THUCYDIDES'
HESPERIA 75 (2006)
SOURCES
S25~540
Pages
AND
THE
SPARTAN
AT
PLAN
PYLOS
To W. K. Pritchett
ABSTRACT
account
of the Spartan-Athenian
conflict at Pylos contains
inaccuracies that demonstrate that the historian had not visited
Thucydides'
topographical
the site. Emendation
is unwarranted, in part because the historian's erroneous
account of the topography harmonizes with his account of the Spartans' plan to
block the entrances toNavarino Bay. The actual topography, however, makes
the reported plan impossible. The Spartans apparendy intended to fight a
inside the bay and therefore stationed hoplites
naumachia with the Athenians
on the island of
stem from his failure
Sphakteria.Thucydides,
misconceptions
to visit
the
site
and
his
on
reliance
tendentious
sources.
Peloponnesian
of the Spartan-Athenian
conflict at Pylos and
description
in
the
in
southwestern
425
has elicited great
Sphakteria
P?loponn?se
a
interest and
good deal of consternation.1 The detailed but problematic
Thucydides'
use of autopsy and
raises important questions about Thucydides'
K. Pritchett,
the foremost scholar of Greek topography and
recently has concluded from his examination of the account that
narrative
sources.2 W.
warfare,
took part in some part of the engagement
and wrote from
no
a
On
the
other
less
student
of
than
hand,
personal autopsy."3
Thucydides
A. W. Gomme
concluded that the historian had never visited the site.4
"Thucydides
1.1 must
thank
Jeffrey Henderson,
Strassler
and Robert
Joseph Roisman,
for useful
and
suggestions
vigorous
criticism
of my
to James
thanks
I owe
views.
Sickinger,
special
not
who
only improved the paperwith criticism
and
but
suggestions,
most
patient
also
served
and knowledgeable
views
on
the
subject
American
School
and
1993,
2. The bibliography on the Pylos
is large,
beginning
works
of Grundy
campaign
important
Burrows
1896,
and
their
guide
at hand)
of Classical
pp. 6-29.
The
latter,
along with
Pritchett 1994, pp. 145-177, supplants
earlier work
on
the topography,
on
which see alsoMcDonald and Rapp
1972 andDavis 1998. Other important
discussions includeWilamowitz 1921;
Gomme 1937, pp. 125-131; 1956,.
Studies
at Athens
pp. 33-41;
and Rubincam
2001.
3. Pritchett 1994, p. 176.
subsequent
1965,
dards he has set in the fields of Greek
The
the
1896
finance,
publications, discussed in Pritchett
that I can acknowledge
my great debt
toW.
K. Pritchett
for the inspiration
stan
he has provided
and the imposing
?
with
pp. 482-489; Wesdake 1974; Kagan
1974, pp. 218-259; Wilson 1979; Baus
laugh 1979; Lazenby 1985, pp. 113
123; Strassler 1988; 1990; Roisman
epigraphy,
as a
to the site. I also hope (despite his
different
warfare,
topography,
and calendars.
4. Gomme
1956,
p. 484;
see also
1974 and Rubincam 2001.
Wesdake
and Burrows
Grundy
disagreed
on
the
same point, with Grundy (1896, p. 21)
writing
that "any one who
has
seen
the neighborhood of Pylos can have
no
had
reasonable
never
been
doubt
that Thucydides
there himself," while
LOREN
526
To
\
Proteica.
11 km)
i
*"
"-J
/\^J
II
SAMONS
J.
Voidokoilia Bay
Osmanaga Lagoon
Pylo(
V^^1^
IN
A
Modern Pylos
Figure 1.Map
Sphakteria,
After Pritchett
showing Pylos,
and Navarino
Bay.
1965, p. 143, pi. 1
Such radically different conclusions by scholars of this caliber offer
cold comfort to anyone intending to enter the debate. In fact, one must
admit that the text as it stands contains elements that suggest the use of
(if not personal autopsy) and topographical
of a quality and quantity to cast doubt on this
fails to make
conclusion
(or on the text itself).5 For example, Thucydides
located north of Pylos, a bay
of the small bay (Voidokoilia)
any mention
that offered potential access (friendly or hostile) to Demosthenes'
troops
and therefore must have figured into any alleged Spartan plans to defeat
in detail
the Athenians
(Fig. I).6 Because of such anomalies, described
to
account
either
tried
scholars
have
often
below,
by
explain Thucydides'
detailed
firsthand
and narrative
accounts
anomalies
to interpret the text via the topography or by emending
the
attempting
text so that it conforms to the locale.7
Iwish to approach the problem from a different angle, taking my lead
in his study of the battle of Mara
from a suggestion made by Gomme
thon. Gomme
that, in attempting to reconstruct the battle, we
s account what those who took part in
in Herodotos
maintained
should first accept
and whom
the campaign
Herodotos
Burrows (1896, p. 76) concluded that
"Thucydides does indeed describe the
last battle
have
failed
(cf. Burrows
that he can hardly
exactly
to have been on the
spot"
so
1897,
p. 9).
1956,
dokoilia
p. 484.
Pritch
ett (1994, p. 160) does not believe Voi
interviewed
to have
been
noting
campaign,
him
allowed
depth
center
similar
5. Cf. Grundy 1896, pp. 42-47.
6. Cf. Gomme
could have
that
a factor
have
in the
He
across
makes
a role, and this would
seem to be a
compelling
to discount
the need to control
tainly played
not
therefore
its shallow
to "wade
of it in 1960-63."
observation
would
the
a
(pp. 170-172),
entrance
about the northern
however,
east of the ...
to Navarino
Bay ("just
cer
which
channel
proper"; p. 170),
reason
Voidokoilia (and tomention
account
of the tactical
it in any
situation);
also n. 21, below.
7. See
respectively,
e.g.,
1988 and Bauslaugh 1979.
Strassler
see
SOURCES
THUCYDIDES'
AND
THE
SPARTAN
PLAN
527
Iwish to begin
known (or believed) actually happened.8 Following Gomme,
with what all those who served at Pylos would have known, and then ask
could have written
the account we possess given these
how Thucydides
"facts" known to his informants. The basic facts that we possess about this
are that an Athenian
episode
the Spartans and Athenians
force occupied the rocky headland of Pylos,
then fought a sea battle inNavarino Bay, and
the Spartans were defeated. This defeat resulted in the stranding of a large
group of Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphakteria, where they had been
before
stationed
the battle.
we are told
we may as
by Thucydides
Gauging what
against what
sume his informants knew and the
itself, I argue here that
topography
account
at least in part on
that
the
historian
relied
suggests
Thucydides'
sources (who themselves
Peloponnesian
possessed firsthand
and that the historian himself had no firsthand knowledge
information)
that the
of the topography or of the campaign. I also hope to demonstrate
tendentious
at Pylos relied on a
to engage the Athenians
in a
plan
a
to
Navarino Bay rather than plan
block the harbor as
records.
Spartan strategy
naumachia within
Thucydides
THUCYDIDES' ACCOUNT
In 425 the Athenian
fleet with
Eurymedon,
having deposited the former
a
on
small force
the promontory
of Pylos, con
and
general Demosthenes
tinued northward to Zakynthos.9 The approach of Peloponnesian
ships,
had avoided notice of the Athenian
navy, then caused Demosthenes
to his compatriots
to send a message
in the fleet. Thucydides
relates the
as follows:
episode
which
?'xi xcov Il??,07tovvr|oic?v ?7teK7i?u7t?i
?r|uoo0?vri? Se 7tpoG7C?,?Ovxcov
(p6aaot? ?uo voc?? ?yy??A,ai E?puiaiSovxi Kai xo?? ?v xa?? vauoiv ?v
Zock?vGcoi AGrrva?oic Ttape?vai ?? xo? y/op?ou KivSuveuovioc.
