S UP P LEME NT
No.6 .. March 16. 1954
RESULTS OF
THE BERLIN CONFERENCE
Statement by V. 1\1. l\lolotoy,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.H.
Printed in the U.S.S.R .
Results of the Berlin Conference
Statement by V. M. Molotov,
Minister of Foreign AHairs of th e U.S.S.R.
The conference of Fo reig n ;\ \inistefs of France,
Great Britain, the united S ta tes and the Soviet Union
which met in Berlin from January 2.:; \0 February IS
examined a number of major international problems.
The preceding confe renc e of Foreign ;\\inistcrs of
the four PO\\WS \\",IS held in the spring of 19.f9, and
there had been no such conferences in the interveni ng
five years. The Berlin Conference, for its part, was
unanimous concerning the necessity of holding another
conference, with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of France, Gre a t Britain, the U.S.A., the
u.s.s. r~ . and the Chinese P eople's Republic, (Inc! this
is of definite international importance.
In the pns t fin' year-s the post -war trend of development in the camp of the capitalist countries has become distinctlv apparen t. It is now clear 10 all that
the ruling circles of the United S tates
claim to the
role of leader of that camp . They lay
to more
than that. Thcv nnccrernoniouslv declare that thcv
have taken llp~n themselves th~ "hutden of wor l~l
leadership," that the United States is the "leader of
the' world," though, it goes without saying, HIL're is
no foundation whatever for these claims.
These ambitions han' found practical expression in
the North Atlantic bloc , founded in 1949 on the initiatin' of the U.S. government and with the active support of British ruling circles. The No rt h Atlantic pact
was signed by the following countries: the United
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium. the
Netherlands, Luxem bourg , Denma rk, Norway, Ireland,
Portugal. ltalv, Greece and T urkey. Some of these
countr-ies signed the pad under direct outs ide pressure. Actuully, the pad is an instrument of th e Ang loAmerican bloc: ill effect the United Stales is endea vouring to usc it for the establisluucnt of its wor ld
supremacy . The Xort h Atlantic pact resemble s the
"Ant i-Comintern Pact" which was concluded in 1937
by Hitler Germany, militarist J a pa n and fascist Ital y.
and which was at first directed against the U.S .S. H.
There is no reason to doubt that the fate of the Nort h
Atlantic pact will be no better than that of the "AntiComintern Pact."
Besides laying frank claim to world supremacy. the
rliling' circles oi the United States, and of Great Britain , began incr casingly 10 stress that they intended
t(\ conduct their foreign policy "from positions of
strength." There is nothing' surprising' in this. Fr om
em urge for world supremacy tu a "positions-ofstrength" policy . or a "peace based on s trength"
policy, is only one step.
;\O\\' "'C <Ill know perfectly \\"(,11 what the extolling
of that policy has led to, not only in the United States
and Great Brita in , but also in the other North Atlantic
bloc countries.
,\ direct reflection of that policy is the ar ms dr-ive
which has developed in recent years . Armament piling
has attained unprecedented dimensions in the U nited
States, Great Bri ta in, France, Belg ium, Xorway and
other member coun tries of the bloc . The capi talist
monopolies of America and Europe haw already ma de
!Jig fortunes out of rearmament. But it has laid a
hcavv burden of unbearable taxation 'and inflated
price's on the backs of the people, of the working folk.
Partlcu'ar importa nce was attached to all manner
of atom-bomb intimi dation. But that was not cflccfivc
lor very lonlt either. Everyone can now see that the
calcul<l'IOnS based upon the futile hope that the
United States would retain a monopoly in this field
hav c prove d abso lutely unfou nded.
Together with the arms drive, the United Slate ..._
as well as Great Britain, began to build a network of
military bases in Europe and adjacent territories. The
fact that these military bases are frankly di rected
lIgainst the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies on I} serves to empha ... ize that the cstablishm nt
of American military ba ... s has nothing to do \\ ith
purposes of defence.
Devotion to the "positions-of-strength" policy led to
the signing, 1\\0 ~ ars ago, of the Paris treaty provlding for the Icrmati 11 oi a so-called "European Defence
Comm unit v." which envisages the rebuilding of the
armed strength of western Germany. P lans <Ire now
on foot for the r vival of G rman militarism. which
until vcrv recently was opposed not only by France
and other European countries, but also by the United
Sta tes and Great Britain. This has giwn rise to new,
and extremely sctiou ... , difficulties in the settlement of
the Ger man problem.
The "positions-of-strength" policy is reflected in
ma nv other actions of the United States in the sphere
of i~ternational relations,
One cannot, for instance, close one's eyes to the
discri mina tion in international trade which the United
States, in conjunction with Britain and other countries of that camp, have been practising in recent
years against th l-.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Democracies. In spite of the
fact that that policy has already caused great damage
to the United States and Great Britain themselves.
pressure is still being exercised by var-ious means and
under various pretexts wit h the object of furt her h ampering normal international trade and of restricting
and impeding commercial intercourse with the countries of the democratic camp. That policy, however. is
having a contrary effect, inasmuch as cconornic relations between the G.S.S.R., China and the People's
Democracies han in this period become much stronger. and their economic progress has gained momentum from year to year.
Even-one can now see that the "positions-ofstreng-t-h" policy conducted by the ruling circles oi
the United States .1!1d Great Britain has not been productive of positive results either in the politica l or the
economic sphere. \nd it is meeting with failure in the
military sphere too,
In the first place, that policy fa iled to sta nd the test
in Korea. It did not br ing the United S tate s military
\ ictcry. Having involved itse lf in arme d int ervention
in Korea , the United States began to suffer a loss of
military prestige and mora l aut hority. That policy was
boun d to end in failu re when levelled again st a people
which was st aunchly fighti ng for its national rights,
its independence and liberty.
