DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO. 45A-58-2010 _____________________________________ PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN ALIREZA SHAHIDI HOUSHANG (Warganegara Iran) PENGHAKIMAN 1. Alireza Shahidi Houshang (OKT) telah dilepas dan dibebas di akhir kes Pembelaan. Pendakwa Raya merayu terhadap keputusan itu. 2. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil Sembilan (9) orang saksi. 3. Keterangan Oliver Tiong (SP1) menyatakan bahawa dia telah diarahkan oleh SP3 dan SP7 untuk mengambil gambar berkaitan dengan kes ini. Gambar-gambar yang diambil oleh SP1 ditandakan sebagai P5 (1-35). 1 4. Pada 1.2.2010 Mohd. Zamri Shafiee (SP2) bertugas bersamasama Norazmakhairoladhar Abu Hassan (SP3) dan Mohd. AlHakim Mohd. Salleh di Unit Khas Pemeriksaan Penumpang 1 (UKPP), KLIA. Pada jam lebih kurang 11.45 malam, seorang penumpang yang dicamkan sebagai OKT telah datang dari Carousel D menuju laluan hijau bersama satu beg pengembara berwarna merah hitam (P4). SP2 telah melihat OKT dalam jarak lebih kurang 10 meter membawa P4. OKT ditahan dan dia telah diarahkan oleh SP2 pergi ke mesin pengimbas yang dikendalikan oleh Mohd. Al-Hakim Mohd. Salleh dan juga SP3 untuk imbas bagasi yang dibawanya. Hasil imbasan adalah mencurigakan. SP3 mengarahkan OKT mengosongkan P4 dan ia diimbas sekali lagi. Hasil imbasan P4 yang kosong tetap mencurigakan. SP3 telah menghubungi Idris bin Ismail untuk memaklumkan perkara berkenaan. OKT diarahkan bersama P4 untuk ke pejabat. 5. SP3 telah memberi keterangan bahawa semasa pemeriksaan awal dilakukan di Kaunter Pemeriksaan A, OKT nampak berpeluh-peluh dan telefon bimbitnya sentiasa berbunyi. OKT juga pucat semasa pemeriksaan berkenaan. 6. Apabila pihak Narkotik tiba iaitu SP1, Amaludin Gimin (SP7), Stanley a/l Simon Joney dan Choo Kim Hon, P4 telah diperiksa rapi oleh SP3. SP3 telah memotong kain dalam P4 di bahagian atas dan kemudian telah mengeluarkan satu cardboard tebal berwarna putih (P59). SP3 kemudiannya telah 2 memotong cardboard tersebut dan mendapati terdapat satu kertas karbon (P60) dan satu plastik lutsinar yang mengandungi serbuk putih Kristal (P61) yang disyaki dadah. 7. SP3 telah melabel dan membuat penandaan pada semua barang kes. Semasa proses melabel dan membuat penandaan barang kes, OKT berada bersama barang kes. 8. SP3 telah membuat serahan barang kes kepada SP7 melalui borang serahan kes (P9). 9. SP7 telah memeriksa barang-barang milik OKT dan menyediakan senarai sita (P64) di mana kesemua barang yang disita daripada OKT telah dicamkan. SP7 telah membuat pemeriksaan dan menurunkan tandatangannya ke atas semua barang kes. 10. Selepas penerimaan barang-barang kes daripada SP3, SP7 telah membawa balik semuanya bersama OKT dan ia disimpan dalam kabinet besi berpalang di biliknya di mana SP7 seorang sahaja yang memegang kuncinya. 11. SP7 dalam keterangannya mengatakan P59 telah dimasukkan dalam sampul (P57) dan telah diseal dengan seal Kastam dan telah dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia. Sepanjang pergerakan barang-barang kes ini, hanya SP7 yang mengawalnya sehinggalah ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia. P57 telah diserahkan kepada Zulkefli bin Mohd. Edin (SP6). 3 12. SP7 telah menerima semula P57 daripada SP6 dan P57 telah disimpan selamat di dalam kabinet besi berpalang yang dikawal oleh SP7 seorang. 13. SP7 dalam perbandingan keterangan pasport mengatakan beliau (P7) dengan E-tiket membuat (P63) yang dirampas daripada OKT dan SP7 mendapati kedua-duanya mempunyai persamaan pada nama OKT. SP7 juga membuat perbandingan dengan tag bagasi (P72) yang dirampas pada beg OKT (P4) dengan “baggage claim tag” yang ada pada OKT yang dirampas oleh SP3 dan didapati terdapat persamaan pada nombor tag, iaitu Y9853551. 14. SP6 (ahli kimia) telah menerima satu sampul bertanda AG (P57) dari Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) beserta borang Kimia 14 (P54) pada 8.2.2010. Selepas menerima P57, SP6 telah mengeluarkan resit kepada SP7. Resit ditandakan sebagai P55. SP7 mendapati di dalam P57 terdapat P59, P60 dan P61 yang mengandungi dadah. 15. SP6 telah menganalisa bahan serbuk kristal yang disyaki dadah itu. SP6 telah menyediakan laporan kimia iaitu P56 yang menyatakan hasil analisa menunjukkan bahawa bahan berbentuk kristal itu ialah dadah jenis Methamphetamine. Berat dadah Methamphetamine ini ialah 1795 gram. 4 16. Setelah selesai analisa dadah tersebut, SP6 telah memasukkan dadah Methamphetamine tersebut ke dalam peket (P58) yang dibekalkan oleh Jabatan Kimia. 