Factors that influence recent mental health law decisionmaking in New Zealand
Associate Professor Kate Diesfeld J.D.
Director
National Centre for Health Law and Ethics
AUT University
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Conference
19-20 February 2010
Auckland
I. Introduction
This research examines current developments in mental health law decisionmaking in New Zealand. A selection of decisions have been studied regarding
discharge, Mental Health Review Tribunals and responses to historic claims of
abuse and neglect in psychiatric facilities.
In the first portion, a comparison is made regarding discharge from compulsion
for mental health consumers and for people with intellectual disabilities. The
threshold for discharge under the mental health legislation was established in
2001 in Waitemata Health v Attorney General (2001) FRNZ 216; NZFLR 1122
(CA). However, the recent appeal of a decision under the Intellectual Disability
(Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 may reveal a shift regarding
principles relevant to discharge. A decision from December 2009 regarding
discharge of a person with intellectual disabilities identifies a broad range of
relevant discharge considerations and may have implications for mental health
consumers under compulsion (M v RIDCA (2009) 8 /12/09, Simon France J,HC
Wellington CIV -2009-485-541).
The second portion focuses on the decision process of New Zealand‟s Mental
Health Review Tribunal. Building upon an analysis of 95 New Zealand decisions
from 2003 to 2004, this section inquires whether the same pattern exists in more
recent decisions. The analysis draws upon international scholarship regarding
judicial and tribunal decision-making.
The third portion analyses New Zealand‟s approach to claims of abuse and
neglect. A traditional tort claim for damages for mistreatment alleged to have
occurred over 50 years ago in a New Zealand psychiatric facility was decided in
2008 in J v Crown Health Financing Agency, Gendall J, HC Wellington CIV2000-485-876. This legal approach to historic claims is compared with New
1
Zealand‟s recent, extra-judicial, reconciliatory response through the development
of the Confidential Forum and Confidential Assessment and Listening Service.
This snapshot of judicial and extra-judicial developments in New Zealand‟s
mental health law may be the foundation for further collaborative international
research.
II. Court decisions regarding discharge
Two decisions illuminate the contrast in the courts‟ reasoning regarding
discharge from compulsion for people with an intellectual disability and people
with a mental disorder.
The entrance and exit criteria under New Zealand‟s Mental Health (Compulsory
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 has stimulated considerable academic
interest. Necessity is an essential entrance criteria for compulsion of mental
health patients pursuant to Section 27(3)(a):
If the court considers that the patient is mentally disordered, it shall
determine whether or not, having regard to all the circumstances of the
case, it is necessary to make a compulsory treatment order (emphasis
added).
However, the legal threshold for discharge does not match this entrance criteria.
In Waitemata Health v Attorney General G [2001] NZFLR 1122 (CA), the Court of
Appeal rejected the “appeal to symmetry” argument (para 87). For the
initiation of compulsion, a high threshold of necessity is justified based on the
grave intrusions into personal liberty. But the Court held that for discharge, only
the presence of mental disorder is relevant. If the mental disorder is present, the
compulsion must continue. If the mental disorder is absent, the person must be
“immediately released” (Dunlop, 2006: 226).
Where a compulsory patient is still „mentally disordered‟ that person
cannot be discharged, whether or not the person is fit to be released from
compulsion for some other reason (Bell and Brookbanks, 2005: 3 citing
Waitemata Health v Attorney General, para 93 per Elias CJ).
Does the disparity in the entrance and exit criteria constitute preventive
detention and arbitrary detention? Bell and Brookbanks (2005: 284) posed this
argument:
To maintain compulsory psychiatric detention simply on the basis of a
diagnosis of mental disorder, where there is no prospect of treatment that
2
is either efficacious or therapeutic, can only be for preventive purposes
and, as such, would constitute arbitrary detention.
The Waitemata case provides the backdrop for a more recent interpretation of
discharge criteria for people with intellectual disability subject to compulsory care
in M v RIDCA (2009).
M was subject to compulsion under Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and
Rehabilitation) 2003. The Act incorporates elements of the criminal justice,
protective and rehabilitative legal regimes. According to Section 3, the Act‟s
purpose is:
(a) to provide courts with appropriate compulsory care and rehabilitation
options for persons who have an intellectual disability and who are
charged with, or convicted of, an offence; and
(b) to recognise and safeguard the special rights of individuals subject to
this Act; and
(c) to provide for the appropriate use of different levels of care for
individuals who, while no longer subject to the criminal justice system,
remain subject to this Act. 1
M had an intellectual disability with a reported IQ of 58. In 2005, M was found
unfit to plead to the charge of possession of a weapon in a public place. Under
criminal law, the maximum penalty was a fine of $2000 or three months
imprisonment (potentially reduced to 6 weeks). But as a care recipient under
the new legislation, M had compulsory care in a designated residential facility
for 3 years and 3 months, resulting in this appeal to the High Court against a
renewal of the order.
