Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles Author(s): G
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Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles Author(s): G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 2 (May, 1986), pp. 357-378 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111101 . Accessed: 13/01/2011 19:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mpsa. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Political Science. http://www.jstor.org Extremist Partiesand PoliticalTurmoil. TwoPuzzles G. BinghamPowell,Jr.,University ofRochester Comparative researchhas consistently established a relationship betweensupportfor so-calledextremist The present partiesand variousmeasuresofpoliticalturmoil. analysis combinescitizensurveydata from12 nationswithaggregate data to addresstwopuzzles posedbytheseresults:(1) theroleofsuchpartiesas reflections ofcitizendiscontent or as sourcesofturmoil; oftheparties'ideologicalextremism independent (2) theimportance or theiralienationfromthesystem. The findings a sharpdistinction suggest betweenparties' proximate impacton legislative turmoil (cabinetinstability) and theirprimarily associative rolein riotsand protests. Theyalso emphasizesystemalienation,ratherthanleft-right extremism ideological as such,as a sourceofturmoil. Theorists andanalysts ofpartysystems havelongwarnedthatsupport forextremist politicalpartiesposes seriousproblemsfordemocracy.' Amongthetheorists, Duverger(1954,pp. 419-420),Huntington (1968,p. 412) and Sartori(1976,ch.6) agreethatextremist partystrength impliesa weakpartysystem.Thisagreement standsin sharpcontrast to disagreementsoverthevirtuesand vicesofothercharacteristics ofpartysystems (Powell,1981). Amongempiricalanalysts, Taylorand Herman(1971) foundthatextremistpartystrength was strongly linkedto cabinetinstability. Hibbs (1973) foundthatCommunist partymembership wasassociatedwithcitizen riotsand demonstrations. Dodd (1976) foundthatpartypolarization, wasrelatedtoreducedcabinet shapedbythepresenceofextremist parties, Powell(1981,1982)foundextremist durability. partysupportassociated withbothcabinetinstability andcitizenturmoil, although notwithdeadly violenceortheoverthrow ofdemocratic regimes. Thereseemslittledoubt, linkedtoproblems then,thatthepresenceofextremist partiesis frequently withindemocratic governments. 'The research forthispaperwascarriedoutwhiletheauthorwas supported bya John SimonGuggenheim I wishtothankthefollowing MemorialFellowship. fortheirassistance: theGuggenheim Foundation andtheUniversity ofRochester theICPSR at fortheirsupport; theUniversity ofMichiganforproviding thesurvey data;SamuelH. Barnes,MaxKaase and theirassociatesas wellas theZentralarchiv f.empirische Sozialforschung attheUniversity of CologneformakingavailablethePoliticalActionsurveys; RabierandRonald Jacques-Rene Inglehart formakingavailabletheEuro-Barometer surveys; JeromeH. Blackand his colleaguesat McGillUniversity, wherean earlierversionofthispaperwaspresented; Manfred J.Holler,LyndaW. Powelland threereviewers fortheAJPSforusefulcomments. Noneof theabovebearanyresponsibility fortheanalysesorinterpretation here. presented 358 G. Bingham Powell,Jr. therelationship and empiricalagreements, Despitethesetheoretical forextremist partiesandthepresenceofpoliticalturmoil betweensupport posestwoimportant puzzles.First,itis notclearto whatdegreethepresis a reflection ofcitizendiscontent or an enceofextremist partystrength Thispuzofdemocratic government. independent contributor toproblems to thelarger forit drawsattention zle is ofmorethanacademicinterest, effectofpartysystems and theirsupporting questionoftheautonomous Second,it is not on democratic performance. institutional arrangements arethoseassociclearwhatelements underthegenerallabel"extremism" ofthenatureof Different interpretations atedwithorpromoting turmoil. in theclassification ofpartiesand extremism itselflead to disagreements theoretical imagesof partysystemsas "extreme"and to verydifferent partysystem dynamics. TwoPuzzlesintheAssociationofExtremist Party SupportandPoliticalTurmoil forextremdoessupport Thefirst puzzlemaybe statedinthisfashion: whichis as a barometer ofcitizendiscontent, istpartiesserveprimarily in variousformsofturmoil,or do suchpartiesbecome also manifested in societiesin whichnew activeagentsin promoting turmoil? Particularly parties easily,the appearanceof extremist partiesare formedrelatively Wherethe mayserveas an indicator ofcitizenissueconflictoralienation. whatever therootcause,thepolitical societyis troubledin thisfashion, partieswarns Supportforextremist processmayexperiencedifficulties. are a cause forconobservers and politiciansalikethatcitizenattitudes maynotbe thesourceoftrouble.On the cern,butthepartiesthemselves otherhand,partiescommitted tosocietaltransformation ortheexpression theirelectoralmobilization ofdiscontent turmoil or through maypromote Hence, throughtheirbargainingintransigence. paralyzethe legislature theirpresencecontributes to difficulties wellbeyondwhatwouldbe exchannelsor appearedthroughnonpartisan pectedif similardiscontents withinoneofthenonextremist parties. in The secondpuzzlemaybe posedas follows: Whataretheelements thatcreateproblemsfordemocratic governpoliticalparty"extremism" ment?Thetwomostplausiblecandidates forsolutions tothesecondpuzzle withthepoliticalsysare divergent issuepositionsand severediscontent tem. For example,in Dodd's (1976) polarizationanalysis,extremism seemsto meanwidely-divergent on policyissuesoron thenature positions Theextremist a demandformajortransforoftheregime. partyrepresents mationof the society,eithertowardssome futurevisionor back to an idealizedpast. Such demandsdivergefromthe general,currentpolicy theirpresenceseverely strainstheabilityto reconcileexpressed consensus; EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 359 in thepoliticalsystem. interests Fromthispointofview,extremist parties