29.4.2010, SP6 Pada telah menyerahkan semula barang kes kepada SP7. 17. Revathi a/p Perumal (SP4) merupakan ahli kimia bagi analisa DNA. Pada 17.12.2010 lebih kurang jam 3.00 petang SP4 telah menerima satu kotak bertanda AG-1 (P13) daripada Meor Ahmad Sazali bin Dol Hadi (SP5). Permintaan adalah untuk menjalankan ujian profiling DNA ke atas pakaian- pakaian (P19-P52) dengan membandingkan sampel darah yang diambil dari OKT (P18). Hasil ujian DNA berkenaan, SP4 membuat kesimpulan seperti berikut: (a) profil DNA lelaki berpadanan dengan P18 (darahOKT) pada pakaian-pakaian P19, 42, 45; (b) profil DNA separa berpadanan dengan P18 (darah OKT) pada pakaian-pakaian P22, 23, 27, 33, 40, 43, 47; (c) profil DNA tidak berpadanan dengan P18 (darah OKT) pada pakaian P31; (d) profil DNA campuran sekurang-kurang 3 orang individu pada pakaian-pakaian P21, 26, 28, 29, 39, 48, 49; (e) profil DNA campuran sekurang-kurangnya 2 individu pada pakaian P20, 34, 37 (penyumbang major ialah OKT); 5 18. (f) profil DNA lemah pada pakaian P24, 44, 46, 50, 51; (g) tiada profil DNA diperolehi daripada pakaian P25, 32, 35, 38, 41, 52A & B; (h) tiada DNA dikesan pada pakaian P30, 36. Mohd. Samsul Shamsuddin (SP8), telah memberi keterangan bahawa pada 4.2.2010, SP8 telah didatangi oleh SP7 bersama Md. Fuad Saad dan juga OKT untuk mengambil sampel darah bagi ujian DNA. SP8 telah mengeluarkan Kad FTA (P18) yang mengandungi sampel darah OKT dan seal Kad FTA berkenaan kemudiannya menyerahkannya kepada SP7. 19. Idris Ismail (SP9) telah memberi keterangan bahawa beliau mengendalikan CCTV milik Kastam di Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Kuala Lumpur dan telah menerima permintaan untuk mendapatkan salinan rakaman CCTV di empat lokasi iaitu di Carousel D, laluan hijau lorong keluar, mesin pengimbas A serta di kaunter pemeriksaan A. SP9 telah mengecamkan SP7 membuat permohonan berkenaan. SP8 memberi keterangan bahawa pada 2.2.2010, beliau telah menyerahkan kepada SP7satu pen drive bagi rakaman CCTV di empat tempat berkenaan. SP8 juga memberi keterangan bahawa pen drive tersebut gagal dikemukakan atas alasan telah dijangkiti virus dan telah dibuang. 6 20. Di akhir kes Pendakwaan Mahkamah membuat pendapat bahawa: (a) Semasa OKT ditahan dia mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan P4; (b) Pasport OKT (P7) dan E-tiket (P63) menunjukkan persamaan nama OKT padanya sementara tag bagasi pada P4 dan “baggage claim tag”(P18) yang dirampas daripada OKT oleh SP3 mempunyai nombor tag yang sama iaitu Y 9853551; (c) P4 mengandungi dadah methamphetamine seberat 1795 gram disembunyi sulit di tulang belakang P4 terselindung dengan “cardboard” putih (P59). 21. Milikan (“possession”) telah diperjelas dalam kes PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah merujuk kepada kes Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 22 MLJ 237 seperti berikut: “ In Chan Pean Leon v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 LNS 17; [1956] 22 MLJ 237 Thomson J dealt with the issue of possession under the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance 1953 and at p. 239 he observed: “Possession” itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen’s Digest (9th Edition, page 304): A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. 7 To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. The accused must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shewn that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shews such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found shew such an intention. It may be found in a locked room to which I hold the key or it may be found in a drawer mixed up with my own belongings or it may be found, as occurred in a recent case, in a box under my bed. The possible circumstances canot be set out exhaustively and it is impossible to lay down any general rule on the point. But there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the court that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own had the intention of doing so. [15] And further down on the same page he added: Here again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite.”. (Penggarisan oleh saya). 