Despite all the assistance the United St ates is
giving France in Ind o-Chin a , the "p ositions-ofstrength" policy has not led to a nyt hing good ther e
either. French colonial policy, and, wit h it . the Un ited
State ... policy of supporting "colonialism," is sustaining defeat after defeat in Indo-Ch ina. The protr acted war agains t the people of Indo-China, who arc
fighting for their liberty, h as not glorified the " positions-of-strength" policy, but only discredited it complete ly.
To al l this shoul d be added the fact that the past
five years have witnessed not only the establishment,
but ulso the consolidation of the Chinese People's
Republic, which has delivered the Ch inese people from
foreign imperia list domination, Tha t fact has radically
altered the situation throughout Asia and is of cardinal importance for the whole futu re trend of inte rn ational developments.
It is against China that the " posi t ions-of-s trength"
policy is being applied with particula r obsti nacy a nd
\\ ith rnanv absurd excesses. But it is precisely here
that the f~ilure of that policy is being most convin cing ly demonstrated,
In the past few years the entire camp of socialism
and people's democracy has g rown muc h firmer
and stronger. During this period there was formed
a second wor ld market , emb raci ng both the highlyindustrialized and the agrarian-industrial countries
of the democratic camp. The trend of politica l relations betwee n these countrie s is towa rds ever clos er
co-operation an d fir mer friend ship .
What does the "positions-o f-stre ngth" policy of the
ruling circles of the United States and the other coun tries of the t\nglo-i\merican bloc imp ly? In the final
analysis. it implies the conduct of a foreign and domcstic policy which facilitates the engi neer ing of
"mother \\ ar. It can have no ot her implication. Suc h a
policy cannot enjoy the firm sup port of the people s.
Unli ke the policy or the United S tat es, the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union aims at pro moting peace
md international co-operation. The fundamenta l principle of the Sovie t government's policy is that the re
arc no internatio na l iss ues which ca nnot be settl ed by
peaceful means. It is a policy or promoti ng peace.
It conduces to friendly co-operation among nation s
and helps to unite the peace-loving forces of all the
nations of the world.
Until wry recently. the foreign policy of the United
States and Great Britain referred to above set a dcfinile tone for the majority of the countries of the
capitalist camp. The "positions-of-strength" polk)
Incvitablv made for greater international tension. That
\\ as to be felt both in Europe and in Asia. It was, and
I". to be felt in every part of the world.
The international situation was materially chang d
bv the initiative of the Chinese People's Republic and
the Korean People's Democratic Republic which led
last vear to the termination of the war in Korea.
Th-e conclusion of the Korean armistice helped to
lessen international tension. This enabled the Soviet
Union to raise the question of a further reduction of
international tension. The convening of the Berlin
Conference was in itself proof that there is a pcssibilltv of achieving that under present conditions.
-The Berlin Conference was preceded by a long diplomatic correspondence between the Soviet government and the governments of the United States,
Great Britain and France. The exchange of notes was
of value. It improved the conditions for the holding of
the Berlin Conference.
\\'hat the three Western governments in effect proposed was that the conference should confine itself to
the discussion of certain questions relating to the German problem, and of the question of the Austrian
treaty. They were anxious to avoid discussion of other
issues and the g-eneral question of lessening international tension.
The Soviet government. however, believed that
termination of the war in Korea and the conclusion of
art armistice had created favourable conditions for the
examination of measures that would conduce to a
general relaxation of international tension, including
reduction of armaments and prohibition of foreign
military bases on the territories of other countries.
The Soviet government proposed a conference of
the Foreig-n Ministers of the five Great Powers
France. Great Britain, the U.S.:\., the U.S.S.R. and
the Chinese People's Republic-e-tc discuss measures
for lessening international tension, and a conference
of ,\\inisters of the four Powers to discuss the German
question. including the problem of restoring Germany's unity and the conclusion of a peace treaty.
The diplomatic correspondence conducted up to the
close of last year failed to produce full agreement.
inasmuch as the United States, Great Britain and
France objected to the proposed conference of the five
Great Powers, with the Chinese People's Republic
participating. The Soviet government then declared
that it would raise this question at the conference of
representatives of France. Great Britain. the L'.S.,\
the U.S.S.R. in Berlin, concerning which agreement had ulrcndy been reached.
At the B rlin Conference, we proposed the following agenda:
I. ,\\ea:.ur{'-. for lessening international tension, and
the convoninu of a conference of Foreign ~\\inisters of
Franco. Gr ,II Britain, the U.S ..\ .. the Soviet Union
and the Chinese People's Republic.
2. The German question and the safeguarding of
European security.
1. The Austrian stale trectv.
This agenda \\ as accepted by the conference, albeit
\\ ith certain rcscrv at ions.
We must not forget what was being done before the
Berlin Conference to mould public opinion in the \\'(st·
ern countries. There. too, we saw the influence of the
ba sic line of Anglo- \merican foreign policy to which
I have referred.
,\\('a5ures of every kind were employed by the ruling
circles of the United States. as well as of Great Britnin. 10 increase pressure on the U.S.S.R. It was asscr ted nol only by their press. but by leading statesmen as well, that it was useless to negotiate with the
Soviet Union and that the Berlin Conference was
doomed to inevitable failure. But while resorting to
various moans of pressure, up to and including the
direct threat of torpedoing the conference. the renetionary press was unable to conceal that the U.S.:\.,
Great Britain and France were interested in the Berlin
Conference.
The governments of these countr-ies could not hut
reckon with the increasing pressure of democratic opinion, which demanded that the conference of rcprcscntativcs of the four Powers take into account the
popular desire for relaxation of international tension.
The growth of the people's national-liberation movements, especially in Asia. operates in the same dircction. Developments have confirmed that France. Britain and the United States were deeply interested in
having" the Berlin Conference take place.