arethosepartiespromoting clearlyarticulated issueproposalsthatare at oddswiththosepromoted bymostotherparties.The alternative visionof "extremism" focuseson expression ofseverediscontent withtheauthorities,perhapswiththeregimeitself.Suchdiscontent oralienationpresents seriousproblems becausedistrust and frustration impedebargaining and createa propensity towardsangryor obstructive conflictbehavior.From thispointofview,an extremist partyis anyparty, ofitsspecific regardless issuepositions, whosesupportreflects suchseverediscontent. Whileextreme issuepositionsand severediscontent withthesystem areplausibly associated,theyneednotgo together. Discontent mayexist withouta visionof itsalleviation;a desirefortransformation of society maycoexistwitha beliefthatthe presentsystemis workinggradually towards itsrealization. Forexample,RobertPutnam(1971) foundvarying relationships in his betweenideology,hostility and politicalextremism elitesin Britainand Italy.In Sartori's(1976,pp. studyofparliamentary 132-144) sophisticated analysisof "polarizedpluralism,"he discusses and ideologicalextremism, bothantisystem alongwithotherassociated and ultimately conditions, emphasizesthealienationelement(delegitimation)as thedecisiveindicator ofa troubled partysystem. It is important to emphasizethat I am not concernedwith the in someabsolutesense.Rather, "correct" ofextremism definition Puzzle2 is foundedon the empiricalobservation thatsupportfora varietyof is associatedwithpoliticalturmoil. labeled"extreme" partiescommonly Weneedtounderstand thefeatures ofthesepartiesthatleadtotheassociation.Ofcourse,thetwomajoralternative hereare explanations suggested I shallin factconsiderthevariouscombinations notmutually exclusive. of andalienatedpartytypes.Atthispointthedataarenotavailable, extreme however, to analyzethespecificissueproposalsand regimepositionsthat maybe thecomponents of"issue"extremism. I wanttotakesomefirst stepstothesolutionofthetwopuzzleslinked to the associationof extremist partysupportand democraticturmoil. Somerecently availablecitizensurveydata makeitpossibleto investigate theroleofcitizendifferences anddiscontent relative totheroleofextremistpartysupportin shapingunrestin some 12 moderndemocracies. Consideredfroma somewhat different thesedataalso allowus to perspective, explorePuzzle 2, bydistinguishing betweenextremist partieswhosesupand thoseextremist portersare relativeissue extremists partieswhose manifest withthesystem.Bothsursupporters relatively highdiscontent discontent measuresare takenfromthe 1970s.Natuveysand aggregate rally,wedo notwantto assumethatthekindsofextremist partiesfoundin Western Europein the 1970s represent thefullrangeofsuchpartiesand 360 G. BinghamPowell,Jr. However,we can at leastbeginto clarifythenatureofthe theireffects. whosebroaderimplications mustbe tentative solutions puzzlesandsuggest analysisat otherlevelsandin othercontexts. subjectedto further or ofDiscontent Partiesas Indicators Extremist Analysis ofTurmoil:Aggregate Promoters relationship an aggregate studieshavedemonstrated Variousprevious partysupport,measuredin variousways,and citizen betweenextremist the Ithasnot,however, beenpossibletodistinguish andlegislative turmoil. ofcitizendivisionanddiscontent fromthepossibleinflammadirecteffect The problemhas been theabpartiesthemselves. toryroleof extremist senceof measuresofcitizens'attitudesapartfromtheirsupportforexsolvedwiththe tremistparties.Whilethe problemis not exhaustively presentdata, the 1975-76 PoliticalActionstudiesand the 1979 Euroon citizenself-placement did ask questionsmeasuring surveys Barometer scales,as well as citizenalienation.By combiningthe results left-right relevant citizenattifromthesetwosetsofsurveydata,we can construct whether theassociatudemeasuresfor12nations.Wecan thendetermine whichdoescontinueto tionbetweenextremist partysupportandturmoil, withstands as itdidinthelargerstudies, holdinthissubsetofdemocracies forcitizenattitudes. controls dimensionwe shalluse citizens'selfTo getat theissueextremism similaruse and left-right scales.(Fora somewhat on ten-point, placement These scaleshave see Sani and 1983.) Sartori, someevidenceon validation is extremely The instrument simpleand easyto a numberofadvantages. and acrosslanguages.It hasbeen applyin a similarfashionacrosssurveys in WesternEurope,and surwidelyused in thelastdecade,particularly inwhichsuchplacements have veysareavailablefromatleast15countries been asked.Whileit is clearthatcitizensdo not alwaysuse the same thereis evidencethattheytendtousethemostsalientoftheissues criteria, to locatethemselves 1984;DaltonandFlanagan, ordimensions (Inglehart, ofissue assumptions neednotmakearbitrary 1982),so thattheresearcher is very suchscaleplacement salience.Atleastin somesystems, moreover, in votingbehaviorand,within andshifts closelyrelatedto votingbehavior some measurement error,quite stable over time (van der Eijk and Niemoller,1983). Analysisof open-endedfollow-upquestionsin five countries 1979,pp. 227-233)showedthatmostrespondents (Klingemann, corwhoplacedthemselves, perhaps80 percenton average,interpreted thanhalfshowed"high fewer andleft(although themeaningofright rectly andunderstanding"). ideologicalrecognition suchas in somecountries, The scalesdo seemto be lessmeaningful withthescale,the Ireland,thanin others.Asidefromlackoffamiliarity EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 36I thatingenuinely forourpurposesis theprobability mostseriousdifficulty scale will captureonlyone disystems, theleft-right multi-dimensional mension,leadingus to overlookseriousconflictsor partiesthatare not Forexample,previous butare so on another. extremist on one dimension worksuggests thattheBelgianlanguagedimensionis botha significant scale.However, sourceofconflictand notwellcapturedon theleft-right Wecan use toolwithinitslimitations. theleft-right scalecanbe a powerful citizenpolarization in different countries (bycomitbothto characterize