8 22. Beralih kepada faktor “pengetahuan” di pihak OKT dalam hal keadaan milikan dan kawalan P4 (serta kandungannya) itu, keadaan mental pengetahuan OKT boleh dilihat dari latar belakang semua fakta dengan memberi “weight” kepada kredibiliti saksi-saksi (PP v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424). Milikan (“possession”) dalam undang-undang jenayah telah ditafsirkan dalam Stephen’s Digest (Edisi 9 di muka surat 304) seperti ditunjukkan di perenggan 22 di atas tadi. 23. Dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764 Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan bahawa: “It is true that mens rea possession is an element of the offence of trafficking. But it is an element like the mental element in other crimes which cannot be established by direct evidence save in a case where an accused expressly admits the commission of the offence. It has, like the mens rea in other offences, to be established by circumstantial evidence. In other words it is an ingredient that is to be inferred from the totality of the circumstances of a particular individual case. We can here do no better than to quote from the judgment of Lord Diplock in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1980]1 LNS 181; [1981] 1 MLJ 64, at p. 69: ‘Proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such purpose is a necessary ingredient of the offence with which an accused is charged, presents a problem with which criminal courts are very familiar. Generally, in the absence of an expressed admission by the accused, the purpose with which he did an act is a matter of inference from what he did. Thus, in the case of an accused caught in the act of conveying from one place to another controlled drugs in a quantity much larger than is likely to be needed for his own consumption the inference that he was transporting them for 9 the purpose of trafficking in them would, in the absence of any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible – even if there were no statutory presumption such as is contained in section 15 of the Drugs Act.’. Turning to the facts of the present instance, we agree with the learned trial judge that the method employed to bring the drugs in question from Thailand into Malaysia was done in a most cunning fashion to escape detection by the authorities. The method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid detection and thereby point to knowledge. Of course it all depends on the facts of each individual case.”. (Penggarisan oleh saya). 24. Dalam kes Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All ER 356 (House of Lords) Lord Morris menyatakan pengetahuan (”knowledge”) yang perlu bagi membuktikan milikan (“possession”) adalah seperti berikut: “If there is assent to the control of a thing, either after having the means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains or being unmindful whether there are means of knowledge or not, then ordinarily there will be possession. If there is some momentary custody of a thing without any knowledge or means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains then, ordinarily, I would suppose that there would not be possession. If, however, someone deliberately assumes control of some package or container, then I would think that he is in possession of it. If he deliberately so assumes control knowing that it has contents, he would also be in possession of the contents. I cannot think that it would be rational to hold that someone who is in possession of a box which he knows to have things in it is in possession of the box but not in possession of the things in it. If he had been misinformed or misled as to the nature of the contents, or if he had made a 10 wrong surmise as to them, it seems to me that he would nevertheless be in possession of them.”. 25. Dalam kes Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 633 Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura menyatakan di muka surat 639 seperti berikut: “21. For the element of `possesion’ (within the meaning of s. 17 of the Misuse of Drugs Act) to be established, it must not only be shown that the accused had physical control of the drugs at the relevant time; the prosecution must also prove that the accused possessed the requisite knowledge as to the contents of what he was carrying: see Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; Tan Ah Tee & Anor v. PP [1978] 1 LNS 193; [1978-1979] SLR 211; [1980] 1 MLJ 49. In the course of the appeal before us, counsel for the appellant relied heavily on the fact that the contents of the bundles were securely wrapped in newspapers and could not be identified. We were accordingly invited to draw the inference that the appellant had no knowledge of the contents of the bundles. 