Ethnic protest in core and periphery
states
Susan Olzak
Abstract
Social scientists have not yet considered the role of world-level processes
that might explain ethnic movements. This article offers the argument that
the increasing integration of a world economic and political system facilitates
ethnic fragmentation within states. Two key processes are related to
integration of the world system: (a) increases in the politics of ethnic
inclusion, and (b) decreases in ethnic inequality. Both contribute to the rise
in ethnic protest in contemporary states. Taken together these two
processes suggest why core countries tend to experience a greater number
of ethnic protests that are more temperate, whereas peripheral countries
tend to experience only sporadic incidences of ethnic protest that are more
likely to be confrontational and violent.
Keyw ords: Ethnic protest; ethnic separatism; world-systems theory; ethnic
inequality.
Ethnic protest in core and periphery states
Social scientists studying ethnic movements commonly recognize the fact
that ethnic identity has become politically mobilized in nearly every
region of the world.1 Moreover, recent comparative research suggests
that ethnically-based movements account for the majority of violent conicts among and within nation-states since World War II (Gurr 1993) .
Given the consensus that ethnic movements generate widespread conict and violence in the modern period, it is curious that social scientists
have not systematically considered the role of world-level processes that
might explain ethnic movements. This article addresses this issue by shifting the locus of theory on ethnic movements to the world-level of analysis. My theoretical argument holds that integration of a world economic
and political system has encouraged ethnic fragmentation within states. It
does so by (a) increasing the level of ethnic inclusion in state politics, and
(b)decreasing levels of ethnic inequality within states.
To begin, I offer a deŽnition of ethnic mobilization as collective actions
in pursuit of collective ends by groups organized around some feature of
Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 21 Number 2 March 1998
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ethnic identity such as skin colour, language, regional location, or
customs. This deŽnition distinguishes ethnic mobilization from ethnic
solidarity, characterized as the conscious identiŽcation with an ethnic
population. Measures of ethnic solidarity have included the existence of
strong networks of ethnic interaction and of institutions that socialize
new members and reinforce social obligations. Using these distinctions
allows us to examine the conditions under which mobilization facilitates
solidarity, as well as the reverse. On this view, more theoretical power
can be gained from transforming these concepts into an empirical question, rather than assuming that an association between mobilization and
solidarity always exists. 2
Some scholars have argued that ethnic claims have become increasingly numerous because ethnic boundaries are elastic in nature (Nagel
and Olzak 1982; Nielsen 1985). Moreover, ethnic claims are inŽnitely
exible and are not limited by current geographica l boundaries, population concentrations, or any other feature of modern states. They can
span national borders, as in the pan-Arab movement, or they can be
highly dispersed, as in Jewish diaspora movements. Ethnic movements
mobilize as small and localized, regional movements, as in the Lombardy
region of Italy, or large-scale coalitions of ‘people of colour.’ Ethnic
movements can be relatively peaceful expressions of cultural activities
and festivals of diversity, or, more dramatically, they can instigate fullscale civil wars. How can we explain these differences in expressions of
ethnic rights?
The literature on state-building has suggested that ethnic movements
turn violent during early stages of nation-building, when contested claims
of power and legitimacy remain unresolved (Rokkan 1970). During
periods of state-building, the content of ethnic claims, especially territorial rights, often brings them into confrontation with a nation-state that
has not completely won the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the
contested territory. Even if they are only temporarily successful, ethnic
movements can undermine the legitimacy of the concept of a single
nation existing within one administrative unit. That is, ethnic/national
identiŽcation as a ‘Nigerian’, a ‘Finn’, or an ‘American’ is easily contradicted by reality, since the vast majority of countries include population s
speaking multiple languages, with different ethnicities, cultures, and
religions within its borders. These contradictions can render state-building efforts problematic, especially when state-builders are attempting to
legitimate a single national ethnic identity, as Nigerians, Finns, and
Americans.
Although these arguments suggest that while ethnic movements are
not new, historical forces of nationalism have reinvigorated their
momentum and provided a new basis for ideological grounding. My argument is that integration of the economic and political world system has
created new forms of ethnic politics that varies systematically among
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
189
types of countries, especially among core and peripheral nations that
have varying levels of ethnic incorporation policies and varying degrees
of economic inequality. Together, the dual trends of increasing political
access and decreasing ethnic economic disparity shape ethnic protest.
This argument considers the fact that ethnic social movements can
potentially take many different forms – ranging from small-scale, local,
linguistic conicts to large-scale territorial demands for special regional
status, or even civil war. Ethnic con ict is collective action that is based
predominantly on some set of ethnic markers – such as skin colour, language, migration, history. One or more ethnic movements can emerge
from ongoing ethnic con ict that begins to articulate nationalist goals,
such as claims of ethnic dominance over the state, or, exclusion of some
other group from citizenship.
Ethnic movements are distinct from other bases of group conict in
that they employ distinctly modern political claims. At the same time, to
others, ethnic movements seem to be expressions of primordial identities
(Isaacs 1975). The current consensus Žnds it useful to consider how
ethnic movements have revived ancient traditions, dialects, or practices,
and they have made use of historical myths in mobilizing sentiment and
loyalties against ethnic enemies (Horowitz 1985; Nagel 1995). A central
goal of this article proposes to shift the locus of debate upward by considering world-level processes that cause ethnic movements.
Integration of the world system and ethnic protest
Attempts to link historical processes of nationalism and ethnic protest are
well-documented. For example, consider Anderson’s (1991) observation
that both nationalism and ethnic movements claim that they have legitimate authority over a speciŽc territory or population. This argument holds
that ideological roots of nationalism have shaped the nature and legitimacy of modern demands for territorial, administrative, economic parity,
and political rights of ethnic groups (Smith 1981, p. 18). Rokkan’s (1970)
sequential theory of the consequences of state-building crises suggests that
peripheral nationalism peaked during speciŽc periods of world history, but
then declined as major divisive factors such as class and occupational
cleavages superseded those based upon ethnic loyalties.
These same processes are examined here by considering the effects of
world-level processes on ethnic movements within states. Our theoretical argument holds that the process of increasing integration and interlocking of a world economic and political system among states as actors
facilitates ethnic fragmentation within states. World-systems theory is
useful because it allows us to frame arguments about ethnic protest
movements at a macro-level of analysis, namely, by characterizing states
and groups of states along a continuum of dependency. This perspective
emphasizes that understanding the distribution of power relations among
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states shapes internationa l economic and political activity of states as
they have become more interdepend ent. In this essay, we extend these
insights about the consequences of economic and political integration of
states to outbreaks of ethnic protest.
World-systems theory provides a single explanation that links the outbreak of ethnic movements in the contemporary period with processes
associated with the diffusion of nationalism in earlier periods. Prior to
World War I, nationalism splintered empires using similar themes of
ethnic sovereignty which reect similar claims of separatist movements
that threaten state authority in the modern period. Broadly speaking,
nationalism may be conceptualized as a process of diffusion of citizenship rights, Žrst to individuals and later to ethnic groups. We argue that
because nationalism and ethnic movements share common ideological
roots, they are both consequences of the integration of states and territories into an interdepend ent world system. Our point here is the underlying sociological processes of empire disintegration and separatism
within nations share similar causes that can be identiŽed and studied as
part of a larger world trend. If this argument also holds for ethnic social
movements, then we may be able to understand how different forms of
ethnic protest and violence emerge in different world-systems contexts.
World-systems theory argues that the density of economic links among
the world’s states has created a hierarchy of more and less powerful countries. This perspective divides the world into two main extremes of
dependent relations: core and peripheral states. 3 Core states can be
deŽ ned as having (1) centrality in trade and military interventions, (2)
maintained dominance through the use (or threat) of a superior armed
force, and (3) centrality in a network of diplomatic information and
exchange, speciŽcally in their role of sending diplomats and authoring
treaties (see Snyder and Kick 1979). Periphery states are those that score
lowest on these same dimensions of centrality in military, economic,
trade and diplomatic domination .
