Autonomy, Freedom, and Rational Suicide: Human Flourishing Within End-of-Life Contexts: A Catholic
Perspective
Relevant Resources
© 2009
Fr. Christopher M. Saliga, O.P., R.N.; Mr. Jeffery Hover, B.S.; Mr. Jeremiah Curtis, B.S.; Ms. Ellyn Mayher
Human Freedom
Pinckaers, S. (1995). The Sources of Christian Ethics. (Translated from the third edition by Mary
Thomas Noble, OP). Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
A careful historical and theological account of the distinction between “freedom of indifference” and
“freedom for excellence,” this seminal work helps readers see human freedom as much more than
mere “rational” choice making capacity.
Pinckaers, S. (1999). “Human Freedom and Natural Law.” Ethical Principle in Catholic Health Care (ed.
Edward Furton; Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, OP). Boston, MA: The National Catholic
Bioethics Center. 41-3.
“Freedom for excellence” coheres with natural law (participation in divine law); or, “real [human]
autonomy” = “participated theonomy.”
Pinckaers, S. (2003). Morality: The Catholic View. (Translated by Michael Sherwin, OP). Chicago, IL: St.
Augustine’s Press.
This is a more concise version of Pinckaers’ great work The Sources of Christian Ethics. It is arguably
an easier read.
Pinckaers, S. (2005). “Aquinas on Agency: Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?” The Pinckaers
Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology (ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus;
Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, OP). Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 167-84.
Fully-free human action coheres with God-given human nature; or, “Freedom for excellence” =
theonomy + human autonomy.
Pinckaers, S. (2005). “The Role of Virtue in Moral Theology.” The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing
Thomistic Moral Theology (ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus; Translated by Sr. Mary
Thomas Noble, OP). Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 288-303.
Rather than a reduction of morality to duty-bound behavior, the Christian-moral-life-fully-lived-out
amounts to people most freely and happily flourishing in full accord with their God-given+Graceelevated nature.
2
Saliga, C. (2006). “Freedom at the End of Life: Voluntary Death vs. Human Flourishing.” The National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 6(2), 253-62.
This is the essay out of which our poster presentation has evolved. In it, “freedom of indifference” and
“freedom for excellence” are distinguished via two real-world cases, one in which a cancer patient
voluntarily commits a rational act of suicide (Jo Roman) and another in which suicide is never
considered (Christi Chronowski). For widely-distributed accounts of Roman’s case, see: New York
Times, 17 June 1979; and Newsweek, 2 July 1979. For the little-known and only other published
reflection on Chronowski’s case, see: Chronowski, R. (1996). “Christi’s Story: A True Marian Success,”
Signs and Wonders for Our Times, 8(4), 21-7.
Human Dignity
Austriaco, N. (2005) “Debating Embryonic Dignity in a Liberal Society,” Stem Cell Reviews, 1(5), 305-7.
Concepts of “dignity” and the light they shine upon embryo-destructive research are explicated. These
concepts are very helpful in analyzing whether or not assisted suicide (AKA “aid in dying”) grounded in
“death with dignity” truly make sense.
Conner, P. (2008) “What is Human Dignity and the Sanctity of Life,” Catholic Exchange: Catholic
Bioethics. http://bioethics.catholicexchange.com/2008/09/28/83/.
Human dignity is best understood in light of human nature and human destiny.
Korsgaard, C.M. (2005). “Two Distinctions in Goodness.” Recent Work on Intrinsic Value (ed. Toni
Ronnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman). New York: Springer, 77-96.
The distinctions between objects as means and those as ends, and the application of intrinsic value
and extrinsic value to both categories, is implicitly linked to discussions of human dignity in light of
Kantian theories on human value.
Saliga, C. (2008) “Nutritional Support and Human Dignity within the End-of-Life Context,” Catholic
Exchange: Catholic Bioethics. http://bioethics.catholicexchange.com/2008/10/24/90/.
“Attributed dignity” and “intrinsic dignity” are distinguished and applied to a real-world end-of-life clinical
case, an implicit critique of the contemporary concept “death with dignity.”
Sulmasy, D. (2003) “A Keynote Presentation: Dignity and Vulnerability,” The Catholic Health
Association of the United States 2003 Physician Leader Forum. To obtain a copy, see
www.chausa.org or call (314)253-3458.
“Intrinsic dignity” and “attributed dignity” are historically traced and defined. Although assisted suicide
grounded in the contemporary concept “death with dignity” is not directly addressed, this distinction
sheds light upon its moral significance.
Sulmasy, D. (2008). “Dignity, Rights, Health Care, and Human Flourishing.” Autonomy and Human
Rights in Health Care (ed. David N. Weisstub and Guillermo Diaz Pintos). New York: Springer,
25-36.
The two definitions of dignity are differentiated apropos of an understanding of kinds, personhood, and
moral excellence. Also, the implications of intrinsic dignity upon human rights are explicated.