The PaciŽc Review, Vol. 14 No. 2 2001: 195–220
Directional leadership in institutionbuilding: Japan’s approaches to
ASEAN in the establishment of
PECC and APEC
Takashi Terada
Abstract Studies on leadership stress the leaders–followers relationship in
which leaders are supposed to induce followers to act for certain goals of
both leaders and followers, a leadership style which can be characterized as
directional leadership. This sort of leadership seems essential in institutionbuilding. This article, based on this notion, examines Japan’s roles behind
the establishment of the PaciŽc Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in
1980 and the Asia-PaciŽc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989.
This article asserts that a major feature of Japan’s leadership role behind
the establishment of PECC and APEC was Japan’s special attention to
ASEAN countries and endeavoured to incorporate ASEAN’s interests. The
rationale behind treating ASEAN respectfully stemmed partly from Japan’s
traditional leadership intention to contribute to the economic development
of Southeast Asian countries. This intention has been sustained by its selfperceived identity as the only industrialized country in Asia and self-imposed
duty as a bridge between the developed and developing countries in international politics. The article suggests that Japan’s leadership efforts to
incorporate ASEAN’s interests into PECC and APEC through launching
blueprints and conducting diplomacy can be regarded as an example of
directional leadership which partly caused PECC to emerge as a quasigovernmental institution and APEC as an organization with a legally nonbinding force.
Keywords
Japan; institution-building; leadership; PECC; APEC; ASEAN.
Address: Department of Japanese Studies, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge
Crescent, 119260 Singapore. E-mail: jpstt@nus.edu.sg
The PaciŽc Review
ISSN 0951–2748 print/ISSN 1470–1332 online © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/0951274011003735 2
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The PaciŽc Review
Introduction
An international institution cannot emerge without leaders. Leaders play
such important roles as determining an institution’s aims, agenda and
potential membership and undertaking diplomacy to persuade participants
to join the institution. In the history of the development of regional economic institutions in Asia and the PaciŽc, Japan, along with Australia,
assumed leadership in organizing the Žrst meetings of the PaciŽc Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980 and the Asia-PaciŽc Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. The origins of PECC can be traced
to Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira’s PaciŽc Basin Cooperation
Concept, and the idea of organizing a non-government seminar stemmed
from an agreement between Ohira and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser in Canberra, January 1980. This was realized as the PaciŽc
Community Seminar held at the Australian National University (ANU)
in September 1980, an event that marked the beginning of PECC. The
actual creation and the circumstances of the announcement of the APEC
initiative were at the instigation of Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke
and his advisers in the Prime Minister’s ofŽce, and Australia’s Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was responsible for organizing the
Canberra meeting. Yet, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) also played a supportive but signiŽcant role behind the
establishment of APEC through the policy coordinations with DFAT
(Terada 1999, Krauss 2000).
Before Ohira, Japanese political leaders had conceived their ideas about
Asia-PaciŽc economic cooperation, albeit in quite primitive forms, during
the 1950s to 1970s and these ideas evolved around their common hopes
to help economic development in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries were supposed to be a main actor in Japan’s proposals of regional
economic cooperation.1 Ironically, a signiŽcant barrier to Japan’s institution-building efforts was resistance from those countries due mainly to
Japan’s attempt to create the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
during the war period and its growing overwhelming economic presence
in the region after the war. After they embarked on the consolidation of
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the postVietnam War era in the mid-1970s, Southeast Asian countries increasingly
developed a collective voice and Japan regarded it as the representative
of developing countries in the Asia-PaciŽc region. Accordingly, as Morley
(1987: 27) declared,
the PaciŽc Basin Movement was not likely to succeed in breaking
the barrier to intergovernmental formulation until the Southeast
Asian states felt assured that there would be no signiŽcant negative
consequences – that is, it would not cause dangerous antagonisms
within ASEAN.
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
197
Japan, as well as Australia, were well aware of ASEAN’s sensitivity to a
wider regional institution and attempted to carefully incorporate ASEAN’s
interests while assuming leadership in establishing PECC and APEC.
This article aims to examine Japan’s approaches to ASEAN in the establishment of PECC and APEC, focusing on why Japan was interested in
ASEAN and how Japan attempted to incorporate ASEAN’s interests.
Through this analysis, it asserts that Japan’s leadership in the establishment of PECC and APEC can be regarded as an example of directional
leadership; that is, a leader directing its followers’ behaviour towards
collective goals which the leader sets up. Yet, ASEAN countries were not
necessarily genuine followers, as seen in the fact that PECC emerged as
quasi-governmental in which government ofŽcials participate in a private
capacity, and APEC, established as an intergovernmental institution, did
not contain a legally binding force. These organizational structures resulted
in part from Japan’s, as well as Australia’s, intention to incorporate
ASEAN’s interests in creating PECC and APEC.
Directional leadership
According to the hegemonic stability theory which ‘holds that hegemonic
structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive
to the development of strong international regimes’ (Keohane 1989: 75),
international institutions2 are formed in the presence of the hegemon, as
seen in the leadership of the United States in the establishment of the
Bretton Woods and GATT systems. Yet this type of leadership, which can
be called ‘hegemonic leadership’ whereby leaders impose their intentions
on followers by force, does not necessarily entail the leader’s intention to
consider followers’ interests. For instance, the United States successfully
made its coalition partners obey its decision to sanction Iraq in the 1991
Gulf Crisis, but Cooper et al. (1991: 407) do not regard this case as leadership but ‘headship’ in which ‘decisions for the groups are arrived at
unilaterally by a leader whose overweening power ensures that subordinates will have few other options than to comply’. Malnes (1995: 94)
supports this position and asserts that ‘things that are done or said for
the sole purpose of furthering national goals do not fall within the category
of leadership’.
As Kindleberger, a major advocate of the hegemonic stability theory,
who used the term ‘leadership’ instead of ‘hegemon’, argued, ‘it is possible
to lead without arm-twisting, to act responsibly without pushing and
shoving other countries’.3 Institution-building may not necessarily require
‘hegemonic’ leadership implying leadership exercised through the imposition of will and measurable materialistic dominance over others. A
leader’s possession of ‘hard power’ such as military strength and economic
prowess is certainly useful in making followers conform with its proposal
for security or an economic institution. Yet, the forced imposition of will
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in international institutions, based on the leader’s materialistic dominance,
tends to invite resistance from others which coalesces in the form of a
blocking power in opposition to hegemonic pretensions (Young 1994: 89).
Any international institution takes a form of multilateralism when more
than two countries seek to adjust their activities or policies to gain joint
beneŽts. When some parties are forced to sacriŽce their interests for collective goals in negotiations, voluntary compliance is unlikely and the possibility of cooperation is reduced, threatening the institution’s viability. The
leader thus prefers to negotiate rather than run the risk of an institution’s
collapse through imposing its will by force. This requires collaborative
action with the followers, and the notion of followership, which means
that other countries in an international institution follow or support what
the leader does, becomes crucial in leadership for institution-building. This
stance is congruent with a deŽnition of leadership made by MacGregorBurns (1978: 19) as ‘leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals
that represent the values and the motivations – the wants and the needs,
the aspirations and the expectations – of both leaders and followers’.