Some scholars claim that the process of ethnic mobilization in periphery countries undergoing state-building has intensiŽed in recent decades,
when compared to the pace of resistance to state-building that took place
in older, mostly Western European states (Young 1987). While this
proposition has not been systematically examined, it is apparent that
state-building has been problematic in former colonies in Asia and
Africa. The ideology of national self-determination, that each separate
peoples has a moral claim to sovereignty, can also be used as an effective
strategy to undermine nation-states and stymie attempts at nation-build ing.
According to dependency theory, the economic integration of the
world system linked various regions, polities and markets together into
a dense and interdepend ent and single system. Economic recessions,
bank failures, or labour shortages now have repercussions in vastly
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
191
different and formerly unconnected regions and states. Political turbulence, including ethnic social movements, can produce serious reactions
across national borders within minutes or even seconds. The implication
of this political and economic integration is that integrative processes
have speciŽc, centrifugal consequences for ethnic politics. In other
words, integration of the world political and economic system has
encouraged local ethnic fragmentation and mobilization.
John Meyer and his colleagues have shifted the emphasis of worldsystems theory to consider the ideological implications of the integration
of the world system (Meyer and Hannan 1979). In recent research, these
scholars have considered the diffusion of human rights as a key motivation of modern social movements, including ethnic ones. On this view,
the fact that the diffusion of human rights organizations and associations
has led to the expansion of group rights in states that declared independence since 1945 (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997). The extensio n
of human rights guarantees in constitutions of all newly independen t
states since 1960, reects an emerging international culture. In core countries, this has the consequence of encouraging multiple movements that
use convention al political avenues for protest, lobbying and voicing
grievances. In peripheral countries, however, where authoritarian
regimes are less likely to embrace human rights policies, ethnic movements are more likely to be repressed. The tendency to suppress conventional protest in peripheral countries means that they will witness less
non-violent protest but, alternatively, when protest erupts it is more
likely to be violent, secessionist, and confrontational than in more open
and democratic countries (Kriesi et al. 1995). In other words, this argument leads us to expect the likelihood of ethnic violence to rise in proportion to repressive tactics used by peripheral states.
Examination of these arguments logically requires a comparative
research design conducted at a more macro-level than most of the
previous research on ethnic social movements. Historically, ethnic movements have been explained mainly in terms of internal processes within
states, regions, or groups. Furthermore, there has been a reliance on
case-studies, which can hamper the developmen t of general theoretical
perspectives. While the conventiona l case-study approach has generated
many interesting Žndings, few are generalizabl e and most of them suffer
from sample selection bias, that is, examination of ethnic movements that
were successful (Hechter and Levi 1979; Olzak 1982). Given these shortcomings, it seems to be an opportune time to consider macrosociological
mechanisms of ethnic mobilization at the global level.
The next section recasts the world systems arguments from a social
movement perspective. It reviews several leading social movement
explanations to develop themes of variation in the forms of ethnic
mobilization across countries. In particular, arguments from competition, internal colonialism, rational choice and political opportunity
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structure theories suggest several insights for understanding the timing
and location of ethnic movements. The third section presents a set of
arguments and hypotheses that compare social movement theory arguments from these four perspectives. The hypotheses all share the assumption that ethnic movements will have different forms in core and
peripheral countries. A fourth section discusses the consequences of
political integration of the world system, as seen in military defence, and
economic trade associations and networks. A Žfth and Žnal section discusses some issues of research design and methods for studying processes
of ethnic protest as a function of world-level economic and political processes.
Forms of ethnic protest and conict
At least four kinds of ethnic movements can be distinguished by their
timing and goals in reaction to a larger state or suprastate entity: (a)
group con ict containing both regional and ethnic themes that arises
during initial periods of state-building, (b) movements claiming regional
autonomy and/or rights to special status some time after state boundaries
have been legitimated, including separatist, secession, and autonomy
movements, (c) non-violent ethnic protest movements, as in the American Civil Rights movement, and (d) violent attacks and genocide, including ethnic cleansing, mob violence and symbolic threats of violence. 4
Past research Žnds it useful to distinguish ethnic aggression from
ethnic/racial protests against discrimination (Olzak 1992; Olzak and
Olivier in press). A conict occurs when two or more persons collectively
attack one or more members of an ethnic/racial group and this confrontation is reported as primarily motivated by the target’s ethnic identity,
language or skin colour. In race/ethnic conicts, one group (or more than
one) may be designated as the victim of the attack, or many groups may
simultaneously confront each other in a conict. Victims might also be
involved symbolically, as in a cross-burning in the yard of a black homeowner in a predominantly white neighbourho od.
In the case of an ethnic protest, a group expresses a racial or ethnic
grievance, usually to government ofŽcials or the public at large.
Examples include a march for voting rights, a sit-in against a discriminating store or restaurant, or a boycott against a company that has discriminated against some ethnic group. Regularly scheduled events and
institutionalized events such as congressional hearings are generally distinguished from protest because they involve conventiona l lobbying
strategies and interest group politics.
Ordinary instances of interracial crime and violent ethnic attacks are
often difŽcult to distinguish, as the concept of ‘hate crimes’ suggests
(Green, Glaser, and Rich 1996; Green, Wong, Strolovitch 1996). Most
researchers have chosen strategies that err on the conservative side in an
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
193
attempt to include only those incidents (reported in newspapers) that
have primarily ethnic/racial motives. In particular, in past research I have
excluded interracial muggings, rapes, or robberies that constitute everyday crime events. I have also excluded pronouncements by public Žgures,
political speeches, and editorials on racial issues (Olzak 1992; Olzak,
Shanahan and West 1994; Olzak, Shanahan and McEneaney 1996).
A second conceptual distinction contrasts violent and non-violent
ethnic events. Ethnic events can be deŽned as violent if participants (not
police) wielded weapons (in the form of bricks, stones, guns, knives, or
bats), or used weapons, Žre, bombs, or vehicles to harm other persons or
property, for example, taking hostages or taking control of public buildings. In these schemes, either protests or conicts can be more or less
violent, depending on the actions of participants and authorities.
We can also distinguish a continuum of violence, with riots and armed
rebellions found at one extreme (Gurr 1993). Riots are generally distinguished from other kinds of ethnic/racial protest in that they involve
more than scattered acts of sabotage or violence, are voiced by a large
mob (hundreds or thousands of persons), and involve violent activity that
lasts several hours or more (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996) .
Although this deŽnition is more or less shared by the internationa l press,
there are differences among countries that are important. For example,
the size of riots differs substantially, depending on the size of the minority population at risk. Olzak and Olivier (in press) Žnd that individua l
South African race riots mobilized thousands of participants, whereas in
the United States, race riots only rarely involve more than one thousand
active participants in one city. While a given riot might mobilize thousands, it is typically short in duration, rarely lasting more than one or two
days. Nevertheless, our experience suggests that in all cases of black race
riots in South Africa and the United States, injuries and damage to property occurred, and, in all cases, the police were a visible and active presence. In addition, in all cases that we judged to be race riots (based upon
size, violence, and duration), reports label the event as a ‘riot.’
Ethnic social movements
Ethnic rebellions represent an escalation in the level of violence and
political aims. They are deŽned as organized, politically-motivated and
ongoing movements, with identiŽ able goals, participants and episodes
that are intended to last months and years rather than days. They range
from political banditry and terrorism on the one hand, to all-out civil war
at the other extreme. They are distinguished from riots not only by the
scale of violence committed, but by the group’s having identiŽed goals of
secession, separatism, autonomy, hostage release, or some other distinctly political goal that is articulated through ethnic symbols and/or
regional identiŽcation.
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When does an ethnic rebellion become a social movement? Answering this question is difŽcult because ethnic rebellions have different constituencies as well as targets that depend upon a given political context.5
One need only consider all the possible accounts of the motivatio n
behind an IRA bombing in central London to see the political complexities involved. While keeping these caveats in mind, the literature does
suggest several relevant categories of ethnic protest can be distinguish ed
by the claims and goals of the movement.