(4) Kai ai u?v vfje? Kax? x?vp? enXzov Kax? x? ?7t?oxaX,|i?va
U7C??rjuooG?vou?- oi 8? AaKe?a?uovioi
? xcoi
rcapeoKeuaCovxo
X?i%iouocxi Tipoa?aAowcec Kax? xe yfjv Kai Kax? 6a?,aaaav,
??Jti?ovxe? pa?ico? aipT|0?iv o?ko8?ut|uxx 8i? xa^?cov cipyaajLi?vov
Kai ?vopcoTtcov ?A?yuw ?v?vxcov. (5) 7tpoa8?Y?U?voi 8? Kai xfrv arc?
xfj? ZaK?vBoi) xcov ?xxikc?v vecov ?ori6?iav ?v vcoi ?i%ov, r\v apa
XOU?lU?VO? ?jl?p?p^ai, O7CC0?
?AXOGl,Kai XO\)? ?G7TAOD?
UT]TCpOX?pOV
?? a?x?v. (6) r\ yap vfjGo? r\
?cpopuioaooai
xe
x?v
?au?va
ZcpaKXTjp?aKa^oujievri
7tapaxe?voi)aa Kai ?yy??
7coi??
Kai
87tiKei|i?vri ?vupov
xo?? ecnXovq axevou?, xfji u?v Suo?v
Lif| fi xo?? ?Onvaioi?
veo?v oiarcAoDv Kax? xo xr?viouxx xcov ?6r|vaicov
8. Gomme
dotos's
p. 34: "[of Hero
we
of Marathon]
1962,
account
should believe, if possible?if
sense,
that
atMarathon
would
add
to discard
is?what
would
that we
all who
have
are not
any element
itmakes
took part
I
known."
licensed
of the battle
accounts
simply
by Herodotos
it does
because
or
not
Thucydides
"make sense"
to us (and I do not believe Gomme
meant
to
we should do so).
imply that
events do occur, and thus
Inexplicable
other factors
internal
(such
consistency)
as the narrative's
must
also be
Kai xfjv II?aov, xfji
to bear on
senseless
brought
apparently
items in any account.
9. For Demosthenes'
formal posi
tion here, cf. Hornblower
1991,
p. 516; 1996, p. 152 (general elect);
andGomme 1956, pp. 437-438 (prob
ably
a
private
citizen).
LOREN
J.
SAMONS
II
?? rcpo? xnv aXXr\v nrceipov okx?) r\ ?vv?a* ??,ci)8r|? te Kai axpi?ric
7caaa urc' ?pnuia? nv Kai u?yeGo? rcepi rc?vxe Kai S?m oxaSiou?
poi? ?uCrrv
(7) xo?? ji?v ouv ?anXovq xa?? vauaiv ?vxutp
xnv
Se
v?aov
?uE?Xov
xauxuv
(po?oujxevoi \ir\ ?? auxfj? x?v
K^fiaew
T??XejLiov
?? a?xrjv Kai napa
acp?ai Tcoicovxai, onX?xaq oie?i?aaav
uxxtaaxa.
xnv nrceipov ?Xkovc; ?xac^av. (8) ouxcd y?p xo?? AOnvaioi? xf|v xe
ouk ?^ouaav
vfjaov Tto^euiav ?aeaBai xf|v xe nrceipov, ajio?aaiv
?aicA^ou
x?
xo?
rcpo?
(x? y?p a?x?.c xfj? IT?A,ou ?c^a)
rc??ayoc; ?Xi^ieva
?vxa oux ??^eiv o0ev ?puxouEvoi cbcpe^naouoi xo?? a?xcov) acpe??
8? aveu xe vauucc%ia? Kai Kiv8?vou eKTCotaopicnaeiv x? xcop?ov
Kax? x? e?K?c, a?xou xe ouk ev?vxoc Kai 81' o?iyn? rcapaaKeur??
Kaxei?T||LiU?Vov. (9) ?>c 8' eS?Kei auxo?? xauxa, Kai Sie?i?aCov
?? xnv vfjaov xo?? onX?xaq a7toKAr|pc?>aavxec arc? rc?vxcov x?v
X6%(?v. Kai Sie?naav
jx?vKai ??Aoi rcp?xepov Kax? SiaSoxnv, oi 8?
xe?,euxa?oi Kai ?yKaxa?J|<p0?vxe? e'?Koai Kai xexpaK?aioi naav Kai
E?^ xe? o? rcepi a?xo??- n.p%e8? a?xcov 'Ercix?Sa? ? MoAxS?pou.
fleet sailed in, Demosthenes
found time
the Peloponnesian
two ships to inform Eurymedon
to send out unobserved
and the
on board the fleet at
of
the
Athenians
Zakynthos
danger of Pylos
summon
to
to
and
them
his assistance. (4) The ships hastened on
Before
but
their voyage in accordance with the message of Demosthenes,
to
and
assault
the
fort
land
the Lakedaimonians
sea,
by
prepared
ease awork constructed
in haste and
hoping to capture with
men. (5)Meanwhile,
as they expected the
a
occupied by few
Athenian
they intended, if they
ships to bring aid from Zakynthos,
failed to take the place before, to block up the entrances to the
to anchor
harbor, so that itmight not be possible for the Athenians
inside it. (6) For the island called Sphakteria, stretching along in a
line close in front of the harbor, at once makes it safe and its
entrances narrow, with a passage for two ships on the side nearest
and for eight or nine on
fortifications,
Pylos and the Athenian
rest
of the mainland. The whole
island was
that side next to the
not being inhabited and
trackless and covered inwoods
through
its length was about 15 stades. (7) The inlets the Lakedaimonians
intended to close with a line of ships placed close together, with
turned toward the sea.Meanwhile,
fearing that the
enemy might make use of the island to operate against them, they
carried over hoplites onto it and stationed others along the main
their prows
land. (8) In this way the island and the mainland would be hostile
as there was no
territory to the Athenians,
point of disembarkation
(for since the parts of Pylos itself outside the entrance on the side
would not have
of the open ocean had no harbor, [the Athenians]
own men),
a
out
from
whence
starting
they might help their
place
and they themselves
either a sea battle or
[the Spartans], without
danger would in all likelihood take the place [Pylos] by siege, there
no
being
grain there and the place having been occupied with
meager preparations for war. (9) This being determined
they carried
over to the island the
hoplites, chosen by lot from all the companies.
and
sources
thucydides'
the
spartan
plan
529
Some others had crossed over before
in successive parties, but these
ones
were
cut
in
the
420
number
and their helot attendants.
off,
last,
son
of
the
Molobros
commanded
them.10
Epitadas
informs us that the Spartans, taking stock of the situation
Thucydides
had occupied the promontory
after the Athenians
of Pylos, intended to
take the hastily built and weakly garrisoned fortifications by storm. Failing
fleet bringing aid to arrive shortly,
this, since they expected an Athenian
the Spartans planned to block up both entrances to the harbor in order
from coming to anchor in it.11There follows a
of Sphakteria and the two supposedly narrow entrances to
description
the (northern) entrance, near the site of Pylos, was large
the bay within:
two ships sailing in together, the (southern) passage, eight
to
admit
enough
to prevent
the Athenians
or nine
to block these entrances with ships
(8.6). The Spartans wished
placed side by side and tightly packed.12 But fearing that the Athenians
troops
might "make war" from Sphakteria against them, they disembarked
on the island, so that both the mainland
and the island would be "hostile
to the Athenians.
territory"
is self-explanatory
The Spartan strategy as presented by Thucydides
and practicable given the small size of the entrances to the bay as recorded
in the text. Yet the account contains several major (and minor) topographi
cal anomalies. The first major anomaly, as we have seen, is the historian's
to mention
failure
needed
the small bay of Vbidokoilia?located
to be blocked off if the Athenians were
just north of
to be isolated.
