PHIL10072: Themes in Epistemology Course Guide 2013-14 Course Organiser: Dr. Nick Treanor (nick.treanor@ed.ac.uk) Seminar Leaders: Professor Duncan Pritchard (duncan.pritchard@ed.ac.uk), Dr. Nick Treanor (nick.treanor@ed.ac.uk), and Dr. Aidan McGlynn (amcglynn@staffmail.ed.ac.uk) Course Secretary: Sue Richards (sue.richards@ed.ac.uk) Contents 1. Course Aims and Objectives 2. Intended Learning Outcomes 3. Lecture Times and Locations 4. Lecture Content 5. PPLS Undergraduate Student Handbook 6. Readings 7. Assessment Information 8. Learn 9. Autonomous Learning Groups 10. Feedback 11. Useful Information 12. Common Marking Scheme Department of Philosophy School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences University of Edinburgh 2 1. Course Aims and Objectives This course offers an overview of some of the key topics in contemporary epistemology. The topics that we will be covering include: The analysis of knowledge; Anti-luck epistemology; Virtue epistemology; Radical scepticism; Understanding and epistemic value; Religious knowledge; Testimonial knowledge; Theories of epistemic justification; Epistemology and the nature of belief; Knowledge-first epistemology; Norms of assertion 2. Intended Learning Outcomes By the end of this course, students should gain: A sound understanding of some of the main themes in contemporary epistemology; An ability to think and write critically and knowledgeably about these themes. 3. Seminar Times and Locations Lectures will be held on Friday 2.10pm – 4pm, Dugald Stewart Building room 1.20. Please note that in addition to the seminars themselves, there are lots of opportunities to speak with the course organiser and the seminar leaders. In particular, you can drop in on them at their pre-arranged weekly office hours, or else contact them directly to ask a question or arrange a meeting. Here are the contact details for the three members of faculty teaching on this course: Professor Duncan Pritchard Room 6.13, Dugald Stewart Building Office Hours: Tuesdays 3-4pm E-mail: duncan.pritchard@ed.ac.uk Phone: 0131-6511784 Web: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/view.php?name=duncan-pritchard-frse Dr. Nick Treanor Room 6.07, Dugald Stewart Building Office Hours: Fridays 9-10am E-mail: nick.treanor@ed.ac.uk Phone: 0131-6513085 Web: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/people/nick-treanor 3 Dr. Aidan McGlynn Room 6.12, Dugald Stewart Building Office Hours: Mondays 2-3pm E-mail: amcglynn@staffmail.ed.ac.uk Phone: 0131-6516333 Web: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/view.php?name=aidan-mcglynn 4. Seminar Content Week 1: Knowledge and Luck (Pritchard) Core Reading: Pritchard, D. H., Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), chapters 1-2. Useful Background Reading: Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2013), chapters 1 & 3. Steup, M., ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/, (2006). Hetherington, S., ‘The Gettier Problem’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 12, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Engel, M. ‘Epistemic Luck’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.) J. Fieser & B. Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/epi-luck/, (2011). Orozco, J., ‘Epistemic Luck’, Philosophy Compass 6 (2011), 11–21. [Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00365.x/abstract]. Advanced Reading: Pritchard, D. H., ‘There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, (eds.) M. Steup & J. Turri, §7, (Blackwell, 2nd Ed., 2013). [Available at: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/31024093/ContraLuckyK0611.pdf]. Hetherington, S., ‘There Can be Lucky Knowledge’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, (eds.) M. Steup & J. Turri, §7, (Blackwell, 2nd Ed., 2013). [Available at: https://dl.dropbox.com/u/31024093/HetheringtonOnLuckyK.pdf]. Black, T., ‘Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 18, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Week 2: Virtue Epistemology (Pritchard) Core Reading: 4 Pritchard, D. H., Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), chapters 3-4. Useful Background Reading: Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2013), chapters 5-6. Greco, J., & Turri, J., ‘Virtue Epistemology’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/, (2011). Beahr, J., ‘Virtue Epistemology’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.) J. Fieser & B. Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtueep/, (2004). Kvanvig, J., ‘Virtue Epistemology’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 19, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Advanced Reading: Pritchard, D. H., ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy (2012). [Available at: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/31024093/ALVEFINAL.pdf]. Greco, J., Achieving Knowledge, (Cambridge University Press, 2009). [Hardcopy in library]. Sosa, E., Knowing Full Well, (Princeton University Press, 2011). [Hardcopy in library]. Week 3: Radical Scepticism (Pritchard) Core Reading: Pritchard, D. H., Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), chapter 6. Useful Background Reading: Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2013), chapters 12-14. Klein, P., ‘Skepticism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/, (2010). Pritchard, D. H., ‘Recent Work on Radical Skepticism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002), 215-57. [Available at: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/fullacademic/documents/RecentWorkonSkepticism.pdf]. Luper, S., ‘Cartesian Skepticism’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 38, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Advanced Reading: Pritchard, D. H., 'McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism', Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, 283-310, (Oxford University Press, 2008). [E-book in library]. 5 Pritchard, D. H., 'Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing', Synthese 189 (2012), 255-72. [Available at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31024093/Papers/WittGroundlessBeliefFINA L.pdf]. Pritchard, D. H. ‘The Structure of Sceptical Arguments', Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52. [Available at: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/fullacademic/documents/StructureOfScepticismProof_000.pdf]. Week 4: Understanding and Epistemic Value (Pritchard) Core Reading: Pritchard, D. H., Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), chapter 7. Useful Background Reading: Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 2nd Ed., 2010), chapter 2. Pritchard, D. H., & Turri, J., ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/, (2011). Grimm, S., ‘Understanding’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 9, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Advanced Reading: Pritchard, D. H., Millar, A., & Haddock, A., The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, (Oxford University Press, 2010), chapters 1-4. [E-book in library]. Greco, J., ‘The Value Problem’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 21, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Week 5: Religious Knowledge (Pritchard) Core Reading: Forrest, P., ‘The Epistemology of Religion’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-epistemology/, (2009). Useful Background Reading: Clark, K., ‘Religious Epistemology’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.) J. Fieser & B. Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/, (2004). Zagzebski, L., ‘Religious Knowledge’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 36, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Advanced Reading: 6 Pritchard, D. H., ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (2011), 145-59. [Available at: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/31024093/WittQuasiFideismPenultimate.pdf]. Pritchard, D. H., 'Reforming Reformed Epistemology', International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), 43-66; and reprinted in The Epistemology of Basic Belief, (eds.) R. Rood & R. van Woudenberg, (Rodopi, 2004). [Available at: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/fullacademic/documents/RREBOOKPROOFS.pdf]. Week 6: Testimonial Knowledge (Treanor) Core Reading: Audi, R., ‘The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification’, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997), 405-22. [Available on JSTOR]. Useful Background Reading: Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2013), chapter 8. Adler, J., ‘Epistemological Problems of Testimony’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/, (2006). Green, C., ‘Epistemology of Testimony’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.) J. Fieser & B. Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-testi, (2008). Advanced Reading: Lackey, J., ‘Testimonial Knowledge’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 29, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Pritchard, D. H., 'The Epistemology of Testimony', Philosophical Issues (supplement to Noûs) 14 (2004), 326-48. [Available at: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/fullacademic/documents/PITestimonyFIN AL.pdf]. Week 7: The Structure of Justification (Treanor) Core Reading: Bonjour, L. ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?, American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 1-13. [Available on JSTOR]. Useful Background Reading: Bonjour, L. ‘The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge’, Philosophical Studies 30 (1976), 281-312. [Available on JSTOR]. Elgin, C. ‘Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence and Tenability’, 7 Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, (eds.) M. Steup & E. Sosa (Blackwell, 3rd Ed., 2013). [An e-version is available on Elgin’s website at Harvard.] Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 2nd Ed., 2010), chapters 4. Fumerton, R. ‘Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/, (2010). Olsson, E. ‘Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/, (2012). Advanced Reading: • Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk I, Ch 1-3 (available online in various translations) • Klein, Peter, 1998. “Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVIII: 919–26. [Available on JSTOR] • Sosa, E., 1980, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5(1): 3–26. [Available online] Week 8: Epistemology and the Nature of Belief (Treanor) Core Reading: • Treanor, N. ‘The Measure of Knowledge’, Noûs, Sept. 2013, pp. 577-601. [Available at: http://tinyurl.com/pq32bu7] Additional Background Reading: • Braddon-Mitchell, D. & F. Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction, (Blackwell, 2nd ed., 2007), chapters 10 and 11. • Schwitzgebel, E. ‘Belief’, in Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 2, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. • Treanor, N. ‘Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry’, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [Available at http://tinyurl.com/ot7q9w9]. Additional Advanced Reading: • Schwitzgebel, E. ‘Belief’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ (2010). • Stalnaker, R., Inquiry, (MIT Press, 1984 or 1987 edition), chapters 1 and 2. • Lewis, D. On the Plurality of Worlds, (Basil Blackwell, 1986), sections 1.4 and 1.5 Week 9: Knowledge-First Epistemology (McGlynn) 8 Core Reading: • Williamson, T. ‘Knowledge-First Epistemology’, in Routledge Companion to Epistemology, (eds.) S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard, chapter 2, (Routledge, 2010). [E-book in library]. Additional Background Reading: • Williamson, T. Knowledge and its Limits, introduction. (Oxford, 2000). (E-book in library]. Additional Advanced Reading: • Williamson, T. Knowledge and its Limits, chapter 1. (Oxford, 2000). (E-book in library]. • McGlynn, A. ‘Believing things unknown’, Noûs, June 2013. [Available at http://tinyurl.com/qf36sh9] Week 10: Norms of Assertion Core Reading: • Weiner, M. ‘Norms of Assertion’, Philosophy Compass 2: 187-195. [Available online]. Useful Background Reading: • Williamson, T. Knowing and Asserting, Philosophical Review 105(4): 489-523. [Available through JSTOR]. • Grice, H.P. ‘Logic and Conversation’, Syntax and Semantics Vol 3, 1975. [Available online]. Advanced Reading: • Lackey, J. ‘Norms of Assertion’, Nous December 2007, pp. 594-626. [Available online]. • Weiner, M. ‘Must We Know What We Say?’. Philosophical Review 114: 227251. [Available online.] Week 11: Revision (Pritchard, Treanor & McGlynn) No Readings 5. PPLS Undergraduate Student Handbook The PPLS Undergraduate Student Handbook has more information on Student Support and academic guidance; late coursework and plagiarism; illness and disability adjustments, and useful sources of advice. 9 The Handbook can be found here: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/students/undergraduate/manage_your_courses.php 6. Readings The core textbook for this course is: Pritchard, D. H., Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). If you would like a primer on epistemology (i.e., a textbook which is pitched at a less advanced level), then you may also find this book useful: Pritchard, D. H., What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2013). Both books should be very easy to get hold off (indeed, in both cases, they are available as e-books through the library). There are lots of textbooks and anthologies available for epistemology. There is a reasonably comprehensive annotated list in What is this Thing Called Knowledge?, 159-62. In addition to the core texts, the seminar leaders will be citing a lot of other material, usually as advanced or introductory readings. In nearly all cases the material cited will be available on-line through the library or you’ll be given a separate weblink. If you have any problems getting hold of readings, then please let the coarse organiser know asap. If you would like recommendations for additional readings for a particular topic, then please don’t hesitate to get in touch. 7. Assessment Information For Honours students and Visiting students: A midterm essay of 1500 words (40%), due on Thursday 24th October 2013, by 4pm; and a final essay of 2000 words (60%), due on Thursday 12th December 2013, by 4pm. Feedback will be provided within 3 weeks, unless otherwise notified by email. For Honours students doing one of the long essays for the coursework dissertation option: A 5000 word essay (100%), due Thursday 16th January 2014, by 4pm. 10 Essay Questions 1. What is the Gettier problem? Can it be resolved? If not, explain why. If so, then describe and defend the solution that you favour. Readings: See readings for week 1. Depending on how you choose to approach this essay, the readings from weeks 2, 3 or 4 could be relevant. 2. Does knowledge entail safety? Defend your answer. Readings: See readings for week 2. 3. What role, if any, should epistemic virtue play in a theory of knowledge? Readings: See readings for weeks 3 & 4. 4. In order to know that p, does one need to have good reflectively accessible reasons for believing that p? Readings: See readings for week 5. 