Before speaking of the areas of agreement reached
at the Berlin Conference, it is necessary to dwell on
the differences which the conference revealed in th
positions of the IT.S.S.R. and the three Western
Powers.
<'HId
II
Th great('~t attention was given at the conference
to the German problem. That. as everyone knows. is
th cb: f of the problems. which have remained unsettled since the end or the war. Yet the lour countries
c-hich were rcprcsontct! at the Ber-lin Conference bear
all ospcc'al responsibility for the proper solution of
that problem, That means that the German question
must be' settled in a wav which \\ ill gu;mmtee PN1'::l'
and security in Ellrop,,: and which \\"ill nlso accord
with the national interests of a democratic
The discussion brought out
Iullv the nature
Ow differences on this question
the Soviet
Lnion on the one hand. and the United States, Great
Britain and France on the other. That. however. docs
not mcnn thai till' attitude to the German problem in
France Iullv coincides with that of the ruling circles
of the United States and Great Britain.
The Soviet Union held. and hold t-. that the salegU:Jrcling of European peace and security requires,
above all, that D rcsurucncc of German militarism
shall not be permitted.
From this it follO\\',;, that the measures necessary for
the rcstorution of Germany's unity on a democratic
and peaceful basis must not he postponed, That attitude fully accords with the aprecments concluded h~
the countries of the anti-I Iitlor coalition-the United
States, Great Britain and the U_S.S.R" with the subsequent adhesion of France -s-both during and immcdiatolv after the war.
I1o~\'e\'er, the gO\-crnllll'nt~ of the United States,
Great Britain and Fr-ance have retreated from this
position. ,H\: dishonouring cardinal international
nprcemcnts to which they put their signatures, and
han' adopted the course of assisting the revival 01
German militarism, Since this cannot he done today
with respect to all Germany. they are per-sistcntlv
paving the way for the remilitarization of the Western part of Germany. In this they arc relying also 0'1
the Adcnaucr gO\'ernnlent in Bonn,
If the gowrnmenb of Fr-ance. GrC';1t Britain and the
United States agreed with the government of the
Soviet Union tha1 there must ll(' no revival of German
n.ilitarisnt. settlement of the remaining' controver-sial
ivsucs would he much easier. That implies that the
zovcmmcnts of the four Powers must rely ill this 1113ttel' not 0)] the Gcrtnuu militarists and rcvanchists. but
on Gcrmanvs dcmm-rubc and peaceful clements. who
the real will oi the CJ~'rnJaIJ people
Berlin Conic renee confirmed that the Germa,l
problem, too, b atTected by th~' foreign policy uf th ..
Anglo-American bloc, as expresstd in the "positionsof-strl'ngth:' or the "pearl' h:Jsed on ::.trC'llgth," policy,
This is at1L'sted b~ such fads :IS tlll' signing of thl'
Paris and Bonn In',ltie" in ,\\(ly I 9,')2, Th{'se treiltie"han' made the datlgL'r of a revinJ1 of Gcrman militarism espf'cially ::Inllc,
UndC'r the Paris trcdly, a SIJ·c(\[1ed Europ(':-!']
Defence Community b to be set up for a period ,If
fifty ycars. and. under its auspices. a European armv
is 10 he [or-rued. consisting of the armed forces (;f
France, ltafv. Belgium. the Xcthcr-lands and LuxellJ_
bourg, as well as of West Germany, It will thus be
seen that out of a total o! approxiruatclv thirtv Europcan StDt('S, six, including Wcvt Germany. h;l\:e !l1'Hle
it their aim to form a narrow and restricted militarv
alignment Oil which thl'y have unluwfullv clapped ~J
"European" label. despite the fact Ihat four-fifths of
tho European states do not belong to it. That trcatv
legalizes the creation of ;J West-German army (\\'{'h~­
macht} and its integration in the aforesaid militarv
alignment. II is proposed to form twelve \\'est-Germa~l
divisions as an initial force, hut there arc already
»ians to increase that number. And that there is talk
of forming 25 and evert GO West-German divisions is
not without its significancC'. In this connection the fad
cannot be ignored that the other dav the West-German
par-liament (Bundestag). in defiar;cf' of the existing
Constitution. passed decisions which permit the introduction of rnilirurv conscr-iption in West Gcrrnanv for
males of 18 years-and over. This is an attempt to'give
the Adcnauer jzovcrnmcnt a free hand 10 form an
army.
Besides the Paris treatv. signed bv six countries,
the Bonn treaty was concluded at thosarno time and
signed by the United Stales, Great Britain and
France, as well as by West Germany, The Bonn and
Paris treaties complement one another.
,\('cording to the Bonn treaty, U.S" French and
British armed forces are to be stationed in West-Getman territory for severn! decades to come, thus turning
West Germany into a semi-occupied country. That
treaty also benr-, the signature of the Adcnaucr
pnvcmmcnt. which is now the chief bulwark of the
West-German rcvanchists. who \\',H1t to clear the \\'ay
for the re-emergence of German milibu-istn. Today the
West-German rcvanchists haw affixed their signature
to the Bonn treaty, which is humiliating to the Germart people, But there can he no doubt that when. in
accordance \\'ith the Paris trcatv. an armv headed hv
\'azi general" \\'ill have been 'created in' \Vest Ger'many, tlll'y will cease to honour their signature, Then
th{'ir real ;Ji111~. their aggressin' re\'illlchist designs,
\\'ill bc rC\'e:J1ed ~,l1ld the Jleighb::.lUring countries \\[[1
be the first to feel it.