at theextremes, orcomparofcitizensplacingthemselves paringnumbers the and to characterize ofcitizenplacement), ingthestandarddeviations ofsupporters.2 relative positionsofpartiesin termsoftheself-placement or alienationwithinand acrosssysofdiscontent The measurement we equivalence.Moreover, temsraisesseriousquestionsaboutlinguistic haveno singlesurveyitemthathas been askedin a verylargenumberof ForthepresentstudyI haveusedtwodifferent items,eachasked systems. thetwostudies. in surveys ofeightnations,withfournationsoverlapping both The virtueoftheoverlapis thatthetwomeasurescan be compared, and in termsof relationto party in termsof the marginaldistribution placement.In the 1974-76PoliticalActionstudy supportand left-right surveys (Barnes,Kaase, et al., 1979),citizenswereaskedabouttheirtrust In the 1979Euro-Barometer surveys (Rabier in thenationalgovernment. ofdemocandInglehart, 1981),citizenswereaskedabouttheperformance In theoverlapping countries, aboutthesamenumracyin theircountry. distrustful bersgavethemostalienatedresponseto eachquestion(highly theitemsfit was working and thought verybadly).Moreover, democracy theimpordenying insimilarfashion. Without withpoliticalpartysupport in nuancebetweenitemsand countries, thesequestanceofdifferences inor ofcitizenconfidence approximation tionsseemtogiveus a rough-cut in whichtheylive. alienationfromthepoliticalsystem partysupportin fromtheanalysisofextremist Table 1 buildsdirectly on thebasis as "extremist" Powell(1981, 1982).Partiesarecharacterized in thesecondary themas representliterature thatidentify ofdiscussions ideology, nondemocratic (a) a well-developed ing any of the following: theextremes different from lookssomewhat 2Ofcourse,itisclearthatthescaleprobably somewhat thanin the middleand thatthedistancealongthe scale maywell represent howrelatively similaris it is striking in different countries. Nonetheless, different intervals Forexample, ofwhatseemto be similarpartiesacrosscountries. themeanself-placement in andSocialistpartisans Communist forexample,) (SwissCommunists, withfewexceptions (See Inglehart acrosscountries. quiteconsistently appearto placethemselves theaggregate 1976,and Dalton,1983,as wellas Saniand Sartori,1983,fordiscussion and Klingemann, interest to itwouldbe ofthegreatest Eventually, andanalysisofpartyandscaleconsistency.) promises. ofpartycampaign measures withmeasures juxtaposetheseperceptual TABLE 1 PoliticalTurmoiland ExtremistPartySupport:PartyExtremism Based on Descriptionsin SecondarySources Variables DependentVariable1968-1977b PopulationSize (log) LegislativeFractionalization ExtremistPartyVotea CitizenAttitudesc Extremeon Left-RightScale Alienated PercentVarianceExplained (N) DependentVariableb PopulationSize (log) LegislativeFractionalization ExtremistPartyVotea CitizenAttitudesc Extremeon Left-RightScale Alienated PercentVarianceExplained (N) DependentVariable EthnicFractionalization ProportionalRepresentation ElectionSystem ExtremistPartyVotea CitizenAttitudesc Extremeon Left-RightScale Alienated PercentVarianceExplained (N) StandardizedRegressionCoefficientsd Riots .64* - .44* 39* Riots .64* - .44* .39* - .01 Riots .58* - .10 - .19 .54 81% (12) 81% (12) 89% (12) Protests Protests Protests .56* - .51* .30 .53* - .58* .49 - 75% (12) .23 78% (12) .49* - .18 - .28 .54 81% (12) Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet Instability Instability Instability .05 .01 .06 .04 .94 .01 .84 .07 .88 .21 94% (9) 96% (9) .06 94% (9) at .05level. Significant a FromPowell,1982,pp.232-234,basedon secondary literature. to the90thperfromTaylorand Jodice,1983.Valuesconstrained bRiots and Protests centiletolimittheimpactofoutliers. cAlienation orthepercentwhonevertrustthegovernment, ofcitizens is thepercentage intheircountry. withtheworkings ofdemocracy agenotat all satisfied dAll equations readdown. EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 363 (b) a proposalto alterfundamentally theboundariesof the nation,(c) diffuseprotest,alienationand distrustof the existingpoliticalsystem riotingand protest, (Powell,1982,pp. 233-234,273-274). In predicting controls forrelevant environmental conditions ofpopulationsizeand legcabinetinstability (inislativefractionalization areincluded;in predicting verseof durationin monthsto a maximumof 36 months),controlsfor electionlawsare ethnicfractionalization and proportional representation conditionssuggested by included.These are therelevantenvironmental in 29 democracies andinstability andarediscussed myanalysisofturmoil morefullythere(Powell,1982,pp. 204-205).The citizenturmoilpredictionsare made forall 12 democraciesin the 1968-77period,themost predictions are recentforwhichdataareavailable.The cabinetinstability madeforthenineparliamentary systems. The table is dividedinto threesections,forpredictionsof riots, protests, and cabinetinstability. The equationsreaddownthepage.The Despitethesmall numbersare the standardized regression coefficients. numberofcases,and thecrudenessofthecitizenattitudemeasures,the resultsare quiteclear-cut.In thefirstcolumnwe see thattheextremist and cabinet partymeasureis a significant predictorof riots,protests, In thesecond conditions. instability, takingaccountoftheenvironmental extremcolumnwe seethatcontrolling forthemeasureofcitizenleft-right incolumn3 weseethat ismhaslittleeffect onthepartyvariable.However, introducing themeasureofcitizenalienationnotonlyreducestheparty extremism butactuallyreverses thesignofits variableto insignificance, coefficient. The implication is that,once we takeintoaccountlevelsof citizenalienation, thepresenceofextremist partysupportdampensrather thaninflamesriotingand protests. partycoeffiOr, sincetheextremist cientsare insignificant at leastthepartieshave afteraddingthecontrols, no additionaleffect. On theotherhand,thebottomsectionof thetableshowsthatthe is notweakened impactofextremist partysupporton cabinetinstability effects