22. We were unable to accede to this request. While the fact that the contents of the bundles were hidden from view may have been relevant in determining whether the requisite knowledge was absent, this factor should still not be given too much weight. Otherwise, drug peddlers could escape liability simply by ensuring that any drugs coming into their possession are first securely sealed in opaque wrappings. Rather, the court must appraise the entire facts of the case to see if the accused’s claim to ignorance is credible. As Yong Pung How CJ remarked in PP v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424 (at p. 438): In the end, the finding of the mental state of knowledge, or the rebuttal of it, is an inference to be drawn by a trial judge from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, giving due weight to the credibility of the witnesses.”. 11 26. Dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741, Mahkamah Persekutuan, antara lainnya, membuat pemerhatian tentang pengetahuan dari sudut perlakuan (“conduct”) seperti berikut: “First, he contended that the High Court and the Court of Appeal had failed to consider the contemporaneous conduct of the appellant in not trying to escape or putting up a struggle with the police when confronted by PW5 and his men or attempting to disassociate or discard the backpack containing the dangerous drugs. Such conduct, if considered by the courts below, could infer that the appellant had no knowledge of the said drugs in the backpack. It is our view that in order to draw a favourable inference from the appellant’s contemporaneous conduct, his action or inaction must be examined in the light of the situation at the material time…. And, if the appellant were to attempt to throw away or disassociate himself with the backpack during this entire duration described it would evidently be noticeable. Of course, since the drugs were so cunningly concealed, there could be no necessity to take such drastic actions which may attract instant suspicion. So against these circumstances, the appellant’s docile conduct throughout the period described could not have inferred an absence of knowledge of the said drugs.”. (Penggarisan oleh saya). 27. Beralih pula kepada faktor pembuktian pengedaran, seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 mentafsirkan seperti berikut: “trafficking” includes the doing of any of the following acts, that is to say, manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buying, selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying, sending, delivering, procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous drug 12 otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the regulations made under the Act.”. Dalam hal keadaan fakta perbuatan OKT membawa masuk ke negara ini dadah methamphetamine (1795 gram) yang tersorok rapi dalam P4 memanglah perbuatan yang boleh memberi satu inferen yang ia dilakukan bagi tujuan mengedar dan tentu sekali bukan untuk kegunaan sendiri. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Mohamad Yazri Minhat v. PP [2003] 2 CLJ 65 menerimapakai prinsip dalam kes Ong Ah Chuan v. P.P [1981] 1 MLJ 64, di muka surat 69, yang menyatakan: “Proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such purpose is a necessary ingredient of the offence with which an accused is charged, presents a problem with which criminal courts are very familiar. Generally, in the absence of an express admission by the accused, the purpose with which he did an act is a matter of inference from what he did. Thus, in the case of an accused caught in the act of conveying from one place to another controlled drugs in a quantity much larger than is likely to be needed for his own consumption the inference that he was transporting them for the purpose of trafficking in them would, in the absence of any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible, even if there were no statutory presumption such as is contained in section 15 of the Drugs Act”. As a matter of common sense the larger the quantity of drugs involved the stronger the inference that they were not intended for the personal consumption of the person carrying them, and the more convincing the evidence needed to rebut it.”