SiJl1ultarwously \\'ith th" signing of the Paris and
Bonn treaties. (he LTni\{'d States, Great Britain :Hld
France issued iI tripartite declaration, the c.'prcss pllrl'0~e of \\'hieh \\'as to support and accvlNate the creation of the "European Defence Community" and,
he11(,(', of the l:ufoppan arllly,
I
J
" I'.,!ht (11 the f,
a.. hitlg" plan . . If
rc " f th I n ted Slat" Great Britain
nd I " tc f If til further. nee of which th Pari" and
n01111 trc [ltit . . \\ l rc concluded. The I 'tutcd States al111
(irc'lI Britain do not propose to include their cm 11
I Iorcc- in til' European nrmv. hut t1w~ want t 1
l~ler" fill the . . am
The onraniz ati in
I hich nn rm~ If til \\ ...1
IT t ... \\
d
an "11 (.!ra1 pi 1'1. can h
X)
I n h\ plan .. for the- mrin r"llg of nnothc
\ <
in Er r lIlt' And it j ... bccominu obv iO\l-. that th
rulinu circles ( f tho l lnih d States want to \\ "Ig'e lint
\\ r 11\ the h nd uf "Europeans."
\\ . th [U"OI ean arll1~ is Ionnc I, Fraucc alone
I
f
Great PO\\('[" \\ 'lib, d prived of the pesfha' Ilg her 0\\0 national army. since h
I ire . . \\ II h incorporat d in the European
rmv That thl armed Iurccs of \\'('"t Gcrmanv will
occupy the dOl1linatin/Z position in the Europl'an' army
is lx-vond all doubt. .\1 the same time. France is
gro""ly tramplill/Z upon the \ cr~ princip l '" of the
Fran -Sovict treaty of 191-1, the object of which is to
n Iresh ads of a/zgTes~ion on the p: rt of Gcrn IT Iitarism. There art' French .\\ini"ter" \\h(
,,,,, nt to all this. thoug-h it i" incornprc hcnsiblc how
such all attitude call he reconciled with France's
national dig nity an d interests.
The Paris treaty has still not lu-cn approved hy thrp rliamcnt- of Fr,IIlCl, Belgium and It aly. and has
But ill'reasin~
h refore not ~et enlend into forc
re LIn: is bll( I~ bein~ (xcrted h~ th I'nit d Stat
I Great Britain-,,"'p(dall~ on !-ranee
to 11<l\l th,
lreat~ ratifiui ;lIul its impl('l1lUltatioll ~tartt'(1.
\t th' Berlin Confert'lll'(" not on 1\' D ull l's <llltl Edell,
but <11"0 the Fn'nrh For( ig-n .\\inbh:r, Bida u lt. adduced
l'\'l'r~ ped£'" of 3rgumellt ill deh:llce of till' P a ri"
d lh' "European Deienc' Communi!" .. Th ~
at
nl 0 far a" to a:''''C'rt th,lt. ft rmall , thl' tre::l.ti "
nd ded \\ ith \\'esl G rman~ \\ ill n~t h bindingP III the future unit"d (iermam. There \\ ill C.JIlIl'
time' when OW"(' 'itatelllC'nb of O~e F rl nch , British .'lnd
\lJ]eriC",lll ,\\ini'iters \\ill b~' relllt lllhered hv tht' (j,'r"
Illiln l1lilitari"t~ and r"\.lnchi~t", 'illOUld' ttll'~ c\"Ir
c
1 '11 gh Il~ pr<lct'c Ii efftrt 0 th
.pp lrtunit~
, r "'1 ltl d h\ th Pari" tn,ll\ fo art"' al of mil"
ri~1IJ In \\ 1 ...1 Cit rmam
flO\\ \ r, il I'" alreatl\ dtar th,lt the l.S, Briti ...h
,nd French g-O\ l'rnllll'llt~, ilntl till' .\d~'natJl'r g'()\ em·
mCllt. too , rule out the \'l' ry pos'iihilil\ of uniting" \Ve:-t
ill1d Ea~1 GNlllll1\ into an inle~r;t1 Ci'nllLltl "late. In
,'onf )fIlIit\ \\ ith Ihe Par'" treal~, th, ~ l\pliritl~ d'dar
hat
nIt ...... lh;:l tr at~ j ... ntendltl to ttl(' unit tI (j,
:lll~
It \ \\ jll 11 It C\l n permit h 1 nion of the 1\\
part ... of Germany and. consequently \~:ill not permit
the creation of a united and in de pen de nt German
"tate. This glarin/ZI~ rewa Is how littl e im porta n ce
they attach to all their other pro posa ls on the Germ a n
question
It miuht he presumed thut. at the Be rlin Confer ence.
th (·.S., British and French ,\ \inbtcr~ were no t interl ... t d
in a real ...o lution of the German problem. lr
\ ell in th St ttl mcnt of any practical issue of maj or
importance to the German people, Th ey were pr eoccupied with only one aim. na me ly, to cl ear the way
for the creation of the E u ro pean army in accordance
with till' Paris trcntv. whic h wou ld open the floodga tes
for the revival If militarism in \\'e 'it Gerrnanv.
