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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
6
INTRODUCTION
6
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
6
SUMMARY OF EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND WORK EXPERIENCE
6
EDUCATION
6
WORK EXPERIENCE
7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
9
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
11
DEEPWATER DRILLING AND BP PRESSURE INTEGRITY TESTS
11
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
12
EVOLUTION OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
13
OVERBURDEN STRESS
20
FRACTURE GRADIENT
21
PRESSURE INTEGRITY TESTS
23
DRILLING MARGINS
28
SAFE DRILLING MARGIN
33
BP’S PRESSURE INTEGRITY TEST OF THE 9-7/8 INCH LINER SHOE
42
EFFECT OF SPACER ON NEGATIVE PRESSURE TEST INTERPRETATION
48
NEGATIVE TEST NOMENCLATURE
49
FLUID DISPLACEMENT
54
MI-SWACO SPACER
54
NEGATIVE PRESSURE TEST
59
WELL MONITORING FAILURE
64
APPENDIX A
69
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APPENDIX B
70
APPENDIX C
71
APPENDIX D
90
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Deepwater Drilling Units and Production Facilities
13
Figure 2a: Pore pressure in hydrostatic equilibrium with surface water
18
Figure 2b: Pore Pressure is controlled by Mud Pressure
18
Figure 2: What is Pore Pressure?
18
Figure 3: What is Mud Weight?
19
Figure 4: Overburden Stress calculated from Macondo Well Logs
21
Figure 5: What is Fracture Gradient
22
Figure 6: Comparison of Calculated and Observed Leak-off Test Results
23
Figure 7: Typical Leak-Off Test Plot
26
Figure 8: Typical Pressure Integrity Test Plot
27
Figure 9: Approximate effect of Water Depth on Fracture Gradient at 3500 feet
28
Figure 10: What is a Kick?
29
Figure 11: Shoe Strength protects Weaker Sediments Above
31
Figure 12: What is an Underground Blowout?
32
Figure 13: Pressure Integrity Test at 13-5/8 inch Liner Shoe
41
Figure 14: Pressure Integrity Test at 9-7/8 inch Liner Shoe
45
Figure 15: Common Assumptions in Fracture Modeling
48
Figure 16: Schematic of Macondo Well after Circulating Cement
50
Figure 17: Planned Configuration of Macondo Well with Temporary Cap
51
Figure 18: Use of Equivalent Mud Weights in Negative Test Nomenclature
53
Figure 19: Displacement Planned by MI-Swaco Drilling Fluid Specialist
55
Figure 20: Plot of Real Time Data Recorded during Negative Pressure Test
61
Figure 21: U-tube analogy for Negative Test being conducted (pressures equal)
64
Figure 22: Real Time Data Showing Kick Indications that were not detected
66
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L I S T O F TA B L E S
Table 1 –Summary of Events during the Initial Displacement
58
Table 2 – Summary of Actions Taken during the First Negative Pressure Test
60
Table 3 – Summary of Actions Taken during the Second Negative Pressure Test
62
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INTRODUCTION AND STA TEMENT OF PURPOSE
INTRODUCTION
The BP Exploration & Production Inc. Macondo Well (OCSG 32306-001) located offshore
Louisiana in Mississippi Canyon Block 252 was in the process of being temporarily capped
when a tragic accident occurred in which eleven people lost their lives and 17 others were
injured. The rig “Deepwater Horizon,” sank, and the well continued to flow oil into the Gulf of
Mexico for 87 days before it was successfully plugged.
The well had been successfully drilled, the production casing had been run, and cement
circulated at the time of the blowout. However, an event of this magnitude invariably raises
questions about the drilling operations as well as the temporary capping operations.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Upon the request of counsel representing BP, I have reviewed the daily operational
summaries and reports, reports of other experts, and other materials provided. The list of those
materials is included in Appendix D. I was asked to review various aspects of the drilling
operations for the Macondo well.
This report summarizes my opinions reached based on my reviews and analysis. It also
provides schematics illustrating well conditions during various operations. These opinions are
based on the information I have reviewed at this time. My work is ongoing and I reserve the
right to adjust my opinion as new information is obtained.
SUMMARY OF EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND WO RK EXPERIENCE
EDUCATION
B. S. in Petroleum Engineering, Cum Laude, May 28, 1966
Louisiana State University
M. S. in Petroleum Engineering, January 23, 1968
Louisiana State University
Ph.D. in Petroleum Engineering, January 24, 1970
University of Texas at Austin
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WORK EXPERIENCE
I have more than 45 years of experience in the oil and gas industry, particularly in Louisiana
and the Gulf of Mexico. My work experience in the oil and gas industry began through
participation in summer/co-op programs while in college. I worked for Mobil Oil Company
three months as an onshore roustabout and three months as an offshore roustabout. After
reaching senior status at Louisiana State University (LSU), I worked three months as an
Engineering Assistant involved with offshore drilling and well work-over planning.
After
receiving my B.S. Degree and prior to entering graduate school, I worked three months for
Texaco as an Assistant Drilling Engineer involved with offshore field operations, well planning,
and drilling optimization. My training for this position included working as a floor hand on the
first semi-submersible rig, the “Ocean Driller.” After entering graduate school, I worked three
months for Chevron at their research laboratory in La Habra, California and three months for
Conoco at their research laboratory in Ponca City, Oklahoma.