5. Is it possible know that one is not a brain-in-a-vat? If not, then does radical scepticism follow? If so, then does that suffice to resolve the problem of radical scepticism? Readings: See readings for week 6. 6. ‘Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief’. Discuss. Readings: See readings for week 7. 7. Is understanding a type of knowledge? Defend your answer. Readings: See readings for week 8. 8. Critically describe what you consider to be the most promising account of religious knowledge. Is it successful, do you think? Defend your answer. Readings: See readings for week 9. 9. What justifies beliefs formed on the basis of testimony, if anything does? Readings: See readings for week 6. 10. Does justification have to bottom out? Readings: See readings for week 7. 11. ‘Questions about what belief is have little to do with questions about what it is 11 to do better as a believer.’ Discuss. Readings: See readings for week 8. 12. Do the arguments Williamson offers provide a strong case for the knowledge norm of assertion? Readings: See readings for weeks 9 & 10. 13. Is there an important distinction between primary and secondary propriety? Readings: See readings for week 9 & 10. If you are an honours student submitting two essays for assessment, then try to avoid overlap in your essays. For example, if you do question 1 for your first essay and opt to write extensively about the safety condition on knowledge, then it would be unwise to choose question 2 for your second essay. For the same reason, if you are taking the honours course on Scepticism, then it would probably be wise to avoid answering question 6. If you would like suggestions for additional readings for the essay questions, please just ask. General Essay Guidance Remember that it is important that your essay is a response to the essay question in hand. You need to defend the claims you make with arguments, and in doing so draw on the materials from the texts that we have covered. Make sure that your writing is clear and that you properly explain all terminology. Where you explore other peoples’ work, make sure that you properly reference them. For some general advise on writing philosophy essays, see: Martinch, A. P., Philosophical Writing: An Introduction, (Blackwell, several editions). See also the following guidance that is available on the web: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html (Jim Pryor). http://www.public.asu.edu/~dportmor/tips.pdf (Doug Portmore). http://www.dartmouth.edu/~writing/materials/student/humanities/philosophy.shtml (Dartmouth). http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/resources/writing.html (Peter Horban). Word Count Penalties Essays must not exceed the word limit, which includes footnotes but excludes bibliography. The precise word count must be written on the coversheet. Overlong essays will be penalised according to the following rule: 5% will be deducted for every 100 words, or part thereof, over the word limit. So, 1-100 words over lose 5%; 101-200 12 words over lose 10%; 201-300 words over lose 15%; and so on. Penalties for Late Submission of Essays Unless an extension has been granted, essays must be submitted by the dates shown in the table of Submission Dates below. Essays submitted late without an extension may not be marked, but, if marked, will incur a penalty (in accordance with section 3.8 of the University Undergraduate Assessment Regulations at: http://www.docs.sasg.ed.ac.uk/AcademicServices/Regulations/TaughtAssessmentRegulations201314.PDF For each working day that the work is late there will be a reduction of the mark by 5% of the maximum obtainable mark (e.g. a mark of 65% on the common marking scale would be reduced to 60% up to 24 hours later). This penalty applies for up to five working days, after which a mark of zero will be given. Please note - Regulation 14 Assessment deadlines: Student responsibilities It is a student’s responsibility to ascertain and meet his or her assessment deadlines, including examination times and locations. 8. Learn Essays are to be submitted online, and for essay submission instructions please see the instructions on LEARN. Please note you should not include your name or matriculation number on coursework, only your exam number. 9. Autonomous Learning Groups One of the best ways to learn, and get feedback, is from talking to each other. In order to facilitate this, each of your Honours courses now has dedicated Autonomous Learning Groups. In week 2, you will receive an email from our Student Support Officer (Tamsin Welch, tamsin.welch@ed.ac.uk) asking if you would like to be part of an Autonomous Learning Group (ALG) for each of your Honours courses. If you agree, Tamsin will form the ALGs for you and email you with details of which group you are in, and the email addresses of the other members of the group. It is up to you, the members of the ALG, to organise the meetings. You decide how often to meet and what to do in your ALG. ALGs are designed to help you learn and get to know your classmates; they are not a formal requirement of the course. It is important