Even the Soviet go\"('rnml'nr~ proposal "lhat the
German ... should be giwn a hcerinp. ...0 as to learn
\\ hal the German people themselves think of th e urt:C'nt til~k~ of uniting' Germany and the pa r ticipati on
if the Ger man people ill gllaral1kl' i tl ~ pea ce an d
-ocuritv in Eur op e -evcn that proposa l wa s not 3 Ccoptcd at the Berlin Conference. The West -Germ an
rrovcrnmcnt did nol want that either, because. you
--t-e. it i" not disposed to "it down at one ta bl e wit h
the covcrnment of East Germany-the goycrn me nt of
the German Democratic Republic-s-which resists all
plans to revive Germa n militarism, Yet. as th in g s ar e
now. it is the German Dem ocrat ic Rep ubli c whic h
voices the real will of all peace-loving Germ a ns , the
n al de "ire of the German people for peace a n d
Iriendlj relations \\ ith other nations. The refusal of
the LS., Britbh and Frt'nl'h reprt ~('ntati\"e:; to gin a
h aring 10 rt'prt':-.cntatins of Germany shows h ow
rt mott th,'y wert' frolll any ~l'rious intl'ntion of ('xa mining thl' Ger m an question
The I '.S., Bri tish and F rl'n eh .\\inisters did not wa nt
to examine thl' SO\ id draft peac(' Ireaty wi th G er "
lIIan~
'or did Iht,~ suhmit any drilft peace treaty of
the'r o\\n. Thl'~ t\("n rl'iu".. d to examine wa~s and
IT ean ...of accelerating- the pn'paration of a pl'ace trc'1ty
\\ith (ll'rJlWIlY, although ,I detailed exami nation of
thb qlJl'~tion had itireM ly hl'l'n U1Hkrt'lken at a conlerence of lh,' .\\inbter..; of th" four P OWN S se\"eral
~ t'ar~ ago.
Th thrl'e \\\"Il'rn "\ \illi~tl'rs dtdil1l'd to exnminC'
the qu{'...tion of forming a pro\'bion<ll all-German
gOHrnn1l'llt comprising r"prc-"'entati\"es of the parI:anwnt... of Ea:-.t and \\",,,t Germany, though this
\\oul d han' heell an e!Tecth!' :-.tep t()\\ards the reu ni fiC<JtiOl1 of nerma ny o n a dt'mocraliL' a nd peacd u l ba si s .
rhey Iikl'wise n'jcded the So\"iet proposal to se t up
t\\O all·(Jlrman l"lHllmittt'{':-.: one to impro\"e economic
Ild atlmini"lr<llh t' relatiolb hetween East and \\'est
G\.rn1all~, <lnd tilt' other tIl promote bl'tter conditions
for the deve lopme nt of German national culture. They exploiters and militarists have a free hand and live
avoided all practical steps to bring East and West in piping prosperity. \\ hiIe the worki ng folk are con.
Germany closer together, though such steps \ ould b
stantly menaced with \\ ar and annihi la tion. It goes
the surest road to German reunification.
without sa~ ing that this is not the kind of " freedom"
The U.S., British and French .\\ini"-Ier.;; declined to we stand for. \\'e stand for real freedo m, freedom
examine the proposals made by the 50\ iet Union for under \\ hich the militarists are deprived of the poseasi ng the fina ncial and economic obligations of East
sibility of plunging the people into new holocausts.
and West German y arisi ng out of the war. They
We know that lI it ler and his clique', in 1932-33
know, of course, th at in East Germany these measures also came to power by means of so-ca lled "free elechave alr eady been car ried out, and that occupation tions." H itler did not become Cha ncellor of Gprrnanv
all at OIll'C. The road was cleared for him by th~
expend iture, for instance, has already been reduced
to 4.5 per cent of Eas t Germany's national revenue
Adcnauets of the time, men like von Papcn, who beIn Wes t Germ an y, on the other hand, taxes art?" longed to the same party as the present Bonn Prime
mounting and occupation expenses steadily increas.\\inister, Adenauer. It is wet! known that behind
ing. This year occupation expenditure will amount to Hitler and his lieutenants. men like von P apen , stood
nea rly 35 per cent of West Germany 's total national the German monopoly magnates, \\ ho \\ ere making
huge fortunes by expanding the war industries. And
reven ue.
The U.S., Bri tish and French Ministers made, in now, too, behind the back of the Adcnauer clique,
effect, on ly one proposal on the German question, awl who are dreaming of accelerating the remi lita riza tion
that wa s the holding of so-called "free elections" in of West Germany, stand similar Germa n monopoly
East an d Wes t Germany. But even that proposal was magnates, who are bas ing their hopes of ad ditional
fat profits an d super-profits on anot her ar maments
in no way designed to pro mote a settlement of th,
German problem in the interests of European peace drive, and who associate their interests prim arily with
and security, or the holding of reall y free elections. the plans for revivi ng German mi litarism.
The U.S., British and French governments profess
What is more, it was imbued through and through
with dis tru s t of the German people and their demo- to stand for free elections, but actuallv thcv refuse to
han any thing- to do with the democratic and peace ful
crati c forces.
H was proposed that even this, purely internal forces of the German people. They calculate that the
affair of Germanv should be taken out of the hand ... kind of "freedom" thev want to confer on Gcrmanv
of the Germans' and entrusted to the occupation can best be assured throug-h the occupation aut hori'authorities. The Soviet Union's proposal that the four lies, backed by the forces of occupation. Far from
Powe rs help the Germans form a provisional all-Get- promoting- Germany's development on democra tic a nd
man government consisti ng of representatives of the' peaceful lines, such distrust of the German democrati c
and peaceful forces amou nts to d irect sup port of the
pa rliaments and democratic orga nizations of East and
West Ger many, and tha t that gover nmen t shoul d German milita rists a nd rcvanchists, who ar c a lready
its elf conduct Irce all-German elections, was rejected. utilizing that support for the furtherance of their a ims
Rejected, too, \\ as another of our proposals, namely, in West Germany.
In the present German policy of the U.S., Brit ish
that a ll occupation forces, wit h the exception of strict
ly limite d contingents, should be \\ ithdrawn from both and French governments everything- is subordinated
East and west Germany prior to the all-German to the plan for a "European Defence Community,"
elections. The object of this SO\ iet proposal \\ as to that is, a European army. and this is leading to the
eliminate the possibility of the occupation authorities revival of militarism in West Germany. That cour-se
exerting pressure on the elections. But the advocates cannot promote peace in Europe. It would also close
of so-called "free elections" also rejected this pro- the path to German reunification, ina "much as West
posal , which is in the highest degree calculated 10 Germany wou ld cease to be a peacefu l state an d it
would become impossible to re-establish Germa ny on
promote real freedom at the polls.