bytakingaccountofcitizenalienation.Rather,thecitizenattitude theextremist are all mediatedthrough partymeasure.Thesecontrasting bargaining seem,of resultsforthearenasofstreetprotestand legislative roleforpolitical course,quitereasonable.Theysuggesta verydifferent In thepredicpartiesintheassociationwiththedifferent typesofturmoil. tionofriotingand protest, parties,at leastin these supportforextremist in the 1970s,seemsto havebeenlargely a barometer ofcitizen countries ofcabinetinstability, thepresenceofsuchparties unrest.In theprediction in thelegislature seemsto haveitsownimpact,apartfromcitizendisconno doubtresponding to it. tent,although One can,ofcourse,raisemanyquestionsabouttheseresults.Above 364 G. Bingham Powell,Jr. associations and a smallnumberofcases. all,theyarebasedon aggregate of partiesas "extremist" are based on one Moreover,the designations to replicate On thelatterpoint,it is reassuring readingoftheliterature. withothermeasures. Forexample,I haveusedtheplacements theseresults ofpartiesin a surveyof"experts"by Castlesand Mair (1984) to getan iftheywereon considering partiesas "extreme" independent designation, scale. Theseratings averageratedat under2 or over8 on theten-point the correspond verycloselytothosein Powell(1981,1982),andmodifying resultsin essentially measurein Table 1 to reflectthesefewdifferences resultsin theregression analysis.Aftertakingaccountofcitiunchanged ofriots zen alienation, partysupportis nota positivepredictor extremist ofcabinetinstability. to be sucha predictor orprotests; itcontinues partiesbasedon a verydifferent Table2 usesa measureofextremist and PoliticalActionsurveysto approach-it uses the Euro-Barometer Partieswere on theattitudes oftheirsupporters. classify partiesdepending classifiedat thetimeofthesurveyand assumedto havethesamestatus theperiodoftheelectionsaveragedin Tables1 and 2. A party throughout ifitssupporters' as "extremist" either averageself-placements wasclassified ormoreaboveorbelowthe scalewerea standard deviation ontheleft-right deviation abovetheEuropean Europeanaverageoriftheywerea standard averageof alienation.In practicethesecriteriamean thata partywas on averagebelow 3.3 or placed themselves "extreme"if its supporters above 7.7 on theten-point scale,or if 20 percentor moreof themexordistrust. As shownin theAppendix,it was pressedextreme discontent possibleto classify87 partiesin the 12 countriesaccordingto thestateoftheseparties, mentsoftheirsupporters. The averageelectoralstrengths basedon electoraloutcomedata,werethencalculatedas inthemeasurein Table 1.3 Table 1 and Table 2 showsimilarresults,althoughtheyuse very The supporter-based measureof different measuresofpartyextremism. of riots,protests, and extremist is a significant predictor partystrength cabinetinstability, conditions. takingaccountonlyofthe"environmental" 3A possible is thatthismeasuremayseemtoocloselytiedtothegeneralcitizen problem likeItalyandFrance,withhighlevelsofcitizenalienalienation so thatincountries measure, notreallyperceived as such moderate although parties mayappearalienated, ation,relatively In fact, wouldbe reclassified as notedintheAppendix, (as not onlyfourparties bytheirvoters. ifweaddedtherequirement be 10%morealienated thanthecountry thatsupporters extreme), theresults of20%.Rerunning deviation as wellas falling abovetheEuropeanstandard average, inTables2 and3 inanynotable suchparties as notextreme doesnotchangetheresults counting on thispaper,thesimplermeasureis used fashion. As suggested byseveralcommentators bebetter measured thewithinthepurely effects byapplying party might throughout, although nationcut-off standard. TABLE 2 PoliticalTurmoiland ExtremistPartySupport:PartyExtremism Based on the AttitudesofPartySupporters Variables DependentVariable1968-1977b PopulationSize (log) LegislativeFractionalization ExtremistPartyVotea CitizenAttitudesc Extremeon Left-RightScale Alienated PercentVarianceExplained (N) DependentVariableb Population Size (log) LegislativeFractionalization ExtremistPartyVotea Citizen Attitudes Extremeon Left-RightScale Alienated PercentVarianceExplained (N) DependentVariable EthnicFractionalization ProportionalRepresentation Election System ExtremistPartyVotea Citizen Attitudesc Extremeon Left-RightScale Alienated PercentVarianceExplained (N) StandardizedRegressionCoefficientsd Riots .70* - .29 .27* Riots .70* - .29 .25 .03 Riots .57* - .18 - .12 .51 81% (12) 80% (12) 89% (12) Protests Protests Protests .58* -.43 .26 .57* -.44* .40* - 75% (12) .22 78% (12) .48* -.33 - .06 .41 81% (12) Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet Instability Instability Instability .02 .01 .05 .15 .85 .10 .74 .22 .67 .20 88% (9) 90% (9) .21 90% (9) at .05 level. Significant See theAppendixforpartyclassifications, ofsupporters. basedon attitudes b Riotsand Protests fromTaylorandJodice,1983.Valuesconstrained to the90thpercentiletolimittheimpactofoutliers. ofcitizenswhonevertrust thegovernment, 'Alienationis thepercentage orthepercentwiththeworkings ofdemocracy. agenotat all satisfied d All equationsreaddown. a 366 G. BinghamPowell,Jr. a controlforcitizenalienationcreatesan insignificant ornegIntroducing ativerelationship withcitizenturmoil.Yet,as in Table 1, theimpactof thecontrolforcitizen on cabinetstability survives extremist partystrength partymeasure alienation.Althoughwe mightexpectthattheextremist bythedirectcitizen attitudes wouldbe moreaffected basedon supporter alienationmeasure, thebasicpatternis verysimilar. inthenuancesofaggregate tobecometooinvolved Whileitis fruitless analysiswithso fewcases, it is usefulto examinethe internalpattern somewhat moreclosely.Whatseemsto be happeningin therelationships and citizenturmoilcan be betweencitizenalienation, extremist support, In thecountries witha fairly statedquitesimply. pureformofproportional representation (Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,Italy,the Netherbetweenextremist thereare close relationships lands,and