Accordingly, the crux of leadership centres on the skills of leaders in persuasion, guidance, cajolery and coaxing to ‘produce cooperation wherein
followers defer to a leader’s conception of a particular aspect of their relationship’ (Wiener 1995: 225). Leadership thus rests on the capability to
‘direct other peoples’ behaviour’ to promote collective goals which Malnes
(1995: 93) calls ‘directional leadership’.
Directional leadership makes it possible for leaders to make other
countries follow voluntarily without wielding power based on their
material dominance, if the followers judge it to their advantage and if
they perceive leaders’ capabilities and intentions as suitable. The leaders’
task is to adjust their interests with those of followers to gain support for
an international institution, which is a way of making their ‘power legitimate in the eyes of others’, so that it ‘will encounter less resistance to
its wishes’.4 Adjustment of different interests is especially important for
leaders’ attempts to persuade others to join the international institution,
because ‘persuasion can be successful when one appeals to the norms that
others hold dear’ (Russett and Starr 1996: 120). It is thus crucial for leaders
to demonstrate the beneŽts of establishing a new institution to the
followers by setting up common goals so as to get followers to join the
international institution. Leaders must know the other countries’ preferences and incorporate them in planning strategies or come to a compromise. Nye (1990: 31) calls this ‘cooperative power’ and it hinges on ‘the
attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a
way that shapes the preferences that others express’. How these can be
actually provided is a key in institution-building.
Directional leaders can offer the so-called ‘institutional blueprint’ for a
newly evolving institution, including proposals to meet potential participants’ interests, launched prior to the establishment of an institution. This
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
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blueprint can be used to explain the institution’s objectives to followers.
It is important for leaders to create an attractive institutional blueprint
which shapes the preferences that the potential participants are likely to
follow, and involves ‘a combination of imagination in inventing institutional options and skill in brokering the interests of numerous actors to
line up support for such options’ (Young 1989: 355). A blueprint designed
by leaders helps create consensus regarding the agenda or organizational
structure among the participants by making the motivation behind the
creation of international institutions clear. Leaders may prefer to conduct
diplomacy, through which leaders on the basis of their own ‘institutional
blueprints’ attempt to narrow differences between potential participants’
interests of an institution. Diplomacy helps Žnd a ‘focal point’ which ‘helps
deŽne acceptance solutions to collective action problems’ and without
which institution-building ‘may often not be formed at all’ (Rittberger et
al. 1997: 144). The institutional blueprint and diplomacy are useful instruments which leaders can employ to direct followers towards a new institution through persuasion.
In sum, features of directional leadership converge on leaders’ efforts
to adjust different interests of potential participants and persuading them
to join new regional institutions by setting up common goals, which can
be legitimated by followers who perceive the beneŽts of complying with
those goals. This article later tests the appropriateness of these features
of directional leadership in the case of Japan’s leadership in the formation
of PECC and APEC.
Japan’s intention as a leader in Asia-PaciŽc economic
cooperation
To exercise a leadership role is frequently costly and difŽcult, as leadership
requires leader states to spend time, energy and capital and to run the risk
of losing international prestige if they fail, as former US Secretary of State,
James Baker (1989) was aware: ‘there is nothing more difŽcult to take in
hand, more perilous to conduct, more uncertain in its success, than to take
the lead in the introduction of a new order of things’. This costly leadership exercise requires strong interests in leader countries relevant to institution-building. Leaders should feel at least that ‘controlling the (followers)
will bring beneŽts and that these beneŽts will outweigh any potential costs
[they] may pay for the inuence attempt’ (Rothgeb 1993: 29).
In this sense, a major and consistent rationale behind Japan’s leadership in building regional economic stability was an intention to assist economic development in Southeast Asia. Japan considered it necessary to
exercise leadership in Asia through its high economic growth during the
1960s and regional economic cooperation was regarded as a suitable Želd
for its leadership activity. In April 1966, Japan hosted the Ministerial
Conference for Southeast Asian Development in Tokyo, the Žrst inter-
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national conference that the Japanese government convened in the postwar period. Japan also had a strong commitment to the establishment of
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to which it contributed US$200
million which was equivalent to the contribution from the United States
to the Bank.5 Against this background, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki
launched the Asia-PaciŽc policy in 1967, based on the idea that developed countries in the PaciŽc should cooperate to assist economic development of underdeveloped Asian countries. In his Asia-PaciŽc policy, Miki
deŽned Japan’s role as a bridge between developing Asian and developed
PaciŽc Rim countries, based on his perception of Japan’s international
identity as the only industrialized nation in Asia. The desire to play such
a bridging role to assist development in Asia made Japan feel obliged to
see itself as a representative for Asian countries in international fora
(Terada 1998). This had been already observed in the Žrst Diplomatic
Bluebook published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA 1957: 8),
asserting that Japan had endeavoured to improve Asia’s status and secure
its support in international society as an appropriate speaker on Asian
issues. This was reinforced by being a member of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964 and the Group
6 Summit Meeting in 1975.6 As a senior MITI ofŽcer explains, the region
was one in which Japan might ‘be able to try to solve the North–South
problem’ (Atarashi 1984: 110) and this concept was selected when Japan
came to be aware of its international responsibility.
As discussed later, it is true that Ohira did not use the term ‘AsiaPaciŽc’ and placed more emphasis on the ‘PaciŽc’ in his concept and that
Ohira did not emphasize the North–South problem strongly in his concept.
Yet his PaciŽc Basin Cooperation Study Group acknowledged that ‘. . .
the conict-ridden North–South problem is nearing a turning point . . .
PaciŽc basin cooperation can also be expected to help usher in new relations between advanced and developing countries’ (cited in Crawford and
Seow 1981: 185). This shows that Japan under Ohira did not necessarily
drastically change its traditional approaches to Asia-PaciŽc regionalism.
Although mention of the North–South problem rarely appeared thanks
to the high economic growth of ‘the South’ in Asia since the mid-1980s,
a report by MITI on an APEC proposal touched on its concept. MITI’s
report (1988: 6) detailed the fragility of developing countries’ economies
despite their high economic growth and emphasized the importance of
multilateral economic cooperation in the region to sustain the growth
of these developing countries. Japan’s wish to contribute to regional economic development as a leader on the basis of its international status as
the only industrialized nation in Asia was a factor behind Japan’s leadership in PECC and APEC.
Japan’s initial objective in its approach to APEC remains even after
APEC’s establishment. Toyoda, who drafted this MITI’s report, comments
in the context of Japan’s hosting the APEC Osaka Meetings in 1995:
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
201
As a means of leadership, Japan as the host nation should appeal
the signiŽcance of gradual approach within APEC liberalization,
while undertaking development cooperation in this process. Japan,
from its own experience of development, should take the initiative
to formulate an economic theory for a step-by-step approach to liberalization to convince other developed countries like the United States
of the effectiveness of this approach.
