himself) in order to
meet a certain immanent desire (i.e., giving the law its opposition-creating
force). Out is the idea of a strict penal substitution; in is the idea of a
divinely-invested law with genuine potency that nonetheless is without any
actual operativity.
Why Lehi would be interested in such a thing, however, may not become clear
until the question of opposition is introduced….
REPLY
o
jennywebbsaid:
February 5, 2013 at 6:56 am
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Joe, I think this is a useful way of setting the stage for where
Lehi is going to go in a few versus. I like how it elevates the
identity of Christ as the law giver—”giver” here takes on almost
a maternal sense, “birther” or the like, no? Also, I think this ties
back to the previous discussion of justification and what it means
to be justified. Couldn’t we say, following your reading, that the
law is brought into the correct alignment or brought into the
position of being fully effective, in full force through Christ’s
sacrifice?
REPLY
joespencersaid:

February 7, 2013 at 2:07 pm
Yeah, it’s something like this that I’ve got in mind.
The philosophically fascinating irony would be,
though, that the law is only made fully effective
when its stripped of its power to punish. There’s
something of a Pauline gesture there: the law
is fulfilled in the Messiah’s triumph, but it becomes
full only at the moment that it’s de-activated.
4.
ricosaid:
February 2, 2013 at 5:54 pm
There is quite a bit to respond to here Joe.
First, I’d like to consider the 19th century references that you point
out. We’re looking for a specific connotation in the phrase ”answering the
ends of the law” or any derivatives; anything that points to this phrase being
theologically loaded with a common understanding of the day, that if we put
as the background of Lehi’s sermon, provides greater coherence.
John Wesley argues against those who say “preaching the Gospel answers all
ends of the law.” (Note that it is the preaching that does the answering in his
statement). Wesley seems to be reacting to preachers, who take a literal
reading of New Testament passages, and who claim to “preach Christ” but fail
to preach the law. This seems to me why Wesley argues one end of the law
is this protreptic effect to “convict the sinner.” He suggests that unless you
preach the law (having the effect of convicting the sinner) that people won’t
see the need for Christ (the solution). So Wesley concludes “to preach Christ,
is to preach all things that Christ hath spoken; all his promises, all
his threatening and commands; all that is written in his book. And then you
will know how to preach Christ.”
Incidentally, Lehi somewhat fits this pattern. As a general observation, Lehi
preaches the problems with the law (all men are cut off), and then
he unveils the the solution (wherefore, redemption) as Christ. (I think Sheila
suggested Lehi is somewhat more nuanced than this, so feel free to chime in
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Sheila). Yet, Lehi’s message seems to me unconcerned with exactly how
preachers are trying to preach the Gospel. For Wesley the way to answer the
ends of the law is to preach the law. This seems to me to be a different
message from Lehi who is saying that Christ is answering the ends of the law.
As a side note, what was Wesley’s theory of atonement? In his commentary
on Romans 3:25 he wrote “A propitiation – To appease an offended God. But
if, as some teach, God never was offended, there was no need of this
propitiation. And, if so, Christ died in vain.” (Explanatory notes upon the New
Testament).
I think the reference closer in language to Lehi is the one by Richard Baxter
(1615 – 1691):
“As he was a sacrifice for sin, he answered the ends of the law which we
violated, and which condemned us, as well as if we had been all punished
according to the sense of the law: and therefore did thereby satisfy the
Lawgiver: and thereby also merited our pardon and justification; so that his
obedience as such, and his sacrifice (or whole humiliation) as satisfactory by
answering the ends of the law, are conjunctly the meritorious cause of our
justification.”
Baxter suggests that Christ is punished as if we had been all punished, but he
goes a step further to say that this satisfied the Lawgiver. Now, Lehi doesn’t
use the word satisfy in his discourse. Lehi says that Christ answers the law
but he doesn’t say Christ satisfies the law. Abinadi and Amulek use the
phrase “satisfy the demands of justice’” but Lehi does not, so I want to avoid
rewording Lehi to say there is a kind of satisfaction being performed. I think
technically that would be connoting more in terms of atonement theory than
Lehi is saying. Maybe Lehi would agree with this language anyway, but I
don’t want to fill in he gaps and risk implying more than he does.
Here is another reference to “answering all ends of the law” from Matthew
Poole (1624–1679)
“That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us: here is another end
of God’s sending his Son, as before; it was that he might perfectly fulfil the
righteousness of the law in or for us, which for us ourselves to do in our own
persons was utterly impossible; and yet upon which (as being imputed unto
them, and accepted of God on our behalf) we shall be accounted just and
righteous, as if we had done it ourselves. Christ’s being a sacrifice for sin was
not sufficient to answer all the ends and demands of the law; there must be
doing of what it commanded, as well as suffering of what it threatened:
therefore Christ was sent for both, and both were accomplished by him; and
what he did and suffered is accounted unto us as if we had done and suffered
it. This is the imputed righteousness which was so often spoken of, Romans
4:1-25; and in reference to this he is said to be made righteousness for us,
1 Corinthians 1:30, and we are said to be made the righteousness of God in
him, Romans 5:19 2 Corinthians 5:21.”
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Poole introduces the idea that one end of the law is for it to be obeyed, and
another end is for punishment in the violation of it. Christ’s sacrifice for sin
answered the end of the law dealing with punishment, but not the end of the
law dealing with obedience, Christ’s life did that. In contrast to Poole, Lehi
never argues that the end of the law is that it needs to be obeyed and that
Christ answers that end of the law.
In the end, I’m not sure I see really any inherent meaning in “the ends of the
law” in as much as Wesley, Baxter, and Poole and each posit a different end
of the law and argue how it is answered or satisfied. Some of this language
sounds derivative of the English in “For Christ is the end of the law for
righteousness to every one that believeth” (Romans 4:10), the telos of the
law, and it seems that the definitions of “end” in the 1828 edition of
Webster’s (13 and 15) seem to fit the text well.
I read Lehi to say that the ends of the law is to inflict punishment and to
inflict that punishment at the great and last day. (2 Ne 2:10, 25). I think this
is important because the ends of the law happens when men are brought
before God to be judged. There is no protreptic ends of the law for Lehi, no
overtones of the law as pedagogue, and he doesn’t focus on those ends being
met by preaching. Perhaps Lehi doesn’t use the term “ends of punishment”
because the infliction of punishment itself is the end of the law. The
punishment is affixed to the law and by the law men are cut off. Lehi
suggests there is a way to escape being acted upon or punished by that law
at that great and last day. The ends of the atonement, on the other hand, is
happiness.
I’d like to draw another contrast in case it comes up. Nephi says that “for
this end was the law given” or that they “know for what end the law was
given” (2 Ne. 25:25-27). The “end” here is that they “may look forward unto
that life which is in Christ.” Lehi and Nephi are speaking of different ends to
the law in different contexts. Nephi, it seems to me, is explaining that the law
is dead in a salvific sense, but the reason they keep the law, at least in part,
is because it is propaedeutic. Nephi is speaking to what end the law
was given to the Nephites and what that does in during their days of
probation. Lehi is talking about the ends of the law at that great and last
day.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 3, 2013 at 3:40 pm
Thanks for these thoughts, Rico. Some responses:
On Wesley: I’m not sure Wesley’s emphasis on preaching
distances his use of the phrases in question from Lehi too much.
However Wesley thinks the particular end of the law in
question is accomplished, the identity of the end remains as it is.
89
The debate in Wesley is over the means to the end, and Lehi—
perhaps—has a different means in mind, but the end remains
the same, or so I’m suggesting. I might note further, though,
that the interpretation I’m putting forward wouldn’t be terribly
irrelevant to the Wesleyan emphasis on preaching: Christ’s selfsacrifice, on the reading I’m offering, is a kind of performative
preaching of the law, one that gives it to its “threatening” end
while—and here’s the paradox—nonetheless removing its sting
(but only for the contrite). (That Wesley had a theory of
atonement at odds with what Lehi spells out is similarly
irrelevant, however interesting. The question I’m asking here
concerns only the received meaning of “the ends of the law” or
of “answering the ends of the law.”)
On Baxter: The language of satisfaction can be ignored, I think,
in trying to fix the meaning of “the ends of the law,” here.
What’s important is that direct punishment is not among the
ends of the law if they’re answered through vicarious
punishment. The point is that the ends of the law are
answered even though punishment for the actual violators isn’t
effected. Although the actual ends of the law aren’t specified
here, it seems clear enough that punishment—at least of the
actual violators—isn’t among them. It may be, of course, and
some other passages in Baxter suggest this, that the ends of the
law include punishment of some sort, but the significance of
that’s still to be shown.
On the variously authored commentary on Paul’s epistles: This
reference is, I think, key. Here the authors argue that the ends
of the law wouldn’t be met if some kind of punishment weren’t
effected, though the ends of punishment remain distinct from
the ends of the law. From the larger discussion, it seems clear to
me that the primary end of the law here is a certain seriousness,
a certain validity. If the punishment isn’t effected, the law won’t
have been a law, and that means that the atonement will be
without effective meaning. The punishment has to be effected so
that the law remains a law—but that punishment might be
inflicted on the innocent, such that the law remains a law
without the ends of punishment being accomplished. The law
remains law but without a certain force.
On Poole: Is Poole equating “ends” and “demands” here? If so,
then I think your comments raise certain difficulties. If not, I’m
left wondering about a number of things. It is clear that, as you
say, Poole sees these two… functions… of law as being answered
by Christ’s life and sacrifice respectively, but is it clear to what
90
“the ends of the law” refers? I guess I remain a bit ambivalent
about that.
In the end, at any rate, I think it’s clear that for Lehi one of the
major purposes or ends of the law is the establishment or
maintenance of opposition (we’ll be dealing with this in verses
11-13, obviously). I think the reading I’m offering fits well with
that as well. There’s something about the enforcement of the
law—albeit in this strangely oblique way (through the
punishment of the innocent)—that allows the law to retain its
opposition-creating power while nonetheless losing the sting of
punishment for the contrite. The sting, presumably, remains for
those who refuse. The point, then, would be to ensure that those
who are forgiven remain within the oppositional or differential
structure of the law even as the law is rendered inoperative.
Or something like that….
REPLY
5.
ricosaid:
February 2, 2013 at 8:28 pm
As to your other concern, it is possible that Lehi simply does not offer a
coherent theory of atonement or unaware of the implications of suggesting
that the Messiah offers himself a sacrifice for sin.
The earliest description of Lehi’s teachings is that “of the coming of a Messiah,
and also the redemption of the world.” (1 Ne. 1:19). Lehi’s teachings are
further elaborated in 1 Ne. 10: “a prophet would the Lord God raise up among
the Jews—even a Messiah, or, in other words, a Savior of the world . . . all
mankind were in a lost and in a fallen state, and ever would be save they
should rely on this Redeemer.” So far, so good. According to Nephi, Lehi
refers to this Messiah as “the Lamb of God, who should take away the sins of
the world.” (1 Ne. 10:10; cf John 1:29). What’s going on here? Is this a
paschal lamb reference? Is this take away as in carry away sins? I think this
verse really complicates matters on several levels. Sure, there is the issue of
Book of Mormon translation and how John ends up here, but making sense of
this statement in John in terms of atonement theory turns out to
be something of a challenge. Nephi then experiences his own vision and says
“And I, Nephi, saw that he was lifted up upon the cross and slain for the sins
of the world.” (1 Ne. 11:33). Now we haveslaying being connected
with sin. It isn’t clear exactly what Lehi or Nephi understand in terms of
atonement theory at this point (or at any point), but it would seem these are
the precursor texts for Lehi’s statement “he offereth himself a sacrifice for
sin.” I’ll have to come back to this point.
What about this language “broken heart and contrite spirit”? Would it be
fruitful to consider that Lehi is drawing upon the language in Psalms 51
91
here? ”For thou desirest not sacrifice; else would I give it: thou delightest not
in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a
contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.” (Psalms 51:16-17). In terms of
dating Psalms 51, there is no consensus, but a few scholars take the position
that Psalms 51 is pre-exilic or late pre-exilic, although verses 18-19 were
added after the destruction of the temple.
Some scholars read Psalms 51 as a critique on animal sacrifice or as attempts
to spiritualize the cult. I should point out that some atonement theorists
argue that it it was problematic when Paul decided to Christianize the
sacrificial ritual that had been attacked by several prophets and
psalmists. This is one reason why we end up with less than desirable
atonement theories. In some ways, I find both Lehi and Paul to be faced with
same problem, that is, how to understand the death of the Messiah given the
pervasive background of the Hebrew cult. Paul mixes and conflates
metaphors to the consternation of atonement theorists. I wonder whether we
should expect Lehi to be more careful or cognizant of the implications of his
metaphors than Paul.
Now, others scholars suggest that the psalmists weren’t so much aiming to
repudiate animal sacrifice, but to point out that whether accompanied by
animal sacrifice or not, one’s inner orientation is key. In that vein, some
suggest that Psalms 51 was even possibly used in the temple to assist in
directing the supplicant’s mind, to avoid falling prey to the risks of ritual and
routine. If Lehi is using Psalms 51:17, would this particular choice be
significant?
Whatever Lehi means by his negative portrayal of the law, the Nephites went
ahead and built a temple and continued to “keep” the law of Moses. But they
are always rationalizing why they keep the law. Nephi says that the law is
“dead” to them but that by knowing the “deadness of the law” they look to
the life of Christ (2 Ne. 25:24-30) and Jacob explains that “for this intent we
keep the law of Moses, it pointing our souls to him” (Jacob 4:5). Perhaps
Lehi’s language gestures at the proper orientation for the supplicant. Perhaps
we can see Lehi’s greater theological concern as that of linking atonement
with this inner orientation rather than making an overture at a kind of
atonement theory.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 4, 2013 at 1:55 pm
Okay, getting to this comment now (I ended up unable to return
to the blog yesterday…).
Of course it’s possible—even likely—that Lehi had an inconsistent
or unsophisticated theology of atonement, if he had one at all.
But whatever Lehi himself would have believed is so completely
92
buried in historical context, Nephi’s own redactions (or
recreations), subsequent Nephite layering, nineteenth-century
recontextualization, and our own “doctrinal” mystifications that
I’m not terribly eager to try to unearth what Lehi
meant originally. Although I phrased my worry in terms ofwhat
Lehi meant when he spoke of sacrifice, my intentions would be
better explained if I spoke of what we’re to understand when we
read the word “sacrifice” here.
What gets me worrying about hints at penal substitution theories
of atonement in the Book of Mormon is not—emphatically not—a
set of ethical qualms. (Frankly, I don’t have a lot of ethical
qualms generally.) It’s, rather, that there’s so little, almost
nothing, in the Book of Mormon indicating such an idea. (Amulek
seems to be the only clear exception, and I think there’s a lot to
say about that fact.) If Lehi’s brief reference to
sacrifice is indeed a gesture in the direction of penal
substitution, it’s odd and largely out of place, and it doesn’t fit
well with everything else Lehi has to say about atonement (in
the verses following).
As a theologian, then, I find that the Book of Mormon generally
sets me the task, in reading Lehi, of trying to see how he might
be speaking of sacrifice in a non-penal-substitutionary way, if it’s
possible. If the best interpretation is indeed to move in that
direction, one follows the text. But I’ve got many reasons to
suspect that “sacrifice” should be read in some other way. And
so I venture. And I think the approach I’m working out makes
better sense of the whole chapter than does any penalsubstitutionary reading….
REPLY
6.
jennywebbsaid:
February 5, 2013 at 7:30 am
Deidre, what a wonderfully provocative post. I hope you’ll be able to
participate in the discussions more, because I really enjoyed the threads you
teased out here! Here are my responses:
1) Christ as responding to the demands of the flesh: what does the flesh
demand? Ultimately, it demands death. Christ’s response is to fill death in
such a way that it is satisfied and thus able to be overcome, sidestepped,
swallowed, etc.
2) Your emphasis on the word “through” left me thinking. Salvation through
implies some sort of conduit (here, Christ) through which salvation moves.
With that understanding in place, our concept of salvation is reworked: we
have a salvation that always already existed, but that needed a means of
93
reaching us. Reformulated in these terms, salvation links up thematically with
Joe’s discussion of Christ’s sacrifice: both seem to presuppose some sort of
unorganization that is brought into order through Christ, through the
atonement. Salvation is accessible. Law is effective. To me, these are ways of
thinking about the atonement as an expression of creation. Or perhaps better,
they highlight the Creation facet of the atonement.
3) Finally, I wondered if Lehi might be bringing up the bodily suffering of
Christ in order to elicit compassion from his sons? A final attempt to move
L&L?
In light of what your reading brings out in terms of gifts and death, I think it’s
important to remember the greater context here: Lehi’s reaction to the gift of
his own death (i.e., reading this chapter as part of a larger narrative of the
process of dying) is to have one last unifying moment with his fragmented
family; to bring them to Christ. Receiving death, he unites his family
physically (recall the image of the family circle brought up a few weeks ago)
in order to bring (move, drag, etc.) them to Christ. I can’t shake the
endowment image: Lehi, dying, approaching the veil, instructing his family all
the way to give them the same death, the death in Christ.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 7, 2013 at 2:33 pm
Jenny, these are all great thoughts! Your #1 is a beautiful
encapsulation of the Book of Mormon’s theology of the flesh, I
think. Your #2 provides me with a feast for thought. And I think
you’re likely right with your #3. Finally, your note on Lehi’s
approach to death here makes me embarrassed that I hadn’t
asked this sort of question before….
REPLY
7.
joespencersaid:
February 7, 2013 at 2:30 pm
Alright, Deidre: I’m finally getting to the more substantive part of your post
(my apologies for my lateness!).
I absolutely love the articulation you’ve given of the broken heart and the
contrite spirit—as a kind of mirroring relation between Christ’s divine sacrifice
and our own necessary human sacrifice. What strikes me theologically is that
it’s only possible to offer this reading if we abrogate the usual (i.e., penalsubstitutionary) view of atonement that’s too often read into Lehi’s words
here. The sacrifice described here has to have been a self-offering on Christ’s
part—not a satisfaction of the eternal, inflexible demands of abstract justice—
if it’s to motivate and mirror (and possibilize!) our own self-offering. On the
“usual” reading, the mirroring you spell out is too dissymmetrical: an
untouched Father, a passively sacrificed Son, and a set of actively contrite
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human beings. Where the sacrifice is indeed a self-offering without an eye to
any “demands of [abstract] justice,” we have the sort of symmetry necessary
to your articulation: an actively self-sacrificing God, and a set of actively selfsacrificing human beings.
I don’t know, though, that I’ve got anything to add to your beautiful
articulation of the mirroring itself. I’m happy just to thank you for it and hope
for opportunities to share it….
REPLY
2 Nephi 2: 8b-9
05
TuesdayFEB 2013
POSTED
BY JENNYWEBB IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 18 COMMENTS
The text for this week:
who layeth down his life according to the flesh and taketh it again by the power of the
8b
spirit that he may bring to pass the resurrection of the dead, being the first that should
rise. 9Wherefore, he is the firstfruits unto God inasmuch as he shall make intercession for all
the children of men. And they that believe in him shall be saved.
I feel like this section really connects with 7-8b thematically, and would encourage
continued discussion on Deidre’s insightful post as I think it will further the work on this
section as well. To this end, my post this week is mostly a series of questions aimed at
furthering discussion.
The action of “layeth” in “layeth down his life” gives us a Christ who is in control, who
masters his movements, presents his gift, who willingly dies. (Is there another way to read
this? I’m missing it if there is.) Why does Lehi qualify or clarify this description with
“according to the flesh”? Is there any sense of “accord” here as agreement? That is, in
agreement with or in obedience to the laws governing the flesh? Is this emphasis on death
as a physical, embodied experience significant?
“and taketh it again”: I think the more expected phrase here would be “and taketh
it up again”, but clearly there is no “up” in play. Why? I’m reading this as a way of
emphasizing both Christ’s power and right—he is strong enough to take; taking, grasping,
holding is his right as the firstborn (in taking his life-as-flesh again he takes his
inheritance). The word “again” implies a repetition of a previous action—are we to
95
understand Christ’s original incarnation as a taking? Also, clearly this again is misleading:
Christ does not take again the same flesh, but rather perfected, celestial flesh. It’s a
repetition with a difference. But what if it isn’t? What if the “again” is not misleading? Could
the point be not the difference of the resurrected flesh (it’s escape from death) but rather
itssameness? (i.e., this body is not something foreign, but rather familiar, in fact, the
same?)
Is it significant that Lehi presents the resurrection in a binary pair of actions?
“by the power of the spirit”: what is this power? What does this phrase mean? Whose spirit?
His? The Holy Ghost? How can a spirit have power to physically grasp (take)? If we read this
as Christ’s spirit, does this change our understanding of our own spirits in any way? Do our
spirits effect physical change in our world / lives?
“that he may bring to pass the resurrection of the dead, being the first that should rise”:
Why the sudden introduction of the conditional here (“may” and “should”)? Why not just
“that he brings to pass the resurrection of the dead, being the first to rise”?
“Wherefore, he is the firstfruits unto God”: the sacrificial language here is clear. But we
normally think about Christ’s sacrifice as linked with the imagery of the sacrificial lamb, or
perhaps the scape goat—in other words, animal sacrifice. I think it’s interesting that after
this careful, logical traversing of the atonement Lehi deliberately aligns the sacrifice not with
animal, but rather vegetation. He is Abel’s offering, not Cain’s. And again, the question of
word choice: why “unto” God? It’s easy to read this description quickly with Christ as God’s
firstborn, first full fruit from God himself, but I don’t think that’s what’s going on here. So in
what sense is he the first fruit if it’s not paternal?
It’s worth looking at Jacob 4:11 here too: “Wherefore, beloved, be reconciled unto him
through the atonement of Christ, his Only Begotten Son, that ye may obtain a resurrection
according to the power of the resurrection which is in Christ, and be presented as the first
fruits of Christ unto God.”
How is firstfruits used differently here? If Christ is the firstfruits unto God, and we are the
firstfruits of Christ, what, exactly, does that mean? Why the difference?
“inasmuch as he shall make intercession for all the children of men”: Does this “inasmuch”
qualify Christ’s sacrifice? It seems to say that the sacrifice is effective/effected only on the
condition that it be available to everyone. Why this qualification? What does this tell us
96
about the nature of sacrifice? Of atonement? “Intercession”—how is this word used here?
Does it align with a more judicial, law-oriented sense of the term? Or does it evoke the
intimacy of a personal plea? (Or, of course, both?) How does it provide further evidence for
the discussion regarding opposition that Lehi is gearing up for?
“And they that believe in him shall be saved.” This is a fairly straightforward, declarative
statement after many sentences flavored by clauses and conditions. Perhaps Lehi does this
to provide contrast? That is, that while the mechanics of the sacrifice and atonement are
themselves necessarily murky at best, the mechanics of salvation itself appear much
simpler: belief. Perhaps this contrast clarifies grace? Perhaps it calls the attention of his
listening sons?
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About jennywebb
Mom, wife, editor. Not much time left over at the moment.
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18
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2: 8B-9”
John Hilton IIIsaid:
February 5, 2013 at 9:32 pm
Jenny, thanks for your thoughts here. Great insights and questions. A quick
note on the phrase bring(eth) to pass the resurrection. This phrase appears
for the first time in 2 Nephi 2:8 and it appears almost exclusively in the Book
of Mormon and never in the King James Bible (it is however in JST Luke 3:7).
The next time this expression appears is in the words of Abinadi, who makes
it clear that he is referring to an earlier source: “Have they not said also that
he should bring to pass the resurrection of the dead?” (Mosiah 13:35). In
context, Abinadi makes reference to Moses (Mosiah 13:33), Isaiah (Mosiah
97
14:1), and “all the prophets who have prophesied ever since the world began”
(Mosiah 13:33). Since this phrase does not appear in the Bible and is only
used by Lehi previously in the Book of Mormon, it plausible that Abinadi is
referring to Lehi’s foundational teaching when he says bring to pass the
resurrection (of course he could also be referring to teachings from other
sources).
The phrase bring(eth) to pass the resurrection is later used by Alma2, Samuel
the Lamanite, Mormon, and Moroni. In fact, of the six individuals who use
resurrection more than once, only Jacob does not employ bring(eth) to pass
the resurrection. I wonder if the consistent use of the phrase bring(eth) to
pass the resurrection in the Book of Mormon (but not the Bible or, with one
exception, the Doctrine and Covenants) indicates a pattern of speech that was
developed and used by Book of Mormon prophets. If so, it could bear on our
first guiding question: “What relationship does the sermon of 2 Nephi 2 bear
to scripture generally—whether in terms of its immediate setting, its reliance
on other scriptural texts, or its influence on other scriptural texts?” Thoughts?
REPLY
2.
jennywebbsaid:
February 6, 2013 at 3:01 pm
John, I had no idea that the phrase was so particular to the Book of Mormon.
Thank you for drawing this out. It certainly appears to represent a specific
speech formula used to talk about the resurrection. I’m wondering its
influence on other scripture texts (within the Book of Mormon) might extend
beyond formulation and into theology. That is, could this phrase be a
linguistic marker signifying a prophet’s exposure to a certain (Lehite?) strain
of theological thought? At the very least, it would seem to indicate exposure
to a similar scripture canon among the Lehite prophets.
REPLY
3.
jennywebbsaid:
February 6, 2013 at 3:11 pm
Another thought regarding the use of various words (like “unto”) that may or
may not have a particular signifying meaning. I was listening to a course on
the history of the English language. The professor was covering the history of
the Bible in English, reading aloud examples from various translations (Bede,
Wessex, Wycliffe, Tyndale, and up to King James). He made the point that the
King James version appears to incorporate a markedly more poetic sensibility
in its approach to translation, and argued that the poetic texture in scriptural
translation is meant to convey the multi-faceted nature of scriptural texts. I
thought this was an interesting approach, and I wonder if Joseph’s translation
of the Book of Mormon and its linguistic relation to the King James translation
might be similarly marked. That is, is it possible that the expanded rhythms
and word choices here are meant to convey a poetic sensibility in Lehi’s
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original, one that marks scripture as open to multiple and overlapping
interpretations?
REPLY
4.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
February 7, 2013 at 3:57 pm
I think the connection about “layeth down his life” and “taketh it again” is
intriguing. Why do you think the more expected phrase here would be “and
taketh it up again”? I was interested to see that while Christ says, “for such I
have laid down my life, and have taken it up again” (3 Nephi 9:22) he also
says, “Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I
might take it again [no up]” (John 10:17). Also Moroni writes, “I remember
that thou hast said that thou hast loved the world, even unto the laying down
of thy life for the world, that thou mightest take it again to prepare a place for
the children of men” (Ether 12:33).
As far as I can tell (and I may be missing something here) these are the only
four instances where we see language like this in reference to Christ, and of
course the “up” only appears once. Perhaps Christ only uses the word only
appears post-resurrection – maybe the “up” is a change know that he actually
has taken up his life. This naturally leads to the question of what Moroni was
referring to in Ether 12:33. A prior conversation he had had with the Lord? (If
so, this kind of defeats the idea that the word “up” is connected to postresurrection statements). I’m curious to know what others think.
REPLY
o
jennywebbsaid:
February 7, 2013 at 8:50 pm
John, I think that in my original reading I was expecting “up”
due to the presence of “down” in “layeth down his life.” If one
lays down a life, then I was expecting for that to be reversed
one would need to raise it up (or take it up). I’m not saying
that’s a good reason for the reading, but just what my sense of
symmetry wanted.
REPLY
o
jennywebbsaid:
February 7, 2013 at 8:54 pm
Re: “up”‘s connection to post-resurrection statements, I’m not
certain—could it also be a distinction between Christ as the
speaker and someone else as the speaker?
REPLY
5.
shltaylorsaid:
February 7, 2013 at 7:30 pm
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Something I’ve never quite understood is the connection between Christ’s
resurrection and everyone else’s. Why exactly does Christ getting resurrected
mean that everyone else will, too? Does his resurrection somehow alter the
laws of the universe so that now this is possible for everyone?
So I’m looking at this clause: “that he may bring to pass the resurrection of
the dead, being the first that should rise.” And the crucial point seems to be
the firstness. I’m also thinking about the firstfruits imagery. When it’s animal
sacrifice, isn’t the emphasis on the animal being unblemished (as opposed to
firstborn)? But with the agricultural imagery, the emphasis is on its firstness.
Perhaps Christ’s ability to perform the atonement is tied to his being
unblemished, not his firstness—after all, he’s not the first human being. But
when it comes to the resurrection, the issue of firstness does become
significant: he is the first to be resurrected, the firstfruits, and this is
important.
But I still don’t really understand how him doing it first paves the way for
everyone else.
<>
I like this. I think one of the theological challenges with our doctrine of
premortal spirit –> mortal body –> postmortal spirit –> resurrected body is
finding some way to have some continuity of identity through all these phases
of existence. The resurrected body might be in some sense radically new, but
I don’t think it can be entirely different.
REPLY
o
shltaylorsaid:
February 7, 2013 at 7:32 pm
I’m not sure what I did, but the is supposed to be this quote
from Jenny’s OP:
“Also, clearly this again is misleading: Christ does not take again
the same flesh, but rather perfected, celestial flesh. It’s a
repetition with a difference. But what if it isn’t? What if the
“again” is not misleading? Could the point be not the difference
of the resurrected flesh (it’s escape from death) but rather its
sameness? (i.e., this body is not something foreign, but rather
familiar, in fact, the same?)”
REPLY
o
jennywebbsaid:
February 7, 2013 at 9:06 pm
Sheila, I like the distinction you draw out between Christ’s
perfection (unblemished-ness) as qualifying him to perform the
atonement and the significance of his first-ness with regards to
the resurrection.
In reading over the passage again, this emphasis on his first-
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ness as the first to be resurrected is possible significant in
several ways: it’s a mark of the completion of the atonement
through the act of resurrection and it’s an indication of the
universality of the resurrection and the potential universality of
the complete power of the atonement itself (the only way
something can be first is if there are others who follow).
REPLY
6.
joespencersaid:
February 8, 2013 at 2:56 pm
Well, it’s Friday, and I’m finally caught up enough to turn to the post that
went up this week! A few responses to things already said, and then I’ll see if
I can’t say something in my own name tomorrow morning. :)
Jenny asks: “Why does Lehi qualify or clarify this description with ‘according
to the flesh’?”
It’s a great point. Some serious work needs to be done on the Nephite
theology of the flesh—if there’s a consistent tradition to discover, at least.
Saint Paul, with whom the Nephites tend to have a good deal in common, has
a significant theology of the flesh, one that ties flesh to death and disallows
its redemption (bodies are redeemable, but not flesh, for Paul). This can’t, I
think, be Lehi’s theological position, since he’ll go on to talk about the way the
redemption makes us “free according to the flesh.” It would seem that the
resurrection, for Lehi (and his theological heirs?), amounts to an
actual transformation of the flesh, one that frees it from its orientation to
death—regardless of the status of bodies.
Maybe.
Jenny asks: “Christ does not take again the same flesh, but rather perfected,
celestial flesh. It’s a repetition with a difference. But what if it isn’t? What if
the ‘again’ is not misleading? Could the point be not the difference of the
resurrected flesh (it’s escape from death) but rather its sameness?”
Cribbing Adam (Miller), eh? :) First a quick point of clarification: I assume
that the “it” of “taketh it again” refers most directly to “his life” and not to
“the flesh.” Does that change things here? What’s resumed in the resurrection
is not the flesh—which, presumably, has indeed been changed (“perfected,
celestial”)—but life itself?
Jenny says: “The sacrificial language here is clear. But we normally think
about Christ’s sacrifice as linked with the imagery of the sacrificial lamb, or
perhaps the scape goat—in other words, animal sacrifice. I think it’s
interesting that after this careful, logical traversing of the atonement Lehi
deliberately aligns the sacrifice not with animal, but rather vegetation. He is
Abel’s offering, not Cain’s.”
I’m going to take your innocent mistake and make a big deal of it. :) It was
Cain who sacrificed vegetation and Abel who sacrificed animals, not the other
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way around. (Joseph Smith makes a big deal about this in one of his relatively
early uncanonized theological speculations.) This leaped out at me, perhaps,
just because I read this the other day in Rene Girard’s Violence and the
Sacred: “One of the brothers kills the other, and the murderer is the one who
does not have the violence-outlet of animal sacrifice at his disposal” (p. 4). So
while I think you’re dead on to point out the vegetable-versus-animal
distinction here, and I’m quite as fascinated by the emphasis laid on the
“firstfruits” language, I wonder what it might mean to connect this up with
the Cain-and-Abel story, since it would associate Christ’s sacrifice with Cain….
John says: “Since this phrase ['bring to pass the resurrection'] does not
appear in the Bible and is only used by Lehi previously in the Book of
Mormon, it plausible that Abinadi is referring to Lehi’s foundational teaching
when he says bring to pass the resurrection (of course he could also be
referring to teachings from other sources).”
I think he has to have Lehi in mind, but as a kind of lens through which to
read all the other prophets—all those who, to put it frankly, never said such a
thing. If I understand Abinadi’s basic gesture correctly, there, he’s trying to
say that the theme of the resurrection, etc., should be read into all the
prophets whose writings don’t seem to say any such things, at least not in
such a straightforward way. But I take it that what provides him with this
hermeneutic key is indeed, as you say, Lehi, who provides the beginnings of
the theological trajectory that Abinadi takes up.
Sheila asks: “Why exactly does Christ getting resurrected mean that everyone
else will, too? Does his resurrection somehow alter the laws of the universe so
that now this is possible for everyone?”
Yes, this is a crucial question if we’re to begin sorting out the Nephite
theology of the flesh. If it is indeed the case (as I suggested above) that the
Nephites saw in Christ’s resurrection a certain transformation of flesh as such,
then it seems that there’s something in that transformation that makes the
resurrection a real possibility. Of course, we don’t seem to have any actual
discussion of amechanism for how this works, but perhaps it’s enough to say
that the flesh—the universal flesh of the world—is itself somehow affected by
the resurrection?
Sheila again: “Perhaps Christ’s ability to perform the atonement is tied to his
being unblemished, not his firstness—after all, he’s not the first human being.
But when it comes to the resurrection, the issue of firstness does become
significant: he is the first to be resurrected, the firstfruits, and this is
important.”
This is a nice distinction. This might suggest that we split the difference
between Cain and Abel, between the sedentary and the nomadic, no?
REPLY
o
jennywebbsaid:
102
February 13, 2013 at 10:24 pm
Joe, thanks for correcting my sloppy reading … weakness of my
flesh and all at play I’m afraid …
Re: “it” You’re right, of course, that the clearest referent is “his
life,” however I think there’s at least a plausible reading of “his
life” as “his life-according-to-the-flesh.” We normally read
“according to the flesh” as modifying how he lays down his life,
but I don’t think that reading is the only possible one here.
Granted, the “life-according-to-the-flesh” is clunkier, but what if
we do read “it” in those terms? What if we do see Christ’s work
as physical, as the raising and taking of an enfleshed life?
Re: Cain and Abel. Yikes, that was a bad slip up. But the
question of what the reading and association with “first fruits”
(and therefore Cain) is, as you say, an interesting one. What
could that mean? Just brainstorming here: maybe Christ’s
sacrifice is somehow the inversion of Cain’s actions? That is,
Cain kills his brother rather than see his brother become closer
to God while Christ gives salvation to his brother so that he can
see his brother become closer to God?
REPLY
joespencersaid:

February 14, 2013 at 2:55 pm
Ah, this is helpful. I’d misunderstood you’re claim—
so thanks for correcting my sloppy reading. :)
Yes, this is worth playing around with: “it” referring
to “his life according to the flesh,” not to “his life,”
taken apart from a verb (“layeth down”) qualified
by the according-phrase (“according to the flesh”).
What might this suggest about the “by the power of
the spirit” business? Do you also want to think
about that phrase as qualifying “it” (and hence “his
life”) instead of “taketh . . . again”? What is lifeaccording-to-the-flesh, and what is life-by-thepower-of-the-spirit?
And yes, this is exactly the sort of thing I’m trying
to think about re: Cain….
7.
ricosaid:
February 8, 2013 at 8:41 pm
Great discussion. I’ve been thinking about the usages of “the flesh” in the
Book of Mormon for several posts now and I think since some of it has
bearing on the current post I’m going to place them here. I hope to come
back to some of the other themes and interesting questions later.
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First, one thing John noted in an earlier post the distinction between spiritual
and temporal. What I find interesting is that initially this distinction seems to
be provided by Laman and Lemuel when asking Nephi about how to read
texts or understand visions.
“And they said unto me: Doth this thing mean the torment of the body in the
days of probation [i.e. the temporal], or doth it mean the final state of the
soul after the death of the temporal body [i.e. the spiritual], or doth it speak
of the things which are temporal? And it came to pass that I said unto them
that it was a representation of things both temporal and spiritual.” ( 1 Ne.
15:31-32)
“[M]y brethren came unto me and said unto me: What meaneth these things
which ye have read? Behold, are they to be understood according to things
which are spiritual, which shall come to pass according to the spirit and not
[according to] the flesh? And I, Nephi, said unto them: Behold they were
manifest unto the prophet by the voice of the Spirit; for by the Spirit are all
things made known unto the prophets, which shall come upon the children of
men according to the flesh. Wherefore, the things of which I have read are
things pertaining to things both temporal and spiritual. . . and it cometh unto
men according to the flesh . . . And now behold, I, Nephi, say unto you that
all these things must come according to the flesh.” (1 Ne. 22:1-3, 18, 27).
I get the impression that Laman and Lemuel are more worried if the
revelations or texts deal with the temporal or according to the flesh because
then they really have to worry about them. It affects them. If things are
only spiritual then they don’t seem to be too concerned. It could be the case
that Nephi has a different understanding of “according to the spirit” his
brothers, and it could be that this definition changes over time, but at least in
these passages, it sounds as if “according to the flesh” can mean a time
marker, and not necessarily a statement on the quality or nature of the flesh.
Things that shall come to pass according to the flesh are things that will occur
in the mortal lives of humans, or what occurs during temporal probation or
deal with the temporal body. That’s one idea.
I sense this in other passages: “For behold, the promises which we have
obtained are promises unto us according to the flesh; wherefore, as it has
been shown unto me that many of our children shall perish in the flesh
because of unbelief. . . . For I will fulfil my promises which I have made unto
the children of men, that I will do unto them while they are in the flesh” (2
Nephi 10:2, 17). Is Nephi using “according to the flesh” and “in the flesh” in
the same way? Is Nephi stressing that these promises refer to the here and
now (while in the flesh) or mortal life. Is he saying that their children
will physically die, in contrast to a spiritual death? Does it make sense to
read this as promises that related to some quality of the flesh?
We have a precedent of Nephi speaking of flesh in relation to God. ”And he
said unto me, Behold, the virgin which thou seest, is the mother of God, after
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the manner of the flesh.” (1 Nephi 11:18, 1830). Does this language qualify
mother? That is, does this language function as a qualification that she is the
mother of the flesh or with respect to the flesh but not in other respects?
“Behold, the Lord esteemeth all flesh in one.” (1 Nephi 17:35). “all flesh shall
know that I, the Lord, am thy Savior and thy Redeemer, the Mighty One of
Jacob.” (1 Nephi 21:26; 2 Nephi 6:18). Is the phrase “all flesh” being used
differently here? Does all flesh signify human nature or humankind? It seems
this is not being used as a time marker but speaking of flesh as humanity.
Likewise, does the phrase “no flesh” also gesture at humans or
humankind? The phrase appears twice in our text: “And by the law no flesh is
justified; or, by the law men are cut off” and “there is no flesh that
can dwell in the presence of God, save it be through the merits, and mercy,
and grace of the Holy Messiah, who layeth down his life according to the
flesh, and taketh it again by the power of the Spirit, that he may bring to pass
the resurrection of the dead, being the first that should rise.” (2 Ne. 2:5,
8). Should we understand this “no flesh” to be merely an idiom for “no
human”? It’s humans that dwell not mere bodies, after all. Or should we
read this in some other way? It seems to me that the flesh in ”no flesh” and
“according to the flesh” point to different things. Does it make sense to read
“according to the flesh” as a time marker as it has been used before? Or,
does it make more sense in this case to read “according to the flesh” to
modify “his life.”
I like the discussion between Joe and Jenny as to whether “take” refers to life
or to the flesh: “who layeth down his life according to the flesh and taketh it
again by the power of the spirit.” The word “again” seems to be
problematic. There is a temptation to want to find the same action being
repeated (e.g., I took my life once and I’ll take it again, or, I took my flesh
once and I’ll take it again). I’m wondering, however, if the Book of Mormon
text is adopting the King James language from John 10:17 : “Therefore doth
my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take
it again.” The Greek term is palin, which can mean again but also back or
anew and some have translated it: “I lay down my life, that I might take
it back again.” If this is correct, perhaps we could read the text as: ”who
layeth down his life according to the flesh and taketh it back by the power of
the spirit.”
If the language does reflect John 10:17, what purpose does it serve to add
“according to the flesh” to the sentence? Wouldn’t it still make sense without
it? Is this just an attempt to resolve a logical contradiction that if God lays
down his life, then by what means can he take subsequent action? Is this
Lehi’s way of saying “he is only laying down life in one aspect but he
continues to live obviously since he is God and cannot die”? Or does this have
nothing to do with that? But what does “life according to the flesh” signify if
not “the mortal body”?
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John has pointed to other passages where Christ lays down his life: “Behold,
for such I have laid down my life, and have taken it up again.” (3 Ne.
9:22). Now, given the above, I’m not so sure what “up” means here. Does it
just sound better in 1830 English to have a more symmetrical form: “lay
it down” and “take itup“? The phrase “lay down” appears to be one word in
the Greek, so perhaps these prepositional adverbs “up” and “down” are
merely an incidental byproduct of translation into English. We could remove
these adverbs in translation, getting rid of the need to pair down with up:
“who gives his life according to the flesh, andtakes it back by the power of the
Spirit.” This is just an example to eliminate the directions, not that I think
this is a good translation.
Ups and downs make a lot of sense in terms of the Resurrection. Bodies
laying down and raising up makes a good image.
While perhaps not directly
related to the Book of Mormon text we do have a text where Christ speaks of
“my body which was laid down for you” (D&C 27:2).
I think what makes this passage complicated is that I feel we have passages
speaking of God “taking” flesh. Ammon states “God should come down
among the children of men, and take upon him flesh and blood.” (Mosiah
7:27). ”Because of thy faith thou hast seen that I shall take upon me flesh
and blood.” (Ether 3:9). Why do these use the phrase “flesh and
blood”? Would this be different if it just said flesh? Should we understand
this to mean God is taking on human nature or humanity, rather than taking
a body?
Jacob speaks of “the flesh” rising, which seems to refer to the resurrection of
the body: ”this flesh must have laid down to rot and to crumble to its mother
earth, to rise no more. . . if the flesh should rise no more our spirits must
become subject to that angel who fell from before the presence of the Eternal
God, and became the devil, to rise no more.” (2 Ne. 9:7-8). Does it make
sense to read “the flesh” here as humanity or humankind (as in “all flesh” or
“no flesh”, or in a more limited to the corporeal body “this flesh”?
“And now, if I do err, even did they err of old; not that I would excuse myself
because of other men, but because of the weakness which is in me, according
to the flesh, I would excuse myself.” (1 Ne. 19:6). This “according to the
flesh” doesn’t seem to be a time marker. Does it even make sense to read
this as weakness according to being human? Is he gesturing at some
inherent weakness in the flesh? It would seem Lehi gestures at such “And not
choose eternal death, according to the will of the flesh and the evil which is
therein” (2 Ne. 2:29). Nephi seems to allude to this: “why should I yield to
sin, because of my flesh? Yea, why should I give way to temptations.” (2 Ne.
4:7). In these passages, flesh seems to be associated with sin and evil.
Finally, do the Nephites ever see a problem with the God dwelling in the flesh
when flesh is associated with evil and sin? I know Christian theologians have
viewed this as a problem and have tried to reconcile this issue by positing
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that Christ’s flesh is the equivalent to Adam’s body before the fall, or that
Christ has unfallen human nature, not infected or tainted with this sin. Do
the Nephites ever view this as a problem and if so do they ever offer
solutions? Does Abinadi perhaps gesture at these issues? That question will
have to wait since this is getting much too long.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 9, 2013 at 3:00 pm
Well, I was going to begin outlining some of my own thoughts on
the flesh this morning, but then Rico posted this monster of a
brilliant comment on the flesh in the Book of Mormon. I’ll have
to postpone working up my own thoughts until tomorrow while I
respond to several fascinating points Rico makes.
First, regarding Laman and Lemuel: Yes, this is a brilliant take
on those passages. I’d soften your conclusion on this point ever
so slightly, however. Yes, there seems to be a link between
“according to the flesh” and the temporal more generally, but it
isn’t clear that that doesn’t imply something about “the quality
or nature of the flesh.” The very order of the temporal—of time
as experienced—is grounded by the existential reality of death,
as philosophers from Plato to Derrida have convincingly argued,
and there’s good reason (as I suggested in response to one of
our earlier posts) to see the term “flesh” as connected
specifically to mortality as mortality—that is, as oriented to
death. Hence, to say that there’s a kind of extensional
equivalence between “according to the flesh” and “temporal” is
to say that the flesh is what has the nature or quality of dying, is
to say that flesh is what we inhabit when we’re living toward
death. So, at any rate, it seems to me.
I’d offer the same qualifications later when you deal with texts
that suggest a kind of equivalence between “flesh” and “human.”
To whatever extent “being human” means “being mortal” or
“being-toward-death,” the temporal marker of “according to the
flesh” is at work in “all flesh” and “no flesh,” no?
I think you’re exactly on the mark when you connect this
passage with John 10:17, but I want to double your question
about what it means to add “according to the flesh” to the
wording of John. I think we need to ask also what it means to
add “by the power of the spirit” to it. If we ask both of these
questions, it might help us to recognize that the two additions
are two qualifications of the “laying down” and the “taking
again.” The first of these is done according to the flesh; the
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second by the power of the spirit. The question we’re then left
with is what Lehi adds to the Johannine statement by setting up
this opposition between “according to the flesh” and “by the
power of the spirit.” That’s something I’d have to do a bit of
thinking about. But in the meanwhile, bringing out this pairing
helps to make all the clearer to me that we need not bother with
Christ “taking flesh” here, even if that sort of phrasing appears
elsewhere in scripture. Flesh appears here only as a qualification
of how Christ goes about laying down His life; and spirit appears
here only a qualification of how Christ goes about taking His life
again. What’s laid down and taken again is always, it seems to
me, life.
Now, the reference in 1 Nephi 19:6. I’ve written a little about
this passage. I think it’s actually quite inescapable that there’s
some kind of temporal marker here. First because there’s
already a temporal marker in every assertion of mortality (and
it’s hard to see how “weakness” doesn’t point precisely to
mortality). But second because what Nephi’s trying to explain
and “justify” in that passage is his recourse to a temporal
narrative framing (1 Nephi 1–2 Nephi 5) of the “more sacred
things” he had been commanded by God to produce in his small
plates record (2 Nephi 6-33). It seems to me, given the work
I’ve done on the larger passage within which that text falls, that
Nephi’s point is precisely to say that because he’s a temporal
being, a being who experiences things in terms of narratives and
histories, he’s felt it necessary to embed the non-narrative
sacred materials of his record in a framing narrative.
Finally, this question of “evil and sin.” Yes, Nephi’s reference in
his so-called “psalm” can’t be entirely uncoupled from evil and
sin, but it isn’t necessary to posit that the flesh itself in his
reference is evil or sinful. The Nephites seem more generally to
have a theology of sin that roots it in orientation to death (I’d
have to explain this at length to justify it, especially since my
article on this hasn’t yet appeared in print, though it should be
out in the next year… I’ve been saying for three years), that is, a
theology that suggests that sin is mobilized by mortality as such.
There’s thus a sense in which, for the Nephites, sin can’t be
uncoupled from death and the temporal nature of being human,
but it isn’t therefore the case that mortal flesh
is inherently sinful. Indeed, I think we’ll see Lehi explain in the
course of this sermon how it’s possible to talk about flesh that
doesn’t sin. It follows from all this—if my reading isn’t
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misguided—that there’s no real theological difficulty in Christ
assuming flesh.
Now, my responses here seem like a bunch of criticisms, so let
me reiterate that you’ve made a series of brilliant moves, all of
which ratchet up the stakes of this discussion. I mean only to
further the conversation with all the nits I’m picking!
REPLY
ricosaid:

May 2, 2013 at 12:20 am
I’m late in offering a clarification, but here it is. I
am not in my comment above intending to posit
that the mortal flesh is inherently sinful. Is this an
argument others have raised (that the flesh
is inherently sinful) that I’m not aware of? All I’m
saying above is that there seems to be
an associationbetween flesh and evil, the nature of
which needs further exploration. I’ll try to explain
more in the 2 Nephi 2:28-30 thread.
jennywebbsaid:
o
February 13, 2013 at 10:16 pm
Rico, you’ve really covered a lot of important ground here—
thank you. Re: 1 Ne 19:6, in light of the discussion relating to
flesh and death, I’m tempted answer your question as to
whether there’s an inherent weakness in flesh with a qualified
“yes.” That is, the inherent weakness of flesh is its inevitable
death. The ongoing journey towards death necessarily impacts
and impairs the flesh over a lifetime. Thus, Nephi’s words in 1
Ne 19 seem to indicate his acknowledgment of his own mortal
limitations—his weaknesses are a natural part of the frailty of
the human enfleshed body. In this reading, the inherent
weakness is not some sort of original sin, but rather the
inevitable process of decay that occurs whenever flesh is placed
in time.
REPLY
8.
ricosaid:
February 28, 2013 at 10:29 pm
Not taken as criticism at all but a thoughtful and welcomed critique Joe! Let
me agree with you that “according to the flesh” could imply something about
“the nature and quality of the flesh” namely that, as you put it, “the flesh is
what has the nature or quality of dying, is to say that flesh is what we inhabit
when we’re living toward death.” I can agree with this. However, I’m trying to
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make a distinction between what can be inferred from a passage and the
function of a particular phase.
One specific passage I had in mind was 1 Ne. 22:18 “Behold, my brethren, I
say unto you, that these things must shortly come; yea, even blood, and fire,
and vapor of smoke must come; and it must needs be upon the face of this
earth; and it cometh unto men according to the flesh if it so be that they will
harden their hearts against the Holy One of Israel.”
I agree that the “flesh” implies a “temporal nature” in that all flesh has a
expiration date, but this is not what I had in mind by “temporal marker.” I
only mean to say that Laman is asking whether a prophesied event will occur
in this life or after death. That is, the phrase is demarcates two time periods.
So, in this case I actually do not mean “temporal” in the sense that “there’s
already a temporal marker in every assertion of mortality” although I agree
with the statement.
What I’m suggesting is that if the sentence read, for example, “and it cometh
unto men in this life if it so be that they will harden their hearts against the
Holy One of Israel” that it might perform the same function and that the
meaning might be the same. Now, if this substitution is semantically
equivalent (acknowledging that there could be other meanings), then what
I’m saying is that I don’t see Nephi being particularly interested in getting
Laman and Lemuel to understand the temporary nature of human flesh or the
inevitability of death in that specific passage, even though I would agree that
those statements are true. Nephi, I would argue, is not trying to make a
statement about the flesh here.
Rather, the purpose of the statement in this passage, I would argue, is to
explain to Laman and Lemuel that these events are not in reference to
punishment that will take place after this life, but are reference to events that
will occur in this life, so Laman and Lemuel had better pay attention to them
and should not ignore them. I’m only suggesting this for particular passages,
and not attempting to draw a general conclusion of this phrase in the Book of
Mormon, because I think it is used in different ways in different places.
So, in this specific case, while I agree that there are these inherent meanings
between flesh, mortality, death and time, I’m wondering if Nephi is using the
term to clarify to Laman and Lemuel which category they should understand
these events to take place. So, I might try to substitute “according to the
flesh” with “in this life” and see what happens or what readings are produced.
I’m only trying to make these substitution to ferret out these phrases that
might have multiple meanings, like using a prism to separate light.
So let me substitute “according to the flesh” with “in this life” in a few
passages and observe whether the meaning is altered.
2 Nephi 10:2 “For behold, the promises which we have obtained are promises
unto us in this life.” I think this is a fruitful substitution. It seems to hold true
and seems like a good fit, especially considering promises that the Nephites
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will “prosper in the land,” which resists a spiritual reading or that they will
prosper only in heaven after they die. One could always argue that keeping
the commandments prospers one spiritually, or is good for one’s soul, but has
no bearing on one’s financial situation in this life, and we could accept this is
a true statement, but I don’t think this is the intended reading.
2 Nephi 9:53 “he has promised unto us that our seed shall not utterly be
destroyed, in this life, but that he would preserve them.” This too seems to
hold true without a loss in meaning.
Alma 7:12 “And he will take upon him death, that he may loose the bands of
death which bind his people; and he will take upon him their infirmities, that
his bowels may be filled with mercy, in this life, that he may know in this
life how to succor his people according to their infirmities.” This feels wrong to
me. This feels like there is important meaning that is lost by this substitution.
So, in this case, the phrase “according to the flesh” has to mean something
else or something more, or performing some other function than demarcating
time.
Alma 7:13 “Now the Spirit knoweth all things; nevertheless the Son of God
suffereth in this life that he might take upon him the sins of his people.” This
leads to a reading that, while it might be true, I don’t think this is the
intended reading. We also lose the spirit and flesh dichotomy and the
connection between suffering and the body. This substitution doesn’t capture
all the meaning that I feel is intended, so here I do not think this is a good fit.
2 Nephi 2:27 “Wherefore, men are free in this life; and all things are given
them which are expedient unto man.” I can’t decide on this reading. Maybe
this too leads to a true statement as it stands, but maybe it doesn’t capture
all the intended meaning. By the way, I also want to make a distinction
between a true statement and an intended meaning. It doesn’t matter
whether a substitution leads to a true statement. If there is a loss in meaning,
then there must be more intended. I know this seems like a rather subjective
approach and it’s fraught with difficulties, but its just a brainstorming tool.
To recap, I don’t think every instantiation of “according to the flesh” will
function the same way. In fact, I almost feel this first usage drops out after
Nephi’s interactions with Laman and Lemuel, especially when “according to
the flesh” begins to be applied to Christ (and therefore refers to his
Incarnation) and not to future events such as prophesied destruction or divine
promises (which need not have any reference to the Incarnation). These later
types of contexts (prophesies and promises) are not complicated by the
Incarnation, and so it is easier to see that they are not, I still would argue,
intended to be statements about the flesh, but only a signifier that some
event is not to be spiritualized or understood to occur after death.
But yet, and here is the rub, for the Nephites, the Incarnation is an event
taking place in time: an event that they prophesy will occur in the future
“according to the flesh.” I’m just musing on this odd circumstance that if
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Nephi had told Laman and Lemuel that “the Messiah will come according to
the flesh” would they would understand Nephi to be saying that “this is not an
event that will happen after death, but a Messiah will arrive in human history”
or whether they would understand Nephi to be saying “God will
be incarnated into human history and the point is that God will take on
corruptible flesh.” At any rate, I’m considering this usage more on a case by
case basis, trying to look at how the phrase functions within the text and
seeking to look for the intended reading, however problematic that approach
may be.
In fact, there was a another passage I had considered but it didn’t make it
into my comment.
“And he will take upon him death, that he may loose the bands of death
which bind his people.” (Alma 7:12a). Do you think we could substitute death
for flesh here without any change or loss in meaning? That is, taking on death
is the same as taking on flesh? If so, I think that makes sense.
That’s a good point on the addition of “power of the spirit” in 2 Nephi 2:8. I
feel that there is a dichotomy between spirit and flesh that runs throughout
the Book of Mormon, but I’ll have to save that topic for a different time.
Joe and Jenny, as for 1 Nephi 19:6, I’m just not at the point where I
understand Nephi to be saying that the reason for his errors and the errors of
“other men” or “they . . . of old” is due to the fact that he will inevitably die.
What does the fact that he will ultimately die have to do with making errors in
the text? If the only weakness of the flesh is that it will ultimately expire,
what logical connection does this have to making errors in the recording of or
producing a sacred record? We have a counter example in the God who takes
on flesh. We don’t see any references to the incarnate God being susceptible
to making errors just because he dwells in a tabernacle of clay. I also have a
hard time seeing this as being related to a specific strategy that only Nephi
makes in arranging his record, because he is claiming that “they of old” also
made errors. So whatever error is being made, it would seem, is something
common to both Nephi and these “other men.”
If, for example, Nephi claimed that due to the weakness in the flesh that he
wouldn’t be able to record events after his death because he wouldn’t be
around to experience them, then that would indicate to me that the weakness
to which he refers is that his life has a time limit. I see a weakness in the
flesh that goes beyond the fact that he will inevitably die. What do you think?
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
March 7, 2013 at 1:57 pm
This is helpful, Rico. I have no real quibble with anything here.
My point wasn’t to say that every time we have “according to the
flesh” in scripture the point is to teach something about the
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nature of the flesh; my point was to say that to use that phrase
is at the very least to draw on the idea of the nature of the flesh
in order to say something. I had misunderstood you to be saying
that there were instances where “flesh” didn’t seem to have
reference to the temporally determined nature of mortal flesh
because the sense of the larger sentence in which “flesh”
appears is focused elsewhere. But I think we’re in agreement.
So perhaps I could phrase you original question in the following
way: Does the (basically constant) referent of “flesh” play a
significant role in the sense of what Lehi says here when he
employs the phrase “according to the flesh,” or does the way
that the phrase is used downplay that referent (because Lehi’s
semantic emphasis is on the fact that Christ’s death/resurrection
will be real and not merelyspiritual)? If that’s the question, I’m
simply inclined to say: No, I think the referent of “flesh” is
crucial to what Lehi’s saying. It seems to me clear that Lehi’s
distinguishing between two actions of the Savior—the one
accomplished “according to the flesh” and the other
accomplished “by the power of the spirit,” and both associated
with His dealings with His “life” (laying down and then taking
again).
On 1 Nephi 19:6, I should have been clearer. My point is not to
say that the mere fact of death makes people structure texts in
a certain way! My point is just to say that the weakness
associated with mortality plays a role in how Nephi thinks his
text has to be structured: mortal human beings, because of the
flesh, will approach what he writes in a certain way, and that
demands that he produce it in a certain way. I meant no more
than that. (I should also note that I don’t take his “if I do err” to
refer to “making errors.” He’s referring in that passage, on my
reading, to erring by structuring his record in a certain way,
something others before him did for the same strategic reasons,
presumably. Obviously, there’s a lot more to say about all that—
which I’ve undertaken in my book.)
2 Nephi 2:10
12
TuesdayFEB 2013
POSTED
BY SHLTAYLOR IN
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And because of the intercession for all, all men come unto God; wherefore, they stand in
the presence of him, to be judged of him according to the truth and holiness which is in
him. Wherefore, the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given, unto the inflicting of
the punishment which is affixed, which punishment that is affixed is in opposition to that of
the happiness which is affixed, to answer the ends of the atonement—
This verse continues a lot of the topics that we’ve been discussing. Lots of good (and
confusing!) stuff here!
And because of the intercession for all
We’re working here, then, with a universal aspect of the atonement. The passage continues
an emphasis on “all”—as we saw last week in v. 9, “he shall make intercession for all the
children of men,” and here the “all” is repeated. It’s interesting to note that it’s used in
three different constructions in v. 9-10: “all the children of men,” “all,” and “all men”—a
repetition which I think emphasizes that Lehi’s not kidding around when he says “all”; it
really is everyone. And while in v. 9, this was followed by a conditional requirement that
humans act in a certain way—”they that believe in him shall be saved”—v. 10 focuses on
what happens to everyone, regardless of what they have or haven’t done.
What exactly is meant by “intercession”? It’s not a word used often in the BoM; the only
other passages where I can find it come in Abinadi’s discourse in Mosiah: first when he’s
quoting Isaiah: “and he bore the sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressors”
(14:12, channeling Isaiah 53) and then in the following chapter, in his own words: “And
thus God breaketh the bands of death, having gained victory over death, giving the Son
power to make intercession for the children of men—” (15:8).
If you’re going to intercede, you need to have two parties that need to be reconciled, but
it’s not always clear to me what those are. Humans and the law? Humans and justice?
Humans and God? Here it’s possibly the third of those options, since the result is that
everyone comes to God. But how is this connected to the law (which comes up later in the
verse)?
all men come unto God; wherefore they stand in the presence of him
And thus the Fall is reversed: humans were cut off from the presence of God, and are now
brought back into it. But how exactly does the intercession of Christ bring everyone to stand
in the presence of God? And since we’re showing up to be judged (to be discussed shortly),
wouldn’t you think that the intercession of Christ would take place at the judgment? But
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here it seems that the intercession actually enables the judgment. That’s interesting. What
if salvation isn’t about escaping judgment, but about being brought to it?
to be judged of him according to the truth and holiness which is in him
So. Judgment. It’s a term that often has negative connotations; in looking it up in the
Topical Guide, for example, I noted that it refers you to both “condemnation” and
“excommunication” – but strikingly not really to anything positive.
In looking at various scriptural passages on judgment, I was particularly interested in some
aspects of Alma’s sermon to Corianton. He talks about it going both ways—when you’re
judged, if your works and the desires of your hearts are good, then you’ll be restored to
good, and if evil, to evil. (Alma 41:3-4) Sounds straightforward enough. Except that we
know that the atonement has to play some role somewhere, because in our natural state,
our works and the desires of our hearts are pretty messed up. But in this particular
narrative, there isn’t a redeemer jumping in at the last minute to rescue you just as the
jaws of hell are about to gobble you up. I’m thinking it would make more sense to read
passages like this (about being judged for our works) in the context of the atonement as
something that’s been at work all along (if we’ve allowed it), transforming our desires,
rather than something that only kicks in at the end to balance the books. Because notably,
everyone (righteous or wicked) gets judged; as I said earlier, far from getting you out of
the judgment, the atonement sends you there.
There’s a parallel, of course, in which Christ was judged by us—”the Son of the everlasting
God was judged of the world” (1 Nephi 11:32)—and now we’re judged by God. But while the
world’s judgment of Christ was unrighteous, God’s judgment is a righteous one. It’s
“according to the truth and holiness which is in him.” I find this phrase fascinating, though
I’m not entirely sure what it means. I notice that I’m prone to think of judgment in terms of
courtrooms and law—and because of that, it’s easy to impose a legalistic framework on such
passages. But while the law comes up in this verse, it’s not stated that the law is the means
by which God judges, only that the ends of the law are answered. And strikingly, it doesn’t
describe judgment as an evaluation of whether you followed a particular moral code.
Rather, it’s grounded in holiness and truth. And not in any potential holiness and truth in us,
but the truth and holiness in God.
Why both truth and holiness? And what exactly do those terms mean? I’m thinking that
holiness is likely related to the assertion that no unclean thing can dwell with God. Perhaps
similarly, un-truth can’t be in the presence of God. From this angle, judgment seems more
implicit than explicit—in the presence of perfect truth and holiness, our own self-deceptions
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are stripped away, and we cannot hide from our sin. But I don’t want to lose track of the
possibility that this judgment can be a saving judgment, and not only a damning one. If we
let it, an encounter with truth can be not a condemnation, but a call to something better. Is
it possible that judgment isn’t so much God’s final verdict on us, but an encounter in which
we see things as they really are: who God really is, and who we really are—and the
judgment comes in how we respond to this, according to the desires of our hearts?
Does it mean anything significant that we judged not “by” him, but “of” him?
A couple more thoughts on judgment. We have, of course, Matthew 7:1, “judge not, that ye
be not judged,” and the JST which adds the qualification, “judge not unrighteously.”
(Though it’s interesting that in 3 Nephi 14:1, the “unrighteously” qualification isn’t there.)
But regardless, we know that we can get into trouble with judgment, because “with what
judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be
measured to you again.” (Matthew 7:2) The mote/beam imagery which follows also
suggests that we should be very careful in judging because of our inability to see clearly,
our own blind spots.
So should we ever judge? Is there such a thing as (human) righteous judgment? That’s a
minefield that’s probably worth its own seminar. But I did want to mention a couple of brief
thoughts. If God’s judgment is grounded in holiness and truth, that would be the model for
us to follow in our dealings with one another. Not as in, judging whether people are
sufficiently holy and true (however fun that might be), but if we are in a position that we
have to judge, to think in those terms instead of legalistic ones.
I have to admit that I’m not sure exactly what that looks like. But going back to Alma’s
sermon to Corianton, he says “see that you are merciful unto your brethren; deal justly,
judge righteously, and do good continually.” (Alma 41:14) Mercy, justice, righteousness,
and doing good are all linked here. And, continuing Alma’s restoration theme in this chapter,
if you exercise them, you get them restored to you. What’s really interesting, given that
Alma is about to launch into an extended, quite complex, discourse on the relationship
between justice and mercy, here they are mentioned as part of the same general
orientation: in your dealings with others, be merciful, deal justly, judge righteously. That
might tell us something about the nature of God’s judgment.
I’m getting pretty far afield from 2 Nephi 2. So getting back to verse 10,
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Wherefore, the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given, unto the inflicting of the
punishment which is affixed, which punishment that is affixed is in opposition to that of the
happiness which is affixed, to answer the ends of the atonement—
I’m having a hard time following the syntax here:
the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given
So we have a law, given by the Holy One, for some particular ends.
unto the inflicting of the punishment which is affixed
The (ends of the law?) lead to punishment; this punishment is affixed (by the law? to the
law?).
which punishment that is affixed is in opposition to that of the happiness which is affixed
This punishment is the opposite of happiness, which is also affixed (by the law? by the
atonement?).
to answer the ends of the atonement
It sounds like happiness, then, is affixed by (or to) the atonement. (?)
And then we go on to the much-anticipated “opposition in all things” discussion. So the
most basic point I can see here is that the law is tied to punishment, and the atonement is
tied to happiness. It’s interesting that it doesn’t sound like an inherent relationship; rather,
it’s something that’s been “affixed”—presumably by God? Significantly, the law here is
something that God has given (not something self-existent to which God is subject).
The statement begins with a “wherefore,” which I think refers back to everyone coming into
the presence of God and being judged. The confusing thing (or one of them!) is that the
subject “the ends of the law” doesn’t ever get a verb; we just have “wherefore, the ends of
the law . . .” and then all the clauses about punishment and things being affixed. But we
can say that the “ends of the law” have something to do with God’s judgment (though as I
mentioned earlier, I’m interested that it doesn’t actually say that God uses the law to
judge).
We’ve already had a lot of good discussion about what the law might be, and what the ends
of the law might be. Does this verse contribute anything to that? Just to review, we know
from v. 5 that no flesh is justified by the law, that it cuts us off both spiritually and
temporally, and from v. 7 that Christ’s self-sacrifice is to answer the ends of the law. Then
here we have the statement that God gives the law, and the law has to do with punishment
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being affixed. The verse does not clarify, however, to what exactly the punishment has been
affixed, which adds to my confusion. Affixed to sin? Or is it affixed to the law itself (or to the
ends of the law)?
The “ends of the atonement” phrase always strikes me as a little out of the blue, maybe
because the term “atonement” hasn’t been used yet. But what are the ends of the
atonement, and are they different from the ends of the law? It looks to me like the law and
the atonement are being set up as opposites (especially considering the next verse). That
would make sense in terms of the law causing us to be cut off, and the atonement allowing
for reconciliation. But in the end, aren’t they working for the same thing? (Presumably God
gave the law for salvific purposes.)
I’m starting to think in circles, so I’m going to end there and await your insights.
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1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:10”
joespencersaid:
February 13, 2013 at 2:55 pm
Sheila Lots of great stuff here. I’ll begin this morning by responding to a set of
issues you raise in the first half of your post. And then I’ll have to turn
tomorrow to the questions you raise about the incomplete sentence that takes
up the second half of the verse.
You say:
Since we’re showing up to be judged (to be discussed shortly), wouldn’t you
think that the intercession of Christ would take place at the judgment?
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But here it seems that the intercession actually enables the judgment.
That’s interesting. What if salvation isn’t about escaping judgment, but
about being brought to it? . . . I’m thinking it would make more sense to
read passages like this (about being judged for our works) in the context of
the atonement as something that’s been at work all along (if we’ve allowed
it), transforming our desires, rather than something that only kicks in at
the end to balance the books. . . . Is it possible that judgment isn’t so much
God’s final verdict on us, but an encounter in which we see things as they
really are: who God really is, and who we really are—and the judgment
comes in how we respond to this, according to the desires of our hearts?
Yes! Yes! That is:
I hear in your words the indication of two reversals of our usual thinking
about the plan of salvation. First (from the second stretch I’ve quoted from
you), the atonement has to be recognized as an enabling power that has
worked on us from the beginning (this, I take it, is the whole point of Lehi’s
later “ye are free according to the flesh” business), not as a conquering power
that comes to us only at the end (at the end of our becoming worthy, at the
end of our works, at the end of the judgment, what have you). Second (from
the first stretch I’ve quoted from you), the atonement is what delivers
us to not from judgment.
These reversals are, I’m convinced, the beating heart of Nephite thinking
about atonement—thinking that’s being launched in this sermon from Lehi.
Christ’s salvific intervention possibilizes, transforms our very flesh so that
we can do good (where “doing good” means “doing something without a basic
orientation to ourselves” not “doing things we consider good” or “not doing
things we consider bad”). That, I take it, is why Lehi is so profoundly focused
in these verses on the resurrection (isn’t it significant that he never refers to
what we usually call the atonement here, only to the resurrection event and
its effects?). It’s the way the resurrection transforms our very flesh that’s at
the core of the atonement for the Nephites. Lehi seems not at all to be
concerned about questions of sins being forgiven, only about how we can be
set free from our self-obsessions.
The resurrection, further, overcomes the separations that keep us from
judgment. Judgment, it seems, is nothing more than coming into God’s
presence. There the relationship we’ve sustained to the God who has
delivered us from ourselves comes fully to light. How do we respond to His
presence? All our genuine desires are revealed there. Have we taken our
freedom-through-the-resurrection as the source of all our misery, as reason
to rebel against life by continuing to cling to our death—to the one thing that
remains ours in light of the resurrection? Or have we praised God in the
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freedom granted us, given ourselves to the work of building the kingdom? The
judgment is the moment where all that becomes clear. (Is this why Jacob, in
2 Nephi 9, will speak of “perfect knowledge” in the moment of reunion and
judgment? We’ll know exactly what we really want, and that’ll be either
devastating or the source of the greatest joy.)
Okay, I’m soap-boxing now, but I think you couldn’t be more right
here. This is the Nephite theory of atonement.
And then it gets complicated by all this law business. I’ll see what I can say in
response to your thoughts on this tomorrow.
REPLY
2.
jennywebbsaid:
February 17, 2013 at 1:42 am
Sheila, like Joe said, lots of great stuff here. Just wanted to apologize for not
getting my thoughts together earlier—responding here is my first priority
tomorrow!
REPLY
3.
joespencersaid:
February 17, 2013 at 9:00 pm
Sorry I’m just getting back to this. I’ve been surprisingly busy this past week!
The second half of verse 10, it seems to me, can be approached broadly in at
least four different ways, all motivated by the lack of a verb (which you point
out):
(1) We might take “wherefore” to be, somewhat loosely, used in something
like the way we sometimes use the word “hence.” We’d then read the middle
part of verse 10 as follows: “Everyone ends up in God’s presence to be judged
according to God’s truth and holiness. Hence the ends of the law.” That’s not
crazy talk, but it’s less than satisfying.
(2) We might play with the possibility that either Nephi failed to write or
Joseph failed to pronounce or Oliver failed to write or Oliver failed to copy
over a verb that Lehi did in fact say. Perhaps there should be an “are” before
“unto the inflicting of the punishment.” Or perhaps there should be an “are”
before “to answer the ends of the atonement.” Or some other verb in some
other place. This isn’t impossible, but Royal Skousen has given us some
reasons to be wary about going this route (see the appendix entry on 2 Nephi
2:10 in his Analysis of Textual Variants, volume 6).
(3) We might play with the possibility that there’s dittography in this passage,
an accidental repetition of “the punishment which is affixed” in the form of
“which punishment that is affixed.” If the latter “repetition” is removed, we
get: “Wherefore, the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given, unto the
inflicting of the punishment which is affixed, is in opposition to that of the
happiness which is affixed, to answer the ends of the atonement.” In one
way, that’s really satisfying, but again it’s Royal Skousen who points out its
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pitfalls. If it isdittography, it’s not strict dittography, since “the” is replaced by
“which” and “which is replaced by “that.” Oliver quite likely wouldn’t have
done that. But Skousen doesn’t play with the possibility that Nephi, in an
original language whose translation into English wouldn’t reflect it exactly,
produced a dittography that we’re still dealing with. That remains an
intriguing possibility—though not an unproblematic one (note, for instance,
that the singular “is” doesn’t match up with the plural “ends of the law” like it
does with the singular “punishment that is affixed” if we don’t emend the
text).
(4) The simplest and, in a certain way, most likely explanation is simply that
we have here a really tortured sentences that gets interrupted by the aside of
verses 11-13 and to which Lehi (or Nephi, in his reconstruction) never gets
back to. There are other examples of this phenomenon in the Book of
Mormon, so it wouldn’t be at all surprising to find it. Indeed, it’s quite
characteristic of the almost “oral” quality of much of the Book of Mormon. And
perhaps we could play around with the possibility that Lehi cut off his
sentence because he could see the way some of his sons were reacting to
what he was saying about opposition already.
I’ve been convinced of every one of these at one time or another. At present,
I’m most swayed by option (4). I like it because it suggest thats Lehi ties
himself up in a complete knot when he begins to expound the idea of
opposition—as if Lehi realizes that he’s constructed an impossible sentence
and so abandons it to start anew, and much more basically (and
philosophically!), in verse 11. It’s as if the second half of verse 10 just has
Lehi saying, just after mentioning the judgment, something like:
“Opposition!”
Of course, we can dig out a good deal more than just that from the passage,
which Sheila has already begun to do. I’ll add the following systematization,
just to clarify things for me:
Basic Elements
At the Punishment Extreme
The Law
The Ends of the Law
Punishment
The Inflicting of the Punishment
At the Happiness Extreme
The Atonement
The Ends of the Atonement
Happiness
“That of” (the “Inflicting” of?) the Happiness
Between the Extremes
Affixing Punishment
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Affixing Happiness
Opposition
Basic Relationships the Elements
At the Punishment Extreme
The Law —— > Its Ends —— > Infliction of —— > Punishment
At the Happiness Extreme
The Atonement —— > Its Ends —— > That of (Inflicting of?) —— >
Happiness
Between the Extremes
Punishment (Affixed) < —— Opposition —— > Happiness (Affixed)
Maybe something like that? At any rate, these seem to me to be the basic
elements and relationships that have to be determined. Obviously, it remains
to e determined exactly what "that of" refers to on the happiness extreme. It
also remains to be decided what the actual significance is of the fact that
"that of" (rather than "happiness" pure and simple) is apparently what is
opposed to the affixed punishment. And none of this is even to begin to ask
really difficult questions—some of which we've begun to discuss—like those
regarding the actual meaning of "ends of the law" and "ends of the
atonement," etc.
REPLY
o
deidre329said:
February 18, 2013 at 12:18 am
Sheila, thank you for your insightful post. In response to your
discussion of the universal aspect of the atonement and the use
of “all,” I like how you balance this with Abinadi’s quotation of
Isaiah 53: “he bore the sins of many”—this highlights our earlier
discussion on 2 Nephi 2:7—there is a universal aspect of the
atonement in terms of resurrection and the availability of
redemption, but the atonement is only efficacious to those who
bring forth a broken heart and contrite spirit, who repent and
receive salvation.
I also like your discussion of atonement as being ongoing in our
lives—it is a process of sanctification. As it reads in Moroni
10:33, “And again, if ye by the grace of God are perfect in
Christ, and deny not his power, then are ye sanctified in Christ
by the grace of God, through the shedding of the blood of Christ,
which is in the covenant of the Father unto the remission of your
sins, that ye become holy, without spot.”
I like the point that the world’s judgment of Christ was
unrighteous, God’s judgment on the world is righteous.
My favorite aspect of your discussion is when you take about
God’s final judgement not being his verdict on us, but about us
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seeing God and ourselves as we really are. This comes down to a
discussion of charity. 1 Corinthians 13: 12 “For we see through a
glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but
then shall I know even as also I am known.” I have always
thought this verse is in a discourse on charity for a reason—it is
through charity that we come to see God, others and ourselves
as we really are. This ties into your point about being judged of
Christ instead of by Christ. Christ’s love becomes the standard
we measure ourselves by and that God measures us by. The
Book of Mormon is clear that charity is absolutely crucial to our
salvation: Alma 34:29 “Therefore, if ye do not remember to be
charitable, ye are as dross, which the refiners do cast out, (it
being of no worth) and is trodden under foot of men” and further
Moroni 7:47 states, “But charity is the pure love of Christ, and it
endureth forever; and whoso is found possessed of it at the last
day, it shall be well with him.” Christ’s atonement saves those
who become like him, who develop charity, who live up to the
standard of Christian love.
REPLY
jennywebbsaid:

February 18, 2013 at 5:07 am
Deidre, I found your association of 1 Cor. 13:12
with the context of God’s judgment here really
useful and interesting. I had never thought of that
verse that way before, but I think your reading
brings the force of charity into the discussion of
judgment quite strongly.
joespencersaid:

February 18, 2013 at 2:32 pm
Yes, Jenny’s quite right. I want to think further
about what you’re spelling out here (I’ve been
working quite a bit on Paul’s first letter to the
Corinthians lately), and about what it suggests
about Paul’s larger analysis of knowledge in that
letter….
4.
jennywebbsaid:
February 18, 2013 at 5:04 am
Ok, finally have some time at the computer today! I, like Joe and Deidre,
really think that part of what is fascinating (and important) in your reading
here is seeing salvation as being brought to judgment. In thinking through
this “Nephite” (perhaps better to say “Lehite”) understanding of the
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atonement, I can’t help but wonder if part of the power of this
understanding—that their flesh will be enabled to rise and stand in the
presence of God through the atonement—has anything to do with their time:
that is, pre-resurrection. Is there any evidence in the Book of Mormon of a
kind of shift in emphasis from the wonder of the resurrection to the wonder of
grace (/forgiveness) that would pivot around the witness received of the
reality of the resurrection? Would the pitfall be that whatever side of the
resurrection you’re on temporally the temptation would be to undervalue the
power of the other side?
Next question: I know that this may be opening up a can of worms given the
academic dating of the various Isaiahs, but I wonder if the context you point
out for the word “intercession” in any way points to any type of theological
connection between Lehi and Isaiah? I’ve been struck several times over the
past few years by the kind of literary “ghost” Lehi plays in the Book of
Mormon. And I wonder if Nephi’s own love for Isaiah’s writings and their style
(in which Lehi had Nephi educated) points towards Lehi’s own affinity for
Isaiah, either stylistically (from the snippets Nephi shares of Lehi’s visions I
think there’s some fascinating overlap) and/or theologically.
Third point: you make a parenthetical comment right at the end:
“(Presumably God gave the law for salvific purposes.)” I just wonder if there’s
any interpretive space opened up by flipping this assumption on its head—
something like “Presumably God did not give the law for salvific purposes.”
Because what I see over and over in the texts is that the law cannot save, the
law does not save, the law will not save, etc. So perhaps its purpose is not
salvific, but rather something different … instructive? Corporeal? Something
between the two? The law as teaching mankind to see so that they might
recognize the Messiah as he dabs mud in their eyes? Obviously I’m spitballing
here (no irreverence intended in the pun), but what if the ends of the law are
markedly different, perhaps even categorically distinct, from the ends of the
atonement?
And the last point: Your discussion of the atonement as being at work all
along throughout our lives, performing a gradual yet continual
transformation, reminded me strongly of an excellent talk/article by Elder
Bednar from 2006/7, “Seek Learning by Faith.” In it, Elder Bednar makes a
significant connection between our own action—choosing to exercise faith, to
act, to seek learning—and the resulting change in our own natures:
“The learning I am describing reaches far beyond mere cognitive
comprehension and the retaining and recalling of information. The type of
learning to which I am referring causes us to put off the natural man (see
Mosiah 3:19), to change our hearts (see Mosiah 5:2), to be converted unto
the Lord, and to never fall away (see Alma 23:6). Learning by faith requires
both “the heart and a willing mind” (D&C 64:34). Learning by faith is the
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result of the Holy Ghost carrying the power of the word of God both unto and
into the heart.”
The type of learning that Elder Bednar describes here is explicitly not a
passive consumption of facts, but rather an experiential learning that at its
heart continually invites the Holy Ghost to witness truths as we undergo the
processes of putting off the natural man, changing our hearts, and being
converted to the Lord. I see these processes as both physically and spiritually
literal; the work of the atonement in our lives is just that: a lifetime of
conversion, change, and the burning of dross. And I find it interesting that we
still have an active ecclesiastical rhetoric of this type of change today.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 18, 2013 at 2:38 pm
Jenny, could you say more about your first paragraph here? I’m
not exactly sure I understand the distinction between the two
attitudes you mention. (And, to be fully disclosive, my question
is rooted in my conviction that there’s a kind of atemporality to
Nephite theories of atonement….)
In the meanwhile, let me thank you for especially your second
and third points here. I like the way you describe Lehi’s influence
on Nephi here—and it might be worth noting that something
similar seems to be at work in 1 Nephi 10, where Lehi uses
Isaiah’s words to frame his prophecies—and I like your Zizekian
inversion of Sheila’s parenthetical a good deal.
REPLY
jennywebbsaid:

February 18, 2013 at 3:57 pm
Sure Joe. What I’ve been seeing in terms of
thematic emphasis as we go through this chapter is
a marked focus on the resurrection aspect of the
atonement. I think we can view the atonement
through different “lenses” so to speak: redemption
from the grave through resurrection, redemption
from sin through forgiveness. (Personally, I think
that seeing the “whole” would be redemption
through grace.) I see the Nephites as focusing
more on the “redemption through resurrection”
aspect theologically. And I’m speculating /
wondering if this has anything to do with their
temporal location: pre-resurrection.
I wonder if prophetic attitudes pre-resurrection
might focus on the thing that seems most
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impossible because it has never been seen before:
in this case, resurrection of the flesh. And,
correspondingly, if attitudes post-resurrection shift
to a focus on redemption of sin because once the
resurrection becomes a past event temporally, the
thing that seems the most impossible is atoning
forgiveness.
This is not to say that the other aspect(s) of the
atonement are ignored, but rather that they just
are not apparently in as much focus theologically.
Maybe. I’m not committed to this reading; just
wondering if there’s any evidence for it beyond the
emphasis on resurrection here 2 Ne. 2. And I’d
really like to hear more about how you see a kind
of atemporality at work in the Nephite theories of
atonement, so please take my ramblings as an
invitation to expand!
jennywebbsaid:

February 18, 2013 at 4:11 pm
Also, re: Lehi, yes, I think the same kind of thing is
going on in 1 Ne. 10. And again in 1 Ne. 1. Nephi’s
description of Lehi’s prophetic calling as it were (we
actually don’t know if he was called as a prophet
prior to this, but the text seems to indicate that this
may be his first visionary experiences; at the very
least, it’s significant that Nephi is presenting us to
Lehi in the text itself in terms of a prophetic
experience and thus providing a kind of literary
prophetic calling to Lehi’s character) shares what I
think are significant themes and images with Isaiah
6 (and a little with Isaiah 8).
• Fire / burning imagery
• Book / scroll imagery
• Destruction
• Preaching to people who will not understand and
will reject the message and messenger (for Lehi
this is both those at Jerusalem and then again in
his own family)
• Angels / Seraphim praising God
• The theme of the remnant / our knowledge that
Lehi’s family will be a remnant
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Given how intimately Nephi is acquainted with
Isaiah’s writings, it seems like this initial
presentation of Lehi is not merely accidental in its
Isaianic associations; I’m interested in seeing how
2 Ne 2 (and other chapters) might play into further
strengthening this association, especially in terms
of theology and doctrine.
5.
ricosaid:
March 2, 2013 at 2:55 am
Thank you for the thought-provoking post Sheila. As I read the post and
comments, I’m very curious about what we mean when we
say atonement and what we mean when we say resurrection. What are the
conceptual boundaries for these terms? Are they ultimately interchangeable?
Is resurrection merely a sub-set of the atonement? Does one lead to the
other or cause the other? I feel like there is some conceptual murkiness here.
For example, you use the phrase “universal aspect of the atonement” where I
would be more inclined to say “universal aspect of the resurrection.” Do the
Nephites or the text draw a distinction between resurrection and atonement?
I like how you point out this is the first time the word “atonement” is used in
the text, and I would add this is also the first time “resurrection” is used in
the text. (Although we have conceptual precursors: the Messiah is said to
“rise from the dead” in 1 Ne. 10:11 and “redemption of the world” in 1 Ne.
1:19.) This makes me want to tease out how these terms are being used.
Several passages in the Book of Mormon seem to draw a clear distinction
between the atonement and the resurrection.
Jacob seems to consistently make this distinction: “Wherefore, may God raise
you from death by the power of the resurrection, and also from everlasting
death by the power of the atonement” (2 Ne. 10:25). And again: “the grave
must deliver up its captive bodies, and the bodies and the spirits of men will
be restored one to the other; and it is by the power of the resurrection of the
Holy One of Israel.” (2 Ne. 9:12). “[B]e reconciled unto him through
the atonement of Christ, his Only Begotten Son, and ye may obtain a
resurrection, according to the power of the resurrection which is in Christ, and
be presented as the first-fruits of Christ unto God. . . for why not speak of
the atonement of Christ, and attain to a perfect knowledge of him, as to
attain to the knowledge of a resurrection and the world to come?” (Jacob
4:11-12).
An overwhelming majority of passages directly link the atonement with sins
but not resurrection: “[T]he atonement, which God himself shall make for
the sins and iniquities of his people” (Abinadi in Mosiah 13:28); ”[T]herefore
there can be nothing which is short of an infinite atonement which will suffice
for the sins of the world.” (Alma in Alma 34:12); ”[E]xcept
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an atonement should be made; therefore God himself atoneth for the sins of
the world.” (Alma in Alma 42:15). Alma makes this distinction clearer when
he discusses both atonement and resurrection in the same passage: “he shall
suffer and die to atone for their sins; and that he shall rise again from the
dead, which shall bring to pass the resurrection.” (Alma in Alma
33:22). Notice it isn’t the death of Christ that brings to pass the resurrection,
it is that he rises from the dead. Christ doesn’t break the bands of death by
dying but by rising from the dead. I think this statement by Alma is very
precise.
For this reason I probably would not connect Lehi’s reference to “intercession”
with Isaiah 53 or Mosiah 14:12. Lehi seems to be using “intercession” to
apply to the resurrection of the dead and not to transgression. As Lehi
explains, the Messiah makes intercession as the “firstfruits unto God . .
. being the first that should rise” from the dead. I would answer that the
Messiah makes intercession between death and man. This fits with Mosiah
15:8 “And thus God breaketh the bands of death, having gained the victory
over death; giving the Son power to make intercession for the children of
men.” But I would conceptually sequester this from intercession between sin
and man.
There seem to be other reason to keep atonement and resurrection
distinct. Lehi does not speak of any need to judge whether man is worthy to
be resurrected from the dead. The Messiah makes intercession for the dead
for all. This universal resurrection, without any conditions, and universal
judgment I might add, stands in contrast to conditions of salvation in verse 7:
“unto all those who have a broken heart and a contrite spirit—and unto none
else.” But I don’t know if there is universal reconciliation, unless even the
unrepentant sinner is reconciled to God upon being damned.
Now, I’ve identified at least two passages that seem to run counter to all the
rest of the passages above: 1) Alma states that “the atonement bringeth to
pass the resurrection of the dead” (Alma 42:23) and 2) Jacob states:
“Wherefore, it must needs be an infinite atonement—save it should be an
infinite atonement this corruption could not put on incorruption.” (2 Nephi
9:7). Alma’s usage above seems to greatly broaden atonement to include
Christ rising from the dead in a way that I don’t really see repeated by
anyone or elaborated later in the Nephite tradition. The sentence has a logic
to it given Alma’s progression as he crafts his sermon, but it seems to me to
be an outlier. Likewise, Jacob’s usage seems a little surprising because it is
Christ rising from the dead that allows corruption to put on incorruption, not
his atoning for sin. Even the unrepentant will be resurrected. This sentence
seems somewhat tortured and goes against the clear distinction between the
atonement and the resurrection Jacob makes several times elsewhere. So,
these seem to be two cases that I can find where we get a
broader definition of atonement, but only against the rest of scripture that
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seems to define atonement to not encompass the resurrection. I’m not sure
how to account for this. Alma, for example, does not repeat Jacob’s usage of
“infinite atonement” but limits it to atoning of sin.
What might make this more confusing is the usage of “plan of
redemption.” Again, here the phrase seems to be limited to redemption from
sin. ”[T]herefore only unto him that has faith unto repentance is brought
about the great and eternal plan of redemption.” (Alma 34:16). ”[I]f ye will
repent and harden not your hearts, immediately shall the great plan of
redemption be brought about unto you.” (Alma 34:31). ”[T]he plan of
redemption could not be brought about, only on conditions of repentance of
men in this probationary state” (Alma 42:13). This seems to be a consistent
articulation of the plan of redemption, but we do have at least one verse that
takes a broad view of the plan of redemption: “Now, if it had not been for the
plan of redemption, which was laid from the foundation of the world, there
could have been no resurrection of the dead; but there was a plan of
redemption laid, which shall bring to pass the resurrection of the dead, of
which has been spoken.” (Alma 12:25). Again, not sure how to explain this
given the otherwise consistent usage of the phrase.
The term redemption in the vast majority of cases points to a redemption
from sin. For example, “Therefore the wicked remain as though there had
been no redemption made, except it be the loosing of the bands of death.”
(Alma 11:41). “[T]he resurrection of the dead, and the redemption of the
people, which was to be brought to pass through the power, and sufferings,
and death of Christ, and his resurrection and ascension into heaven.” (Mosiah
18:2). But there are at least two places where the text speaks
of redemption from death. Most notably “[T]his is wherein all men are
redeemed, because the death of Christ bringeth to pass theresurrection,
which bringeth to pass a redemption from an endless sleep.” (Moroni
in Mormon 9:13). And also: “[T]he redemption which the Lord would make for
his people, or in other words, the resurrection of Christ.” (3 Nephi
6:20). Clearly not all men are redeemed from sin because of the conditions
of repentance, so Moroni cannot mean redemption from sin.
And of course, I think we blur the atonement and resurrection because its
common to use all-encompassing definitions of atonement as found in the
LDS Study Helps. In more than one place we get this sentence “The
atonement of Jesus Christ conquered death so that everyone will be
resurrected (1 Cor. 15:21–23)” and this sentence “Because of the Atonement,
everyone will be resurrected from the grave,” or this sentence “Jesus’
atonement redeems all mankind from physical death.” Technically, I don’t
think these are accurate statements unless we expand the meaning of
atonement to mean everything Christ does including the resurrection, but I do
not think the scriptures use the term this way. I get the sense this is more of
a gloss on the Atonement. Again, scripture generally doesn’t articulate the
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atonement or the resurrection in this fashion. And 1 Cor. 15 is not speaking
about atonement for sin but the resurrection, so I can’t see how this verse
supports the sentence in front of it. I also feel we have a cultural tendency in
Mormonism to make the Atonement the ultimate doctrine, but I don’t know
that the scriptures articulate it so. I know it is common to cite Joseph Smith
as teaching that “all other things which pertain to our religion are only
appendages” to the Atonement, but this gloss is not entirely accurate. The
full quotation is: “What are the fundamental principles of your religion?” The
fundamental principles of our religion is the testimony of the apostles and
prophets concerning Jesus Christ, “that he died, was buried, and rose again
the third day, and ascended up into heaven”; and all other things, are only
appendages to these, which pertain to our religion.” (History, 1838–1856,
volume B-1, pp. 249-250). This statement surely includes the resurrection:
“rose on the third day.” It is fascinating that this is how Atonement is defined
but I wonder whether we are reading this conceptual shorthand back into the
text.
For our purposes, I just want to clarify our usages of these terms so that I
can avoid misunderstanding everyone’s responses. So for example, I would
say there is a universal aspect of the atonement but only if by atonement we
really mean resurrection. And, it follows, I would probably say it is not the
atonement which sends us to the judgment, but the resurrection.
Metaphorically, I’m willing to say that the resurrection could be deemed a
kind of at-one-ment in that it brings the body and spirit back together as one,
as the atonement brings man and God together as one, but I don’t recall the
scriptures drawing this analogy or using atonement to mean the joining of the
spirit and body. That’s reserved for the resurrection. Granted that the
resurrection brings man and God back together in that man stands in the
presence of God, and thus one might term it an at-one-ment, man is being
brought to the presence of God to be judged, not to dwell with God or be
reconciled with God. I think there is a difference between dwelling in the
presence of God (house) and standing in the presence of God
(courtroom). So I can’t see the resurrection in terms of man being brought
back into Eden, unless we are only taking about the part in Eden where God is
passing judgment upon Adam and Eve for their actions.
REPLY
2 Nephi 2:11 – Opposition!
17
SundayFEB 2013
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POSTED
BY JOESPENCER IN
UNCATEGORIZED
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2 Nephi 2:11 – Opposition
Well, I’ve written another ridiculously long post. My apologies in advance.
We come, at last, to what’s arguably the most philosophical passage in the whole Book of
Mormon: Lehi’s claims about opposition. Here’s the text:
For it must needs be that there is an opposition in all things. If not so, my firstborn in
the wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness—neither
happiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a
compound in one. Wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead,
having no life, neither death, nor corruption, nor incorruption, happiness nor misery,
neither sense nor insensibility.
Even to get started on discussion, it seems to me, there are any number of preliminary
considerations to be addressed. Feel free, of course, to skip past these, but be warned that
I’ll be assuming what I “establish” in this first part of the post.
Preliminaries
Right from the start, we need to note that there’s one textual issue here. The text as we
have it—as we’ve always had it—reads “neither holiness nor misery” (just after the em-dash
in the second sentence), but Royal Skousen has argued that it was originally (that is, in the
no longer extant original manuscript) “neither happiness nor misery.” I’ll let you consult his
argument yourself (see his Analysis of Textual Variants, vol. 1, pp. 494-495), but I’ll just
state in advance that I’m convinced, and so I’ll be using the “restored” text for this
discussion.
With that concern out of the way, let me turn immediately to another—this time a basic
interpretive issue. The third sentence of the passage—“all things must needs be a
compound in one”—can be and has been interpreted in two drastically distinct ways. The
basic question is whether this “compound in one” business is meant to describe a fortunate
(and actual) or an unfortunate (and only theoretical) state of affairs. That is, is “all things
must needs be a compound in one” more or less equivalent to “there is an opposition in all
things” or to “[all things are] one body”? The difficulty comes from the ambiguity of
connecting the word “compound,” which seems to indicate the presence of opposition, with
the word “one,” which seems to indicate the absence of opposition. A glance through the
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literature on this passage reveals that the phrase has been interpreted both ways, each
about as much as the other, and almost never with any actual discussion of the difficulty.
The solution I propose, and I’ll assume the consequent interpretation in this discussion, is
as follows. It’s necessary to see the four sentences of the passage as carefully structured,
and in a way that sets up clear parallels between the first and third sentences, as well as
between the second and fourth sentences. Thus, “for it must needs be that there is an
opposition in all things” is directly parallel to and (at least roughly) semantically equivalent
to “wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one.” We might note how close in
construction these two sentences are: the “for” of the one is echoed by the “wherefore” of
the other, and both sentences uniquely use the phrases “all things” and “must needs be.”
Much more obviously parallel and thus clearly confirming what I’ve just argued are the
second and fourth sentences—each with a hypothetical conditional (“if not so . . .
[something] could not be brought to pass,” “if it should be . . . [something] must needs
remain”) and a series of oppositions (righteousness/wickedness, happiness/misery, and
good/bad; life/death, corruption/incorruption, happiness/misery, and sense/insensibility).
All this suggest to me, quite straightforwardly, that the whole “compound in one” business
should be interpreted as referring to the “positive” actuality of opposition obtaining in all
things.
If all that’s clear, what might be said about the relationship between the two series of
oppositions (in sentences two and four)? It’s important to note that, apart from the curious
and largely out-of-place repetition of the happiness/misery couple in the second series,
there seems to be a difference between the kinds of things listed in the two series. The first
series—righteousness/wickedness, happiness/misery, good/bad—seems to be largely ethical
in nature, while the second series—life/death, corruption/incorruption, sense/insensibility—
seems to be, basically, existential. And there’s good reason to think that each of these
series has to be distinguished from the singular opposition (“an opposition”) that, according
to Lehi, inhabits or haunts “all things.” If we call that fundamental opposition ontological,
then we can say that we’ve got three distinct sorts of oppositions to deal with in this
passage: the ontological (apparently singular and universal), the ethical (an open-ended
series of oppositions that have to be “brought to pass”), and the existential (another openended series of oppositions, but ones that are “had”). I’ll use these basic distinctions
regularly in this discussion.
One final consideration to get out of the way from the beginning. There is a very longstanding devotional interpretation—better: appropriation—of 2 Nephi 2:11 that, frankly,
doesn’t make much sense of the text, namely, that Lehi is telling us something about facing
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adversity or hardship. The idea is, basically, that when Lehi says that there is opposition in
all things, he’s pointing out that none of us will escape passing through “trials in our
everyday lives,” and he provides an apparently profound philosophical justification for all
that suffering (opposition is absolutely necessary to meaningful existence as such). This
interpretation/appropriation isn’t entirely unjustified exegetically, since the whole of Lehi’s
discourse here opens with him saying a bit about “afflictions,” etc., but it’s still exegetically
naïve in certain ways. As the verses immediately before and immediately after verse 11
make clear, Lehi’s primary focus is on the kind of “opposition” that is introduced into “all
things” by law, and the “repetition” of this discussion of opposition in the second half of the
sermon (in its narrative form) will emphasize the necessity of knowing “misery” in order to
have joy, of knowing “sin” in order to do good—experiences that seem to have a great deal
more to do with moral corruption and rebellion against the divine than with temporal
struggles and mental anguish. Whatever the merits, then, of using Lehi’s words to make
sense of suffering, I’ll keep my focus on what Lehi seems to be saying about the role played
by the law.
So much for preliminary considerations. I might note that I’ve dealt at the Feast blog with
some other preliminaries on this passage. You might, for instance, take a look at my threepart summary of the history of interpretation of this passage (in the twentieth
century): here, here, and here. I’ve also dealt with some of the major translations of this
passage into non-English languages, translations that reveal a bit more of a history of
interpretation, as well as, more radically, the profound instability of this text:
see here, here, here, andhere. (I might note that I’m currently in the process of
transforming these four posts on translation into a much more concise article that’ll
hopefully appear in print.)
Now, on to some actual discussion!
All Things
In an attempt to curb my obsessive (and, of course, impossible) desire to be comprehensive
when I tackle scripture, I’ll limit myself to assessing just two questions. The first concerns
what Lehi calls “all things,” which I take to be the semi-subtle focus of the entire passage:
the first and third sentences make “all things” the direct object of their focus, and the
second and fourth sentences tell us something about what holds among “all things.” The
second question I’ll address concerns the verbal constructions of each of the four sentences
(“must needs be that there is,” “could not be brought to pass,” “must needs be,” and “must
needs remain as”) that form the backbone of Lehi’s several claims about “all things.”
Between these two issues, I’ll really only have attempted to get a basic sense of what
Lehi’s philosophical gesture is.
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To begin with, then: all things. I’m going to offer a markedly theological interpretation of
this phrase as it’s used throughout the canon, throwing the supposed rigor of historicallygrounded exegesis to the winds. I’ll take the guiding principles of strict theological concern
as my sole guide.
Well, let me begin with one exegetically responsible point: The phrase “all things” (which
appears almost six hundred times in scripture!) seems most often to be a simple phrase
referring to the whole of what God created. Even where “all things” doesn’t have
an explicit link to creation, it generally makes good sense of the text to provide such a link.
I won’t list instances more generally (I’ve done so in another one of these 2 Nephi 2:11
posts at the Feast blog), but I will note that a few such explicit connections between “all
things” and creation are to be found right in 2 Nephi 2: verse 14 says of God that “he hath
created all things, both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them are, both
things to act and things to be acted upon”; verse 15 refers to “our first parents, and the
beasts of the field and the fowls of the air, and in fine, all things which are created”; and
verse 22 refers again to “all things which were created.” The general pattern connecting “all
things” to creation, and these references in particular, make it relatively clear that “all
things” in 2 Nephi 2:11 refers to the creation. (Verses 15 and 22 of 2 Nephi 2 are perhaps
particularly important in this regard. The former not only speaks of “all things which are
created” but states in a direct echo of verse 11 that “it must needs be that there was an
opposition.” The latter, similarly, not only speaks of “all things which were created” but
states in a direct echo of verse 11 that all those things “must have remained in the same
state” had certain conditions not obtained.)
So I think we’re pretty safe in assuming from the get-go that the phrase “all things” in 2
Nephi 2:11 refers to what God has created. But that’s just to get started. Now I’ll leave my
exegetical caution behind and put on my speculative theologian’s hat. Two “places” in the
Bible are littered with references to “all things”: the Book of Ecclesiastes and Paul’s
Corinthian correspondence. The Preacher and Paul seem to be doing quite drastically
different things with “all things,” and I want to take the “debate” of sorts between them as
a kind of backdrop for thinking about what Lehi’s doing with “all things” in 2 Nephi 2:11.
Ecclesiastes opens with talk of the circular nature of, well, nature. This circularity is meant
to justify the Preacher’s despairing “vanity of vanities!” Here’s what he says:
One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for
ever. The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he
arose. The wind goeth toward the south, and turned about unto the north; it whirleth
about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits. All the rivers
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run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither
they return again. . . . The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which
is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. (Ecclesiastes
1:4-7, 9.)
The sun, the wind, the waters—all these work in unending cycles, always working and never
getting anywhere. Hence verse 8: “All things are full of labour; man cannot utter it.”
(There’s actually an interesting play in the Hebrew here: kol hadebarim can be translated
either as “all things” or “all words,” and the latter is obviously related to “man cannot utter
it.” This is even clearer in the Hebrew. The verb for “utter” is dabar, from the same root
as debarim.) Our introduction to “all things” in Ecclesiastes follows usage elsewhere—“all
things” has reference to the creation: sun, wind, water, etc.—but it adds a note of striking
melancholy: “all things” are in a certain sensepointless, going nowhere but nonetheless
going, and working hard at it!
After this introduction of sorts, the Preacher begins to introduce his search for wisdom:
I the Preacher was king over Israel in Jerusalem. And I gave my heart to seek and
search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven: this sore travail
hath God given to the sons of man to be exercised therewith. I have seen all the works
that are done under the sun; and, behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit.
(Ecclesiastes 1:12-14.)
Uniquely positioned to seek for wisdom, he undertook the quest. And what did he find? Only
that “all is vanity and vexation of spirit.” This is what he found when he went out looking for
wisdom “concerning all things.” He can only describe that search itself as a “sore travail”
(“an unhappy business,” the NRSV translates). By verse 18, he’s stating that “he that
increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.”
This is a pretty bleak vision of “all things,” but it continues right through the Book of
Ecclesiastes. In chapter 7, the Preacher applies his pessimistic accusation of vanity to the
ethical realm: “All things have I seen in the days of my vanity: there is a just man that
perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his
wickedness” (Ecclesiastes 7:15). What’s the point here? That supposed wisdom and
supposed virtue aren’t worth as much as everyone seems to believe. He goes on (I’ll quote
the clearer NRSV on this one): “Do not be too righteous, and do not act too wise . . . . Do
not be too wicked, and do not be a fool . . . . It is good that you should take hold of the
one, without letting go of the other” (Ecclesiastes 7:16-18). And this follows immediately
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after the Preacher explains that “God also hath set the one [prosperity] over against the
other [adversity]” (Ecclesiastes 7:14)—pointing out the role that opposition seems to play in
“all things,” which the Preacher has seen to be pure vanity.
At this point it seems that the Preacher might be slightly—and significantly—expanding the
meaning of “all things.” In chapter 1, it seems straightforwardly clear that “all things” just
refers to “all things which have been created.” Here in chapter 7, though, it seems as if the
“all” of “all things” is meant to bringopposites together. If the Preacher has seen “all things”
in his vain days, it’s because he’s seen both that the just can perish in their
righteousness and that the wicked can be prolonged in their wickedness. And the secret of
life, for him, is to find a place between opposed extremes—neither too righteous nor too
wicked, neither too wise nor too foolish; only thus can one find one’s way among the
extreme opposites of prosperity and adversity. But even this, it seems, is vain: “all things,”
despite the basic oppositions that structure them, end up in the same place. “God also hath
set the one over against the other,” yes, but only “to the end that man should find nothing
after him” (Ecclesiastes 7:14; in the NRSV: “so that mortals may not find out anything that
will come after them”).
If this last point isn’t as clear as it could be in chapter 7, it is in chapter 9. “All things come
alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the
clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the
good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath” (Ecclesiastes 9:2).
Righteousness versus wickedness? Nah. Clean versus unclean? So what! Piety versus
impiety? Grow up. Goodness versus sin? All the same. Honesty versus deception? Meh. Here
again “all things” is made up of oppositions that divide and differentiate, and yet those
differences are in a sense pointless: “This is an evil among all things that are done under
the sun, that there is one event unto all” (Ecclesiastes 9:3). “All things”—not only vain,
now, but evil, because there’s “one event” that indifferentiates all differentiation. (It isn’t
hard to guess that the “one event” would be death, no?) Opposition, yes, but, according to
the Preacher, pointlessly so.
There’s much to be thought about with this formulation: an event (miqreh, literally, a
chance happening—the NRSV’s “fate” is overdetermined) that indifferentiates oppositional
differentiation, calling into question every supposed “point” that might give “all things” an
essential orientation. I could go on for some length on the theological possibilities bound up
with this formula, but I want to follow the Preacher’s attitude toward it—which is
depression, frustration, and an evil regard. And what does the Preacher propose to do in the
face of this “event,” in the face of the apparent pointlessness of “all things”? His answer
comes in chapter 10, and it is the most depressing moment in all of Ecclesiastes: “Money
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answereth all things” (Ecclesiastes 10:19). There’s the miserable “wisdom” of the Preacher.
If “one event” indifferentiates all differentiation, stripping everything of its supposed
purposefulness, one might as well counter that indifferentiation with one’s own—
money, theindifferentiator. I could quote either Shakespeare or Marx on this one, no? When
Timon digs up gold:
This much of this will make / Black white, foul fair, wrong right, / Base noble, old
young, coward valiant . . . . / This yellow slave / Will knit and break religions, bless
th’ accurs’d, / Make the hoar leprosy ador’d, place thieves, / And give them title, knee,
and approbation / With senators on the bench. This is it / That makes the wappen’d
widow wed again; / She, whom the spittle-house and ulcerous sores / Would cast the
gorge at, this embalms and spices / To th’ April day again. (See Timon of Athens,
act IV, scene iii, lines 28-30, 34-42.)
Or, from the infamous manifesto of 1848:
[Money] has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has . . . left
remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous
“cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of
chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical
calculation. . . . [It] has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and
looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the
poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers. [It] has torn away from the family
its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation. (See
Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, section 1.)
The point isn’t, here, to introduce politics. It’s only to point up the miserable “answer” the
Preacher offers to “all things.” If opposition doesn’t serve the Preacher’s interests—and that
because of the “one event” that keeps opposition’s differences from granting him his
desires—his best response is to war against opposition by securing himself in the stronghold
of liquid cash, the only thing that “answereth all things.”
Well, so much for the Preacher. What about Paul?
One of the several motivations that drove Paul to write his first letter to the Corinthians was
a letter written to him by the saints in Corinth, and one of the claims they made in their
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letter—apparently in defiance of some of what Paul was teaching—was “all things are
lawful.” Paul’s letter can be read as an attempt not exactly to refute but more nuancedly to
complicate that claim. Thus for Paul, while it is indeed true that “all things are lawful,” it is
truer that “all things are not expedient” (1 Corinthians 6:12); or again, while it is indeed
true that “all things are lawful,” it is truer that “all things edify not” (1 Corinthians 10:23).
The basic point of contention, it seems, was that where the Corinthians understood the
basic differentiating oppositions held in place by the law to have been canceled or
deactivated by the “one event” of Christ’s resurrection, Paul contended that the Christ event
deactivated one set of oppositions and differences by introducing another, the more
fundamental opposition between love and arrogance. For Paul, it was less that, after Christ,
“all things are lawful” (even if that’s true in a way) than that “all things are new” (2
Corinthians 5:17).
In a certain way, the Corinthians saints Paul sought to correct were the descendants of the
Preacher of Ecclesiastes. The Preacher suggested that the indifferentiating force of the “one
event,” coupled with a great deal of observational evidence, indicated an essential
arbitrariness about God’s dealing with humankind: there is a lack of any consistent link
between human behavior and divine reward. The Corinthians believed something similar,
though they seem to have identified the “one event” less as (human) death than as (divine)
resurrection. That event, for the Corinthians, uncoupled human behavior and divine reward
in grace, allowing for a kind of radical freedom to pursue all of one’s perverse desires (oh,
the sorts of things that were going on in Corinth!). The Corinthians saints reached a happier
conclusion, in some ways, that their royal ancestor—resurrection in a happier prospect than
death—but they nonetheless seem to end up quite as miserable as the Preacher, pursuing
pleasure, status, money, etc. These “answer all things” as much for them as for their
predecessor.
What is Paul’s “answer” to “all things,” however? The resurrection. It’s that event through
which the Father “hath put all things under [Christ’s] feet,” though the process of conquest
is only underway (1 Corinthians 15:27-28). And how is one to deal with “all things” in the
meanwhile? Well, Paul explains, “the Spirit searcheth all things” (1 Corinthians 2:10), and
“he that is spiritual [thereby] judges all things” (1 Corinthians 2:15). And the key to
negotiating one’s way is love, since it’s love that “beareth all things, believeth all things,
hopeth all things, endureth all things” (1 Corinthians 13:7). If this means that “all things” in
some sense belong to those called (1 Corinthians 3:21), it must nonetheless be recognized
that they were before alienated from all things: Paul says they were “the offscouring of all
things” (1 Corinthians 4:13) and even now that they “suffer all things” (1 Corinthians 9:12).
But where they were nothing before, they’re now to become all things. How? Through a kind
of accommodation that allows all to hear the message. Paul thus speaks of being “made all
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things to all men” (1 Corinthians (9:22) and of his care to “please all men in all things” (1
Corinthians 10:33), this in order to help cancel the false oppositions that structure the
world—Greeks/Jews, wisdom/foolishness, honor/shame, bondage/freedom, male/female,
etc.—and to allow for the realopposition grounded in the law of love to have its full,
reorienting sway.
I could go on like this at much more length. I’ve not even mentioned all the references to
“all things” in First Corinthians, nor have I mentioned more than one such reference in
Second Corinthians, and I’m leaving off all of the other Pauline references that can be dug
out as well. The point, I hope, is clear enough already. Yes, a certain indifferentiation is
called for, but it’s rooted in the resurrection rather than in death. But more importantly,
that indifferentiation is accomplished through a redifferentiation, rooted in
a newfundamental opposition.
So much for both Paul and the Preacher. What, now, of Lehi? Well, in order to get at this,
we have to sort out the basic logic of 2 Nephi 2:11, and that requires a turn to the meaning
of the several verbal structures employed in the passage. I turn, then, to the next part of
this post, at the conclusion of which I’ll have something, finally, to say about Lehi’s position
in this “debate” of sorts. In the meanwhile, I’ll reassume the rigorous exegete’s posture.
Must Needs Be That There Is, Could Not Be Brought To Pass, Must Needs Be,
Having
What’s the logic of 2 Nephi 2:11? Whatever it is, it would seem to be bound up with the
several verbal constructions to be found in the passage. As I read the passage—I’ve already
spelled out the details above—we have (1) two statements (sentences one and three) about
what I’m calling “ontological opposition,” some kind of fundamental or base opposition that
seems to ground other sorts of opposition, (2) one statement (sentence two) about ethical
opposition, a set of oppositions that distinguish the good from the evil, and (3) one
statement (sentence four) about existential opposition, a set of oppositions that distinguish
forms of life. Each of these has its own verbal construction: (1) ontological opposition is
something that “must needs be” (though in two different constructions, the difference
between which may prove important), (2) ethical oppositions are things that must “be
brought to pass,” and (3) existential oppositions are things that are “had” (this last in a
rather complicated verbal structure that we’ll have to sort out). What needs to be said about
all this?
In sentences one and three, we get statements of necessity. There’s apparently no way
around ontological or fundamental opposition—whether we want to talk about this in terms
of “an opposition in all things” or whether we want to talk about this in terms of “all things”
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being “a compound in one.” Although the next verses, along with the narrative of the
sermon’s second half, will seem to suggest that the contingent imposition of law (“Don’t!”)
is what allows for or even produces opposition, these two sentences seem to indicate a sort
of opposition more fundamental that whatever opposition or oppositions law brings into
existence, seem to indicate a sort of opposition the necessity of which is irrecusable, a basic
ontological fact of the universe as such. Why do I say so? Sentence one suggests this
through the employment of the indicative rather than the subjunctive mood: “it must needs
be that there is an opposition in all things,” not “it must needs be that there be an
opposition in all things.” What we have here is, in logical terms, a statement about a
statement: the statement “there is an opposition in all things” is, Lehi
claims,necessarily true (“it must needs be that”). Sentence three suggests
anunproducible opposition more fundamental than any producible opposition in its own way.
It’s no statement about a statement, sure, and it uses only the subjective in its “must needs
be,” but it’s hard to understand how any kind of intervention—even a divine one—could take
what isn’t “a compound in one” and make it “a compound in one.” Further and finally, the
fact that each of these sentences provides the contours of the antecedent of the conditional
stated in the sentence that follows it (sentence two’s “if not so”; sentence four’s “if it should
be one body”) makes clear that what each describes (“an opposition in all things”; “all
things [being] a compound in one”) serves as something like a condition of possibility for
those other sorts of oppositions—ethical and existential—that are indeed brought to pass.
Okay, my apologies for the remarkable exegetical and philosophical complexity of that last
paragraph, but I think it’s necessary work—even if, as I suspect, I’ll have to explain what on
earth I was saying. The point, in a sentence, is that sentences one and three seem to
indicate that “ontological opposition” is simply the way things are, is simply there, and that
it’s something that allows for the possibility of other sorts of oppositions—less ontological
than logical, less a matter of being than a matter of appearing—being produced. We’re
being told, it seems to me, that there’s a kind of basic inconsistency at work in what is, an
inconsistency that possibilizes (but, it seems, doesn’t actually necessitate) the differential
structure of actual experience. That’s still too philosophically laden, but I’m not sure how to
make it less so yet.
We’re already on our way to a basic interpretation of what’s said in sentences two and four.
In sentence two, the ethical oppositions (righteousness/wickedness, happiness/misery,
good/bad) are things that have to “be brought to pass.” But, we’re told, they can’t “be
brought to pass” if the basic, ontological opposition of sentence one isn’t in place. That
much we’ve already glimpsed. What’s particularly striking about the “be brought to pass”
phrasing, however, is the suggestion that among the necessary conditions one finds, not
only ontological opposition, but also some kind of intervention. The claim here isn’t that, if it
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weren’t for “an opposition in all things,” the ethical oppositions wouldn’t come to be; it’s
rather that, if it weren’t for that basic opposition, the ethical oppositions couldn’t be brought
to pass. There’s someother condition in addition to the basic, possibilizing opposition that
lies at the inconsistent kernel of things, apparently an active force—since the ethical
oppositions are brought to pass (again, instead of come to pass). When we take sentences
one and two together, we recognize that ethical opposition—the basic differences between
good and bad, between happiness and misery, between righteousness and wickedness,
etc.—(1) are impossible without a still more basic opposition obtaining at the core of things
and (2) are brought to pass through some kind of intervention or imposition or creation.
Presumably, we’re here treading on the ground of the opposition-introducing law that’ll be
discussed in the next verses.
Sentence two, I should think, is clear enough at this point. What of the much more
complicated verbal construction of sentence four? Here we don’t have a straightforward
“could not be brought to pass,” but rather a “must needs remain as dead, having no” (I’ve
somewhat deceptively described this above merely as a “having”). What’s going on here?
The straightforward “if not so” of sentence two is here replaced with a more-fully-fleshedout “if it should be one body.” This “should be one body” is, I think, a straightforward denial
of what sentence three calls “be[ing] a compound in one” (I’ve provided my argument for
this above, in my “preliminaries” section)—but whatever straightforwardness there is about
it, it’s still a curious way of denying the necessary condition described in sentence three. (I
suspect it’s the repetition of “one” in these two sentences that leads so many to interpret
sentence three the way I’m notinterpreting it here.)
All things must needs be a compound in one: a kind of inconsistent fusion, a weaving
together of so many elements in a way that refuses to congeal into a complete totality. If
it weren’t so, Lehi tells us, we’d have “one body,” an uncompounded homogeneity that
couldn’t ground any other oppositions? What sorts of oppositions do we now have in mind?
Existential oppositions: life versus death, corruption versus incorruption, sense versus
insensibility—all oppositions that allow what lives to have an inside and an outside, a
permeable border across which activity and passivity play out their drama. Well, it isn’t hard
to see how these would be rendered impossible if there weren’t some kind of
compoundedness about “all things.” If there really were some kind of fleshly homogeneity
(not that it makes any sense to speak of flesh when dealing with the homogeneous), that
flesh would have to be “as dead,” without any actual form of life—since life is precisely the
give and take across fleshly boundaries.
Again the basic conditionality in question is clear. The basic, ontological opposition
(sentence three) serves as the condition of possibility for other oppositions, here existential
(sentence four). And again we see that we’re dealing only with a condition of possibility, not
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a cause that drives necessity: we’re not told that the mere fact that there is a compound in
one entails orensures that there will be life/death, corruption/incorruption,
happiness/misery—only that the former makes the latter possible. Again, it seems, we can
only get from ontological opposition to other oppositions through the intervention of a
Creator—and this may well again be a matter of law, as the especially the narrative second
half of the sermon will suggest. We have, then, the same logic as before—as in sentences
one and two, that is—and yet it’s phrased in terms of “must needs remain . . . , having no.”
Not “could not be brought to pass” but “must needs remains as dead.” The point, it seems,
is not just to mark impossibility where the condition of possibility doesn’t obtain; it’s also to
mark the kind of incessant continuity that would follow from a consistent ontological base.
What, though, of this “having” business? I’m afraid that would take me too far afield, and
I’ve been far too thorough (not long-winded! I promise!) in this post. So let me take what
we’ve discovered and come back to what Lehi seems to be doing with his “all things.” How
does what Lehi’s doing here connect (or not) with the Preacher and with Paul?
The Preacher of Ecclesiastes and the Paul of First Corinthians agreed on one crucial point:
that “one event” problematizes the basic structuring oppositions of appearance and
experience. For both Paul and the Preacher, differences are indifferentiated by an event that
cuts across them. Of course, the event in question seems to have been death for the
Preacher, but the resurrection (of Christ) for Paul. Moreover, while indifferentiation leads
the Preacher to a kind of nihilism (“Nothing matters, so let’s get rich, answering
indifferentiation with another indifferentiation!”), it leads Paul in a drastically distinct
direction: one need be nihilistic only about the fading order over which death reigned,
because the resurrection of Christ—the triumph of the Messiah—inaugurates an era in which
a new and fundamental difference takes hold, the difference between fidelity and unbelief,
between hope and despair, between love and selfishness. For both Paul and the Preacher,
the opposition-creating law is in a certain sense insufficient, but each sees quite differently
what that insufficiency calls for.
Is Lehi even in the same ballpark? At the very least, it’s possible to see that the kinds of
oppositions and differences to which the Preacher and Paul give their attention would have
to fall within Lehi’s categories of ethical oppositions—surely not within his (singular)
category of ontological opposition, and just as surely (though perhaps less obviously) not
within his (multiple) category of existential oppositions. What the Preacher frets over is the
indifference between good and evil, between wickedness and righteousness, between
happiness and misery, in the face of death. And what Paul sees disappearing with the
Messiah’s triumph is the set of supposedly ethical differences established by the law. (I
should note that “ethical” is the right term for Paul, and not “moral”—though the latter
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might well fit what concerns the Preacher as well. I’ll leave an explanation of these
distinctions, though, for another time.) That Lehi acknowledges the fact that ethical
oppositions have to “be brought to pass,” apparently through the imposition of law (verses
12-13 again), marks a point of important continuity between him and his “interlocutors.”
But what of the other categories of opposition Lehi introduces?
Well, it should strike us as interesting, I think, that the difference between the Preacher and
Paul is ultimately the difference between their respective interests in death and life—that is,
between the core existential opposition Lehi mentions. Indifferentiation is for the Preacher a
function of the monolithic nature of death—as if there were no real opposition for him
between life and death. It’s almost as if the Preacher says, against Lehi, that the supposed
“compound in one” is, actually, “one body,” and so it ultimately has neither life nor death,
etc. Everything remains, from beginning to end, “as dead.” Paul counters this, but in what
might be called a kind of reactionary way. He privileges life—through the resurrection—but
in such a way that death is swallowed up, done away with, deprived of any force. Paul as
much as the Preacher indifferentiates the existential oppositions that must be had. Paul is
as given to the logic of “one body” as the Preacher, it seems, though from the side of lifewithout-death rather than from the side of death-without-life. Better: Paul distributes these
two sides into two historical eras, a before and an after of the Messiah’s triumph; there is
the Preacher’s era, in which the one holds because death indifferentiates, and there is Paul’s
era, in which the one holds because life indifferentiates.
Lehi differs from the Preacher and from Paul in that he affirms existential opposition as
much as ethical opposition. Lehi, like all of his theological successors in the Book of
Mormon, affirms a kind of atemporal or ahistorical atonement/resurrection. Although the
event of the resurrection takes place in time, its force extends from the foundation of the
world throughout history, and the before/after distinction is troubled, if not outright
canceled. For Lehi, it’s as necessary to confront death as to confront life, as necessary to
dwell in incorruption as it is to dwell in corruption. Every person is suspended, as it were,
between the two, caught up in a real opposition that neither the Preacher nor Paul wants to
deal with in its entirety.
And fascinatingly, it would seem that this set of oppositions—the existential—are quite as
rooted in the law as the ethical set for Lehi. Perhaps this is why he distinguishes between
the temporal and the spiritual law back in verse 5, why he’s so interested in the story of
Adam and Eve in the second half of the sermon, etc. The temporal law establishes the one
set of contingent (but crucial!) oppositions, and the spiritual law establishes the other set of
contingent (but crucial!) oppositions.
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And, of course, Lehi goes further, philosophically, than either Paul or the Preacher in terms
of his interest in ontological opposition, that singular inconsistency at the heart of things.
We might just say that Lehi draws all the consequences of his entanglement of the two sorts
of contingent opposition. If the One doesn’t hold sway—if death and life are intertwined
rather than radically separated—then it’s necessary to see that the without-One of being
runs right to the core of things, to see that there is an opposition, a kind of basic
inconsistency, at the very heart of things, in all things. What thatopposition ultimately
means is something we’ve only begun to think about, but it’s certainly of real significance.
Perhaps philosophical readers have been right to think that Lehi is a particularly
philosophical figure in the Book of Mormon, but we’ve not yet really even begun to assess
his claim.
Maybe I’ve made a start.
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9
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:11 – OPPOSITION!”
John Hilton IIIsaid:
February 20, 2013 at 4:27 pm
Joe, I hesitate to comment, having read most of your Feast posts, which,
along with this one indicate that you have spent more time studying 2 Nephi
2:11 than probably any other living soul! :)
I confess that I’ve always read the “compound in one” phrase differently and I
had a little trouble following your logic (not saying the problem is yours). Let
me articulate how I’ve seen it in the past and I would welcome a clarification:
“For it must needs be that there is an opposition in all things. If not so, my
firstborn in the wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to pass,
neither wickedness—neither happiness nor misery, neither good nor bad.
Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one.”
Or in other words, “There has to be opposing forces in the world. Without
these opposing forces there couldn’t be righteousness or wickedness,
happiness or misery, nor good or bad. Wherefore (if this weren’t the case that
144
there is opposition) everything would be compound in one and we wouldn’t
have life/death, happiness/misery, etc.”
I admit to being a little slow on these sorts of things so I would welcome an
explanation that would clarify why this approach could not be equally
justified…
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
February 21, 2013 at 3:32 pm
So, let me state first that the interpretation you’re outlining is
certainly possible. The language is certainly ambiguous. But
what eventually convinced me (and I tip my hat here to Robert
Couch) is the structure of the passage—the obvious parallels
between the first and third sentences (“must needs be,” “all
things,” etc.) and the similarly obvious parallels between the
second and fourth sentences (“if not so”/”if,” lists of oppositions,
etc.). This structural insight sets up a kind of back-and-forth
logic that isn’t necessarily there, but seems pretty obvious once
it’s been glimpsed.
What had convinced me for a long time that the reading your
outlining was right (it was only within the last eight months or so
that I began to see the strength of the reading I embrace in the
post) was: (1) the repetition of “one” in sentences three and
four and (2) the singularity of “it” in the fourth sentence. Those
can, I think, be explained.
My turn to the interpretation I follow in the post was solidified
substantially when I began to look at the translation of 2 Nephi
2:11 into other languages (well, just into German, French,
Spanish, and Italian). The translations almost systematically
interpret the passage in the way I’ve outlined here. Translations
that have been undertaken since the production of a standard
manual apparently all interpret the passage this way, which
leads me to suspect that this is something like the “official”
interpretation of the passage.
Of course, the ambiguity remains, and I think we ought to be
quite ready to go in whichever direction the text leads us. I think
there’s strength in both interpretations, and a glance at the
literature shows that it has been read in both ways by
commentators.
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:

February 21, 2013 at 3:58 pm
145
I restudied this verse last night and noticed the
word “wherefore” — both its appearance in verse
11 and in the next two verses. In verse 12 and 13
the word “wherefore” seems to have the meaning
“If this were the case.” I’m going to try substituting
“if this were the case” in verses 11-13 … what do
you think of he result?
11 For it must needs be, that there is an opposition
in all things. If not so, my first-born in the
wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to
pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor
misery, neither good nor bad. “if this were the
case” all things must needs be a compound in one
[they aren't but if there weren't an opposition in all
things they would be]; “if this were the case” if it
should be one body it must needs remain as dead,
having no life neither death, nor corruption nor
incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense
nor insensibility [it's not actually this way].
12 “if this were the case” it must needs have been
created for a thing of naught; “if this were the
case” there would have been no purpose in the end
of its creation. “if this were the case” this thing
must needs destroy the wisdom of God and his
eternal purposes, and also the power, and the
mercy, and the justice of God.
13 And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also
say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is no sin,
ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if
there be no righteousness there be no happiness.
And if there be no righteousness nor happiness
there be no punishment nor misery. And if these
things are not there is no God. And if there is no
God we are not, neither the earth; for there could
have been no creation of things, neither to act nor
to be acted upon; “if this were the case” all things
must have vanished away [and because all things
have not vanished away we can have confidence
that there is an opposition in all things and all
things are not compounded in one].”
I agree that flexibility is important and there isn’t a
definititive answer. To me the repetition of
146
“wherefore” in verses 11-13 indicates a discussion
about a hypothetical state that really doesn’t exist.
Then again the 22 instances of “wherefore” in 2
Nephi 2 (more than any other chapter in the Book
of Mormon) probably merits further investigation…
joespencersaid:

February 21, 2013 at 8:50 pm
That’s one way of understanding “wherefore.” I
assume that definition 5a from the Oxford English
Dictionary is the one on offer in the Book of
Mormon (particularly in light of the apparent
equivalence of “wherefore” and “therefore,”
demonstrated well by Brent Metcalfe [see table 2
in his not unproblematic essay on Mosian priority]):
“Wherefore. Introducing a clause expressing a
consequence or inference from what has just been
stated: On which account; for which reason; which
being the case; and therefore.” This is only slightly
different from your “if this were the case,” but
nonetheless importantly different. Inserting “for
which reason” at the beginning of sentence three in
verse 11 instead of “if this were the case,” we’re
likely to see Lehi as saying something like: “In light
of what I’ve just laid out, we can see that all things
need to be acompound in one, and not merely
one body—since the latter would remain as dead,”
etc.
There’s still ambiguity here, of course. Like I said
before, I’m not claiming that the case is closed—
only trying to see what we might learn from the
reading that seems to me the most likely one.
2.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
February 22, 2013 at 4:59 pm
Okay – another topic coming from your “preliminary” section. You state:
“There is a very long-standing devotional interpretation—better:
appropriation—of 2 Nephi 2:11 that, frankly, doesn’t make much sense of the
text, namely, that Lehi is telling us something about facing adversity or
hardship. The idea is, basically, that when Lehi says that there is opposition in
all things, he’s pointing out that none of us will escape passing through “trials
in our everyday lives…”
147
You also state, “This interpretation/appropriation isn’t entirely unjustified
exegetically, since the whole of Lehi’s discourse here opens with him saying a
bit about “afflictions,” etc…”
I searched 2 Nephi 2:11 on scriptures.byu.edu and found several instances in
which this in fact the interpretation that is used. For example:
“A life without problems or limitations or challenges—life without “opposition
in all things,” as Lehi phrased it—would paradoxically but in very fact be less
rewarding and less ennobling than one which confronts—even frequently
confronts—difficulty and disappointment and sorrow” (Elder Holland, CR Oct.
1996).
Most of the references only include the phrase “opposition in all things”;
however, Elder Howard W. Hunter quoted more:
“He [Lehi] reminded Jacob of the afflictions and sorrows that had come to him
because of the rudeness of his brethren, and told him how these afflictions
would ultimately result in good. These are the words of Jacob to his son:
“Thou knowest the greatness of God; and he shall consecrate thine afflictions
for thy gain” ( 2 Ne. 2:2).
In other words, the afflictions that had come to him in the form of opposition
or resistance would be for his good. Then Lehi added these words that have
become classic: “For it must needs be, that there is an opposition in all
things. If not so, … righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither
wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad” ( 2 Ne. 2:11).
We came to mortal life to encounter resistance. It was part of the plan for our
eternal progress. Without temptation, sickness, pain, and sorrow, there could
be no goodness, virtue, appreciation for well-being, or joy. The law of
opposition makes freedom of choice possible; therefore, our Heavenly Father
has commanded his children, “Choose ye this day, to serve the Lord God who
made you” ( Moses 6:33). He has counseled us to yield to his spirit and resist
temptation. Free agency, of course, permits us to oppose his directions; thus,
we see many who resist the truth and yield to temptation” (CR, 1980).
Clearly Elder Hunter is equating afflictions and opposition. I believe that how
Lehi uses word “first born” and particularly the way “first born in the
wilderness” supports this idea. Note the connection around the word
“firstborn,” “afflictions,” and “opposition.”
“AND now, Jacob, I speak unto you: Thou art my _first-born_ in the days of
my _tribulation_ in the wilderness. And behold, in thy childhood thou hast
suffered _afflictions_ and much sorrow, because of the rudeness of thy
brethren. Nevertheless, Jacob, _my first-born in the wilderness_, thou
knowest the greatness of God; and he shall consecrate thine _afflictions_ for
thy gain….For it must needs be, that there is an _opposition_ in all things. If
not so, _my first-born in the wilderness_ righteousness could not be brought
to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor
bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one;
148
The words first born and wilderness only appear in 2 Nephi 2:1,2 and 11. The
word “firstborn” itself only six times in the Book of Mormon (other references
are in 2 Nephi 4, 24, and Ether 6).
So the point I’m making is this: Lehi’s use of the word firstborn, particularly
the phrase “my firstborn in the wilderness” could provide an intentional
connection between afflictions and opposition. Clearly opposition has
additional meanings in 2 Nephi 2:11, but the connection to afflictions or trials
may not be weak.
REPLY
joespencersaid:
o
February 25, 2013 at 2:23 pm
Yeah, so this is exactly what I was pointing to with my “isn’t
entirely unjustified exegetically” comment. The repetition of
“firstborn in the wilderness,” etc., seems to indicate some kind
of a connection between the sermon’s opening on affliction and
consecration and this talk of opposition in verse 11.
And I might mention that references to 2 Nephi 2:11 in General
Conference, for instance, are without exception interpretations
along the lines of “facing opposition.” It’s the going
interpretation, as the quotations you muster show, and as a few
dozen other quotations that could be mustered show as well. Of
course, there’s a bit difference between “a general authority
drawing on a going interpretation to make a pastorally crucial
point” and “a general authority declaring what a text means.”
So let me soften my rhetoric. It’s not that the traditional
interpretation makes little sense of the text. It’s that it makes
very limited sense of the text, and for situationally specific
reasons that we shouldn’t feel bound to in theological
interpretation. Mostly my point is to make it clear that we’re free
to recognize how Lehi’s discussion of opposition plays a role in
its immediate context: in connection with law, as a way of
sorting out the punishment/happiness business, etc. I’m just
trying to prevent a too-quick escape into the status quo. Nothing
more, really.
REPLY
3.
ricosaid:
March 2, 2013 at 6:46 pm
John and Joe, just to weigh in on the devotional or pastoral reading of
“opposition,” I agree with how Joe has articulated the issue. I think limiting
Lehi’s meaning to only opposition in terms of facing trials might make sense
of some of the text, but not all of the text. If that were the only meaning, it
seems to me that Lehi’s sermon is overkill. On the other hand, to argue that
149
Lehi is only speaking ontologically, and that his sermon has absolutely no
relationship to affliction could ignore the contextual situation surrounding the
sermon.
Here is my take. First of all, I see Lehi addressing the context of Jacob’s
adversity when he says God “shall consecrate thine afflictions for thy gain.”
(verse 2). That’s the pastoral reading that I believe Lehi intends. Frankly,
this seems to me to be rarely referenced as pastoral advice. Rather, as John
points out “opposition in all things” is being directed towards those of facing
adversity. If one compares the frequency (at scriptures.byu.edu) of
references made to verse 2 and verse 11, verse 2 is overshadowed and
dominated by references to verse 11. But I think there are good reasons
(exegetical, contextual, theological, and pastoral) to reclaim verse 2 as Lehi’s
address on suffering and not verse 11.
Contextually speaking, someone earlier raised the point that Lehi is speaking
to Jacob in front of all his children, including Laman and Lemuel, so Lehi
needs to address Jacob’s suffering in a way that still holds Laman and Lemuel
responsible for how they mistreated Jacob, not in a way that exonerates them
as unwitting instruments of God’s will. ”Yes, we were rude to you Jacob, but
look at how strong you are because we hurt you and provided the necessary
opposition for your growth. We were actually doing you a favor.” So, I can
agree that there is a context of adversity at play here, but I feel that
examining the context actually leads us to abandon viewing verse 11 as
addressing affliction.
Exegetically speaking, if Lehi intended to mean affliction, he had a whole
range of terms in his literary arsenal: afflictions, trials, troubles, sorrows,
struggles, sufferings, and travails, all of which have multiple attestations in
the Book of Mormon text as being used in the context of affliction. Those
terms are the vocabulary of affliction in the Book of Mormon, but I can’t find
any context where opposition is ever used to mean affliction. Opposition only
appears in the text in 2 Ne. 2. Affliction as a theme appears many times after
2 Ne. 2 and no Nephite ever appeals to 2 Ne. 2:11 to make sense of
suffering. I might go as far as to say that in the Book of Mormon text
“opposition” never means afflictions.
As I stated earlier, I agree that addressing Jacob’s affliction is part of Lehi’s
sermon, but I also think that we often misunderstand the manner in which
Lehi actually consoles Jacob. When Lehi tells Jacob that God will consecrate
his afflictions, there is no unfortunate connotation that
God caused those afflictions or wanted those afflictions to occur or that those
afflictions are simply inevitable. But those connotations, in my experience, do
exist if we take verse 11 to mean affliction. There is a world of difference
because God designing my afflictions and God consecrating afflictions for my
gain. I don’t think “opposition in all things” (verse 11) is designed by Lehi to
provide comfort to Jacob. Rather, I see verse 11 to perform a different
150
function. Is Lehi really telling Jacob that the reason he suffered is because if
he didn’t, all things would be one body, but now that Laman and Lemuel has
made him suffer, all things can be a compound in one and that’s better? This
isn’t satisfying textually or pastorally.
Therefore, linking verse 2 and 11 would be connecting two portions of the
sermon that were designed for different purposes. By linking them this could
be construed to mean that it is God’s will to cause pain to his children to
toughen them up and make them stronger. We might agree with the
statement that “there is opposition in life” but the keen observation made by
victims of adversity is that not everyone seems to be experiencing the exact
same oppositions. Jacob could still ask why he got these particular
oppositions when Laman and Lemuel did not or why Sam did not. It is
difficult to see why, at an individual level, this would be seen to be
comforting. I like Joe’s reading that “all things” can refer to the creation and
therefore, this also helps turn us away from reading “all things” to mean “all
events that happen in my daily life.”
I’m inclined to think we often attach the pastoral significance in terms of
suffering to the wrong portion of Lehi’s sermon, with profound theological
implications, and in ways that make Lehi more difficult to understand.
REPLY
o
deidre329said:
March 2, 2013 at 8:50 pm
Joe says that for Qohelet, creation is in motion but going
nowhere. Compare this observation to the principle taught in
Doctrine and Covenants 121:33 “How long can rolling waters
remain impure?” This implies that creation has a telos–the
motion moves toward purgation, toward sanctification. That
natural process of sanctification can only occur amidst the
change and motion that opposition affords. Waters cannot roll
without opposition. This evokes Joseph Smith’s observation that
he was a “rough stone rolling”–it was through motion and
encountering adversity/opposition that he became smooth.
Opposition allows creation to become sanctified, to reach its
telos: holiness.
This brings me to the next point, the use of the word
“happiness” in lieu of “holiness.” Joe accepts Skousen’s
argument that the word ought to be “happiness” rather than
“holiness” which is what currently appears in the text. Read
Skousen’s explanation here:
“Corbin T. Volluz has suggested (personal communication) that
the phrase ‘neither holiness nor misery’ may be an error for
‘neither happiness nor misery.’ The text here shows no variance
151
with respect to the word holiness, but the original manuscript is
not extant. When we look elsewhere in the text (including later
on in this same verse), misery is always opposed tohappiness
(nine times), never holiness:
“2 Nephi 2:11 happiness nor misery
2 Nephi 2:13 no righteousness nor happiness . . . no punishment
normisery
Alma 3:26 eternal happiness or eternal misery
Alma 40:15 this state of happiness or this state of misery
Alma 40:15 to happiness or misery
Alma 40:17 to happiness or misery
Alma 40:21 in happiness or in misery
Alma 41:4 raised to endless happiness or to endless misery
Mormon 8:38 greater is the value of an endlesshappiness than
that misery which never dies
“The word happiness is much more reasonable as the opposing
member for both occurrences of misery in 2 Nephi 2:11;
happiness is an opposite to misery, but holiness is not, except by
some kind of conjectured inference (perhaps only those who are
holy are happy).
“Orthographically, holiness and happiness are similar, so it is
quite possible that the original manuscript (which is not extant
here) read happiness and was accidentally copied asholiness. In
fact, this error would have been facilitated if happiness was
actually spelled in O as hapiness (that is, with only one p).
Although elsewhere Oliver Cowdery consistently
spelledhappiness with two p’s (15 times in extant portions of O,
26 times in P), he did occasionally spell happy as hapy (twice in
P: Mosiah 2:41 and Alma 56:11); his six other spelling of
happyare correct (three in extant portions of O, three in P).
Related evidence comes from Oliver’s spellings of the similarsounding word happen. Out of 18 occurrences (17 of happened,
1 ofhappen), he spelled happened eight times with one p (three
times in extant portions of O, five times in P). So if Oliver
Cowdery wrote happiness as hapiness, then the chances are
even higher of the word happiness being miscopied as holiness.
Often Oliver Cowdery’s a’s look like o’s, and his p has a high
ascender, which means that the p of hapiness would have easily
been misread as an l.” [Skousen, 494-495]
I am interested in the theological implications for the
substitution. What is lost or gained by the substitution of
happiness for holiness? Can these words be considered
interchangeable in LDS thought? 2 Nephi 2:25 asserts that
152
“Adam fell that men might be, and men are that they might
have joy.” The telos of human existence is joy: “a feeling of
great pleasure and happiness” (OED). Joy/happiness fulfills the
purpose of our existence. Creation, through opposition, works
through a process of sanctification to lead to holiness. Holiness
and happiness represent dual ends of creation and existence. Of
course, happiness is possible without holiness–the NT tells us
that the sun shines on both the wicked and the righteous
(Matthew 5:45) and the Book of Mormon says that the wicked
may have joy in their works for a season (3 Nephi 27:11). But
the overarching lesson of the Book of Mormon is that lasting,
pervasive happiness is only possible through the Atonement of
Christ, as we use it to sanctify ourselves. Holiness and happiness
are the dual ends of our creation and the latter is dependent on
the former.
REPLY
joespencersaid:

March 6, 2013 at 2:36 pm
Deidre, really fun stuff here. I really like what
you’ve done with D&C 121:33. I’m most intrigued,
and I’ll be thinking about this way of understanding
the telos of opposition.
On the distinction between happiness and holiness:
yes, I think there’s a clear sense in which the
distinction is without too much force. But at what
might be called the formal level, it seems to me
that there are real and important differences. If
“happiness” belongs in the text, we get a perfect
repetition of the happiness/misery couple in each of
the two lists of oppositions (the existential and the
ethical)—a repetition that is troubling in other ways
(indeed, in my post I’ve more or less ignored the
repetition). I’ve been thinking about how to make
sense of this, and I could go on and on about a
weird sort of Deleuzian reading of this that I’ve
been cooking up in my head (repetition of a
disjunctive synthesis, as paradoxical element, in
two series—once as lack, once as excess—that
allows for the two series to communicate in
productive ways and as a kind of local instantiation
of a global affirmation of fundamental
153
inconsistency: ontological opposition…), but I’ll
spare you.
So, yes, happiness/holiness at the,
say, semantic level, but I wonder what happens at
the syntactic level when we play with each reading.
2 Nephi 2:12-13 – Opposition Again!
24
SundayFEB 2013
POSTED
BY JOESPENCER IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 8 COMMENTS
My last post was—my apologies anew!—too long, too philosophical, and too speculative, all
at once. Let me see if I can’t be a bit more down to earth—and a bit briefer!—this time
around. I’ll just offer a kind of brief (and rather rambly) interpretation of the passage. At
any rate, here’s the text:
Wherefore, it must needs have been created for a thing of naught. Wherefore, there would
have been no purpose in the end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing must needs destroy
the wisdom of God and his eternal purposes—and also the power and the mercy and the
justice of God. And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. And
if ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be
no righteousness, there be no happiness. And if there be no righteousness, nor happiness,
there be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not, there is no God. And if
there is no God, we are not, neither the earth—for there could have been no creation of
things, neither to act, nor to be acted upon. Wherefore, all things must have vanished
away.
Let me begin with a number of textual issues, all of which I’ll try to handle quickly. I’ll
present these as a series of questions and (possible) answers.
Textual Issues
To what does “it” refer in the first sentence of verse 12?
The best reading, I think, would be that “it” here in verse 12 refers back to the “compound
in one” that characterizes “all things” (sentence three of verse 11), but in its negated form
as “one body” (sentences four of verse 11). What must needs have been created for a thing
of naught? All things, if they were “one body” rather than “a compound in one.”
154
What on earth does “a thing of naught” mean?
The phrase comes from the King James rendering of the Hebrew prophets: Isaiah 29:21;
41:12; Jeremiah 14:14; Amos 6:13. Curiously, every instance of this phrase in the KJV
translates an entirely distinct word or phrase in the Hebrew! Isaiah 29: tohu; Isaiah
41: esef; Jeremiah 14: elol or elil (there’s a variants); Amos 6: lo dabar. What we have
here is an English flattening of a variegated Hebrew landscape, employing an apparently
common phrase at the time (see the OED entry for the pronoun “nought,” definition 3b:
“thing of nought: a mere nothing; a person or thing of no worth or value”). If any one of
these sources most likely lies behind Nephi’s usage (but Lehi’s?), it’s Isaiah 29, which is
quoted in both 2 Nephi 27:32 and 2 Nephi 28:16. That may be significant, actually, since
the Hebrew of Isaiah 29 is tohu, the word used to describe the formless matter in Genesis
1:2 over which God breathed in order to create the world. To say that, had “all things”
remained “one body,” it was have been “created for tohu” might be to say that, had “all
things” remained “one body,” it would have been created without creation, it would have
been created formless.
What’s with the redundant phrase “purpose in the end”?
This is a strange phrase, but I find myself wondering whether it should be altered through a
couple of commas: “there would have been no purpose, in the end, of its creation.” This
phrase, it appears, was in use long before the translation of the Book of Mormon (see the
OED entry for “end,” definition 16c).
What is “this thing” that “must needs destroy” God’s wisdom, etc.?
There are several possible referents here: (1) “all things” considered as “one body”; (2) the
“thing of naught”; (3) the lack of a “purpose” in creation. There’s little motivation to prefer
one of these over the other, though I think there’s a certain poetic power in taking “this
thing” to refer back to the “thing of naught” (“thing” and “thing”). If that’s not a bad
interpretation, we might play around with what it means to say that the “thing of naught”—
the formless itself—is what destroys God’s wisdom, etc.
Why do “if ye shall say” and “ye shall also say” drop out of Lehi’s logic after the first two
sentences of verse 13?
We might play with the possibility that there’s just some kind of abbreviation going on
here—that Lehi means to continue with the “ye shall say” and the “ye shall also say”
formulations, but that the text is leaving them out for economic reasons. It’s more likely, it
seems to me, that the shift is intentional. If Lehi’s addressing these words to all his sons—
Laman and Lemuel among them, then—it might be that they’d only be willing to say that
there’s no law, no sin, and no righteousness. Perhaps they’d be reticent to go on to say that
all that would imply that there’s no happiness. Indeed, it wouldn’t be difficult to imagine
155
Lehi’s sons thinking that happiness is precisely what would exist if the law and the
sin/righteousness couple were dispensed with.
Is there a significant difference between the “there is” of sentences one, two, five, and six,
and the “there be” of sentences three and four?
Is it significant that Lehi shifts, as he drops the “ye shall say”/“ye shall also say” formula, he
leaves the indicative “is” for the subjunctive “be”? If so, why does he shift back, two
sentences later, to the indicative “is” and “are”? The first shift makes some sense. When
using the intersubjective “ye shall say”/“ye shall also say” business, it makes sense to use
the indicative (whoever it is that says this stuff would say that “there is no” this or that);
and when leave this behind, it makes sense to use the subjunctive (since we’re now talking
about hypothetical absolutes, the subjunctive mood is perfectly appropriate). The question,
really, is why Lehi shifts back to the indicative in sentences five and six. Does this bring out
or highlight the absurdity of the conclusions, perhaps? It’d be one thing to remain in the
subjunctive mood, maintaining the hypothetical. It’s another to assert these conclusions
straightforwardly in the indicative, forcing a full recognition of the sheer insanity of what “ye
shall say” leads to: the non-existence of God, and then, in fact, of ourselves and the earth!
Why the sudden return of “all things” right at the end of the verse?
Nowhere in verses 12-13, except in the last, short sentence, does “all things” appear,
despite the fact that it’s so centrally important to verse 11—though it may, complexly, be
the reference of “it” and “this thing” in verse 12. Suddenly it comes back, and perhaps we
should feel the force of this quite fully: ultimately, if there’s not “an opposition in all
things,” there aren’t “all things.” They “must have vanished away.” We conclude verse 13
with what verse 11 opens with disappearing entirely.
What’s at work in “must have vanished away,” since it’d seem more appropriate just to say
that “all things” never were?
It has to be said that the wording here is a bit strange. It would seem more natural to say
that “all things must never have been.” Is Lehi referring to a specifiable event that would
have taken place—an actual occurrence in which “all things must have vanished away”? Or
is Lehi just being a bit sloppy with his words? Or is Lehi trying to make the absurdity of
these conclusions only sharper? (I can picture him saying this line with a deeply sarcastic
voice: “Then what happened to everything? I guess it all just disappeared, huh?”) All of
these are possibilities worth thinking about.
Let’s call that good for basic textual issues. On to theological interpretation!
Some Theological Reading
156
Verse 11 might be said to give a strictly abstract bit of theological discourse. We’re just
being given, there, a handful of principles: the necessity of there being a kind of basic
inconsistency at the core of all things, the role that that necessity plays in possibilizing (but
not necessitating) ethical opposition, the necessity that all things be a kind of compound,
the role that that necessity plays in possibilizing existential opposition, etc. Now in verse 12
we turn from the abstract to the concrete. Now it’s a matter of talking about God’s activity,
about the designs and intentions of an actual person (albeit a divine one), etc.
It seems obvious to me that most of verse 12 is working on the hypothetical “if” of the
second half of verse 11: if it weren’t the case that all things were compounded; if all things
were, in fact, merely one body. The last part of the verse, however, seems to me to return
to the concerns of the first half of verse 11. The lack of existential oppositions would
compromise God’s purposes in creation—and this would “destroy,” then, His “wisdom.” But
when we get this “and also” business, which turns from wisdom and purpose to “power,”
“mercy,” and “justice,” it seems to me that we’ve come back to the ethical oppositions of
the first part of verse 11. Does verse 12, then, in the end, assert—subtly, sure—some kind
of relationship between the two sets of oppositions from verse 11? Or are we just being told
that the elimination of the basic opposition at the core of “all things” would be problematic
for both sorts of opposition: ethical and existential?
This might seem a less-than-burning question, so let me explain why it strikes me. If God’s
mercy and justice go out the window with His wisdom and purposes, and if the latter are
compromised in particular by the disappearance of existential opposition, then aren’t we
saying that mercy and justice can only take on any real significance in a frame oriented by
the difference between life and death? That, it seems to me, would be the implication.
Further, if there’s a connection here—again: however subtle—then we’re perhaps being told
that mercy and justice lie at the heart of God’s “eternal purposes.” But maybe that’s a
separate question. Let me turn to it now.
Do we learn anything from verse 12 about God’s actual purposes, about God’s wisdom? It
seems to me that the second half of the sermon will say a good deal more about this; here
it almost seems to be assumed—as if all concerned already know what God’s “eternal
purposes” are. Or, as I suggested just above, perhaps God’s purposes are meant to be
suggested by Lehi’s brief mentions of justice and mercy. But maybe any search for an
actually identified purpose is misguided here. Lehi’s emphasis is first just on the fact that,
without compoundedness in all things, there would’ve been no purpose at all. The point,
perhaps, isn’t to identify specific purposes so much as to point that purpose as such only
makes sense in the framework of compoundedness and existential opposition. But isn’t that
again to say that it’s the polarity of life and death that allows everything to make real
sense?
157
Well, you can see where verse 12 leads my thoughts—always to the apparent sensegranting opposition between life and death. The question, though, is how that opposition
gets off the ground, no? Verses 11-12 only tell us that it couldn’t arise without a kind of
compoundedness in things. That’s a necessary condition of possibility, but it’s not clear that
it’s a sufficient condition for existential opposition. And verse 13, it seems to me, tells us
the other one: the imposition of law. This brings us back to verse 10, or even back to verse
5—to those places where law has already surfaced as a focus of the discussion. We saw in
verse 5 a split between the temporal and the spiritual law, the former apparently being the
word given in Eden to Adam and Eve regarding the tree and tied to a specific penalty—
temporal death—and the latter apparently being the words given outside Eden to Adam and
Eve regarding doing good and not doing evil which were in turn tied to a specific penalty—
spiritual death. We saw in verse 10 that law is somehow connected with punishment, which
is affixed in opposition to happiness, which is somehow connected with the atonement.
Perhaps I should have made a bigger deal last week of the possibility of verse 5 helping us
to make sense between the two sets of non-ontological oppositions in verse 11: the ethical
oppositions are, in a way, rooted in the spiritual law, while the existential oppositions are, in
a way, rooted in the temporal law. No? If that’s right, then verse 13, by returning to the
theme of the law and what’s said about it in verse 5, may well be telling us more about the
relation between the two sorts of oppositions. Existential oppositions have to be produced
first, perhaps, and that through the temporal law—the law that introduces the opposition
between death and life—and then it’s possible to produce ethical oppositions through the
spiritual law—the law that introduces the opposition between wickedness and righteousness.
And now I think I see the logic of verse 12-13 for the first time. Verse 12 begins from
existential opposition, from the question of how the opposition between life and death is
necessary if purpose is to have any real purchase, but it eventually finds that it can’t get
very far in this without turning to the mercy/justice couple. That leads into verse 13, which
begins from ethical opposition, following the introduction of mercy and justice into the
discussion, but then it produces an argument that roots that sort of opposition in purpose
and wisdom—since if there isn’t righteousness-and-punishment, there’s no God, etc. Over
the course of verses 12-13, then, we move in a kind of circle: from life/death and its
connection to purpose/wisdom to justice/mercy and its connection to
righteousness/wickedness, and then from righteousness/wickedness (now implicitly with its
connection to justice/mercy) to purpose/wisdom (now implicitly with its connection to
life/death).
158
Of course, there’s much more that can be said about verse 13. How do we think about the
weaving of Lehi’s logic back and forth from just one side of the opposition in question to the
opposition itself? (To be clear: the first connection is between law and sin, but the second
connection is between sin and righteousness; third comes the connection between
righteousness and happiness, but fourth comes the connection between
righteousness/happiness and punishment/misery. It’s as if Lehi alternates between vertical
and horizontal connections.) We might well ask about why Lehi opposes “righteousness” to
“punishment” and “happiness” to “misery” here, when he opposed “punishment” to
“happiness” in verse 10. We might also ask about exactly how Lehi makes the leap to “there
is no God.”
And we might especially begin to ask about the “act”/“acted-upon” couple. I have a million
questions about this, such that I don’t know where to begin. Perhaps I’ll just let others
decide whether we want to take this up now or later (when it appears again), and what
sorts of question to ask. My only question for now will be: What sorts of questions need to
be asked about the opposition between acting and being acted upon?
There, a relatively short post! Now, let’s get talking!
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8
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:12-13 – OPPOSITION AGAIN!”
1.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
March 1, 2013 at 3:47 pm
Joe,
Thanks for your post, there is a lot to respond to here. Not to beat a dead
horse (I promise this is probably the last time I’ll bring this up), but if we look
at the phrase “compound in one” as another way of saying, “There isn’t an
opposition in all things” then I think the wherefores give clear logic through
verses 12 and 13 that tie together some of the phrases you highlighted in
your post.
159
V. 11: There has to be an opposition in ALL THINGS. If there weren’t we
couldn’t have had righteousness, wickedness, happiness nor misery and
everything would have been compounded in one (an unfortunate by
hypothetical situation).
V. 12 If this [there being no opposition] were the case there would be no
purpose in the EARTH’S CREATION wherefore, “THIS THING” [living in a state
without oppostion] would have destroyed the wisdom, purposes and power of
God. Why?
V. 13, Well, [like I told you in v. 11, Lehi says] if there were not opposition
there would be no righteousness, sin, happiness, nor misery [same elements
as v.11].And without these things [opposition] there would be no God, and
not only would there have been no purpose in the creation there COULD HAVE
BEEN NO CREATION.
I don’t think this is too far afield from what you are saying, but want to offer
it as an alternate version of reading the verses. The parallels of
righteousness, wickedness, happiness and misery in verses 11 and 13
suggest to me that Lehi is circling around the same theme of a lack of
opposition and what would happen in this hypothetical situation.
That said, I’ll leave that alone now because I want to make a separate
comment on another aspect of your post!
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
March 2, 2013 at 1:59 pm
Yes. Though I don’t think anything of your interpretation rides
on how we read “compound in one.” We can read that line
differently and still read the “wherefore’s” and the basic logic of
verses 12-13 the way you’ve outlined, no?
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:

March 5, 2013 at 3:31 pm
I think that could work, yes.
2.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
March 1, 2013 at 9:15 pm
I’m curious to know what sense everybody makes of the cause and effect
logic of verse 13. As I understand the logic goes something like this (my
thoughts in brackets).
If there is no law then there is no sin [makes sense.]
If there is no sin then there is no righteousness [makes sense.]
If there is no righteousness then there is no happiness [well, I guess I can be
persuaded by that, but it doesn’t quite seem as logical as the previous two – I
know that “wickedness never was happiness” (Alma 41:10), but at the same
160
time if the Lord “would not _always_ suffer them to take happiness in sin”
(Mormon 2:13) does that mean _sometimes_ or _in some senses_ people
can?]
If there is no righteousness nor happiness then there is no punishment nor
misery [okay, I guess]
If there is no righteousness, happiness, punishment nor misery then there is
not God [What? Why?]
If there is no God then there is no creation (earth, people, etc.) [Okay, I can
get that.]
In reviewing the statements made by others (from the document Joe
provided) the two that best seemed to relate to my question of “What is the
meaning of the logic here (particularly the proposition that “if these things are
not there is not God”) are as follows:
“Lehi’s statement clearly indicates that moral laws in the universe do not exist
independent of God: if there is no law, there is no God, and if there is no God,
there is no law; for God is always the author of law.” He further taught that
the laws of God are ‘given unto men’ and that people ‘are instructed
sufficiently that they know good from evil.’ (2 Ne. 2:5.) In still another
passage, he stated that not only is God the author of law, but that he will
judge us as to how we kept his law and then reward or punish us accordingly:
‘All men come unto God; wherefore, they stand in the presence of him to be
judged of him according to the truth and holiness which is in him. Wherefore,
the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given, unto the inflicting of the
punishment which is affixed . . .’ (2 Ne. 2:10; emphasis added.)” [Garrard,
90, 93-94]
***
“[Lehi’s] proposition [is] that there must be an opposition in all things and
that this opposition is so significant as to be the purpose behind all creation.
Without creation, things would not exist, either as the subjects or the objects
of action, ‘wherefore, all things must have vanished away.’ The law of
opposites creates a condition in which there are ‘things . . . to act [or] be
acted upon.’
***
This has always been a puzzling point for me and I’d love to hear comments
from others about how you see the cause and effects making sense for Lehi
(and us).
REPLY
3.
ricosaid:
March 2, 2013 at 9:41 pm
Thanks Joe. My initial reaction is to say that Lehi is constructing opposites in
verse 11, but he is not doing the same thing in verse 13. So in verse 11 we
get the paired opposites that you mentioned in your last post:
161
(righteousness/wickedness, happiness/misery, and good/bad; life/death,
corruption/incorruption, happiness/misery, and sense/insensibility). But in
verse 13, Lehi is no longer attempting to create opposites. Rather he is trying
to put forth a kind of logic chain, but not necessarily an linear one. My first
question is to ask why Lehi begins with law, as if the law is the genesis,
rather than God. He could begin with God could he not? “If there is no God,
there is no law,” etc. He already stated in verse 5 “the law is given unto men”
so we can presume that God is the giver of the law and the narrative also tells
us this is the case. Is this just understood that God gave the law or is Lehi
deliberately leaving this out?
In terms of no God, I suppose that Lehi means that there is no God because
one of the attributes of God is justice and righteousness, so if these things
are not, then one could no longer speak of God as such. At least this is what
I see later Nephite interpreters doing with the phrase “God would cease to be
God” (Alma 42: 13, 22, 25; Mormon 9:15, 19) which phrase is common in
English sermons: “Justice is essential to God, he may as soon cease to be
God, as cease to be just” (Thomas Hall, 1661); “For if it were possible, as
soon as ever he should cease to be just and righteous, he would cease to be
God” (Stephen Charnock, 1699); ”[U]nless God will be unjust or false, and
heaven cease to be heaven, and God cease to be God” (Richard Baxter,
1707). It seems to make sense if there is no Creator there is no creation.
At any rate, it makes sense that if there is no law then one cannot be
punished for breaking the law (being wicked) or rewarded for keeping the law
(being righteous). If there is no punishment one cannot be miserable (misery
as punishment for wickedness), and if no reward one cannot be happy
(happiness as reward for righteousness).
Perhaps if we populated all the “missing” opposites we would end up with the
following:
“And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. And if ye
shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness [and no
wickedness]. And if there be no righteousness [and no wickedness], there be
no happiness [and misery]. And if there be no righteousness [or wickedness],
nor happiness [and misery], there be [no reward and] no punishment nor
[happiness nor] misery. And if these things are not, there is no God. And if
there is no God, we are not, neither the earth—for there could have been no
creation of things, neither to act, nor to be acted upon. Wherefore, all things
must have vanished away.”
I realize I have to hesitantly supply the term reward as an opposite of punish
because Lehi never provides an opposite of punish (perhaps reward isn’t the
best opposite but I use it here). I wonder whether this is intentional or
significant. For instance, Lehi presumes that no one can be righteous because
by the law all men are cut off, so how can man be rewarded for obeying the
law? If you recall in verse 3, Jacob is redeemed not for his own righteousness,
162
but “because of the righteousness of [his] redeemer.” So, perhaps Lehi
intentionally omits rewards. Is this the same situation where Lehi says there
is punishment that is inflicted, but fails to provide a corresponding verb for
happiness (inflict happiness?). Now that I think about it, why would happiness
be a good counterpart to punishment, rather than reward? He pairs happiness
with misery, right? Does Lehi fail to use the logical pairing of inflicting
punishment due to breaking the law, which would beproviding a reward for
obeying the law, because it would run counter to his theology that by the law
all men are cut off, and by the law no man is justified? Is Lehi skirting a strict
logical pairing because that would do violence to his theology? Lehi has a
phobia to rewards here. So, perhaps if we supply the termreward we do so
against Lehi’s intentions. Any thoughts on this?
REPLY
4.
joespencersaid:
March 6, 2013 at 2:48 pm
Thanks, John and Rico, for these further thoughts and questions.
I’ve got the same questions you have, John, and no real good answers. Rico
may well be on the right track by wanting to insert talk of reward, which
might make the connection between righteousness and happiness clearer.
Maybe. As for the other strange link in the chain, Rico’s comments also make
me think about how the strange shift to God in the chain marks a kind of
unbalance: why not begin with God, rather than end with Him? Rico’s
question doubles yours and makes it all the more puzzling for me.
Obviously, purpose is what’s supposed to make for that link—the sort of
purpose discussed in verse 12. But is that all that’s going on? What more
justifies the link?
Rico, I don’t know that I’ve got any answers to your further questions either.
I think my lack of answers might be rooted in a bit of confusion on my part
about what you mean when you speak of Lehi as not “constructing”
oppositions in verses 12-13. I wouldn’t want to say that he is doing that, but
I’m just not sure what you mean to say by it. It seems obvious to me, so I
think I’m missing the force of what you’re saying. That said, you have my
thanks for digging up references to “God ceasing to be God.” These are
helpful contextualizations, to say the least!
REPLY
5.
jennywebbsaid:
March 12, 2013 at 1:53 pm
Joe, I’ve been working out (far to slowly) several responses to this and your
previous post. Give me one more week before you write up your summaries …
the last two weeks have been unexpectedly busy. Sorry.
REPLY
163
o
joespencersaid:
March 12, 2013 at 2:14 pm
Unexpectedly busy? That sounds suspicious…. :)
REPLY
2 Nephi 2:14–16
07
ThursdayMAR 2013
POSTED
BY RICO IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 19 COMMENTS
The Text: 2 Nephi 2:14–16
And now, my sons,[i] I speak unto you these things for your profit and learning, for there
14
is a God, and he hath created all things—both the heavens and the earth, and all things that
in them is,[ii] both things to act and things to be acted upon.
And to bring about his
15
eternal purposes in the end of man, after he had created our first parents, and the beasts of
the field, and the fowls of the air—and in fine, all things which are created—it must needs
be that there was an opposition, even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life,
the one being sweet and the other[iii] bitter. 16Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that
he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that
hewere[iv] enticed by the one or the other.
Textual Variants
Royal Skousen’s work offers insights regarding several portions of this week’s
reading. See Analysis of Textual Variants of the Book of Mormon, Part 1(2004), 496503. A brief summary of his conclusions:
[i] Lehi highlights Jacob’s understanding of God (v. 1-4), and therefore Jacob needs no
additional persuasion from Lehi that there is a God. It is more likely that Lehi is speaking to
all his sons. Lehi never addresses Jacob as “my son” but as “Jacob my firstborn in the
wilderness.” (v. 1, 2, 11). “And now my sons” is repeated (v. 28, 30). The 1830 typesetter
changed to “sons” perhaps by accident, but this probably represents the original (not
extant).
[ii] The word “is” was replaced with “are” in 1920. Maintain “is” to agree with the KJV
language in Exodus 20:11 and Acts 4:24.
[iii] Elsewhere, bitter refers to negatives and sweet with positives (2 Ne. 15:20; Alma
36:21). Here, a “strict parallelism” is unnecessary and other usages of “one” and “other”
indicate “simply a contrast or an unordered opposition.”
[iv] The word “were” was replaced with “was” in the 1837 . Keep the subjunctive were.
164
I find Skousen’s conclusions persuasive and have adopted them here for the purposes of our
discussion.
Textual Influence
Profit and learning (1 Nephi 19:23).
God created all things in heaven and earth (Mosiah 4:2, Mosiah 4:9; Mosiah 5:15; Alma
18:28-29; Alma 22:10; 3 Nephi 9:15; Mormon 9:11).
Bring About Great Eternal Purposes (Alma 42:26).
Forbidden fruit (2 Ne. 2:15, 18-19; Mosiah 3:26; Alma 12:22; Helaman 6:26; D&C 29:40).
Tree of Life (1 Ne. 15:36; Alma 5:34, 62; Alma 12:21, 23, 26; Alma 32:40; Alma 42:2-6).
Sweet Bitter (1 Ne. 8:11; 2 Ne. 15:20; Alma 32:42; 36:21; 38:8; 40:26)
Act and Acted Upon (2 Ne. 2:13-14, 26).
Act for Himself/Free to Act for Yourself (2: Ne. 2:16; 2 Ne. 10:23; and Helaman 14:30).
Free to choose (2 Ne. 2:27).
State to Act (Alma 12:31).
Entice (2 Ne. 2:16; 9:39; Helaman 6:26; 7:16; Mosiah 3:19; Moroni 7:13).
These are not exhaustive lists.
Structure of the Text
Verses 14-16 are characterized by frustrating starts, stops, digressions, and incomplete or
at best ambiguous sentences. Lehi enumerates God’s creations but then categorizes them
as things to act and things to be acted upon. As he begins to explain the purposes in the
end of man, he goes back to enumerates more things that are created.
Do we get a better sense of Lehi’s message if we reordered the passage as follows:
And now, my sons, I speak unto you these things for your profit and learning, for there is a
God, and he hath created all things—both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in
them is, our first parents, and the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air, both things to
act and things to be acted upon.
After he had created all things which are created—it must needs be that there was an
opposition, to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man. [Wherefore, the Lord
God gave] the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life, the one being sweet and
the other bitter. Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself.
Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he were enticed by the one
or the other.
165
This reordering of the text may be not perfect and certainly we can come up with other
ways to rearrange the elements of Lehi’s sentences.
However, I think this might provide a
catalyst for discussing Lehi’s meaning, even if that means, hopefully, disagreeing with
this arrangement.
“Forbidden fruit”
Lehi describes the fruit as “forbidden” drawing upon Genesis 2:17 (“But of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it”). Notably, the phrase forbidden
fruit does not appear in the Bible. The phrase in English (sometimes appearing as fruit
forbidden) does seem to be a common expression from the 17th century as found in Sir
Walter Raleigh’s The History of the World (1614). In addition, it is possible that the English
phrase is ultimately derived from the Latin fructus vetiti or vetiti fructus. Interestingly, a
survey of the use of vetiti in Latin writings shows it was also used with
phrases vetiti ligni (forbidden tree) and vetiti pomi (forbidden bite). All these phrases can
be dated to at least the early 16th century (I don’t see them necessarily derived from the
Vulgate). Unfortunately, forbidden tree andforbidden bite never took off in the English
language, but forbidden fruitseemed to have made it into circulation. There is more to say
about this forbidden language, but I just point it out here since this is the first time the
phrase appears in the Book of Mormon.
Things to Act and Things to be Acted Upon, Act for
Himself/Themselves/Yourselves
Okay, so let’s dive into this concept a little deeper.
Lehi enumerates God’s creations but then abruptly notes that some things are created to
act and some are created to be acted upon. In verse 16, we see that God sets up conditions
so that man can act for himself, so at least we know man falls into things created to
act. However, Lehi also admits in verse 26 that man can also be acted upon by
punishment of the law at the last day. It isn’t clear whether this is the only way that man
can be acted upon (its certainly conceivable that man could be acted upon in other ways),
and it isn’t clear whether other creations are created to act. Based on 2 Ne 2, man is the
only creation mentioned that was created to act. This is further strengthened by Lehi
introducing this notion by stating: ”to bring about his eternal purposes in the end
of man.” Does this imply that everything else that God created was created to be acted
upon? Is God the one acting upon his creations? Does it make sense to say that the tree of
life and the forbidden fruit are also things created to be acted upon?
166
Lehi also uses the phrase “free to act” and “free to choose” in much the same way (verses
26-27). This suggests that act for oneself seems to mean the ability to choose good or evil
or life or death.
Are we to understand, in these verses, this enticement to be emanating from the tree of life
and the forbidden fruit? What to we make of the fact that it is the tree and fruit that does
the enticing in verses 14-16 and not the devil, or God, or the law? Later Nephite
interpreters state that it was the devil that did the enticing, and not opposites of the fruit
and the tree (Helaman 6:26). Is there anything necessary about this particular “opposition”
or is Lehi saying any opposition will do, so long as there is an opposition?
By the way, what happened to Lehi’s opposites? Why is the forbidden fruit an appropriate
opposite for tree of life? Why doesn’t Lehi say tree of death and tree of life,
or forbidden fruit and permitted fruit? Why are we comparing fruits with trees? Why does
Lehi seem to be averse to using the description that is found in the Genesis account: the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil? Is this significant? Is this because that name
already contains two opposites that might ruins the symmetry Lehi is trying to work
out? Would this be awkward for Lehi to claim that one needs more than the tree of
knowledge of good and evil in order to have good and evil? Later, Lehi will tell his sons to
choose life and not death (verses 28-29). While associating life with tree of life seems clear
enough, does Lehi presume the reader will associate death with the forbidden fruit?
And what role does the tree of life play in this discourse? Isn’t the real opposite here
between the forbidden fruit on the one hand, and all other fruitson the other hand? After
all, the Genesis account never provides instructions to eat the fruit of the tree of life. Even
without a tree of life, Adam and Eve could still be enticed by the forbidden fruit, could they
not? Are we to understand that the tree of life is also enticing man in the Garden? And if
so, in what way? Also, should we bring in anything from Lehi’s dream and Nephi’s vision to
bear on the text? Or, should we consider those to be a separate tree of life narrative that is
performing a different kind of work than what we find here?
What is the role of the law in all this? Isn’t Lehi just using “forbidden fruit” as a synonym
for the temporal law (that he seems to suggest sufficiently instructed man to know good
from evil)? Should we really take Lehi’s statement at face value that the tree and the fruit
is doing the enticing? Isn’t it really “the law” that allows man to act for himself? Therefore,
is it really the case that God needs both the tree of life and the forbidden fruit to create a
situation where man can act for himself? Clearly he doesn’t need it today, right? Why does
Lehi spend so much time talking about how important the law is (the temporal law and the
spiritual law), and then speak as if its really fruits and trees that are creating a reality where
man can act for himself? Is there a strategy (literary or theological) behind this move?
167
And what happens when Adam and Eve are driven from the Garden and neither the tree of
life or the forbidden fruit is in existence? Does man lose the ability to act for himself? Is
there no enticement? Lehi seems to suggest there are enticements in verses 27-29. This
would suggest that post-lapsarian enticements are no longer the forbidden fruit vs. the tree
of life, but the devil/will of flesh vs. the mediator/will of Holy Spirit. But on the other hand,
wasn’t this always the case? Are these elements interchangeable?
How does the related material found Alma and Helaman, etc., shed light on Lehi’s meaning?
Free Will, Agency, and Act for Yourselves
It is notable that the term agency appears nowhere in the Book of Mormon (although it does
appear in the Book of Moses). Is that significant? Should we equate “act for himself” with
agency? With free will? Are there any problems with doing this? Some commentators
point out the language “act and acted upon” have been used in debates on free will
(Augustine, Calvin). Does that context shed any light on Lehi’s meaning?
One thing that strikes me is that God does something after the creation of all things. Lehi
says that after God creates all things which are created, then God gives unto man that he
should act for himself. Therefore, that man should act for himself doesn’t seem built into the
nature of man, but is set up for man by arranging man’s external environment, by providing
opposing enticements as it were. If this is the case, I have a couple of comments.
First, Irenaeus interpreted “image of God” (imago dei) to be the source of man’s free will.
Now, I’m not suggesting Lehi’s “act for himself” should be equated with the theological
concept of “free will.” At least I’m not making an argument here. But supposing these
ideas are rough equivalents, we can contrast Lehi’s views with that of Irenaeus. It would
seem that, for Irenaeus, he very fact of being created in the likeness and image of God
imbues humans with free will. Yet, for Lehi, the mere act of being created in the image of
Goddoes not mean man can act for himself. God must do something post-creation.He must
set up opposing enticements to create a condition of humans acting for themselves.
Second, isn’t this really reaction? Wouldn’t we think of “acting for oneself” to be acting in
the absence of any enticements? Again, all this points to the question of what Lehi means
by “act for himself.”
Bitter and Sweet
While I seem to have accepted Skousen’s arguments that there isn’t a good reason to
accept Lehi to mean the forbidden fruit is sweet and the tree of life is bitter, is there any
argument that Lehi does intend this and that this would be significant? We do have some
precedent for sweet being associated with the forbidden: “Stolen waters are sweet, and
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bread eaten in secret ispleasant.” (Proverbs 9:17). But aside from deciding which
description goes with which item, what are we to make of the fact that Lehi describes the
fruit and tree with sweet and bitter and not something else like good and evil, or life and
death? Or is this implied?
“it must needs be that there was an opposition”
In what ways is the “opposition” in verse 15 different from the “opposition” in verse 11? At
least, might we be open to the fact that these might be different?
I like the taxonomy of opposition that Joe suggests: (1) ontological opposition (2) ethical
oppositions and (3) existential oppositions. I think this is a useful way to conceptualize
Lehi’s statement. Is there anyway we can use this taxonomy to make sense of verse
15? Does it fit into any of these categories?
Remember, Lehi’s conclusion in verses 11-13 is that if there were no opposites then there
would be no God or creation. Here, Lehi is talking about an opposition that is
created after the creation. In other words, God created several things before creating the
forbidden fruit and tree of life. Lehi seems to be suggesting that the whole point of “an
opposition” in this case is so that man could act for himself, not so that man would exist at
all. Perhaps all of this is to say that Lehi can’t be referring to an ontological opposition. But
is Lehi referring to what Joe calls ethical opposition or perhaps existential opposition, or
both?
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19
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:14–16”
joespencersaid:
March 8, 2013 at 2:26 pm
Good stuff here, Rico.
A first comment, and regarding your reordering of the text. Let me first say
that I think that this sort of experimentation with the text can be very
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productive, and can also be very revealing. At the same time, though, a good
deal of meaning can be lost. Comparing your reordering with the original, I
see six points worth noting about how meaning is lost in the reordering. (And
it would be just as possible, of course, to note six points about how meaning
is created in the reordering—which is not to say that it’s either a good or a
bad thing to create meaning in that way.) Let me note them not as criticisms
of the reordering, but as points of interpretation that the reordering brings
out about the original. That is, by noting where meaning seems to be lost,
perhaps we can see more about the original text that we ought to take into
consideration as we interpret the text.
First, then, the reordering places a distance between Lehi’s “all things” and
the distinction between things that act and things acted upon. Perhaps,
though, the proximity of these is important. Might it be that Lehi wants us to
think of “all things,” in its first iteration here, as precisely what is divisible into
these two categories?
Second, and closely related, the reordering essentially suggests that it is
living beings (humans, animals, birds) that are divided into “all things.” (This
is a result in part of the distancing between this incomplete list and the
second iteration of “all things” as an aggregative, introduced by the “in fine.”)
But might it be that Lehi wants to keep the acting/acted-upon distinction at
the abstract level of heaven and earth and “all things” in them? And might it
be that living beings aren’t what are supposed to be divided up into things
acting and things acted upon—precisely because, perhaps, it is living beings
that all end up on the acting side of things?
Third, and already hinted at in the previous point, it may be significant that
Lehi only gets specific in the second description of what was created,
remaining very general and relatively abstract in the first description. Might
this distribution be important to Lehi’s meaning? Might it be important that
Lehi only turns to the specifics of creation (albeit, of course, in a kind of quick
beginning of list that turns into an aggregative) when he addresses the
supplementary opposition necessary for the plan?
Fourth, the reworking of the order of the second sentence changes Lehi’s
emphasis, methinks. By opening it with “And to bring about,” etc., Lehi lays
heaviest emphasis on God’s intentions, on how the supplement of opposition
to the creation achieves something God needs for His plan. To begin it, on the
other hand, with the relative prepositional clause beginning with “after,”
makes Lehi’s words more narrative in orientation than theoretical or
theological—and it relegates God’s purpose to a kind of almost-dispensable
note at the end of the sentence, rather than the whole point of it.
Fifth, and already mentioned in a way above, it might be interpretively
significant that the second “all things” in this passage is an aggregative. In
the reordering, it’s a sheer repetition, rather than a way out of listing
everything created. In other words, where in the original text, the first “all
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things” is an abstract or general term and the second “all things” is an
aggregative that allows Lehi to get out of listing all that was created, in the
reordering, both “all things” are abstract or general terms.
Sixth, the reordering of the second sentence, the replacement of Lehi’s
“even,” and the division of the second sentence into two sentences create a
distance between “an opposition” and its specification, making the strict
specification murky and vague. The original underscores the nature of the
singular opposition in question in a way that’s lost in the reordering, and it
may be that that underscoring is of real importance for making sense of Lehi’s
claim.
Seventh, finally, the replacement of “even” with “wherefore, the Lord God
gave” changes the meaning of the text pretty drastically. It isn’t clear in
Lehi’s original whether there was any act on God’s part, an act of creating
opposition. We’re only told that there had to be an opposition, and that that
opposition was the opposition between the two trees. Was this something God
could have avoided? Was it built structurally into things? All this remains
fruitfully ambiguous in the original text.
There may be other points worth mentioning here. Again, the point of noting
all these isn’t to criticize. Indeed, the reordering is precisely what helps me to
see all these points of significance in the original text. The point, then, is just
to note that there are aspects of the original I don’t know that I’m ready to
leave behind for the sake of flow or clarity. In short, you’ve got your wish:
I’m disagreeing, but precisely in a way that, I hope, reveals the catalytic
nature of your reordering. In a kind of Hegelian fashion, the self-alienation of
the text in its reordering allows for a return into the original text in a fully
self-conscious way….
REPLY
o
ricosaid:
March 9, 2013 at 12:27 am
This is excellent Joe. It might not seem like it, but this was the
kind of response I was hoping for. And we are on the same
page, I expect a critique of the reordering and that helps us
make considerations in the text. To clarify, I’m not proposing a
new text here, we have the fixed text already at the top of the
page. This is merely a tool for exploration.
I want to stress that I’m not relying on the reordered passage
for any of my arguments in this post (at least I believe all my
arguments can be made from the original text). To simplify
things, I will be responding to your comment by referring to the
original text.
With that out of the way, let me respond to some of your points.
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1. The phrase “all things.” I thought we were agreed that “all
things” refers to all things that God has created, exhaustively.
Are you suggesting that Lehi has two different categories for “all
things”? That is, are you saying that Lehi is using an all
things1 and an all things2?
If so, I probably take the position that “all things” includes the
entire set of things that have been created by God, including the
forbidden fruit and the tree of life. I don’t (yet) see anything
significant about grouping “our first parents, and the beasts of
the field, and the fowls of the air” because Lehi still qualifies
these items by saying “and in fine, all things which are created.”
That is, these items too, are included in “all things which are
created.” I wonder if Lehi is merely alluding to the language
found in Genesis 2:19 “And out of the ground the Lord God
formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air” as
things in the earth that God created. So the language of beasts
and fowls invokes the completeness of the creation. In fact,
there is an argument to be made that “heaven” should be paired
with “fowls of the sky” (the Hebrew shamayim being translated
as both heaven andair. The KJV sometimes translates this
as fowls of heaven) and “earth” should be paired with “beasts in
the field,” that is, “all things that in them is” (although here the
Hebrew word is different, but still conceptually linked). If we
understand “all things that in them is” to be based on Exodus
20:11, then it would need to include both animals and man as
well: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea,
and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day.”
2. Is Lehi linking “things to act” with “act for himself”? Or should
we make a distinction between these? I have more to say but it
will depend on whether these mean the same things or different
things.
3. Verse 15 is indeed problematic. I get the sense Lehi never
finishes his sentence. I expect something like “And to bring
about his eternal purposes in the end of man, [God did X].” But
Lehi interrupts mid-sentence to give a chronology. Let me take
artistic license to offer an expanded and playful version that gets
at what I’m thinking.
Now to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man, let
me tell you what God did. [Pause] But you know what? I’m
getting ahead of myself. I have to back up. Okay, so this is after
he had created our first parents, and the beasts of the field, and
the fowls of the air, and in fine, all things which are created—
remember how I was talking about how God created all things?
172
So this is after that. [Pause] You know what? I also left out
another thing you have to know for this to make any sense. I
forgot to say that it must needs be that there was an opposition
[ so that man could act for himself]. What opposition you ask?
Well, I’m talking about the the forbidden fruit in opposition to
the tree of life. By the way, a funny thing about the flavors of
the fruit and the tree, one is sweet and one is bitter.
[Pause]. But back to what I was telling you, that’s how God
made it so that man could act for himself. I know many of you
keep asking me why God put that forbidden fruit in the Garden
in the first place, but I’m telling you, without creating the
forbidden fruit and the tree of life, man couldn’t act for himself,
and acting for himself is part of God’s purpose for man, which is
what I’ve been trying to tell you from the beginning.
That’s the sense that I get. In other words, in a round about
way, with several digressions, Lehi is saying that God created
the forbidden fruit and the tree of life so that there could be an
opposition so that man could act for himself; and God needs
man to be able to act for himself to bring about his eternal
purposes in the end of man (in contrast to his eternal purposes
for his other creations).
While Lehi doesn’t explicitly state that it was God who created
the forbidden fruit or the tree of life, I think there is no other
conclusion but that the God who created all things also
created these things. It is also stated in Genesis 2:9 that “out of
the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is
pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in
the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and
evil.” But we know that the nothing in its creation (or structure,
as you say) makes the fruit of tree of knowledge of good and
evil forbidden. The only thing that makes the fruit forbidden is
that God forbids Adam and Eve (or just Adam depending on how
you look at the chronology of Genesis). That is, after the
creation, God promulgates a law about what can be eaten and
what cannot be eaten (the temporal law). So I do think the
“after” really does play a crucial role in the narrative. It seems to
me that Lehi cannot claim that the “Lord God gave unto man
that he should act for himself” unless God is responsible for the
forbidden fruit and the tree of life. The text doesn’t seem to
make sense if Lehi could say “God gave unto man that he should
act for himself” and “to bring about his eternal purposes in the
end of man” God didn’t take any action at all but these things
just were or spontaneously occurred.
173
REPLY
joespencersaid:

March 11, 2013 at 1:48 pm
Point by point:
1. I think the (Fregean) distinction between
reference and sense is helpful here. Yes, we’re
agreed that the referent of “all things” is everything
God created. I didn’t mean to suggest otherwise. I
meant, rather, to point out the different senses that
accompany the phrase in its different iterations in
the passage—first as a kind of top-down summary
term, and second as a kind of bottom-up
aggregative term. In each case, the referent is all
that has been created, but “all that has been
created” is doing something different in each case.
2. I haven’t any idea. At least not yet.
3. Your imaginative reconstruction is very helpful,
opening up a very different reading of what’s going
on here. I’ve tended to see a complete sentence (or
at least a complete thought) here: all things were
created, and then came the need for an opposition.
I’ll respond to the rest of what you’re working out
on this point in another comment.
2.
joespencersaid:
March 8, 2013 at 2:35 pm
Getting on to your comments dealing with substance instead of structure—
and I have time only for one brief comment this morning, and then I’ll be
traveling over the weekend; I’ll get back to this on Monday.
Forbidden. Yes, these comments are helpful. What strikes me in particular is
that (perhaps precisely because “forbidden tree” didn’t make the transition
from Latin to English?) we don’t—as I have always unthinkingly taught this!—
have an opposition between two trees, but between a tree (the “tree of life”)
and fruit (the “forbidden fruit”). Or perhaps the asymmetry of the tree/fruit
pairing suggests that the real opposition here is what is “of life” and what is
“forbidden.” How might we think about these two ways of thinking about the
basic opposition here?
That might speak to your final discussion, regarding the nature of the
opposition in question—ontological, ethical, or existential. If, as I think we
have reason to believe, the opposition in question is ontological (note the
strict parallels between the text of verse 14 and the first sentence of verse
11), how might we regard ontological or fundamental opposition, the
possibilizing opposition that lies at the heart of all things, as a question of
174
opposition between tree and fruit, or of opposition between what is “of life”
and what is “forbidden”? Is the asymmetry of this opposition precisely what
might give us to think we’re dealing with ontological opposition (since there’s
a pretty strict symmetry governing the ethical and existential oppositions laid
out in verse 11)? How do we think about that?
Well, I’ve asked more questions than answered any, but I’ll be thinking very
carefully about all this. You have my thanks for bringing this set of questions
out of me.
REPLY
o
ricosaid:
March 8, 2013 at 8:56 pm
Yes, we certainly have an asymmetry between fruit and tree.
Although, we know (from reason but also scripture) that behind
the forbidden fruit is a forbidden tree and behind the tree of life
is a fruit of the tree of life. But be that as it may, Lehi has made
a choice to use the term “forbidden fruit” as opposed to “fruit of
the tree of knowledge of good and evil.”
One hypothesis I’m entertaining is that this is deliberate on
Lehi’s part. What reasons could we imagine for why Lehi may
not want to use this name? First of all, the name of the tree
already contains opposites “good and evil.” That’s a problem.
Plus, it contains the term “knowledge,” which, the way I look at
it, Lehi isn’t very concerned with in this discourse. Lehi is telling
a narrative that, at its heart, isn’t about knowledge or certainly
not about becoming like the gods. And perhaps as a result, the
Book of Mormon never repeats the phrase “tree of knowledge of
good and evil.”
But what other phrase can Lehi use in its place? He can’t simply
say tree or fruit because there are many trees and many fruits.
He can’t say good or evil because he wants to show how good
and evil come from opposites, not from the fruit itself, and he is
already setting up opposites with both the forbidden fruit on the
one hand and the tree of life on the other. So for Lehi, it’s
almost like he doesn’t want to say “the bite” allowed man to act
for himself, he wants to say before any bite occurred, the
existence of forbidden fruit and the tree of life, enticing man one
way or the other, allowed “man to act for himself.”
If that’s Lehi’s goal, then a good choice is to use the label
“forbidden fruit” because the reference is clear. There is only one
tree’s fruit that was forbidden. This allows him to avoid
complicating good and evil and knowledge in his discourse. I
suppose he could use fruit of the tree of life, which probably
175
could have worked as well and added more symmetry. In fact,
this is how Alma understand the narrative and he uses the
phrase “fruit of the tree of life” several times (Alma 5:34, 62;
Alma 12:21, 23; Alma 32:40). “Come and be baptized unto
repentance, that ye also may be partakers of the fruit of the tree
of life.” (Alma 5:62).
REPLY
joespencersaid:

March 11, 2013 at 2:17 pm
I’m going to be thinking about this a great deal. I’m
inclined to see in the asymmetry a crucial structural
point. It may be that at the ontological—as opposed
to the ethical or the existential—level, “opposition”
isn’t or even can’t besymmetrical opposition,
“binarity,” we might say. I hear something like this
idea at work in the strange wording of the first
sentence of verse 11: an opposition, in all things.
It’s as if there has to be some kind of rift, some
kind of fundamental inconsistency. (I’ve done a bit
of textual work on this approach here.)
Maybe I can illustrate this in the following,
confessedly bizarre way.
At the turn of the century, a number of
philosophers of mathematics were trying to figure
out how to provide the number system with a kind
of foundation. One thinker in particular, Gottlob
Frege, attempted to root mathematics in
(indubitable) logical truths. The project, that is,
was to show how all the laws of mathematics were
derivable from the laws of logic. Frege argued
powerfully against other possible ways of founding
the laws of mathematics, and then he set about the
task of articulating the logicist foundation. Things
went swimmingly until a young Bertrand Russell
wrote to Frege to show him how the fifth of Frege’s
five “basic laws” of arithmetic could be used to
derive a contradiction. The consistency of Frege’s
project was ruined, and further attempts to shore
up the logicist project failed.
In thinking about ontological opposition, I want to
think not about the moment where the derived
contradiction emerges—not about the moment
176
where a kind of direct opposition between two
incommensurable terms emerges—but about the
earlier, pregnant moment where that contradiction
becomes possible, becomes implicitly inscribedin
the system, but unconsciously, as it were. What
would derivatively become stark opposition, explicit
inconsistency in the shape of the opposition
between P and not-P, begins as a kind of
underground inconsistency written invisibly into the
heart of things. And that inconsistency takes the
shape not of “mere” opposition, symmetrical
opposition, but of law—in Frege’s case, “basic law
V.”
It’s in this sense that I want to think about
“ontological” opposition, possibilizing opposition.
It’s a question less of term-by-term symmetry than
of a kind of absolute pre- or proscription. It’s a
question, maybe, just of law.
It’s with that in mind that I want to think about
“the forbidden.”
Of course, I have a great deal more I want to think
out loud about here: What’s going on, anew, with
the juxtaposition of “forbidden” and “of life”? And
what’s going on, anew, with the juxtaposition of
“fruit” and “tree”? I’m convinced there’s much to
learn by thinking more carefully about those.
3.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
March 8, 2013 at 10:45 pm
Rico — this is very thought provoking.
I was intrigued by your list of textual influences, particularly the phrase “Bring
about…eternal purposes (2 Nephi 2:15, Alma 37:7, 42:26, Mormon 5:26).
You’ve commented before on the connections between 2 Nephi 2 and Alma 42
and this phrase jumped out at me as another example.
Just prior to Lehi’s reference regarding God bringing “about his eternal
purposes in the end of man” he talks about God creating “things to act and
things to be acted upon.” As you point out, “Lehi also admits in verse 26 that
man can also be acted upon by punishment of the law at the last day.” I
wonder if there is a connecting point here, in terms of how Alma uses the
parallel phrase “And thus God bringeth about his great and eternal purposes.”
After giving a list of causes and effects similar to those put forth by Lehi,
Alma makes a statement that could be construed as an instance in which man
is acted upon: “Justice exerciseth all his demands, and also mercy claimeth all
177
which is her own; and thus, none but the truly penitent are saved. What, do
ye suppose that mercy can rob justice? I say unto you, Nay; not one whit. If
so, God would cease to be God. And thus God bringeth about his great and
eternal purposes.
If we continue with Alma’s words, it seems to me that “being acted upon” can
in at least one sense have a positive connotation, in that we can be acted
upon to receive salvation: “And thus cometh about the salvation and the
redemption of men, and also their destruction and misery.”
Just following Lehi’s use of the phrase “bring about…eternal purposes,” Lehi
states, “the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself.” Nobody
is forced one way or another. This is parallel to Alma’s statement (made just
after he employs the phrase “bring about…eternal purposes,”), “Whosoever
will come may come and partake of the waters of life freely; and whosoever
will not come the same is not compelled to come; but in the last day it shall
be restored unto him according to his deeds.”
Thanks for opening up this phrase – it’s helping me make better sense of 2
Nephi 2 and Alma 42, and also pushing me to want to do a closer comparison
of these two chapters.
REPLY
o
ricosaid:
March 9, 2013 at 1:53 am
John, thanks for bringing up Alma 42 as a text influenced by
Lehi’s discourse. In terms of language, one difference is that 2
Ne. 2:15 includes the modifier “in the end of man” which doesn’t
seem to be repeated in the Book of Mormon text. However,
contextually, I get the sense these other passages are also
concerning “the end of man.”
What really is interesting to me, however, is that Alma (in
chapter 42) does not repeat the language of “act and acted
upon.” In fact, other than Lehi, no Nephite ever will repeat this
phrase. It’s not clear what this means, if anything. Perhaps, no
one really knows what Lehi means by the term “acted upon.”
However, we do get a couple of variants:
“Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men, they having first
transgressed the first commandments as to things which were
temporal, and becoming as gods, knowing good from
evil, placing themselves in a state to act, or being placed in a
state to actaccording to their wills and pleasures, whether to do
evil or to do good.” (Alma 12:31).
What’s interesting here is that Alma departs in a crucial way
from Lehi. Alma is saying that men place themselves in a state
to act. Lehi says that God places man in a state to act by
178
establishing opposites. I see this as a radically different
theological paradigm. It might be that Alma is trying to correct
his mistake when he supplements his record with “or being
placed in a state to act” and leaving out the subject. Again, as I
wrote in my comment to Joe above, I think Lehi is saying that
Adam and Eve could act for themselves not at the moment they
partook of the fruit, but at the moment there existed two
opposing enticements. Alma seems to abandon Lehi’s idea in
favor of the fruit doing the work. I think Lehi was trying to avoid
this conclusion.
“And now remember, remember, my brethren, that whosoever
perisheth, perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity,
doeth it unto himself; for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted
toact for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a
knowledge and he hath made you free. He hath given unto you
that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you
that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be
restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good
restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil
restored unto you.” (Helaman 14:30-31).
Samuel the Lamanite, like Alma, locates man’s freedom in
knowledge, even though he states that it was God who provided
this knowledge. However, this does not seem to be Lehi’s
project either. Lehi, under my reading, is not saying that
knowledge makes man free, but rather
that opposing enticements allow man to be free to choose. So, I
see both Alma and Samuel to be abandoning Lehi’s theory of
freedom arising from opposing enticements, in favor of a theory
of freedom arsing from knowledge of good and evil.
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:

March 9, 2013 at 5:08 pm
I’m interested in the conversation around acting,
and not being acted upon. If I understand your
reasoning, Lehi is positing that the freedom to act
comes from opposing enticements, whereas Alma
and Samuel the Lamanite base the freedom to act
on knowledge. I wonder if the three of them were
sitting in a room if they would disagree or if these
are simply different ways of expressing the same
ideas.
179
The example you point out in Alma 12 is really
interesting. So we have
“It must needs be that there was an opposition;
even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of
life; the one being sweet and the other bitter.
Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he
should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not
act for himself save it should be that he was
enticed by the one or the other” (2 Nephi 2:15-16)
VERSUS
“Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men,
they having first transgressed the first
commandments as to things which were temporal,
and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil,
placing themselves in a state to act, or being
placed in a state to act according to their wills and
pleasures, whether to do evil or to do good.” (Alma
12:31).
It does seem that Lehi is stating that the power to
act came when there were opposing forces, namely
“the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life.”
Now as you mention, Alma’s second clause, being
placed in a state to act could be crucial. Especially
with the presence of “or” preceding it, it is as
though Alma is stating those phrases as equal
points. But they aren’t (or at least don’t appear to
be). Did they place themselves in a state to act (by
partaking of the fruit) or were they placed in a
state to act (by being presented with opposing
fruits). Another possibility is that Alma is saying
they placed themselves in a position to act by
partaking of the fruit, or, as a result of partaking of
a fruit they were placed (by their own actions in
partaking) in a state to act.
I looked into other instances in which Alma
discusses the concept of opposites. While he
mentions it in Alma 41:11-13, I think the more
germane occurrence is in back in Alma 42. Alma
states, “Repentance could not come unto men
except there were a punishment, which also was
eternal as the life of the soul should be, affixed
opposite to the plan of happiness, which was as
eternal also as the life of the soul. Now, how could
180
a man repent except he should sin? How could he
sin if there was no law? How could there be a law
save there was a punishment?”
This section, and that following is obviously
reminiscent of 2 Nephi 2:11-15. Alma describes an
eternal punishment being fixed in opposition to an
eternal plan of happiness. This opposition launches
Alma into a discussion about how without factors
(opposites) such as sin and law God would cease to
be God … just as Lehi said that without opposing
forces such as sin and law there would be no God.
To me this indicates that Alma is familiar with
Lehi’s previous argument and I’m wondering to
what extent (if any) he is deviating from it — or if
he is acknowledging that opposition is a key factor
in man’s ability to act.
As to Samuel the Lamanite’s statement, I’m
wondering if it is a derivative of one made by
Jacob, rather than a commentary on the words of
Lehi or Alma. Jacob is closest in time to Lehi, and
best able to provide insight as to what Lehi might
have meant by the word “act.” But while he
mentions the idea of acting he makes no comment
as to where the freedom comes from when he says,
“cheer up your hearts, and remember that ye are
free to act for yourselves—to choose the way of
everlasting death or the way of eternal life” (2
Nephi 10:23).
Samuel also says, “Ye are free…to act for
yourselves; for behold, God…hath given unto you
that ye might choose life or death” (Helaman
14:30-31).
Given the parallels between those verses, there is a
clear connection. However, as you point out, one
way or another, Samuel (unlike Jacob) connects the
ability to “act for yourselves” with knowledge. As
Samuel continues to focus on knowledge (Helaman
15:6, 7, 11, 13) he again seems to tie back to
Jacob.
Jacob had taught that “Our children shall be
restored, that they may come to that which will
give them the true knowledge of their Redeemer”
(2 Nephi 10:2). Samuel the Lamanite says, “And
181
this is according to the prophecy, that they [the
Lamanites] shall again be brought to the true
knowledge, which is the knowledge of their
Redeemer” (Helaman 15:13).
So I guess part of the sense I’m making of
Samuel’s statement is that when he uses the word
“knowledge” it is less a commentary on knowledge
providing the freedom to act and more a statement
about the knowledge that the contemporary
Nephites had been given and how that knowledge
(in contrast to the lesser knowledge received by the
Lamanites) would make them accountable for their
actions. Now I could still be persuaded otherwise,
and this obviously needs more untangling than I
can give it right now. I’m wondering, did is Samuel
abandon “Lehi’s theory of freedom arising from
opposing enticements, in favor of a theory of
freedom arising from knowledge of good and evil”
or was this more a statement about the status of
the knowledge of the Nephites in his day and time?
John Hilton IIIsaid:

March 9, 2013 at 5:20 pm
I’m interested in the conversation around acting,
and not being acted upon. If I understand your
reasoning, Lehi is positing that the freedom to act
comes from opposing enticements, whereas Alma
and Samuel the Lamanite base the freedom to act
on knowledge. I wonder if the three of them were
sitting in a room if they would disagree or if these
are simply different ways of expressing the same
ideas.
The example you point out in Alma 12 is really
interesting. So we have
“It must needs be that there was an opposition;
even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of
life; the one being sweet and the other bitter.
Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he
should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not
act for himself save it should be that he was
enticed by the one or the other” (2 Nephi 2:15-16)
VERSUS
182
“Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men,
they having first transgressed the first
commandments as to things which were temporal,
and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil,
placing themselves in a state to act, or being
placed in a state to act according to their wills and
pleasures, whether to do evil or to do good.” (Alma
12:31).
It does seem that Lehi is stating that the power to
act came when there were opposing forces, namely
“the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life.”
Now as you mention, Alma’s second clause, being
placed in a state to act could be crucial. Especially
with the presence of “or” preceding it, it is as
though Alma is stating those phrases as equal
points. But they aren’t (or at least don’t appear to
be). Did they place themselves in a state to act (by
partaking of the fruit) or were they placed in a
state to act (by being presented with opposing
fruits). Another possibility is that Alma is saying
they placed themselves in a position to act by
partaking of the fruit, or, as a result of partaking of
a fruit they were placed (by their own actions in
partaking) in a state to act.
I looked into other instances in which Alma
discusses the concept of opposites. While he
mentions it in Alma 41:11-13, I think the more
germane occurrence is in back in Alma 42. Alma
states, “Repentance could not come unto men
except there were a punishment, which also was
eternal as the life of the soul should be, affixed
opposite to the plan of happiness, which was as
eternal also as the life of the soul. Now, how could
a man repent except he should sin? How could he
sin if there was no law? How could there be a law
save there was a punishment?”
This section, and that following is obviously
reminiscent of 2 Nephi 2:11-15. Alma describes an
eternal punishment being fixed in opposition to an
eternal plan of happiness. This opposition launches
Alma into a discussion about how without factors
(opposites) such as sin and law God would cease to
be God … just as Lehi said that without opposing
183
forces such as sin and law there would be no God.
To me this indicates that Alma is familiar with
Lehi’s previous argument and I’m wondering to
what extent (if any) he is deviating from it — or if
he is acknowledging that opposition is a key factor
in man’s ability to act.
As to Samuel the Lamanite’s statement, I’m
wondering if it is a derivative of one made by
Jacob, rather than a commentary on the words of
Lehi or Alma. Jacob is closest in time to Lehi, and
best able to provide insight as to what Lehi might
have meant by the word “act.” But while he
mentions the idea of acting he makes no comment
as to where the freedom comes from when he says,
“cheer up your hearts, and remember that ye are
free to act for yourselves—to choose the way of
everlasting death or the way of eternal life” (2
Nephi 10:23).
Samuel also says, “Ye are free…to act for
yourselves; for behold, God…hath given unto you
that ye might choose life or death” (Helaman
14:30-31).
Given the parallels between those verses, there is a
clear connection. However, as you point out, one
way or another, Samuel (unlike Jacob) connects the
ability to “act for yourselves” with knowledge. As
Samuel continues to focus on knowledge (Helaman
15:6, 7, 11, 13) he again seems to tie back to
Jacob.
Jacob had taught that “Our children shall be
restored, that they may come to that which will
give them the true knowledge of their Redeemer”
(2 Nephi 10:2). Samuel the Lamanite says, “And
this is according to the prophecy, that they [the
Lamanites] shall again be brought to the true
knowledge, which is the knowledge of their
Redeemer” (Helaman 15:13).
So I guess part of the sense I’m making of
Samuel’s statement is that when he uses the word
“knowledge” it is less a commentary on knowledge
providing the freedom to act and more a statement
about the knowledge that the contemporary
Nephites had been given and how that knowledge
184
(in contrast to the lesser knowledge received by the
Lamanites) would make them accountable for their
actions. Now I could still be persuaded otherwise,
and this obviously needs more untangling than I
can give it right now. I’m wondering, did is Samuel
abandon “Lehi’s theory of freedom arising from
opposing enticements, in favor of a theory of
freedom arising from knowledge of good and evil”
or was this more a statement about the status of
the knowledge of the Nephites in his day and time?
4.
ricosaid:
March 9, 2013 at 8:05 pm
John, thanks for this. I’m convinced you are right about Samuel. One thing
that occurred to me as I continue to think on these verses is that when Lehi
speaks of “freedom” in relation to the atonement.
“And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free
forever.” (verse 26).
So it would appear we have two situations, so to speak. Initially, God gives
“unto man that he should act for himself” through, as I argue, setting up two
opposing enticements (I try to avoid using the term forces only because this
term seems to be based in 19th century science and I’m not sure whether this
might be misleading because forces by definition “act upon” objects and this
could confuse our conception). But man lost something through the fall. I’m
not sure whether we should articulate this as the ability to act or freedom to
act. Later, Aaron touches on this when he tells Lamoni’s father: “And since
man had fallen he could not merit anything of himself; but the sufferings and
death of Christ atone for their sins, through faith and repentance, and so
forth.” (Aaron in Alma 22:14). But when we speak of things after the fall, the
freedom to act for oneself came through redemption.
(Here, however, I think we need to be careful when understanding the term
redemption because the Book of Mormon uses redemption in several ways,
redemption from death, redemption from sin, and here, I sense, redemption
of freedom to choose, or something like that).
But I think you are right that we could read Samuel’s words in the following
way:
[F]or behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold,
God hath given unto you a knowledge [of the plan of redemption] and he
hath made you free [by redeeming man from the fall].
In this way, knowledge need not be understood as knowledge of good and
eviloriginating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, but knowledge of
the plan of redemption.
I think this reading is further supported by Samuel’s words in chapter 15:
185
And behold, ye do know of yourselves, for ye have witnessed it, that as many
of them as are brought to the knowledge of the truth, and to know of the
wicked and abominable traditions of their fathers, and are led to believe the
holy scriptures, yea, the prophecies of the holy prophets, which are written,
which leadeth them to faith on the Lord, and unto repentance, which faith and
repentance bringeth a change of heart unto them—Therefore, as many as
have come to this, ye know of yourselves are firm and steadfast in the faith,
and in the thing wherewith they have been made free. (Samuel, in Helaman
15:7-8).
This is an important distinction I need to think about. In a sense, the
knowledge is still has redemptive qualities. As if God has redeemed man from
the fall andbecome free forever, even those who are ignorant of the plan
(remember Jacob’s concern about those who do not have the law in 2 Ne.
9:25 and how they are stillredeemed). But without knowledge of the plan of
redemption (and the conditions of repentance), somehow man is
not free. Does that make sense?
As for Alma 42, I think it is clear this has to be related to 2 Ne. 2; the
connections are too numerous. I do think, however, that Alma elaborates on
the law in subtle ways that Lehi does not. For example, Alma asks if there
were no law would men be afraid to murder or sin. (Alma 42:19-20). This, to
me, is more of a deterrence theory of law, which I do not see Lehi utilizing
focusing on or making explicit.
REPLY
5.
joespencersaid:
March 12, 2013 at 2:13 pm
Great discussion, Rico and John. I’m wrestling with what I might add. Perhaps
just a couple of points that haven’t really been mentioned that may (or may
not) shape the way we read the relevant texts in 2 Nephi 2.
First, I think it’s worth noticing that there are some difficulties about the word
“entice.” In the KJV rendering of the OT, the word is univocally negative,
always referring to seduction into some kind of evil. It’s perhaps a little more
ambiguous in its infrequent NT instances, but there’s good reason to suspect
the same. The 1828 Webster’s concurs, giving the possibility of a “good”
interpretation of the word only as a last definition. The Book of Mormon,
however, is interesting. Mosiah 3:19 and Moroni 7:13 use “entice” to refer to
good things—the enticings of the Holy Spirit, and God’s enticing us to do
good. But even in the case of the Book of Mormon, every other instance is
unequivocally bad. How does all that bear on 2 Nephi 2:16?
Perhaps relevant here is the obvious logical continuity in 2 Nephi 2 between
verse 16′s reference to enticement and what is recounted in verses 17-18:
Eve and Adam had to be enticed by the one or the other; enter the devil. As
Lehi tells the story, Eve and Adam were enticed only by the “bad” option.
186
Although “enticed by the one or the other” sounds ambiguous, the way it
cashes out is less ambiguous.
It’s also important to ask, I think, about exactly what’s implied by the two
“wherefore’s” of verse 16. There isn’t an obvious interpretation of the first
one, of how it’s functioning. It’d feel more natural to have something like
“Now” there. There also isn’t an obvious interpretation of the second one, of
how it’s functioning. It’d feel more natural to have something like “But” there.
The connections here are vague, and that makes it difficult to know how to
move forward with verse 16, I think.
This phrase “for himself” deserves attention, even independently of the verb
“to act,” it seems to me. When the phrase is used in the way it is here, it
seems to mean something like “as one’s own representative.” If one “answers
for herself,” or if one “thinks for herself,” or if one “acts for herself,” it is
because one serves as one’s own double, both as oneself and as one’s
representative. In being “for oneself,” there’s a kind of division of the self, the
development of a kind of self-reflexivity even. One acts as one’s own steward
or agent, commissioned to represent oneself appropriately. (I’m thinking, in a
certain way, of Romans 7, Paul’s impassioned aside about the split self—as
well as of 2 Nephi 4, the Book of Mormon parallel to this text.) Might it be
that what God aims to do is less to establish some kind of free will—whatever
that might mean—than to split the subjectivity of humankind?
If that last comment isn’t entirely misguided, we might play with the
possibility that the second half of verse 16 is tying the question of enticement
to the splitting of the subject, no? How can the kind of doubling necessary to
self-representation—necessary to agency, strictly speaking—be accomplished?
Perhaps only by seduction. (If my talk of splitting the subject has rather
obvious roots in Freud, I suppose you could say that I’m now playing with a
parallel “seduction theory,” of a sort.) Is the point that forbiddenness isn’t
enough in and of itself to get from implicit ontological inconsistency to explicit
existential and ethical oppositions unless it’s coupled with some kind
of subjective investment, some kind of desire. The law that forbids establishes
only half of what’s necessary to split the subject; it has to be doubled by the
allurement necessary for the birth of desire. (In Freudian terms: condensation
has to be coupled with displacement; in Lacanian terms: metaphor has to be
coupled with metonymy. Okay, my apologies for this parenthetical!)
Finally, I think it’s well worth considering whether verse 16′s “act for himself”
shouldn’t be understood to be intentionally distinct from verse 26′s “act for
themselves” precisely because the latter is uniquely coupled with “not to be
acted upon.” I’m inclined to see in verse 16 God’s attempt to produce, as a
kind of first step, the possibility of human beings acting for themselves while
nonetheless being acted upon. It’s only with the full fruition of this first
possibility—ejection from the garden, etc.—that God intervenes the second
time through the messianic gesture, which allows acting for itself to be, in the
187
end, uncoupled from being acted upon. The fall, we might say, is meant to
induce a split in the subject, but that split remains debilitating. The
atonement, then, comes along to heal the wound of that split, but not by
ridding us of our doubled nature; instead, the atonement leaves the split in
place while de-traumatizing the relationship between the two “parts” of the
subject.
Well, that got a bit more interpretive in the end than I expected. I have
something to contribute after all!
REPLY
o
ricosaid:
March 13, 2013 at 1:31 am
Joe, thanks for digging deeper into the term “entice” (I’ve added
these important references to the Textual Influences section).
I’ve had many of the same questions you raise here. Is “to
entice” positive or negative? Although we do have Mosiah 3:19
“the enticingsof the Holy Spirit” as positive (and I see this to be
connected to verse 28 “choose eternal life according to the will
of his Holy Spirit”), I think you are right that overwhelmingly, it
is used in a negative sense as in Jacob’s “remember the
awfulness in transgressing against that Holy God, and also the
awfulness of yielding to the enticings of that cunning one” (2 Ne.
9:39). In terms of 2 Ne. 2:16, however, to be enticed as such
seems neither positive nor negative since Lehi is stressing that
one must be enticed “by the one or the other” so that one could
“act for oneself.” I find it interesting and significant that Moroni
7:13 adds “invite and entice” as if to temper the negative
connotation of entice with the more positive invite.
Your interpretation of “Wherefore” in verse 16 is intriguing:
“Now, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for
himself. But, man could not act for himself save it should be that
he were enticed by the one or the other.”
Under this interpretation, God “setting up” the forbidden tree
and the tree of life by itself is not sufficient. Adam and Eve need
to be enticed one way or the other? The flow of the sermon then
moves to the devil. So, the logic is there that the forbidden fruit
isn’t doing the enticing but rather the devil. But, as you point
out, there is an omission in Lehi’s narrative because we never
get a corresponding paragraph discussing the being who is
enticing them to, supposedly, partake of the fruit of the tree of
life. What are we to make of that omission? I wonder if this is
deliberate or strategic, what would happen if this wasn’t an
omission?
188
In terms of “act for himself” to mean agent. Should we look at
the language D&C 29 here? Again, this will depend on our
thoughts about the relationship between the Book of Mormon
and subsequent revelation. However, I find it interesting that
D&C 29 repopulates the phrase “act for himself” with the phrase
“agent unto himself”:
Behold I give <gave> unto him that he should be an agent unto
himself . . . it came to pass Must needs be that the Devil should
tempt the children of men or they could not be agents
unto themselves for if they never should have bitter they could
not k[n]ow the Sweet Wherefore it came to pass that the Devil
tempted Adam & he partook of the forbiden fruit & transgressed
the commandment wherein he became subject to the will of the
Devil Because he yielded unto temptation (September 1830).
You write:
I’m inclined to see in verse 16 God’s attempt to produce, as a
kind of first step, the possibility of human beings acting for
themselveswhile nonetheless being acted upon.
This is very interesting. I’m wondering (either along with you,
or perhaps in a different direction but at least prompted by your
statement) whether we should see “to be enticed” as a kind of
“to be acted upon”? There is this “yielding” language that the
Book of Mormon keeps repeating: whether yielding to the
enticings of the Holy Spirit, or yielding to the enticings of the
cunning one. Should we simply just understand this as
being acted upon by the Holy Spirit or beingacted upon by the
devil? How else should we understand “to yield” other than to
mean “to allow yourself to be acted upon”?
Augustine, in De Correptione et Gratia wrote:
But let them rather understand that if they are the children of
God, they are led by the Spirit of God to do that which should be
done; and when they have done it, let them give thanks to Him
by whom they act. For they are acted upon that they may act,
not that they may themselves do nothing [aguntur enim ut
agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant]; and in addition to this, it is shown
them what they ought to do, so that when they have done it as
it ought to be done— that is, with the love and the delight of
righteousness— they may rejoice in having received “the
sweetness which the Lord has given, that their land should yield
her increase.” But when they do not act, whether by not doing at
all or by not doing from love, let them pray that what as yet
they have not, they may receive. For what shall they have which
189
they shall not receive? Or what have they which they have not
received? (italics added).
Obviously, there are issues related to free will and grace here,
and it might be coincidentally that this particular English
translation uses the phrase “acted upon” because certainly other
translations state it differently. Still, it’s interesting to entertain
the idea that we must be acted upon or else we cannot
act. King Benjamin alludes to something similar, perhaps in a
slightly different context, when he says: “I say unto you that if
ye should serve him who has created you from the beginning,
and is preserving you from day to day, by lending you breath,
that ye may live and move and do according to your own will. . .
” (Mosiah 2:21). Or to put it differently, we can’t even move
according to our own will unless God takes some action upon us.
REPLY
6.
jennywebbsaid:
March 12, 2013 at 2:23 pm
Rico, this was very productive—thanks for jumping in here. I found your lines
of questioning especially useful, so I’m going to start there with a few
questions and responses.
1) “Why are we comparing fruits with trees?” I, like Joe mentioned, paused
and realized that I’d been unthinkingly teaching this situation as opposition
between two trees. When you pointed out the actual nature of this
comparison, it made me pause.
I wonder if it’s useful to see think about this question in terms of seeds. That
is, both the tree and the fruit provide (distinct) ways of accessing/producing
seeds.
For the tree, seeds are created from the tree itself. It grows them. It
produces them. It creates them.
For the fruit, seeds are accessed through the consumption of the fruit and the
resulting exposure of the seeds. The fruit hides seeds; seeds result through
the removal of the flesh of the fruit.
Thus, Lehi appears to be setting a distinction between internal and external
ways of producing seeds. (Behind this analysis I’m drawing on an
understanding of “seeds” deriving from Alma 32, where the point of planting
the seed is to grow the tree of life within oneself so that fruit is produced and
can be consumed, thereby exposing seeds that can then be shared with and
planted by others.)
I have more responses, but I need to run to PT right now. Still, better to get
something up than nothing, right? :)
REPLY
7.
jennywebbsaid:
190
March 12, 2013 at 7:22 pm
Ok, I’m back.
2) Lehi’s use of “act for himself.” As you point out, we often (perhaps
always?) read this in terms of free will / agency, especially given the contexts
of choice and enticement implicit in the final sentence: “man could not act for
himself save it should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.”
In the spirit of experimentation, I read the phrase “act for himself” in terms of
self interest rather than will. Doing this, “act for himself” is thus understood
as acting for one’s own self, in one’s self interest, i.e., selfishly.
Reading verse 16 in this new light: “Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man
that he should act for himself [instead of others]. Wherefore, man could not
act for himself [i.e., could not put his self-interest first] save it should be that
he were enticed by the one or the other.” In other words, man could not be
selfish unless he first was enticed—unless his desires were drawn out such
that he was able to claim in his selfishness his desire for one object over the
other.
To me, this interpretation highlights another interesting opposition: the
opposition between man (self-interested / internally oriented) and God
(other-interested / externally oriented). The whole of the atonement pivots
around this tension: Christ puts off the natural man (self-interest) in order to
be the Son of God (other-interested) in order to go through his life and the
atonement.
REPLY
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
March 13, 2013 at 1:34 pm
I love how you are “experimenting” with possible meanings.
Searching Google Books for the phrase “act for himself” brought
up some interesting results, some of which approximate the idea
of acting in one’s self interest:
“I, therefore, think the true ground is that the agent, being a
person appointed when the principal could act for himself to act
for him, when the principal, according to law, cannot act for
himself” (American Law Register, 1880)
From a case in 1830: “He is not the officer or agent of the
corporation, but is understood to act for himself as entirely as a
tavern-keeper, or any other person who may carry on any
business.”
I suppose that these usages could also be couched in terms of
free will, but I think there is something to do the idea of “act for
one’s own self.” That’s an interesting idea to keep exploring.
REPLY
ricosaid:

191
March 18, 2013 at 2:48 am
John, these are cases in agency law, where the
agent acts on behalf of the principal, but only as
authorized by the principal. Strictly speaking, only
the principal can “act for himself.” Agents can
never act for themselves. An agent can only act as
directed by the principal. Therefore, in order to
clarify that a person is not an agent, meaning that
the person is a principal, we must use the language
“act for himself.” Now, in agency law these actions
are not colored by moral implication. In other
words, we would not say that the principal is by
definition “selfish” and the agent is by definition
“selfless.”
This also seems to be the case in religious sermons
where God, it is said, acts for himself.
Does not God make all things for himself? Does he
not always act for himself? Is he not always his
own End? Has not this the Evidence of a First
Principle, That God acts only for himself? We must
therefore of necessity conclude, That as God is the
Author of this Motion, so he is the Natural End and
Term of it too; and that he moves us to Good no
otherwise, than by moving us towards himself. We
must conclude, that God is the true great Magnet of
our Souls; that he continually draws and moves
them, not from, but to himself, as being both their,
and his own great End. (John Norris, 1707).
Whence it will follow, that as GOD must therefore
be his own End, and whatever he wills or acts he
must will and act for himself (as I have already
represented it in the Discourse of Divine Love) so
also that the Love which is in us must be the Effect
of that very Love which GOD has for himself, there
being no other Principle in the Nature of GOD
whereby he is supposed to act. (Mary Astell, 1705).
8.
jennywebbsaid:
March 12, 2013 at 7:31 pm
Last one.
3) Regarding the opposition between sweet and bitter: I think it’s significant
somehow in this discussion that Lehi uses “sweet” and “bitter” rather than
ethical or moral adjectives, or inevitably universal experiences (i.e., life and
death).
192
Sweet and bitter are adjectivally subjective. They must be experienced by a
body and understood in terms of one’s unique judgment or assessment of
those experiences. Sweet and bitter contextualize a situation in terms of
possibility, in terms of subjective experience.
In using these adjectives, Lehi not only posits the necessity of opposition, but
the necessity of individual, embodied experience with those opposites.
REPLY
o
ricosaid:
March 13, 2013 at 1:36 am
Jenny, I really appreciate these points.
1. This is an interesting way to look at the issue. Are you
suggesting we could see the difference to be that tree of
knowledge of good and evil is producing seeds via fruit, but the
tree of life is producing seeds without fruit? I don’t know why
but that makes it sound like producing seeds through fruit is
much better. Are you suggesting that perhaps the fruit has an
allusion to flesh? As I mentioned to Joe, the phrase “fruit of the
tree of life” (or in some cases a clear reference to the fact that
the tree of life bears fruit) is, in fact, employed by the Book of
Mormon text several times (1 Nephi 15:36; Alma 5:34, 62; Alma
12:21, 23; Alma 32:40; Alma 42:3). Does that change
anything? However, at least we can say that Lehi chooses not to
emphasize the fruit of the tree of life in his sermon.
2. This reminds me of something Sheila pointed out in one of
her SMPT presentations. Alma 42:7 “And now, ye see by this
that our first parents were cut off both temporally and spiritually
from the presence of the Lord; and thus we see they
became subjects to follow after their own will.” Here, Sheila
pointed out that the Book of Mormon doesn’t portray this as
anything positive but actually as something quiet negative. So,
for example, while Joe’s reading above is that “act for oneself”
could be understood as “act as an agent for oneself” your
reading is “act for oneself” could be understood as “to act in
one’s self-interest” where self-interest would be negative as in
selfish? Is that accurate?
3. I tend to agree with you that “Sweet and bitter are
adjectivally subjective.” On the other hand, I’m somewhat
struck by how the Book of Mormon seems to use these terms to
as something that is anything but subjective but rather that is
very clear.
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Wo unto them that call evil good, and good evil, that put
darkness for light, and light for darkness, that put bitter for
sweet, and sweet for bitter! ( 2 Nephi 15:20; Isaiah 5:20).
Yea, I say unto you, my son, that there could be nothing so
exquisite and so bitter as were my pains. Yea, and again I say
unto you, my son, that on the other hand, there can be nothing
so exquisite and sweet as was my joy. (Alma 36:21).
In exploring your idea about associating flavor with experience,
I’m contemplating the terms “know” and “knew.” I’m wondering
if those imply experience? The 1828 edition of Webster’s
under know contains this sentence: “We know what we see with
our eyes, or perceive by other senses.” I still need to think on
these issues.
REPLY
2 Nephi 2:19–21
19
TuesdayMAR 2013
POSTED
BY RICO IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 5 COMMENTS
The Text: 2 Nephi 2:19-21
And after Adam and Eve had partaken of the forbidden fruit, they were driven out from[i]
19
the garden of Eden to till the earth. 20And they have brought forth children—yea, even the
family of all the earth. 21And the days of the children of men were prolonged according to
the will of God, that they might repent while in the flesh. Wherefore, their state became a
state of probation, and their time was lengthened, according to the commandments which
the Lord God gave unto the children of men—for he gave commandment[ii] that all men
must repent, for he showed unto all men that they were lost because of the transgression of
their parents.
Textual Variants
There are only two variants in this week’s reading. See Analysis of Textual Variants of the
Book of Mormon, Part 1 (2004), 504-506. A brief summary of his conclusions:
[i] The change from “out from” to “out of” appeared first in 1837. While “out from” may be
awkward for modern readers, restore “out from” as it is consistent with the KJV’s usage of
the preposition from (See Genesis 3:23) as well as the several usages of “out from” in the
Book of Mormon (2 Ne. 9:9; 25; 4; 30:4; Jacob 7:26; Omni 1:15; 3 Ne. 7:22).
[ii] This plural “commandments” only appears in the 1888 LDS large-print edition. The
194
construction “to give commandment” in the singular occurs in the KJV (for example, Exodus
36:6) and the Book of Mormon (1 Ne. 6:6; 2 Ne. 3:7; 4:6).
Textual Influence
Driven out/drove out (2 Ne. 2:19; Alma 42:2; Genesis 3:24).
Skousen points out, in the original manuscript, that Alma 42:2 reads “he drove out the
man.” This was changed to “he drew out the man” in the printer’s manuscript and 1830
edition. See The Book of Mormon: The Earliest Text(Yale, 2009), 424, 770. Skousen notes
that drove out seems to be based in Genesis 3:24. The textual relationship between 2 Ne.
2:19 and Alma 42:2, becomes stronger when taking into account the language from the
original manuscript.
The Hebrew behind “drove out” in Genesis 3:24 is garash (Strong’s 1644). Garash has
been translated as drive out, drive away, cast up out, expel, divorce, dispossess, thrust
out. Incidentally, the language of man being “cast out” from the Garden of Eden, does not
appear in the KJV (you can find it in the heading to Chapter 3 in the LDS Edition of the KJV
Bible). In addition, this language is found in D&C 29:10 (1830).
Till the Earth/Ground. Genesis 2:5; Moses 3:5 and Genesis 3:23; Moses 4:29.
Mankind as lost and fallen. 1 Ne. 10:6; 2 Ne. 25:17; Mosiah 16:14; Alma 9:30, 32; Alma
12:22; Alma 34:9; Alma 42:6.
Mankind as fallen (without lost). Mosiah 4:5; 27:25; 16:5; 3:16; 3:19; Moroni 7:24.
“Fallen state.” 1 Nephi 10:6; 2 Nephi 25:17; Mosiah 4:5; 16:4-5; 27:25; Alma 42:12.
State of Probation/Probationary State/Probationary Time/Days of
Probation/Preparatory
This phrase does not appear in the Bible. The English description of mortal life being a
probation appears in the 17th and 18th centuries.
“The Situation of Man in his Life, with Respect to Salvation, is a mere State of
Probation.” (John Roche of Dublin, 1641).
“Q. When Shall this general Judgment be? A. At the End of the World. When the State of our
Trial and Probation shall be finished, it will be a proper Season for the Distribution of public
Justice, for the rewarding all those with eternal Life.” (Robert Nelson, Companion for the
Festivals and Fasts of the Church of England, with Collects and Prayers for each
Solemnity, 1704).
195
“The Time, indeed, may be long before the final Reckoning may commence, but the Time
allotted us to prepare for it is bounded by the short Space of a human Life. The Night of
Death comes when no Man can work; and though many Ages may pass between that Event
and the Resurrection to Judgment, yet when we leave this World, the Days of Probation
expire, the Account is then sealed up, neither is it in our Power, by any Application, to alter
one Article of it. To day, therefore, while it is called to day, let us address our selves to the
Work of our Lord; to correct our Errors, and finish what is yet imperfect, that we may obtain
his Approbation, and make our Calling and Election sure.” (John Rogers, 1736).
Days Prolonged and Time Lengthened
With the preliminaries out of the way, let’s move to some analysis.
And the days of the children of men were prolonged according to the will of God, that they
might repent while in the flesh. . . and their time waslengthened.
Several interesting ideas appear in this portion of the text. First, something is prolonged or
lengthened from an relatively shorter status. It would make sense to understand
that something to be the lifespan of Adam and Eve. The logic would go something like this:
God had stated that “in the day that you eat thereof you shall surely die.” (Genesis
2:17). Adam and Eve ate the fruit and therefore they should have died that day in
accordance with God’s decree. However, this did not occur. God decided to lengthen their
days to allow them be obedient to his commandment to repent.
Another way to look at this narrative is to view Lehi as “reconciling” a discrepancy in the
Genesis story.
That is, despite God’s decree that Adam would die the same day he eats the
fruit (Genesis 2:17), Adam continues to live 930 years (we have no record of the length of
Eve’s days).
If this is a kind of solution, it may be useful to compare Lehi’s solution with the exegetical
solutions as found within the Christian tradition.
James Kugel explains that ancient readers were troubled by God’s statement that Adam
would die on the day he ate the fruit, and yet Adam did not die until he is 930 years old. At
some point, Kugel argues, someone connected this notion with Psalms 90:4 and saw that
this could be resolved by arguing that one day was a thousand years and therefore God’s
statement is true, after all (930 days just shy of 1000). Kugel cites Jubilees 4:29-30 and
Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 81:3 as examples of exegetes who use the day as a
thousand years solution. Kugel also points out some problems with this exegetical
solution. If God’s decree of death is intended as a punishment, it is hardly seems to
196
function as punishment to say to Adam that if you eat this fruit, you will die within 1000
years.
Interestingly, Kugel surveys other solutions, such as interpreting “you shall surely die” to
mean “you shall become mortal.” Therefore, the punishment ismortality. This, however,
raised the question as to why not just Adam and Eve, but all men were now mortal.
How does this compare with Lehi? Lehi doesn’t use the day as a thousand years
solution. Lehi argues that despite God’s initial decree is that man would die on the very day
he ate the fruit, God prolonged the days of men according to his will in order that man
might repent while in the flesh. (The idea ofprolonging their days seems to suggest Lehi
accepted that God decreed that Adam and Eve should have died earlier than they did). God
commands men to repent and therefore in order to repent they must be alive, and in order
to be alive, God must rescind his decree that Adam would die the day he ate of the fruit.
Lehi’s solution has merit in that it solves the question of why God didn’t cause Adam to die
on the day he ate the fruit as he decreed previously. The answer, according to Lehi, is that
God prolonged his life in order to be able to do something that God also commanded.
Is this a consistent approach in the Book of Mormon? When Alma retells the Garden of
Eden account, he does something interesting. He omits the “in the day” portion of Genesis
2:17.
And now behold, I say unto you that if it had been possible for Adam to have partaken of
the fruit of the tree of life at that time, there would have been no death, and the word
would have been void, making God a liar, for he said: If thou eat thou shalt surely die.
(Alma 12:23).
But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it:for in the day that
thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. (Genesis 2:17, emphasis added).
It would seem then that at least Alma interprets God’s punishment or decree (God’s word)
to mean mortality, rather than immediate death. This seems to follow the second
exegetical solution mentioned by Kugel, namely, that God’s punishment is
mortality. However, this approach raises the question of why everyone else other than
Adam has suffered this exact same fate. Why do the children of men suffer the punishment
(i.e. mortality) of Adam and Eve?
prolonged.
In fact, Lehi doesn’t say that Adam and Eve’s days were
He states the days of the children of men were prolonged.
Korihor’s Critique
Prolonging the days of Adam makes sense because Adam has sins for which heneeds to
repent. However, Lehi states that God would prolong the days of all the children of
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men. What is the rationale for prolonging the days of all the children of men? Lehi argues
that “all men” must repent because all men arelost because of the transgression of their
parents. Man must repent because of the transgression of their parents. This was the very
argument that bothered Korihor:
Ye say that this people is a guilty and a fallen people, because of thetransgression of
a parent. Behold, I say that a child is not guilty because of its parents. (Korihor in Alma
30:25).
[F]or he showed unto all men that they were lost because of thetransgression of
their parents. (Lehi in 2 Ne. 2:21b).
Rather than dismiss Korihor’s statement to Giddonah as either an exaggeration or deliberate
caricature of Nephite doctrine, I would like to take his allegation seriously. Perhaps it
provides an accurate description of Nephite theology, or at least preserves the implications
of Lehi’s teachings. An examination of the textual material shows that the Nephites do, in
fact, argue that the people are a “fallen people” and in a “fallen state” because of the
“transgression of Adam” or their first “parents.” However, the Nephites never use “guilty”
or “guilt” in connection with the fall (although Moses 6:54 contains the phrase “original
guilt”). Is it wrong for Korihor to associate “lost and fallen” with “guilty”? Is Korihor merely
asserting that “a child is not fallen because of its parents“? Is Korihor foreshadowing
Ezekiel 18?
At the risk of belaboring the point, not only must Adam repent but also all his children must
repent. Is Lehi providing an original sin argument for repentance? We can agree that
Adam and Eve ate of the forbidden fruit and therefore this caused them to be driven from
Eden and to become mortal or fallen. But if this was their punishment, but why does it
extend to all the children of men? Why do all the children of men suffer this
punishment? And if the answer is that this is not a punishment at all, but this is mercy that
allows men to repent and be judged, then why do the children suffer “fallenness” because of
the transgression of the parents? How does the Book of Mormon answer these questions?
(Alma 12:21-37 and Alma 42).
Lehi as Adam
One last idea that isn’t limited to this passage. Is Lehi assuming the role of Adam? Adam
was driven from the Garden of Eden and brings forth children. Lehi driven from Jerusalem,
brought forth children. Is there a deliberate parallel that Lehi is crafting?
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1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:19–21”
John Hilton IIIsaid:
March 21, 2013 at 1:46 pm
Rico – This is a very interesting post. I like your suggestion of trying to take
seriously Korihor’s question. One can see how it would arise given Alma’s
teaching that “Now we see that Adam did fall by the partaking of the
forbidden fruit, according to the word of God; and thus we see, that by his
fall, all mankindbecame a lost and fallen people” (Alma 12:22).
It seems clear that Book of Mormon peoples (and us today) believe that all of
us are subject to the effects of the Fall. Alma plainly states, “By his [Adam’s]
fall all mankind became a lost and fallen people.” So while we are not directly
punished for Adam’s transgression, in a sense we do suffer for it because we
inherit a fallen state. You point to Alma 42 at the end of your post where
Alma says, “The fall had brought upon all mankind a spiritual death as well as
a temporal” (Alma 42:9) and “Thus we see that all mankind were fallen, and
they were in the grasp of justice; yea, the justice of God, which consigned
them forever to be cut off from his presence” (Alma 42:14).
It’s interesting that this is a theme of sorts throughout the Book of Mormon –
that all men suffer the effects of the Fall. For example:
Nephi says (referring to Lehi’s teachings) “All mankind were in a lost and in a
fallen state” (1 Nephi 10:6).
Abinadi speaks of “That old serpent that did beguile our first parents, which
was the cause of their fall; which was the cause of all mankind becoming
carnal, sensual, devilish, knowing evil from good, subjecting themselves to
the devil. Thus all mankind were lost” (Mosiah 16:3–4).
Finally, Samuel the Lamanite points all that “All mankind, by the fall of Adam
being cut off from the presence of the Lord, are considered as dead, both as
to things temporal and to things spiritual” (Helaman 14:16).
This doesn’t get us any closer to effectively answering Korihor’s question, but
hopefully it fleshes out the idea that this is a consistent teaching throughout
the Book of Mormon.
REPLY
2.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
March 21, 2013 at 1:52 pm
Just a couple of extra notes on textual connections between 2 Nephi 2 and
Alma 42. Lehi twice focuses on the idea of the days being prolonged, saying,
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“And the days of the children of men were prolonged according to the will of
God, that they might repent while in the flesh…and their time was
lengthened, according to the commandments which the Lord God gave unto
the children of men—for he gave commandment that all men must repent.”
Alma similarly talks about the increase in time being specifically to allow for
repentance: “There was a time granted unto man to repent, yea, a
probationary time, a time to repent and serve God” (Alma 42:4).
Both Lehi and Alma share an interesting way of employing the word “state”:
“Wherefore, their state became a state of probation” (2 Nephi 2:21) and “this
probationary state became a state for them to prepare; it became a
preparatory state” (Alma 42:10). This
article:http://maxwellinstitute.byu.edu/publications/jbms/?vol=5&num=1&id
=116 has some interesting insights on the use of the word “state” in the Book
of Mormon.
REPLY
3.
ricosaid:
March 21, 2013 at 6:40 pm
John, thanks for the link. Allred’s paper seems to be focused more on finding
evidence of multiple authorship in the Book of Mormon, but not so much
aimed at exploring the meaning or usages of “state” in the Book of Mormon.
For my part, this language seems to be quite common in 19th century
Christian sermons. Besides “state of probation” Christian writings speak of a
multiplicity of states:
“Of all views under which human life has ever been considered, the most
reasonable in my judgment is that which regards it as a state of probation. …
Now we assert the most probable supposition to be, that it is a state of moral
probation; and that many things in it suit with this hypothesis, which suit with
no other. It is not a state of unmixed happiness, or of happiness simply; it is
not a state of designed misery, or of misery simply; it is not a state of
retribution; it is not a state of punishment. It suits with none of these
suppositions. It accords much better with the idea of its being a condition
calculated for the production, exercise, and improvement of moral qualities,
with a view to a future state in which these qualities, after being so produced,
exercised, and improved, may, by a new and more favouring constitution of
things, receive their reward, or become their own.” (Thomas Burnet, The
Sacred Theory of the Earth, 1816, emphasis added).
So, here we get state of probation in the context of an alternative to these
other possible states.
“We say, we find no Place of Torment for good Men after this Life, nor any
ease for the Wicked, either in Scripture or ancient Fathers, but as the Tree
falls, so it lies, the State of Probation being in this World only, the true
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Purgatory only here, as the other World the State of Retribution, of eternal
Punishment or Reward.” (John Dunton, ed., The Athenian Oracle, 1703).
“The sufferings of men prove the present life to be a state of Discipline, and
Discipline infers Probation; for men are proved by the exercise of patience
and every other virtue; and a state of Probation necessarily infers a future
state of Retribution.” (Gregory Sharpe, A Second Argument in Defense of
Christianity, 1762).
In the following passage we see that the Universalists took the position that
this life was a state of retribution and not probation:
“The subject to which your attention is directed is embraced in the following
question—”Is the present state of being one of probation or retribution? While
the majority of professing christians assume the former position as true,
Universalists contend for the latter. A calm discussion of this important
question cannot fail of interesting us, and the more especially as it has lately
been agitated, and the position against which we contend, advocated with
much earnestness and zeal. … The terms probation and retribution have been
thus defined—probation is a state of trial in which man unfolds his moral
character.— Retribution is a state in which moral beings are treated according
to their deserts, we have no particular objections to these definitions we shall
therefore let them stand thus, and see whether this life is not one of
retribution . . . . We now submit this question to your candor. was not this
state of being in the instance of Adam retributive? Endeavor to weigh this
matter fairly. If it was not in a state of retribution why should he have
suffered the consequences of his transgression? Why not have continued him
in the garden of Eden, flourishing like the green Bay tree and not an indefinite
period cut him off and then sent him straightway to hell? But how different
was the procedure. No sooner did he transgress, than he become the
conscious victim of remorse and the penalty of his transgression was
suffered in the earth. (Clement Fall LeFevre, The Gospel Anchor, 1832).
REPLY
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
April 23, 2013 at 5:44 pm
The germane part of the article I referred to is this: “All but two
of the eleven writers who used state did so infrequently and
sporadically. In contrast, the recorded writings of Alma, and in
one case, Lehi, contain passages that display unusual
concentrations of the word state. For example, Lehi uses the
word four times in three verses when describing Adam and Eve’s
paradisiacal existence in 2 Nephi 2:21–23.” The point being that
although the word “state” is used by 11 individuals, it is only
Lehi and Alma that use it in a consistent, coherent way.
REPLY
201
4.
joespencersaid:
March 23, 2013 at 1:07 pm
Hey all,
I just wanted to check in and say thanks for all this. I haven’t really come up
with anything to say in response, but I wanted to say that I appreciate the
post and the comments.
2 Nephi 2:22-24
25
MondayMAR 2013
POSTED
BY DEIDRE329 IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 13 COMMENTS
Dates: March 25 – 30
2 Nephi 2: 22-25
22And now, behold, if Adam had not transgressed, he would not have fallen, but he would
have remained in the garden of Eden, and all things which were created must have
remained in the same state which they were after they were created, and they must have
remained forever and had no end. 23And they would have had no children. Wherefore they
would have remained in a state of innocence—having no joy, for they knew no misery;
doing no good, for they knew no sin. 24But behold, all things have been done in the wisdom
of him who knoweth all things. 25Adam fell that men might be, and men are that they
might have joy.
This passage has always struck me theologically for its deterministic leanings. I have never
been sure how widely to apply verse 24—what do we mean by “all things”? This comes back
to Joe’s discussion of verses 11 ff, how far do we carry the opposition in all things? In verse
24, do we apply the phrase “all things” to the situation of Adam and Eve in the Garden and
the felicitous Fall, or do we apply it in a Hegelian sense, to the totality of world history in a
theodical way?
Bracketing that question, I want to think about the opposition and the Fall and rise of Adam,
the Fall and resultant joy of Adam in terms of Victor Turner’s anthropological theory of
social advancement through the ritual process known as structure/anti-structure.
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Victor Turner posits that social life is a “dialectical process that involves successive
experience of high and low, communitas and structure, homogeneity and differentiation,
equality and inequality” (The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell, 1977), 97). Turner states that liminality in cultural rites is what characterizes
“rituals of status elevation,” in which the ritual subject is transferred irreversibly from a
lower to a higher position in an institutionalized system of hierarchical positions. (Turner,
167). The imagery of a naked Adam in the prelapsarian Garden clothing is analogous to
neophytes, or “liminal entities,” which may go naked to symbolize that they have “no
status, property… [or] position in a kinship system” (Turner, 95). Turner describes the
behavior of neophytes as “normally passive or humble; they must obey their instructors
implicitly, and accept arbitrary punishment without complaint” (Turner, 95).
Turner elucidates why this humiliation and abuse gives dynamic thrust to a new relation:
the subjugation of the one being initiated into a new social status is part of a process of
being “ground down…to be fashioned anew and endowed with additional powers to enable
them to cope with their new station in life” (Turner, 95). Under this lens, Adam’s new
relationship to God and status of joy after the fall as a reliant on his abasement, rather than
a mere manifestation of grace. Adam and Eve must be abased and reduced to nothing
before they can be exalted.
As all social relations are dynamic and dialectic, there must be a shift in the position of the
one in the dominant role as well as the one in the subordinate role. In liminality, according
to Turner, “the underling comes uppermost” and the authority is humbled, almost as a slave
(Turner, 102). In the ritual process, the subordinate is elevated while the superior is made
weaker (Turner, 168). As Turner observes, liminality “implies that the high could not be
high unless the low existed, and he who is high must experience what it is like to be low”
(Turner, 97).
Turner asseverates that religious institutions mimic this ritual process and that, though
debasement is not the final goal of these groups, it is an essential liminal phase through
which individuals must pass to reach a state (Turner, 94). Turner justifies the humiliation
those preparing for rites of passage endure on the grounds that while they are “often of a
grossly physiological character” which dually serves to “represent partly a destruction of the
previous status and partly a tempering of their essence” so that they can be prepared to
deal with the responsibilities of their new social status and to “restrain them in advance
from abusing their new privileges. They have to be shown that in themselves they are clay
or dust, mere matter, whose form is impressed upon them by society” (Turner, 103). Turner
ultimately concludes that the humiliation of the rite of passage may be intended to humble
203
the neophyte precisely because he will be exalted when the rite is terminated. The
humiliation simultaneously punishes the initiand for “rejoicing in liminal freedom” and
prepares her for a higher office (Turner, 201).
Through the expulsion from the Garden, Adam is simultaneously being punished for the
disloyalty to God inherent in his transgression, the betrayal of his identity as belonging to
God, and is being prepared for a new understanding of identity. The joy and exalted status
of Adam in 2 Nephi 2 follows the Fall and abasement as a necessary, ritual process rather
than incidentally. God does not save or exalt Adam despite his abasement, but because of
it. The anti-structure of liminal chaos that follows the expulsion from the Garden—the loss
of one’s identity and understanding of one’s primary relation—necessarily precedes the
structure of the clearer and more exalted identity that follows. In this light, the
transgression of Adam and Eve proves necessary for new creation.
Humiliation, the Fall, is a necessary part of progression. This brings me to an earlier point
made in response to Joe’s posts on opposition. He wrote about the worldview of Ecclesiastes
that creation is in motion but going nowhere. I responded by citing Doctrine and Covenants
121:33 “How long can rolling waters remain impure? What power shall stay the heavens?”
to argue that creation is in a process of purification and sanctification. What I want to
highlight here is that it seems—again somewhat deterministically—that creation is in this
process even despite itself. That through transgression, progress is made and purification
occurs. I want to connect this idea back to a recent discussion I was privy to about Nephite
and the Jaredite voyages to the promised land. The point is this: Nephi obediently
constructs a ship according to God’s commandment, not after the manner of the world (1
Nephi 18:2), but “after the manner which I shall show thee, that I may carry thy people
across the waters” (1 Nephi 17:8). Now, the passage implies to me that Nephi will construct
the ship and it will be smooth sailing after that—the Lord will carry His people across the
waters. Similarly, the Jaredites construct ships that are “tight like unto a dish” (Ether 2:17)
complete with means for light and air. Again, it seems like they have done what they were
supposed to do to make traversing the ocean to the promised land possible and they will get
their without incident. Of course, we know that this does not prove to be the case. They are,
to borrow the turn of phrase employed by Lucy Mack Smith to describe Emma, “Tossed
about on the ocean of uncertainty.” In both cases the journey proves tumultuous,
unpredictable, and precarious. This brings us to another interesting point—though God is
intimately involved in both cases in the construction of the vessels that will carry each party
to their promised land, in each instance God points to God’s own (at least partial) absence
during the journey and his final reappearance: God covenants with the Jaredites that he will
“meet [them]” and “go before [them] into a land which is choice above all the lands of the
204
earth” (Ether 1:42). Likewise, God tells Lehi that God will be their light and they will know
that God is leading them to the promised land, yet God implies that they will have greater
knowledge of this fact after they have arrived: “After ye have arrived in the promised land,
ye shall know that I the Lord, am God; and that I, the Lord, did deliver you from
destruction; yea, that I did bring you out of the land of Jerusalem” (1 Nephi 17: 13-14).
There is no shortage of opposition as Nephi seeks to construct the ship or when they begin
the journey; Nephi describes that “there arose a great storm, yea, a great and terrible
tempest, and we were driven back upon the waters for three days” (1 Nephi 18:13). What is
especially significant given the context of 2 Nephi 2, the discussion of opposition, and the
idea that transgression and humiliation are necessary for progression and joy, is that these
set backs are the consequence of the sin and rebellion of Nephi’s brothers (v. 15). Both the
Nephites and the Jaredites arrive at their promised land. What I want to point out is that it
is not so much in spite of, but because of the opposition, the sin, the transgression, that
they are able to move—that turbulence is generated and propulsive progress is made.
Opposition, even being stymied by opposition, ultimately generates the necessary energy to
move us forward, to allow impure waters to keep rolling until they become pure and
sanctified. Adam’s progression is only possible through transgression and falling—it is only
through abasement that he can become exalted, only through being stripped by sin that
exiled that he can become clothed with righteousness and inherit a promised land, only
through misery in a fallen world that he can know joy. And God is with him on the journey—
even when God cannot be seen—and God, in God’s wisdom, carries Adam and Eve, and the
whole human family, forward “through this vale of sorrow into a far better land of promise”
(Alma 37:45) in which God reappears: God’s presence and guiding hand throughout the
journey of world history becomes retroactively apparent.
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13
1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:22-24”
joespencersaid:
205
March 27, 2013 at 1:41 pm
Fantastic discussion here, Deidre. I’m still puzzling over some of the details—
it seems to me, for instance, that Turner’s characterization of the ritual
process is complicated in certain ways when applied to the Fall—but I love the
direction all of this goes. It’s certainly a beautiful articulation of the last bit of
verse 23: “having no joy, for they knew no misery; doing no good, for they
knew no sin.”
I’ll do what I can over the next couple days to make time to make a few
comments: (1) about what complications I see the dynamics of the Fall
introducing into Turner’s outline of ritual process; (2) about your brief
comments on “all things,” which I find most intriguing; (3) about the larger
passage from which D&C 121:33 is taken; and (4) about verse 22 and its
possible interpretations (about which Rico will have far more to say than I
will, I suspect!). For the moment, just my thanks and this promissory note!
REPLY
2.
ricosaid:
March 27, 2013 at 6:11 pm
Through the expulsion from the Garden, Adam is simultaneously being
punished for the disloyalty to God inherent in his transgression, the betrayal
of his identity as belonging to God, and is being prepared for a new
understanding of identity.
1) Deidre, I really like how you have articulated the situation here. Whatever
else is going on, there is a punishment inherent in the narrative. In my view,
in the last 100 years, Mormon interpretations have tended to ignore,
downplay, or erase this feature of the text, and by so doing, this disrupts and
does violence to the narrative.
2) I think this passage is often read so that “Adam’s transgression” itself is a
necessary “opposition” that leads to man coming into being. In this way,
verse 22: “they must have remained forever and had no end” performs the
same function as verse 11: “Wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs
remain as dead, having no life, neither death, nor corruption, nor
incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility.” Both
situations connote a negativestate where there is no change. (Or, “and had
no end” could be read as “and had no purpose.”) We should note that
changelessness is as a positive virtue elsewhere in the text (1 Nephi 10:18; 2
Nephi 2:4; 27:23; 29:9; Alma 31:17; 3 Ne. 24:6; Mormon 9:9-10; Moroni
10:19).
Lehi’s reasoning seems to be as follows. In verse 11, Lehi is arguing that
there must be an opposition in all things, or else things could not exist. In
verse 16, after things exist, Lehi argues that there must be opposing
enticements among the things that exist, or else man could not act for
himself. Starting with verse 22, he appears to be arguing that after things
exist and man is able to act for himself, man must “oppose” the
206
commandments of God, or else mankind could not exist and mankind could
not know joy. This chain of reasoning was severely criticized by early critics of
the Book of Mormon (I’m not sure whether I we should discuss verse 25 this
week or next. We grouped it for next week but it seem to conclude Lehi’s
reasoning in verses 22-24).
Is there a way for Turner’s approach to make sense of this? Turner’s model
seems to suggest that through ritual one goes from “total obedience” to
“obedience to superior rank” (106), whereas progress in Lehi’s story requires
Adam to be disobedient. In Adam’s case, he isn’t being asked to accept
arbitrary punishment, or is he? The two examples you suggest for progression
through opposition or movement, the Jaredite and Nephite vessels, are good
examples that do not have the negative side-effect of requiring either the
Jaredites or Nephites to be disobedient in order to progress. In addition, the
opposition seems to come from the cosmos or external world, and not from
man acting as the thing that “opposes” God himself. There is a strange
argument implicit in Lehi that man must “oppose” God to have joy. What are
we to make of that? Is this deliberate on Lehi’s part, or just an unintended
consequence of his theology? Is this a case where Lehi has simply chosen the
wrong Biblical narrative to make his point about progression?
3) “And they would have had no children.” Looking towards other interpreters
within the text of the Book of Mormon for clues as to what Lehi means
provides little help because, as far as I can tell, no one repeats this portion of
Lehi’s discourse. It does not show up in the Nephite theological tradition, it
never gets elaborated, or repeated.
So we might look at other traditions for clues. I’m not aware of any Jewish or
Christian exegetical tradition that posits there is something wrong with Adam
and Eve that in their immortal state they are physically unable to
reproduce. It is unclear what Lehi makes of Genesis 1:28, which he notably
omits from his discourse. In fact, this commandment is not mentioned in the
Book of Mormon text at all (although Mormon readers have almost always
read Genesis 1:28 into Lehi’s text to create a comprehensive Garden
narrative). Even the most ardent celibacy advocates who used the Garden
account to argue for celibacy, never argue that Adam and Eve had defective
reproductive systems in the Garden only that they were celibate while in the
Garden. For them the Garden represented not only the past but the
afterlife. Inasmuch as they did not believe in marriage in heaven, they
argued that there was no marriage in the Garden. Those who argued that
marriage was preferable to celibacy on the other hand, didn’t argue that
Adam and Eve had children in the Garden (accepting the Genesis account that
mentions no children in the Garden), but only that they did, in fact,
consummate their marriage in the Garden, and that they could have born
children while in the Garden. The Book of Jubilees (not to mention Milton) has
Adam and Eve having sexual relations before the fall. (It has been noted that
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in Jubilees Adam and Eve do not have relations inside of Eden but only
outside of Eden because Eden is understood as the Temple and Levitical
purity laws are assumed in the text).
Another possibility is that the text takes the position that innocence is the
cause for absence of sexual relations, which would be closer to some Christian
interpretive traditions (i.e. no children due to innocence, or lack of sexual
passion, lust, or concupiscence, rather than biological incapacity. Lehi states
they would not have had children, not that they could not have had
children. That language may or may not be significant. A Jewish text from
which some scholars believe Christian interpretations eventually developed is
2 Baruch 56:6:
For since when he transgressed Untimely death came into being, Grief was
named And anguish was prepared, And pain was created, And trouble
consummated, And disease began to be established, And Sheol kept
demanding that it should be renewed in blood, And the begetting of children
was brought about, And the passion of parents produced, And the greatness
of humanity was humiliated, And goodness languished.
One can see some affinities with Lehi, but more differences. This text focuses
more on the pain that is produced. But more importantly the author of the
text sees the transgression in a negative light and not at all necessary. The
text assumes that the prelapsarian state was in fact good (“goodness
languished” and the “greatness of humanity was humiliated”). In terms of
procreation, the text seems to place the lack of the “passion of parents” as
the reason for no children in Eden. Scholars link this Edenic view with a view
of the afterlife that posits no sexual relations.
In terms of chronology,
scholars argue that Jubilees is the earlier tradition.
Looking at the text alone, the logic of Lehi’s move appears to be based in
verse 11: “Wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead,
having no life, neither death, nor corruption, nor incorruption, happiness nor
misery, neither sense nor insensibility.” In which case, perhaps Lehi is
understanding the Garden “as dead” in that there is no life (meaning no
children) and no death, nor happiness nor misery, etc. This would appear to
be the function of Lehi’s statement. Having children is better than not having
children (which is precisely why rabbinic sources understand Adam and Eve to
have sexual relations in the Garden). Therefore, to produce life is better than
a changeless or endless or purposeless state.
Be that as it may, it is still a strange move, is it not? The Garden of Eden as
“dead” with neither life or death? How can Lehi make this argument when
Eden presumably contains opposites?
He has needed to argue so at least
twice already. Lehi remains silent regarding Genesis 1:28. This move is
awkward from the point of view of marriage and eschatological metaphors:
paradisaical marriage becomes a childless marriage and reclaiming Eden now
means returning to a state of childlessness. No longer can Eden be
208
considered the ideal state or a prototype of the afterlife. Again, is this a case
where Lehi has simply chosen the wrong Biblical narrative to make his point
about progression?
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
April 6, 2013 at 12:14 pm
Rico, you’ve got some nice provocations here.
“Starting with verse 22, he appears to be arguing that after
things exist and man is able to act for himself, man must
“oppose” the commandments of God, or else mankind could not
exist and mankind could not know joy.”
A bit nit-picky, but might it be important that Lehi doesn’t claim
that “mankind could not know joy,” but rather that human
beings couldn’thave joy and couldn’t know misery (and then the
second version: they couldn’t do good, knowing no sin)? It’s not
entirely clear what’s at stake in these formulations, but I think
it’s worth thinking about the fact that the negative things,
misery and sin, are what must be known, while the positive
things, joy and the good, are what must be had anddone. Does
that speak to these issues?
“The Garden of Eden as “dead” with neither life or death? How
can Lehi make this argument when Eden presumably contains
opposites? He has needed to argue so at least twice already.”
Isn’t this rather easily answered? The logic of verse 11, it seems
to me (and I’ve argued in our previous discussions), is that some
kind of fundamental (“ontological”) opposition has to possibilize
the sorts of oppositions (“ethical” and “existential”) that we
actually experience. Verse 16, both on its own terms and
through the remarkably precise allusions to the first sentence of
verse 11, suggests that the opposition within the Garden was
the fundamental sort of opposition, which only possibilizes (but
doesn’t realize) the oppositions that make up the weave of
experience. Hence it seems to me that all Lehi would have to be
saying here is that, had Adam not partaken of the fruit, Eden
would have been left with only the fundamental or ontological
opposition, a kind of implicit because unexperienciable
opposition. There would have been opposition, but it wouldn’t
have been known by human beings. No?
REPLY
3.
joespencersaid:
April 2, 2013 at 3:38 pm
The first of my four promised comments!
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Deidre, I really like what you’ve done with Victor Turner here. I’m wondering,
though, to what extent the nature of the Fall complicates the picture. At least,
there’s a kind of irony about the parallel between the couple’s nakedness in
the Garden and the neophyte’s nakedness in initiation rituals: where the latter
arestripped naked as part of the ritual humiliation you refer to, Eve and
Adam beginnaked and their humiliation comes, in a certain sense, when
they’re clothed. Of course, you might say that there’s a kind of
stripping/humiliation in the realizationof their nakedness, and so that the
parallel is stricter than I’d suggest. Still, I think there may be reason to think
of the Garden story as imposing a kind of reversal on what Turner is outlining,
and it may be that Christian and Mormon rituals that employ nakedness in
one way or another (early Christian baptism, for instance, and certain
versions of the initiatory in Mormonism) mark a return fromhumiliation rather
than to it.
Perhaps.
If I wanted to complicate this further, I’d drag Giorgio Agamben’s essay,
“Nudities,” into all this, which I read for the first time recently. I don’t think
I’ll complicate it further for the moment, however. :)
REPLY
4.
joespencersaid:
April 2, 2013 at 3:56 pm
The second of my four promised comments!
Thanks, Deidre, for pointing out the reappearance of “all things” in verse 24.
I’d noted this, but your comments forced me to think more carefully about
exactly what’s going on in the text there. A few thoughts in response, then:
(1) We get “all things” twice in verse 24. First we have a reference to “all
things” being “done,” and second we have a reference to God as He who
“knoweth all things.” In the first case, moreover, we have a present perfect
construction (“have been done”), while in the second case we have a simple
present construction (“knoweth”). Still more, in the first case we have a
passive verb (“be done”), while in the second case we have an active verb
(“know”). How might we think about the relationship between these two
verbs (“to do,” “to know”) these two constructions (present perfect, simple
present), and these two voices (passive, active)? Is the simple present
suggestive of a kind of atemporal activity on God’s part (God, regardless of
time or history, knows all things), while the present perfect is suggestive of a
kind of temporal activity on God’s part (God, enacting time and history, has
ensured that all things are done)? Does the gap between active and passive
suggest something about the active agent in each case (God actively
knowing, but God not actually being the one who does)? Does the reference
to knowledge suggest a kind of abstraction not present in the reference to
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doing? Does one of the two things precede the other, or how are they
intertwined?
(2) What relationship does “all things” here in verse 24 bear to “all things” in
its double appearance in verse 11? I suggested before that there’s a link
between “all things” and creation in verse 11. Does the focus on creation in
the verses leading up to 24 suggest that the same is the case here? But
perhaps “all things” means something different when they’re “done” (maybe
that’s a reference to creation?) than when they’re “known” (maybe that’s a
reference to a kind of absolute knowledge on God’s part?). And is the echo of
verse 11 meant to mark a connection between the “all things” of verse 24 and
the oppositions mentioned at the end of verse 23 (“having no joy, for they
knew no misery; doing no good, for they knew no sin”)? (Looking again at the
end of verse 23 makes me realize that there’s a pairing of “do” and “know”
there as well: “doing no good, for they knew no sin.” How does verse 23 help
to clarify the basic meaning of verse 24? Does verse 24 mean to suggest that
only God, because He knows all things, can trulydo good—in fact, do all
things? Or what’s the relationship there?) Finally, does verse 15, which
repeats so much of the first line of verse 11, shed any light on all this. There
Lehi has already transitioned to the story of Adam and Eve, but he’s again
talking about “all things” need to have “an opposition” at their core, if God’s
plan would get off the ground. Is that what we’re seeing in verse 24 also?
Much to think about here. Since I’ve more or less decided to write on this “all
things” business in verse 11 for my paper, I’ll be thinking about this passage
at length.
REPLY
5.
joespencersaid:
April 2, 2013 at 4:04 pm
The third of my four promised comments! (I won’t be getting to number four
until at least tomorrow.)
I love the reading of D&C 121:33 you’ve offered. I just want to offer the
larger passage from which it was excerpted into the D&C (by Orson Pratt,
incidentally, and in preparation for the 1876 edition). Here’s the whole text:
But I beg leave to say unto you, brethren, that ignorance, superstition and
bigotry placing itself where it ought not, is oftentimes in the way of the
prosperity of this Church; like the torrent of rain from the mountains, that
floods the most pure and crystal stream with mire, and dirt, and filthiness,
and obscures everything that was clear before, and all rushes along in one
general deluge; but time weathers tide; and notwithstanding we are rolled in
the mire of the flood for the time being, the next surge peradventure, as
211
time rolls on, may bring to us the fountain as clear as crystal, and as pure
as snow; while the filthiness, flood-wood and rubbish is left and purged out
by the way. How long can rolling water remain impure? What power shall
stay the heavens? As well might man stretch forth his puny arm to stop the
Missouri river in its decreed course, or to turn it up stream, as to hinder
the Almighty from pouring down knowledge from heaven, upon the heads
of the Latter-day Saints. What is Boggs or his murderous party, but
wimbling willows upon the shore to catch the flood-wood? As well might we
argue that water is not water, because the mountain torrents send down
mire and roil the crystal stream, although afterwards render it more pure
than before; or that fire is not fire, because it is of a quenchable nature, by
pouring on the flood; as to say that our cause is down because renegades,
liars, priests, thieves and murderers, who are all alike tenacious of their
crafts and creeds, have poured down, from their spiritual wickedness in
high places, and from their strongholds of the devil, a flood of dirt and mire
and filthiness and vomit upon our heads. [History of the Church, 3:296297.]
I think the larger text makes your reading all the more insightful.
REPLY
6.
jennywebbsaid:
April 3, 2013 at 3:16 am
Deidre, another rich and thought-provoking post. Thank you.
Two thoughts.
1) Re: Creation as ritual
What I see you drawing from the text here is that ultimately being separated
from God and embarking on a journey (i.e., the narrative of the Fall) proves
to be not a reactive/received punishment nor even necessary consequence,
but rather a mechanism or structure by which progress toward God is made
through the experiential knowledge gained. Am I on the right track here?
If so, then it seems that the creation narrative is not the story of earth, but
rather of birth. It is not a planetary creation, but rather the emergence of an
identity—it’s how we come to know our selves. We are beings both fallen and
saved. The paradoxical tension in this identity needs narrative structuring to
keep both potentialities open and in relation to each other; without this
structuring, the identity collapses in on itself.
Lehi’s discursive address of opposites here, then, can be read as a thematic
response to this tension (fallen/saved).
212
Recall the larger framework of this section: Lehi repeatedly identifies Jacob in
terms of his birth(place/right) before shifting the discourse to all his sons. In
other words, Lehi discursively employs identity-creation in an attempt to
reconstitute a creation narrative that ultimately brings said sons into
experiential knowledge of God as they are birthed into their identity as both
fallen and saved.
2) Re: God as being “retroactively apparent”
I think this is a good place from which to consider Lehi’s own theological
approach to the Fall: i.e., the Fall as beneficial (and therefore necessary?).
This is not the Fall as inevitable, but the Fall as needful; it is also an
acceptance that recognition of that beneficiality and needfulness may only be
retroactively apparent—that is, God’s works may not be seen unless at a
remove.
As both beneficial and needful, the Fall can be seen as opening a space in
which God can work in individual lives and bring about salvation. (As Deidre
stresses, God can’t save unless there is something to save *from*.)
Given this orientation, we can derive several ways in which Lehi “reads” the
Fall:
• as a looking for or search for God?
• as another act of Creation?
• as charity?
• as an instance of seeing God’s hand where it is not explicit?
At root in this approach, I see Lehi’s own theological leanings as much more
individually charitable than I previously thought. That is, Lehi’s God appears
to be interested in saving *individuals* from the very beginning, something I
would not have expected given Lehi’s identity as a covenant people (plural). I
wonder if Lehi’s own experiences here, being individually called out by God,
individually flung into the wilderness, etc. have influenced and nuanced his
conceptions of God and salvation?
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
April 6, 2013 at 12:28 pm
Jenny, nice stuff here.
Yes, birth of identity. That seems to me to be exactly right. Like
the Genesis story, the point isn’t cosmogony (“How did all this
stuff get here in the first place?”) but ethnogony (“How did we
come to be who we are?”). Of course, ethnogony is here
presented as possibilized by a certain telling of the story of the
earth’s creation: we couldn’t have been who we are (identity as
a function of the weave of oppositional differences at the
existential and ethical levels) had the earth itself not been
ordered in a certain way (with a fundamental ontological
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opposition that allows for the weave of oppositional differences
necessary to our identity). Even here, though, the point isn’t one
of cosmogony so much as cosmology.
And then thanks for your distinction between the inevitable and
the needful. Because there’s such a strong emphasis in Lehi’s
sermon on a kind of structuralism, I find myself consistently
tempted to see a kind of inevitability here. (I tend to reproduce
in my head something like Umberto Eco’s account of the Garden,
where the fact that God spoke meant that the Fall would
happen.) But Lehi’s God is, I think you’re right, sovereign
enough to problematize any reading of inevitability—and
perhaps, therefore, any ultimately structuralist or semiotic
reading—into Lehi’s story. That’s an important warning I need to
keep making to myself.
REPLY
7.
jennywebbsaid:
April 3, 2013 at 3:25 am
Rico,
In response to your 3rd point, I wanted to add in a thought. Verse 22
describes the Garden as a space of stasis: “all things which were created
must have remained in the same state which they were after they were
created, and they must have remained forever and had no end.” I think that
stasis can be read as applying to Adam and Eve’s physical bodies as well.
The pregnant body is the very (literal) incarnation of the concept of change.
And the arrival of parenthood demands an ongoing change in identity: one’s
identity (and body) is constantly shifted by the demands of another.
REPLY
8.
jennywebbsaid:
April 3, 2013 at 3:39 am
Joe,
You say: “it may be that Christian and Mormon rituals that employ nakedness
in one way or another … mark a return from humiliation rather than to it.” I’m
agreeing with you on this point.
There’s a sense in which nakedness is a revelation, no? A removing of the
veil/cloth that allows for the naked flesh to be experienced/known? The
removal of the cloth is an invitation to knowledge: when Adam and Eve
realize they’re naked, they’re realizing specifically that they are *not
clothed*—they realize they’ve lost something they once had, and in that
realization their naked bodies witness the reality of their Fall?
Verse 23 states that they were created “in a state of innocence,” where
innocence is an absence of knowledge. Knowledge here is flat; it has no
purchase and thus cannot exist. But it is when they see their nakedness that
214
knowledge gains dimension. Knowledge, Lehi keeps insisting, arrives through
opposites, through structures that demand conceptual space. When they see
their naked bodies, they recognize the absence of clothing and thus gain a
conceptual opposite, i.e., knowledge. The dimensionality of knowledge arrives
through the flesh (something I would argue occurs for Adam and Eve in the
Fall, but also, and perhaps more significantly, through the body of the atoning
Christ).
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
April 6, 2013 at 12:42 pm
Yes, I think this is right. The intersubjective character of this
revelation as experienced in the Garden story complicates things
greatly. It’s as if the realization of nakedness should have been a
revelation—an endowment of knowledge of the other, perhaps
this last word in more than one sense!—but it turns out to be a
unveiling that veils all the more completely. How so? Adam
recognizes his own nakedness when he sees Eve’s nakedness for
the first time, just as Eve recognizes her own nakedness when
she sees Adam’s nakedness for the first time. The result is that
the revelation of the other ends up being diverted into a
revelation only of the same, and the other’s flesh serves solely
as the occasion for the self-palpation that marks one’s own flesh.
Put another way: the other’s naked flesh, at the very moment of
its denuding, ends up being veiled by my own naked flesh—but
because the same holds for the other (my naked flesh ends up
being veiled for the other by her own naked flesh), we’re each
only seeing on the naked body of the other the mirror image of
our own shame.
I blush at the other’s nakedness because it’s my own
nakedness—even if I’m clothed.
So, yes, the dimensionality of knowledge arrives through the
flesh, but the problem with the Fall is that it’s always and only
knowledge of selfthat arrives through the flesh. What might be
so important about your parenthetical reference to the body of
the atoning Christ is that the atonement opens the possibility of
a knowledge that arrives through the flesh that isn’t ultimately a
self-knowledge. In or through (evenreaching through) Christ’s
flesh—which Hebrews equates with the veil—there’s a knowing
that finally isn’t a knowing only of myself, but of the other,
perhaps of the Other….
REPLY
9.
joespencersaid:
215
April 5, 2013 at 12:54 pm
Finally, my fourth promised comment! And then I can get on to responding to
others’ comments, and to John’s post!
Rico (as also Jenny in her brief response to Rico) has said a handful of very
helpful things about the complexities of verses 22-23. I’ll respond to him
directly in another comment, because I’d like here just to say a few things
about the possible interpretation of verse 22.
If we pay close attention to how the words “man,” “Adam,” and “Eve,” and
“men” are used in verses 14-25, we find the following:
(1) “Man,” despite the fact that it’s singular and unmistakably masculine (we
get “he” as the pronoun that replaces it, for instance in verse 16), seems to
have reference to both Adam and Eve. Importantly, it is the only term used
for human beings, and always in the singular, up through verse 16. (It’s
replaced by a rough equivalent in the first part of verse 18, “mankind.”) After
verse 16, interestingly, it never appears again. If we take verse 18′s
“mankind” as a final iteration, then it’s particularly interesting that it
disappears precisely at the moment that the word/name “Eve” appears in the
text. Once Eve has been introduced, the singular “man” disappears from
Lehi’s narrative.
(2) As I’ve already just mentioned, “Eve” appears for the first time in verse
18. And, importantly, “Adam” doesn’t appear until verse 19. At first, it’s only
Eve who intervenes. This separability of Eve from Adam is significant, I think,
despite the fact that the two will appear together in verse 19 and then Eve
will drop out of the narrative as a distinct character. The separability of Eve
is, of course, here a function of her being the one the serpent approaches, but
I don’t think that’s any reason to think that Lehi is sour on Eve. I’ll see if I
can’t spell out the importance of what Eve’s doing here later on.
(3) “Adam,” as I’ve just noted, doesn’t appear until verse 19, where it
appears right alongside “Eve.” The two are a couple, now a full replacement
of “man.” Together they “had partaken of the forbidden fruit,” and together
“they were driven out of the garden of Eden, to till the earth.” In verse 20, we
get “they” (a nice change from the “he” of verse 16). By verse 21, they
become the “parents” of “the children of men,” their names disappearing for a
moment. But then Adam, alone suddenly, appears in verse 22. The couple
remains in question in certain ways, but always pronomially (“they”), through
verse 23. When we come to verse 25, it’s again only Adam that gets
mentioned. Here we have a separability of Adam from Eve, and I think we
ought to ask why. If verse 19 has been so careful to couple Adam and Eve,
and if verses 20-23 are insistent on referring to both through the pronoun
“they,” why does Adam get this separate role here and there in verses 22 and
25? I’ll be coming back to that.
(4) Suddenly in verse 25, we get “men” in the plural for the first time. Here
Adam and Eve drop out of the story, and they’re replaced by the term used
216
before (“man”), but now in the plural. It’s as if the singular gendered term
has given way to the plural gendered term through the intermediary of Eve
and Adam. Although “man” comes back in verse 27 (“all things are given
them which are expedient unto man”), it’s a passing reference, and the focus
seems to remain on “men.”
Okay, now: So what? All of the above might be used to offer a
reinterpretation of verse 22 (and verse 23 along with it). Might the
separability of Adam rather suddenly in verse 22 be significant? Why break up
the couple at that point? That seems strange. But perhaps there’s a clue in
the fact that the couple was broken up before in verse 18, when Eve was
approached by the serpent. Might Lehi means what he says in verse 22, then?
That is, might Lehi actually mean to suggest that it is
specifically Adam’s and not Eve’s transgression that keeps “all things” from
“remain[ing] in the same state,” etc.?
What do I mean? Well, what if we interpreted the verse as follows? Eve is
approached by the serpent, and eventually both she and Adam eat the fruit.
But there’s a curious space between her eating and him eating, and that’s the
moment that interests Lehi in verses 22-25. In verse 22, Lehi is thinking
about what might have happened if Adam had not decided to eat after Eve
had already done so. And that would then explain the claim at the beginning
of verse 23: “they would have had no children” because Eve and Adam would
have been separated, and having children would have been impossible. And in
that sense everything would have “remained the same”—perhaps “remained
the same” as it had been before Eve was produced from Adam’s rib and
presented to him. “Remained the same” in the sense that, problematic as it
sounds to put it this way, Eve would have failed, like the other animals, to be
an “adequate” help for Adam. And all this would clarify the meaning of verse
25: “Adam fell that men might be,” because he actually knew that children
were an impossibility if he didn’t follow Eve into the fallen world.
There may be real problems with this reading, I’m sure—especially from a
feminist perspective. (On the other hand, what about the Garden
story isn’t problematic from a feminist perspective?!) But I wonder about it’s
strength as well. It’d make 2 Nephi 2 into a rather startling reading of Genesis
2-3. Lehi would be suggesting that Eve, like the animals that had been
brought to Adam before her, in a sense “failed” Adam, but that Adam chose
to reverse that failure—recognizing that she uniquely was indeed bone of his
bone and flesh of his flesh. That might be the beginning point for a great deal
of theologizing—and hopefully also for a good deal of careful rethinking of the
gender issues here so that it can all be put less problematically, etc.
Is it a good reading? I don’t see any textual reason to dismiss it. And it makes
a good deal of sense of what might otherwise be wild aspects of the text
(malfunctioning reproductive systems?). And it might be said that an
interpretation not entirely distinct from this seems to have been behind the
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narrative of the Fall in the endowment, where a drama not entirely unlike
what’s been laid out above (though without a close focus on Genesis 2-3) is
presented. At any rate, it’s one worth thinking about….
REPLY
10.
ricosaid:
April 15, 2013 at 11:38 pm
Joe, as I wrote in my other comment, this interpretation is essentially the
interpretation advanced by Orson Pratt, although the path you take to get
there is slightly different (you may have actually strengthened his claims).
Whether this is a “good reading” is complicated. It was certainly a powerful
reading. This reading was either the only reading or the dominant reading of
the Garden narrative for at least 70 to 100 years in Mormon discourse, for a
variety of reasons, some of which you mention. First and foremost, it
answered the charges of early critics of the Book of Mormon that Lehi
contradicted bible passages such as Genesis 1:28 and it made God the author
of sin by forcing Adam and Eve to be disobedient in order to be obedient.
These were some of the strongest criticisms of the Book of Mormon that came
out just months after the book was published in 1830. Early Mormon
missionaries struggled with finding a good response to critics until Orson
Pratt’s solution. The earliest account I have found of this interpretation dates
to 1840, preceding the formulation of the temple ceremony (the first time),
which perhaps explains why this is the interpretation we find in the temple
liturgy. Brigham Young also embraced this reading (although he had
additional theological reasons of his own to adopt it). You mentioned the
space between the time Eve ate the fruit until Adam ate the fruit. That
chronology was an important part of Orson Pratt’s narrative. He also fairly
consistently taught that Adam and Eve could have had children in the Garden.
The reading was ultimately abandoned when John A. Widtsoe advanced his
reinterpretation of the Garden. That interpretation, which modern Mormons
are most familiar with today, can be traced to Widtsoe and Joseph Fielding
Smith: Adam and Eve are unable to have children in the Garden and there are
two conflicting commandments and Adam and Eve are being obedient to the
greater commandment by transgressing the lesser commandment. This
interpretation post-dates the temple liturgy which is why is no where to be
found there. The Widtsoe interpretation, which may be more friendly from the
feminist perspective, is highly problematic textually and theologically
speaking. Pratt’s interpretation adheres much more to the textual language
of the scriptures (though not without its own implications). See my other
comment for possible textual difficulties.
REPLY
218
2 Nephi 2:25-27
02
TuesdayAPR 2013
POSTED
BY
JOHN HILTON III
IN
UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 18 COMMENTS
The Text
25 Adam fell that men might be; and men are, that they might have joy.
26 And the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that he may redeem the children of men
from the fall. And because that they are redeemed from the fall they have become free
forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be
by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments
which God hath given.
27 Wherefore, men are free according to the flesh; and all things are given them which are
expedient unto man. And they are free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great
Mediator of all men, or to choose captivity and death, according to the captivity and power
of the devil; for he seeketh that all men might be miserable like unto himself.
Textual Variants
There are not any significant textual variants.
Textual Influence on Samuel the Lamanite
One particularly important textual influence may be in how Samuel the Lamanite employs
Lehi’s words. Samuel says, “ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold,
God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free. He hath given unto you
that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you that ye might choose life or
death; and ye can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is
good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you”
(Helaman 14:30–31, compare 2 Nephi 2:26-27).
Textual Influence on Alma 42
A pattern that has come up several times throughout our discussions is the relationship
between Alma 42 and 2 Nephi 2. As I focused on 2 Nephi 2:25-27 one phrase that I was
drawn to was the phrase “the punishment of the law” in verse 26. That is the only time this
phrase appears in scripture. But the words “punish” and “law” appear together in fourteen
219
verses in the Book of Mormon; the two chapters with the highest frequency are 2 Nephi 2
and Alma 42 (three each).
The connection between these chapters has started to make more sense for me, considering
the topic that Alma explicitly states at the beginning of Alma 42: “And now, my son, I
perceive there is somewhat more which doth worry your mind, which ye cannot
understand—which is concerning the justice of God in the punishment of the sinner; for ye
do try to suppose that it is injustice that the sinner should be consigned to a state of
misery” (Alma 42:1).
So Alma turns to (among other sources – I’ve also written on his use of Abinadi) Lehi. I’m
going to come back to verses 26-27, but first I want to come back to a discussion led by
Sheila on 2 Nephi 2:10. In this verse we see the phrase, “Wherefore, the ends of the law
which the Holy One hath given, unto the inflicting of the punishment which is affixed, which
punishment that is affixed is in opposition to that of the happiness which is affixed, to
answer the ends of the atonement.” Sheila points out the general difficulty of following the
syntax and then provides a summary as follows: “The most basic point I can see here is
that the law is tied to punishment, and the atonement is tied to happiness. It’s interesting
that it doesn’t sound like an inherent relationship; rather, it’s something that’s been
“affixed”—presumably by God?”
It is interesting that we don’t have any specification of who is affixing this punishment. Is it
a law of nature, something out of the control of God, or something that he is in charge of?
In Alma 42:16, 18 and 22 the same idea of “punishment” being “affixed” and interestingly,
just like in 2 Nephi 2:10 the passive voice is used (no specific indication of who is affixing
the punishment).
Regardless, the idea of punishment being affixed seems crucial to Alma’s line of reasoning
with Corianton. In Alma 42:16-22 Alma ties the idea of punishment with law. Corianton
struggles to understand how it is just for God to condemn (punish) the sinner. Alma says,
“Look, a punishment has been affixed, and laws are in place.” This leads to the punch line
tying back to 2 Nephi 2:26-27: There is a “punishment of the law” (2 Nephi 2:26) that is
going to act on people. Again it’s interesting that it isn’t an individual (God) who acts on
them, but another force, “the law” that does the acting (although Alma 42:26 intimates that
it is God who is the controlling force).
This is a very long build up to what I think is an important punch line. Alma’s continual
allusions to 2 Nephi 2 may be most connected to the basic premise of verses 26 and 27:
“[Men] have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to
220
be acted upon save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day…they are
free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great Mediator of all men, or to choose
captivity and death, according to the captivity and power of the devil.”
In other words, “Corianton, you have been worried about the justice of God in condemning
the sinner, but you have misunderstood. God does not condemn sinners. Men act for
themselves, they are free. The law condemns sinners, but that is not God’s doing, that is up
to the basic actions that each individual faces.” Ultimately man’s agency eliminates that
argument that God is not just.
Other notes
The word “punish” and its variants occurs 35 times in the Book of Mormon. The chapters
where its use is most concentrated are 2 Nephi 2 (4 times), Alma 30 (7 times) and Alma 42
(6 times). I think there are some potentially very interesting threads to connect
regarding Rico’s post on Korihor’s critique of the Nephite theology. Hopefully this is
something else we can continue to discuss in the comments below!
The phrase “fulness of times” (appearing twice in the Book of Mormon both times in 2 Nephi
2, although see also 2 Nephi 11:7) appears to refer (in the Book of Mormon) to the first
coming of Christ. However, as the phrase is used in Ephesians and the D&C it seems to
refer to the latter-days. This juxtaposition has made me wonder if the phrase in 2 Nephi 2
actually refers to the Second Coming. If so, what implications would this have?
<UPDATE: Rico pointed out that the Book of Mormon actually uses the phrase “Fulness of
time” whereas Ephesians and the D&C use “Fulness of timeS.” Is this an important
distinction? Why or why not?>
I am embarrassed that I have not written anything about 2 Nephi 2:25. I hope that my
friends in the seminar will add to this glaring weakness and share some insights they have
been holding back all seminar waiting for the discussion of this vital verse. If we were to
continue in exploring connections between Alma 42 and 2 Nephi 2 the first 12 verses of
Alma 42 could be seen as an expansion of this one short verse.
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1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2:25-27”
jennywebbsaid:
April 2, 2013 at 3:40 am
Thank you John for continuing our discussions.
Re: Samuel the Lamanite
This connection is great, in part because it’s not just theological (although it
certainly is that) but also because of its literary quality. By this I mean that
StL’s words reflect (in my opinion) the kind of thematic and literary
constructions that occur when a reader has absorbed a prior text and is
incorporating that text into their own linguistic expression. I’m not saying StL
read Lehi’s exact words (their are various ways in which this expression can
occur), but it is fascinating to imagine him doing so.
Let’s imagine: StL hypothetically has access to Lehi’s words. What would it
mean for StL to have studied Lehi (as opposed to, say, Nephi)? One can well
imagine that a Lamanite might be inherently skeptical of Nephi’s perspective,
and thus turning Lehi for a conceivably more balanced approach.
The phrase in StL’s words “God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath
made you free” could be seen as a re-visioning of the Fall, one that sees
transgression in terms of blessing/opportunity/opening rather than straightcut sin. The transgression of the Fall would be the opening through which God
gives a specific knowledge (the knowledge that corresponds to the experience
of the transgression).
Is this (admittedly tenuous and creative) reading of StL reading the Fall
through Lehi something that might be expected from a descendent culturally
accustomed to a distinct narrative regarding the assignation of responsibility
for familial fractures? (Joe has a great reading of the Lehite narrative in which
the Nephite/Lamanite division is the Fall section of an overarching CreationFall-Atonement-Veil structure to 1-2 Nephi; I’m drawing on that a bit here
thematically.) I can certainly see a son of Laman and Lemuel reading Fall
experiences in terms of knowledge gained and ultimate trajectories toward
God rather than in terms of specific instances of sin that result in death.
Re: Alma 42 connections
The case you make for these connections just continues to grow as the
seminar continues John. This time around, the thematic emphasis on law and
punishment that you develop caused me to pause and ask myself questions of
framing. That is, in what kind of universe does Alma see himself and his sons,
and how is this universe reflected theologically here?
222
Hypothesis A: Alma’s worldview is one in which things are both directed and
structured by higher causes.
Hypothesis B: For Alma, said higher causes can be either divine (i.e., God) or
natural (i.e., law).
Point B-1: In the case of the law, we have natural consequences and natural
processes that ultimately lead to death. That is, while the consequences
themselves may not be literally deadly, they ultimately fail to save men and
women from themselves. Bodies deteriorate. Humans sin. “Good”
consequences, however many they are, cannot reverse, overcome, or
compensate for these gaps; in the end we are not complete, but rather decomposed.
Point B-2: In the case of God, it is important to recall Alma’s own personal
experience of the atonement as an interruption of his sinning. To Alma, it is
never a question of whether or not God personally intervenes or directs lives;
his conversion experience is the quintessential example of God’s direct
involvement in our lives.
Point B-3: Drawing on B-2, we then have the Atonement as a graceful,
unmerited interruption of entropy.
Conclusion: The only way the Atonement can be an interruption is if it is
interrupting some *thing*, something extant, something structurally prior.
Hence, the necessary discussion of law and the affixed punishment: the
artificial edifice of law and consequences is structurally necessary so that the
Atonement as the graceful interruption of entropy both functions and
fractures our lives.
REPLY
o
studyyourscripturessaid:
April 3, 2013 at 1:48 pm
Jenny,
Thanks for your thoughts. I really enjoy thinking hypothetically
about the text and exploring different possibilities such as how
Samuel might have read Lehi. I did some digging and it appears
to me that Samuel is quite prolific in his allusions to the words of
previous prophets not just Lehi (for examples, compare Mosiah
3:8/Helaman 14:12, 2 Nephi 26:3-10/Helaman 13:24-30, 2
Nephi 6:11/Helaman 15:12).
My point here is to explore the possibility that Samuel might not
have been selectively quoting Lehi as his ancestor, but rather
that Samuel has accepted the entire Nephite canon. Does it
change things if Samuel is employing Lehi as but one of his
witnesses? Perhaps to say, “I have not only referred to your
previous prophets, but also our common ancestor.”
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I think your point regarding Samuel’s phrase “God hath given
unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free” is interesting.
Know/knowledge and freedom appear together relatively rarely
in the scriptures. Comparing Samuel’s words with Lehi’s (”
they have become free forever, knowing good from evil” (2
Nephi 2:26) provide an interesting relationship to think about.
I’ll have to ponder this one more.
REPLY
2.
ricosaid:
April 2, 2013 at 10:20 pm
There is much to say on these final verses. Rather than breaking these up
into different comments, I’m just going to post it and let the chips fall where
they may. Apologies in advance. Joe may have the record for the longest
post, I’ll set the record for the longest comment.
1) Regarding verse 25, in a previous comment, I attempted to populate all
the “missing” or unstated opposites:
“And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. And if ye
shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness [and no
wickedness]. And if there be no righteousness [and no wickedness], there be
no happiness [and misery]. And if there be no righteousness [or wickedness],
nor happiness [and misery], there be [no reward and] no punishment nor
[happiness nor] misery. And if these things are not, there is no God. And if
there is no God, we are not, neither the earth—for there could have been no
creation of things, neither to act, nor to be acted upon. Wherefore, all things
must have vanished away.”
Here, we could do the same thing with verse 25:
Adam fell that men might be [and die], and men are that they might [know
misery and] have joy.
Lehi is couching the phrase as if they telos of man is joy, but given everything
Lehi has built theologically, this seems to be only one half of the equation. If
it is only through opposites that things come into being, then the telos of
man, according to Lehi, is just as much misery as it is joy. It sounds much
more pleasant to “omit” misery from the purpose of existence, but this seems
to follow given the house that Lehi has built.
2) Orson Pratt came up with an early interpretation of verse 25. Using Old
and New Testament passages as a key, he read into the text a liminal space
where Eve had already eaten the fruit but Adam had not yet done so. It was
only in thatwindow of time, Pratt argued, that the phrase “Adam fell that men
might be” holds true. By way of illustration, Pratt’s interpretation would look
something like this:
22a And now, behold, if Adam had not transgressed, he would not have
fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden, and all things
224
which were created must have remained in the same state which they were
after they were created, and they must have remained forever and had no
end. 22b Eve was cast out of the Garden, separated from Adam, and became
mortal. 23 And they would have had no children. Wherefore they Adam would
have remained in a state of innocence—having no joy, for they he knew no
misery; doing no good, for they he knew no sin. 24 But behold, all things
have been done in the wisdom of him who knoweth all things. 25 Adam fell in
order to remain with Eve that men might be, and men are that they might
have joy.
Pratt’s sought to solve the problem of making God the author of sin. The
reason I mention this is because Pratt’s approach is an implicit agreement
with the early critics that (without this liminal understanding) the text would
make God the author of sin. Pratt’s approach was extremely influential,
especially as it predated the development of the temple liturgy. However, his
approach fell out of favor and was replaced by Widtsoe’s approach, which,
among other things, seeks to remove the element of sin all together from the
narrative (here is where a special distinction between sin and transgression is
born, with transgression being offered as a non-sins). The reason I mention
this is because these interpretive traditions are driven by an exegetical worry
with sin (either by God or by man); they indicate an anxiety with the text
requiring an alteration of the text by the reader. Looking at the text alone,
Lehi seems to be making a strange argument that man must “oppose” God
for man to have joy. What are we to make of that? Is this deliberate on Lehi’s
part, or just an unintended consequence of his theology?
3) Samuel the Lamanite and knowledge. We discussed some of this in 2 Ne.
2:14-16.
God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free. (Helaman
14:30).
John, I appreciated your observations there that the knowledge spoken of by
Samuel may refer to “knowledge of their redeemer” rather than a knowledge
coming from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
Since our discussion, I’ve given more consideration to the way the
term knowledge is used in the Book of Mormon and have noticed that the text
uses specific phrases “knowledge of their Redeemer” and “knowledge of their
God” and “knowledge of the Lord” and “knowledge of the truth.” Samuel uses
this phrase three times in chapter 15 :
. . . that they may bring the remainder of their brethren to the knowledge of
the truth; therefore there are many who do add to their numbers daily. . .
And behold, ye do know of yourselves, for ye have witnessed it, that as many
of them as are brought to the knowledge of the truth . . . the restoration of
our brethren, the Lamanites, again to the knowledge of the truth. (Helman
15:6-7, 11)
225
So, it could be (as you said in our past discussion) that Samuel is actually
contrasting the knowledge given to the Nephites with that given to the
Lamanites and may be saying something more like the following:
30 And now remember, remember, my brethren, that whosoever perisheth,
perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity, doeth it unto himself;
for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold,
God hath given unto you [Nephites in contrast to the Lamanites] a knowledge
[of God/the Lord/the truth] and he hath made you [Nephites] free.
31 He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath
given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be
restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored unto
you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you.
Still (and I think I’ve gone back and forth on this one) given the context and
close proximity to these other elements in verse 31, I’m thinking that perhaps
he is essentially restating himself in verse 31. It doesn’t form a perfect
chiastic structure but it is repetitive in nature:
for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold,
God hath given unto you a knowledge [of good and evil] and he hath made
you free [to act for yourselves]. He hath given unto you that ye might know
good from evil, and he hath given unto you [to act for yourselves] that ye
might choose life or death.
If that is what Samuel is doing he may drawing upon Lehi:
and men are instructed sufficiently that they know good from evil; and the
law is given unto men. . . . And because that they are redeemed from the fall,
they have become free forever, knowing good from evil, to act for themselves
and not to be acted upon. (2 Ne. 2:4-5, 26).
My only other observation is that I still think Samuel diverges from Lehi
because in Lehi that knowledge never makes you free. The knowledge
condemns you. I see Lehi to be saying that all men have knowledge so they
cannot be blameless, and by the law no man is justified, so freedom doesn’t
come in knowledge (in fact I’m not sure the Book of Mormon ever speaks
of knowledge itself being the cause of freedom). Whereas Samuel’s
condensed statement omits Lehi’s teaching that we are only free because we
are redeemed from the fall by the Messiah, not because God gives us some
kind of saving knowledge. Now, of course Samuel teaches that the Son of
God comes to redeem (Helman 13:6; 14:2, 11-19). But maybe for Samuel
from the perspective of the Lamanites its being brought to that knowledge
that does make them free.
Yea, I say unto you, that the more part of them are doing this, and they are
striving with unwearied diligence that they may bring the remainder of their
brethren to the knowledge of the truth; therefore there are many who do add
to their numbers daily. And behold, ye do know of yourselves, for ye have
witnessed it, that as many of them as are brought to the knowledge of the
226
truth, and to know of the wicked and abominable traditions of their fathers,
and are led to believe the holy scriptures, yea, the prophecies of the holy
prophets, which are written, which leadeth them to faith on the Lord, and
unto repentance, which faith and repentance bringeth a change of heart unto
them— Therefore, as many as have come to this, ye know of yourselves are
firm and steadfast in the faith, and in the thing wherewith they have been
made free. (Helaman 15:6-8).
Unfortunately, with the long sentence, I really can’t tell what “the thing”
is. Skousen doesn’t say there is any textual variants here but it would make
more sense if it read “and in the truth wherewith they have been made free”
to connect with ideas in John 8:32. No where in the Book of Mormon is this
phrase repeated, but just a thought.
4) Alma 41 and 42: Perhaps there is a movement to shift the one who
punishes from God, to law, to man. It would seem at least these are the
options.
Lehi: “And because of the intercession for all, all men come unto God;
wherefore, they stand in the presence of him, to be judged of him according
to the truth and holiness which is in him” (2 Ne. 2:10). There are numerous
passages where individuals stand or are brought or come in the presence of
God or before God or this bar to be judged by Him. These are all courtroom
metaphors.
Alma: “And if their works are evil they shall be restored unto them for evil.
Therefore, all things shall be restored to their proper order, every thing to its
natural frame—mortality raised to immortality, corruption to incorruption—
raised to endless happiness to inherit the kingdom of God, or to endless
misery to inherit the kingdom of the devil, the one on one hand, the other on
the other—These are they that are redeemed of the Lord; yea, these are they
that are taken out, that are delivered from that endless night of darkness;
and thus they stand or fall; for behold, they are their own judges, whether to
do good or do evil.” (Alma 41:4, 7). Here we get an interesting twist that
people are their own judges, or that there really isn’t a “judgment” at
all. Rather there is a restoration and good is restored for good and evil
restored for evil.
Samuel: ”He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he
hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good
and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored
unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you.”
(Helaman 14:31). I think Samuel is following Alma here, rather than Lehi,
who doesn’t use the language of restoration. But I don’t think these two
expressions are mutually exclusive. At least, these thinkers seem to use both
depending on the situation.
5) fulness of time vs. fulness of times. We discussed this issue back in 2 Ne.
2:3b-4. It seems to me that the usages are very distinct. The singular refers
227
to the time Christ comes in the flesh (i.e. KJV Galatians 4:4; 2 Ne. 2:3,
26; 11:7). The plural form that appears in the KJV Ephesians 1:10, never
appears in the Book of Mormon text (but does appear in the D&C and usually
as part of the larger phrase “the dispensation of the fulness of times”). I
agree with others that the atonement applies in every age and in all times, so
in that sense it is a-historical, but I don’t want to read that concept into the
specific phrase “fulness of time” which I think is very strongly pointing to
a specific moment in salvation history. Other Bible translations of “fulness of
time” in Galatians 4:4 include “But when the set time had fully come” and
“But when the right time came” and “But when the appropriate time had
come.” So, I have a difficult time reading this other than gesturing at that
one special moment in time that is not repeated ever. It is a
moment prophesied to come in the future, and one told that happened in the
past. But again, that doesn’t mean I don’t agree the influence of God’s
atonement applies to people in every age. If the text actually said “fulness of
times” then we would get the following:
Verse 3: For thou hast beheld that in the dispensation of the fullness of
times he cometh to bring salvation unto men.
Verse 26: And the Messiah cometh in the dispensation of the fullness of
times that he might redeem the children of men from the fall.
It seems to me this would drastically change the meaning. It would
disconnect these phrases from Abinadi’s statement: “I would that ye should
understand that God himself shall come down among the children of men,
and shall redeem his people.” (Mosiah 15:1, see also Mosiah 13:34; Mosiah
17:8). It would also disconnect these verses from the passages that speak of
“the time of his coming.” (Alma 13:24, 26; 16:16; 39:16-17, 19; Helaman
14:3).
6) “punishment of the law at the great and last day.” This conforms with
notions that this life is a probationary state. Lehi does not speak of
punishment as occurring during the state of probation, rather the punishment
comes only one time at the very end after man stands before God to be
judged. Even though it may be the case that we are punished and rewarded
constantly over the course of our lives, this does not appear to be the
paradigm that Lehi uses. In addition, there seem to be only two options
here. Judgment is binary. The judgment is either eternal death or eternal
life. Notions of multiple heavens would not come into discourse until at least
1832.
REPLY
John Hilton IIIsaid:
o
April 4, 2013 at 6:52 pm
Rico,
228
Great comments here – thank you! It is interesting to see how
rarely the words “know” or “knowledge” appear in conjunction
with the word “free” (I think Lehi and Samuel are the only
individuals who use them in the way we’ve been discussing). You
shared your observation that with Lehi knowledge never makes
you free. The knowledge condemns you. I think this is an
interesting point to pursue.
Lehi says, “The Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that he
may redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that
they are redeemed from the fall they have become free forever,
knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be
acted upon, save it be by the punishment of the law at the great
and last day, according to the commandments which God hath
given” (2 Nephi 2:26).
Clearly being redeemed from the fall is what causes men to
“become free forever.” But what do we make of the next phrase,
“knowing good from evil”? How closely connected are these
phrases? Could this be read as, “Because of the redemption,
men have become free forever, essential parts of which is
knowing good from evil and having the ability to act for
themselves”? Or is it meant to be read, “Because of the
redemption, men have become free forever. They also have
knowledge and the ability to act, which things will condemn
them at the last day if they choose poorly”?
Is Samuel diverging from Lehi when he says, “Whosoever
perisheth, perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity,
doeth it unto himself; for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted
to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a
knowledge and he hath made you free” (Helaman 14:30).
Again, it is not clear how closely connected being “free” and
having “knowledge” are. Do we interpret the last clause as
saying, “God hath given unto you a knowledge and [as a result]
he hath made you free” or “God hath given unto you a
knowledge and [separate from this] he hath made you free [to
act and make your own decisions].”
I wonder to what extent a person could truly be free without
knowledge. Inherent in the ability to be free to make wise
decisions is knowledge. A pedestrian example that is helping me
think through this issue: I’ve struggled with a really bad cold for
the past six weeks. I’ve take two different rounds of antibiotics
and both times I recovered, only to immediately relapse. As I’ve
tried to figure out what to do I’ve searched several websites,
some of which encourage me to avoid antibiotics, others of
229
which tell me to take more. I’m not a doctor and I don’t really
know what the right course of action is. So while I’m free to
choose to go to the doctor (and presumably get more
antibiotics) or try to suffer through it on my own, I don’t know
that I am “free” in the fullest sense of the word. I can make a
choice, but not an informed choice, which in some senses limits
my freedom.
A quick note on your Alma 41-42 comment. I this it’s difficult to
pull apart who Samuel is referring to, and I wonder if he is
intentionally weaving together the words of multiple individuals:
Lehi: “They have become free forever, knowing good from evil;
to act for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by the
punishment of the law at the great and last day” (2 Nephi 2:26).
Jacob: “Remember that ye are free to act for yourselves—to
choose the way of everlasting death or the way of eternal life” (2
Nephi 10:23).
Alma: “And if their works are evil they shall be restored unto
them for evil…they are their own judges, whether to do good or
do evil.” (Alma 41:4, 7).
Samuel: “Ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves…He
hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he
hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye
can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have
that which is good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and
have that which is evil restored unto you.” (Helaman 14:30-31).
REPLY
3.
joespencersaid:
April 7, 2013 at 12:52 pm
I’m finally caught up on last week’s discussion, just in time to be late catching
up on this week’s discussion. :)
First, my thanks for the post and subsequent discussion. There’s a lot here to
learn from. I’ll confess, though, that I’m finding I have little to say in
response to it all. I’m happy just to be listening in.
Consequently, I’ll add to the discussion, if I can, just by doing a bit of
theological work on the text itself, ignoring all the complications of
subsequent work on these ideas by Alma, Samuel, and others. I’ll also ignore
much of what leads up to this point in 2 Nephi 2, since verse 26 marks a shift
from Lehi’s long narrative of the Fall to his relatively short—but nonetheless
remarkable—analysis of the atonement.
“and the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time” — A few things have already
been said about how this should be interpreted, and I concur. We might,
though, ask why Lehi makes a kind of return here to verse 3. Is there
230
something in particular to be learned from that? Are verses 26-27 in a certain
sense marking a transition back to the concrete setting (which will be front
and center beginning in verse 28)? Does this return suggest that verses 1425 are a kind of filling in of the background to what Jacob had already known
or witnessed or beheld somehow—as if the second half of the sermon were
meant only to clarify the stakes of what Jacob knew, so that he
could understand it?
“that he may redeem the children of men from the fall” — The preceding
dozen verses have outlined the Fall in great detail, and now we’re prepared to
see what’s at stake in redemption from it. How significant is it that Lehi
doesn’t talk about the Fall being reversed or overcome? How significant is it
that the verb in question is “to redeem”? What should be read into the use of
the phrase “the children of men” (when the preceding verses have almost
exclusively focused on “man” and “men”—except, note, in verse 21)? What
does it mean to be redeemed from the Fall? If we take the imagery in a
relatively literal fashion, it’d seem to indicate that the Fall remains a real
force, but that “the children of men” are no longer its slaves. What does that
signify? And how significant is it that this blessing seems to be universal? That
is, why should we pay attention to the fact that all human beings are
redeemed here? The idea is, I take it, that the work of the redeeming Messiah
here is the work of the resurrection specifically, the triumph over (temporal)
death. Why is that the whole of Lehi’s focus again (as it was, note, in verse
8)?
“and because that they are redeemed from the fall they have become free
forever” — Interpreters move way too quickly at this point, methinks. If what
I’ve said about the preceding line isn’t amiss, then we might render this line
as follows: “and because death has been conquered they have become free
forever.” How is death what enslaves us? How is being brought out from
under death’s sway a kind—apparently the most important kind—of freedom?
And why the emphasis on “forever”? The resurrection definitively overturns
death, but why talk about eternity here? However these details are worked
out, it seems to me that the crux of Lehi’s theology of atonement is here in
this line: the atonement is, so far as Lehi sees, entirely a question of the
event of the resurrection, and it’s a matter of death’s enslaving power being
removed so that human beings are finally free. Grace in its entirety might
consist only in this: the removal of death’s enslaving power so that
we can not-sin. Unless we’re inclined to some kind of penal-substitutionary
model of atonement (for my own part, I’m not, and I don’t think scripture
even remotely commits us to such a model), there’s no need for atonement to
be anything more than this.
“knowing good from evil” — Here’s what remains of the fall, of having
been under death’s sway, it seems to me. No longer under the enslaving
power of death, but still cognizant of the distinction between good and evil,
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human beings have been redeemed from the Fall. What’s nice is that the
freedom that has finally dawned is what makes it possible actually
to do good; without the resurrection, we’d only know good from evil (but be
unable to do anything but evil), but with the resurrection, we not only know
good from evil but can do the former and avoid the latter—if we desire.
“to act for themselves and not to be acted upon” — I hear in “not to be acted
upon” the idea of “not to be acted upon by death.” The Fall would seem to
have been aimed at making for the possibility of acting and not being acted
on—such is suggested, anyway, in verse 16—but it failed. Well, it succeeded
and failed at once. It opened the real possibility of acting for ourselves by
positioning us in a differential frame in which good and evil (and all the other
non-ontological oppositions) mean something, but it foreclosed
the practical possibility of acting for ourselves by leaving us under the
enslaving power of death. But the Messiah’s triumph over death gives us the
best of both worlds: we continue in the tension of opposition, but we do so
free—if we desire—from death. (We can, of course, choose death, as verse 27
says, but it’s now something we choose and not something we can’t avoid.)
“save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according
to the commandments which God hath given” — The only way that we’ll be
acted upon at this point, it seems, is if we choose death, because the
sinfulness that comes with choosing death reengages the disengaged law and
so brings the acting-upon punishment back into the picture. But again, this is
something that we choose, at this point.
That’s just an outline of what’s going on in verse 26. I think there’s a rather
rich theology of atonement at work in it, one that complicates most of what
we say about atonement in the Church. We’d do well to pay close attention to
it, I think….
REPLY
o
ricosaid:
April 17, 2013 at 6:56 pm
Love the questions here Joe. I’ve tried to engage some of them
in my comment below in terms of why Lehi does not speak of
the fall as being reversed, and also in our discussions on
freedom. However, I’d like to briefly list some of my responses.
I think you are exactly right that we need to explore more about
this notion of freedom. Like you, I want to say that the free in
Lehi means free from the captivity of the devil (captivity in verse
27 corresponds well with the idea of free). I feel good about
that interpretation except for or even despite the fact that Lehi
never seems to use the word this way. I think one of the
interpretive problems is that the sentence could be read one of
two ways.
232
1) And the Messiah cometh in the fullness of time that he might
redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they
are redeemed from the fall, they have
become free1 forever(knowing good from evil) to act for
themselves and not to be acted upon.
2) And the Messiah cometh in the fullness of time that he might
redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they
are redeemed from the fall, they have become free2 forever
[from death], knowing good from evil, [free1] to act for
themselves and not to be acted upon.
If “free” is grammatically connected with the verb “to act” or “to
choose” (as it is also in verse 27) then I don’t think the text is
intended to mean free “from death.” I would rather read Lehi to
say “free from death” and I think he wouldn’t disagree with this,
but I question whether the grammar of the sentence allows this
particular verse to mean this particular thing, regardless of
whether it is a true statement (and I think it is) and regardless
of whether Lehi would agree with it (and I think he would). I
can’t find the specific phrase “free from death” or “free from
hell” in the Book of Mormon text. Of course we have the “free
according to the flesh” construction in verse 27, but that could
simply be Lehi referring to “free to act” construction.
But clearly the concept is there in passages like 2 Ne. 9:10 “God,
who prepareth a way for our escape from the grasp of this awful
monster; yea, that monster, death and hell.” There is the notion
of escaping or “being set free” from death and hell. So, yes I
would agree with you but it seems there are legitimate textual
reasons to read “free” to mean “permitted to act” rather than
“free from death.” I know you are arguing that redemption here
specifically refers to the resurrection, but the connection seems
too tenuous for me.
I’ve discussed “knowing good and evil” below, and frankly there
is much more to say about what this means in the Biblical texts
than we have. But I agree with you that Lehi probably is using it
to mean discern or distinguish one from the other. However, I
still don’t quite understand why a person cannot do good if he or
she does not resurrect. Why does that logically follow? Suppose
Adam and Eve fell and God choose not to provide a
resurrection. And suppose Adam runs into a burning building
and saves his child from burning to death. Why isn’t that
considered “doing good”? Why do we say that merely because
Adam dies for good never to rise again that he
cannot dogood? What is the definition of good that is required
233
for this logic to follow? All this means, according to Nephite
theology, it that good will not be restored to that person after
their death, but why is that act in mortality then uncolored by
goodness because they cannot resurrect? Is this to say that
unless Adam can resurrect, he would never desire to save a child
in his condemned state?
I know for Lehi’s narrative to make sense he has to convince us
that Adam and Eve could do no good in the Garden. But is that
only because Adam and Eve could not die, or is it because they
lacked the ability to distinguish between good and evil? But
again, if the latter, then how can the opposing enticements have
any real effect on Adam and Eve in the Garden? Lehi wants his
audience to accept that God has provided opposing enticements
that entice Adam and Eve one way other or the other, thereby
allowing them to act for
themselves, andthat simultaneously Adam and Eve are unaware
at a cognitive level of their being enticed one way or the other
because they lack knowledge of good and evil. Right? If that is
the case, then they really cannot act for themselves in the true
sense that they are moral agents. I don’t understand how this
logic can follow. Again, Lehi tries to disconnect these
two phenomena: acting for oneself and knowing good from evil
(for a particular reason as yet unidentified) but I don’t see how
he can successfully do so (or why he wants to). Either they can
act for themselves before they eat of the fruit or they cannot. If
they can, the fruit is redundant, if they cannot, then they really
cannot act for themselves, it is a mere semblance of agency but
not true agency.
In terms of “not to be acted upon” to mean “acted upon by
death” how then do we reconcile this interpretation with verses
13 and 14 that God created “both things to act and things to be
acted upon”? Isn’t this the creation? Are you then saying that
God created things to act death and things to be acted upon by
death? I don’t see the symmetry. Why not say, instead,
something like “not be acted upon by the law that incurs or
affixes death“? In addition, I don’t understand what you mean
by “the fall was aimed” without accepting the notion that the fall
was intended by God and designed by him. Given Lehi’s
theology, I’m inclined to agree Lehi sets things up as if to say
God is intending the fall (another theological move), but if that is
the case, I don’t understand what you mean by it “failed.”
REPLY
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joespencersaid:

May 2, 2013 at 1:21 pm
First point: I don’t see a strong difference between
the two readings of “free.” Why? Because I see
“free to act for themselves and not to be acted
upon” as being equivalent to “free from death.” The
former is, I take it, a fuller way of explaining the
latter. Because what acts upon us is death (in this
sense we’re, according to verse 27, free to choose
life!), to be free to act is to be free from death. So,
at any rate, it seems to me.
Second point: I don’t mean to say that one can’t do
good unless one resurrects, but that one can’t do
good unless one is oriented to the resurrection—
that is, unless one is dis-oriented from (her or his
unique) death. So long as what one does is a way
of serving death, even if what one does has
positive effects or is beneficial, it still fails to be
good, in my view. This is a very Pauline point: it
isn’t the work itself that is either good or evil, but
the orientation of the work, whether it responds to
grace (the resurrection) or to self (death).
Third point: I think you’re reading Lehi right, but
I’m not particularly mystified by the claims. I take
Lehi’s point to be that God’s intention
was eventually to set up the possibility of human
beings acting for themselves, not immediately(that
is, in the Garden) to set up that possibility. The
way to do that had to unfold in several stages:
Adam and Eve had to be inserted into a differential
framework (the two trees seem to accomplish this);
they then had to come to recognize that differential
framework (eating the fruit seems to accomplish
this); they then had to be freed from the
overwhelming influence of what guarantees that
differential framework (namely, from death, and
this is accomplished by the resurrection). Only with
the fall behind them and the resurrection ahead of
them, on my reading, do human beings become
free to act for themselves and not to be acted
upon. Hence, the fall failed only in the sense that it
didn’t alone set up the possibility of acting for
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oneself. I don’t mean to suggest that God failed,
though—only that the fall doesn’t get things all the
way. I assume God knew that and planned on the
resurrection business from the beginning.
ricosaid:

May 2, 2013 at 6:04 pm
1) Which death do you have in mind? I think what
complicates this discussion for me is that the
Nephites have a bifurcated notion of death: the first
death (temporal death) and the second death
(spiritual death). So, when you say “free from
death” which one do you mean? I can’t understand
this to mean free from the first death since it is
appointed unto men to die. All must die and all
must resurrect and the choices of man play zero
role as to whether man will resurrect. That leaves
us with the second death, that man is free (not
from the first death) but from the second death. Is
this what you mean?
2) Same question as before. Here again, all men
are already oriented towards the resurrection, are
they not? This has nothing to do with their choices
in this life, but this is the result of Christ raising
from the dead. As a result, I’m not sure what sense
it makes to say that a personresponds to the
resurrection. Even if the wicked wish not to be
resurrected and wish to “become extinct both soul
and body” and wish not be “brought to stand in the
presence of God, to be judged” they must
resurrect. I sense you may be saying something
different, but I’m just trying to wrestle out some
clarity.
3) But my question is why all these steps? Why
does Lehi (or the text, or the Book of Mormon) feel
he needs to improve upon the Genesis narrative by
including these additional steps, which do not
seem, at least on my reading, to serve any
significant function. They don’t seem to resolve any
particular theological concern. In other words, if we
liken Lehi’s overall argument to a machine, it
seems to have more parts than needed, and it isn’t
236
clear how his innovations improve the task. What
does it add to the narrative?
Normally, we can look to how later Nephi
interpreters take up these ideas and repeat or
elaborate them for clues, but we look in vain for
anyone else in the text to repeat these steps. Might
that tell us something? One might argue that its
possible other Nephites simply didn’t have Lehi’s
discourse, but we know from our discussions that
other Nephites are borrowing heavily from Lehi’s
discourse. So that line of argument doesn’t hold up.
What meaning should we take from the fact that
despite borrowing Lehi’s ideas and language, they
seem to throw out these steps? Is it that they
disagree, don’t understand, don’t see the need?
joespencersaid:

May 3, 2013 at 12:57 pm
Well, my complete inability to communicate this
clearly may make perfectly obvious that there’s a
good deal of theological work on the Book of
Mormon presupposed in everything I’m saying.
Rather than answering your questions directly,
then, let me spell out my reading of Book of
Mormon atonement theology a bit and see if that
clarifies things. (And I might note that at least one
subsequent Nephite sermon seems to have picked
up on these sorts of ideas: Alma 12. It’s not Lehi
alone who works through this sort of series of
steps. Not at all.)
A number of passages in the Book of Mormon make
clear that, while there is a certain sort of distinction
between Christ’s resurrection and
Christ’s atonement, they can’t be uncoupled from
one another. This is made clearest, I think, in the
fact that the Nephites never distinguish between
two redeeming events: there is one redeeming
event, namely, the rising of Christ from the grave.
What we usually think of as just the event of the
resurrection is what the Nephites consider to be
the one event of redemption—with effects both
temporal and spiritual. If we’re to get anywhere in
making sense of the Nephite theology of
237
atonement—what few constants there may be in it
over the course of its development in Nephite
history—we’ve got to begin by asking, theologically,
what could be meant by claiming that spiritual
redemption is effected in some way by Christ’s
resurrection.
This is confirmed by the much more readily
acknowledge fact that, in the Book of Mormon (as
in our common discourse), there’s an inextricable
entanglement betweensin and death. We say that
death entered the world through the eating of the
fruit in Eden, and we also say that sin had its
beginning in the same event. The Nephites are
clear on this point as well. Most radically, we have
Jacob in 2 Nephi 9 saying that death is the very
anchor of sin, since we’d remain in utter sinfulness
without the resurrection being a reality. Here again,
if we’re to get anywhere with the Nephite theology
of atonement, we’re going to have to think carefully
about how death—mere temporal death—has
effects both temporal and spiritual, about how sin is
somehow a function of death.
How to make sense of this? I think we ought to
recognize that sin is a certain sort of relationship to
one’s death. That, I think, is implied in—and has
theologically to be riddled out of—the Nephite
conception of things. Mortality, our death-boundness, gets us sinning. Our flesh ends up with a
certain sort of evil in it—not because that’s just the
nature of flesh per se, but because flesh ends up
subject to death, ends up oriented to death.
Inasmuch as our entire horizon is bounded by
death, we give ourselves to sin. (Why? That’s a
complicated philosophical and theological story that
would require me to start providing bibliographies,
etc. For the moment, just work with me.) And it
seems that, so long as we remain under the sway
of death, we can’t get out from under sin.
We’re trapped in sin due to our being trapped in
mortality. We might say it radically: we can’t do
good so long as we’re irrevocably mortal.
But then there’s the resurrection. Christ effects the
(future) resurrection through His own (past)
238
resurrection. That trumps death and frees us all
from the power of sin. It becomes possible to do
good. That is, we’re finally free according to the
flesh, to act and not to be acted upon. The reality
of the resurrection—but only on the horizon—is
such that we can do otherwise than sin. The root of
sin has been pulled out, and we’re free to do
otherwise than wallow in self-pity.
But there’s a twist. The resurrection isn’t yet.
Indeed, all we have is a preached word, claiming
that Christ rose from the dead, and that
that past event says something about
afuture redemption from death. We, as hearers of
the word, are caught between the reality of death,
which we can see working in us in all sorts of ways,
and the word of the resurrection, which we can’t
see at all. We have no evidence that Christ really
rose from the dead, and we just have to take the
word of Christ’s messengers on faith. We’re free of
sin-bound mortality, but we can’t know that we’re
free. To be faithful is to act as if our death-boundness has been trumped. To be faithful is to trust
that wecan do otherwise than we’ve always done.
We’ll still have no evidence, but we’ll have to work
in faith.
At this point, then, we have a kind of fundamental
choice. We can decide that the resurrection talk is
sheer nonsense, and we can remain oriented to
death. We can do so consciously and explicitly, but
we can also do so implicitly and unconsciously. We
can say a whole lot about how we believe in Christ
and trust that the resurrection took place, etc.,
while nonetheless obsessing over ourselves and
doing nothing but sin. Or we can decide that the
resurrection talk is the truth of truths, and we can
become oriented to the resurrection. This, too, I
think, can be either explicit and conscious or
implicit and unconscious, but I’ll leave that
complicating point aside for the moment. If we give
ourselves to the truth of the preached word, we
become oriented to the resurrection, and we begin
to act in a non-sinful way. We’re freed from sin and
death, and we begin to do whatever work God
239
would have us do. The flesh itself is transformed—
though indiscernibly—and we’re free according to
it, no longer acted upon by death. We act. And
perhaps for the first time.
That’s the picture I’m working with, and it’s one
I’ve worked up over years of theological study of
the Book of Mormon. I think it’s the best way to
make sense of the whole book, when it comes to
the “plan of salvation.” And it’s what I see working
all the way through 2 Nephi 2.
Now, you ask why these “additional steps” are
helpful. I’m not entirely sure what you mean. I
don’t see there being anything here that’s so much
in addition to the Genesis story, nor do I see how
any of this isn’t absolutely crucial. So that’ll have to
be clarified for me. But hopefully this clarifies what
I’m after….
4.
ricosaid:
April 17, 2013 at 4:18 am
Great questions John. I should probably correct myself and point out that Lehi
doesn’t explicitly state that knowledge of the law condemns. I inferred that
based on his view of the law. Certainly the law does; it is certainly not a
salvific law that Lehi has in mind. But I don’t want to make too much of that
because I don’t think Lehi is focused on knowledge. I will have to explain
what I mean by that in a later comment. But let me see if I can’t answer the
rest of your questions.
All, this is a comment I’ve had in draft for a week or so, so it might look like
I’m ignoring some of the discussion that occurred after I wrote it, but I’m just
trying to kick out these ideas with the little time we have left, and trying not
to worry about how they fit into our larger discussion.
One question that keeps coming to me is why Lehi (or the text) chooses to
utilize the Genesis account in the manner he does. Why does he choose to
highlight certain portions, omit certain portions, or add his own ideas to the
narrative?
So, I’d like to examine the development of the Genesis account up until Lehi
and then see how Lehi modifies the narrative and more importantly inquire
why he does this.
For some of my ideas, I’m drawing on W. Malcolm Clark, “A Legal Background
to the Yahwist’s Use of “Good and Evil” in Genesis 2-3,” Journal of Biblical
Literature88, no. 3 (Sep., 1969): 266-278. Clark writes:
The basic dialectic in the pre-J tradition is the connection of life and
knowledge, although for J this element becomes less important. The concern
240
of this pre-J story is “why is man so like the gods in that he has knowledge
and yet so unlike the gods in that he is mortal?” -a common motif in the
ancient Near East. “Knowledge” is what gods and men share and what
distinguishes men from animals. (266).
Clark takes the position that the phrase “good and evil” was not original to
the story but introduced by the J tradition for a particular reason. ”To know
good and evil,” Clark argues should not be understood as a case of merismus
where “good and evil” means everything or indicates omniscience (as in
saying “we searched high and low” to mean “everywhere”). Rather, Clark
argues, “good and evil” refers to a legal judgment or the position to declare
what is good and what is bad:
Judgment in the OT is ultimately a matter for God. Man exercises judgment
only as the agent of God and to distort this judgment means that one is held
responsible before God. . . . Applied to Gen 2 f., I think this investigation
strengthens the position of those who say that the J emphasis is not on the
content of knowledge but on man’s moral autonomy. Man takes upon himself
the responsibility of trying apart from God to determine whether something is
good for himself or not. It is not that man has no knowledge before and gains
knowledge, or that to know good and evil means to experience evil in addition
to good. Rather, man himself declares what is good. He does what is good in
his own eyes rather than what is good in the eyes of God. . . .If the trees of
life and knowledge are central in the pre-J narrative, the “tree of command” is
central for J.
. . . Unlike Laban, Adam did not accept the decision from God as sufficient
reason to preclude him from making a contrary decision. Man would
determine himself what was good and what was not—a divine prerogative.
Thus, like Solomon and David, in regard to knowing good and evil Adam
became like God (vs. 22), with the difference that he had seized this likeness
whereas it was given to Solomon. (277-78).
I want to explore whether this might assist in reading Lehi. If we can follow
the development of the Garden narrative from pre-J, to J, to Lehi, it could
highlight Lehi’s meaning. I’m still trying to work through how Lehi’s discourse
compares to these narratives, so please jump in, but
my tentative observations are as follows:
1) Like J, Lehi is not so much focused “on the content of knowledge but on
man’s moral autonomy.” Lehi eliminates all together reference to the name
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, preferring instead to use the term
“forbidden fruit” and thereby highlighting the “tree of command.” The focus
is not on knowledgebut the fact that the fruit was forbidden by God.
2) Unlike J, Lehi reads into the Garden narrative an ontological framework
requiring an opposition in all things for man to act for himself (using
a differentmethod from J to focus on a concern of man’s moral autonomy that
both Lehi and Jseem to share). Lehi describes creation of things to act and to
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be acted upon (a distinction not found in the Genesis account). In order to
set up an oppositional element in the Garden he imputes evil to the serpent
(a point not made in Genesis) and associates the serpent with an angel that
fell from heaven because he sought that which was evil (borrowing Isaiah
14:2-15). This sets up an opposition element in the Garden allowing for man
to act for himself.
However, to act for oneself seems to be a distinct idea from gaining
knowledge of good and evil and becoming as God. For Lehi, the opposing
enticements in the Garden is all that is necessary to say that man can act for
himself, so what does knowing good and evil mean for Lehi? I’m struck that
Adam and Eve can act for themselves well before they partake of the
fruit. We can contrast this with the J story where knowing good and evil is
the moment where man becomes morally autonomous in that man takes it
upon himself to declare what is good or bad. Unlike J, Lehi doesn’t seem to
take “good and evil” to mean a legal judgment or declaration, and therefore
does not seem associate good and evil with man making his own moral
judgments.
So what does Lehi mean by “good and evil”? He discusses good and evil in
three passages: v5 “men are instructed sufficiently that they know good
from evil“; v18 “Partake of the forbidden fruit, and ye shall not die, but ye
shall be as God, knowing good and evil.”; v26 “And because that they are
redeemed from the fall, they have become free forever, knowing good from
evil.” This seems to be significant.
Bracketing for a moment any discussion of possible underlying Hebrew (only
focusing on English), notice how Lehi changes the phrase from
“good and evil” to “good from evil.” It is significant that this construction
that does not appear in the KJV Bible (leaving only the serpent’s language
unmodified). Lehi (or the text) seems to be using the phrase to mean
“discern good from evil” and by extension to be able to discern between
misery and happiness. The Book of Mormon is idiosyncratic in its usage of
this phrase. (Abinadi even inverts this phrase to “knowing evil from good,
subjecting themselves to the devil.” cf. Mosiah 16:3).
2) Perhaps most radically, Lehi envisions the Garden of Eden much different
from J. I’m drawing upon Gary Anderson, “Celibacy or Consummation in the
Garden? Reflections on Early Jewish and Christian Interpretations of the
Garden of Eden,” The Harvard Theological Review 82, no. 2 (April 1989): 121148. In Genesis, the garden represents fertility. God commands Adam and
Eve to multiply and replenish. Adam searches for a mate and rejoices when
he finally has Eve brought to him (see Gary Anderson’s discussion of zo’t
happa’am, 125-127). Presumably Adam and Eve experience joy in eating and
drinking in the Garden. Eve, upon looking at the forbidden fruit, notes that it
is pleasurable. There still seems to be joy in the Garden. The root ‘d-n, as
argued by Anderson, is related to sexual joy (137). Even the punishment
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directed towards Eve after the fall is not that childbirth will be a brand new
experience, but that God will multiply her pain in childbirth (and she can’t
avoid that pain by avoiding her husband she will desire her husband). Lehi
seems to reject all of that for reasons that continue to remain a mystery.
For Lehi, the Garden is not a place where Adam and Eve can have joy,
requiring man to transgress the commandments to experience joy
(an unprecedented and theologically bewildering move that I might point out
has absolutely no logical relationship to the felix culpa tradition). By
transgressing the commandments and partaking the forbidden fruit Adam is
cut off temporally and spiritually and therefore requires a redemption. This
too, is not found in Genesis.
Lehi seems to say that two things happened as a result of partaking the
forbidden fruit: 1) they became as God being able to discern good from evil
(but they could act for themselves before this) and 2) they were cut off and
lost. One could conceive the redemption as reversing both 1 and 2. That is,
through the redemption Adam and Eve 1) become innocent again and 2) are
brought back into the presence of God. Lehi wants to make it clear that the
redemption only affects 2, not 1. In other words, they retain their ability to
discern good from evil. The purpose of redemption is not to restore
everything to how it was in the Garden (because the Garden is not ideal for
Lehi), but only to free man from death and hell. For this reason I view Lehi to
be saying:
And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free
forever (knowing good from evil) to act for themselves and not to be acted
upon—save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day,
according to the commandments which God hath given.
But what I see happening in the Nephite tradition is that knowing good and
evil gets conflated or equated with being free to choose (even though Lehi
deliberate disconnects these two things).
We know Lehi is drawing upon the Garden story but I’m intrigued by the
portions that Lehi omits. Lehi tells us what the serpent said to Eve but
doesn’t tell us what happened afterwards. Lehi never refers to Genesis 3:7,
22. For example, we don’t get the following:
[W]herefore, [the serpent] said: “Partake of the forbidden fruit, and ye shall
not die, but ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.” And after Adam and
Eve had partaken of the forbidden fruit, [missing: their eyes were opened
(Genesis 3:7) and they became like the Gods knowing good and evil
(Genesis 3:22) and] they were driven out from the garden of Eden to till
the earth.
In the Genesis account, God doesn’t give Adam and Eve knowledge of good
and evil. Adam and Eve seize this knowledge for themselves. I think that’s
an integral part of the Genesis account. For this reason I view references to
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God giving knowledge of good and evil to be a divergence from the Genesis
account.
The Book of Mormon, does however, speak of God giving knowledge of the
plan of redemption or knowledge of the truth. He sends angels and prophets,
etc (as articulated in Alma 12:28-30). Perhaps that is why I like to think that
Samuel means knowledge of the truth (but again maybe he isn’t saying that
at all, maybe this is just a divergence).
But what if we looked at Lehi’s omissions as important? Suppose that Lehi
omits Genesis 3:7 and 22 deliberately in order to craft a new kind of
narrative. God is the one who creates the situation where man can act for
himself. As Lehi states: “Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he
should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it
should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.” (2 Ne. 2:16). Is Lehi
disagreeing with J in some way here?
Incidentally, this is another reason why I don’t see Lehi to be teaching
that knowledge makes one free. Adam and Eve were free to act for
themselves the moment they “were enticed by the one or the other” and
knowledge is not required. Lehi is saying that they could act for
themselves before they ate the forbidden fruit and before they had a
knowledge of good and evil. In a strange way, Lehi separates “act for
himself” from “know good and evil.” But again, for what reason? Why is Lehi
not satisfied with the J account?
Now, this leads to a situation where “if Adam had not transgressed, he would
not have fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden, and all
things which were created must have remained in the same state which they
were after they were created” but Adam and Eve would still be free to act for
themselves in the Garden (but apparently those actions could not be
considered good or evil).
But this is not the only way to read the narrative. I would like to point out
that each day that Adam and Eve are not eating the forbidden fruit they are
being obedient to the commandment not to eat the forbidden fruit! (So we
have righteousness, not to mention reaping the reward of immortal life each
day they abstain from the forbidden fruit). We have opposition in the Garden
and we have law in the Garden and Adam and Eve can act for themselves in
the Garden. By Lehi’s own definition the Garden is not “one body” but “a
compound in one.” We have every ingredient Lehi claims we need, and yet
Lehi still argues that a violation of God’s commandment is necessary or else
there is no joy in the Garden.
Finally, we could understand the word free in a variety of different
ways. Here are two: 1) free as in permitted or allowed (Helaman 14:30 “ye
are permitted to act for yourselves”; “free to choose” 2 Ne. 2:27; “free to act”
10:23; ) or 2) free as in released or delivered from death, hell, captivity of
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the devil. (2 Ne. 9: 7-12). I think you are right Joe that we need to think
more about what free means.
To reiterate, it would seem to me that in the Genesis account man already
acts for himself in that he is created in the image of God (being in the image
of God plays no role in Lehi, although other Nephites use it). The Genesis
text assumes that man acts for himself. The Genesis account, it seems to
me, does not require this elaborate system of external structures to bring out
the situations where man could act for himself. But in either of these two
scenarios, I don’t see a causal nexus between knowledge and freedom.
But all this leads to my largest question. Accepting that Lehi is playing the
role of patriarch-philosopher, grafting into the Genesis account
a philosophical system of ontological, ethical and existential opposites, why
does he do this? What about the traditional Genesis account is he not
satisfied with? What theological or exegetical worries is Lehi trying to solve
by his narrative? And isn’t it curious that Lehi’s more metaphysical
emendations don’t seem to ever get repeated by anyone else in the Nephite
tradition, only a severely reductionist version (or inaccurate version) of Lehi’s
ontology survives, if it survives at all. Does this mean none of the other
Nephites could understand Lehi either, or were not sure what to make of him?
Lastly, I know there is a lot to disagree with here, and the text is a maze of a
thousand passages and all that, so I know one temptation is to escape into
agnosticism as to what the text could ever mean, and how we could ever
know it, etc., but I still think it is worth to ask these questions, despite the
difficulties.
REPLY
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
April 23, 2013 at 4:05 pm
Rico, great work. I love how you are helping me worm deeper
into the text. I especially appreciate your concluding comment,
“I know one temptation is to escape into agnosticism as to what
the text could ever mean, and how we could ever know it, etc.,”
Truly it is head-spinning to think of the various possibilities and I
have to admit, I have been tempted to say, “Well, it’s anybody’s
guess!”
For me, part of the temptation to become agnostic about the
meaning of the text is that we are forced to make so many
assumptions. For example, you ask why Lehi “chooses to utilize
the Genesis account in the manner he does. Why does he choose
to highlight certain portions, omit certain portions, or add his
own ideas to the narrative?”
This is a great question, but it also assumes that Lehi is
intentionally omitting certain portions of the text because he
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doesn’t agree with them or wants to rework them in some
fashion. I am not sure that “Lehi is playing the role of patriarchphilosopher, grafting into the Genesis account a philosophical
system of ontological, ethical and existential opposites.”
A person today could conceivably give a talk focusing on
selected verses from 2 Nephi 2, without any intention of
minimizing the rest of the chapter. But then, 2000+ years later,
others could be analyzing that talk and asking, “Why did Elder
Smith avoid certain sections of 2 Nephi 2? Why did he omit a
focus on verses 27-28?” when in reality, Elder Smith just had
limited time, or a different focus at that time, with no intention
of minimizing any portion of the text.
All of this is to say that we have to be cautious (and I know that
you are) about imputing motives to Lehi because we have so
little to go on.
Notwithstanding the difficulty, I understand that we need to
keep on digging. So with that caveat aside, I’d like to pursue a
little bit more the idea that “Lehi is not so much focused “on the
content of knowledge but on man’s moral autonomy.” Regarding
some of your statements:
-I think your point about the “forbidden fruit” vs “tree of
knowledge” is significant. Likewise the point regarding
opposition.
-Your point about knowing good from evil before the fall is
interesting. I think I understand your line of logic; at the same
time we have Eve’s statement that “Were it not for our
transgression we …never should have known good and evil”
(Moses 5:11). Is Lehi saying something different from Eve, or
are these two ways of looking at the same issue? Or do they
mean different things by the phrase “knowing good and evil”?
-I did a little searching on the phrase “good from evil.” Doing a
Google Book search between 1600-1800 yields hundreds of
results for the phrase “good from evil” (there are also a few
dozen “evil from good.”) This makes me wonder how much we
can depend on the usage being significant, although your point
that the phrase appears throughout the Book of Mormon is also
important. It could be argued that its occurrence in Moses 6:56
could make it a derivative of brass plate text.
-In addition to your comment that “Lehi seems to say that two
things happened as a result of partaking the forbidden fruit” I
would add a third. It seems to me that the result of partaking of
the fruit that Lehi most emphasizes concerns posterity. Lehi
states, “they have brought forth children; yea, even the family
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of all the earth,” “If Adam had not transgressed he would not
have fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden.
And all things which were created must have remained in the
same state in which they were after they were created; and they
must have remained forever, and had no end. And they would
have had no children,” and “Adam fell that men might be.”
Now I don’t know that Lehi is intentionally focusing on the
connection between the fall and posterity, if is he is, this seems
to follow the account in Genesis (“in sorrow thou shalt bring
forth children,” and “Adam called his wife’s name Eve; because
she was the mother of all living.” It would represent an even
stronger connection with the account in Moses: “Were it not for
our transgression we never should have had seed.”
-I like how you provide some definitions of free. Here are some
others, although likely not as germane to the present
conversation. Free as in “not in slavery” (1 Nephi 4:33, 2 Nephi
10:16), free as in “without cost” (2 Nephi 26:33), free as in
“without compulsion” (Mosiah 22:10), free as in generously
(Jacob 2:17, Mosiah 22:10), and free as in “open” (Alma 23:2)
(and there are still other ways the word is used).
Interestingly, the two definitions of free that you described only
appear in the Book of Mormon (double check me on this) in 2
Nephi 2, 2 Nephi 9-10, Mosiah 5 (?), Mosiah 18, Mosiah 23 (?),
Alma 30 (?), Alma 58, 61 (?), Helaman 14-15. Curiously Alma
42, which has been shown to be parallel to 2 Nephi 2 in so many
ways uses the word free only in passing, and it has the meaning
of “without cost” or “generously.” I do agree that a deeper study
on the word free could be in order.
Rico, I know I have hardly begun to respond to your comment
and I apologize for stopping short. I hope this is enough to keep
the conversation going amongst all of us in the group, because I
would love for it to continue.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
May 2, 2013 at 1:26 pm
Fantastic stuff here, Rico, and helpful responses, John. Thanks to
you both. I don’t have much to say in response except thank
you, and thank you especially, Rico, for pointing out how it’s
particularly thisontological business of verse 11 that doesn’t
seem ever to have been picked up by the Nephite tradition.
That’s crucial, and it may give me a starting place for my
paper….
247
REPLY
5.
ricosaid:
May 2, 2013 at 6:11 pm
John, I really appreciate your comment.
1) I think we are always making assumptions with the text. As you point
out, we cannot help but do so. My aim is to examine our assumptions (or
hypotheses) and explore whether those assumptions have merit. Ultimately,
some questions may yield very little fruit, but others could be significant. It’s
hard to know what a question will yield before asking it. Your suggestion to
be cautious when interpreting narrative omissions, gaps, and silence, is very
well taken. The approach of considering omissions as a narrative device is an
important tool of textual interpretation. Recently, Hardy utilizes this tool
(very cautiously!), and cites Meir Sternberg’s The Poetics of Biblical
Narrative. Sternberg discusses the importance of the Narrator’s Reticence
and Omissions. If we assume that omissions are unintentional and the result
of lack of time or space, we may miss out on important insights. It think the
time is ripe to consider omissions in the Book of Mormon to interpret the
narrative. We may decide that some omissions are not deliberate, but again,
I think it would be important to explore this issue.
2) On the one hand, there are good reasons to keep the Book of Moses and
the Book of Mormon distinct and separate in terms of narrative. In other
words, it may be better to view the Book of Mormon text as a closed
system. Lehi may have his own logic in crafting his particular narrative that
has a much different emphasis and goal than the author of the Book of
Moses. In other words, the Book of Moses may have its own internal logic
and narrative goals. By taking the Book of Moses as an extension of the
narrative in Lehi, we risk overlooking the possibility that the texts contain
their own distinct narrative logic. We may unintentionally harmonize these
two accounts. On the other hand, there are good reasons to look to the Book
of Moses when seeking to interpret Lehi. Both texts came through Joseph
Smith, and the texts are close in time (as well as D&C 29) compared to other
texts. As a result, there is less possibility for radical doctrinal development in
the interim. I sense that looking at these texts together will tell us something
different than looking at the text in Lehi on its own without reference to the
Book of Moses. And as we discussed earlier, others have posited that the
Book of Moses represents an earlier source and that Lehi’s account may be
derivative.
In terms of actual production, it is the Book of Moses
comes afterthe Book of Mormon, and I don’t see strong evidence in Lehi’s
account t that Lehi possessed what Joseph Smith produced as the Book of
Moses. As I mentioned in a previous comment, the Book of Moses contains
doctrinal markers that if possessed by Lehi, would mean we should get a
much different teaching.
248
3) I would like to know more about the context of your search for the phrase
“good and evil.” My own searches show that the phrase “good from evil”
occur very frequently in the context of the larger phrase “distinguishing good
from evil” or “discern good from evil” in addition to “know good from
evil.” So to recap, here is what we have:
The KJV Bible never uses the
English construction ”know good from evil” but it does use the construction
“good and evil.” It would seem that 17th to 19th century English texts often
use the construction “distinguishgood from evil” or
“discern good from evil” and “know good from evil.” The Book of Mormon
uses both constructions ”good and evil” and “good from evil.” Based on this
alone, what does this tell us, if anything?
Any any rate, Clark’s reading of Genesis is probably considered novel in that
the tradition preceding him tends to view knowledge of good and evil
as discernmentor the ability to distinguish, or judge between good and evil or
judge good fromevil, rather than the ability for man to declare, in his own
eyes, what is good and what is evil, an element that Clark would argue makes
the narrative work, and functions as the very thing that makes Adam and Eve
like the God who declares to man what is good and what is evil.
The view incorporated in the Book of Mormon and even in the Book of Moses
seems to be that of the ability to distinguish, discern, or judge. ”I can judge
between thee and God . . . wherefore I can judge between him and thee.”
(Moses 1:15, 18). Clark notes that in the Old Testament, judgment is always
a matter for God and man may judge good and evil only as an agent of God,
but never independent of God. This seems to hold true in the Book of
Mormon. Man may be free to choose, but man is never free to judge what is
good and what is evil independent or apart from God. This is seen very
clearly in Mormon’s words: “For behold, my brethren, it is given unto you to
judge, that ye may know good from evil. . . For behold, the Spirit of Christ
is given to every man, that he may know good from evil; wherefore, I show
unto you the way to judge. . . ye should search diligently in the light of Christ
that ye may know good from evil.” (Moroni 7:15-16, 19). This “know” clearly
means “discern.” But again, Mormon’s language seems to diverge from Lehi,
or he seems to be disconnected from Lehi’s teachings. Isn’t the ability to
discern between good and evil a result of the fall (“men are sufficiently
instructed”)? If this is the result of the fall, why does man then need the
Spirit of Christ as a substitute for the knowledge of good and evil? Isn’t this
just redundant? Or is Mormon now retroactively reading the Spirit of Christ
into the fall narrative? This is why I don’t think we can have a consistent
theology of the Book of Mormon. The Book of Mormon seems to contain
distinct and separate theologies. Both Lehi and Mormon might agree that
God creates conditions so man can judge, but they do not get there in the
same manner.
249
As a result, it may be that Clark would be more useful in interpreting Genesis,
but less useful in interpreting Lehi because Lehi seems to be following a 19th
century interpretation of Genesis. Or in other words, it may be doubtful
that Lehi interprets “good and evil” in the way Clark suggests was the intent
of J.
4) Whether Adam and Eve together in the Garden in their prelapsarian state
could have had children or not is still an unresolved tension. And either way
we decide we have serious theological problems. Orson Pratt, for example,
argues that Adam and Eve were able to have children in the Garden because
God gave the commandment to Adam and Eve before the fall and
not after the fall. Pratt rejected any notion that God would command Adam
and Eve to do something that they were incapable of doing. He certainly
rejects any notion that God would give conflicting commandments or that he
would require man to break one commandment to obey another. The reason
I cite Orson Pratt’s view is not that I consider it authoritative and not even
because I think it is the best reading of the text, but rather because he
articulates well and explains the essential problem. This is why Pratt argues
that Adam and Eve would not be able to have children due to
being separated in proximity (Eve being cast out for eating the fruit and Adam
remaining in the Garden). Otherwise, we are left with the ethical problem of
God providing conflicting commandments to his children and then punishing
them for any move they make to the right or the left. The history of exegesis
on this point is a history of Mormon interpreters trying to find some way, any
way, to reconcile these difficulties (arguing God didn’t really punish or God
didn’t really give commandments, the forbidden fruit wasn’t really forbidden,
etc). And most of these interpretations are resisted by the text or narrative
logic on almost on every point.
But this is precisely why I point out that Lehi omits any reference to God
commanding man to multiply and replenish the earth (Genesis 1:28). Lehi’s
narrative might make sense if we eliminate the commandment to multiply
and replenish the earth. Otherwise, God commands Adam and Eve to do the
impossible and then punishes them, or worse, commands Adam and Eve to be
disobedient, not unlike the Serpent in the narrative. After Orson Pratt’s
death, Mormon interpreters went the other way and argued that Adam and
Eve could not have children in the Garden and its been that way ever
since. Yet, this interpretation has problems that have never been
satisfactorily resolved.
REPLY
6.
ricosaid:
May 6, 2013 at 9:01 pm
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(And I might note that at least one subsequent Nephite sermon seems to
have picked up on these sorts of ideas: Alma 12. It’s not Lehi alone who
works through this sort of series of steps. Not at all.)
First, let me address Alma 12, because I think it will illustrate what I am
getting at in terms of Lehi’s unnecessary steps in 2 Nephi 2. Lehi feels this
need to discuss opposition as necessary for man to act for himself. Alma 12
contains no trace of Lehi’s ontology of opposites as a necessary stage for
agency to occur. In fact, it seems to me the purpose of Alma 12 is not to
specifically address agency but immortality (Antionah’s question). Yes, it is
true Alma talks about agency but notice how Alma skips over Lehi’s step.
Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men, they having first transgressed
the first commandments as to things which were temporal, and becoming as
gods, knowing good from evil, placing themselves in a state to act, or being
placed in a state to act according to their wills and pleasures, whether to do
evil or to do good (Alma 12:31).
I suggested previously that this is a departure from Lehi. Alma is saying that
Adam and Eve placed themselves in a state to act by partaking of the
forbidden fruit, knowing good from evil1. By contrast, Lehi teaches
that God places man in a state to act by creating opposing enticements apart
from knowing good and evil (2 Ne. 2:16). For Lehi, it would appear that Adam
and Eve could act for themselves the moment two opposing enticements were
brought into existence and the forbidden fruit is not required. Although they
can act for themselves in the Garden, Lehi maintains they can do no
good. (Lehi eliminates the element of Adam and Eve’s eyes being
opened as occurring after the partaking of the fruit). Now, when we get to
Alma’s sermon, there is no need for Alma to repeat to his audience Lehi’s
teaching that before partaking the fruit, God needed to set up the first stage
by providing opposing enticements, as a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition to eventuate moral agency and also that Adam and Eve could do no
good in the Garden. This is what I mean by no one repeating Lehi’s steps.
Now, I can anticipate someone saying that Alma and Lehi are saying the same
thing. Lehi is saying Adam and Eve could act for themselves in the Garden
but couldn’t do evil or good. After they fall they still can act for themselves
but now can do evil and good, and Alma is simply repeating that last part
(skipping over Lehi’s elaboration of opposites and the opposing enticements
as a necessary initial state in the Garden, etc). Even if this is the case, Lehi’s
steps are still unnecessary to Alma’s sermon and he does not repeat them.
____
1. It could be that Alma senses his statement isn’t entirely accurate and tries
to correct it by rephrasing himself to say “or being placed in a state to act.”
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
251
May 7, 2013 at 1:02 pm
I see. I misunderstood your comment. Yes, Lehi goes further
than Alma in his talk about opposition. I thought you meant by
“extra steps” the idea that there had to be a tension between fall
and atonement—that the fall wasn’t alone enough to set up
agency in full. That I see Alma taking up as well as Lehi, though,
yes, Lehi alone frames all this in terms of opposition. I’m more
than happy to let him be the unique thinker of that. :)
REPLY
ricosaid:

May 7, 2013 at 5:25 pm
I know I wasn’t clear on what I meant by extra
steps. Over the few months we’ve seen several
thinkers in the Book of Mormon repeat or rephrase
several elements of Lehi’s teachings (Nephi, Jacob,
Alma, Samuel, King Benjamin), except, as you put
it, “Lehi alone frames all this in terms of
opposition.” It wasn’t until we explored many of
these passages related to Garden of Eden discourse
in the Book of Mormon that this came into relief.
Not only is Lehi alone in framing things in terms of
opposition, but I see it that Lehi alone makes sure
that Adam and Eve can act for themselves before
they fall. Now, it isn’t that this is novel in the
history of Eden interpretations. Many 19th century
thinkers and those earlier stressed that Adam and
Eve were moral agentsbefore the fall, or before
partaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
For those thinkers, Adam had to be a moral agent
before the fall, otherwise it made no sense to
punish him for the fall (reading the text to say that
he was in fact punished). We even see this idea
(only a moral agent can be punished) showing up
within Mormon interpretations of the Garden of
Eden, except that the opposite was concluded: that
Adam and Eve were notmoral agents before the fall
and therefore we cannot impute sin to them (and
idea that ironically interferes with interpretations
that want to argue Adam and Eve made good
decisions by intentionally falling). But Lehi seems to
diverge from traditional interpretations when he
eliminates the idea that Adam and Eve could do
good in the Garden. And I realize I may be
252
misreading “to do good.” But at the very least, Lehi
never grants the possibility that Adam and Eve
were obedient to God’s commandment during the
time they abstained from the forbidden fruit (as
others have recognized). His interpretation will not
allow him to see this as obedience. Rather he
insists that Adam and Eve could do no good in the
garden (which does seem novel among the
interpretations of the fall that I’ve canvassed, I
haven’t seen the view that Adam and Eve were
moral agents that could do not good, and I’m still
not sure it makes sense to say you can have
a moral agent incapable of doing good or evil). It’s
also that teaching that I do not recall repeated by
anyone else in the Book of Mormon.
Not sure why, but I feel compelled to keep asking
why that is the case. Why didn’t this particular idea
get passed on? Why did some and not others?
Maybe it’s nothing, but I keep feeling there is
something there that might shed light. There is a
possibility that this is intentional. When later
thinkers modify or even omit ideas of their
predecessors it can often signify disagreement. I’m
thinking of arguments you’ve made with Nephi and
Abinadi or with Alma and Amulek, for example.
Whether that is the case here, it’s too early to tell,
but it’s a possibility to consider.
7.
ricosaid:
May 6, 2013 at 9:02 pm
Joe, thanks for taking the time to explain your reading of Book of Mormon
atonement theology. I really appreciate it. This is extremely useful and helps
to clarify our possible points of divergence. My comments presume a
different understanding of the text.
First of all, I set forth the textual reasons that I believe justify a distinction
between atonement and resurrection. I see in the text a fairly consistent
tradition (with a few exceptions) of holding a distinction between atonement
and resurrection. I do not see, in the text, the atonement to be doing the
same theological work as the resurrection, nor the resurrection to be doing
the same theological work as the atonement. In my view, the fact that both
the resurrection and the atonement are both brought about in and through
Christ does not justify eliminating the fact that the Nephites use the terms
253
atonement and resurrection to mean different things. Whether there is one
redeeming event or two, does not factor into my analysis.
I agree that the text places in close proximity sin and death (as does the New
Testament) but I don’t read Jacob in the same way. Jacob chooses to speak
of death of the body and death of the spirit (2 Ne. 9:10-12). I see 2 Nephi 9
as one of the strongest textual evidence for a clear demarcation between
these two deaths.
Sin and death are related, in my reading, because the Nephites use
death analogically as a species of separation or cutting off.
What the
Nephites call the first death, the temporal death, or Jacob calls the death of
the body is understood as separation of body from spirit. It is temporal
because it will only last for a time and all will be resurrected; their body and
spirits will be reunited todie no more (Alma 11:45). What the Nephites call
the second death, spiritual death, or Jacob calls death of the spirit, being cut
off from the presence of God is understood as separation of man from God or
righteousness. The Nephites also understand that the spirit or soul
cannot die (Alma 12:20; 43:9. Nephites use souls
and spirits interchangeably. Alma 40:11, 15, 19), so this death is analogical in
the sense of a separation. There is a separation of flesh from spirit in the
one, and a separation of man from God in the other. The fact, however, that
the Nephites need to add adjectives to death (the first and second, spiritual
and temporal, death of the body, or use the phrase death of the spirit even
though the spirit cannot die) indicates to me that they mean something
different.
The analogy has limits, however, as the causes and solutions to both of these
situations are entirely distinct. God is the one who appoints unto man to die
and death is a necessary part of the plan of redemption. Spiritual death is
not a necessary part of the plan of redemption. I do not take the second
death to have more than an analogical relationship to physiological death, as
the second death cannot be cured by the resurrection, because, according to
Nephite theology, thewicked are resurrected but not considered to be
redeemed, but filthy still. I do not understand the Nephites to hold the view
that the resurrection addresses the problem of the second death, only the
first death. Immortality is not necessarily equated with righteousness.
Also, I’m not attempting in any of this to make sure this results in a theology
of atonement in the Book of Mormon. What I hear in your reading of Book of
Mormon atonement theology, is that the only sin that exists is sin that arises
because of the fact that we will die or are mortal or death-bound. The fact
that we are death-bound is ultimately the source of all sin. Overcome death
and we overcome of sin. Christ overcame death via the resurrection, and
therefore overcame sin via the resurrection. I may be mistaken, so my
apologies if I am misreading you, but the reading of atonement theology you
are outlining seems to substitute the resurrection for a theory of atonement.
254
Given that atonement theory is highly problematic
(penal substitutionary theory, etc.), I can see the rationale in finding the work
of atonement to be accomplished by the resurrection. This would eliminate
the problems associated with atonement theory. For my part, I do not see
this in the text. It may be that we are taking past each other or that I am
completely misunderstanding you. Or, it could be that we simply disagree on
the best reading of the text. I suspect that we are using different definitions
for death, mortal, flesh, sin, resurrection, atonement, all the building blocks
of a conversation on point, so I’m not entirely confident how to proceed.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
May 7, 2013 at 1:17 pm
This is helpful. A couple of very quick points:
(1) Yes, what seems to differentiate our positions is precisely
whether the fact that atonement and resurrection are effected
by a single redemption event factors into our theological
reconstructions. I don’t know how to set that fact aside, how not
to factor it into things. How can Christ’s rising from the dead
transform us spiritually? That’s the question I hear the Book of
Mormon asking me, and the account I’ve outlined is an attempt
to answer that perplexing question.
(2) I don’t disagree with more or less anything you say about
the two kinds of death discussed in the Book of Mormon. I don’t
at all mean to collapse them into one kind of death. I mean to
suggest that they—like atonement and resurrection—are
complexly interwoven. So I’m happy to concede that there are
two sorts of death. What I want to know is why they can’t be
entirely disentangled. That’s what my account of Nephite
atonement theology is meant to work out.
(3) Yes, I’m claiming that all sin is ultimately rooted in our
death-bound-ness. But that doesn’t at all imply that resurrection
simply gets rid of sin, that in being resurrected I’m no longer
sinless. The resurrection only uproots sin, and that makes it all
the more sinful to remain in sin. (Indeed, at that point, my sin
binds me to spiritual rather than temporal death; it binds me to
a kind of death that won’t be overcome.) And note that all this is
a matter of dwelling between the (announcement of the)
resurrection of Christ and our own resurrection. That’s what
interests the Nephites, that time between learning of the plan of
redemption and our own eventual deaths and resurrections, that
“time of probation.” That’s why the resurrection (Christ’s, with
only the promise of my own) uproots sin but doesn’t eradicate it.
255
I’m faced with the evidential reality of my own death, which
works all kinds of sinful things in me, but I’m told that my
death—what is most mine!—has been removed, such that I’m
free not to sin. Will I believe, be faithful to that event (Christ’s
resurrection), and so escape spiritual death? Or will I reject the
message, ignore the promise of that event, and so die
spiritually? That, I think, is what the Nephites present to us.
REPLY
2 Nephi 2: 28–30
10
WednesdayAPR 2013
POSTED BY JENNYWEBB IN UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 13 COMMENTS
The Text
28
And now, my sons, I would that ye should look to the great mediator and hearken unto his great commandments—
and be faithful unto his words, and choose eternal life according to the will of his Holy Spirit, 29and not choose
eternal death according to the will of the flesh and the evil which is therein, which giveth the spirit of the devil
power to captivate, to bring you down to hell that he may reign over you in his own kingdom.
30
I have spoken these few words unto you all, my sons, in the last days of my probation. And I have chosen the good
part, according to the words of the prophet. And I have none other object save it be the everlasting welfare of your
souls. Amen.
There are no textual variants in these verses, and no readily apparent influences on other scriptures. In fact, it’s
striking how much of Lehi’s phrasing here is singular to these verses:

great mediator

great commandments

faithful unto his words

will of his Holy Spirit

eternal death

everlasting welfare
Other wording is also very uncommon:

will of the flesh [1 appearance: John 1:13]

good part [1 appearance: Luke 10:42]
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I was struck by these phrases in particular because they all, to some degree or another, make up my sense of
mormon scriptural phrasing. That is, with one exception (“will of his Holy Spirit; more later on), all of these phrases
seemed or felt like descriptions and phrases that I had heard or read repeatedly in scripture. This is, of course, not
scientific: my familiarity could be due to my prolonged and repeated exposure to this chapter! And yet, I don’t think
that if you approached an unbiased mormon with these phrases that they would feel unfamiliar to them, or like they
didn’t understand or think they understood what the phrase signified theologically.
I’m left with several questions from this exercise:

To what extent could this possible familiarity indicate the breadth and depth to which Lehi’s words have entered
mormon scriptural language? (I do not, for example, think that many people would feel that they were
necessarily familiar with much of Lehi’s discourse beyond the tree of life vision.)

