National
Readiness for
Automated
Election System:
An Assessment
Atty. Ronald O. Solis, Bantay Balota
Bantay Balota’s Goal:
To achieve the shared objective of a clean,
honest, and credible automated elections (AES)
on May 10, 2010
To collaborate with COMELEC in formulating
effective and practical solutions to identify issues
and concerns regarding the AES and provide
means for the overall improvement and security
of the system
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Legend:
Polling Center
Polling Center
(37,226 in total)
Pr
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Pr
PCOS machine
(75,471 in total
accomodating a
max. of 1,000 voters
each)
Pr
Precinct
(max. of 200 Voters
each)
Administrative Issues:
Issues which involve the effectivity of using an automated system of
elections and the actual implementation and operation of the AES in
the May 10, 2010 Elections:
Possibility of massive disenfranchisement of voters considering factors such
as:
lack of experience and the novelty of the technology
the short period available in the preparation and implementation of the system
inadequate voters’ education and the fact that only 1 ballot will be allowed per voter.
Will COMELEC be able to adequately train all the election officers and IT
personnel to operate the machines to be used in the AES?
With the clustering of precincts which will increase the number of voters to
be handled by each BEI, will all the voters be accommodated within the 11hour period?
Difficulty in the distribution of all the PCOS machines, CCS laptops, security
keys, other equipment and election paraphernalia to the proper precincts.
Overcoming the lack of public confidence that the system will work and truly
reflect the choice of the voting populace
Technical Issues:
Issues which involve the hardware and software
components of the AES:
Possibility of hacking and tampering of the system
Will the various machines to be used in the AES work
in real life conditions?
Will the AES accurately report the election results?
Possibility of system breakdown and how to recover
from it
Transmission concerns
Partial automation
With difficulties in transmission and given the
probability of breakdown on some of the PCOS
and CCS machines, 30% to 50% of the country
might resort to manual counting and physical
delivery of the election results
Resort to manual counting in the event of a
system-wide breakdown
Critical Areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Source Code Review
Printing of Ballots
Education and Training
Preliminary/Final PCOS and CCS Testing &
Sealing
Continuity Plan
Transmission Concerns
Access to the Media Server
Random Manual Audit
Periods
Before Elections
Source Code Review (Ongoing)
Preliminary Testing (Ongoing)
Education and Training
Printing of Ballots (January 25 to end of March 2010)
Final Testing and Sealing (3 days before Election day or not later than May
7, 2010)
Election Day (May 10, 2010)
Transmission Concerns
Access to Media Server
Continuity Plan
Post Elections
Random Manual Audit (May 11, 2010)
What is a Source Code?
xxx “12. Source code - human readable
instructions that define what the computer
equipment will do;” xxxx
Law”
- Section 2 of RA 9369, the “AES
Currently conducted by SysTest Labs, Inc. of
Colorado, USA
Review of Source Code includes:
Firmware/Software of the PCOS machines
Firmware/Software of the CCS laptops
Firmware/Software of the EMS and the Printers to be
used for printing the various election paraphernalia
Other Utilities, Tools and Devices for the Diagnostics
and Administration of the various component
machines of the AES
Purpose:
Check the integrity and robustness of the source
code
Test and Check the security features in place
Troubleshooting and debugging
Verify that the firmware/software reviewed is
what is actually installed on the machines
Deter tampering, hacking and insertion of any
spurious and/or malicious software
Issues:
Source code itself will not be made available to the
public or at least to the major stakeholders.
No means of knowing the extent and breadth of the
review conducted or the effectiveness of the
methodology used
No way to verify and audit the findings of SysTest
Labs
Delay in the release of findings to public
Result: No real assurance that the purpose of the
review will be met
Recommendation:
Need to conduct an independent parallel source
code review
Advantages:
Provide an independent 3rd party assessment
May cover any overlooked areas in the review
conducted by SysTest Labs considering the amount
of source code reviewed
Increase public confidence on the automated
election system
Legal Basis
Provided by Sec. 12 of RA9369, the “AES Law”
which provides:
“xxx Once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly
make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political
party or groups which may conduct their own
review thereof. xxxx”
Printing of ballots and other election
paraphernalia and materials will be printed
by the National Printing Office
Smartmatic/TIM to provide printing
equipment and paraphernalia
Printing is estimated to take two (2) months
from January 25 to end of March 2010.
Issues:
Possible errors and malfunctions in printing
which could cause delay
Printing of spurious marks and other triggers that
could influence the PCOS in appreciating the
correct choices in the ballots
Proper alignment in the printing of the
candidates’ names which could affect how the
PCOS would appreciate the choices in the ballot
Recommendations:
Need for 24/7 non-stop surveillance during the
entire 2 month period.
Watchers from the major stakeholders should be
allowed to observe the printing process.
Need to check for spurious ultraviolet markings
which cannot be seen by the naked eye without
the aid of ultraviolet light as used by money
changers
Installation of cameras and other security
surveillance equipment at the site of the printing
Education for the Voters and Watchers:
According to the recent SWS survey, 60% of
Filipinos do not know anything about the AES
This is alarming since a voter will be provided
with only 1 ballot,
There can be no mistakes. Every voter should
handle the ballots with extra care to avoid
smudging, crumpling and folding which could
invalidate it
Recommendations:
It is imperative that the Sample Ballots should
be released as early as possible
Educational paraphernalia containing
screenshots of the PCOS and CCS interfaces
should also be disseminated in order to help
educate the voters and the watchers on what to
expect as to how the voting and canvassing
process would look like and adequately prepare
come election day
Training for the BEIs, BOCs and IT
personnel
Considering the novelty of the technology, there
may be difficulties in providing adequate training
Does COMELEC have the sufficient time and
resources to train all the election officers
concerned?