In contrast to isolated ethnic events, ethnic rebellions and social movements involve sustained efforts to evoke major changes in political goals,
such as policies regarding subordinate groups, redeŽnition of citizenship
boundaries or rights, and/or efforts to exclude, subjugate, or control a
subpopulation or region. Ethnic movements tend to have broad goals of
social change in institutions, especially political systems. Well-develope d
ethnic movements will have identiŽable goals that seek to change the
society in a way that redistributes resources to disadvantag ed minorities,
obtain new political rights, change (or prevent) some public policy or law,
affect public opinion about an ethnic population or populations. More
diffuse movements will involve claims of discrimination centred around
an aggrieved group or region.
Ethnic protests that seek to eradicate and replace existing geographi cal and administrative state boundaries are secession or separatist movements. They differ from other forms of ethnic movements in that they
involve demands for ‘formal withdrawal from a central political authority
by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status’ (Hechter 1992, p. 267). Secessionists seek to establish a new
state (or, in the case of irredentist movements, to separate and join an
existing state). However, secession movements are difŽcult to sustain.
This is because host states have (by deŽnition) a monopoly over legitimate militia forces and have treaty rights and other ties with existing
states. The power balance is therefore highly asymmetric. Hechter(1992,
p. 270) hypothesizes that successful secession movements are relatively
infrequent, because they are extremely costly for smaller subregions and
require political organizations capable of mobilizing large numbers
willing to confront state repression. Yet, since the end of the Cold War,
we have observed many separatist movements, especially in Eastern
Europe. To explain these events, we argue below that the core/periphery
status and the levels of ethnic inequality within countries together shape
ethnic protest. In particular, we propose that core nations experiencin g
a decline in ethnic inequality will begin to see rising claims for autonomy
and political rights for minorities, while patterns of ethnic violence will
be more likely to occur in states that exclude ethnic minorities from the
political process (Smith 1979, p. 35).
Nevertheless, we agree that even if success is often illusory, secessionist claims can provoke widespread violence and long-term civil wars.
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
195
Secession movements that invoke principles of self-determination as
their anthem imply that domination of their region by another ethnic
group is illegitimate. State organizations and bureaucracies that are
dominated by one or more dominant ethnic groups will forcefully resist
the break-up of the state. In this case, further ethnic conict is often
mobilized in response to secessionist ethnic movements.
Smith (1979, p. 34) identiŽes a common set of events, which encourages a separatist response over a more accommodationist position. These
sequences begin with initial state building processes including the creation of a centralized bureaucracy and the diffusion of national educational institutions. If ethnic élites Žnd their mobility blocked, ethnic
movements based on minority discrimination will arise. The resulting discontent commonly involves a sense of violated rights, distributive injustice, and devalued self-esteem (see also Horowitz 1985, p. 181). Ethnic
conict results to the extent that one side is responsible for maintaining
these low evaluations based on ethnic identity. Civil wars of the kind in
Eritrea, Bangladesh, Biafra, and Sri Lanka are recent examples of this
form of ethnic secessionist movements.
Ethnic autonomy movements are those that claim special status for a
territory but refrain from outright secession. These movements often
seek special regional or group (that is, reservation) status, but they do
not initially aim at complete separation from the administrative state.
Such movements share many characteristics of civil rights movements.
Their claims reect the language of discrimination and draw attention to
unacceptable levels of ethnic or racial inequality, and they tend to
employ standard social movement strategies (such as marches, referenda, sit-ins, ethnic symbols). As Horowitz notes, the rhetoric of ethnic
autonomy movements strikes similar themes of injustice, whether they
are based in Quebec Province in Canada, the Punjab in India, Northern
Ireland’s Roman Catholics, or contemporary nationalist movements
within the former Soviet Union. As many have noted, positions of ethnic
disadvantage need not be true in order to have potent effects on social
movements for autonomy. Advocates of regional autonomy tend to voice
the rhetoric of economic and/or political subjugation , even in regions that
are undergoing an economic boom (Nielsen 1980; Olzak 1982).
An extreme form of ethnic violence against a target population might
be called ‘exaggerated nationalism’. In the past, these movements often
involved goals of ethnic or racial purity that required exclusion of some
other group of undesirable s. Most recently, this form of violence has
arisen as former states (or modern empires) fragment or dissolve entirely
and attempt to forge new and ethnically homogeneous identities (Jalali
and Lipset 1992 –93). The consequence is often a combination of
pogroms, terrorist movements, disenfranchisement, as well as other
methods of physical attack, such as rape, civil war and the taking of
hostages.
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The decline of authoritarian regimes coincides with the resurgence of
ethnic or nationalist movements, because the retreat of strong repressive
authorities leaves a power vacuum. As the former military and administrative structures recede, local level élites take advantage of this vacuum.
To the extent that élites are able to mobilize linguistic and cultural constituencies, they may voice claims for territorial self-determination to
authorities in the United Nations [UN]. Prior to the end of the Cold War,
it was a common strategy for ethnic minorities to make alliances with one
or the other side to the conict. Since the end of the Cold War, voices of
self-determination have been heard at the UN, and the European Parliament, and other forums that have a multi-state audience.
There are two types of ethnic reactions to declining authoritarian
regimes. The Žrst is a nationalist movement, which may or may not
involve violence. For dramatic examples, consider the nationalist claims
by Bosnians, and Chechens that followed the dissolution of the Soviet
Republics and related communist regimes. Clearly, the retreat (and, in
some cases, reappearan ce) of communist control in these regions has
opened the potential for a spectacular rise in chauvinistic nationalism . In
these movements, dominant ethnicities mobilize in the name of ethnic
nationalism against the former regime.
Under conditions of state disintegration, the same process that encourages nationalist sentiment can become mobilized as conict among
ethnic minorities. This second process involves ethnic violence among
groups competing for political dominance of a new territory. This type of
violence occurred within Bosnia that followed the break-up of the former
Yugoslavian state. In this example, violence between Serbs, Croatians
and Muslims became intractable within the small region of Bosnia. In the
Baltics, this has taken the form of policies and party platforms that
restrict citizenship for the former Russian-speaking élite (Ulfelder 1995).
In Romania, this has taken the form of anti-Hungarian activity. Some
forms of these local power struggles that occur in the wake of the retreat
of communist political monopolies have taken on an especially sinister
tone, as the phrases ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘ethnic genocide’ suggest
(Akbar 1995).
An ideological undercurrent links these forms of ethnic mobilizatio n
together. Leaders and supporters of all these ideal types of ethnic
mobilization and protest use the language of nationalism and selfdetermination to justify ethnic movements. Examples range broadly,
including both developed and underdevelo ped nations, socialist and
capitalist economies, and older Western European nations and newly
independent states. Recent cases include incidents of anti-foreigner violence in Germany, France and Denmark, Azerbaijani protests within the
former Soviet Union, successful nationalist movements in Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia and the Ukraine, ongoing separatist movements in
Eritrea and Sri Lanka, Serbian nationalism in the former state of
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
197
Yugoslavia, long-standing linguistic struggles in Quebec and in the
Basque region of Spain, and Hungarian protests against resettlement of
Hungarians in Romania. The next stage suggested by this line of reasoning prompts us to specify the causal links among ethnic movements,
forms of conict and levels of violence.
Thus far we have not yet considered the consequences of ethnic movements. In many such cases, wars, famine and natural disasters initiate
migration of refugees across borders. Transnational immigration raises
the likelihood that ethnic competition over jobs, land, resources even
citizenship rights, will occur. Current evidence suggests that during
periods of declining resources, competition among immigrant and native
groups intensiŽes (Jenkins and Schmiedl 1995). Anti-foreigner violence
often erupts under these conditions, as does the political support for
immigration restrictions, new deportation rules and other legal means of
expelling an unwanted group.