What does Lehi mean by using the adjectival qualifier “great” here? Is it significant that “great commandments”
come from the “great mediator”? Is there a specific quantitative thrust at play here? Or just general “greatness”?
The fact that it’s unique makes me think Lehi is trying to get at something specific, but I’m not sure what it is
…
Word Choice
The strategy I employed for reading these verses here was to closely read them word by word, noting the various
word choices employed by Lehi and my responses to them. I’m reproducing what I deemed to be the most
interesting results of this exercise in this section; I’ll follow the text fairly chronologically for clarity’s sake.
Look
Returns to the theme or motif of sight/seeing/waking (motions associated with the eyes as sense organs, as portals
for information), which Lehi initially brought up in 2 Ne. 1:14: “Awake! and arise from the dust, and hear the words
of a trembling parent.” The connection with the phrase “Awake! and arise” is significant for two reasons: 1) the only
other instance of this phrase in the Book of Mormon occurs in Moroni 10:31, itself another farewell chapter and 2)
the connection between sight and creation.[Fn1]
[Fn1] I’ve been struck by the ways in which the theme of sight, or looking in this case, connects with the creation
narrative. We have the LDS temple liturgy of course, in which Adam’s creation in some ways begins with a
command that he awaken and rise up to meet Eve. But beyond that, we also have a repeated emphasis on Christ as
the figure who restores sight, who covers the eye in order to re-new the vision, re-create the new man in Christ. The
emphasis of the atonement is to be reborn anew; one way to mark that rebirth is through a new sight, a new way of
seeing, of looking at things, followed, of course, by action: we awake, and then we arise.
Will of his Holy Spirit
How do we understand this phrase? If this refers to the Holy Ghost, then why is he appearing in this context: “and
choose eternal life according to the will of his Holy Spirit.” I’m just not clear on what is going on here, and would
appreciate some discussion. The closest I’ve come is to look at 1 Nephi 10:17(words are spoken and knowledge is
257
given by the power of the Holy Ghost) andMoroni 10:5 (by the power of the HG you can know the truth of all
things).
Mediator
I think Lehi’s switch to the title “Mediator” here at the end is interesting in part because of the role of the mediator
to reconcile estranged parties. This is precisely Lehi’s hope against hope: to reconcile the bitter factions within his
own family. With Lehi, no matter how great the scope of the visions, in the end he returns to his personal anxieties
for the salvation of his own family members (e.g., his version of the tree of life vs. that of Nephi’s).
Choose
Just a note: the choice Lehi puts forward here is not the choice between the Mediator and the Devil, but rather in this
case the choice between eternal life or eternal death. It seems like it would be easier to justify choosing the devil
over the christ in some ways (in that one could always say something like “well, he may be the devil from your
perspective, but from mine he’s not” or some other relativizing of the situation) than it would be to choose eternal
death over eternal life. Eternal death and eternal life cannot be (as easily) explained or justified away, and they
involve not a choice between associates, but rather a choice between one’s own, personal future. Just an interesting
rhetorical strategy to again personalize his discourse for his sons, trying to reach them.
Spoken
Lehi’s witness here is explicitly oral rather than written. Lehi is a prophet of the book, to be sure, but in the end it’s
the spoken witness, the oral testimony, that he chooses to leave with his sons rather than his writings.
Probation
This word does appear at other places in the Book of Mormon:

1 Ne. 10:21 [Nephi responding to Lehi's tree of life vision]

1 Ne. 15:31–32 [Questions from his brothers regarding Lehi's vision]

2 Ne. 2:21 [This discourse]

2 Ne. 9:27 [By Jacob]

2 Ne. 33:9 [By Nephi in his farewell chapter]

Helaman 13:38 [By Samuel the Lamanite]

Mormon 9:28 [By Moroni in what he thinks is his farewell chapter when he's writing it]
1) The majority of the users are those directly connected to and presumably thus influenced by Lehi, Samuel the
Lamanite, and Moroni (who, presumably in his role as Mormon’s son was also exposed to Lehi).
2) Its use appears often in discourses connected thematically with a final farewell, with an emphasis on the state of
the soul after death.
Prophet
Note that this is singular, not plural (which is how I’ve always accidentally read it). Singular usage by original
Lehites appears to refer either to a prophet previously identified in the discourse, or to Isaiah in most cases.
None other object
In these last few sentences, Lehi is being deliberately apolitical, setting himself apart from the family feud. This
258
rhetorical move is pathetic—it evokes a strong sense of pathos as it highlights Lehi’s sorrow at his fracturing family
and what, to him, must have seemed like failure on the family level.
Hearken/Be faithful
I ended up doing a little digging surrounding the phrases ”hearken unto his great commandments”and “be faithful
unto his words.” These are both phrases unique to Lehi, but that in part appears to be due to an inversion of the verbs
“hearken” and “be faithful.”
The phrase “unto his words” is much more commonly associated with the phrase “hearken” as in “hearken unto his
words”: 5 out of the 7 instances of these words appearing together in a verse use some variation of “hearken unto his
words”; one of the two instances where this is not true is here in 2 Ne. 2.
The connection between “faithful” and “keeping commandments” is a little more complicated, but essentially the
same: of the 26 instances where these words appear together

12 are in slight variations of the phrase “be faithful in keeping the commandments”

4 refer to the commandments themselves as being faithful

5 use faithful as an adjective unrelated to the act of keeping the commandments

2 explicitly identify people who keep the commandments as faithful

and 3 are instances where the words are not in a related phrase
2 Ne. 2:28
1 Cor. 7:25
D&C 58:2
Concluding Thoughts
I realize this may have been a bit tedious, and there are definite drawbacks to looking at things on a word/phrase
level rather than in terms of the big picture, but hopefully there are some thoughts here that will allow us to continue
our discussion this week.
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About jennywebb
Mom, wife, editor. Not much time left over at the moment.
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1.
THOUGHTS ON “2 NEPHI 2: 28–30”
ricosaid:
April 10, 2013 at 7:07 am
Thanks for the post Jenny. I just wanted to give a quick response to get
started. Hopefully I can come back later in the week for a careful response to
your ideas.
In A Reader’s Edition, Grant Hardy puts “chosen in the good part” and notes
that the reference is uncertain. Presumably Lehi is quoting the words of a
prophet, but we do not have any Old Testament scripture that we know Lehi
could have been quoting.
In terms of textual influence: I think Jacob in 2 Ne. 10:23-25 is influenced by
2 Ne. 2:28-30. The language is strikingly similar. Also, Jacob uses “welfare
of your souls” in 2 Ne. 6:3.
“Will of the Holy Spirit” seems to have influenced King Benjamin’s discourse in
Mosiah 3:19. Mosiah 3 is certainly Lehi’s progeny. I don’t know that I would
have seen how rich the discourse was with allusions to Lehi but for all the
time we have spent over the past months (too many connections to list them
here. Benjamin even begins with “awake” and discusses the fall of Adam and
the forbidden fruit). Verse 19 is the part I had in mind: “yields to
the enticings of the Holy Spirit.” We have the word “enticing” and I think
about Lehi’s statement: “save it should be that he were enticed by the one or
the other.” King Benjamin could have stated the enticings of God, or the
Lord, or Christ, or the Messiah or any number of terms. Holy Spirit, at least
to me, seems to connect back to Lehi.
I’m thinking that “will of the flesh and the evil which is therein” had an
profound influence on Nephi. I think I’ve mentioned this one before but I
think 2 Nephi 4 is deeply influenced by Lehi’s discourse. In terms of
proximity, Nephi’s lament comes on the heels of Lehi’s discourse, it’s
immediately after the death of Lehi. For those who enjoy a more creative and
speculative interpretation related to family dynamics, I think of it this way. I
feel like Lehi’s discourse makes all of life very straightforward and easy. All
you have to do is choose God and not the devil. It’s that simple. Everyone is
free to choose and you have two choices: life or death, God or the
260
devil. Everything is focused on man’s choice as the ultimate determining
factor. God has set up the experiment of opposing enticements and man
takes center stage to choose one way or the other. In 2 Nephi 4, I hear
Nephi resisting Lehi’s philosophy. Nephi is depressed because it isn’t as easy
as Lehi makes it out to be. Choice, it turns out, is not as straightforward and
reductionist as Lehi makes it out to be. I hear Nephi saying “If my father is
right, I’m supposed to be free to choose. So why don’t I feel free? Why do
I feel like I have no power at all?” Nephi, in complete contrast to Lehi, notes
the utter uselessness of man’s ability and power to be obedient: “the arm of
the flesh.” Nephi isn’t satisfied with a God who sets up opposing enticements
and then says to man: now you choose. Nephi’s entire prayer is not about
man’s ability to choose God, but on God’s ability to save man. He asks God
to intervene in ways far beyond merely providing positive enticements. Lehi’s
discourse, while perhaps a last effort to turn Laman and Lemuel back to the
path, perhaps inadvertently ends up having a psychologically damaging effect
on Nephi. Too much focus on man’s agency (if I can speak in broader terms
unrelated to the Book of Mormon context) is not always empowering. It often
backfires when individuals realize just how unable they are to choose the
good. “Behold, here is the agency of man, and here is the condemnation of
man.” (D&C 93:33). And remember, we have an unresolved tension hiding in
Lehi’s discourse. After Lehi convinces us that the by the law all men are cut
off, or by the law no one is justified, he proceeds to set up agency as the
solution. How can agency be a solution where no one is righteous? For
Nephi, our salvation is not in man’s choices but in God’s choices. In Nephi’s
words: “Yea, cursed is he that putteth his trust in man or maketh flesh his
arm” I see a serious critique of the approach where man’s trusts in his ability
to choose the good (agency as the vehicle for salvation), because that
ultimately this not trusting in God, but trusting in one’s own ability, history, or
track record of righteousness. Nephi’s lament is where Lehi’s theory meets
practice.
REPLY
o
John Hilton IIIsaid:
April 12, 2013 at 2:34 am
Rico, I would love to hear more of your thoughts on connections
between King Benjamin’s speech and Lehi, particularly since so
much of Mosiah 3 is coming from an angel. I too thought of
Mosiah 3:19 when I read this passage — not only in the
enticings of the spirit but also choosing death according to the
flesh (like “putteth of the natural man.”
“Choose eternal life, according to the will of his Holy Spirit; And
not choose eternal death, according to the will of the flesh” VS
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“For the natural man is an enemy to God, and has been from the
fall of Adam, and will be, forever and ever, unless he yields to
the enticings of the Holy Spirit, and putteth off the natural man
and becometh a saint through the atonement of Christ the Lord,”
Even though there isn’t a strong direct textual connection right
here, I think it would be interesting to explore thematic
connections. Thanks for spark on this and hope to hear more!
REPLY
2.
joespencersaid:
April 11, 2013 at 12:42 pm
Wow, Jenny. Your “opening exercise” is incredibly striking. I’m floored. Your
experience is mine. And I’m left wondering. I’ll be getting back to the rest of
this as I can over the course of the week, but I’m astounded that these
phrases are so unique. I’m inclined to think that, as you suggest, there’s
something privileged about these last verses here—perhaps about this whole
chapter—in the Mormon imaginary. I’ll be reflecting on this….
REPLY
3.
John Hilton IIIsaid:
April 12, 2013 at 2:38 am
Jenny, thanks for this post. It is interesting to see how unique many of the
phrases are.
One other musing one unique words/phrases … focusing on words like you did
led me to look at the word “great.” Lehi says it 6 times (including
“greatness”) in 2 Nephi 2, and particularly focuses on it towards the end of
the chapter (“Great and last day,” “Great Mediator,” “Great commandments”).
I wonder if there is something to that (?)
I need to mull over your post and come back with some specific comments at
a later time. For now, I just wanted to re-mention something we discussed
towards the beginning of this seminar, namely the audience Lehi is
addressing. He clearly ends the talk with a focus on sons, plural, “Unto you all
my sons….” But then in Chapter 3 he directly shifts back to Joseph, and when
he concludes that message, the focus is still on Joseph. It is almost as though
Jacob has become lost in the narrative. I wonder if this is intentional either on
the part of Lehi or Nephi. While the start of the chapter clearly begins directed
to him, any specific reference to him is gone after verse 4 and this effect
seems magnified by verse 30.
What was this like in the real-life dialogue? Did Jacob feel slighted at the end?
Was it just the natural course of a conversation? Was there a concluding
message to Jacob that just wasn’t included in the record that we have?
REPLY
o
deidre329said:
262
April 15, 2013 at 3:36 pm
Jenny points out the intriguing phrase in verse 28 about the will
of the Holy Spirit. It is interesting because it highlights the Spirit
in a conversation about the flesh—Lehi is still thinking very
dualistically, and invoking the will of the incorporeal Spirit
underscores the division between flesh and spirit. It is also
interesting given the way the Spirit is spoken about in Alma 7
where the embodiment of Christ is discussed and explained.
Alma explains that Christ will take upon him flesh that he may
know how to succor his people. He continues in verse 13: “Now
the Spirit knoweth all things; nevertheless the Son of God
suffereth according to the flesh that he might take upon him the
sins of his people, that he might blot out their transgressions
according to the power of his deliverance; and now behold, this
is the testimony which is in me.” Here, Alma says that the Spirit
knows all things, nevertheless, Christ chooses embodiment so he
can suffer according to the flesh. In light of Lehi’s discourse, it is
interesting to reconsider what we say commonly enough in
Mormon parlance, that the trinity is unified in will while
remaining separate as persons, as bodies. Does this point to a
division in wills? The Spirit does not just remain disembodied,
but wills a separation from the flesh, from death in favor of life,
while Christ, to empathize with the full range of human
experience, wills embodiment and death?
I like that Jenny highlights Lehi’s closing declaration that he has
“none other object save it be the everlasting welfare of your
souls” (2 Nephi 2:30). Jenny suggests that Lehi speaks
strategically here as a diplomat, trying to unify a divided family.
I appreciate this idea, but think there is another angle as well.
Lehi has just finished one of the most deeply philosophical
elaborations in the Book of Mormon record; in fact, he has
waxed quasi-Kantian at times in both his ethics and underlying
metaphysics. Now he concludes that he has none other objects
save his children’s everlasting welfare. In other words, none of
this seems to matter for its own sake—it only matters if it leads
to the salvation of his family, both individually and collectively
(as Jenny points to). This hearkens back to Nephi’s insistence in
his appropriation of the Isaiah material, that the scriptures must
be likened unto individuals (and civilizations) for their profit and
learning: “And I did read many things unto them which were
written in the books of Moses; but that I might more fully
persuade them to believe in the Lord their Redeemer I did read
unto them that which was written by the prophet Isaiah; for I
263
did liken all scriptures unto us, that it might be for our profit and
learning” (1 Nephi 19:23). In fact, Lehi employs this same
language earlier in the discourse when he proclaims, “And now,
my sons, I speak unto you these things for your profit and
learning; for there is a God, and he hath created all things, both
the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them are, both
things to act and things to be acted upon” (v. 14). This points to
LDS scripture, revelation, and thought as pointing us towards an
ethics more than a theology or religious philosophy. (This relates
back to the earlier point about the Spirit and embodiment: on a
worldview informed by a corporeal God, how could religion be
anything but an ethics? God is bound to God’s own corporeality,
and this forever underscores the significance of the human body
and human behavior within that embodied self, and does so “all
the way down.”) Theological reflection is useful not in terms of
helping us understanding the nature of God or the universe in
which we dwell for its own sake, but insofar as it informs the
ways in which individuals live in the universe, the actions which
they choose. This is not just the overarching theme or the
bottom line, it is the sole object of Lehi’s extended reflections. It
is all about action, behavior, about salvation and exaltation. It is
not just about family peace and diplomacy, it is about
encouraging individual obedience, which is inextricably bound up
and tied together in familial exaltation. This of course allows me
to do what I am impelled to do anyway, which is to give
Kierkegaard the last word. In his most ethical text, Works of
Love, which is extended exegesis on the commandment to love
the neighbor, he claims that Christian love is sheer action. He
writes, “But Christian love, which is the fulfilling of the Law, is,
whole and collected, present in its every expression, and yet it is
sheer action; consequently it is as far from inaction as it is from
busyness. It never accepts anything in advance or gives a
promise in place of action; it never rests satisfied in the delusion
of being finished…it never sits idle marveling at itself” (WL, 9899). Christ was the fulfilling of the law because he did what it
required: “There was in his love not the distance of a moment,
of a feeling, of an intention from the Law’s requirement to its
fulfillment”; Christ did not say yes or no, rather “In him love was
sheer action” (WL, 99). Kierkegaard elaborates on Christ in a
way that is clearly instructive to individual persons, “there was
no moment, not a single one in his life, when love in him was
merely the inactivity of a feeling that hunts for words while it
lets time slip by, or a mood that is its own gratification, dwells
264
on itself while there is no task—no, his love was sheer action”
(99-100).
REPLY
joespencersaid:

May 1, 2013 at 12:13 pm
Deidre,
Thanks for these reflections on the ends of
philosophy. I couldn’t agree more in principle, and
I’m glad to see you find textual support for this
idea right here in the text. In my view,
philosophical and theological reflection is something
we’re called to do because of charity, and because
of nothing else.
4.
ricosaid:
April 15, 2013 at 5:44 pm
Deidre, I get the sense that Lehi and Alma have different aims in the texts
you point out. Alma, it seems to me, is trying to address the question as to
why the Son of God does not know certain things until he experiences them in
the flesh (connected to verse 12). Alma has to explain that it is true “the
Spirit knoweth all things; nevertheless the Son of God suffereth according to
the flesh” for reasons other than gaining experiential knowledge. Alma seems
to be trying to explain why it is correct to say that the Son of God does not
know all things or why he must suffer to “know according to the flesh how
to succor his people according to their infirmities.” I get the sense that Alma
is trying to reconcile the omniscient God with the Son of God who, apparently,
is not omniscient.
Lehi, by contrast, is not speaking about knowledge but about the two (binary)
opposing enticements: “the will of his Holy Spirit” and “the will of the flesh
and the evil which is therein” (or as Jacob rephrases Lehi: “the will of God”
and “the will of the devil and the flesh.” 2 Nephi 10:24).
I think you are quite right that Lehi is speaking very dualistically. Lehi is
attributing evil to flesh and goodness to spirit (a lesson not lost on Nephi:
“And why should I yield to sin, because of my flesh?” Nephi 4:27).
Joe, I know we discussed this briefly (I need to go back and respond) and you
question whether Lehi is saying that flesh is “inherently sinful.” I’m
somewhat at a disadvantage because I haven’t read your paper addressing
this question (so I don’t know to what extent we diverge). But at any rate, at
the moment I don’t see any good reason not to associate the devil and evil
and the flesh in the text of the Book of Mormon given the way that Lehi,
Jacob, and Nephi make this connection. In fact it may be important to
maintain and preserve this connection between evil and the flesh and not
eliminate it. One thought that comes to mind is that this makes Christ’s
265
embodiment in mortal flesh more of a victory. Associating flesh with evil
infuses meaning into Abinadi’s words that “the flesh becoming subject to the
Spirit, or the Son to the Father, being one God, suffereth temptation, and
yieldeth not to the temptation.” (Mosiah 15:5). Abinadi isn’t describing Christ
as suffering temptations from the devil in the wilderness as he does in the
New Testament (Matthew 4 and Luke 4), but suffering temptations from the
mere fact of being subject to “the flesh and the evil which is therein.” The
victory of Christ, however, is that he inverts this relationship, subjecting the
flesh to the Spirit, and yielding not to temptation. This in turn highlights the
importance of partaking of the flesh of Christ—incarnation as sacrament—the
flesh we partake is flesh that has been subjected to the spirit, or as we
say sanctified. For these reasons, I don’t want to be too quick to find a way
to interpret the flesh as not evil, because I fear I may overlook these
associations. Christ’s victory over sin and death (i.e. the flesh) is attenuated
if the flesh is not also evil. (Now if the flesh can be sanctified—via the
Incarnation—then perhaps the conclusion is that the flesh is
not inherently sinful, and if that is what you are saying then I would agree).
The more positive view of the human body and corporeality in Joseph Smith’s
thought and in Mormon thought generally, post-dates the Book of Mormon,
and are driven by a series of theological developments, that I sense are
unrelated to the concerns in the Book of Mormon so I worry about reading
these paradigms into the Book of Mormon text in ways that may mask the
work the Book of Mormon is performing. Again, I might be too cautious here.
There are different views within Christian theology as to whether Christ was
born with prelapsarian or unfallen human nature, untainted by original sin
(as Augustine argued), or whether Christ was born with the same fallen
nature that we all are (as asserted by Karl Barth who reassesses the
traditional view). It seems to me that in the Book of Mormon Christ takes on
flesh and the evil therein, not some prelapsarian flesh untainted by the fall,
but its in Christ overcoming that evil that breaks the bands of sin and
death. Or something like that.
Alma, still seems to me to be somewhat doing something different with flesh
and knowledge in a way that Abinadi and Lehi do not do. Perhaps I’m trying
to keep their paradigms distinct too much, but can’t help but feel they are
speaking in slightly different contexts.
REPLY
o
joespencersaid:
May 1, 2013 at 12:49 pm
Hey Rico,
Just getting back to this. My apologies, of course.
I’ll organize my response as a few clarifications at the level of
terminology.
266
First, I think it’s important not to conflate “body” and “flesh.”
“Body” implies something of a total system, a thing with
boundaries, and a certain sort of inhabitation, a mode of
presentation that places something in a world. “Flesh,” however,
implies a certain sort of affective tissue, a complicated because
unlocatable point of contact for the living with things. The word
“body” can be used of inanimate things—not only generally but
in the Book of Mormon: 2 Nephi 2:11; Mosiah 21:18; 25:4, 15,
21; 29:39; Alma 2:5; 43:51; 49:20; 50:29; 57:33; 62:14, 15,
33; Helaman 1:24; 3:4; 3 Nephi 3:25; 4:3, 4; 19:5; Mormon
2:7; Ether 3:16—but the word “flesh” is always used to refer to
the animate, because it’s the animate to which flesh lends itself
as substance. (Particularly interesting here is Ether 3:16, with its
discussion of a human-like body that isn’t of flesh. This might be
set side by side with 3 Nephi 28:15, which speaks of a “body of
flesh,” a phrase that itself suggests the radical difference I’m
pointing out.)
Why is it important to keep this difference in mind? Well, for
one, I want to make clear that whatever I have to say about the
flesh in the Book of Mormon isn’t tied to any Mormon theology of
the body, later or earlier. I’m looking only at what the Book of
Mormon is doing with the flesh. For two, though, I think it’s just
a necessary distinction so that we don’t fall into ambiguities, etc.
Second, there’s a major difference
between inherence and connectionor relation. In your comment,
you seem to conflate these two (except, perhaps, in your
parenthetical aside at the end of the first paragraph on this
issue). To say that the flesh isn’t inherently evil isn’t at all to say
that there’s no connection between flesh and evil; indeed, it’s
only possible for there to be a connection between two things if
the one isnot inherent in the other. This point may, I think, be
the key to whatever disagreement or misunderstanding there is
here.
Why is this difference important? It helps to clarify that, as you
guess between parentheses, there seems in the Book of Mormon
to be an understanding of the possibility of the flesh being
redeemed—not justin the case of the Incarnation,
but through what becomes possible by means of the Incarnation,
namely, the resurrection. This is already on display in 2 Nephi
2:8, I think: “there is no flesh that can dwell in the presence of
God,” yes, but then Lehi adds: “save it be through the merits,
and mercy, and grace of the Holy Messiah.” Lehi could have
said: There is no flesh that can dwell in the presence of God, and
267
so human beings have to be drawn from their flesh. He doesn’t,
though, but instead suggests that flesh itself can be changed.
Jacob seems to have picked up on this in what is unquestionably
the most important passage on flesh in the Book of Mormon: 2
Nephi 9:7-9. There he points out that “if the flesh should rise no
more our spirits must become subject to that angel who fell from
before the presence of the Eternal God, and became the devil, to
rise no more.” Flesh must rise again if spirits are also to rise.
There’s much to think about there.
So what’s the link between flesh and evil? It seems to me that
the key to thinking about mortal flesh in the Book of Mormon lies
in its mortality, its orientation to death. It’s not the flesh per
se that lusts, etc., but the flesh as oriented to death that’s
naturally evil. Wherever we find “flesh” meaning, in the Book of
Mormon, something like “the naturally evil substance of our
human bodies,” I think we can assume that there’s a tacit
qualifier there: “death-bound.” To whatever extent the flesh is
uncoupled from death—whether in the actual event of the
resurrection, or in the event of orienting oneself to something
other than death—the flesh is redeemed. Human beings are
then, as Lehi has it, “free according to the flesh.” The flesh itself
is freed, freed from its bondage to death and freed to do as it
will—if it wills anything other than death.
That’s what I’m after, anyway. :)
REPLY
5.
ricosaid:
May 6, 2013 at 8:58 pm
I appreciate the follow up Joe.
But to make sure I’m being clear, let me go back to what I suggested initially:
“In these passages [2 Ne. 2:29; 2 Ne. 4:7], flesh seems to be associated with
sin and evil.” Your response was that “it isn’t necessary to posit that the flesh
itself in his reference is evil or sinful… it isn’t therefore the case that mortal
flesh is inherentlysinful.” I was confused by this response, partly because it
seemed aimed to safeguard against something I wasn’t arguing.
Lehi uses the phrase: ”the will of the flesh and the evil which is therein.” I’m
not rephrasing Lehi’s statement to read “the will of the flesh and
the inherent evil which is therein.” Whether that evil is inherent in the flesh
or not, I don’t know. Lehi’s phrase that there is evil therein seems significant,
and often overlooked. Lehi’s statement might not be precise but it wasn’t my
intention make a claim beyond his statement. I may be wrong, but I don’t
think I’m conflating inherenceand connection, I just I haven’t been speaking
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to the issue of whether the flesh isinherently evil or necessarily evil any more
than I see the Book of Mormon speaking to this issue.
You make the argument that because the flesh can be redeemed, the flesh is
notinherently evil. I can agree the flesh can be redeemed and I suppose I
can agree this means that the flesh isn’t inherently evil, but I’m less certain
this is an important distinction. But it may be that it is more important for
your purposes than for mine.
In the text for this post Lehi uses the phrase: “the will of the flesh and the
evil which is therein.” (2 Ne. 2:29). I point out that Jacob later appears to
restate this idea to say “the will of the devil and the flesh” (2 Ne.
10:24). This gives us additional associations with the devil, evil, and the
flesh. What are we to make of this?
In trying to make sense of this association, and noticing Nephi’s many
references to flesh in 2 Nephi 4, I’m proposing a speculative reading or
hypothesis: what if Nephi’s lament, following right on the heels of Lehi’s
discourse, is a manifestation of his misgivings about the flesh after hearing
Lehi’s teachings? Nephi doesn’t resolve his anxiety by reminding himself that
the flesh is not inherently sinful. It doesn’t ameliorate his anxiety. He
laments: “And why should I yield to sin, because of my flesh?” (Nephi
4:27). Nor does he seem to look towards the resurrection to find
comfort. He associates sin and flesh and is concerned for his soul.
I can accept the distinction you’ve offered, but I don’t see the issue of
whether the flesh is inherently sinful or necessarily sinful to play a significant
role in Nephite theological discourse or in the narrative (and I’m not saying
that you are saying this is important to the narrative). I don’t, for example,
see a debate among Nephites or their dissenters as to whether the flesh is
inherently sinful or necessarily sinful. (I’m not saying a distinction or
inference is irrelevant if we cannot find it articulated by characters in the Book
of Mormon. But I’m focusing my attention on the anxiety in the narrative and
I want to explore the cause of their anxiety and also explore how they resolve
that anxiety).
For the most part, I don’t think I’m in disagreement with most of what you’ve
outlined above. It’s only your last paragraph where I’m still puzzled. Are you
suggesting that we should understand “evil” in the phrase ”the will of the
flesh and the evil which is therein” to mean “death”? That is, are you
suggesting that the evil of the flesh is that it will die?
To whatever extent the flesh is uncoupled from death—whether in the actual
event of the resurrection, or in the event of orienting oneself to something
other than death—the flesh is redeemed. Human beings are then, as Lehi has
it, “free according to the flesh.” The flesh itself is freed, freed from its
bondage to death and freed to do as it will—if it wills anything other than
death.
269
1) If the flesh is only free at the actual event of the resurrection, what
comfort is that to those who struggling with the flesh during the time they are
alive, during their probationary state? This seems to be Nephi’s concern in 2
Nephi 4.
2) “or in the event of orienting oneself to something other than death—the
flesh is redeemed.” This may be a good restatement of Lehi’s teachings
(except that Lehi states man is free, not that the flesh is free). But if it is, I
don’t see Nephi gaining solace in it. In fact, I hear Nephi to be saying
“Haven’t I already oriented myself to God? Then why do I not seem to be
free? Why am I still angry?” or saying “I can’t seem to orient myself to God,
even though I’m supposed to be free to do so.” He recounts all the great
things God has done for him but it isn’t enough. He conclusion is significant:
I will not put my trust in the arm of flesh; for I know that cursed is he that
putteth his trust in the arm of flesh. Yea, cursed is he that putteth his trust in
man or maketh flesh his arm. (2 Ne. 4:34).
My proposed reading is that Nephi is wrestling with the some of the
implications of Lehi’s teachings. Nephi doesn’t seem to find solace in Lehi’s
teaching that man is free to choose God or the devil. Nephi laments “why
should I yield to sin, because of my flesh? Yea, why should I give way to
temptations, that the evil one have place in my heart to destroy my peace
and afflict my soul? Why am I angry because of mine enemy?” In other
words, if Lehi is right, then why isn’t it working? Lehi’s specific teachings on
agency do not reflect Nephi’s religious experience. This is one reason why I
feel Nephi latches on to Lehi’s earlier words that those with a “broken heart”
and “contrite spirit” are saved (2 Ne. 4:32).
I don’t see anything in Lehi’s discourse that suggests that “evil which is
therein” is removed. Rather he says to “choose eternal life according to the
will of his Holy Spirit, and not choose eternal death according to the will of the
flesh and the evil which is therein, which giveth the spirit of the devil power to
captivate, to bring you down to hell that he may reign over you in his own
kingdom.” If Lehi is still following his ontology of opposites, and I think he is,
then he needs both the will of the Holy Spirit and the will of the flesh to be
enticing man one way or the other. In other words, the two opposing
enticements established in the Garden, are now located within man after the
fall (or something like that). ”The will of the flesh and the evil which is
therein” will continue to exist in man during his life, despite
being redeemed from the fall. Redemption from the fall allows man the
freedom to choose to follow the will of the spirit or the will of the flesh but it
doesn’t rid the flesh of the evil therein (otherwise man could not act for
himself). Redemption from the fall doesn’t eliminate the will of the flesh as a
choice, otherwise, man could not act for himself. That’s what I hear Lehi
saying.
270
I’d like to challenge the idea that flesh uncoupled from death is best
understood as flesh redeemed. The flesh of Adam and Eve before the fall are
arguably uncoupled from death (according to Lehi) and yet they don’t seem to
be “redeemed.” If Adam and Eve had eaten the fruit of the tree of life after
they had fallen, their flesh would be uncoupled from death, but they wouldn’t
be considered “redeemed.” Also, being resurrected doesn’t mean one can
dwell in the presence of God. As I’ve suggested before, we should avoid
conflating brought to stand in the presence of God to be judged,
with dwelling in the presence of God (although I think this sometimes is
conflated in the text of the Book of Mormon). An unrepentant individual is
resurrected and raised to immortality, and God judges his works to be
evil. So, his flesh is “redeemed” I suppose from the first death, but he is not
redeemed from the second death and he does not dwell in the presence of
God and he perishes. That seems to be the understanding of the Book of
Mormon. Look at Alma for example:
12 And Amulek hath spoken plainly concerning death, and being raised from
this mortality to a state of immortality, and being brought before the bar of
God, to be judged according to our works.
18 Then, I say unto you, they shall be as though there had been no
redemption made; for they cannot be redeemed according to God’s justice;
and they cannot die, seeing there is no more corruption. (Alma 12:12-18).
Being resurrected—raised from corruption to incorruption—in and of itself, is
not considered “redemption” (Alma 12:18; Alma 11:14; Moroni 7:38; Mosiah
16:5.) Just because the flesh cannot die any longer due to the resurrection is
not redemption for the wicked. “Therefore the wicked remain as though there
had been no redemption made, except it be the loosing of the bands of
death.” (Alma 11:41). There is no rejoicing or benefit in the fact that now,
now that its too late, that the flesh has somehow been changed. The evil in
the flesh has already done its work during the probationary state. We have
unredeemed immortality in Book of Mormon theology.
3) As to whether flesh is inherently evil, to squarely address this point. You
write “It seems to me that the key to thinking about mortal flesh in the Book
of Mormon lies in its mortality, its orientation to death.” This seems
tautological. Naturally,mortal flesh is mortal. Yet, I’m not sure how this is
key to thinking about flesh in the Book of Mormon. Why isn’t it the case that
the key to thinking about the mortal flesh in the Book of Mormon that there
is evil therein, as the text states?
Lehi could have said: There is no flesh that can dwell in the presence of God,
and so human beings have to be drawn from their flesh. He doesn’t, though,
but instead suggests that flesh itself can be changed.
I don’t disagree with this. Lehi is limiting his words to the resurrection. He is
saying that no flesh can resurrect except through the Messiah. Yes, flesh can
be changed from corruption to incorruption, but this was never in
271
dispute. Yet, if flesh is changed, I see no reason why we cannot discuss the
nature of the flesh before this change (or examine how or when this change
takes place). I don’t need to posit that the flesh is inherently sinful
or necessarily evil. I’m not by any means saying that the flesh is
evil and that this is an immutable state and the flesh is impervious to change
and that the resurrection and redemption of Christ cannot change this evil,
because flesh is inherently or necessarily evil, and that the resurrection is
only the resurrection of spirits and not bodies. My inquiry begins with Lehi’s
statement: ”the will of the flesh and the evil which is therein.”
REPLY
6.
joespencersaid:
May 7, 2013 at 1:30 pm
Key to everything I’m saying here is this: Nothing of what I’m saying is about
the actual event of our own resurrection. Everything I’m saying is about how
we dwell in mortal flesh between the announcement to us of Christ’s
resurrection (with the accompanying promise of our own eventual
resurrection) and our deaths. I’m not saying that we’re free from evil
when we are resurrected; I’m saying that we’re free from evil when Jesus is
resurrected. Christ’s resurrection changes the nature of the flesh because it
uncouples it—through a promise to which we have to be faithful—from death.
Because we don’t have to be oriented to our own deaths (and there’s the root
of sin), we’re free to do good—or to embrace evil, if we want to. And that
means that, even as we’re in the flesh, we’re free from evil. That’s why I’m
insistent on distinguishing inherence from connection: the evil that’s in the
flesh is rooted in its inhabitant’s orientation to death, but that can be
overcome while one remains in the flesh.
I think that’s the point I’m failing over and over to communicate. The way
that the event of Christ’s resurrection redeems us spiritually is by uprooting
sin long before our (unmistakably assured) deaths and (merely promised)
resurrections. There’s no necessity of a penal substitution theory or any such
thing if the whole point of the atonement is just to free us up, in the flesh,
from the sin-generating power of death. And that’s accomplished through the
event of the (Christ’s) resurrection (with its promise of, but not yet the
actuality of, our own).
REPLY
7.
jennywebbsaid:
May 13, 2013 at 3:36 am
There have been several really great questions and discussions brought up
here; thanks all for participating.
I wanted to follow up to Joe and Rico’s discussion regarding flesh and its
relationship with evil. The following may seem like it’s wandering a bit, but I
do think it’s applicable here.
272
If we jump to Jacob’s first significant appearance in the text following Lehi’s
blessing, we find him speaking to the (now separated) Nephites in 2 Ne. 6-10.
As he begins his discourse, Jacob explicitly recalls Lehi’s teachings, saying
“and I have taught you the words of my father; and I have spoken unto you
concerning all things which are written, from the creation of the world” (2 Ne.
6:3).
Jacob launches into the theological meat of his discourse by saying “I would
speak unto you concerning things which are, and which are to come;
wherefore, I will read you the words of Isaiah” (2 Ne. 6:4). The point of this
review of Isaiah appears to be to remind the Nephites that God always fulfills
his covenants: “Even the captives of the mighty shall be taken away, and the
prey of the terrible shall be delivered; for the Mighty God shall deliver his
covenant people” (2 Ne. 6:17).
Chapters 7 and 8 continue to cover Isaiah’s teachings on covenants and God’s
relationship to his covenant people.
Chapters 9 and 10 contain Jacob’s theological explication not, as we might
first expect, of Isaiah’s words, but rather of the concept of covenant as
exemplified through Isaiah’s teachings: “And now, my beloved brethren, I
have read these things that ye might know concerning the covenants of the
Lord that he has covenanted with all the house of Israel” (2 Ne. 9:1).
This focus on covenant is crucial: Jacob knows that his brethren have been
worried about their unknown future (justly so—they’ve left Jerusalem, and
now left the Lehite colony) and that in their studying, they keep running up
against two irrefutable facts: their bodies will die, and Christ will also become
embodied (and therefore he will die too). “For I know that ye have searched
much, many of you, to know of things to come; wherefore I know that ye
know that our flesh must waste away and die; nevertheless, in our bodies we
shall see God. Yea, I know that ye know that in the body he shall show
himself unto those at Jerusalem” (2 Ne. 9:4–5).
The trick here is that the scriptures generally, and specifically the words of
Isaiah, are, as Jacob emphasizes, speaking of “things to come” (note this
phrase both in 2 Ne. 6:4 and 2 Ne. 9:4). It appears that the Nephites have
seen only part of these multiple “things” in the prophecies—death and
embodiment—and that they have not clearly seen the more important
“things”—the covenants of the Lord.
Chapters 9 and 10 tell the same covenantal story over and over in order to
drive home the point that “the covenants of the Lord” are “great” … “and
because of his greatness, and his grace and mercy, he has promised unto us
that our seed shall not utterly be destroyed, according to the flesh, but that
he would preserve them; and in future generations they shall become a
righteous branch unto the house of Israel” (2 Ne. 9:53). Jacob teaches that
all the covenants of the Lord point toward preservation and regeneration
273
(recall Jacob 5, where the branches are repeatedly cut off and re-grafted; in
the end the tree still bears fruit).
We have several covenantal stories throughout these chapters, but they all
witness the same truth of redemption: the Lehite Exodus to the isle of the sea
(a promised land), the scattering and gathering of Israel foretold in Isaiah,
the Fall and entrance into mortality, the birth of an embodied Christ destined
to atone and die and resurrect, and each individual life in the flesh—these
present, at a macro level, the same motif of inevitable loss followed by
graceful gain.
So, Jacob says, if all you’re reading is the inevitability of death, you’re
missing the covenantal point of redemption: “may God raise you from death
by the power of the resurrection, and also from everlasting death by the
power of the atonement, that ye may be received into the eternal kingdom of
God” (2 Ne. 10:25). Death and sin are both redeemed.
But, as Joe points out, this covenantal redemption is explicitly not a future
event; it is not something we are waiting for, but rather something we are
recognizing (veils lift, as it were). Jacob is clear on this point: “For I [God] will
fulfil my promises which I have made unto the children of men, that I will do
unto them while they are in the flesh” (2 Ne. 10:17). The covenants are
fulfilled not at our future resurrection or judgment, but now, on earth, while
we “are in the flesh.”
God’s covenants are all the same: he promises safety in land, restoration to
land, preservation of seed, a gathering of Israel. All of these are another way
of explaining and teaching the reality of being a covenantal people—a reality
of safety, restoration, preservation, gathering, regeneration, freedom—in
essence, a witness of life in spite of the reality of death. Put another way,
Lehi, Isaiah, and Jacob each witness our covenanted, already-fulfilled,
freedom from sin while yet in the flesh, by and through the atoning Christ.
REPLY
8.
ricosaid:
May 17, 2013 at 6:36 am
Jenny, I really like that we are continuing this discussion.
Quick question:
I’m not sure I understand why you consider atonement and resurrection to be
“covenantal redemption.” I don’t know what this language does.
So, Jacob says, if all you’re reading is the inevitability of death, you’re
missing the covenantal point of redemption: “may God raise you from death
by the power of the resurrection, and also from everlasting death by the
power of the atonement, that ye may be received into the eternal kingdom of
God” (2 Ne. 10:25). Death and sin are both redeemed.
I agree with you that death and sin are redeemed but I want to stress
the meansby which each are redeemed. Jacob specifically says that death
(what Jacob also calls the death of the body) is overcome by the resurrection
274
(not the atonement), and he specifically says that everlasting death (clearly
not physical death but only the analogy of death in that man is cut off from
the presence of God or what Jacob calls the death of the spirit) is overcome
through the atonement (not the resurrection). In other words, in this verse,
Jacob is not saying that the resurrection overcomes sin and that the
atonement overcomes physical death, this would be inverting the relationship
that Jacob explicitly sets forth. The language in the Book of Mormon is atone
for sins, never atone for death. So any interpretation that requires the reader
to substitute of atonement for resurrection, or says sin is overcome via
resurrection and physical death via atonement, or conflates the two or
redefines atonement and resurrection in a way that ignores this fundamental
distinction, I feel, has serious and perhaps insurmountable textual challenges,
regardless of what other merit they may have. I continue to be open to all
possible readings of the text but I don’t think the argument has been made
yet that this reading can be grounded in the language and structure of the
text. I know this wasn’t the point of your comment per se, but I thought I’d
still raise it here.
But, as Joe points out, this covenantal redemption is explicitly not a future
event; it is not something we are waiting for, but rather something we are
recognizing (veils lift, as it were). Jacob is clear on this point: “For I [God] will
fulfil my promises which I have made unto the children of men, that I will do
unto them while they are in the flesh” (2 Ne. 10:17). The covenants are
fulfilled not at our future resurrection or judgment, but now, on earth, while
we “are in the flesh.”
I still disagree with this discussion on the futurity or immediacy of redemption
in these passages. I strongly agree with you on your seventh paragraph. I
see an overwhelming amount of textual material that repeatedly focuses on
how the Nephites are concerned with future events. They talk about it, they
worry about it, they lament about it. In 2 Nephi. 9:4–5, as you rightly point
out, Jacob focuses on two of those future events from the perspective of the
Nephites 1) the resurrection (“in our bodies we shall see God”) and 2) the
incarnation (“in the body he shall show himself unto those at Jerusalem”).
The resurrection is in fact a future event, and even the atonement, in so
much as the Nephites are looking forward to the “coming of one Jesus Christ,
a Son of God, to atone for the sins of the world” is a future event. The story
of the Nephites is a story where they repeatedly long for a future event and
debate about this future event. I have a difficult time overlooking this facet
of Book of Mormon narrative.
Now, I fully agree with you on the temporality of Jacob’s words here: “For I
will fulfil my promises which I have made unto the children of men, that I will
do unto them while they are in the flesh” (2 Ne. 10:17). In other words,
“while they are in the flesh” means that God will fulfill these promises while
the children of men are alive and not after their death. Where we differ is in
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which “promises” Jacob has in mind and whether those promises are in fact
immediate or in the future.
What has God promised? Jacob says a the very end of the chapter, “he has
promised unto us that our seed shall not utterly be destroyed, according to
the flesh, but that he would preserve them; and in future generations they
shall become a righteous branch unto the house of Israel” (2 Nephi
9:53). How can this not be a future promise? How can this not be something
that Nephites will still need to wait on perhaps even to come true after the
current generation passes? In chapter 10, Jacob picks up right where he left
off. What are the promises?
[T]he promises which we have obtained are promises unto us according to the
flesh; wherefore, as it has been shown unto me that many of our children
shall perish in the flesh because of unbelief, nevertheless, God will be merciful
unto many; and our children shall be restored, that they may come to that
which will give them the true knowledge of their Redeemer. (2 Nephi 10:2).
But behold, thus saith the Lord God: When the day cometh that they shall
believe in me, that I am Christ, then have I covenanted with their fathers that
they shall be restored in the flesh, upon the earth, unto the lands of their
inheritance. (2 Nephi 10:7).
The reason why Jacob has to add the language “according to the flesh” here
is because otherwise his audience may think he is just repeating the language
from 2 Nephi 9. There he used “restore” to mean “bodies and the spirits of
men will be restored one to the other” and “and the spirit and the body
is restored to itself again” and “they are restored to that God who gave them
breath, which is the Holy One of Israel.”
Jacob,it seems to me, wants to be clear to say, “I don’t mean our children will
perish in that they will die, but I mean they will perish because they no longer
believe (i.e. “perish in the flesh” or perish while alive). I don’t mean our
children will be restored in the sense of their spirit and body being restored to
itself, and I don’t mean they will be restored to a knowledge because they are
resurrected. I mean they will be restored to their lands and restored to a
knowledge of God while they are alive.”
So this “according to the flesh” business is Jacob’s way of distinguishing
between the difference senses of perish or restore. So back to Jacob’s
statement ”he has promised unto us that our seed shall not utterly be
destroyed, according to the flesh, but that he would preserve them; and in
future generations they shall become a righteous branch unto the house of
Israel” (2 Nephi 9:53). Again, from the perspective of Jacob’s audience, the
only reason they know that in the future their children will fall away is
because Jacob has a revelation about it and tell them: “it has been shown
unto me that many of our children shall perish in the flesh because of
unbelief.” (2 Ne. 10:2). This is not unlike Nephi seeing in vision the future
destruction of his people (1 Ne. 15:5, 2 Ne. 26:7-11). But both the perishing
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and the restoration are future events. I agree with you that they are
asfar into the future as the resurrection or judgment but
“in future generations they shall become a righteous branch unto the house of
Israel” is a future event that, from the stand point of Jacob’s audience, they
will not be alive to witness when it finally comes to pass.
One final comment. The Book of Mormon text aside (text aside), I don’t
disagree with the idea that we can feel to sing the song of redeeming love
while we are alive, that’s one of the ideas I personally cherish. I just don’t
want to read that idea into the language of the text that was never intended
to have that meaning. That’s only where I am coming from. This is my main
quibble. I think the Book of Mormon is replete with language that will serve
the exact same purpose , or was intended to serve the purpose of “alreadyfulfilled” or redemption that we are “recognizing.” For example, where King
Benjamin’s says that God “is preserving you from day to day, by lending you
breath, that ye may live and move and do according to your own will, and
even supporting you from one moment to another. . . he doth require that ye
should do as he hath commanded you; for which if ye do, he
doth immediately bless you.” (Mosiah 2:24). That text is dripping with this
immediacy and intimacy and alreadiness. Or, Alma “Now, as my mind caught
hold upon this thought, I cried within my heart: O Jesus, thou Son of God,
have mercy on me . . . And now, behold, when I thought this, I could
remember my pains no more.” (Alma 36:18-19). Here again, there is this
instant redemption the moment Alma directs his mind to Christ.
I don’t want my push back to be interpreted as if I disagree with the idea per
se (and to be sure that may be true at times as well) but mostly I’m
concerned with the idea matching the most appropriate text. I hope that
makes sense.
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joespencersaid:
May 17, 2013 at 12:57 pm
Nice discussion, Jenny and Rico.
Just a quick point: I’m not sure if I’m misreading you, Rico, but I
don’t think anyone has argued that the atonement somehow
overcomes death and the resurrection somehow overcomes sin,
nor has anyone argued for a view that atonement and
resurrection are somehow to be conflated. At least, I’ve certainly
not meant to argue that. Instead, what’s been argued for is a
theology in which a single event (the event of Christ’s
resurrection) offers the promise of an ultimate triumph over
death quite generally (that’s the resurrection) and thereby
uproots sin in the present (that’s the atonement). The
resurrection and the atonement, the conquests of death and of
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sin, are kept quite separate, though they are effected through a
single act or event on the part of the divine. I take it that when
Jenny speaks of a present redemption of the flesh, she has
reference to the present uprootedness of sin in view of the
future destruction of death.
I can agree that this theology hasn’t here been shown in all rigor
and detail (speaking for myself, I frankly haven’t had time to do
any more than make a few sketchy promissory notes), but I
can’t agree—if you’re saying this, and I’m not sure you are—that
it’s simply at odds with the text. For it to be at odds with the
text, we’d have to identify some passage where one of the
following is stated baldly: (1) there were two distinct redemption
events, not one; (2) there is no fundamental relationship
between death and sin. The opposites of those two things are
either stated or implied again and again throughout the Book of
Mormon, and that’s all that’s necessary to underpin the theology
being set forth (but not really argued for).
Now, I don’t want at all to say that the Nephites consciously
thought all of what I’ve suggested in here. I think it’s likely that
they—or at least some of them—did, but it doesn’t much matter
to me whether they actually did. What I’m doing in working up
this theological picture is hermeneutical, an investigation of a
certain set of theological ideas in light of what the text presents
us with. It presents us with a kind of double surprise: (1) there
was only one event of redemption (forget the
Golgotha/Gethsemane split!); (2) there is a fundamental
relationship between death and sin (such that without the
resurrection all would become devils!). The exegete can simply
assert those surprising statements and move on, but the
theologian can’t. I can’t help but ask what’s implied by or
presupposed in or possible to think about in light of those two
statements. And the picture I’ve painted is one that makes sense
of it. I don’t doubt there are others, but they’d also have to
explain in a theologically productive way that double surprise.
Of course, theology issues a call that no one in particular needs
to answer. Exegesis is crucial, perhaps more crucial, than any
particular theological project. But there’s nothing illegitimate
about theology just because it goes beyond exegesis. It
responds to different worries and concerns, and it ought to.
Now, again, I don’t know if I’m responding, really, to anything
you’ve said—perhaps only to my own neurotic will to hear
worries on your part about this approach to the text. But it’s all
worth saying, I think.
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