The High Court held that “the Act was not designed for indefinite detention of
someone like M”. Renewal would produce an outcome wholly disproportionate
both to the original offence and to either the static or diminishing risk that M
posed.
1
Prior to its enactment, Professor Brookbanks predicted that the relevant number of recipients
would be 200 individuals (2003). According to the M decision, in December the following were
subject to the Act: 124 persons were subject to compulsory care orders and 51 of the orders
were for secure care; 155 civil clients were receiving services; 40 care recipients had had their
orders extended, 10 on more than one occasion. Affidavit of Lester Mundell, Chief Advisor,
Disability Support Services to the Ministry of Health. Para 26. M was one of the 10 individuals
who had multiple renewals.
3
The High Court held that the lower court‟s renewal decision failed to take
account of a range of relevant factors. This range was far wider than the initial
considerations undertaken when the order was made. Rehabilitative detention
for people with intellectual disabilities required on-going, and increasing,
justification. Renewal could not be justified solely by “what was good” for the
recipient; renewal must be justified by risk of a nature and level justifying
extended compulsion. Serious scrutiny of the justification for compulsion was
required if future rehabilitative gains were unlikely.
The factors relevant to renewals included:
the initial offence;
length of detention to date,
assessments of further progress
timeframes attached to any projected progress, and
detention must be for as short a time as necessary.
In short, the relevant exit factors are more numerous than the entrance criteria.
The longer the compulsion, the greater the required justification.
Accordingly, the High Court held that continued detention was a disproportionate
response to M‟s original offence of wielding a weapon. The High Court allowed
the appeal, held that the second extension should not have been authorised and
quashed the compulsory care order.
Three dimensions are of particular note. First, proportionality was analysed at
length by Judge Simon France:
In a broad sense there should be maintained proportionality or focus on
what brought the care recipient within the system. The less serious the
offending, the less one should normally expect extended periods of
detention (Para 92).
Secondly, the decision emphasised that potential impact of compulsory care
orders is indefinite detention. The spectre of indefinite detention was identified
by Professor Brookbanks in 2003 and central to the M outcome. Both the Family
and High Court decisions reported that the Act has had “unfortunate and likely
unforeseen consequences” (para 47) of unjustifiably restricting M‟s liberty.
Importantly, recipient‟s perceptions were emphasised. Both courts observed that
those subject to the Act perceive their compulsion as punishment, regardless of
the Act‟s stated purpose. Judge Simon France quoted the Family Court‟s
observation that:
A strong theme which arises in many if not all of these cases is that the
care recipients … have a clear understanding that the (order) is a form of
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punishment or consequence—a „sentence‟—for their wrongdoing that is
expected to be finite in duration (para 55)…. (They) believe they have
„done their time‟ and it is unfair for their „detention‟ to be extended. The
sense of unfairness must be increased when so much of the other
evidence emphasises the care recipients‟ good behaviour and positive
progress (para 56).
According to the High Court decision, while the legislative intent may have had a
rehabilitative instead of a punitive focus, “the distinction is lost on the persons
involved” (para 83). Also, if recipients did not have disability, their liberty would
be restored within months instead of years.
Finally, the decision identified that clinicians‟ benevolent intentions may have
unfortunate impacts. Some clinicians “often ask” for the maximum potential
extension (3 years) in the recipient‟s best interests, believing this will maximise
opportunities for rehabilitation and minimise disruption of legal processes.
However, this is legally problematic.
Decided 8 years apart, the cases demonstrate a contrast in the legal factors
surrounding discharge. Based on the Waitemata case, people governed by the
mental health legislation may have their compulsion extended even if that
treatment is not necessary. From the wide entrance criteria, the avenue narrows
at the exit. The sole determinant of discharge is whether a mental disorder
exists. The reasoning can be contrasted with the M case.
Under the intellectual disability legislation, the entrance criteria are relatively
narrow. The M v RIDCA decision lists a broad range of relevant factors that must
be considered to justify continued compulsion. The greater the duration of the
detention, the greater the required justification. From the relatively narrow
entrance criteria, the opportunities for discharge increase based on a wider
spectrum of exit criteria.