Theoretical arguments and hypotheses
This section provides some ways of understanding why structurally
similar positions of economic dominance in the world system produce
different patterns of ethnic violence, protest and rebellion. Two sets of
theories of ethnic mobilization emphasize economic inequality among
ethnic groups. One perspective holds that disadvantage d minorities
experiencing new economic advantages produce high levels of ethnic
mobilization. The other framework proposes the opposite relation, that
worsening economic conditions for minorities foster ethnic movements.
We extend these perspectives by adding the effects of core/peripheral
status in the world system and the effect of political opportunity structures within states. These additions allow us to include factors that
operate at the world-systems level as well as at the level of internal politics.
Political opportunity structure [POS] theorists add another dimension
to existing theories of economic inequality and ethnic protest. POS arguments suggest that we can usefully analyse cross-national variation in
ethnic protest by examining the variation in the rules of political
incorporation of new groups, demands, or policies (see McAdam,
McCarthy and Zald 1988; Kriesi et al. 1995). In particular, researchers
from this tradition Žnd that the amount of protest and levels of violence
used by protesters depends on the availability, permeability, and ease of
access to state decision-making processes. For instance, in extremely
closed and exclusive systems, violence is relatively rare; however, when
it erupts, it becomes highly uncompromising and radical in form (Kriesi
1995, p. 177). On the other hand, Kriesi’s model suggests that decentralized states with multiple routes of access to political power are able to
diffuse the impact of radical politics through accommodation and
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Susan Olzak
concession. The result is that inclusive state strategies encourage accommodationist politics by conventiona l and non-violent means.
Table 1 displays variation in ethnic protest and violence across two key
types of structural characteristics of states and their political systems.
First, Table 1 distinguishes arguments about processes that cause ethnic
protest in core states as compared to periphery states. We compare competition, internal colonialism, world systems/dependency, and rational
choice theories concerning the impact of ethnic inequality. The analysis
uses the distribution of power relations among states into core and
peripheries as a guideline. Core states can be deŽned as having (1) centrality in trade and military intervention s, (2) maintained dominance
through the use (or threat) of a superior armed force, and (3) centrality
in a network of diplomatic information and exchange, speciŽcally in their
role of sending diplomats and authoring treaties (see Snyder and Kick
1979). Periphery states are those that score lowest on these same dimensions of centrality in military, economic, trade and diplomatic domination.
The second dimension providing variation among the world’s states
involves the levels of ethnic exclusion or inclusion in states. Table 1 outlines four outcomes for ethnic mobilization in core and periphery
nations, with inclusionary and exclusionary policies regarding ethnicity.
Table 1 thus extends Kriesi’s typology for protest using exclusionary/
inclusionary policies by suggesting that exclusionary policies will have
different effects in the core compared to the peripheries . If this analogy
holds, we would see an intensiŽcation of non-violent protest in the core,
Table 1. Effects of changes in economic inequality and political inclusion on the
rate of ethnic protest and violence
Increasing ethnic inequality
Strategy of incorporation:
Core states:
Exclusion of minorities:
low rate of ethnic protest
(competition)
Inclusion of minorities:
Peripheral states:
Exclusion of minorities:
Inclusion of minorities:
high rate of ethnic protest
(internal colonialism)
non-violent protest
(all theories)
violent ethnic protest
(world sys./dependency)
high rate of ethnic protest
(world sys./dependency)
Declining ethnic inequality
high rate of ethnic protest
(competition, rational
choice)
low rate of ethnic protest
(internal colonialism)
non-violent protest
(all theories)
violent ethnic protest
(competition, rational
choice)
high rate of ethnic protest
(competition)
See text for discussion of the effects of changes in economic inequality and ethnic inclusion.
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
199
while the periphery states would experience more ethnic violence,
among the set of states having exclusionary policies.
Table 1 also distinguishes the effect of changes in ‘economic inequality’. This distinction refers to changes in inequality among minority and
majority groups. These dimensions explicitly address a shift in inequality
that either increases or decreases ethnic minority disadvantag e. Previously, world-systems theories have considered the impact of relatively
stable characteristics of economic dependence on collective action. Table
1 attempts to move the theoretical debate beyond static conditions to
locate the causes of ethnic protest in changes in equality, regardless of
the starting position. Thus, increasing ethnic inequality produces more
ethnic protest according to competition theory. A second argument is
that while ethnic protest may increase, outbreaks of violence instigated
by these protests will be shaped by a country’s core or periphery status.
Studies of inequality among countries suggest a strong correlation
between levels of political suppression of protest and economic inequality. That is, countries with more democratic rights and routes of political
access might be expected to have lower levels of economic inequality
(Muller and Weede 1990). 6 We build on this Žnding to argue that peripheral countries that are likely to employ more exclusionary policies
towards ethnic minorities will have higher levels of ethnic equality.
Recall that our purpose goes beyond describing the expected levels of
inequality in core and peripheral countries. Instead, our goal is to predict
a set of outcomes for ethnic movements related to changes in economic
inequality and in policies of ethnic inclusion. Our argument is twofold.
First, ethnic movements in core and peripheral countries arise in reaction to increases or decreases in ethnic economic inequality, according to
internal colonialism and competition theories, respectively. The second
dimension suggests that policies of ethnic inclusion and exclusion shape
the form of ethnic protest and violence within countries.
Ethnic movements in the core
Internal Colonialism Theory. Internal colonialism theory suggests that
policies of ethnic exclusion in core nations intensify grievances related to
ethnic disparities in economic attainment. An internal colony refers to a
situation in which a rich, culturally-dominant core region dominates and
exploits an ethnically-different and exploited periphery. In an inuential
statement of this perspective Michael Hechter (1975) analysed the persistence of cultural voting patterns in the Celtic Fringe in Great Britain.
He found that cultural factors, including Nonconformism and the use of
the Welsh language, accounted for voting patterns in economically disadvantaged counties but not in wealthier or more English counties.
Because internal colonialism theories were originally derived from
world-systems/dependency theories, it is relatively easy to transform
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these arguments at the world level of analysis (Wallerstein 1976). The key
argument from this tradition is that since the Žfteenth century the world
states have been transformed into economically and politically dominant
‘core’ nations, a less-developed ‘semi-periphery’ and increasing poverty
and dependence in ‘periphery’ nations. The second and related argument
is that the diffusion of a world capitalist system reinforces the dependence of peripheral nations on core nations, which retards development
in those poor countries.
According to this perspective, a combination of uneven industrialization and cultural differences among regions in core nations causes ethnic
grievances to become the basis of enduring political conict. On this
view, the sources of ethnic solidarity include uneven regional development that reinforces or creates inequality, dependency on external or
international investment, and an occupational structure that is highly
segregated along ethnic lines. According to Hechter’s line of argument
(1975, p. 43) strong ethnic solidarity provokes more ethnic conict in the
periphery than in the core.
Examples from ethnic movements based in the core nations of Canada,
Spain, Belgium and the United Kingdom have cast doubt on these claims
(Ragin 1977, 1986; Nielsen 1980; Olzak 1983; Medrano 1993). In confronting this issue, Hechter employs the concept of a cultural division of
labour to the internal colonialism imagery. A cultural division of labour
exists where jobs are allocated on the basis of cultural and ethnic boundaries. The relegation of minority group members to occupations with low
wages and poor conditions reinforces ethnic solidarity, so that organizations, networks and political parties based upon ethnicity emerge.
Hechter thus joins Marxist theories of group solidarity to the notion that
ethnic mobilization occurs where class-based grievances reinforce institutional and cultural subordination. From this perspective, the persistence of regional inequality, ethnic segregation and ethnic solidarity
explains the persistence of ethnic conict within modern nation-states
that are designated core nations.
World-systems/dependency theory suggests that peripheral and semiperipheral countries will experience high rates of ethnic violence,
whereas the core should experience relatively less unruly conict (and,
the core will experience relatively more violence if ethnic inequality
grows). According to this view, core nations that can afford accommodationist and redistribution policies will serve to undermine ethnic grievances and social protest (Muller and Weede 1990). One implication that
has received some empirical support is that ethnic disparities are smaller
in core nations as compared to periphery nations. On the other hand, on
this view, the integration of the world system implies that nationalism
produces more associational politics of protest in the core compared to
the periphery. If we expand this idea, then we might expect that core
nations will experience relatively higher rates of non-violent and
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
201
conventiona l ethnic protest, reecting the fact that they have more
democratic state polities (see the row labelled ‘Inclusion of Minorities’
for Core countries, in Table 1).