(Personal interview, 20 January 1995, Tokyo)
APEC places emphasis on development and technical cooperation for
developing countries, along with trade liberalization and, as Funabashi
(1995: 235) argues, ‘development is still most ardently pressed by the
South, and liberalization by the North’. Japan’s high regard for development cooperation in APEC, epitomized by its launching the concept of
Partnership for Progress (PFP) in 1994 to promote human resource development, represents Japan’s general and consistent approach in regional
economic cooperation.7 Such a policy orientation makes Japan stand out
among developed countries such as the United States and Australia who
tend towards liberalization rather than development cooperation and do
not favour a gradual approach to liberalisation, as Toyoda’s above statement illustrates. Japan’s preference for a gradual approach is associated
with its tendency to think that it has valuable knowledge of economic
development because of its own success after the war. Masaru Yoshitomi
(1995: 58), the head of ADB Research Institute, identiŽes a key of Japan’s
economic development as step-by-step liberalization. As an Indonesian
ofŽcial clearly stated, development cooperation was necessary for ‘the
weaker countries’ to enhance ‘their capabilities that enable them to participate more fully in regional trade liberalisation exercises’ (cited in
Soesastro 1996: 26). This view concurs with Japan’s. Japan has hoped to
help Asian development by taking advantage of this knowledge and by
establishing and utilizing multilateral regional institutions in particular for
this undertaking. This is connected with its self-consciousness as an industrialized nation in Asia and with its responsibility as a leader felt obliged
to contribute in the international society. In this sense, one of Japan’s leadership interests in regional economic cooperation was to make ASEAN
countries join PECC and APEC.
Japan and ASEAN in the 1960s and 1970s
As argued above, in stressing the necessity of directional leadership for
institution-building, the notion of followership becomes crucial. In this
sense, if leaders have a good relationship with their followers, it is easier
for the leaders to get them to conform. Leaders’ good relations with
followers are instrumental in creating a common interest in international
relations between them, which makes it easier for leaders to establish an
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international institution. Good relations with followers are relevant to
leaders’ reputation among followers, which is related to ‘the degree
to which [their] past behaviour affects expectations regarding [their]
present and future behaviour’ (Rothgeb 1993: 31).
In the context of Japan’s leadership in Asia-PaciŽc regionalism, Japan
had not forged sound relations or gained credibility with Southeast Asian
countries. This means that Japan lacked an essential leadership criterion
when it began to develop its interest in Asia-PaciŽc regionalism. Southeast
Asia’s negative perceptions of Japan were fostered especially by wartime
experiences reected in hostility to the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere that constituted the ideological prop of the PaciŽc War. The aftereffects of the Co-Prosperity Sphere were vivid in the post-war period, and
Southeast Asians suspected that Japan’s launching of regional cooperation
proposals was an attempt to create another Co-Prosperity Sphere through
which Japan would attempt to dominate the region.8 To gain conŽdence
in its diplomacy to further regional cooperation, Japan had to exterminate the spectre of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The sound diplomatic interaction with potential participants and
common institutions where leaders and followers participate also help
leader states understand others’ desires to create an attractive plan of the
institution. ASEAN, formed in 1967, became a vehicle through which
Japan could understand Southeast Asian countries’ views and wishes and
Southeast Asian countries could carry collective complaints and criticism
to Japan more directly and strongly. It was not until the Tanaka administration that Japan recognized the signiŽcance of ASEAN, but, ironically,
Tanaka encountered massive riots in Thailand and Indonesia when he
visited Žve ASEAN countries in January 1974. Anti-Japanese feeling had
been exacerbated by Japan’s growing economic presence in Southeast
Asia, and malpractice by Japanese business people. This, however, marked
an important turning point in Japan’s leadership ambitions in Asia-PaciŽc
regionalism. Japan realized that it was imperative to change its stance and
approach towards Southeast Asia and place a higher priority on improving
relations with ASEAN. As the then chief cabinet secretary, Susumu
Nikaido, commented, these encounters were not necessarily harmful to
Japan in the long run because they provided an opportunity for Japan
to rethink its diplomatic approaches to Southeast Asia and assisted mutual
understanding (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 January 1974). As a result,
Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda, who came into power in December 1974
and December 1976, respectively, both placed a much higher priority on
foreign policy towards ASEAN.
For instance, when speaking of the anti-Japanese protests during
Tanaka’s visit to ASEAN, Miki as deputy prime minister said on 16 January
1974 that ‘the time has come for the Government to conduct a serious
review of previous foreign policy and of economic cooperation’ (cited in
Sudo 1992: 72). At the 31st LDP convention held in January 1976, Miki
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
203
spoke of ASEAN for the Žrst time as the principal actor in Southeast
Asia, which, along with Japan, could contribute to stabilizing the region.9
Miki envisaged three plans to improve relations with ASEAN countries:
(1) to develop an Asian version of the Lomé Agreement, (2) to triple its
OfŽcial Development Aid (ODA) and (3) to contribute to the International Agricultural Development Fund (Nakamura 1981: 131). Although
all these plans were abandoned due to opposition from the Ministry of
Finance, which had experienced Žnancial difŽculties caused by the oil
shock and was reluctant to increase expenditure, they were indicative of
Miki’s keenness to forge good relations with ASEAN countries. Miki capitalized on every opportunity to express his pro-ASEAN stance.
Fukuda’s contribution to the improvement in the Japan–ASEAN relations was made through the Fukuda Doctrine, announced on 18 August
1977 in Manila, which is now regarded as ‘a major turning point in postwar
Japan–ASEAN relations in that it provided what Japan regarded as a
statement of its political interests in the Southeast Asian region’ (Morrison
1988: 422). The second point of the doctrine that Japan, as a true friend
of the countries of Southeast Asia, would do its best to build a relationship of mutual conŽdence and trust based on a ‘heart-to-heart ’ understanding, not only in political and economic areas, but also in social and
cultural areas, was especially signiŽcant. This was based on Fukuda’s idea
that the Japan–ASEAN relationship conŽned to money and goods should
be converted to one based on ‘heart-to-heart’ contact.10 This abstract
notion of ‘heart-to-heart ’ relations was Fukuda’s attempt to modify Japan’s
negative image as selŽshly pursuing economic beneŽts, as an ‘economic
animal’, and to create a friendly relationship with ASEAN countries on
the basis of mutual understanding and conŽdence (Nishiyama 1977: 5).
The notion originated in Fukuda’s memory of Japan’s defeat in the contest
over the ADB’s headquarters with the Filipinos in 1966, an event to which
Fukuda referred: ‘if we do not develop a heart-to-heart relationship with
the people in Asia, similar events will take place again’ (cited in Sudo
1992: 122). Fukuda believed the emergence of the anti-Japanese protest
movement unleashed during Tanaka’s 1974 visit could have been avoided
if Japan had attempted to cultivate mutual trust with Southeast Asia
(Atarashi 1984: 112).
Miki’s and Fukuda’s ASEAN-oriented diplomacy, inspired by the 1974
Tanaka diplomacy in the region, constituted a favourable environment for
their successors to launch a fresh approach to Asia-PaciŽc economic cooperation. It was necessary that ASEAN countries would recognize Japan
as a benevolent contributor to the region, one that did not seek reward
and that conducted diplomacy on the basis of equality. President Marcos,
immediately after hearing Fukuda’s doctrine speech, showed his respect
for Fukuda’s foreign policy by stating: ‘We have been waiting a long time
for this kind of attitude to appear in Japan. Now, without any hesitation,
I can say that ASEAN really has found a true friend in Prime Minister
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Fukuda’ (cited in Shibusawa 1984: 105–6). Japanese prime ministers had
never before received such a tribute from Southeast Asia for their foreign
policy. Their diplomatic efforts and Japan’s growing economic power led
to ameliorating Japan’s relations with ASEAN and brought about more
favourable conditions for Ohira to launch a major initiative for regional
economic cooperation.