. (Penggarisan oleh saya). 13 28. Seterusnya, dalam kes Wjchai Onprom v. PP [2006] 3 CLJ 724, Y.A. Gopal Sri Ram telah berkata: “Here the appellant was caught conveying a very large quantity of cannabis from Thailand to Malaysia. In view of the amount involved, it is safe to infer that the drug was intended for a third person or persons known or unknown. That other person or persons may, to borrow Lord Diplock’s words, be “the actual consumer or a distributor or another dealer”. So this is not a case of mere passive possession. There were overt acts done by the appellant, namely the active concealment of the drug on his person followed by its conveyance from Thailand into Malaysia which reasonably supports the existence of criminal purpose proscribed by the Act. We may add that the very same facts also give rise to a strong inference that the appellant was aware of his possession, knew the nature of the drug possessed and had the power of disposal over it. So much for the prima facie proof of actual trafficking.”. (Penggarisan oleh saya). 29. Tambahan pula, dalam kes PP v. Lim Hock Boon [2009] 3 CLJ 457, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa: “There is another matter that needs to be considered by this court. The Court of Appeal had ruled that the alternative ground advanced by the learded trial judge that the respondent was guilty of trafficking because his case came within one or more of the acts set out under the definition of the word “trafficking” in s. 2 of the Act is against both authority and principle. On perusal, there is nothing in Teh Geok Hock to suggest that the prosecution could not rely on s. 2 establish trafficking. Thus, the reliance placed by the Court of Appeal on Chow Kok Keong, supra, to hold that the definition section under s. 2 of the Act could never be invoked to impose criminal liability, was, with respect, misplaced. A good example where the definition of trafficking in s. 2 of the Act was invoked is in the case of 14 Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Manaf Muhamad Hassan [2006] 2 CLJ 129. There the Federal Court, in order to avoid contravening the bar against the use of double presumptions following the case of Muhammed Hassan v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 CLJ 170, substituted the presumption of trafficking under s. 37 (da) of the Act relied on by the trial court, to find trafficking in the dangerous drugs by carrying under s. 2 of the Act.”. (Penggarisan oleh saya). 30. Berdasarkan kepada apa yang diperjelaskan di perengganperenggan di atas tadi, Mahkamah ini berpendapat di sisi keterangan dan undang-undang, bahawa di peringkat akhir kes pendakwaan ini, terdapat satu kes prima facie yang telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan pihak OKT diperintah untuk membela diri. OKT diterangkan tiga alternatif iaitu sama ada untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah di mana dia boleh diperiksa-balas atau untuk memberi pernyataan dari kandang pesalah di mana dia tidak boleh diperiksa-balas atau untuk berdiam diri. OKT membuat pilihan alternatif pertama tadi. 31. Dalam pembelaan OKT dia mengatakan telah pergi bersama ibunya, Shahla Shakoi (DW2) dan seorang sahabat ayahnya telah ke Lapangan Terbang Teheran di mana dia (OKT) berlepas untuk ke Malaysia melalui Kish dan Dubai. berkata OKT di lapangan terbang itu dia diberi satu bagasi (P4) oleh Reza Sultani untuk disampaikan kepada Behnam (muka surat 73 Nota Keterangan). P4 telah dibuka olehnya dan OKT mendapati di dalamnya ada tuala, seluar dan pakaian lain dan 15 buku-buku (muka surat 74 Nota Keterangan). Selain yang diperkatakan itu oleh OKT dalam pemeriksaan awal, dia turut menyatakan yang sama dalam pemeriksaan balas oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, iaitu P4 diberi oleh Reza dan terdapat tuala dan pakaian dalam P4 itu (muka surat 78 Nota Keterangan). DW2 (ibu OKT) turut memberi keterangan dalam pemeriksaan awal bahawa dia telah periksa kandungan P4 yang Reza telah beri kepada OKT dan mendapati dalamnya tuala, pakaian dan buku-buku (muka surat 80 Nota Keterangan). 