Competition Theory. Competition theories emphasize that regional
development and declining ethnic inequality produce ethnic movements
in either core or periphery nations. These arguments hold that declining
inequality among regions (or groups) releases forces of competitive exclusion and conict. Competition theorists argue that ethnic conict arises
when ethnic groups within nations come to compete in the same labour
markets and increase their access to similar sets of political, economic
and social resources. That is, this view holds that ethnic collective action
surges when a cultural division of labour begins to break down. The key
argument is that ethnic collective action results from conditions of niche
overlap (Barth 1969). As ethnically different groups come to compete for
jobs, housing and other material rewards, hostilities and con icts among
groups intensify. Ethnic mobilization can occur as dominant groups
attempt to reassert their dominance over newly competing groups, or as
formerly disadvantag ed ethnic groups challenge the existing power structure.7
Application of competition arguments to world-system level processes
involves more than just a simple inversion of internal colonialism theory.
Because competition theory requires that competition be within the
same markets, one has to assume that capital, labour and information
ow across country borders. Prior to 1989 in the USSR and Eastern
Europe, in contemporary China, most of Southeast Asia, and in many
Middle Eastern countries, this is not a reasonable assumption. Which
groups, then, are in competition, at the world level today?
I suggest that one answer to this question lies in the core –periphery
distinctions. Within these categories competition is intensiŽed, but
between them, conict and competition are minimized. Core nations
compete for economic dominance, political and military superiority, and
for control over the dependent peripheries. Conict among peripheries
is likely to be a function of these rivalries among core nations, as the
history of colonial and post-colonial Africa suggests. Periphery nations
also experience conict along internal borders, and when ethnic mobilizations are displaced by civil war, and other consequences of instability
within nations.
We have evidence that as core nations experience longer periods of
stable democracies (Muller and Weede 1990; Strang 1990), they are
inclined towards policies of ethnic inclusion, having multiple routes of
access to political power for minorities. Examples of the United States,
Switzerland and The Netherlands all suggest that ethnic minorities
protest vigorously in these settings, but they do so mainly within the
context of normal politics. This is because the routes of access are
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well-known and understood, and the heavy costs of violent protest can
normally be avoided in most circumstances. In core nations with such
inclusionary strategies of ethnic incorporation, all the perspectives
reviewed above would lead us to expect that conventional ethnic politics
and non-violent protest will prevail. Thus, we Žnd that most forms of
protest in the core nations, including ethnic ones, will commonly involve
conventional party politics, or conventiona l non-violent protest, such as
marches, vigils and petitioning (Kriesi 1995, pp. 176 –78).
Competition theory arguments also hold that processes of declining
inequality among ethnic groups in core nations lead to more conventional ethnic protest than it would in semiperiphery and periphery
nations. Competition (especially political competition) intensiŽes as
groups achieve more equivalent size distributions within a state (as
opposed to asymmetric power dominance that is based on highly different size distributions). Diversity is also likely to have an independen t
effect on competition levels. For instance, earlier research on domestic
violence argued that ethnic heterogeneity had a positive and signiŽcant
effect on instability and collective violence of various kinds. In contrast,
recent work by Gurr (1993), Muller and Weede (1990) and others Žnd
that group conict intensiŽes when there are relatively few groups of
similar size. According to this view, we might expect an interaction effect
between declining inequality and ethnic diversity measures within the
core. Competition theories would expect that ethnic heterogenei ty (or
diversity) will have stronger effects in countries in the middle range of
diversity, when compared to nations that are extremely ethnically homogeneous or have highly racial and ethnic diverse populations.
Rational Choice Formulations. A third framework, from rational choice
theory, emphasizes that modern ethnic movements occur with regularity
because they have unique properties that allow them to overcome the
free-rider problem that encourages non-participation. According to this
view, because ethnic groups are able to form dense social networks,
group solidarity is high, which helps to minimize costs of mobilization.
Simultaneously, ethnic groups can efŽciently apply systems of monitoring behaviour, ensuring loyalty, and sanctioning members (Hechter
1987a). One consequence of these features of ethnic groups is that solidarity remains high, despite the attraction of other competing loyalties.
Yet, as Nielsen (1985) and Hechter (1987b) point out, solidarity does not
alone ensure that mobilization on the basis of ethnicity will arise. Nor can
it explain the timing of social movements.
In order to explain the conditions under which ethnic mobilizatio n
occurs, rational choice theorists attempt to specify factors that decrease
the costs of ethnic mobilization. The more core the nation, the lower are
the costs to conventiona l ethnic protest. Hechter (1982; 1987b) proposed
an explanation of why secessionist and separatist rebellions are more
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
203
infrequent in the core, whereas other, more radical forms of ethnic movements are more likely in the periphery. In the contexts of regional secession and ethnic separatist movements, the process of mobilizing against
the host nation-state becomes increasingly costly because of the very
nature of the state. That is, because the state has organizational legitimacy and a monopoly over repressive forces, outright opposition to
legitimate state control becomes increasingly costly as an ethnic movement begins to challenge a state’s existence (Hechter 1992, p. 275). This
leads to the hypothesis that the more core the nation, the costs to outright separation from the state will increase. Thus, we can begin to understand why non-violent ethnic movements might be more frequent at the
same time that more virulent threats to state power decline in number
within core nations.8
While this tradition has not yet generated many empirical studies, it
has one advantage over existing traditions. It can account for the well
documented Žndings that upper-middle classes form the social basis of
ethnic movements.9 That is, the majority of empirical investigation s of
ethnic separatist and regional movements Žnd that leadership and attitudes favouring support of ethnic movements are in the more educated
and white-collar sectors (Rogowski 1985; Bélanger and Pinard 1991;
Medrano 1993). On this view, the material wealth of the upper-middle
and educated class is less dependent on remaining in the host country
than are other social classes, while at the same time the middle and more
educated classes stand to gain from a constrained distribution system that
is regionally bounded. These arguments suggest that measures of class
inequality should be included in investigation of core/periphery differences in ethnic conict.
Ethnic movements in the periphery
From a world-system/dependency theory perspective, peripheral nations
have a different political dynamic with respect to ethnic group conict
than do core nations. This is due to the fact that peripheral nations by
deŽnition hold a relatively dependent position in the world stratiŽcation
system. On this view, dependency intensiŽes effects of all types of
internal conict. The analogy here is on a shrinking or limited resource
environment, in which groups Žnd themselves increasingly in competition for fewer political and economic resources. The processes of
change within peripheral nations will have more immediate and more
intensiŽed consequences.
Most theorists tend to agree that the peripheral nations have more violence, conict and outright rebellion than do core nations (Gurr 1993) .
Peripheral nations regularly experience episodes of regime change,
uncertainty and power vacuums, which lower costs to ethnic mobilization
(Fearon and Laitin 1995). At the same time, peripheral nations are more
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Susan Olzak
likely to experience regime shifts towards authoritarian regimes and
away from more democratic policies (Meyer and Hannan 1979).
Analyses of repressive regimes suggest that models that take a curvilinear relationship between authoritarian regimes and domestic violence
into account are useful (Rasler 1996). In such settings, protest peaks as
regime repression is in the middle ranges of repression.10 According to
this view, we would expect more overall variation in the amount of ethnic
violence in countries that exclude political participation of some ethnic
groups than in countries with inclusionary policies. In countries exercising extreme political disenfranchisement the only means to political
power is by the violent overthrow of the regime. This implies that when
protest begins, it becomes difŽcult to constrain. We expect that the difŽculties in moderating ethnic movements would be greater in the weaker,
periphery nations that have fewer military and police resources.