Pylos?which
A second anomaly relates toThucydides'
conception of the tactical impor
tance of the island of Sphakteria (see below). Finally, amajor error appears in
his description of the southern entrance to the harbor: the distance between
so far from
end of Sphakteria and the mainland,13
admitting
ca. 1,200 m and "could not
entrance for only eight or nine
is
actually
ships,
have been blocked even by the whole Peloponnesian
fleet."14
the southern
4.8.3-9
lO.Thuc.
lation
based
on
rev. T. E. Wick,
11. Here
that
I follow
the
to which
the limen
trans
(OCT);
that of R. Crawley,
New York 1982.
account
never
ditional
"inner"
Strassler
standard
view
explain
indicates
any kind
harbor. As noted
and others
what
might
have
though Strassler (1988) has argued that
the term
should
write
to a kind
of small
Thucydides
is in fact Navarino
Bay
southeast
the usage of limen here,
Pylos. On
the likelihood
that this "cove" was
smaller
in antiquity,
see Pritchett
pp. 149-151,153-154,158.1
and
the report we
and oversights
stands suggest
that
even
visit
to refer
be understood
"cove"
al
itself,
of
1994,
would
that Thucydides'
report that
emphasize
to
the Spartans
intended
ultimately
a
area.
"in the limen1 suggests
large
fight
to me
Strassler
has suggested
(pers.
that the term limen might
be
comm.)
used
to refer
(alternately)
cove
to the
bay and the
in the account, which
is strictly possible; but Thucydides'
takes
attempted
above,
to
have
the topography
given
I am attempting
versely,
how Thucydides
could
refers
of ad
of the channel
happened
of the area. Con
come
did not
some confusion
site himself,
results when we compare
the actual
meaning
who
that
placed
"prow
to
prow"
(avxircptp
clearly
demonstrates
that
the word
supports
14. Gomme's
the entrance
1979, pp. 73-75,
poi?). Pritchett (1994, pp. 147-149)
p. 2, n. 4,
and notes
the
view
lower figure.
(1956,
p. 443;
1896, p. 74), quoted
here, rested in part on his mistaken
belief
that the Peloponnesians
intended
to sink their vessels
in order to block
opinion
counters Gomme's
view
effectively
to be sunk after
the ships were
being
ca.
see also Burrows
with Thucydides'
report.
over the
the controversy
of ?uCrrv, see Gomme
1956,
p. 444, andWilson
from
that the official 1:100,000 map of
Greece
the
topography
12. For
ranged
1979,
p. 22, and Bauslaugh
who
collects
the scholarship
to
Since mis
possess.
in the text as it
the historian
have
1,200 to 1,300 m: see Pritchett 1965,
to ascertain
have
refers to ships "closely packed," with
toward the enemy.
prows facing outward,
13. Scholars'
estimates
of the width
'
(see n. 12, above).
regarding
But
the Peloponnesian
fleet's inability to block the channel
will stand despite his error on this
or
on either the
point and
longer
shorter estimates
of the southern
entrance's
width
(see n. 45, below).
his
LOREN
53o
J.
II
SAMONS
an attractive emendation of this pas
Bauslaugh has proposed
the
historian
from
this
sage, rescuing
major topographical error by suggest
an
or nine stades" rather than one
to
entrance
of
that
he
refers
ing
"eight
Robert
or nine
ships."15 Catherine Rubincam, however, has
enough for "eight
shown that this emendation results in a text that "violates Thucydides'
idiom
wide
of distance."16 Moreover,
and practice in giving measurements
this emenda
tion does not solve the problem of the alleged Spartan strategy reported by
the historian. (Nor does it account for the historian's mistaken description
is also significantly wider than he allows,
entrance, which
is about
the
itself, which
length of Sphakteria
regarding
24 stades in length rather than "about 15.")17The southern entrance is still
far too wide for the Spartans to have closed it up and thus taken Pylos
of the northern
or his mistake
a sea battle."18
"without
the historian's text to reconcile it with
the actual
emending
is not licensed in this case, first, because it results in a text
topography
that is inconsistent with
standard Thucydidean
practice and, second,
Thus,
in his
and anomalies
errors, omissions,
topographical
were
site
that
his
the
inaccurate
about
(and thus,
suggest
reports
as Gomme
noted, we should not arbitrarily "correct" one mistake).19
Finally, and most important, emendation of this passage ismethodologically
because
the other
account
it is only Thucydides' mistaken belief that the southern
narrow and thus could be blocked that supports the
relatively
that corrects
strategy that the historian reports. Any emendation
unsound
because
entrance was
Spartan
Thucydides' mistake about the size of the southern entrance to the harbor
results in a text presenting a patently absurd plan to block a relatively wide
entrance with an insufficient number of triremes. To put it differently, the
describes depended completely on the
Spartan strategy that Thucydides
existence of narrow entrances to the bay.20The reported plan thus confirms
that the text originally stated that the southern entrance was narrow enough
this plan understandable, while emending the text makes nonsense
of the rest of the historian's account of the strategy. Therefore,
since we are
not licensed to emend the text and since the reported Spartan plan was
in fact impossible given the actual topography, we must conclude that the
tomake
the
an accurate account
did not possess
historian
of the Spartan
strategy for
campaign.21
15. Bauslaugh
Pritchett
1979;
1994,
Hornblower
pp.
1996,
16. Rubincam
17.Width
by
accepted
and
167-175,
pp.
Athenian
159-160.
p. 79.
of the northern
2001,
entrance:
Wilson, p. 75; length of the island:
Gomme 1956, p. 443, with Pritchett
1965,
topographical
accept...
that
"most
that
impediment
scholars
there
to
is no
accepting
[Thucydides'] description of the
of the two sides in
respective
strategies
in
the campaign:
the Peloponnesians
to station
in each channel
tended
ships
fleet
nian
fleet,
but
of avoiding
rather
battle
altogether
19. Gomme
pp. 21-22.
notes
towards
text does not
In fact,
Thucydides'
speak
of the Spartans
the Athe
"contesting"
a sea
(see below).
p. 443.
1956,
20. See also Schwartz [1929] 1960,
18. Contrast Rubincam (2001,
p. 78), who
now
would
the open
sea,
any attempt
by the
to sail into the
bay."
facing outwards
so as to contest
p. 292,
Though
laugh's
p. 22)
nected
and Burrows
he
pp. 74-75.
to accept Baus
Pritchett
(1965,
1896,
later came
emendation,
con
that Thucydides
recognized
the "narrow entrances"
(4.8.6)
with the plan to block them (8.7), and
that
this problem
"cannot
be explained
as a matter
merely
in
of the numbers
Thucydides." Rubincam (2001, p. 79)
not
emendation
rejects Bauslaugh's
only
on the
it "violates Thucy
that
grounds
dides'
idiom and practice"
but also be
cause
sions
expres
Thucydides'
qualifying
in the passage
demonstrate
his
own
reservations
the
figures
of her view that
about
and because
given,
"there
is no valid
reason
for assuming
thatThucydides' topographic descrip
tion
rests on autopsy
of the area."