To this day Dulles is delivering s peeches on the a democ ratic and peacefu l basis.
The Soviet Unio n stands for a different policy, for
Berlin Conference in which he professes to be <Ill
a different course with regard to Ger many.
ardent believer in "freedom" of nations and in "free
This found expression in its proposals for accele rat electio ns." But we know that not all talk of "freedom" is a defence of real freedom for the people, for ing the conclusion of the peace treaty, for the reunion
the working folk. Certain "defenders" of freedom hav e of Germany, the formation of a provisiona l all-Gera fa ncy for the kind of "freedom" under which the man government and the holding of free all-German
electIOns. The purpose of these proposals is 10 ensure
the speediest possible unification of the German nation and German) 's subsequent development on
d mocratic and peaceful lines. Quite obv iousfy. the
U.S.S.R.'s proposals rule out the possibility of a situutlon arising in \\ hich Germany might again become
a dangerou~ scat of aggression in Europe. These proposals arc based on the principle that there must be
no revival of German militarism.
Thus the settlement of the German question now
hinges on one fundamental problem: is German
militarism to be rc oiocd or not?
It must be sa ill that the policy of creating a European rmy and of rev iving militarism in West German. is meeting with activ e resistance, outside of
go\ernment circles, in such countries as Fr-ance and
Britain, and even in \\'est Germany.
In France, for instance, opposition to this policy I"
mounting not only among the workers and other
sections of the working population, but also in bourgeois circle.... That opposition is increasing in th·
French Parliament. Dissatisfaction \\ ith this policy is
widespread among the British people. It is not without significance that nearly half the Labour ,\\.P.s
have come out in opposition to this policy, which the
Right-wing Labour leaders defend. And in \\'est Germany, the Social-Democrats, mindful of the sentiment
of the masses, continue to oppose Adenaucr's policy
of speeding up the rev i\ al of German militarism even
at the price of renouncing the unification of Germany.
And that is understandable. A policy \\ hieh leads
to the revival of German militarism arouses legitimate alarm in all European countries.
That policy raises the question foursquare: where
are matters tending-to the consolidation of peace, or
to another \\ ar?
Where is the present German policy of the United
States, Great Britain and France tending?
That policy is tending towards the creation of a
military alignment of certain European states ag-ain ... t
other European states. To follow that course is to
abandon the task of promoting peace and security in
Europe. To follow that cour c is to head for another
war in Europe, and that would lead to a third world
war.
I~ it true that France, Italy. Belgium and the Eu
ropcan countries associated with them are compelled.
in the interests of their sccuritv. to follow that course?
Is it really necessary to create a "European Defence
Community" and. along with it, to r militarize West
German}, in order to safeguard their security and
peace in Europe?
It has been asked again and agai n late ly, especially in France, whether there is no alternative to the
"European Defence Community," whether that notorious "Community" cannot be replaced by something else, and whether European peace and securitv
cannot be guaranteed without building a Europea~
army based on the revival of militarism in West Germany. These questions have been raised again and
again, but usually in order indirectly to vindicate
the plans embodied in the Paris and Bonn treaties.
In opposition to the plans for military alignments
in Europe, the Soviet Union put forward at the Berlin
Conference a concrete plan which would place the
safeguarding of the peace and security of all the European countries on a firm footing. That plan was
embodied in the Soviet draft of a General European
Treaty of Collective Security in Europe.
The General European Treaty provides appropriate
quar antces against aggression and violation of the
peace in Europe. The treaty would he open to a ll Eu .
ropean countries, no matter what their social svstems.
Both the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic could be parties to it pending
the reunification of Germanv and the united Germane
after reunification had been- achieved. The treaty provides that if any of the parties is subjected to armed
attack, the other parties shal l assist it by all the
means at their disposal, including the use of armed
force, in order to re-establish and maintain international peace and security in Europe.
In addition, the Soviet proposals envisage an immediate substantial easing of Germany's position, including the \\ ithdrawal of the occupation forces of
the four Powers, with the exception of strictly limited
contingents, from all German territory.
The object of the Soviet proposals is to create, instead of mutually opposed military alignments of
European states, an effective system of collective
security in Europe.
.\ regional inter-American treaty of mutual assistance, to which the United States and all the LatinAmerican republics are party, has been in existence
since 1947. Such regional arrangements, provided
they arc of a strictly defensive character, may be of
positive value, although, of course, the attempts of
U.S. ruling circles to use the before-mentioned treaty,
under the pretext of combating communism, for the
furtherance of their own selfish interests cannot be
regarded as legitimate. Rebuffing the objections raised
to the General European Treaty of Collective Securit~ in Europe, the Soviet delegation made it clear
how untenable such objections were when directed
against a European regional treaty. Such
a
treaty, being of a genuinely defensive character. h
fully compatibl e wit h the United Xuttons Charter.
It was sa id ti me and again at the Berlin Conference
that LIe p re sent -da y world is divided, that there arc
now cou ntries with different social
Fhal, of
course, is a fact, and must be
\\ ith. II is
impossible to d isregard the fad that not only the
Sov iet Uni on , but a whol e number oi other countries
ha ve emba rked upon the road of sociali,;rn and
people's dem ocracy and arc successfully advancing
a long that roa d,
We regard this as one of the greatest achievements
of the t we nt iet h centurv. We do not propose to dl'l1~
that the cam p of peacl': democracy and socialism 1l0\\
em braces countries with an aggf('ga\e population of
800 mi ll ion. The gro\\ing strength of the dcmccrutic
cam p is obviou s, and, indeed, H'ry instrurtlvc.