Each case was governed by separate Acts, each with distinctive purposes.
However, the more recent M v RIDCA decision under the intellectual disability
legislation introduced a higher level of scrutiny and a requirement for greater
justification for extended compulsion. Will these principles and consumeroriented approaches influence future discharge decisions in New Zealand‟s
mental health context?
III. Mental Health Review Tribunal decision-making
New Zealand‟s Mental Health Review Tribunal provides a fascinating study in
therapeutic proceedings. The Tribunal Annual Reports express its therapeutic
goals:
5
In the majority of cases, the tribunal‟s decision is contrary to that sought by
the applicant and so an effort is made to provide the applicant with
constructive and positive comment by way of support and encouragement.
Tribunal members seek to conduct hearings in such a way as to enhance
rather than damage therapeutic relationships. On the other hand, the
process is quasi-judicial, involving the determination of the rights and
interests of not only the applicants but other persons as well. Therefore, the
process necessarily involves a degree of formality (MHRT,2009:11).
The review body‟s therapeutic intent was analysed in 2006, based on the 95
decisions from 2003 to 2004. In the vast majority of cases, the panel upheld its
explicit commitment to support pro-therapeutic proceedings in two forms: it
offered positive comment and it attempted to enhance therapeutic relationships
(Diesfeld and McKenna, 2006). Also, the panel incorporated additional
dimensions that could be described as pro-therapeutic and that were not
explicitly stated in its Annual Reports: incorporating consumers‟ perspectives in
the written decision; giving advice; and challenging clinicians‟ treatment
decisions.
However, unintentional outcomes could flow from the adoption of therapeutic
goals in a legal setting (Diesfeld and McKenna, 2007). On some occasions the
rhetoric of therapeutic jurisprudence legitimated problematic practices. For
example, the decisions revealed occasions when the lawyers abrogated their role
as client advocates, justified through “therapeutic language” (Diesfeld and
McKenna, 2007 citing Freckelton, 2008: 586).
According to the most recent Annual Report, 7 people were discharged from the
100 cases heard by the panel from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009.2 Importantly,
none of the 15 decisions cited precedent from tribunal or court cases. As in
previous Reports, therapeutic processes were a stated goal. However, in
comparison with cases from 5 years before, the decisions incorporated fewer
references to therapeutic factors such as: maintaining therapeutic relationships;
explicit affirmation of consumers; and congratulations on progress.
Yet the Tribunal‟s enduring commitment to therapeutic processes could be
detected in the broad considerations weighed by the panel in select cases. The
following decision incorporates elements of this form of decision-making (Re XXX
27/4/07MHRT 07/037). In 2007, the applicant challenged his compulsion under a
community treatment order. The decision emphasised the person‟s deep
attachment to his occupation and explained how his condition, if untreated, could
jeopardise his livelihood. The applicant‟s industry had cautioned that it was likely
2
Two people were discharged from the 15 most recently reported decisions.
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to reject his product because his unorthodox practices could contaminate other
products. The review panel noted that this could in turn result in his bankruptcy.
The relatively lengthy decision (12 pages) cited no case law. However, the
decision incorporated some dimensions that could be portrayed as protherapeutic. For example, the decision included affirming comments: “The
tribunal found him intelligent, articulate, logical and clear” (para 8). Also, the
panel‟s decision sensitively detailed the likely impact of his condition on his
identity, well-being and family.
Several principles of therapeutic jurisprudence identified from the 2003-2004
analysis may be apparent in more recent decisions. And therapeutic
jurisprudence may continue to offer a meaningful international analytic
framework to understand tribunal decision-making. Future tribunal analysis in
New Zealand and other jurisdictions may be aided by Professor Freckelton‟s 2008
summary of critiques, and defences, surrounding the concept of therapeutic
jurisprudence.
Another analytic perspective on these decisions may be applied from Justice
Richard Posner‟s scholarship on judicial decision-making. As a distinguished
appellate judge and legal academic at the University of Chicago Law School, his
perspective is primarily focused on the decision-making by United States federal
appellate judges and Supreme Court Justices. Justice Posner observed that legal
decision-making may be portrayed as a spectrum. Located at one end, legalists
“do not look outside legal texts—mainly statutes, constitutional provisions and
precedents” (2008: 8). At the other end, legal pragmatists have recourse to
other sources of judgment, including their own political opinions, preferences
and policy considerations. Additionally, pragmatic judges “cite policy
considerations, consider purposes of the law and pay attention to social
consequences” (2008: 230).