21.Wilson (1979, pp. 73-84) main
tained thatThucydides (or his source)
confused
Navarino
the southern
Bay with
entrance
the entrance
to
to the
and
sources
thucydides'
the
spartan
plan
531
or so
Bauslaugh has argued that 55
ships arrayed in
Peloponnesian
the southern entrance "would leave hardly enough room for even a single
trireme to pass without
touching the oars of the flanking ships."22 But 55
not
block
this passage, and the scenario that Bauslaugh
could
actually
ships
room for Athenian
would
allow
sufficient
the
envisions
tactics.23 Thus
a blockade remains an
Spartan plan for
anomaly given the real
most have agreed that
and
this
is
since
particularly troubling
topography,
a
at
not
if
received
present
Thucydides,
Pylos himself,
good deal of his
information about the campaign from those who were present, including
alleged
must
As the commanding officer on the spot, Demosthenes
have had some idea of what the Spartans had intended, and certainly after
the Spartan prisoners were taken alive he could have learned something
Demosthenes.24
about the Peloponnesian
himself also spent time among
plan. Thucydides
after his exile in 424/3 (5.26.5), and so one must as
the Peloponnesians
sume that the historian
the Spartans about their intentions
questioned
was so great
Pylos.25 Yet the disaster of the Pylos campaign for Sparta
to exculpate
that it would not be surprising if some Spartans attempted
themselves by coloring the facts, perhaps presenting a story that in some
way made their defeat more explicable.26
Before exploring this possibility, let us state some general assumptions.
First, the Spartans would never have occupied the island of Sphakteria if
lose control of the surrounding waters, for this
they thought they would
would mean the isolation of their men on the island (the very thing that
after the Athenians
defeated them in the naval battle in the
happened
at
Second, the Spartans can never have intended to "block up"
(euxpap^ai: 4.8.5) or "close" (kat|G?iv: 4.8.7) the southern entrance to the
an
bay,
impossible operation. Third, the Spartans cannot, therefore, have
bay: 4.13-14).
formed any plan that required closing the harbor to the Athenians.
Fourth,
since they cannot have blocked the harbor's southern entrance, they cannot
have expected to take the place "without a sea battle or danger" (4.8.8); at
most they may have planned to meet the Athenian
fleet in the relatively
more constricted waters27 between the southern end of the island and the
smallVoidokoilia Bay, just north of
(see n. 6, above; see also Wilson
Pylos
and Beardsworth
1970, and cf. Grundy
en
Voidokoilia's
1896, pp. 21-22).
trance, however,
or nine triremes
writes
who
abreast
see Pritchett
waters:
not
would
allow
to enter
1994,
pp.
eight
its
160-161,
not
however, would
difficulty,
or
assistance
prevented
resupply
at
of the men
(even if inconvenient)
Such
have
unless
Pylos via Voidokoilia
tans blocked
the landings.
22. Bauslaugh
23. Strassler
tactics
necessary
below.
p. 213;
and
to block
1979,
1988,
the Spar
an area,
of ships
see n. 45,
e.g.,
Schwartz
and Pritchett
Thucydides'
Athenian
25. That
tioned
1994,
pp.
was
174
to
restricted
sources.
he would
ques
a lack of
require
(1.1.1) in the first place. Gomme
125-131)
a similar con
reached
pp. 292-294)
cf. Burrows
clusion;
(1896, pp. 74-75;
that the
1897, p. 9), who believed
in
themselves
captured Spartans
vented
this "excuse" for their dilemma.
seems to me
scenario
extremely
the Spartans who
returned
unlikely:
a
to
Sparta needed
plausible
explana
tion for the failed plan, while
those
This
not have
inconsistent
curiosity
psychologically
to "write the war"
with
the decision
pp.
26. Schwartz ([1929] 1960,
1960,
[1929]
(1921) argued that
account
them would
(1937,
the neces
demonstrated
sity of Spartan (aswell asAthenian)
informants
p. 4.
p. 202. For Athe
the number
See,
176.Wilamowitz
that
"passage may have been
into this
due to a lower
difficult"
bay
water
level in 425 and protruding
rocks.
nian
24.
pp. 293-294; Gomme 1956, pp. 485
486; Silhanek 1970;Westlake 1974,
for the campaign.
captured and held inAthens wanted
an excuse
for their
the tactic
of
27. Cf. Hdt.
Aesch.
to the
free ascription
of motive
Spar
tans" in this account
and to the possi
stem from
bility that this may
"conjec
was
part
(p. 167).
not
surrender,
them
on
for
the
island.
Horn
blower (1996, p. 160) refers to "much
ture" on Thucydides'
placing
Pers.
8.60, Thuc.
1.74.1,
on this tactic
412-414
and
at
Salamis. This aspect of the battle in 480
1994,
obviously
p. 64.
well
known:
see
Kennelly
LOREN
532
J.
SAMONS
II
and try to prevent any attempted entrance by battle. Fifth, we
should presume that the Spartans knew an Athenian
fleet would eventu
men at
us that
were
to
arrive
relieve
the
tells
ally
Pylos; Thucydides
they
even
not
if
and
did
the
the
fleet
expect
expected (4.8.5),
Peloponnesians
to return as swiftly
and Sophokles
from Zakynthos
with Eurymedon
mainland
as it did,
they surely knew
that Athenian
ships would
arrive from
some
quarter.
Thucydides
implies that the Spartans believed they might capture the
arrived to help them, and
enemy garrison at Pylos before any Athenians
it does seem that the fleet with Eurymedon
returned much sooner than
the Spartans had anticipated. Thucydides
reports that the Spartans had
as the
sent ships to fairly distant Asine for wood (for siege machines)
just
fleet arrived (?v xo?xcoi: 4.13.1-2).28 The quest for wood implies
Athenian
that the Spartans thought that they had time to construct and employ
such equipment, while the dispatch of their ships indicates that they did
not expect an Athenian
fleet to arrive quickly. Perhaps they did not know
to send two ships out with messages
that Demosthenes
had managed
just
before Pylos was cut off, or they did not know the precise location of the
Athenian fleet, expecting that it had continued northward from Zakynthos
(4.8.3). But if the Spartans believed that they had enough time to build
and employ siege equipment, why did they station forces on Sphakteria?
After all, what possible advantage could accrue to the Spartans from plac
men
ing these
on the island?
THE TACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF SPHAKTERIA
on
was ill conceived has been main
stationing Spartans
Sphakteria
tained by Schwartz, Kagan, and Gomme. Gomme,
however, later came to
believe that the plan to occupy the island was not "sowrongly
conceived,
That
move could be
though it turned out badly," arguing that the
justified because
of the necessity to provide safe landing places for the triremes (i.e., not
a
troops, but a place where the boats might
simply
place for disembarking
be beached and dried).29 There were, however, almost none of these landing
on
one on the landward side of the island, which
Sphakteria?only
places
no
ships?and
certainly
explains why the Spartans stationed there had
or the
not enough to provide either the Athenians
Spartans with "a base"
where they might drag ashore numerous triremes.30 Since the Athenians
could not launch triremes from Sphakteria,
island harm the Spartans? Even Athenians
on
how could their control of the
armed with missile
more than harass any
Spartans
Sphakteria could do little
to
close
the
island to offer them targets.
anchoring
enough
sailing
or
an Athenian
could neither aid
force occupying
Sphakteria
nor attack the
at
its compatriots
Spartans, despite Thucydides'
Pylos
Indeed, these "fears" may
report of Spartan fears about this contingency.
men were stranded on
to
well have been invented
help explain how the
Thus,
of Thucydides'
(see below). The vagueness
language (4.8.7,
cf. 8.4) about Spartan fears that the Athenians might (literally) "make war
an otherwise very detailed account, suggests
on them" from
Sphakteria, in
the island
the western
Gulf:
shore
see Gomme
1996,
p. 450, and Hornblower
167.
evidence
and the mod
p.