Howe ver, we are consistent believers in the Lenin
principle of co-existence of countries with different
socia l svstcm s.
We believe that notwithstanding (he different social
sys tems in E ur ope. fur instance, all the European na
tions a re interested in the preservation and consolida tio n of peace, Our endeavour is that, in the matter
of pr ot ect in g peace, there shall he no two camps either
in Eur ope or ill the world gl'l1erally, We appeal to all
the Eu ropea n states to refrain frum creating militury
alignments directed against one another, since such
align ments cannot but lead to war Instea d of that, we
propose the [ormation of a united camp of all European
st ates which are anxious to safeguard their security
and to promote peace in Europe. In such a system uf
E uro pea n security, no state. however strong, must
enjoy a dominating position. The sovereignty uf each
and every party to this collective security system ruus:
be guarantl'cd and protected from outside encroachment. It is on these principles that our draft of
General European Treat y of Collective Security in
Europe is based.
T hat draft did nut meet with the support of till'
French, British and U.S. Foreign .\\inisters. But no
ministers can repudiate the idea of collective security
of th e European nations. It is an idea which the
peoples understand. It wins the sympathy of all peaceloving men and wome n.
Th e idea of a general European treaty of collective
security in Europe will find its way to the hearts of the
million s t hroug h manv different channels, and that will
contribute in the surest way to the cause of peace and
security in Europe and, with it, throughout the world
generally. The Soviet Union, furthermore , urges that.
pendi ng the conclusion of a peace treaty, the creation
of German armed forces shall not be permitted, which
,I
\0
would mean that during this period Germany would b(
neutralized.
Ccrtu!n ministers J1Ia\, of course, continue Lu build
nil manner uf plans lor the creation of a "European
Dolence Community" and the reruilitarfzutton of West
Germany. Hut nothing will come of this except another
unreliable military alignment ben-It of the support of
the peoples. The idea uf collective security of the Eurcpoan nations, embodied in a general European trcatv
or in some other form, is nuother matter. That ide;
is winning increasing sympathy among the E uro pean
nations, because it is expressive of a deep desire to
promote universal peace and security.
The Soviet government has never concealed iii;
disapproval or" the North Atlantic pact, which is an ex
pression of the urw' of the .\nglo-.\merican bloc for
world supremacy. The attempts to create a "European
Defence Comrnunitv ,. which would be diroctlv instrumental in revi'ving German militarism g~eatl)
multiply existing differences. The Soviet government
is against multtpf y ing' these differences. It is our desire
\0 settle disputed issues in the interest of peace. III this
instance. it is becoming wry deaf that the Soviet
Uniun
the thoughts and sentiments of all the
nations of Europe, and not only Europe.
The discussion of the German question at the Berlin
Conference showed that in this case the differences
between the Soviet Union and the three Western
Powers hinge primarily on the question of German
militarism, inasmuch as there are plans for its revival.
The Soviet Union, haying borne the main brunt of tll!'
sinlggle against Xaz i aggression, cannot undcreslimate the danger of iresh aggression if German militartsm is allowed to re-emerge.
The gro\\ illg menace of West-German rcmlliturtzation could not but uflcct the Austrian question too,
lt was learned at the Berlin Conference that the
I 'nitcd States, Great Britain and France \\ ere prepared
til withdraw their objections to those articles of the
draft
with Austria to which they had been
objecting
the
fin- years. That made it suff
riently clear lll)\"
those objections had been.
The Soviet side declared at the Berlin Conference
that it was prepared to "igl1 the Austrian treaty
forthwith. given the acceptance of two proposals which
were rendered nccc-sarv by the signing of the Parts
agreement for a "European Defen ce Community ,.
Here arc these \\\'0 proposals.
First, we proposed that Austria shall undertake not
to enter into <lny military alignment directed against
any countrv which took part in the war against
Iliilt'risTll an-d in the liberation of Austria, and that she
shall not permit the stabltshm nt of foreign m Wary
bases on I e- t rr.: Jr..
Sec n I, \ cin t! t tar
r\d':on he inserted in
the A. l"1r:; n t r.-. I:
.ilatint- tl. 1. in vic w of the
dela_ In conclu lin <l I ca c :: ,t. \\ ith Ge man " the
militarv units of tl f ur Powers now stationed in
Austri; shall be allowed to remain there, and that the
question of their withdrawal from Austria shall be
reconsidered not later than I!J,)3. If there were no
plans for a European army, this r s vation we uld be
urmeces
:-. It has become I ClS < ry bee u e th
t.n:cd St t 5 and Grc: t B~".Ll1 • r ex tin ever
anncr I presst re on France and ot1 er c un rics to
secure II cir consent to a rev ival of militarism in \res'
Germany, \\ hich, of course, increases the danger of
a new Anschluss (annexation of Austria}.
The U.S., British and French governments refused to
accept these two addenda to the Austrian treaty proposed b~ th SO\ ict Union. They thereby pr vented the
\ustrian government from tr ating these pr posals
',\ith the understanding they dcsc rv e. The result is that
tl e Austrian treat· has not be n s gned.
The facts 1 have cited show that responsibility for
the failure to sign the Austrian treaty Ii s \\ ith the
governments of the United States, Great Britain and
France, inasmuch as they are UI1\\ illing to renounce
their plans for reviving German militarism, which increases the danger of a new An chluss.
The attempts now being made b y official spok smcn
in the United States, Great Brita.n. France, and also
Austria, to lay the blame on t ic 50\ ict Union for nonconclusion of the Austrian treat) are t tally unw arrantcd. Conditions being \\ hat the) , rc at present, the Soviet government cannot close its eyes to the danger
of a revival of German militarism or to the threat of a
new Anschluss, the prevention of which is expressly
provided for in the Austrian treaty. The Sovi t Union
expresses its readiness to sign the treaty \\ ith Austria
as soon as consent is r ccived to the alore-rn n toned
proposals, which are in the interest of the Austrians
themselves. as well as of the pc ce and security of all
the European nations.
f
III
non, \\ here the discussion \\ as uc\otcd mainly to questivns relating tv the first item on the agenda.