Justice Posner‟s framework could contribute to understanding New Zealand‟s
decision-making processes. With rare reference to precedent in routine reviews
of compulsion, the Tribunal‟s decisions could be portrayed as pragmatic. Justice
Posner‟s observation could be applied to New Zealand‟s context:
Academics have little understanding of how cases are actually decided,
where the deciding judges are coming from and what really made them
alter existing doctrine… (Academics) are unaided by a realistic scholarly
literature on judicial decision-making (2008: 219).
Perhaps our understanding of tribunals in New Zealand and abroad could be
expanded by qualitative and quantitative research as recommended by Posner
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(2008: 218), in process by Carney, Tait and Beaupert in Australia (2007, 2008,
2008) and completed in England by Peay (1989) and Perkins (2003).
IV. New Zealand’s response to abuse and neglect.
The final portion of this presentation examines two of New Zealand‟s strategies
for resolution of complaints by aggrieved former patients. New Zealand plaintiffs
have attempted to obtain damages through traditional litigation for alleged
mistreatment in psychiatric facilities. Also, New Zealand recently devised an
alternative response, which may attract international interest.
A. Litigation for historic claims of abuse and neglect
A recent case portrays a standard legal approach within the court system. The
decision in J v Crown Health Financing Agency addressed J‟s admission at age 18
in 1954 to Porirua Hospital in 1954 and events that allegedly had occurred
between 1956 and 1960.3 The claim was based on assault and battery and
negligence. J did not bring the claim earlier because she believed she could not
sue.
The issues were:
(a) whether J proved that she was subjected to indecent and physical
assaults by nursing staff, was punished or threatened to be punished
through use of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT), insulin therapy and
seclusion, and/or suffered harm through breaches of duties of care,
(b) whether Crown Health Financing Agency was vicariously liable for
damages, and
(c) whether the proper measure of compensatory and or exemplary
damages in event liability was established.
The High Court held that for therapies to have been administered for reasons of
punishment there had to have been improper and unethical behaviour fuelled by
vindictive motives. It had not been proved on the balance of probabilities that
ECT, insulin therapy or seclusion was administered or threatened for
punishment. Despite J‟s perception that the treatment was a threat of
punishment, the court was satisfied that justification for the treatments existed.
The nature of J's evidence and its inadequacy did not meet the evidentiary
burden for the majority of allegations. However, the cause of action in assault
and battery through physical assaults by junior nurses or nurse aides was
J claimed general damages of $650,000, exemplary damages of $45,000 and special damages
for pecuniary loss of $250,000.
3
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established. However, J's failure to make the present claim earlier was not
because of her disability and therefore the claims for assault, battery, and
negligence were time barred. But for the Limitations Act 1950, J would have
been entitled to a modest award of damages for distress and suffering at time of
the acts but exemplary damages were not appropriate. J‟s claim was dismissed.
Perhaps the decision suggests that plaintiffs with similar claims will face similar
challenges. This approach can be contrasted with New Zealand‟s extra-judicial
response to historic claims of mistreatment during detention.
B. New Zealand’s reconciliatory strategy
Over the past decade, the New Zealand Government acknowledged historic
psychiatric abuse and neglect. In 2001, Sir Rodney Gallen produced a report on
abuses with the Child and Adolescent Unit of Lake Alice Hospital. The vast
majority of complainants were residents of Lake Alice by reason of unfortunate
circumstances, not mental illness. They were not committed under the mental
health legislation or for a „medical‟ condition (Cameron, 2006: 9).4
Sir Rodney reported:
The best summary which I can make of the large number of statements I
have made and the interviews I have conducted is that the children
concerned lived in a state of extreme fear and hopelessness. Statement
after statement indicates that the child concerned lived in a state of terror
during the period they spent at Lake Alice (Gallen, 2001).
In September 2001, the Government provided a $6.5 million settlement to 95
former patients.5 A personal written apology was signed by the Prime Minister
and the Minister of Health for events that occurred in that Unit between 1972
and 1978.
Subsequently, the Government created a complementary approach for aggrieved
former patients. In 2004, the Government established a panel to listen to former
patients‟ memories of their hospitalisation prior to 1992. The initiative aimed to
create an accessible, informal and confidential environment. Between 2005 and
2007, 493 people attended interviews and were provided with customised
information about local and national support services and networks. A broad
overview of the Forum process and patients‟ perspectives was published as the
Report of the Confidential Forum for Former In-patients of Psychiatric Hospitals
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2007).