Literary
ern sea trials of the reconstructed
1956,
trireme
that ancient
suggest
Olympias
at least
could sustain
speeds of
a 105-km
in
knots. Thus,
journey
triremes
5-7
one daywould have been (strictly)
see Morrison,
possible:
weapons
lies on
28. Asine
of the Messenian
Coates,
and
Rankov 2000, pp. 102-106,259-267.
See
also
and
travel
Strassler
times
29. Gomme
esp. p. 130, with
1990
for this
for distances
campaign.
1937, pp. 125-131,
n. 1 (for the
quota
tion), and pp. 200-201; Schwartz
[1929] 1960, pp. 290-293; Kagan
1974,
pp. 230-231.
30. See Strassler 1988, p. 201;
cf.Wilson 1979, pp. 106-109, and
Pritchett 1965, p. 27.
and
sources
thucydides'
the
plan
spartan
533
himself had no clear idea precisely how an Athenian
that Thucydides
of
the
island would threaten the Peloponnesians.31
occupation
that "the strategic importance of Sphakteria is
Pritchett has written
often overlooked," citing examples from the Greek War of Independence.32
on mod
But I do not think that this 19th-century
campaign (predicated
ern long-range missile
to
in
is
situation
the
entirely analogous
weapons)
no
on
Sphakteria could
or attack the mainland
than
Bay
a
at
is
A
could
the
attack
Athenians
moreover,
trireme,
only
Pylos.
they
in
from
when
afloat
and
and
the
could
sail
Athenians
motion,
weapon
to
to launch an attack with
Prote, the small island to the northwest,
Pylos
antiquity. Hoplites,
peltasts,
more command the entrance
or archers stationed
to Navarino
a small loss of time. In any event, the manning
and launching of any
only
triremes on Sphakteria (had this even been possible) would have
Athenian
been observed from the mainland. The tactical and strategic situations in
425 b.c. seem significantly different from those in a.d. 1827.
It is of course possible that a Spartan force initially occupied Sphakteria
in order to gather wood, water, or other materials, and that some hoplites
oversee the work of the helots.33 However
were present
this may
simply to
some
to
at
small
station
least
be, it is certain that the Spartans needed
forces on Sphakteria to act as lookouts against enemy vessels approaching
the area and to provide information about the Athenians
the
occupying
of
of
The
northern
high ground
Pylos itself.34
Sphakteria provide
heights
and thus
point for both types of information-gathering,
a few men) was necessary if the
commander
(by
Spartan
to have this kind of intelligence.
wished
use of
Nonetheless,
supposed Spartan fears about the Athenian
Sphak
inThucydides'
teria "to make war on them" clearly present a conundrum
the best vantage
their occupation
account. Like the mistake
about the southern entrance to the harbor and the
Bay to the north, this issue is tied to the historian's
to the Spartan strategy. But
conception of the topography and its relation
from
since Spartans on Sphakteria could neither prevent the Athenians
omission
of Vbidokoilia
nor attack the men at
entering the harbor
Pylos, and since any Athenian
of the
force there would have faced the same limitations,
occupation
on
some
or
tactical consideration
island must have rested
other strategic
by Thucydides.
we must ask ourselves what
on
Again,
advantage the Spartans
Sphak
on
were
cut
teria provided. Without
the
the
island
off from
ships,
Spartans
the other Peloponnesian
forces, and thus could offer no naval assistance.
on
To the argument that they were there to prevent an Athenian
landing
unreported
31. Unless
tence
of the sen
the placement
a fear that the Athenians
implies
on the island
might
vessels:
blockading
p. 201, who believes
assail
the putative
cf. Strassler
such
gather
a
called
helots
"wooded
and
track
less," so the idea that some Spartan
as to Asine)
forces went
there (as well
For
noted,
however,
the
large
size and special nature (chosen by lot)
on
island
unreasonable.
in the
since
changes
foliage
antiquity,
see Pritchett
1965, p. 27. As a referee
real possibility.
32. Pritchett 1965, p. 23.
33. Thucydides (4.8.6 and 29.3)
the
is not
wood
for this paper
1988,
a blockade
to
of the Spartan
force ultimately
stranded
that this force was
the island suggest
there for reasons other than overseeing
(see n. 50, below).
34.1 owe this observation
wife,
Jamie, who
during
the
to my
to
of posting
the necessity
at the
the high
ground
I cannot
end of Sphakteria.
on
northern
accept,
as do
some
(e.g., Lazenby
1985,
p. 118), that the Spartans "failed to post
watchers
along
the coast
to warn
of the
approach of theAthenian fleet" and
thus were
The
our visit
site noted
a lookout
have
surprised
by the Athenians.
on
would
Spartans
Sphakteria
view of almost
had an excellent
the entire
theater
of
operations.
534
LOREN
II
SAMONS
J.
the island, one may raise two objections:
(1) such a landing, as we have
no material
seen, would have offered the Athenians
advantage (in terms
of relieving their comrades at Pylos), so it is unclear why they would have
a
or the
to the trouble of
landing
Spartans put themselves
not
in
and
the
did
fact
it;
(2)
attempt to prevent the
opposing
Spartans
Athenians
from landing or even post guards at any potential landing sites
on the island.35 Thus, the Athenians
landed in secret and with apparent
attempted
the final battle on Sphakteria (4.31.1).
had already been taking their lunches
ease before
The Athenians
before
on the island
for that is how
this point
the fire that eventually burned
(4.30.2),
seems
difficult to imagine that a force of only
Sphakteria began.36 Indeed, it
420 hoplites (4.8.9,38.5)
and their helot attendants could have prevented
a
in force on an island as large as Sphakteria.37 Of
landing of Athenians
not at first know how many Spartans occupied
Demosthenes
did
course,
reports that Demosthenes
initially thought
Sphakteria. While Thucydides
that the number of enemy troops was smaller than it eventually proved
to be (4.30.3), he nonetheless
describes the Athenians'
original view of
as
"full
the mainland
and the island
of hoplites" (4.13.3). Demosthenes,
therefore, may have believed that a very large force occupied the island,
and thus did not attempt a landing (where Spartan hoplites would have the
sea battle in the harbor.38
over the Athenians)
during the
advantage
In short, the Spartan force stationed on Sphakteria could not prevent
on the island (as
an Athenian
was meant
Thucydides
implies it
landing
to do) nor could it assist in the alleged Spartan blockade plan, which was
a
significant force of
impossible. I conclude that the Spartans stationed
on
some
reason.
other
hoplites
Sphakteria for
THE SPARTAN PLAN
above discussion suggests that the Spartan forces on Sphakteria formed
a
of
part
Spartan plan (other than blocking the bay's entrances) about which
us return to
was misinformed.
Recalling Gommes
principle, let
Thucydides
events
themselves. After receiving a request
description of the
Thucydides'
for aid from Demosthenes,
the main Athenian
force, having arrived at Pylos
The
and finding
from Zakynthos
35. Of
course,
as one
the
situation
paper noted,
the Spartans
harbor
the
and
their men
were
the men
ceive
no
fleet. We
assistance
can
only
cut off on
was
not been
on
changed
in the
battle
an Athenian
Preventing
at that
point
landing
it had
where
of this
after
lost the naval
island.
now
referee
the
re
the Spartan
from
assume,
therefore,
that
the Spartans
had concluded
on the island was
the force stationed
that
insufficient
landing.