Japan’s leadership in the establishment of PECC
While running for the Liberal Democratic Party’s presidential election in
November 1978, Ohira referred in broad terms to the PaciŽc Basin
Cooperation Concept in his policy guidelines, as one of the highlights of
his policy agenda. The rationale behind Ohira’s launch of the Concept
was his awareness that Japan’s responsibility as a leader in the region
would contribute to its economic development. In attending the Žrst
meeting of the PaciŽc Basin Study Group on 6 March 1979, Ohira said
that ‘Japan needs to understand the roles and responsibilities which international society expects it to assume, and we should seriously respond to
them’ (MOFA ofŽcial document, 6 March 1979). Donowaki (1982: 21), a
member of the PaciŽc Basin Cooperation Study Group which Ohira had
entrusted with the task of reŽning and developing the Concept, wrote:
Ohira felt Japan should no longer remain a passive beneŽciary of
world peace and prosperity, but rather play some role in actively creating world peace and prosperity. To begin with, was there not something Japan could do in the immediate neighbouring area? This was
one of Mr Ohira’s speciŽc instructions conveyed to the Study Group.
Yet, Ohira did not have a special empathy with Asia. This was partly
because he thought that the PaciŽc Basin or the PaciŽc Ocean was more
important for Japan’s survival and development than Asia. A decade
before he launched the PaciŽc Concept, Ohira had already shown that his
interests lay with the ‘PaciŽc’ Ocean rather than the ‘Asian’ continent:
The survival and development of Japan will depend on good relations
in the PaciŽc Basin, and the security of the PaciŽc Ocean. Therefore,
the primary aim of Japan’s diplomacy should be to maintain the
peace, security, and prosperity of the PaciŽc . . . the problem of
the Asian continent should be secondary in Japanese diplomacy. I
think it sufŽcient for Japan to try to achieve merely peaceful co-existence with countries on the Asian continent.
(Australian Financial Review, 2 November 1970)
The expressions ‘PaciŽc Basin’ and ‘PaciŽc Ocean’ were distinct from
the ‘Asian continent’. This propensity emerged in the draft of his Žrst
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205
policy speech to the Diet on 26 January 1979, which originally excluded
ASEAN nations as possible members of the PaciŽc Concept.11 A MOFA
ofŽcial who was asked to proofread the text by the Prime Minister’s OfŽce
found it unacceptable and the modiŽcations the MOFA ofŽcial requested
of the Prime Minister’s OfŽce were to add ASEAN countries to the PaciŽc
Basin Community.12 MOFA felt that Ohira’s original text might give
ASEAN nations the impression that relations among the advanced nations
were central to Ohira’s concept, and that ASEAN’s interests were being
marginalized. In addition, the ideas on PaciŽc cooperation were designed
to improve the economic gap between advanced and developing countries
and the latter referred mainly to ASEAN nations as ‘the Asia PaciŽc
region’ (MOFA ofŽcial document, 19 January 1979). MOFA feared Ohira’s
idea might damage Japan’s improved relations with ASEAN.13
The reference to the PaciŽc Basin Community was eventually dropped
and instead the term ‘the Asia PaciŽc region’ was used, but it only
appeared twice in the speech. Moreover, Ohira did not touch upon his
Concept at all. Nagatomi, Ohira’s secretary (1994: 329) recalled that the
Concept was so unclear that it could not be included on his agenda and
the phrase, ‘the Asia PaciŽc region’ was introduced instead, as MOFA
had requested. MOFA hoped to incorporate Asia or ASEAN in any framework for PaciŽc cooperation and the phrase ‘Asia PaciŽc’ was probably
the most appropriate in this context as it would be unlikely to give an
unfavourable impression to ASEAN nations. Japan’s foreign policy, developed under Miki and Fukuda, required Japan to maintain better relations
with ASEAN, and this approach was not readily amenable to Ohira’s
philosophy that Japan should place more signiŽcance on overall relations
with the PaciŽc nations. There was a need to formulate a framework and
pursue diplomatic efforts to accommodate ASEAN’s viewpoints into
Ohira’s concept. In fact, some of the ASEAN leaders regarded the PaciŽc
Concept as an indication that Ohira accorded relations with ASEAN a
lower priority, as Donowaki (personal interview, 16 December 1994)
revealed.
The Study Group launched the interim report in November 1979 and
the report provided an initial test to check other countries’ reactions to
the PaciŽc Concept. The interim report, which advocated holding an international symposium to promote the Concept, articulated that Japan had
no intention of imposing its Concept on other countries with a hope to
have full consultation with those countries concerned and to work together
with them to promote the Concept (PaciŽc Basin Cooperation Study
Group 1979). Yet, while constructing the Final Report, the Study Group
faced criticisms on the PaciŽc Concept from some ASEAN countries,
which negatively reacted to the interim report. Tsuneo Iida, Deputy
Chairman of the Study Group, commented that ‘we were often told by
Southeast Asians . . . that the concept amounted to the second Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere or that there was surely something like
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the Co-Prosperity Sphere concealed behind the rationale’ (personal interview, 26 December 1994, Kyoto). When MOFA held its Ambassadors’
Meeting in September 1979 to examine how the PaciŽc Concept could be
promoted to complete the interim report, analysis of ASEAN’s reactions
dominated the meeting. Japan had not explained the Concept to ASEAN
countries in any detail because it anticipated a cool reaction (MOFA ofŽcial document, 27 September 1979). MOFA concluded that some ASEAN
countries misunderstood its rationale behind the PaciŽc Concept and the
nature of the Concept needed to be explained to these countries.14
Against this background, Ohira and Australian Prime Minister Fraser
(1994: 321) agreed at the meeting in Canberra, January 1980, that ASEAN
countries which were preoccupied with other issues could not afford to
allocate much energy and time to the PaciŽc Community issue and that
serious institutionalization should not occur until ASEAN was well established. Given national differences of size, history, culture and economic
development, Ohira and Fraser thought it necessary to take the time to
increase mutual understanding to overcome problems. Accordingly, they
agreed that a non-government seminar was the proper initial step for
exploring the Concept, which led to the organization of the Canberra
Seminar at ANU, September 1980.
To explain the substance of the Concept and know ASEAN’s interests,
Japan dispatched Kiyohisa Mikanagi, formerly Ambassador to the
Philippines, to Žve ASEAN capitals during 10–17 March 1980. His main
purpose was to explain the Concept and seek their understanding. He met
with political leaders and senior foreign affairs ofŽcials in each capital.