In May 2001, the Government established a determination process, Sir Rodney commenced his
work in July, the sum of $6.5 million was allocated to settlements in September and Sir Rodney‟s
report was completed shortly after (Cameron, 2006).
5
During a second resolution and resettlement process, additional funds were distributed for a
total disbursement of $10.1 million (Cameron, 2006).
4
9
The Forum was described by Attorney General Michael Cullen as a “new
reconciliation initiative”. Therapeutic terms were used to describe the Forum at
an event hosted by Women‟s Health Action:
(The Forum) is a journey towards truth in the belief that being heard and
believed is fundamental; towards reconciliation in the hope that making
peace with the past helps in the journey to a place of internal peace,
resolution and calmness.6
The Forum participants expressed the hope that their revelations would have
preventive effects:
Many participants said that they wanted the Government to know what
had happened to them and to others. They hoped that the cumulative
effect of the confidential narratives told at the Forum might effect
changes in mental health services in New Zealand (Department of Internal
Affairs, 2007: 3).
In 2009, the Government created a similar but broader Confidential Listening and
Assessment Service (the Services) with an intended duration of five years. Both
the Forum and Service invited participants to express their views on their
experiences prior to the passage of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment
and treatment) Act 1992. This date was selected because “it reflects the time by
which these sectors had modernised their standards and improved mechanisms
to manage complaints” (Confidential Listening and Assistance Service: 2010).i7
The Service‟s scope widened to include people who lived in psychiatric hospitals
and also people who lived in health camps, child welfare facilities, and special
education homes. The highly confidential Service:
Provides an opportunity to talk
Helps participants identify needs and to obtain assistance (e.g. contact
details for the Health and Disability Commissioner, Accident Compensation
Corporation, police, counselling and related services)
Enables participants to access information held about them by the State,
and
Quoted from the invitational flyer for the Women‟s Health Action‟s event entitled “Truth and
reconciliation in the twilight zone” in 2007.
7
The Service facilitator reported that approximately only 20% of the participants are former
psychiatric patients; this may indicate that many former patients participated in, and were
satisfied with, the Confidential Forum(communication on file with author, 8/2/09).
6
10
Assists participants to come to terms with their experience as far as is
reasonable.
The Service does not supplant other legal remedies; a civil claim for damages
may be pursued (see above J v. Crown Health Financing Agency (2008) HC WN
CIV-2000-485-867). In describing what the Service is, the website also defines
what the Service is not. The Service is not a commission of inquiry to test or
evaluate evidence. Legal representatives are not allowed to accompany
participants to interviews. The Service will not produce findings or
recommendations:
(It) is not intended to determine liability or make judgements about the
truth of participants‟ experiences or stories, nor recommend the payment
of compensation…but (it) is designed to assist people with their present
practical and emotional needs arising from their experiences in State care
(Confidential Listening and Assistance Service: 2010).
As demonstrated by the informational material, the Service is designed to offer a
safe and free means to express dissatisfaction with past mistreatment. But the
boundaries of the project also raise questions. Is there sufficient justification for
the 1992 time bar? What is the evidence that conditions in state residential
facilities improved substantially in the interim? How could the participants‟ goals
of preventing similar occurrences be achieved? Could participants‟ anonymised
information be analysed to establish future safeguards for individuals whose
dependence renders them vulnerable within residential facilities?
A final question is inspired by the juxtaposition of the adversarial and
reconciliatory approaches available to survivors of alleged mistreatment in New
Zealand. Plaintiffs may pursue damages within an adversarial court environment.
They may also confidentially express their distress to an independent panel of
listeners “in the journey to a place of internal peace, resolution and calmness”
(Confidential Listening and Assessment Service, 2009). How does New Zealand
reconcile the adversarial legal process (as evident in the J decision) with the
benevolent healing intent of the Service?
V. Conclusion
New Zealand has adopted several legal responses to issues raised by people who
are subject to compulsion on the basis of their history of mental distress.
Regarding discharge decisions, in the future courts may be influenced by the
broad principles that were applied to a decision regarding discharge of a woman
with an intellectual disability. With regards to discharge by the Mental Health
Review Tribunal, the Annual Reports continues to express the review body‟s
commitment to therapeutic proceedings and may be manifest “pragmatic”
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decision-making, as defined by Justice Posner. Further research on how the
review body functions may contribute to international mental health
jurisprudence. Finally, New Zealand‟s dual response to claims of historic abuse
exhibits a fascinating juxtaposition between traditional litigation and a protherapeutic solution.