to note that assessment in your courses is non-competitive: you are not competing against your classmates, only against the general grade criteria. It is in your interests to help each other. As a rough guide, we suggest your ALG meets every 2-3 weeks. You could use the meetings to: 13 Read and discuss the papers together Discuss essay-writing and time-management techniques Constructively critique each other's draft essays or plans Read some of the further readings or related papers Work on presentations or discussion posts that the class may involve Share tips on career advice Tamsin will be able to help you with room booking (you can also do this yourself through MyEd). Please email the CO of the course if you feel that it would be useful for the group if she or he joined one of your sessions. Please contact Tamsin if you find it necessary during the semester to transfer into a different group. ALGs are a new initiative by Philosophy and we appreciate your thoughts. If you feedback on how to make ALGs even better, please email Tamsin Welch (tamsin.welch@ed.ac.uk) or the Director of Undergraduate Teaching, Dr. Mark Sprevak (mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk). 10. Feedback You will get many feedback or feedforward opportunities in your courses. Feedback could be in the form of an essay, a draft write-up, self-generated or peer feedback, small group discussions or quizzes within lectures etc. Feedforward might include a discussion of how to write an essay, or prepare for an exam. Feedback is essential to learning and it takes many forms. We strongly encourage you to use all forms of feedback, including: Asking and answering questions in lectures or classes Asking questions of your Course Organiser or lecturer in their office hours Discussing your work with lecturers and examiners on Philosophy's dedicated Feedback Days (Honours students) Actively participating in your tutorials (pre-Honours students) Actively participating in Autonomous Learning Groups (Honours students) Talking about your ideas outside class with fellow Philosophy students Taking your essay to PhilSoc essay surgeries Participating in PhilSoc discussion groups and study-skills events Participating in PhilSoc debates and talks: http://euphilsoc.weebly.com/ Participating in the British Undergraduate Philosophy Society, including undergraduate conferences: http://www.bups.org If you have any suggestions on how to improve feedback further, please contact either: Your Tutor (pre-Honours students) Your Course Organiser Your Personal Tutor Tamsin Welch, PPLS Student Support Officer (tamsin.welch@ed.ac.uk) 14 Dr Mark Sprevak, Director of Undergraduate Teaching (mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk) 11. Useful Information WEEK 6 INNOVATIVE LEARNING WEEK (17 - 21 February 2014). Normal teaching slots will be suspended and in their place will be a range of other activities such as master classes, a research day, a science fair, and guest lectures. More information will follow nearer the time so please check the School website where details will be available on the PPLS Events page. 12. Common Marking Scheme http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/registry/exams/regulations/common-markingscheme A1 90100 Excellent Outstanding in every respect, the work is well beyond the level expected of a competent student at their level of study. A2 8089 Excellent Outstanding in some respects, the work is often beyond what is expected of a competent student at their level of study. A3 7079 Excellent Very good or excellent in most respects, the work is what might be expected of a very competent student. B 6069 Very Good Good or very good in most respects, the work displays thorough mastery of the relevant learning outcomes. C 5059 Good The work clearly meets requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes. D 4049 Pass The work meets minimum requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes. E 3039 Marginal fail The work fails to meet minimum requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes. F 2029 Clear fail The work is very weak or shows a decided lack of effort. 15 G 1019 Bad fail The work is extremely weak. H 0-9 Bad fail The work is of very little consequence, if any, to the area in question. The marking scheme used for all coursework and for degree and resit examinations is the University Common Marking Scheme. The principal grades and descriptors, as approved by the School of PPLS, of the University’s Extended Common Marking Scheme, are as follows. A1 90-100 Excellent Outstanding in every respect, the work is well beyond the level expected of a competent student at their level of study. It • Shows creative, subtle, and/or original independent thinking • Demonstrates breadth of knowledge and deep understanding of the subject matter • Draws on a wide, relevant literature base • Demonstrates an excellent standard of synthesis and evaluation and a critical and insightful analysis of the literature • Is well focused, with concentration on the main issues to be addressed • Presents a compelling case