His diplomacy was effective in changing some of the negative views held
by ASEAN leaders. For instance, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister
Mahathir, who had reservations about the PaciŽc Community because he
thought it would hamper ASEAN (Mahathir 1980), suggested in his
meeting with Mikanagi that Japan and Australia were pushing ASEAN
countries into a new association. Yet he was persuaded to the view that
examination of the PaciŽc Concept would be useful and ought to continue
(‘memo’ from Drysdale to Crawford; ‘telephone call from O’Leary, 19
March 1980’). Mikanagi (personal interview, 23 January 1995, Tokyo)
recalled that while Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand were in favour
of the Concept, Indonesia and Malaysia reserved their judgement.15
As a result of studying ASEAN’s approaches, MOFA and the Study
Group Žnally decided to incorporate ASEAN’s preferences into the Žnal
report, which eventually gave due emphasis to economic and cultural
aspects. 16 Otsuka, head of the Policy Planning Section at MOFA stated:
. . . the Study Group had come to the conclusion that the creation
of understanding within the region was an important objective and
should be pursued through cultural and social exchanges. This conclusion was reinforced by Ambassador Mikanagi’s visit to the ASEAN
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
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countries . . . the emphasis was on establishing solidarity with
ASEAN and showing responsibility towards ASEAN.17
While Japan and Australia were attentive to ASEAN’s caution, both
countries maintained that the most important element in the organization
of the seminar was the governmental involvement. The seminar chairman,
Crawford, stressed that he would be disappointed if it were not possible
to come up with positive intergovernmental steps (‘memo’ from Drysdale
to Crawford, 26 March 1980). The Japanese also recognized that this issue
was important because government involvement through senior ofŽcials
was thought to be a new element in the PaciŽc Community Seminar. A
MOFA ofŽcial who spoke with Australian Ambassador Menadue, had a
similar view:
[I] saw the role of the government representative as being most
important if there was to be any progress. Scholars and business
people had held many seminars and conferences but without much
progress. The new element would be the involvement of the ‘government’ representative.
(‘Telex’ from Menadue to Crawford, 20 March 1980)
Yet, as Ohira and Fraser concluded, both countries should not rush into
establishing an intergovernmental institution by imposing their will. Japan
and Australia were aware that ASEAN countries lacked conŽdence in their
economies and became reluctant to commit themselves to regional economic cooperation. In fact, after the seminar, it turned out that some
ASEAN countries saw difŽculties in establishing a new and institutionalized form of regional cooperation and were not keen to support the
Concept’s development. The strongest dissenting opinion came from the
Philippines representative, Ambassador Luz Del Mundo, who said other
members of ASEAN had agreed ‘it would not be wise to hold any future
meetings’ in an ASEAN country (Canberra Times, 19 September 1980).
The Malaysian government declined to support a second PECC meeting
(Harris 1994: 5). Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Indonesian foreign minister,
said his government had reservations because it saw no urgent need for the
Concept, partly because the proponents themselves were not clear about
their ideas and presented the ideas in a ‘clumsy’ way (Soesastro 1983: 10).
These reservations forced Japan as well as Australia to make a compromise
and decide to establish PECC as a quasi-governmental institution.
These attitudes inuenced Japan’s approaches to Asia-PaciŽc cooperation in the 1980s, dominated by MOFA which had not been enthusiastic
about the PaciŽc Concept even when Ohira was in power.18 MOFA’s stance
was that unless ASEAN supported it, Japan could not seriously advance
it; MOFA thought it better to focus on furthering relations with ASEAN,
a remark echoed by a senior MOFA ofŽcial (personal interview, 16
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December 1994, Tokyo). MOFA’s view was that the private sector should
develop the Concept and this was conŽrmed when it saw little debate on
the Concept in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) organized
in June 1981 in which Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda had
expected to formally discuss PaciŽc cooperation issues with his ASEAN
counterparts (MOFA ofŽcial document, 30 June 1981). The indifferent
reaction towards the Concept in the ASEAN PMC led MOFA to believe
that no government would be willing to take the initiative or that they
would be reluctant to be involved in developing the Concept (Terada
1999), and this view itself became an obstacle to further development of
the Concept. Yet, it was Thai Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman
who took the initiative in organizing the second meeting at Bangkok
during 3–5 June 1982 where Ali Murtopo, the Indonesian minister for
information, offered to host the next quasi-governmental conference on
PaciŽc cooperation in Indonesia in 1983. Given ASEAN’s cautious views
on the PaciŽc cooperation, it is noteworthy that Khoman, who had found
Ohira’s concept ‘noble’ and the Seminar discussions ‘most fruitful’, worked
harder to maintain the momentum of PaciŽc cooperation after the
Canberra seminar.19
Japan’s leadership in the establishment of APEC
As I highlighted elsewhere, the ideas behind APEC originally came from
Australia, but coordination between Australia and Japan was pivotal in
the successful establishment of APEC in 1989 (Terada 1999). Japan’s MITI
had oated a proposal for economic ministers’ regional meetings in mid1988 and DFAT expressed strong interest in the idea, which urged coordination between the two countries. Although MITI’s role behind the
organization of APEC remained as supportive, MITI delegation’s visit to
regional countries to sound out reactions for its proposal and Hawke’s
initiative laid the groundwork for the Hawke proposal’s relatively easy
acceptance when an Australian delegation later visited regional countries
in April–May 1989. MITI’s proposal was eventually subsumed into the
Hawke initiative because of the latter’s comprehensiveness, but MITI took
the position that the establishment of APEC amounted to success of its
own proposal.
The origins of MITI’s interest in APEC can be found in Shigeo
Muraoka’s initiative in setting up the Trade Policy Planning OfŽce to
outline comprehensive trade policy within the International Trade Bureau
in 1986. Muraoka, then director-general of the bureau, hoped that the
ofŽce would deal with interdisciplinary trade issues which no single section
in the bureau could deal with due to the intersectoral nature of the issues.
Muraoka appointed Masakazu Toyoda as the ofŽcer responsible for
research and they came to believe that Japan should promote regional
economic cooperation at government level. They thought Japan might be
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
209
able to inject strategic thinking into the region, given the fact that more
than four decades had already passed since the Second World War. Asia
was becoming the centre of the world economy; and inward-looking
regionalism was looming elsewhere in the world. Muraoka (personal interview, 20 January 1995, Tokyo) stressed the Žnal factor as signiŽcant for
MITI’s growing interest in Asia-PaciŽc regionalism:
Should Japan follow the trend of discriminatory regionalism? No.
Was Japan powerful enough to curb the trend? No. An option Japan
could take was to commit itself to creating open regionalism by
means of an Asia PaciŽc regional institution. Asia PaciŽc regionalism should not only be consistent with globalism, but it should also
aim to promote globalism. We hoped that MITI’s plan could play a
bridging role between regionalism and globalism.
Toyoda (personal interview, 15 January 1995, Tokyo) also said an important message MITI hoped to carry was to advocate a new model of regionalism. The worst scenario for Japan was for the world economy to be
divided, so he thought it essential for MITI to present open regionalism
as a desirable model to Europe and North America. MITI was concerned
about the development of inward-looking regionalism in the US–Canada
Free Trade Agreement, concluded in January 1988, and the EC’s move
towards a uniŽed market in 1992. To give more substance to these
proposals, in February 1988, a Study Group for Asian Trade and
Development was established within MITI and the group launched a
report in June (MITI 1988) which was distributed to regional countries.
The report indicated that Asia-PaciŽc regionalism should not be inwardlooking and discriminatory, as distinct from the models being developed
in Europe and North America among not only industrial and academic
circles but also ‘government ofŽcials, including those at the cabinet level’
(MITI 1988: 36). It was on the basis of this report that MITI approached
regional countries to explore the possibility of a ministerial meeting on
regional economic cooperation.
Yet MITI was well aware of ASEAN’s cautious view on intergovernmental regional institution. Muraoka (personal interview) recollected:
The reason I thought Japan should maintain a low proŽle and that
Australia should take the initiative in organizing APEC instead, lay
in the belief that memories of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere still pervaded the region and people would not readily support a Japanese idea which might remind them of the old awful days.
I thought the problem of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was deeply rooted.
However, immediately after the Hawke proposal, launched in January
1989, Toyoda, the drafter of MITI’s report, suggested that Muraoka visit
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ASEAN countries to persuade them to participate in a ministerial meeting.