Switzerland), andpopulation-adjusted citizenalienation, partysupport(eithermeasure), The correlation turmoil. betweenextremist partysupportas measuredin Table 1 and thecitizenalienationmeasurewas .84. In thefivecountries (Germany,Ireland,France, withoutpure proportionalrepresentation betweencitizenalienation BritainandtheUnitedStates),therelationship remainsstrong, butonlyinFrancewastherenotableextremist andturmoil theelectoralrulesseemto discourage partysupport.In thesecountries, ofcitizendiscontent. extremist partysupportas a barometer Forty-five PartiesandCabinetInstability: Extremist LegislaturesinTwelveCountries on thequestionof progress Whilewe seemto havemadesubstantial we arenotable therelative roleofcitizenalienationandpartyextremism, in at thislevelto discernmuchdifference theimpactofpartiesofalienwe can explore extremism. Fortunately, ationversuspartiesofleft-right in level,wherebothtypesof thisproblem moredepthat thegovernment cabinetinstability, bymovingfromtheanalypartysupportseemto affect sisusingthenationas theunittoan analysisbasedon legislative situations. theimpactofextremist thelevelofanalysisandexploring Bychanging across post-election legislativesituations partieson cabinetinstability in under1 the we can further and confidence gain insight throughout 970s, the of extremist the Using legislative party support. standing consequences ratherthanthecountry situations as theunitofanalysisgreatlyexpands on thepartyrepresentathenumberofcasesfortheanalysis.Byfocusing theproximate tionofextremism, whichas wehaveseenis apparently cause overtimeby of cabinetinstability, we can measureextremist strength assumingthatpartiesmeanthesamethingto citizensacrossthedecade, eventhoughwe haveno directmeasuresofdiscontent at different points. positionof Comparisonsof 1973 and 1979 data on the mean left-right EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 367 are quiteencouraging forinterpreting supporters thepartyas a relatively stableunitduringsucha shorttimeperiod. Table3 presents thestandardized coefficients in regression equations, as in Table2, butis based on each newpost-election situation legislative constituting a newcase.Thedependent variablehereisgovernment durabilin months itybetweenelections, measured up toa maximum of36 months, whichis theminimum timebetweenfixedelectionsin anyofthesecountries.Ifmorethanone government heldofficein thelegislative term,the scoreswereaveragedforthatterm.A government durability is definedas endingwhenitformally resigns, orwhenitspartycomposition changes, or whena nationalelectionis held.(Thedirection ofthedependent variableis reversed tomaintaincontinuity ofsignswiththeprevious tables.) In cases wheretheelectionresultedin a singlepartymajority, the outcomewas almostalwaystheformation of a singlepartygovernment and thosegovernments wereusuallyverydurable.Suchcases are deleted fromTable3. Thus,herewe examineonlycasesin parliamentary governIn the mentsinwhichtheelectiondidnotresultin a singlepartymajority. nineparliamentary systems forwhichwehadsurveys andclassified parties in theAppendix,therewere29 suchlegislative periodsin the 1970sand early1980s.The firstthreenumericalcolumnsofthetableshowtheregressionequationsbased on those29 cases. The secondthreenumerical columnsextendthetimeperiodbackintotheyears1966-67(as inTable2) and add Sweden,Norwayand Spain.Forthesecountries we havesurveys to measuretheleft-right ofpartysupporters self-placements (Holmberg, 1981; Valen, 1979; Linz, 1980),but have had to assumethe left-right extreme thedata are moredubious partiesare also alienated.4Naturally, as we movefurther backin time(becausethemeaningandconfigurations ofpartiesmaychange)and as we use countries withlessappropriate data. However, thenumber ofcasesis increased to45,andtheappearanceofvery inthestability similarcoefficients increasesourconfidence oftheresults. The independent variablesin the table fallintotwo groups,those conditions andthosemeasuring thepartyrepresentameasuring nonparty tion.The first variablecapturesthoseexceptional caseswhen independent a system thatusuallyproducessinglepartymajorities findsitselfwithno fora partyorpreelectoral coalition.As demonstrated majority elsewhere, (Powell,1982,and Strom,1982),theusual reactionofelitesunderthese circumstances is to allow a minority to form.Such a partygovernment acts moreor less as a caretakeruntila new electioncan government thusclassified as extremists in thesethreecountries 4The partiesin thelegislatures are SocialistElectoralAlliance,SocialistLeftParty;Spain, Sweden,Communist Party;Norway, Euskadiko Ezkerra, Communist Party/PSUC. TABLE 3 withNo Sing Situations in Legislative Predicting CabinetInstability Variables Independent DependentVariable:Cabinet in NineParliaInstability mentary Systems1970-1983 (N = 29) Formation I. Conditionsfor Government System-NoMajorityThis Majoritarian Time VoteLoss byIncumbent Percentage in LastElection Belgium(Dummy) .41 .42 .43 .26 .38 .36 -.02 .36 .02 II. ExtremistPartyRepresentationin the Legislature ofSeatsHeldby: A. Percentage All AlienatedParties All Left-right ExtremeParties ofSeatsHeldby: B. Percentage b .37 .46* .05 .46* .05 .32 Pure ProtestParties Extreme Pure Left-right PartiesBoth Alienatedand Extreme PercentVarianceExplained(R2) 38% 56% at .05 level. Significant 54% a Maximum ofparties. fortheclassification cabinetdurability, 36 months. See theAppendix b Variablenotinequation. coefficients. regression arestandardized 'All equationsreaddown.Entries EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 369 reasonably be called. Such electionsmaybe called by thegovernment, hopingto achievea majority(as happenedin Britainin 1974),or by actionsof the oppositionsto defeatthegovernment (as in Canada and Irelandin theearly1980s).In eithercase, suchgovernments are usually short-lived and do notrepresent an effort at coalition-building. Here,Irelandand Britainare considered as usuallyproviding majorities forsingle