36.
to prevent
Thucydides
an Athenian
(4.30.2)
the
fire as unintentional
1956,
37. Cf.Wilson
difficulties.
there
A
could
(ockovto?);
character
(4.30.3).
landing
would
Demos
not want
pp. 472,488-489.
1979, p. 107, on the
to imply that he launched his attack
only after the fire had allayed his fears
few men
not
that Demosthenes'
way
the assault on Pylos
stationed
a
prevent
here
landing
men
itself
held
(Thuc.
off
4.9
perhaps
ate the effects of the
that
understandably
to
wishing
palli
fire on his decision
to land Athenian
forces, Demosthenes
may have said that only after he saw
even more nu
that the Spartans were
merous than he had thought did he decide
force might
the Spartan
be rela
tively large. (On the fire and its possible
effects
on Demosthenes'
Roisman
1993,
Demosthenes
12).
38. Later,
a
to make
thenes
on the long island of Sphakteria in the
before?because
could
izes
see Gomme
and
crucial?
island
and the island full of hoplites,
"the mainland
fore
attempting
forces
Spartan
their number)
at
Athenians
attacked
strategic,
see
plans,
In any case,
pp. 37-39.)
could take his time be
a
on
landing,
since
the
(whatever
Sphakteria
no threat to the
posed
and in the end were
Pylos,
and
for political
and captured
reasons.
not tactical,
sources
thucydides'
and
the
spartan
plan
535
ships in the harbor and not sailing out, at a loss as to
come to anchor," spent the
on the desert island
they might
night
on
of Prote, "not far off" (Thuc. 4.13.3).39 Although
Spartans stationed
and the [Spartan]
where
could have seen the Athenian
fleet approaching
Sphakteria undoubtedly
for
kilometers
several
before
its
the
made
arrival,
Pylos
Peloponnesians
no effort to effect their supposed blockade
on this day. Indeed, as
plan
at
the Lakedaimonians
reports, even on the next morning
to
nor
to
out
meet
entrances
the
neither
block
of
the
sail
and
tempted
bay
the Athenian
forces on the open sea, but rather, "having neglected to close
their ships and prepared "if anyone sailed in, to
up the harbor," manned
Thucydides
in the harbor' (4.13.4;
emphasis added).
a
or
imagine
Spartan force of extreme laziness
inepti
area on
tude ifwe believe that even after the Athenian
reached
the
ships
the previous day they took no trouble to effect their putative plan "to
block" the bay.40 By not sailing out of the harbor to meet the Athenians,
on
the Spartans risked the possibility of an Athenian
landing
Sphakteria
on
the
Athenians
did
the
seaward side of the island:
(and
eventually land
fight
Now we must
4.31).41 As the Spartans did not take the time to convey their troops back
to the mainland
spent on Prote, we
during the night that the Athenians
can only conclude that they did not feel that the Athenian
fleet's presence
an
men on
we have
to
threat
the
As
posed
unacceptable
Sphakteria.
already
men
on
not
would
have
left
those
the
island
unless
concluded,
they
they
that the bay would remain safe territory for Peloponnesian
ships
therefore reach their troops on the island) and the only way
could
(which
to ensure
was
Spartan control of the bay
by naval battle.
believed
decision to leave the Spartan force on Sphakteria, therefore, sug
that
the Spartans intended to do precisely what everyone knew they
gests
had done?engage
the Athenian
fleet in a naval battle within the bay. Per
The
in the relatively constricted
haps they planned to close with the Athenians
area between the southern end of
and
the mainland,
and thus
Sphakteria
take advantage of a situation that would render somewhat more difficult the
naval tactics of outflanking
(the periplous) or breaking
the line (the diekplous) and ramming amidships.42 The Athenians'
actions
atNaupaktos
and Phormion's speech (Thuc. 2.86-92,
especially 89.8) show
that even a fairly broad area such as the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth
standard Athenian
(more than a kilometer
enough to disadvantage
39. Prote (ca. 11 km from Pylos)
be
seen
from
the Pylos promon
may
Pritchett
1994,
tory and Sphakteria:
p. 160, n. 27.
40. One
the Athenians
morning
off guard.
that
might
hypothesize
so
in the
attacked
early
the Spartans were
caught
occu
the Spartans'
However,
that
of Sphakteria
and their excellent
pation
view of the area (n. 34, above) make
this extremely
unlikely.
does not
Moreover,
say that
actually
1974,
surprised. Cf. Westlake
sees the
who
but
pp. 212,216,
problem,
Thucydides
were
they
and a half wide) could be considered
Athenian
forces.43
concludes
that Thucydides
that
implies
were
surprised
Spartans
(although
he admits
that they would
have had
the
of the Athenian
ample warning
and attack). Roisman
approach
that the
p. 36) also concludes
were
surprised.
41. This was
a
fleet's
(1993,
Spartans
factor,
negligible
since there would
have been
however,
to
little reason for the Athenians
give
to risk
their
aboard
up
superiority
ship
a land battle with
on
the Spartans
in the event of a successful
Sphakteria:
naval
engagement,
they would
cut off
the Spartan
in the event
forces would
forces
on
of a defeat,
be
constricted
and
Sphakteria,
their own
trapped
on a hostile
island.
42. Cf. Pritchett 1994, pp. 172-173,
and Morrison,
43. Phormion's
there
made
and Rankov
Coates,
2000, pp. 67-68.
n. 45, below.
For
the tactics,
tremendous
(in disadvantageous
most Lakedaimonian
see
victory
waters)
surely
command
ers
sea battles with
the Athe
leery of
see Strassler
nians:
115.
1990, pp. Ill,
LOREN
536
II
SAMONS
J.
was small
Spartans may have concluded that the bay itself
enough
in any case, it is smaller than the open ocean and
the Athenians;
had the added advantage of the surrounding shores, against which Athe
The
to hinder
nian ships and troops might be driven. Given the Spartan occupation of
Sphakteria, all of this shoreline (with the exception of the southern bit of
was now "hostile territory to the Athenians"
(4.8.8 and above). That
Pylos)
this apparent advantage proved illusory can tell us nothing, for we must
that the Spartans overestimated
their ability to
confront the possibility
defeat
the Athenians
in a sea battle by making
gave them.
use of the minor
advantage
that their position
In short, a naval battle must have been part of the Spartan plan, Thucy
He relates an impossible
dides' assertion to the contrary notwithstanding.
to
the
harbor
and
from anchoring
close
Athenians
up
prevent
Spartan plan
there, informing us
would take the place
8? aveu xe vauua%ia?