As ... res L of these d cussions, two decisions were
<J ' eed u1J<.) 1 iJ~ the J\\ n sicrs.
It \ a::.;.
l d that tile gO\ ernments of the u.S.S.R.,
the L.S.,\., lruncc and ureat Britain would assist in
promoting a successful solution of the problem of
disunnamcnt. or at least of a substantial reduction of
armaments. I hat agreement did not fully satisfy the
SU\ let delegation. It did not reflect our proposal to
com ene a \\ orkl Confere ice on General Reduction of
.\ mam nts I us year.
cvertheless, the agreement
mpo e~ c rtam 0 I gations on the four governments.
It is directed against the armaments race. It imposes
the obligation to promote at least a substantial rcduction of armaments, upon which the Soviet Union has
always insisted.
Agreement was also reached to convene a conference in Geneva on April 26, I95.t. It will be a confercncc of representatives of the u.S.S.R_, the L.S.A ..
France, Great Britain and the Chinese People's Re pubhc with the purpose of reaching-e-x ith the particip: iion of the Republic of Korea, the Korean People's
Democratic Republic and the other countries the
armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in
Korea, and which desire to attend-a peaceful settle1TI nt of the Korean question: abo for the purposeagain \\ ith the participation of the interested states I restoring peace in Indo-China.
Thus a coni renee in which the the Great Powers
\\.1\ take part \\111 meet in Geneva on April 26 to examine tw 0 of the most pressing Asian issues: the
Korean question and the situation in Indo-China.
And the Chinese People's Republic will at this conference occupy its lawful place side by side with the
other Great Powers.
The importance of this agreement reached at the
Bertin Conf renee cannot yet be fully assessed. But
this agrcem.: I may make for the settl uent of two imp rtant Asian problems, and that would contribute to
a further less ning' of international t nsion.
1 he United I .ations General Assembly prov ed
powerless to settle the Korean question; here too it
acted under United Stutes pressure, That pressure led
the General Assembly to adopt incorrect decisions
\\ hich frustrated the convening of the Political Confe nee on Korea. The L.S. representatives at the
Partmynjon talks worked for this same end.
Th Berlin Conference helped to untie this knot. . '0\\
r r ~entat
of the SO\ i t Union, the Chine..,e
Pc pie's Republ"c, the United States, Great Britain
and france, together with representa!i\·es of both
parts of Korea, will lw abll' to exploH' a final ~ett1e·
j
11
ment of the Korea n quest ion. The task is (Q assist the
national reun ification of Korea on a democratic basis
and the tr an sition of Korea from truce to stable peace
The Fr ench repr esentative at the Berlin Conference
displayed particular interest in the question or indoChina. Here Fr ench colonial policy is at an impasse
ha ving encount ered the heroic resistance of the VietXa mese people, who are defen ding their right to peace
and nationa l libert y. That policy has moreover laid all
intolera ble burden upon th e Frenc h people and is continuous ly deman din g of them new, and futil e, sacrifices.
The Gen eva conference will be faced wit h the inu-icat e problem of restoring peace in Indo-China and
safeguarding the national rights of its peoples. :·\uch
will depen d on the attitude of the French govem.nent,
but much also on the attitude of the United States,
wh ich is int erve ning more and more in Indo-China
affairs. But most of all will depend on whether all the
parti es to the- conference recognize the necessity of
restoring peace in Indo-China not by continuing (I
hopeless war , but by agreemen t based upon the
principles of the liberty and independence of nations.
The results of the Berlin Conference arc now twing
widely discussed. Opinions on the subject are being
expressed in many countries by official spokesmen
and by the press of various trends.
The other day the French Foreign .\\inister spoke of
the s ignificance of the Berlin Conference, and especia lly of the importa nce of the agreement to convene a conference in Geneva at which the restoration
of peace in Indo-China will be discuss ed. Developments
arc showing how urg ent a settlement of that problem
has become.
The Brit ish Foreign Secretary, speaking in the
Hou se of Commons last week, made a number of
critical remark" about the Berlin Conference, but
12
adml ted at the same time that the conference had been
"well worth while." He added that "the conference
certainly has not heightened international tension .'·
His statements betrayed diseatlsfaction at the fact that
certain hopes of exercising pressure on the C.S.S.R.
had not been justified.
We also know that in the United Stutes Dulles has
been attacked by several Sena tors, especially for
having. supposedly, been too yielding in relation to
China. Those Senators nrc eager to return to the past
and would like to have the great Chine-..e people
remain in the old status of a semi-colonia l nation unscrupulously exploited b~ foreign capital. But those
times haw passed Iorever. Let us hope that the
Senators in question will come to realize it.
Certain definite conclusions rna) be drawn from
what has been said.
The results of the Berlin Conference should not, of
course, be overrated. The more so that it will be
possible to form a proper judgment oi them only from
the outcome or the Geneva conference, which it was
agreed in Ber lin to hold.
However, the Iact cannot be overlooked that the
long interruption in the Great- Power conferences,
which lasted five years, has now ended. The Berlin
Conference has been held. It has helped to elucidate a
number of international problems and has paved the
way to a conference of the L'nited States. Great
Britain. France, the Soviet Union and the Chinese
People 's Republic, together with other countries.
The measures being taken by the Soviet Union are
designed to lessen international tension and, hence,
to promote peace. The facts show that these measures
do not remain without result.
Everything goes to show 1II<It the policy of the Soviet government helps to strengthen the international
position of the Sovie t l 'nion and of the entire democratic camp.