Yet Muraoka (personal interview) was in no hurry to act:
I thought ASEAN countries would not accept the plan easily, so I
proposed a preliminary investigation of ASEAN’s reactions to the
Hawke proposal. I thought it most appropriate to visit the region
when the Hawke proposal was well embedded in policy-makers’
minds and they were deciding whether or not to join.
Prior to Muraoka’s visit, MITI ofŽcials were commissioned to visit
ASEAN countries to sound out reactions to the Hawke proposal and
explain the MITI plan. MITI saw that ‘Australia alone would not be able
to sway some cautious Southeast Asian policy-makers and therefore MITI
could make a real difference’ (Funabashi 1995: 66).
Hirokazu Okumura, then seconded from MITI to the Sydney ofŽce of
the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), visited ASEAN countries in February 1989 to meet with senior ofŽcials in trade ministries in
each country. According to Okumura (personal interview, 20 January 1995,
Tokyo), the meetings with Indonesians and Malaysians were impressive.
In Indonesia, it appeared that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave priority
to the maintenance of the ASEAN framework, but ofŽcials in the trade
ministry told Okumura that there was a general awareness that ‘the time
is right, so we should go ahead’. Malaysian ofŽcials also positively
suggested that the post-war generation should not be shackled by the
legacy of the war and should promote the idea. Okumura was conscious
of a ‘generation gap’, and attributed the change to the positive inuence
of Japan’s economic cooperation and business presence in the region. In
Thailand, ofŽcials in the Prime Minister’s OfŽce said that Prime Minister
Chatichai had already discussed the Hawke proposal with President
Suharto and that while they gave Žrst priority to ASEAN, they had decided
not to rule out the Hawke proposal. Okumura reported to Tokyo that
ASEAN nations were in general ready to accept a proposal for an intergovernmental regional institution. Muraoka was delighted to read
Okumura’s positive report, but he continued to be cautious. Accordingly,
Muraoka planned his visit carefully. His Žrst visit was to Singapore because
Singapore was expected to be the most positively disposed towards the
plan, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong. He also
targeted senior ofŽcials and ministers in trade and industry ministries, as
well as prime ministers’ and presidents’ ofŽces, but not foreign ministries.
Before his visit, Muraoka (personal interview) suggested to Kunihiro,
Vice-Minister on economic affairs at MOFA, that MOFA should have
some of its senior ofŽcials accompany his visit. Yet Kunihiro (personal
interview, 16 January 1996, Tokyo) declined the suggestion because he
thought the MITI plan would arouse concern in Asia that Japan was trying
to revive the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere using economic
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
211
power. For this reason, MOFA believed that Asia would not accept it.
Kunihiro felt that the time was not yet ripe and that consensus for the
establishment of an intergovernmental regional institution should be
enhanced through the activities of the existing non-governmental organizations such as PECC.20 Kunihiro believed it necessary to see how ASEAN
would react to the proposal, but assumed that ASEAN would be
concerned about being submerged into a larger organization. In his belief,
Japan could not assist with the development of such an organization and
Japan’s contribution in the development of ASEAN was more important.
Kunihiro therefore warned Muraoka to tread warily.
During 7–21 March, Muraoka visited Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia and Hong Kong, and then he ew to Korea on 24 March, to
advocate the desirability and beneŽts of a trade and industry ministers’
meeting on the basis of its report. In Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, minister
for trade and industry, agreed with the MITI proposal and Lee was especially happy with Muraoka’s idea to include the United States as a
founding member.21 In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir placed a greater
priority on regional integration and reduction of trade barriers within
ASEAN, despite the fact that he expected Japan’s role in the Asia-PaciŽc
region to grow (MITI 1994: 3). Thai ministers were in general cautious,
and reserved their position about the MITI plan. As one minister said to
Muraoka: ‘it is up to Prime Minister Chatichai to have the Žnal say’. In
Indonesia, Muraoka obtained agreement from most ministers, but they
were opposed to the inclusion of the United States.22 An Indonesian
minister asked why it was important to incorporate the United States, and
Muraoka’s answer was: ‘it would perhaps be more effective to combat
and contain unilateral US actions on trade issues if we could include the
United States in the forum’.23 Indonesia and other ASEAN countries eventually accepted this rationale.24 All countries, including the Philippines and
Brunei, which other MITI ofŽcials visited in the region, accepted the idea
of holding a ministerial regional forum on economic cooperation.
According to Okumura (personal interview), MITI thought there were at
least three reasons behind ASEAN’s acceptance of MITI’s proposal: they
were conŽdent about their economies; ASEAN–Japan relations had
improved; and they felt isolated from developing regionalism in Europe
and North America.
Importantly, the Muraoka mission functioned as a sounding board for
every nation in ASEAN. During Muraoka’s visit, each of the countries had
communicated its views. In turn, they were keen to know the views of other
countries. It was MITI’s task during the visit to inform the visiting country
of other ASEAN countries’ views on the idea of a ministerial meeting.
MITI’s diplomacy was useful in creating a receptive atmosphere in the
region for the idea of a ministerial meeting and, importantly, it set
the ‘groundwork’ for Australia’s proposal and its subsequent diplomacy.25
In fact, Okumura provided Australia with feedback on some of the
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reactions to the Hawke proposal which ‘in a sense was more honest because
the reactions to the Australian proposal were given to the Japanese [and]
this was terriŽcally helpful’, as an Australian senior ofŽcial recalled (personal interview, 24 April 1998, Canberra).
As a consequence of MITI and Australia’s diplomatic effort, ASEAN
countries’ formal joint endorsement of their participation in the Canberra
meeting was made in the ASEAN PMC held during 6–8 July 1989 in
Brunei, where the potential participants expressed basic consensus about
Hawke’s proposal to hold a ministerial meeting in Canberra in November
1989 (MITI 1994: 5). ASEAN’s acceptance was ‘a signiŽcant change from
ASEAN’s previous posture which has been one of the main obstacles in
pursing previous initiatives’ and this change was attributable to a ‘gradual
process of socialisation’ to the idea of regional economic cooperation
within each ASEAN nation (Wanandi 1989: 12). ASEAN’s decision to
join the Canberra meeting was a turning point in the history of AsiaPaciŽc regionalism.
Yet at the Canberra meeting, ministers avoided rushing into institutionalization in the form of establishing a secretariat or detailed negotiations
on any speciŽc items including trade liberalization. There was still a divergence of views: Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas, for instance, consistently insisted on retaining the ASEAN framework rather than establishing
a new institution. The informal agreement that every second meeting would
be held in an ASEAN country was made out of consideration for such concerns.26 This indicated that it would be essential to incorporate ASEAN’s
interests into the APEC process for its development.
In sum, a major rationale behind the establishment of APEC was
that Japan and Australia’s recognition of an intergovernmental economic
institution was necessary to capitalize on regional economic growth and
increasing interdependence. They were unsatisŽed with existing regional
institutions and considered PECC to be restricted by its quasi-governmental
character. As Hawke (1989) said in his Seoul speech, PECC’s ‘informality
. . . has . . . made it difŽcult for it to address policy issues which are properly
the responsibility of Governments’. Muraoka (personal interview) stressed:
‘MITI thought that PECC’s inuence was limited due to its unofŽcial
nature’. More signiŽcantly, while endeavouring to realize such a goal, both
countries were attentive to ASEAN’s caution and took pains to make their
purposes behind the establishment of APEC understood among ASEAN
leaders.