partiesor preelection coalitions,and theirfailureto do so in threecases in short-lived resulted governments. Thesecondmeasureofconditions forgovernment instability takesadvantageofworkdoneon thelinkagebetweencitizenvotingbehaviorand otherformsofprotest to consideranotherformofcitizendiscontent that maymakeitselffeltinthelegislature. Byexamining thevotefortheincumbentpoliticalpartiesin theelectionpreceding thelegislative termin questionand comparing it to theirvotingsupportin thepreviouselection,we can measurethedegreeto whichcitizenswereregistering discontent with incumbents through theuse of theballot.Whether theincumbents were returned to officeaftertheelection(witha reducedmajority, forexample), or replacedbyanotherpartyor parties,we wouldexpectthenewgovernmentto havea moredifficult whencitizenswere timeunderconditions registering protest votes.Evenifthenewgovernment is formed entirely of thenewcabinetmustdealwiththe partiesnotin officebeforetheelection, problems anddissatisfactions thatdroveitspredecessor fromoffice. The thirdindependent variableis a dummyvariableforBelgium, whichwas introduced forseveralreasons.First,thePowell(1982,p. 204) measurethatwas relatedto cabinet analysisconcludedwithan ethnicity instability. Usingsucha measuredirectly hereresultsin equationssimilar tothosein Table2, as Belgiumis theonlycountry withmajor,measurable ethnicdivisionsamongthesenations.Second,variousdiscussions(Sani and Sartori,1983,forexample),as wellas simpleobservation ofBelgian scale does notadequatelycapturethe politics,indicatethattheleft-right Belgianlinguistic cleavagedimension, whichwashighly salientthroughout thisperiod.Thus,failureto take specialconsideration of Belgiummay obscureotherleft-right effects. Finally,we sawthatBelgiumhasveryhigh levelsofdissatisfaction in 1979(Appendix) andled to partyclassification thatvirtuallyintroducedthe linguisticcleavagein the formof protest thedirectrole parties.WithoutspecialnoteofBelgium,we mayoverstate ofsuchparties. The equationsin Table 3 read downthepage. The firstnumerical columnshowsthethreenonparty variables,plusthepercentageofseats heldbypartieswhosesupporters' scale averagepositionon theleft-right wasa standarddeviationormoreoutsidetheEuropeanmean.Each ofthe forour at the .10 level and, mostimportantly variablesis significant 370 G. BinghamPowell,Jr. theextremist purposes, witha standardpartyvariableis quitesignificant, ized beta of .37. We can see thattheseresults,especiallytheextremist partymeasure,are relatively robust,as theyholdup in theextended45case set,shownwiththeidenticalequationin column4. However,we knowthata numberoftheleft-right extremist parties werealsoalienated, andthatsimilarconditions allowedbothtogainrepresentation. Thus,in thesecondand thirdcolumnswe introducemeasures forpartyalienationintotheequation.The alienatedpartymeasuresalso come fromtheAppendix.Alienatedpartiesare thosewhosesupporters werea standard deviation moredistrustful oftheauthorities orcondemnatoryoftheregimethantheEuropeanmean.In column2 thesepartiesare lumpedtogether, andincludebothpureprotest parties(suchas theFinnish RuralParty)and partiesofbothprotest extremism and left-right (suchas theItalianMSI andtheDanishLeftSocialists).In column3 thepartiesare pulledapartintothethreetypesofextremists. The resultsofequations2 and 3 areconsistent and striking. Whenaccountis takenofthealienation thepureleft-right effects areoverwhelmed, dimension, reducedtoinsignificance.Furthermore, theexplanatory poweroftheequationis greatlyincreased.Wecan seethatinequation2,thealienatedpartyvariableis strong and significant extremist variablebecomes (beta= .46), and theleft-right trivial results (beta= .05).Almostidentical appearinthe45-caseset.Moreover,whenthethreetypesofpartiesare enteredseparately, thepureleftright extremism variableis veryweak,andthepureprotest parties(.46) are atleastas disruptive as thealienatedandextreme parties(.32). Amongtheindependent weseethatthevariableforminority variables, inmajority situations is consistently systems significant acrossthesixequations.The measureof incumbent losses in elections,althoughslightly weakerinthe45-caseset,isconsistently related tolessdurablecabinets also. Thedummy variableforBelgium, however, becomesinsignificant onceaccountis takenoftheprotestpartyvariable,through whichitsdisruptive poweris apparently felt(ormeasured). Examinationof the unstandardized regressioncoefficients correin Table 3 offers to thefigures sponding somesenseofthemagnitude of effects us thatthestrength ofstandardized (andalso reassures coefficients is notundulydistorted byunequalvariancesofthevariables).We might firstnotethat,as shownbytheconstantterm,a government in a formed nonmajoritarian parliamentary systemwithno votelossesfortheincumbentsand no extremist partyrepresentation couldexpectto enduresome 28 months ofthe36 monthmaximum. Thecondition ofan unusualminorityin a majoritarian systemmeantsome15 months lessdurability. (HowA twopercentvoteloss ever,wehaveonlythreeinstances ofthissituation.) fortheincumbents in theelectioncreatingthelegislative representation implieda lessdurablecabinetbyoneortwomonths. Andevery10percent EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 371 ofthelegislature claimedbyalienatedpartiesmeanta lossofsixmonths in cabinetdurability. Moreovernotonlyaretheresultsquitestableinthe29and 45-casesetsof legislative situations, but the unstandardized coefficientsforpureprotestpartiesare actuallygreaterthanthoseforparties bothalienatedandextreme. The resultsof variouspiecesof associatedanalysiscan be summarizedmorebriefly here.As themeasureofextremist partieson a left-right scale accordingto theself-placement of supporters seemsrathercrude,I developeda measureoflegislative polarization, consisting ofthestandard deviationofthemeansofall thepartiesin thelegislature, weighted bythe size oftheirrepresentation. Thismeasurehastheattractive feature thatit capturesdistancesbetweennonextreme