References
Bell, S. and Brookbanks, W. (2005) Mental Health Law in New Zealand (2nd ed.)
Wellington: Thomson Brookers.
Brookbanks, W. (2003) New Zealand‟s Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care)
Legislation. In K. Diesfeld and I. Freckelton (eds), Involuntary Detention and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: International Perspectives on Civil Commitment.
Aldershot: Ashgate. Ch. 23, p. 529-552.
Cameron, G. (2006) Reliable research and due thought? NZ Lawyer, 27 January,
8-9.
Carney, T. and Beaupert, F. (2007) Strengths and weaknesses of mental health
review processes. Paper delivered at the 20th Anniversary Conference „Learning
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Carney, T., Tait, D. and Beaupert,F. (2008) Pushing the boundaries: Realising
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329-356.
Carney, T., Beaupert, F., Perry, J and Tait, D. (2008) Advocacy and participation
in mental health cases: Realisable rights or pipe dreams? Legal Studies Research
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December 2009 at http://ssm.com/abstract=1307346.
Confidential Listening and Assessment Service (2009) Confidential Listening and
Assistance Service: frequently asked questions. Accessed 14 January 2010 at
http://www.listening.govt.nz/web/RCCMS_cla.nsf/weblivehome/WGTN7S35AP?PenDoc
Department of Internal Affairs (2007) Te Aitonga: Report on the Confidential
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Affairs: Wellington, New Zealand. ISBN 978 0-477-10057-1. Accessed 24
December 2009 at www.confidentialforum.govt.nz
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Department of Internal Affairs (2009) Confidential Listening and Assistance
Service. Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs. Accessed 12 January 2010 at
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Diesfeld, K. and McKenna, B. (2006) Therapeutic intent of the New Zealand
Mental Health Review Tribunal. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, Vol. 13, no. 1,
100-109.
Diesfeld, K. and McKenna, B. (2007) The unintended impact of the therapeutic
intentions of New Zealand‟s Mental Health Review Tribunal: Therapeutic
jurisprudence perspectives. Journal of Law and Medicine, Vol. 14, No. 4, 566574.
Dunlop, N. (2006) Compulsory psychiatric treatment and “mental disorder”, New
Zealand Law Journal, July, 225- 232.
Freckelton, I. (2008) Therapeutic jurisprudence misunderstood and
misrepresented: The price and risks of influence. Thomas Jefferson Law Review,
Vol. 30, 575-595.
Gallen, Sir Rodney (2001) General Report (Lake Alice Hospital). Obtained from
Crown Law Office 19 September 2001. Wellington: Crown Law Office.
Mental Health Review Tribunal (2009) Annual Report of the Mental Health
Review Tribunal.1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. Mental Health Review Tribunal:
Wellington.
Peay, J. (1989) Tribunals on Trial. London: Clarendon Press.
Perkins, E. (2003) Decision-making in Mental Health Review Tribunals. Policy
Studies Institute, University of Westminster: London.
Posner, R. (2008) How Judges Think. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA.
Cases
J v Crown Health Financing Agency 8/2/09, Gendall J, HC Wellington CIV-2000485-876.
M v RIDCA Central (Regional Intellectual Disability Care Agency) 8 /12/09, Simon
France J,HC Wellington CIV -2009-485-541
Waitemata Health v Attorney General (2001) FRNZ 216; NZFLR 1122 (CA)
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Mental Health Review Tribunal cases
Decisions are available at
www.brookersonline.co.nz.ezproxy.waikato.ac.nz/database/modus/caselaw
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
Re
XXX 27/4/07 MHRT 07/037.
X 11/3/09 MHRT 08/202
X 11/3/09 MHRT 08/195
X 13/3/09 MHRT 09/009: released.
X 23/3/09 MHRT 09/013
X 23/3/09 MHRT 09/014
X 30/3/09 MHRT 08/206
X 30/3/09 MHRT 09/011
X 7/4/09 MHRT 09/015
X 7/4/09 MHRT 09/007: released.
X 15/4/09 MHRT 09/027
X 20/4/09 MHRT 09/005
X 20/4/09 MHRT 09/003
X 22/5/09 MHRT 09/010
X 22/4/09 MHRT 09/008
X 22/4/09 MHRT 08/182
14