by means of clear logically structured argument or debate, well supported with evidence • Is written with flair • Has, where appropriate, complete and correct referencing • Is flawless in grammar and spelling A2 80-89 Excellent Outstanding in some respects, the work is often beyond what is expected of a competent student at their level of study. It • Shows original, sophisticated independent thinking • Demonstrates a thorough understanding of the subject matter • Draws on a wide, relevant literature base • Demonstrates critical and insightful analysis of the literature • Is well focused, with concentration on the main issues to be addressed • Presents a strong case by means of clear, logically structured argument or debate, supported with evidence • Shows a good standard of academic writing • Has, where appropriate, complete and correct referencing • Shows a high standard of grammar and spelling A3 70-79 Excellent Very good or excellent in most respects, the work is what might be expected of a very competent student. It • Explores the topic under discussion fully • Shows some complex and/or sensitive independent thinking Complexity and or sensitivity is reflected in the argument • Demonstrates a sound understanding of the subject matter • Draws in a wide relevant literature base • Demonstrates critical analysis of the literature 16 • Is well focused, with concentration on the main issues to be addressed • Presents a good case by means of clear logically structured argument or debate, supported by evidence • Shows a competent standard of fluent academic writing • Has, where appropriate, complete and correct referencing • Shows a good standard of grammar and spelling B 60-69 Very Good Good or very good in most respects, the work displays thorough mastery of the relevant learning outcomes. It • Demonstrates a good understanding of the area in question • Draws on adequate references • Demonstrates good synthesis, analysis, reflection and evaluation of the literature • Concentrates on the main issues to be addressed • Presents an adequate case by means of clear, well structured, logical argument supported with evidence. • Has, where appropriate, complete and correct referencing of sources • Shows a good standard of grammar and spelling C 50-59 Good The work clearly meets requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes. It • Shows evidence of sufficient knowledge and understanding of the material • Uses references appropriately to support the argument, though they may be limited in number or reflect restricted reading. • Demonstrates limited critical analysis and evaluation of sources of evidence. • Addresses the area in question clearly and coherently • Has satisfactory structure, presentation, and expression • Has, where appropriate, complete referencing of sources, though there may be minor flaws in referencing technique D 40-49 Pass The work meets minimum requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes. It • Demonstrates a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding but at a basic level, and there may be minor inaccuracies • Lacks detail, elaboration or explanation of concepts and ideas. • Displays limited synthesis and analysis of the literature • Presents a highly descriptive account of the topic with no real critical analysis • Presents a weak argument which is not logically structured or which lacks clarity or is based on unsubstantiated statements • Has, where appropriate, complete referencing of sources, though there may be flaws in referencing technique. • Has largely satisfactory expression, though there may be minor spelling or grammatical errors E 30-39 Marginal fail 17 The work fails to meet minimum requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes. It • Does not demonstrate a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding • Utilises only limited reference sources and offers poor analysis of them • May not adequately address the area in question, because its content is too limited or because there are some inaccuracies • Presents a poorly structured, poorly developed, or incoherent argument, or no argument at all • Has an awkward writing style or poor expression of concepts • Has incomplete or inadequately presented references • Shows a lack of attention to spelling and grammar. F 20-29 Clear fail The work is very weak or shows a decided lack of effort. It • Displays very poor or confused knowledge and understanding • Does not address the area in question. • Presents no argument or one based on irrelevant and erroneous content • Displays an unacceptable academic writing style and /or presentation • Has incomplete or inadequately presented references, if any G 10-19 Bad fail The work is extremely weak. It • Displays no knowledge or understanding of the area in question • Presents incomplete, muddled, and/or irrelevant material • Provides no coherent discussion of the area in question • Has incomplete or inadequately presented references, if any H 0-9 Bad fail The work is of very little consequence, if any, to the area in question. It • Is incomplete in every respect.