Does the DOST, which have been tasked by the
law to train the BEIs, already have the training
module available?
PCOS/CCS Testing/Sealing is done to check
that the machines work (including screen,
keyboard, printer, feeder, scanner and other
parts) and that the count is accurate.
Preliminary Testing of PCOS machines are
already ongoing
Final Testing and Sealing of PCOS machines
will be conducted 3 days before election day or
not later than May 7, 2010
Issues:
Safekeeping of the PCOS machines for at least 3 days
before the elections at all polling centers (mostly schools)
will inconvenience the members of the BEI and the
watchers
COMELEC has not yet issued the Implementing Rules
for the final testing and sealing of the PCOS and CCS
machines
No news or updates as to the final testing of the CCS
laptops to be used in the City/Municipal, Provincial, and
National level
Likewise, no news or updates as to the testing and
sealing of the various servers that will be used in the
AES and will serve as the repository of all the election
data
Recomendation:
Instead of the polling centers, the PCOS
machines should be kept in the office of the
Municipal or City Treasurer of their respective
locations
More secure with less points of ingress and egress
Will reduce the number of areas to be guarded: from
37,226 (number of polling centers) to only 1,634
(number of cities and municipalities)
Screenshots of the step-by-step process of final
testing and sealing should be distributed to all
BEIs and watchers
COMELEC has provided an outline of a
Continuity Plan in their various public
presentations which consists mainly of the
following scenarios:
1.
2.
3.
4.
PCOS fails to scan
PCOS able to scan but fails to print ER
PCOS able to print ER but fails to transmit
Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS) able
to receive transmission but fails to consolidate
Issues:
COMELEC has yet to issue an official Continuity
Plan which should provide a more detailed and
definite set of rules and procedures
It is possible that given the short amount of time
left before the start of elections, the Continuity
Plan that will eventually be released will not be
complete and as detailed to provide sufficient
procedures in the event of a breakdown in the
system
Issues:
Only a portion of the country has GPRS facilities
that are capable of wirelessly transmitting the
election data, mostly in major cities and
municipalities only
Based on their previous presentations,
COMELEC will avail the services of local
telecommunication companies and the use of
satellite phones in setting up the communication
facilities in the affected areas
However, recent reports indicate that Smartmatic/TIM
has finished 93% site survey and concludes the
following:
64% of the country has coverage
32% has no connectivity. This is further broken down as
follows:
20% definitely has no coverage
While 12% test failed for whatever reason.
In other words, there would be around 13,000 sites
that will have no GPRS or any alternative facilities for
data transmission (i.e. no DSL, cable or dial-up
internet)
Considering the foregoing, what other
contingencies will COMELEC undertake to
address this concern?
Will the number of satellite phones provided
by Smartmatic/TIM be sufficient to cover the
affected areas?
Possible Scenario:
There is a real possibility that there will be a
significant amount of areas that will have to resort
to physical delivery of the election results,
especially in remote towns and barrios
As provided in Section 19 of RA 9369 or the “AES
Law”, the election results should be electronically
transmitted to the following entities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Dominant Majority Party
Dominant Minority Party
Accredited Citizens’ Arm (PPCRV)
Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP)
A single server will be provided to these entities
where they will be sharing its access
The server will be in the custody of PPCRV and will
be placed in their office at Pope Pius Center in Manila
Purpose of the PPCRV Server:
In order for the said entities to receive election
results as they come in in real-time
The election data that will be sent to the PPCRV
Server will enable the said entities to quickly
validate the accuracy of the election results
based on their own election surveys and be able
to appropriately respond to any irregularity or
other contingency during the elections
Issues:
Providing only one server to be shared by all of these
entities would possibly lead to difficulties in the access
and delay in receiving the election data as they come in
COMELEC has not yet provided the technical
parameters of access to the said server. Questions
include:
How will the electronic election data be managed? Is it read only
from a screen? Or will the said entities be able to interface the
said server with their own data management systems?
What will be the manner in which to interface with the said
server? Will there be a local network to be installed with each
entity being provided with their own workstation?
Recommendation:
It is imperative that the technical meeting should already
commence given the technical considerations and
planning needed in order for these entities to begin with
preparations to implement and establish the necessary
mechanisms for access to the said server
The level and manner of access to the said server must
be sufficiently defined so as to provide seamless
integration and provide instant and efficient flow of
information
RA 9369 or the “AES Law” provides that a random
manual audit shall be conducted in one precinct per
congressional district
COMELEC may increase this to 1 to 3 PCOS per
City/Municipality or approximately up to 4,902 PCOS
machines in total
To be conducted the day after the elections or on May 11,
2010
Subject to 24-hour prior notice by COMELEC
Issue:
COMELEC has yet to issue the Implementing
Rules and Guidelines as to the procedure in the
random selection of the PCOS machines and the
conduct of the audit itself