Accounting 617 - Faculty: Stanford GSB

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STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Graduate School of Business

David Larcker

Stefan Reichelstein

Accounting 617 – Winter Quarter 2008

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance:

Concepts and Empirical Methodology

The course will consist of three general topic areas. The first part of the class will examine selected applied econometric topics that are useful in empirical accounting research. Each of these topics will be illustrated using contemporary examples from accounting, economics, and finance. The second part of the class will cover some of the basic theoretical work in moral hazard agency models and various extensions to this type of research. The final part of the course will discuss the empirical literature on corporate governance and executive compensation.

The course will be taught in a seminar style and students will present most of the papers.

Each student is expected to have read the assigned material and be prepared to describe and critique the papers.

Students will be evaluated based on their class discussion and presentations (50%) and development of various research projects on the topics covered in the class (50%).

The course is meant to provide an overview of each topic area. For the research project, the students should expand their reading well beyond the articles covered in class.

Papers marked with an asterisk (*) are the primary articles for the class. The other papers provide some useful background on each topic.

The readings for the ten sessions outlined below may be changed as we progress through the course.

2

Part 1: Selected Empirical Methodologies

Week 1 (Thursday January 10): Measurement error, principal components analysis, and confirmatory latent variable analysis

*Kenneth Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables , Chapter 5 (Consequences of Measurement Error)

*Overview of Principal Components Analysis (the basics of the methodology).

*Kenneth Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables , Chapter 7 (Confirmatory

Factor Analysis).

*Sadka, Gil, Sadka, Ronnie and Ball, Ray, "Aggregate Earnings and Asset Prices"

(November 6, 2007). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972624

Alan Taylor, A Brief Introduction to Factor Analysis (note: This actually describes principal components analysis)

Kristopher Preacher and Robert MacCallum, Repairing Tom Swift’s Electric Factor

Analysis Machine, Understanding Statistics , 2(1), 13-43.

Christopher D. Ittner; David F. Larcker. “Total Quality Management and the Choice of

Information and Reward Systems” Journal of Accounting Research , Vol. 33, Studies on

Managerial Accounting (1995), pp. 1-34. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-

8456%281995%2933%3c1%3atqmatc%3e2.0.co%3b2-g

Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price Behavior

Benjamin F. King The Journal of Business Vol. 39, No. 1, Part 2: Supplement on

Security Prices (Jan., 1966), pp. 139-190. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-

9398%28196601%2939%3a1%3c139%3amaifis%3e2.0.co%3b2-j

3

Week 2 (Thursday January 17): Cross-sectional correlation

*Ian Gow, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel Taylor, “Correcting for Cross-Sectional and

Time-Series Dependence in Accounting Research,” working paper.

*Mitchell Peterson, “Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing

Approaches,” Review of Financial Studies , forthcoming. http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/standarderror.pdf

*The Impact of Merger-Related Regulations on the Shareholders of Acquiring Firms

Katherine Schipper; Rex Thompson Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 21, No. 1

(Spring, 1983), pp. 184-221. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-

8456%28198321%2921%3a1%3c184%3atiomro%3e2.0.co%3b2-n

Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests

Eugene F. Fama; James D. MacBeth The Journal of Political Economy > Vol. 81, No. 3

(May, 1973), pp. 607-636. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-

3808%28197305%2f06%2981%3a3%3c607%3arraeet%3e2.0.co%3b2-j

Victor L. Bernard Cross-Sectional Dependence and Problems in Inference in Market-

Based Accounting Research Journal of Accounting Research > Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring,

1987), pp. 1-48. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-

8456%28198721%2925%3a1%3c1%3acdapii%3e2.0.co%3b2-p

4

Week 3 (Thursday January 24): Endogeneity, instrumental variables, and correlated omitted variables

* The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences

Harold Demsetz; Kenneth Lehn The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 93, No. 6 (Dec.,

1985), pp. 1155-1177. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-

3808%28198512%2993%3a6%3c1155%3atsococ%3e2.0.co%3b2-%23

*Larcker, David F. and Rusticus, Tjomme O., "On the Use of Instrumental Variables in