4.8.S).44 As we have
that the Spartans thought that "in all likelihood they
a sea battle or
[Pylos] by siege without
danger" (cyeiq
Kai kiv8?vou eKrcotaopicr|aevv x? %cop?ovKax? x? c?k?c,
noted, even if the Spartans had arrayed 58 of their 60
vessels abreast in the southern channel, there would have been enough room
for the Athenian fleet to engage them and to effect the diekplous, though the
more difficult than in open waters.45 A battle
operation would have been
of some type?it
not be avoided by this
must be emphasized again?could
some scholars have
recognized that the
putative Spartan strategy. Indeed,
must have planned to fight to prevent easy access to the bay for
Spartans
a
the Athenians,
description of plan explicitly designed
despite Thucydides'
to avoid such combat.46
em
(1979, pp. 81-82),
to eiico?
the
Kax?
phrase
phasizing
to the whole
clause,
suggests
applies
means
that Thucydides
only that the
44. Wilson
that
Spartans
"hoped"
or
they
"thought
would probably" avoid a battle. The
phrase
degree
ity and
a
is stronger
than that, implying
of confidence
based on probabil
"in all likeli
be rendered
should
hood"
also maintains
away
sailed
squadron
first day, the (now
(velsim.). Wilson
that after the Athenian
on
to Prote
the
very sanguine)
Spartans
apparently
that they "had gone
have believed
may
for
writes
that this
good"
(p. 82). Wilson
was not so unreasonable
since the
Athenians
one
"would
entrance
only,
to enter
have
if the
(by
had
Spartans
blocked the Sikia [northern] channel)
a A,iur|v the
from
shores
the small
were
of which
area at
Pylos)
(apart
manned
by Spartan hoplites, in face of a fleet
half
would
as
large again
not be clear
as their
own
[sic]. It
to the Athenians
to
have anywhere
they would
their ships, or what
would
anchor
they
the A,iur|v" (p. 81). In
gain by entering
that
fails to allow forAthe
all thisWilson
nian
in their
confidence
naval
ity (60 Peloponnesian vessels hardly
an
to
obstacle
forming
50 Athenian
insuperable
see Thuc.
2.86-92
ships:
over fleets of
victories
for Phormion's
47 and 77 shipswith a force of only
20
and
triremes)
Athenian
to
position:
the Athenians
on
Pylos
their way
into
appreciate
to rescue
the bay
had
the
(4.8.7). On
K?.fjoew
in which
ships attempted
plous,
their opponents'
line
through
to turn on
their flanks,
and Rankov
Coates,
hardly
the diek
to sail
in order
cf.Morrison,
2000,
pp. 43,53
cf.Whitehead
the periplous,
1987,
I cannot
accept his conclusion
although
the tactic em
that the periplous was
the
that
Athenian
vessel
ployed
by
For
to force
the
Peloponnesian fleet (Wesdake 1974,
p. 216, n. 4). Since
have realized
this,
as
qualify
54; Lazenby 1987; andHolladay 1988.
the men
and defeat
the action would
and
loosely,
superior
turned
man
the Spartans must
cannot have
they
a
stationary merchant
to ram a trireme
in pur
around
in order
suit
InWhitehead's
2.91).
or other obstacle
(Thuc.
believed that theAthenian fleet had
no
or that in all likelihood
"gone for good"
there would
be no naumachia.
to effect the maneuver.
necessary
the merchantman
the contrary,
45. For
the number
of vessels
neces
Wilson
and Beardsworth 1970; and
Wilson
1979,
15 m
per
Allowing
oarsweep
including
for error, it would
margin
ca. 1,200 m wide.
Even
to fill a channel
in this case
the pursuing
Athenian
ca.
trireme,
and a healthy
take about 80 triremes
vented
trireme
view,
was
On
pre
from
maintaining its speed andmaking for
the (now exposed) side of the turning
an area, see Morrison,
sary to block
and
Rankov
2000, pp. 58-59;
Coates,
pp. 73-76.
third vessel
the
channel could only be said to be "blocked"
lose forward
would
necessarily
ship, which
momentum
in the act of
about.
coming
46. E.g., Pritchett
n. 42: "If we are to
to Lakedaimonian
purpose
was
to
keep
1994,
p. 173,
any credibility
their
generalship,
the Athenians
give
sources
thucydides'
and
the
spartan
plan
537
If the Spartans planned to fight in the bay, we can finally understand
the reason for the contingent
left on Sphakteria. During
the sea battle in
the bay, itwould be their duty to present a shore at once friendly to their
own forces and hostile
to the Athenians
(4.8.8). In this way they resembled
force on the island of Psyttaleia at the battle of Salamis (Hdt.
the Persian
or
8.76,95).47 Athenian
ships
stragglers swimming from wrecks would thus
have no safe place to retreat to during the battle, while the Peloponnesians
to the nearest
might make their way
possible shore. Thus, the plan of the
two elements with the battle of Salamis: control
Spartans may have shared
in a relatively constricted area.48
of a nearby island and naval engagement
text
Such a plan may also help explain the anomaly in Thucydides'
over closing the entrances of the
a
to
bay, for
Spartan plan
fight in the
harbor, especially in the southern passage, would benefit from blocking
ves
entrance. This action would prevent Athenian
sels from outflanking the Spartan fleet arrayed in the southern entrance. It
seems
see this necessity or to
unlikely, however, that the Spartans failed to
effect this part of their plan, and that therefore the Athenians
"proceeded
the smaller northern
an immediate
against them by each inlet" (4.14.1, emphasis added), gaining
tactical advantage that helped decide the issue in their favor. Indeed, the
failure of the Spartans to block the northern entrance, despite the obvious
so to force an engagement
in the southern passage,
importance of doing
to
the
the
that
intended
battle
within
the harbor
suggests
fight
Spartans
itself rather than within the southern entrance.49
to risk
It was a piece of bravado on both sides: the Spartans willing
their hoplites on the island as part of a plan to seek a naval victory against
a
the Athenian
fleet, and the Athenians
sailing into bay with shores almost
entirely controlled by the enemy, where the wreck of any ship would mean
almost certain disaster for all the men aboard. The Spartan plan proved
the weaker, perhaps because the Spartans were not as quick as they might
their vessels and meeting
in the more
have been inmanning
the Athenians
constricted waters
plan),
or more
(if this was their
Sphakteria and the mainland
because
the
itself
which
(in
probably,
bay
they intended to
room
to
the Athenians
their
enough
employ
superior naval
between
fight) offered
skills. The upshot of the Spartan defeat was the isolation of the homoioi
on
an event that must have been all the more execrable to the
Sphakteria,
from
entering
the bay." He
also writes
... with
(p. 173):
"Fifty eight ships
... would
prows facing the enemy
a formidable
have presented
array.
was better
At the least, the position
than fighting in the open sea off
Sphakteria or in the bay itself, the
only
alternatives."
47. On
the possible
disinformation
the Athenian
action on
surrounding
see Fornara
1966. Land
Psyttaleia,
were not
used to
troops
infrequently
2.90.3
support naval forces: e.g., Thuc.
6, 7.70.1;
see Morrison,
Coates,
Rankov 2000, pp. 60, 75-76.
and
course
48. Of
differences
great
the two battles.
on
with
Sphakteria
the
at
Persians
the
(4.36.3:
Thermopylai
in 425 are
compared
explicitly
Spartans
with Leonidas's
cf. 7.71.7
for a
forces);
comparison
cuse with
49.
of the Athenians
the Spartans
It is also possible
at
at
Syra
Pylos.
that the Spar
tanswished to fight theAthenians
the northwest
corner
of Navarino
resemble
con
Strassler's
ception [1988] of a plan to protect the
implicitly compares the
Thucydides
Athenians
some ways
there were
between
in
Bay,
in front of their position
just
assailing
corner of
the southeast
(A
Pylos.
in
here would
engagement
planned
so-called
cove
harbor
southeast
see n. 11, above,
Pylos;
and Beardsworth
1970
significance
of
and cf.Wilson
for the tactical
of this area.) A
successful
here, after all,
landing by the Athenians
would
have allowed
the rescue of Dem
osthenes'
constricted
southern
forces,
than
entrance.
and
the area was
the bay
more
itself or the
how
Thucydides,
report such a plan, and
its estimated
usefulness
(based on the
cannot
actual topography)
the
explain
account.
in
problems
Thucydides'
ever, does
not
LOREN
538
J.