However, MITI’s more serious consideration of ASEAN’s view distinguishes its approaches to APEC from those of Australia’s. MITI emphasized economic and technical cooperation as well as trade liberalization.
Toyoda (cited in Funabashi 1995: 66) said:
Australians were very eager to set speciŽc agenda items, which clearly
aimed at trade liberalization . . . we also had that in our mind, but
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
213
here we believed that we had to handle it very carefully. You would
scare away ASEAN countries if you talked about liberalization from
the start . . . Australia did not have any viable policy instrument for
[economic and technical] cooperation.
This implies that Japan was responsible for not highlighting trade liberalization in the Canberra Meeting and instead underscored the signiŽcance
of development cooperation (Funabashi 1995: 192). MITI was also concerned about Australia’s proposal for an Asian OECD, because the OECD
involves policy coordination, but it was too early for APEC to undertake
this role, given ASEAN’s certain opposition (Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
6 March 1989). MITI’s more careful consideration of ASEAN’s view,
consistent with Japan’s traditional approach to regional economic cooperation, upheld Australia’s leadership role, leading to the successful establishment of APEC.
Conclusion
This article examined Japan’s leadership role in the building of Asia-PaciŽc
economic institutions, focusing on its relations with ASEAN from the
perspectives of directional leadership. Japan considered it essential for
ASEAN countries to be involved in regional economic cooperation, and
thus it was keen to incorporate the interests of ASEAN countries. This
was a key element behind the successful initiatives taken by Japan in
establishing PECC and APEC. Considering cautious views of some
ASEAN members, Japan and Australia were careful not to detract from
the important role ASEAN played and hoped that the new body would
enable ASEAN to project common interests more effectively in PECC
and APEC.
This article has also argued that one of Japan’s major interests in AsiaPaciŽc economic cooperation has been to contribute to the development
assistance in Southeast Asia, which consistently sustained Japan’s leadership incentive in regional institution-building. This was evident in Japanese
leaders’ frequent reference to solving the North–South problem, and
Japan’s proposals for regional economic cooperation, partly embodied in
PECC and APEC, amounted to a message as a leader who wished to
assist economic development in the region. The term ‘bridging role’ has
become symbolic of contemporary Japan’s diplomacy in multilateral fora
where Asia and the PaciŽc, which has been promoted by the self-conscious
international identity as the only developed country in Asia. This notion
has been echoed by more recent Japanese leaders. For instance, the then
foreign minister, Yohei Kono, at the 1994 APEC meeting in Bogor
explained the role by saying: ‘Japan can naturally understand the tempos
and ows of Asia’s thinking and can indoctrinate a novice in
the ways of keeping on good terms with Asia’ (Mainichi Shimbun, 13
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November 1994). Ichiro Ozawa (1993: 144), the leader of the Liberal Party,
who held a grand vision of Japan’s future, stressed in his book that the
role of bridging was on the basis of Japan’s status as the Žrst modernized
Asian country enjoying a market economy system like that of Europe and
the US. Japan’s keenness in promoting the interests of developing Asian
and developed Western countries in the region as a bridge has urged Japan
to grant priority to development cooperation rather than trade liberalization in regional economic cooperation.
Importantly, Japan’s leadership was not ‘hegemonic leadership’, which
imposes leaders’ intentions on followers by force, but ‘directional leadership’ which promotes collective goals by directing followers’ behaviour.
The crux of leadership centres on the skills of leaders in persuasion,
guidance, cajolery and coaxing to produce cooperation wherein followers
defer to a leader’s conception of regional economic cooperation. Japan
was committed to adjusting different interests of potential participants
like ASEAN’s and persuading them to join PECC and APEC. Japan
compiled reports which articulated new regional institutions’ goals and
agendas, as ‘institutional blueprints’ which represented a tool for adjusting
the followers’ interests were delivered in building PECC and APEC. They
served as the basis for Japan to gauge ASEAN’s interests and make consequential adjustments through diplomacy. It should be noted that Japan’s
careful consideration about ASEAN’s reservations about the more institutionalized regionalism was partly conducive to PECC emerging as a
quasi-governmental rather than intergovernmental institution.27
Yet, Japan’s leadership role in the establishment of PECC and APEC
could have faced more difŽculties without the joint leadership with
Australia. An Australian government report acknowledged: ‘Japan believes
it is entitled to leadership in the Western PaciŽc, but is unsure how to lead
and hesitant lest others should resist any Japanese leadership role’ (Japan
Secretariat 1980: 3). Toyoda (personal interview) admitted that MITI maintained a low proŽle, but he insisted that MITI’s hope that Australia would
take the initiative was rational if the idea of a ministerial meeting was to
be realized, given Japan’s difŽcult position due to its history. Given their
recent emergence from the status of colonies occupied by powerful imperial countries, ASEAN countries were cautious about involvement in intergovernmental regional institutions which might intrude on their sovereignty
and include some of the former imperial powers, especially Japan which
had resorted to war to create a regional sphere of inuence for itself. Japan’s
militarism had occurred only three or four decades before and Japan’s
image as an aggressor was still vivid. The non-aligned policy of Malaysia
and Indonesia also contributed to ASEAN’s negative attitude to intergovernmental regional economic cooperation. Japan was aware of these
factors, which contributed to Japan’s directional leadership in institutionbuilding. Accordingly, cooperation with Australia was essential because
Australia’s non-threatening middle-power status, underpinned by its lesser
Takashi Terada: Japan’s approaches to ASEAN
215
economic presence, and its active and dextrous diplomacy compensated for
Japan’s more muted leadership style (Terada 2000).
Another important corollary of this sort of leadership is reected on a
feature of APEC. For instance, the United States, the most powerful
country in the region, hosted the 1993 APEC Seattle Meeting and successfully transformed it into an institution which would prosecute trade and
investment liberalization despite some ASEAN members’ reluctance. Yet
a legally binding force which some in the United States wished to incorporate into the APEC principle has yet to be agreed.28 Voluntary commitment to agreements reached in APEC based on consensus among
members is an important criterion which Japan and Australia, the leaders
in initiating APEC, embedded at APEC’s inception as they took into
account the preferences of developing countries in the region. Ippei
Yamazawa, Japan’s representative at the APEC Eminent Persons’ Group
(EPG), comments that ‘some characteristics of PECC such as open regionalism or a exible procedure are attributable to Japanese leaders. . . . These
features which were instigated by the Japanese are also embedded in
APEC’.29 What distinguishes APEC from international institutions like
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is that
the United States did not assume leadership in creating APEC. These
three institutions incorporate a binding force in their agreements. The
APEC norms do not necessarily conform to the approach usually associated with the United States and tend to follow the preferences of Japan
as well as Australia, taking into account opinions of other APEC members,
especially some ASEAN countries which hoped APEC would remain a
loose institution. Although it can be assumed that their attention to
ASEAN was a signiŽcant reason for the Asia-PaciŽc region to take a
decade to create an intergovernmental institution such as APEC, their
leadership style can be assessed as appropriate, given that leadership in
institution-building is a laborious process, requiring adjustment of different
interests.