Accounting Research" (October 29, 2007). http://ssrn.com/abstract=694824

*Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance Journal of Financial Economics , Volume 53, Issue

3, September 1999, Pages 353-384 Charles P. Himmelberg, R. Glenn Hubbard and

Darius Palia http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=mimg&_imagekey=b6vbx-3x2j0ck-2-

29&_cdi=5938&_user=145269&_orig=search&_coverdate=09%2f30%2f1999&_sk=999

469996&view=c&wchp=dglbvzzzskzv&md5=35d8e1ce1d53461ab8ddbbdd64a3e9d9&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

*Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: comment Journal of Financial Economics , Volume 62, Issue

3, December 2001, Pages 559-5. Xianming Zhou http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=mimg&_imagekey=b6vbx-449tk82-1-

3&_cdi=5938&_user=145269&_orig=mlkt&_coverdate=12%2f31%2f2001&_sk=99937

9996&view=c&wchp=dglzvzzzskwa&md5=5d6db5c1308db0ca5a1b78e5c412999b&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

*Kenneth Frank, “Impact of a Confounding Variable on a Regression Coefficient,”

Sociological Methods & Research , Vol. 29, No. 2, 147-194 (2000). http://smr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/29/2/147?ck=nck

5

Week 4 (Thursday January 31): Observational Studies and Matching

*Paul Rosenbaum, Observational Study http://wwwstat.wharton.upenn.edu/~rosenbap/BehStatObs.pdf

*Paul Rosenbaum, Sensitivity Analysis in Observational Studies. http://www-stat.wharton.upenn.edu/~rosenbap/BehStatSen.pdf

*Marshall Joffe and Paul Rosenbaum, Propensity Scores. http://www-stat.wharton.upenn.edu/~rosenbap/AJEpropen.pdf

*Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?

Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew

Journal of Accounting Research , Volume 44, Issue 1, Page 113-143, Mar 2006. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00258.x

*Jared Harris and Philip Bromiley

Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on

Financial Misrepresentation . Organization Science , May-June 2007; 18: 350 - 367. http://orgsci.journal.informs.org/cgi/search?sortspec=relevance&author1=harris&fulltext

=&pubdate_year=&volume=&firstpage =

*Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker,

Matching with Doses in an Observational Study of a Media Campaign against Drug

Abuse Bo Lu; Elaine Zanutto; Robert Hornik; Paul R. Rosenbaum

Journal of the American Statistical Association > Vol. 96, No. 456 (Dec., 2001), pp.

1245-1253 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-

1459%28200112%2996%3a456%3c1245%3amwdiao%3e2.0.co%3b2-5

Paul Rosenbaum example1. http://www-stat.wharton.upenn.edu/~rosenbap/SOSanti.pdf

Paul Rosenbaum example 2. http://www-stat.wharton.upenn.edu/~rosenbap/jcoOvarian.pdf

Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under exogeneity: a review.

Imbens, Guido W. Review of Economics & Statistics , Feb2004, Vol. 86 Issue 1, p4-29. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=116&sid=25d954d2-9703-4158-b117-

3ddf449c6a69%40sessionmgr103

6

Part 2: Theory of Incentives

Week 5 (Thursday February 7): Hidden Action Problems

* The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

William P. Rogerson Econometrica > Vol. 53, No. 6 (Nov., 1985), pp. 1357-1367 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-

9682%28198511%2953%3a6%3c1357%3atfatpp%3e2.0.co%3b2-c

* Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems

Marco LiCalzi, Sandrine Spaeter .

Economic Theory. Heidelberg: Jan 2003. Vol. 21, Iss.

1; p. 167. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=692211691&srchmode=3&sid=1&fmt=6

&vinst=prod&vtype=pqd&rqt=309&vname=pqd&ts=1197677817&clientid=12498&aid

=1

* Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job

Design Bengt Holmstrom; Paul Milgrom Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization

Vol. 7, Special Issue: [Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization,

January 1991] (1991), pp. 24-52 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=8756-

6222%281991%297%3c24%3ampaica%3e2.0.co%3b2-3 .

* Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency

Benjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. Katz Econometrica Vol. 59, No. 6 (Nov., 1991), pp.

1735-1753 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-

9682%28199111%2959%3a6%3c1735%3amhavte%3e2.0.co%3b2-n

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

Journal of Economic Theory , Volume 51, Issue 1, June 1990, Pages 1-31

Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=mimg&_imagekey=b6wj3-4cyggfd-1tm-

1&_cdi=6867&_user=145269&_orig=search&_coverdate=06%2f30%2f1990&_sk=9994

89998&view=c&wchp=dglbvzzzskwz&md5=33fc2c3e58e77405d57a4cd822167c12&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem Sanford J. Grossman; Oliver D. Hart

Econometrica Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 7-45 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-

9682%28198301%2951%3a1%3c7%3aaaotpp%3e2.0.co%3b2-a

7

Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Ian Jewitt Econometrica Vol. 56, No. 5 (Sep., 1988), pp. 1177-1190 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-

9682%28198809%2956%3a5%3c1177%3ajtfatp%3e2.0.co%3b2-a

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts Drew Fudenberg; Jean Tirole

Econometrica Vol. 58, No. 6 (Nov., 1990), pp. 1279-1319 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-

9682%28199011%2958%3a6%3c1279%3amharia%3e2.0.co%3b2-e

Week 6 (Thursday February 14): Stock Price versus Accounting Data in

Performance Measures

* On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation Jonathan M. Paul

The Review of Financial Studies Vol. 5, No. 3 (1992), pp. 471-502 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0893-

9454%281992%295%3A3%3C471%3AOTEOSC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

* Stock Price, Earnings, and Book Value in Managerial Performance Measures

Authors: Sunil Dutta and Stefan Reichelstein The Accounting Review Vol 80 No. 4 2005

1069-1100. http://www.atypon-link.com/AAA/doi/pdf/10.2308/accr.2005.80.4.1069

Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation

Journal of Accounting and Economics , Volume 16, Issues 1-3, January-July 1993, Pages

3-23. Robert M. Bushman and Raffi J. Indjejikian. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V87-45BC69X-P-

1&_cdi=5863&_user=145269&_orig=search&_coverDate=07%2F31%2F1993&_sk=99

9839998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzzzSkWb&md5=74cca91bbd6e41f3ddeebb729a14225d&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

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Part 3: Empirical Studies in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance

Week 7 (Thursday February 21): Background on executive compensation

* Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives Michael C. Jensen; Kevin J. Murphy

The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 98, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 225-264 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-

3808%28199004%2998%3a2%3c225%3appati%3e2.0.co%3b2-i

* Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem

Joseph G. Haubrich The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 102, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp.

258-276. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-

3808%28199404%29102%3A2%3C258%3ARAPPAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

*Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? Brian J. Hall, Jeffrey B. Liebman

Quarterly Journal of Economics August 1998, Vol. 113, No. 3: 653-691. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/003355398555702

* An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in

Executive Compensation Contracts Richard A. Lambert; David F. Larcker Journal of

Accounting Research Vol. 25, Studies on Stewardship Uses of Accounting Information

(1987), pp. 85-125 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-

8456%281987%2925%3c85%3aaaotuo%3e2.0.co%3b2-4

Frydman, Carola and Saks, Raven E., "Executive Compensation: A New View from a

Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005" (July 6, 2007). FEDS Working Paper No. 2007-35 http://ssrn.com/abstract=972399

Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey.

Core, John E.; Guay, Wayne

R.; Larcker, David F .

. Economic Policy Review , Apr2003, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p27. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=9765398&site=ehostlive

Murphy, Kevin J., "Executive Compensation" (April 1998). http://ssrn.com/abstract=163914

9

Week 8 (Thursday February 28): Executive compensation

*The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels

Journal of Accounting and Economics , Volume 28, Issue 2, December 1999, Pages 151-

184 John Core and Wayne Guay. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleList

ID=663985686&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000012078&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_u serid=145269&md5=3ce822aebf069203d608a273fffffd02

*Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?