Inclusionary policies in both core and peripheral countries will
produce more non-violent than violent mobilization. This means that
core/periphery distinctions are less relevant once inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions are taken into account. The distinguishing feature of
peripheral countries is between those with exclusionary and those with
inclusionary ethnic policies. In countries with relatively easy access to
political power, competition theory implies that declining ethnic inequality in the economic sphere encourages ethnic mobilization that is conventional and non-violent. In peripheral countries with declining ethnic
inequality, ethnic mobilization may turn into violent and full-scale rebellion according to competition and rational choice perspectives (see Table
1).
Applying arguments from internal colonialism theory is more difŽcult
because the theory has mostly been used to explain why underdeve loped regions within core countries mobilize on the basis of ethnicity. If
we push internal colonialism arguments to the world systems level,
however, peripheral countries can be considered analogous to peripheral regions. World-systems/dependen cy theory suggests the proposition that peripheral countries with rising ethnic inequality would
experience higher rates of con ict than core countries. This may hold
true in either exclusionary or more open access systems (see the two
lower left-hand entries in Table 1).
Policies of ethnic exclusion, such as Apartheid , should foster higher
levels of ethnic violence in all states, but these effects are more pronounced in peripheral countries when compared to core nations. This is
because periphery nations with closed or exclusionary systems force
protest movements to go undergroun d, become exiled, or engage in outright armed rebellion. Anti-foreigner violence often erupts under these
conditions, as does political support for immigration restrictions and new
deportation rules. In authoritarian regimes, where protest is repressed
with escalating levels of violence, the likelihood of armed rebellion in
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
205
reaction to repression is higher than in countries where there are other
outlets for protest. In particular, case-studies of the Intifada, East
Germany, South Africa and Iran suggest that revolutiona ry outcomes
can emerge triumphant despite conditions of extreme repression and
exclusionary policies (Moore 1995; Olzak and Olivier in press).
Ethnic violence and rebellion will also be more likely in the periphery
according to rational choice theory, which emphasizes that the beneŽts
attached to ethnic mobilization will be higher in those regions with a
weakened institutional apparatus. For example, Weingast (1995, p. 36)
Žnds that periods of regime change and/or shifts in political alliances
often encourage ethnic conict. His point is that ethnic conict is more
likely to occur when institutional constraints on insurgency have been
weakened. Another consequence of an ineffectual political system is that
ethnic leaders can capitalize on the fears of ethnic minorities during
periods of uncertainty. This perspective emphasizes that during political
crises, the threat of ethnic victimization becomes more credible. By intensifying ethnic fears of persecution, leaders are able to successfully
emphasize the beneŽ ts of mobilization as ethnic constituencies (Fearon
and Laitin 1995). Such arguments suggest that ethnic mobilization peaks
in faltering or failing core nation-states that have excluded minorities
(see the upper left-hand cell of Table 1).
Political integration of states and ethnic conict
This section shifts the focus to consider the political consequences of an
increasingly integrated world system. It suggests that as nation-states
became linked together in networks of military and economic associations, national political boundaries weaken. The same forces that
encouraged the diffusion of nationalism as an ideology also affect ethnic
movements within and between state boundaries. These processes of
ethnic resurgence are not new, but they might be intensifying as political
associations (such as the European Union [EU], NATO, the UN) replace
activities once controlled only by state politics. For example, ethnic
movements that span borders, once called irredentist movements, are
now more likely to be seen as nationalist diaspora movements (Horowitz
1985; Brass 1991). As military, economic, trade, and other internation al
associations grew in number, the actions of individual nation-states
became less salient (relative to regions, city-states or other powerful
actors within states). The main point is that the decline in the political
authority of nations coincides with an increasing number of movements
based on ethnic regionalism.
Such legitimacy has had a direct impact on the rhetoric of social movements within nations. Virtually all ethnic subnational movements since
World War II have invoked the language of national self-determination
in their demands. For rather different examples that share this
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characteristic, consider the territorial claims made by the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the American
Indian movement. Until recently, most accounts have not moved beyond
the observation that these ethnic movements share a distinctly nationalist rhetoric based on claims of common culture and ethnic afŽnity.
Only a few treatments of ethnic movements consider the sociological
mechanisms underlying these similar ideological claims. The most prominent of these are based on ecological theories of organization that argue
that the increasing scale of organization is an important by-product of
economic and political development in the world system, as states and
supra-state organizations increasingly dominate the world economy
(Hannan 1979; Olzak and Nagel 1986). On this view, economic and political developmen t promotes interaction and interdepend ence among institutions and populations that were previously unconnected and isolated
from each other. The key point is that modernization processes that link
isolated peripheries and communities have direct consequences for social
movements based on large-scale identities, such as ethnic nationalist
ones. As a result of this interdepend ence, increases in the scale of
organizations at the suprastate level (such as the EU) tend to promote
subnationalist claims, from the Scots, Bretons, Lombardy region in Italy,
etc., for regional membership apart from their nation-state administrative unit.
A principle of isomorphism underlies this process (Hawley 1968;
Hannan 1979). To the extent that political and economic sectors expand
the power of the nation –state this expansion produces a corresponding
increase in the scale of organization on the part of any potential political
groups. This is because modern political systems favour large-scale
organization. Only those political parties, interest groups, occupational
associations and ethnic groups able to compete on a national scale
survive and are likely to be successful. Small-scale dialects, cultural
groups and traditions may recede in importance, as larger, territorial
identities become more salient to a national system of political competition. 11 The theoretical point being made here is that large-scale ethnic
nationalism will be encouraged over small-scale identities even more as
state economies and politics become more integrated. This is because the
scale of social organization and political power shifts from local,
parochial and personal relations to internationa l, associational and
impersonal multi-state bureaucracies.
Smaller-scale identities such as kinship, family and neighbourho ods
remain relevant in local settings. Yet, larger-scale ethnic identities have
become increasingly more important as policies regarding language, education, discrimination, afŽrmative action, regional taxation and redistribution are contested at the national level. So ethnic groups must
reorganize nationally to compete effectively for state resources. According to the principle of isomorphism, ethnic boundaries continue to
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
207
expand to include the largest possible subunits and in this way continue
to create and recreate large-scale ethnic groups and identities (Hannan
1979; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Nielsen 1985). In other words, ethnic-bloc
voting only makes sense if the opposition vote is a substantial one that
can affect outcomes.12 The existence of enlarged ethnic organizations
enhances ethnic collective action on a large scale in so far as they provide
organizational infrastructures, leaders and network links. Taking this
process one step further, I suggest that large ethnic organizations might
spread across state boundaries as well, linking irredentist movements and
diaspora groups in different nation-states in pan-ethnic or pan-racial
movements.
The threat or outbreak of internationa l conicts (which recently
included activities associated with the Cold War) provides a structure for
building new alliances, coalitions and sets of interdepend ent relations
between countries. With each new realignment of nation-states comes a
new set of regulations for political asylum and deportation. As scholars
in the internationa l relations Želd argue, the recent demise of the Cold
War demonstrates that new and different sets of network alliances can
emerge from former enemy camps; and new enemies (with new ethnic
subgroups) become salient to the world system of political diplomacy, as
the case of Mainland China in the late 1990s suggests.
But once again, it is the changing set of conditions which provides the
spark for collective violence within nations. International wars as well as
internal con icts provide a steady stream of political refugees seeking
asylum and refuge. The Arab refugee problem in the Middle East is a
well-known example of ethnic strife that is both a cause and consequence
of future ethnic instability. The Bosnian tragedy provides another kind
of example, as the conict there has produced an enormous number of
refugees in Italy, Germany, Hungary and Austria. Each of these
nation –states in turn has signiŽcantly shifted its immigration policies
towards higher restrictions and fewer permanent or long-term visas. As
host countries such as Germany and Hungary faced internal economic
contractions, internal hostilities and tensions against foreign-born ethnic
groups increased in reaction.