32. Apa yang ketara lagi kekal “impact” keterangan ini ialah terdapat keterangan sokongan bersesama OKT (DW1) dan DW2 bahawa P4 diberi oleh Reza Sultani kepada OKT yang berisi tuala, pakaian dan buku-buku. Keterangan OKT tentang hal ini tidak dicabar langsung dalam pemeriksaan balas oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Usaha Timbalan Pendakwa Raya jelas nampak “inadequate” dan “meager” dengan tidak mempedulikan detail yang mendalam untuk mencungkil “incredidulity” keterangan OKT yang menggambarkan bahawa dia adalah seorang “innocent carrier”. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya lesu dalam aspek ini dan tiada apa-apa penyangkalan ke atas keterangan OKT dan DW2 itu. Tambahan pula OKT berkata (di muka surat 78 Nota Keterangan) bahawa bukan sahaja P4 ada barang-barang dalamnya untuk dihantar kepada Behnam tetapi juga P4 akan diguna kembali untuk membawa pulang ke Iran baju-baju lelaki. 16 33. Apa yang lebih memeranjatkan, pihak Pendakwaan tidak menunjukkan sekurang-kurangnya cadangan sinis yang keterangan OKT adalah pembohongan memandangkan ia bertentangan dengan percakapan beramaran OKT (D88) yang menunjukkan P4 diterima daripada orang suruhan Reza (soalan/jawapan 46 dan 50 dalam D88 masing-masingnya di muka surat 6 dan 7) dan bukan daripada Reza sendiri, seperti yang dikatakan dalam keterangan di Mahkamah. Tidak hairanlah Timbalan Pendakwa Raya sendiri tidak pula inginkan (atau tidak mengetahui) peluang untuk mencabar (“impeach”) OKT atas percanggahan dua keterangan tersebut yang jelas itu. Bukan sahaja itu, tetapi Timbalan Pendakwa Raya juga lalai untuk mencabar OKT atas dua lagi percanggahan bila OKT berkata dalam keterangannya bahawa P4 yang diterimanya di Teheran berisi kandungan tersebut di atas tadi (muka surat 74 dan 78 Nota Keterangan) sementara dalam pernyataan beramarannya, OKT berkata P4 adalah kosong (soalan/jawapan 56 dalam D88) dan juga diperkatakan pula oleh OKT dalam keterangannya dia tidak lihat dalam P4 barang “Sang” (dalam bahasa Parsi bererti “batu”) walhal dalam D88 OKT berkata “Sang” yang dia disuruh-hantar dan yang dibawa ke Malaysia (soalan/jawapan 64 dalam D88). 17 34. Kelesuan pihak Pendakwaan terus terlihat dan diulangi bila mana DW2 tidak diperiksa-balas pun, setelah DW2 memberi keterangan yang menyokong keterangan (OKT) DW1 yang lebih memihak kepadanya iaitu beg P4 diberi oleh Reza Sultani dan ia mengandungi buku-buku, tuala dan pakaian. 35. Mahkamah memahami dan menyedari beberapa autoriti yang menerangkan tanggungjawab pihak-pihak Mahkamah, Pendakwaan dan Pembelaan dalam sesuatu kes jenayah. Dalam kes PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649, Hakim Augustine Paul berkata di muka surat 676: “Thus where the Prosecution has made out a prima facie case and the Accused, in his defence, offers an explanation, the burden of the proof to establish the offence beyond reasonable doubt is still on the Prosection and if, upon a review of the evidence of both sides, there is a reasonable doubt, the Accused must be acquitted.”. dan di muka surat 683: “It is trite law that the explanation of an accused has to be considered together with the rest of the evidence in the case and that he will be entitled to an acquittal if, as a result of such explanation the existence of a material fact on which the prosecution relied is no longer so probable as to make a prudent man act upon the supposition that fact exists.”. 18 36. Kes Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ 311 menyatakan: “It is a well-established principle of Malaysian criminal law that the general burden of proof lies throughout the trial on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused for the offence with which he is charged. There is no similar burden placed on the accused to prove his innocence. He is presumed innocent until proven guilty. To earn an acquittal, his duty is merely to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. In the course of the prosecution case, the prosecution may of course rely on available statutory presumptions to prove one or more of the essential ingredients of the charge. When that occurs, the particular burden of proof as opposed to the general burden shifts to the defence to rebut such presumptions on the balance of probabilities which from the defence point of view is heavier than the burden of casting a reasonable doubt, but it is certainly lighter that the burden of the prosecution to prove beyong reasonable doubt …. if defence is called, the duty of the accused is only to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. He