Notes
1 Northeast Asian countries such as China, Korea and Taiwan in this context
were not central actors in the early Japanese concepts of regional economic
cooperation due mainly to the delayed rapprochement and the subsequent
complex relations. It was 1965 when Japan normalized its relations with South
Korea, and it was 1972 in the case of China, which led to a cessation of the
diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
2 International institutions and international regimes are similar and some
scholars of international relations use both terms interchangeably. Keohane
(1989) regards international regimes as a form of international institution.
3 Kindleberger (1986: 841) referred to the term hegemony as making him
‘uncomfortable because of its overtones of force, threat, pressure’.
4 Nye (1990: 31–2). Nye stresses the value of the institutions that encourage
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other states to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state
prefers, because the dominant state may not need as many costly exercises of
coercive or hard power in the bargaining situation.
This was ‘the Žrst time since the war that a major American contribution to
an international agency was matched by any other country in the world’ (Jo
1968: 785).
Japanese leaders make it a rule to meet and test Asian leaders’ opinions before
attending the G8 Summit Meeting so that Japan can incorporate Asian thought
at the meeting.
Foreign Minister Kono at the APEC Bogor Meeting comments that development cooperation and liberalization are two wheels of APEC (Mainichi
Shimbun, 13 November 1994).
In 1957 when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi proposed a Southeast Asia
Development Fund as an Asian version of the World Bank, in which Japan
and the United States would cooperate providing Žnance to save Southeast
Asia from harsh poverty, the Philippines and Indonesia suspected the plan of
being an attempt to revive the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
(Kesavan 1972: 152).
Sudo (1992: 120). In fact, Miki and MOFA regarded 1976 as the year for activating diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 December
1975).
Fukuda (1995) had learnt a lesson about how to approach ASEAN from his predecessors’ failures. Fukuda was a major Japanese political Žgure who took initiatives in fostering grassroots-level exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asia
and made the decision to contribute 5 billion yen to the ASEAN Cultural Fund.
Fukuda’s personal afŽnity with Southeast Asia was embodied in the doctrine.
The original text stated: ‘Japan’s interdependent relations with the PaciŽc zone
centring on the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and its
friendly relations with the Central and South American nations, are becoming
increasingly deep. I am determined to intensify my efforts to consolidate these
relations to create what we can call the PaciŽc Basin Community’ (MOFA
ofŽcial document, 19 January 1979).
Personal interview, 19 January 1996, Tokyo. The draft included instructions
not to alter the original text if this could be avoided, as it involved the prime
minister’s own expression (MOFA ofŽcial document, 19 January 1979).
After this episode, MOFA provided further brieŽngs for Ohira on the necessity to pay more attention to ASEAN countries (personal interview with
Dohowaki).
A reference to ASEAN’s misunderstanding of the Concept, in MOFA’s judgement, was included in the text of the speech ‘Towards a PaciŽc Basin community: a Malaysian perception’, by Ghazali ShaŽe, Malaysia’s minister for home
affairs. The text was sent by the Malaysian Embassy in Tokyo to foreign
minister Okita on 20 December. MOFA then analysed the speech and realized it might reect general ASEAN views. Yet it discovered that Ghazali’s
excessive focus on political and military aspects of the PaciŽc Concept was
based on a misunderstanding and realized the interim report, which was not
mentioned in the speech, had not been well understood (MOFA ofŽcial document, 27 December 1979).
Australia understood that persuading ASEAN countries to endorse the PaciŽc
Concept was the biggest hurdle and that surmounting it was the key to the
seminar’s success. Crawford, the seminar chairman, also visited ASEAN
capitals to explain the purpose of the seminar.
Akio Watanabe, a member of the Study Group, explained the report: ‘the Žrst
priority was to draw ASEAN’s attention to the Concept and the Study Group
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26
27
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agreed to involve areas which would bring positive gains to ASEAN countries;
the PaciŽc Concept in the Žnal report thus stressed economic and cultural
issues’ (personal interview, 19 January 1995, Tokyo).
‘Meeting between ourselves and Japanese Delegation on PaciŽc Community
Concept, 26 March 1980.’ In the meeting, Iida agreed with Australia’s view
that there was Japanese sensitivity about the history of the Co-Prosperity
Sphere and wondered whether it was because of an anxiety not to be misunderstood that such attention was given to cultural–social relations.
Members of Ohira’s Study Group noticed that MOFA suddenly went cold on
the Concept after Ohira’s death; a MOFA senior ofŽcial told Seizaburo Sato
(personal interview, 14 December 1994, Tokyo) that ‘the era of the Concept
was over’. Sato was also told by a Japanese ambassador to a European nation
that ‘to be frank with you, the PaciŽc Concept was unnecessary’.
After the Canberra seminar, Khoman commented at a press conference at the
Thai Embassy in Canberra that ‘as an inveterate and incurable believer in
regional cooperation, I will do everything I can to promote development of a
PaciŽc community’. Khoman’s positive stance on the Concept was based on
his belief that ‘a wider PaciŽc community would help rather than harm
ASEAN’ (Canberra Times, 18 September 1980).
Kunihiro instead suggested to Muraoka that he request embassies in relevant
countries to give Muraoka mission facilitation, but Muraoka (personal interview) later thought of it as a means of monitoring their activities.
Personal interview with Muraoka. In an illustration of Singapore’s enthusiasm.
Lee told Muraoka to fax him immediately if MITI needed any help from
Singapore.
Personal interview with Muraoka. Muraoka tried to persuade them by using
a metaphor: ‘it would be scary if you let the tiger out of the cage’, but an
Indonesian minister replied, ‘I agree, but it would be more scary if you lived
in a cage with a tiger’.
Cited in Funabashi (1995: 58). According to Muraoka (personal interview),
Indonesia resisted the idea of their foreign minister’s involvement in the
meeting, because Indonesia did not have diplomatic relations with China at
that time.
Then in South Korea, Muraoka (personal interview above) was successful in
gaining a positive reaction and was told by a minister that it was Japan’s duty
to remove the nightmare of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, so
Japan needed to make efforts on behalf of Asia. This astonished Muraoka
who was so careful not to give the impression of creating a second version of
the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Personal interview with Geoff Brennan, 17 June 1998, Canberra. He was a
commerce ofŽcer in the Australian Embassy in Tokyo in 1989.
Information from DFAT ofŽcials. For instance, against Alatas’s insistence,
Canadian Foreign Minister Crosbie said APEC does not have the same objectives as ASEAN, and not all members were from Southeast Asia. While
ASEAN concerns should be reected, the process should also mirror the views
of all participants.
This was reconŽrmed at the Canberra seminar (Crawford and Seow 1981: 28):
‘there was still a major need for PaciŽc countries to “get to know each other”
better before steps were taken towards creation of new, formal inter-governmental institutions for regional cooperation’. This acknowledgement of the
need to create a consensus for the establishment of an intergovernmental institution contributed to making PECC’s status quasi-governmental.
Among the members, for example, it was only the United States that sought to
insist, unsuccessfully, on the necessity of the binding force being incorporated
218
The PaciŽc Review
into the APEC Investment Code which was discussed at the 1994 APEC
Indonesia Meeting.
29 Personal interview, 13 December 1994, Tokyo. Gareth Evans, former Australian
foreign minister, also notes that in the early stages of APEC such an informal
approach ‘suited the mood of the participants, the great majority of whom,
including Australia, were well content to let these things evolve naturally rather
than forcing the pace’ (Evans and Grant 1991: 125–6).
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