This argument also clariŽ es how economic interdepend ence among
states may also foster rising ethnic subnational movements. Organizations such as the EU, OPEC, NATO and other supranational organizations promote interstate migration and decrease reliance of regions
within states on the military and economic power of the nation-state.
Multi-state organizations also provide forums for subnational organizations. On this view, the growing network of internationa l economic
relations, exempliŽed by multinational corporations, growing trade and
foreign investment, and supra-national economic associations, will continue to produce more large-scale ethnic movements. Examples such as
proposals for membership of Northern Ireland and Scotland in the
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Susan Olzak
European Parliament suggest that increasing economic and political
interdepend ence has encouraged regional subnational ism in recent
years.
We might speculate that one (perhaps unanticipated) consequence of
the forthcoming integration of the European economic system will have
for ethnic tensions is that, as labour ows move more freely across
member states, there will be an increasing rather than a decreasing need
to document workers from outside the EU. Thus, one type of ethnic identity – that of non-Europeans – will become more salient at the same time
that distinct national identities within the community (French versus
German) become less so. We might also add that to the extent that the
European/non-European boundary becomes more salient, the political
and economic lines around immigration rights, unemployment and
health beneŽts to workers, and citizenship rules, will be redrawn as a consequence. The point is not just that a new amalgamated identity emerges,
but rather that the social and political movements will become increasingly organized around a boundary line that is not tied to existing state
boundaries (that is, all immigrants from non-European countries).
Because supra-national organizations subsume national boundaries , they
create options for drawing new lines of confrontation based on the new
ingroup and outgroup boundary.
Does this mean that the creation of supranational associations
inevitably leads to rising ethnic tensions? Pushing competition theory to
this world-system level of analysis suggests that at least in the short run,
the initial decline of state barriers and the rising ows of immigrant
workers (temporary or permanent) will increase the salience of some
ethnic boundaries. To the extent that European workers experience competition from transnational migrants, more ethnic violence will result.
Competition theories hold that ethnic violence would depend on the rate
of in-migration, size and wage stability in these core countries. On the
other hand, if the integration of the European economy stimulates widespread economic expansion, the movement of immigrant workers from
regions of low labour demand to high labour demand may occur more
smoothly.
Military interdepend ence constitutes an obvious way that international relations affect conicts within countries. Although such techniques are not new, as Enloe (1980) pointed out in her book Ethnic
Soldiers, and as Tilly (1993) reminds us in European Revolutions, super
powers arm and train ethnic and subnational groups in order to stabilize,
or in some cases destabilize, regimes, as was the case in Afghanistan ,
Nicaragua, Vietnam, Iraq and many other recent conicts. Because of the
political sensitivity of such policies, information on such relationships is
difŽcult, if not impossible, to obtain. However, it is now clear that covert
and overt military aid may have increased the mobilization potential of
subnational movements considerably.
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
209
Military interdependence among states fosters ethnic conict in a less
obvious way. Multiple-state defence organizations diminish the signiŽcance of any one member state. Questions about whether Quebec or
Scotland can and should join NATO, and on what basis, provoke just
such debates and discussions. If Tilly (1993) is correct in his predictions,
such processes will decrease the viability of the nation-state as an
organizational form in future decades. Whether we shall witness more
ethnic civil wars like the one in the former state of Yugoslavia, or
whether ethnic tensions lead to increasing founding of ethnically-homogeneous quasi-states, as in the case of the former Soviet Union, remains
to be seen. However, it has become clear that ethnic con ict does not
invariably diminish with the dissolution or splintering of a multi-ethnic
state.
In fact, recent events suggest the very opposite, that ethnic conict
sometimes increases as the repressive power of a state declines
(Horowitz 1985). When outside nations withdraw their military presence,
as happened in the case of Soviet presence in Eastern European countries, such as East Germany, nationalist movements of all kinds gain
momentum. As Hechter notes, such nationalist fervour results from the
fragmentation of states; thus, they are not the same as movements whose
goal is total separation from an existing state (Hechter 1992) .
At the same time, this does not mean that such nationalist movements
have been created completely anew. Rather, the argument from competition theory is that shifts in the competitive political process have made
room for other competitors. As a result, competition in the political
sphere intensiŽes. For instance, some Soviet and Eastern bloc observers
claim that during the late 1980s, as glasnost and perestroika undercut the
absolute authority of ethnic Russians within the state apparatus of many
Soviet Socialist Republics, nationalist sentiment became easier to
mobilize, particularly in the former republics of Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia
and Lithuania (Ulfelder 1995). This development created the potential
for new national leaders and quasi-party structures. Whether this potential for political competition can be converted into pluralist political
structures is not yet clear; the outcome may depend on the future
organizational strength of such movements in each country.
The position of ethnic minorities within these newly developing states
within Eastern and Central Europe encourages further fragmentation of
ethnic movements against newly democratic states. For example, Gypsies
in Hungary have begun to mobilize in signiŽcant numbers. Some Gypsy
leaders have territorial sovereignty, afŽrmative action programmes, and
various extensions of citizenship and welfare rights as their goals. The
political refugees from civil wars in Bosnia and other regions provide
another set of potential recruits available for ethnic movements,
although resettlement programmes may eventually undercut their ability
to mobilize in any one country. Furthermore, resettlement programmes
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Susan Olzak
(and their opposition) often provide new stimulus for ethnic violence, as
examples from the West Bank in Israel suggest.
Research designs and measurement issues
Sociologists interested in the causes of social movements have long considered the natural histories of movements as a key to understand ing the
process by which collective action unfolds and recedes. Until recently,
most natural histories of ethnic movements have relied on case-study
narratives of one country. While such studies are rich in detail and
history, the wide variety of case-studies has not added up to much cumulative knowledge about causes of ethnic movements. This is because the
case-study approach often focuses on regions or historical periods
characterized by ethnic turmoil. By ignoring other regions or time
periods that were also at risk of having ethnic conict, such studies are
less useful for making causal inferences about the dynamics of ethnic
conict. Recently, researchers have shifted their focus and begun to
analyse such phenomena by focusing on ethnic events that occur and do
not occur in various settings.
Analysis of ethnic conicts within and between nations requires
research designs and methods that take into account the effects of
changes in political and economic structures on rates of occurrence.
Information on the timing of events is crucial, especially if we are trying
to adjudicate among competing theories that imply different causal
sequences.
Event-analysis provides powerful ways of analysing the kinds of
dynamic processes outlined above (Olzak 1989a; Gurr 1993; Olzak and
Olivier in press) This approach uses information of the timing and
sequencing of events to estimate models for rates. Two general forms of
event history analysis are relevant for studying the processes discussed
here. The Žrst involves study of recurrent events of one kind, such as race
riots in the United States, where the typical duration of an event is short
relative to the waiting time between events. The second considers transitions among movements and countermovements, as in the relationship
between the rate of pro-Gypsy demonstrations, and the rate of antiGypsy attacks and violence (and vice-versa).13
Analysis that focuses on the frequency of occurrence of different types
of events is particularly useful for testing the hypotheses offered above.
For instance, competition models of ethnic collective action propose that
economic contraction and changes in the level of competition among
groups spark ethnic conict. Longitudina l research designs are appropriate for examining whether changes in structural conditions coincide
with the occurrence (and non-occurrence) of ethnic collective actions.
This becomes important when analysing data on events that are rare, as
are most separatist and secession movements (see also Hechter 1992).
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
211
That is, only methods that take countries (or time periods) which do not
experience ethnic movements, as well as those which do, will help us to
avoid sample selection bias. Sample selection bias causes problems in
making causal inferences when a sample has been chosen on the basis of
some level of the dependent variable, that is, only countries that have
experienced some ethnic turmoil.
The advantage of examining a set of countries at risk in a longitudina l
design means that explanation s of cycles of protest or ethnic violence can
be explained rather than described in retrospect. Though the concept of
cycles of protest is not new, it has rarely been investigated empirically
(Tarrow 1989). Event-history methods track the unfolding of events and
their responses over time, use of these methods facilitates the study of
diffusion or contagion of events. This means that questions about
whether ethnic protests in one country sparked subsequent protests in
other countries can be investigated with analysis of events as a point
process. Questions about whether state repression increases or depresses
the rate of protest can also be investigated empirically using these
methods that follow the trajectories of movements over time.