partiesas wellas extreme ones.It also hasa nicestatistical I calculatedthismeasureforall the distribution. in Table 3. Unfortunately, legislatures despitetheirstatistical superiority, thesemeasuresbehavealmostexactlylikethecrudemeasureofleft-right inTable3: theyaresignificant extremist partyrepresentation of predictors cabinetinstability whentakingaccountoftheconditionsofgovernment buttheylose mostor all of theirpredictive formation, powerwhenthe alienatedpartymeasuresareenteredintotheequations.As itis tediousto presentanothersetofsimilartables,and theunstandardized coefficients areeasierto interpret in common-sense fashionusingthesimpleextremist I havenotshowntheresultsofthoseelaborate partymeasures, calculations here.Buttheyunderline thefactthattheresultsshownin Table 3, whatevertheirotherweaknesses,are not createdby a fewextremist party outliersorotherartifacts ofthedistributions ofthedata.Entering dummy variablesforspecificcountries does notchangetheresultseither. Despitetheplausibility oftheargument thatleft-right polarization (or therepresentation ofpartiescommitted to relatively extreme leftor right policypositions)in itsownrighttendsto be destabilizing, theEuropean inthe1970sdoesnotseemto support experience it.Theassociation ofsuch polarizationand extremism withcabinetinstability, an undeniablefact, seemsto reflect cabinetinstability's associationwiththerepresentation of partieswhosesupporters weredeeplydissatisfied withtheperformance of In manycases,extremism authorities andregime. andalienation wereassociatedinpartieswhosesupporters tendedtobe bothextreme andalienated; butthepresenceofpartiesofpureprotest wasequallydestabilizing. Comments Concluding Partysystem theorists havelongarguedthatthepresenceofextremist politicalpartiessignalstroubleahead fora democratic politicalsystem. Substantial researchhas supported thisargument, linkingextremist party to turmoilin thestreetsand instability in thelegislature. strength Atthe mostgenerallevel,the findings reportedhereare quiteconsistent with 372 G. BinghamPowell,Jr. suchpreviouswork.In additionto replication usingexpertcharacterizationsoftheparties,the"extremism" of87 partiesin twelvenationsin the 1970swas measuredby the self-reported alienationand left-right selfplacementof theirsupporters. Supportfortheseextremist partieswas, indeed,relatedto the presenceof turmoiland government instability. in suchpartiesalso tendedto be excludedfromparticipation Moreover, Theseresultssupportpreviousresearch, whileavoidingthe government.5 ofobserver-based schemes. subjectivity partyclassification Thisresearch movesbeyondsimplereplication byexploring twopuzzles posed by the literature on partyextremism: (1) Is extremist party or a proximate supportprimarily a barometer cause of turmoil?(2) Is extremism destabilizing becauseoftheradicalnatureofitsvisionor beIn each case,the causeofitsalienationfromthepresentpoliticalsystem? resultshavebeen fairlyclear-cut. Butthelimitations ofthepresentdata andmethodofanalysis(primarily cross-sectional analysisoftheimpactof extremist partiesin Western conclusiveanEuropein the 1970s)prevent swersto thegeneralquestions. On thepuzzleofextremist orproximate partiesas barometers causes, theanswerseemsto dependon the siteof turmoil.For turmoilin the measuredhereby frequency of riotsand peacefulprotests, streets, the of extremist seemed tobe a barometer ofcitizen strength parties primarily alienation.(Alienation was itselfmeasuredbyextreme distrust ofthenawiththeworking tionalgovernment or extreme dissatisfaction ofdemocracy.)Noneoftheextremist partymeasureswas associatedwithriotsor In factthereis some onceaccountwastakenofcitizenalienation. protests, thatthepresenceofextremist suggestion partiestendedto dampenrather inthestreets. thanexacerbate Ata minimum turmoil theseresultscaution us nottoconfusetheroleofextremist with partiesinregistering discontent it. theirrolein stimulating In thelegislature, on theotherhand,it seemedto be thestrength of extremist not citizenattitudes, thatwas directly partyrepresentation, linkedto cabinetinstability. to distinguish Here,ourattempt betweenthe twoaspectsofextremism associatedrespectively withtheideasofoccupyingendpointson a left-right scaleandofexpressing severediscontent also ledtorather decisivefindings. To be sure,thetwoaspectsofextremism, at leastas measuredhere,wereassociated.Quiteaside fromthesteady,althoughhardlyspectacularassociationsat theindividuallevel,theaggrewereclear.Of the70 partiesnotextreme in left-right gatepartypatterns intheAppendix, ofthe39nonexonlytheparliamentary systems eight percent 'Considering fromgovernment from1963through tremist wereexcluded parties participation 1983;33 percentofthe12protest parties wereexcluded; 67 percent ofthesixpurely left-right extreme parties wereexcluded; 90 percent ofthose10parties thatwereextremist inbothrespects wereexcluded. EXTREMIST PARTIES AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: TWO PUZZLES 373 terms,only 15 (21 percent),werecharacterized as alienated.Of the 17 in left-right partiesthatwereextreme terms,11 (65 percent)werenotable fortheaveragealienationlevelof theirsupporters. This associationbefarfromthecitizencenterand extweenoccupationofleft-right positions pression ofalienation fromthepoliticalsystem is certainly notunexpected. The dynamicrelationships thatshapeit are worthy of carefulattention, whether we thinkthatthealienatedpartyoftencomesto holda radical visionorthatthosewithradicalvisionsarelikelytobecomealienated. However,a numberof partiesdid fallintothecategoriesof purely protest (alienatedwithout occupying an extreme positionon theleft-right scale) or purelyextreme(occupyingan extremepositionon the leftrightscale,butnotalienated).Consequently, we wereableto distinguish betweenthetwoaspectsofgeneral"extremism" especiallyin theanalysis inparliamenofcabinetinstability basedon multiple situations legislative tarysystems. The resultsconsistently