is not required to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt. To earn an acquittal, the court may not be convinced of the truth of the defence story or version. Raising a reasonable doubt in the guilt of the accused will suffice. It is not, however, wrong for the court to be convinced that the defence version is true, in which case the court must order an acquittal. In appropriate cases it is also not wrong for the court to conclude that the defence story is false or not 19 convincing, but in that instance, the court must not convict intil it asks a further question, that even if the court does no accept or believe the defence explanation, does it nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt? It is for this reason that in dealing with the defence story or explanation, the majority of judges rightly prefer to adopt straightaway the legally established ‘reasonable doubt’ test, rather than to delve in the ‘believable and convincing’ test before applying the ‘resonable doubt’ test.” The leading case on this point is Woolmington v. DPP Lord Sankey said: “Throughout the web of English Criminal Law, one golden thread is always to be seen, that is the duty of the prosecution to prove the person’s guilt. If at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given either by the prosecution or the prisoner as to whether the offence was committed by him, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.”. 37. Kes klasik Mat v. PP [1963] 1 MLJ 263 memperkatakan: “ The correct law for Magistrates to apply is as follows. If you accept the explanation given by or on behalf of the accused, you must of course acquit. But this does not entitled you to convict if you do not believe that explanation, for he is still entitle to an acquittal if it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving his guilt lies throught on the prosecution. 20 If upon the whole evidence you are left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it.” The position may be conveniently stated as follows: 1. If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt … Convict. 2. If you accept of believe the accused’ explanation … Acquit. 3. If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation … Do not convict but consider the next step below. 4. If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation and the explanation does not raise in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt … Convict. 5. If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt … Acquit.”. 38. Mahkamah membuat pendapat bahawa kes yang di hadapanya sekarang ini tergolong dalam hal keadaan cabang no. 5, kes Mat v. PP itu, di mana walaupun Mahkamah tidak menerima atau mempercayai keterangan OKT tetapi ia membangkitkan pada pemikirannya suatu keraguan munasabah ke atas kebersalahannya, maka ia membebaskan OKT. 21 hendaklah melepas dan 39. Dengan yang demikian Mahkamah ini dengan penuh yakin mendapati bahawa pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan satu keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan dan dalam yang sama juga pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan munasabah. Mahkamah memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan ke atasnya. DATO’ ABDUL ALIM ABDULLAH Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam. 29 November 2011. Pihak-pihak: 1. Puan Nurul Ezwaney Husin bagi pihak Pendakwa Raya. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Kastam Diraja Malaysia. 2. Encik Mohd. Irwan Mohamad. Mubarak dan Encik Zamri Idrus bagi pihak OKT. Tetuan Mohd. Irwan Mohd. Mubarak. 22 Rujukan: 1. PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337. 2. Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 22 MLJ 237. 3. PP v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424. 4. Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764. 5. Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All ER 356. 6. Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 633. 7. Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741. 8. Mohamad Yazri Minhat v. PP [2003] 2 CLJ 65. 9. Ong Ah Chuan v. PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64. 10. Wjchai Onprom v. PP [2006] 3 CLJ 724. 11. PP v. Lim Hock Boon [2009] 3 CLJ 457. 12. PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649. 13. Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ 311. 14. Mat v. PP [1963] 1 MLJ 263. 23