II
SAMONS
because it could have been prevented by removing the
Peloponnesians
men on the
remove these men can
previous night. The decision not to
a
a sea battle with the Athenians
only be explained by Spartan plan to risk
in the bay.50
it remains only to explain Thucydides'
If one accepts this conclusion,
view of the Spartan plan, for we must face squarely the inadequacy either
of his own
of the account the historian received or of the presentation
research. Thucydides
himself can have had little reason to mischaracterize
the Spartan plan, especially as the reaction to the Pylos campaign (in the
so
form of Athenian
refusals of Spartan peace offers) demonstrates
perfectly
a portentous
the
theme
of
Athens'
account.51
That his
"over-reaching,"
slanted his report is suggested above, but
likely informant Demosthenes
it is hard to see why he would have invented a false Spartan strategy that
or their commander.
added little to the glory of the Athenians
us, therefore, return to the Spartans themselves,
upon whom
a
for
of
have
relied
deal
his
information
about the
may
Thucydides
good
Let
an Athenian
battle. As
exile Thucydides
would have had difficulty visit
as long as the site was held
the
ing Pylos
topography
by the
not
it
who
until
did
409.52
Athenians,
sojourn in
relinquish
Thucydides'
and his expressed modus operandi (1.22, 5.26), however,
the P?loponn?se
assure us that he
the account he received from Demosthenes
supplemented
to examine
with data from Peloponnesian
informants, who, in
to
motive
him about their
had
both
the
and
the
mislead
turn,
opportunity
intentions at Pylos.53 (All the more was this true in the period before the
on
were returned as a consequence
of the
Spartiates captured
Sphakteria
reasons
and
alliance
of
the
the
421.) Among
peace
subsequent
Spartans
the death or capture of so
for the tremendous disaster at Pylos?involving
have been widely discussed. It would not have been
many hoplites?must
and other Athenians
odd if blame ultimately came to rest not on the hoplites that had surren
(who were still invaluable to the state) or the men that had failed
to rescue them, but rather on the Spartan general staff or the commander
himself. These men (or this man), in turn, needed a defense for their (his)
dered
apparent folly.54
One must recognize
ers involved
50.
It may
the crucial problem faced by the Spartan lead
how to explain why the Spartiates
in the loss at Sphakteria:
be that
the
plan
Spartan
to fight in the bay did not crystallize
until theAthenians arrived (probably
sooner
than
the battle.
expected)
In that case,
have
positioned
been
other
purposes
n. 34,
above),
night
(perhaps
(e.g.,
but were
with
on
the day before
the hoplites
on
may
for
Sphakteria
as lookouts;
left there
their
forces
see
over
aug
mented) as part of the plan to fight it
out
in the harbor
should
on
the Athenians
the next
offer
day
battle.
implies that they had a specific (and
dangerous?)
Lazenby (1985, p. 114) discusses the
possibility that units (enomotiai)
rather
by
any event, the fact that the final troops
on
were
stationed
"chosen
Sphakteria
from
all
the
lot
(4.8.9)
by
companies"
than
See 4.17.4,
with
wollte,
rechtfertigen
war, wenn
der
of the
versperrt
sources for
Thucydides,
him
Gomme
cf. Xen.
1956,
p. 484.
nun
"Ist die Annahme
pp. 292-293:
so unerh?rt,
wirklich
dass er durch
Bericht
get?uscht
athenischen
nicht
see Stroud
1994.
54. Perhaps
Hell.
peloponne
von
Sphak
die eine
zur Bucht
die Zug?nge
wurden?"
On Corinthian
the words
13.64.5-7;
schlechten
teria
Torheit
einen
durch
der die Besetzung
Flotte
53. See Schwartz [1929] 1960,
einer
Etwa
sischen,
selected
by Thucydides
repeated
Spartans,
self at 21.2 and 41.4.
52. Diod.
wurde?
were
individuals
lot.
51.
1.2.18,
In
(see n. 33, above).
mission
Thrasymelidas
it was
the nauarch
(4.11.2) who decided
to risk a sea battle
with
in what
to him
waters.
appeared
Brasidas
arch here
(4.11.4).
served
the Athenians
advantageous
as a trier
only
sources
thucydides'
and
the
plan
spartan
539
had been left on this island in the first place.
captured by the Athenians
to fight a naumachia with the Athenians
that
had
intended
they
Admitting
a
exposed (in retrospect) their great hubris and poor judgment, if not viola
could not justify an
tion of Spartan policy.55 Since, then, the commanders
actual plan to risk engagement with a large number of Athenian
ships?a
or surrender of so many
Spartiate
that they had intended
Spartan leaders perhaps maintained
hoplites?the
or
to block up the harbor, and take Pylos "without a naval engagement
of
the
standard
kind
with
This
plan comported
apparendy
Spartan
danger."
cases
at that time of avoiding naumachiat with Athens
(except in
practice
numerical superiority), and made the generals' (or their
of overwhelming
that led ultimately
plan
to the death
subordinates') mistake one of execution rather than of premeditated
folly,
a
at their own
risking homoioi in foolhardy attempt to beat the Athenians
game and thus gain the glory attaching to such a victory.56
to conclude that Thucydides,
inac
It is disturbing
presented with
information by an elite Spartan source or sources (perhaps after
first interviewing Athenians
such as Demosthenes),
failed to substantiate
account by visiting the site himself or by interviewing
the Peloponnesian
additional Spartan or Athenian
informants (or that if he did conduct such
curate
interviews, he was unable to correct many aspects of the Spartan report
that he had already received). Of course, Thucydides might have altered the
narrative in the process of completing his work, perhaps
Pylos/Sphakteria
after he had finally visited the site himself. The account's relatively polished
nature, however, forces us to consider the possibility that the historian had
given the piece its finishing touches.
In the end, it seems most reasonable to conclude that the major prob
lems in the narrative stem from Thucydides'
failure to examine the area.
by his inability to visit Pylos and gather the topographical
re
that would have exploded the Spartan story, Thucydides
a
narrow
to
two
block up the
seemingly reasonable plan
ported
supposedly
entrances to the harbor. However,
the actual topography of the region and
Handicapped
information
the 420 Lakedaimonian
tell a different
hoplites
55. Strassler (1990, p. 115) argues
that official
naval
in
strategy
Spartan
on
this period
centered
avoiding
"open
water
of maneuver
battles
with Athe
nian
one
engaged
79), they
numerical
avoiding
existed,
when
in such
enjoyed
certain
it would
the Spartan
the
the Peloponnesians
a battle
(Thuc. 3.76
an
overwhelming
and still
adopted
superiority
tactics. If such
defensive
that on
and notes
triremes,"
occasion
on the island of
Sphakteria
marooned
tale.
kinds
provide
commanders
a
of
policy
of naval battles
another
needed
reason
an
explanation for their failed plans at
Pylos.
56. Thus,
Westlake
cludes
I very much
disagree with
con
(1974, esp. p. 214), who
that there is "no trace of infor
mation
associated
obtained
with
the direction
from
anyone
closely
for
responsible
on the Pelo
of operations
[those]
side." I would
agree, how
ponnesian
the
understood
ever, that Thucydides
difficulty of obtaining "trustworthy and
complete" evidence (p. 226) from his
sources
(including
those
from
Sparta).
LOREN
540
II
SAMONS
J.
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