Journal of Accounting and Economics , Volume 36, Issues 1-3, December 2003, Pages 3-

43 . Michelle Hanlon, Shivaram Rajgopal and Terry Shevlin. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=mimg&_imagekey=b6v87-4bmkgn2-3-

57&_cdi=5863&_user=145269&_orig=search&_coverdate=12%2f31%2f2003&_sk=999

639998&view=c&wchp=dglzvzzzskww&md5=7e1157bef095a9e1fbbb58dc34236567&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

*Discussion of “are executive stock options associated with future earnings?”

Journal of Accounting and Economics , Volume 36, Issues 1-3, December 2003, Pages

91-103.

David F. Larcker http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V87-4BDY762-1-

44&_cdi=5863&_user=145269&_orig=search&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2003&_sk=9

99639998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVtzzSkWW&md5=4e01e0b4b9bced9c9956eb508c61c237&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

*Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance.

Core, John E.; Holthausen, Robert W.; Larcker, David F .

Journal of Financial

Economics, Mar1999, Vol. 51 Issue 3, p371-406. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6VBX-3VY00MF-2-

1&_cdi=5938&_user=145269&_orig=search&_coverDate=03%2F31%2F1999&_sk=99

9489996&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzzzSkWA&md5=3aae4e5479fcc0b1192a61fa22c6a37d&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to

Price and Volatility John Core & Wayne Guay. Journal of Accounting Research June

2002. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1475-679X.00064

10

Week 9 (Thursday March 6):

*Corporate Governance and Equity Prices Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, Andrew Metrick

Quarterly Journal of Economics February 2003, Vol. 118, No. 1: 107–155. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/00335530360535162

*Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm

Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, and

Tjomme O. Rusticus The Journal of Finance , Volume 61, Issue 2, Page 655-687, Apr

2006. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00851.x

*Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance.

Larcker, David F .

;

Richardson, Scott A.; Tuna, İrem.

Accounting Review , Jul 2007, Vol.

82 Issue 4, p963-1008. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=25813002&site=ehostlive

*Eliezer M. Fich, Anil Shivdasani (2006) Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? The

Journal of Finance 61 (2), 689–724. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x

Cremers, K.J. Martijn ; Nair, Vinay B. ; Wei, Chenyang Governance Mechanisms and

Bond Prices The Review of Financial Studies 20, no. 5 (2007): 1359-1388. http://firstsearch.oclc.org/webz/ftfetch?sessionid=fsapp11-35092-fabbg5vfma8b7c:entitypagenum=11:0:rule=100:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=eco_ft:recno=1:result set=6:ftformat=pdf:format=bi:isbillable=true:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=false:entityemailf ullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=6:entityemailftfrom=eco_ft

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Week 10 (Thursday March 13): Executive compensation research in organizational behavior

*The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and

Shareholder Reactions. By: Westphal, James D.; Zajac , Edward J. Administrative Science

Quarterly , Mar1998, Vol. 43 Issue 1, p127-153. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=5&hid=109&sid=00467871-b84b-4978-8eecbdac47d8b6f5%40sessionmgr107

*James B. Wade, Charles A. O'Reilly, III, and Timothy G. Pollock

Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and Executive Compensation

Organization Science , September-October 2006; 17: 527 - 544. http://orgsci.journal.informs.org/cgi/reprint/17/5/527?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&

RESULTFORMAT=&author1=o%27reilly&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=rel evance&resourcetype=HWCIT

*Arimit Chatterjee Donald Hambrick. It’s all about me: Narcissistic CEOs and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly

(forthcoming). http://jacksonleadership.com/pdfs/Narcissistic_CEOs_05-04-06_ASQ.pdf

Substance and Symbolism in CEOs' Long-term Incentive Plans. By: Westphal, James D.;

Zajac , Edward J. Administrative Science Quarterly , Sep94, Vol. 39 Issue 3, p367-390. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=5&hid=109&sid=00467871-b84b-4978-8eecbdac47d8b6f5%40sessionmgr107

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