Another systems-level process is particularly relevant to the world
level of analysis. This is the process of diffusion of ethnic conict that is
central in institutional economics, legitimation theories, and social movement theory. Until recently, few sociologists have analysed data on the
process of diffusion of innovation in movements or strategies (but see
McAdam 1982). New methods for applying local hazard rates to track
the process of diffusion have been developed (Strang and Tuma 1993).
Such methods appear relevant to test claims that ethnic movements
diffuse rapidly in the current world system and that spatial and temporal
proximity affects diffusion. These techniques for analysing diffusion have
been applied successfully to the study of the breakdown of colonial
regimes (Strang 1990). One application of these methods that follows
from the discussion here would be to study diffusion of the American
Civil Rights movement activism in other settings, such as the antiApartheid movement in South Africa (Olivier 1990; Soule 1995; Olzak
and Olivier in press). Another line of inquiry has been developed by
Mark Beissinger, who has collected a data set on ethnic subnational
protests that took place in the former Soviet Union prior to its demise.
His analysis promises to uncover some of the key dynamics of collective
action that led to the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989
(Beissinger 1991) .
Other pioneering work in this area includes the research group on collective action at the Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin. Researchers Friedhelm Neidhardt, Ruud Koopmans, Dieter Rucht, and others have been
gathering data on protest events in Germany from 1950 to the present.
These data include valuable information about location and timing of
anti-foreigner violence in that country. They have also collected
212
Susan Olzak
information on events and on social movement organizations in the city
of Berlin, and they plan to examine the links between outbreaks of violence and organizational network connections in that city. When joined
with ongoing projects on social protest in other West European countries, the outlook for conducting comparative research on the diffusion
of various forms of ethnic mobilization looks promising.
Conclusion
This article began by drawing attention to the fact that the ideology of
territorial self-determination of nation-states has ironically led to ethnic
fragmentation and con ict within state boundaries. I have suggested
ways in which internal colonialism, competition, rational choice, and
world-systems/dependen cy theory illuminate the processes that link the
dynamics to ethnic social movements. In particular, this essay has
argued that processes of economic and political integration among the
world’s states has caused a rise in ethnic protest movements. In core
nations, ethnic protest is relatively frequent but it is also temperate. In
contrast, in peripheral nations, ethnic protest is likely to be sporadic, but
potentially more violent. Whether scattered non-violen t protests
develop into armed rebellions also depends on a variety of internal processes related to the political opportunities for ethnic inclusion and
economic mobility.
Research strategies for studying these processes now emphasize the
importance of gathering information on the history of events as well as
state responses to ethnic events, as one way of untangling the causal
sequences. Social scientists have long been fascinated with the obstacles
to state-building, but only recently has ethnic mobilization been a key
concern of sociologists. In my view, the most exciting trend in social
movements and collective action research is that we now have useful
theories, data and methods to begin unravelling the causal connections
between nationalism and ethnicity.
This article suggests a reformulation of three leading perspectives on
ethnic mobilization that can be applied to the world-systems level of
analysis. Arguments from internal colonialism, competition and rational
choice theories once focused only on internal processes. Recasting these
arguments at the world level allows us to gain some leverage over an
increasingly interconnected world. With this wide lens, we can begin to
include models of network connections of information, labour migration,
political treaties, refugee ows, as well as distribution of internationa l
corporations and companies that span country borders. If these models
also work at world level, then we shall have gained more understanding
of the rising importance of ethnicity as a political identity in the modern
world.
Ethnic protest in core/periphery states
213
Acknowledgements
Earlier drafts of this article were presented as a paper to the Center for
International Security and Arms Control, Workshop on ‘Claims-Making
and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late 20th Century’, at Stanford University in March 1997, and at the National Academy of Sciences,
Workshop on ‘Nationalism’ in November 1988, in Washington DC. The
author gratefully acknowledges the excellent research assistance that was
provided by members of the ethnic collective action workshop at Stanford University: Elizabeth H. McEneaney, Suzanne Shanahan. Michael
Hannan, Ron Jepperson, John Meyer, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Charles Tilly, S.
C. Noah Uhrig, and Barry Weingast all provided excellent criticisms and
suggestions on earlier drafts.
Notes
1.
Connor (1973, 1978); Olzak and Nagel (1982); Horowitz (1985). For reviews, see
Olzak (1983); Nielsen (1985); Brass (1991).
2.
For example, resource mobilization theory suggests that increasing solidarity facilitates mobilization . Without making this distinction, this proposition becomes tautological.
Not everyone agrees with this distinction, however. For example, Hechter (1987b) makes
exactly the opposite claim, in his article entitled ‘Nationalism as Group Solidarity’. Tarrow
(1994, p. 3) also includes solidarity as an integral dimension of his deŽnition of social
movements.
3.
We acknowledge that other researchers commonly also use the category of ‘semiperiphery’. Wallerstein and his colleagues have suggested that this intermediate category
is theoretically useful because it reects the view that dependency can be viewed on a
continuum (Wallerstein 1976). To sharpen the theoretical distinctions, here we focus on the
implications for the core and periphery.
4.
These categorizatio ns do not represent Žxed characterist ics. Longitudinal analysis
of events (discussed below) is particularly useful for studying movements that regularly
change goals, or choose different strategies of violence over non-violence, etc. A related
goal of my research on ethnic movements will analyse the effects of path dependence
among these various forms.
5.
Examples of this problem occurred in my coding of the French separatist movemen t
in Quebec. The Montreal Gazette routinely referred to separatist protesters as ‘rufŽans’,
whereas La Presse would refer to the same protesters as ‘rebels’ or ‘revolutionaries’. In any
given project, when different sources of information are used, the researcher needs to be
aware of the political nature of these labels (Olzak 1982).
6.
Research has established only that the association exists, but it has not clariŽed the
causal sequencing of these two processes. It is likely that a country’s enduring characteristics are highly path dependent, and thus depend upon signiŽ cant outcomes from statebuilding and modernization (Rokkan 1970).
7.
An example of the former is the case of white terrorism and rise in lynching of
blacks in the southern US following Reconstruction (Tolnay and Beck 1995). An example
of the latter occurred during the peak period of civil rights activism in America (McAdam
1982).
8.
Of course, such calculations are subject to change. Opposition may in turn weaken
the legitimacy of a state, so that calculus of costs and beneŽ ts to secessionist movements
shifts over time. It is therefore more realistic to model this as a dynamic relationship,
between state legitimacy and ethnic challenges to that legitimate authority.
214
Susan Olzak
9.
A related hypothesis is embedded in the so-called ‘new social movement’ perspective. Advocates argue that the emergence of a new professional and technical class of
employees fuelled the new wave of social movement activism in Western Europe (Kriesi et
al. 1995).
10.
The next step in this argument would be to develop a dynamic model of repression
and ethnic violence (see Olzak and Olivier (in press) for an initial statement). Such a model
would consider how shifts in deployment of state-sponsored violence would affect ethnic
movements.
11.
This discussion draws on Tilly’s (1978) historical arguments about the emergenc e
of the national social movement as a new form that coincides with state-building and stateexpansion. See also Tarrow’s (1994) related argument positing a causal relationship
between the rise of social movement repertoires that result from processes of nationbuilding, spread of literacy, and increasing organizational interdependence among associations, groups and state authorities.
12.
For a discussion of the dynamics and problems involved in mobilization distinctly
pan-Hispanic political organizations in Chicago’s city politics, see Padilla (1985).
13.
The latter method of analysing multi-state transitions has also been exploited in
analysis of enduring historical states, such as regime changes, as in the rate of movemen t
from one-party to multi-party rule (Hannan and Carroll 1981).
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SUSAN OLZAK is Associate Professor of Sociology, Stanford University.
ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford,
CA 94305-2047, USA.