emphasizedthedestabilizing roleof alienation as theproximate causeoflegislative rather thanpure instability, occupationofendpointson a scale. Atthemoment, it seemsthattheterm"polarization," withitsvisual imageofan overstretched, bimodalstructure ofcompetition, is somewhat misleadingas an explanationof cabinetinstability. (See also Daalder, 1984,andSaniandSartori,1983,on variousimagesofcompetitive space.) Naturally, thesefindings raisefurther questionsoftheirown.Whatis it aboutthepartiesofalienationand protest thatled to suchdestabilization inthelegislature? As Sartori's the (1976,pp. 132-144)discussionsuggests, ofthegovernment, problemmayhaveto do withgeneraldelegitimization an undermining ofitsauthority thatmakesstablecoalitionmaintenance difficult. Or it mayhaveto do withtherecalcitrance oftheprotest party representatives, eitherfrompersonalchoiceor in respectoftheantagonismof theirfollowers, whichcomplicatesthe government processby removing a blocofseatsfrompotential government support.(One thinks hereofthedifficulties oftheDanishmoderate partiesinthelate1970sand ofthelegislature was heldbytheLeft-Socialists early1980swhena fifth and theProgress betweennonsocialist Party,and thenegotiations parties andProgress andunstable.) provedverydifficult An alternative viewinterprets alienationas representating or even a separatedimension ofitsown(as we sawmightbe thecase constituting inBelgiumwiththelanguagedimension), theprocessof andcomplicating formation andmaintenance becauseofmultidistablegovernment greatly andchanging dimensional salience.Belgiuminthelate1970s mensionality in partbecausethelargecoalitionsofSocialists, showedgreatinstability to deal Christians and Liberalsused to enactdecentralization legislation withlinguisticseparatism tendedto collapsequicklyon economicand 374 G. BinghamPowell,Jr. had beenpassed.(The probudgetary issuesafterthelanguagelegislation retypically cesswas especiallyunstablebecausethelanguagelegislation majorities.) Fromthispointof quiredconstitutional changes andtwo-thirds ofthesingleleft-right theinadequacy represent primarily view,thefindings itspowerin predicting voterchoice,to represent the continuum, whatever toformcabinetsin multiplicity ofdimensions facedbypoliticalelitestrying thepresenceofpartiesofalienation. Mitra(1980) takesthisviewofparty andcabiextremism andtestsitwithdataonpartyplatform dimensionality inIndia.Inglehart's netinstability (1984)analysisofthewayin whichantiestablishment attitudes oftheleft-right seemto forma seconddimension studiedwouldalso fitsuchan interpretascalein sixoftheeightcountries wererelatedto protest measures.In general, tion.Suchattitudes potential theseandotherinterpretations without however, wecannotchoosebetween havingmoredirectdata on theattitudesand behaviorof thelegislative representatives themselves. with Finally,it is interesting to notethattheseresultsare consistent theadvanmade (Powell,1981, 1982) concerning arguments previously oftherepresentational approachto constitutions tagesand disadvantages On one hand,thenegativecoefficients forlegislative and partysystems. fractionalization and evenextremist partysupportin the equationsfor riotsand protestssupportthe idea thateasy entryinto the legitimate arenastendsto dampenturmoilin thestreets.It is endecision-making thattheseresultscontinueto holdafterdirectconsideration of couraging in whichtherules citizenalienation.Whendiscontent arisesin systems facilitate ofnewpoliticalparties,such theformation and representation alienationcan be expressed electoraland partymeans.Riotsand through under protests are lesslikelyto appearas vehiclesforcitizenfrustration theseconditions, forprotestleaders perhapsbecauseoftheopportunities to workwithinthesystem.On theotherhand,thecontinuing impactof extremist on government thata instability suggests partyrepresentation Turmoilis pricemustbe paid at the legislative levelforthisstrategy. channeledintothepartyand legislative arenasand theprocessesofbargainingtherearemademoredifficult. 22 May 1985 submitted Manuscript 2 August1985 Finalmanuscript received APPENDIX Par ofSupporters: ofExtremist PartiesBasedon theAttitudes Classification Country (Numberof Parties) (87) Austria (3) Belgium (10) Britain (4) Denmark ( 11) Finland (10) France (8) West Germany (4) Not Supporters AlienatedorExtremist: Parties Nonextremist (55) Socialist Peoples Liberal Socialist-FL Liberal-FL Volksunie Christian-FL Christian-FR Labour Liberal Conservative Social Democratic Radical Single-Tax Christian Liberal Democratic Center Conservative Social Democratic Liberal Christian Center(Agrarian) Swedish LeftRadical Reform(CDS) RPR (Guallist) UDF Social Democratic Free Democratic ChristianDemocratic (CDU/CSU) Supporters Alienateda Only: ProtestParties (15) Supp Extr Only:Pu Extrem (6 Socialist-FR Liberal-FR Francophone Walloon Union Nationalist (Scott, Welsh) Progress Rural Unified Socialist (PSU) Socialistd Ecologistd Green Socialist People Commun Commun Conserv (Natio Mov APPENDIX-continued Country (Numberof Parties) (87) Ireland (3) Italy (9) Netherlands (13) Switzerland (10) UnitedStates (2) Not Supporters AlienatedorExtremist: Nonextremist Parties (55) Supporters Alienateda Only: ProtestParties (15) Labour FineGael FiannaFail SocialDemocratic Liberal Christian Democratic Republicans" Radical Labour Democrats66 Liberal Christian Democratic Catholic Antirevolutionary Christian Historical Communist Socialist Independent Evangelical Radical Farm(UDC) Liberal Christian NationalAction Christian Independent (PICS) Democratic Republican Farmers (BP) (PSDI) Socialist (PSI)' Extrem Only:Pur Extremis (6) - Pacifist (PSP) Calvinist (SGP) Sources:BarnesandKaase,etal., 1979;RabierandInglehart, andKlingemann 1981;Inglehart a Twenty percentormore(onestandard deviation beyondtheEuropeanmean)reported theyne were notsatisfied at all withtheworkings ofdemocracy intheircountry. 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