In 1969, after completion of my course work at the University of Texas at Austin (UTAustin), I joined Conoco in Houston as a Senior Systems Engineer in their Production
Engineering Services Group. There, I participated in several drilling and production projects
including an offshore drilling project involving real-time drilling data acquisition and estimation
of formation pore pressure.
In 1971, I joined LSU as an Assistant Professor. For the next 29 years, I worked in the
undergraduate, graduate, and continuing education programs of the LSU Petroleum Engineering
Department and in administration of the College of Engineering. I had primary responsibility for
the drilling engineering and drilling fluids laboratory courses, but taught production engineering
and reservoir engineering courses as well. I served as Chairman of the Petroleum Engineering
Department from 1977 to 1983. At the time of my retirement in December of 1999, I was the
Campanile Charities Professor of Offshore Mining and Petroleum Engineering and Dean of the
College of Engineering.
I have been especially active in the area of blowout prevention. Soon after joining LSU in
1971, I began assisting Professor Bill Hise, one of the more senior LSU faculty members, in
teaching industry short-courses on well control for onshore and bottom-supported offshore
drilling rigs. Under the sponsorship of the International Association of Drilling Contractors
(IADC), Professor Hise had reworked an abandoned well on the LSU Campus for use in “hands
on” well control training including the safe circulation of a threatened gas blowout. Building on
this foundation, LSU founded the first blowout prevention training program with open
enrollment. The program was enthusiastically received by the industry and several hundred
industry participants per year attended the program during the 1970s. Discussions held with a
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wide cross-section of industry participants provided me valuable insight into the complications
that can arise during well control operations. I became particularly interested in complications
associated with deepwater drilling operations with the blowout preventer at the seafloor. A list
of publications, training courses and other relevant items is included in Appendix C.
Starting in 1979, I guided the development of a multi-million dollar research and training
well facility at LSU to support work on deepwater well control and to complement the older
training well. The newer facility was funded through the combined support of 13 major oil
companies, 40 service companies, and the Minerals Management Service (MMS) (now the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement or BOEMRE), and became
operational in 1981.
The facility was initially centered around a 6000-foot well specially
configured to model the full-scale well control flow geometry of a floating drilling rig in 3000
feet of water. Extensive surface equipment provided for “hands on” training as well as highlyinstrumented well control experiments. Gas could be injected into the bottom of the well to
initiate the conditions of a threatened blowout. The goal of the research was the development of
improved well control procedures and training for deepwater drilling operations.
The facility, which still operates today, was later expanded to include additional wells and
model diverter components for experimental study of flow erosion and pressures seen during
diverter operations. This research was aimed at reducing the incidence of failures in diverters
used to handle a shallow gas flow that could not be safely shut-in. Under sponsorship of Amoco
(now BP) and the Drilling Engineers Association (DEA), the facility was further expanded to
include an additional 6000-foot well to study kick detection and other potential well control
complications associated with gas solubility in oil base muds.
Between 1981 and my retirement in 1999, I supervised the graduate research of 19 MS theses
and 12 PhD dissertations on various well control topics of interest to industry and the MMS
(now BOEMRE). Numerous Well Control Research Workshops were held at LSU during this
period and were well attended by both MMS and industry personnel. The research has resulted
in more than 50 publications related to well control and including formation pore pressure
estimation, fracture gradient correlations, Leak-off test data, modeling well control and relief
well operations, and improved procedures for safe removal of a gas influx. During this period I
also organized and helped to teach specialized deepwater well control schools for Amoco,
Exxon, Shell, Conoco, Phillips, and Zapata as well as numerous open enrollment schools.
I am the lead author of the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) Drilling Engineering
Textbook, entitled “Applied Drilling Engineering” which was developed for petroleum
engineering college curriculums. This textbook is widely accepted and has been a “top seller”
for SPE since it was first published in 1986. I have also written “Drilling Practices,” a chapter in
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the Encyclopedia of Chemical Processing and Design and “Shallow Gas Blowouts,” a chapter in
Firefighting and Blowout Control. I have also written several chapters in a well control manual
used in LSU’s well control schools. I have served as chairman of the SPE reprint series on “Pore
pressure and Fracture Gradient Determination” and also for another reprint series on “Well
Control.” I am a past recipient of the SPE Distinguished Achievement Award for Petroleum
Engineering Educators and have received the SPE Drilling Engineering Award “for
distinguished contributions to petroleum engineering in the area of drilling technology.”
In 1990, I was selected as a Distinguished Member of SPE. In 1997-98, I was selected as a
Distinguished Lecturer by the SPE and gave lectures at about 30 locations in the U.S., Europe,
and Middle East. During 1998 I also served on a steering committee of the International
Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) that coordinated the development of a manual on
well control practices for deepwater drilling operations. I have also served on an ad hoc
committee of SPE to review the exam leading to professional registration of Petroleum
Engineers. Upon my retirement from LSU, I was recognized by the House of Representatives of
the State of Louisiana in House Concurrent Resolution No. 33 of the First Extraordinary Session,
2000, commending me for “achievements in scholarly research and writing in the field of
petroleum engineering and for highly significant contributions to higher education in Louisiana.”
In December of 2001, I was recognized as a Distinguished Graduate of the College of
Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. In 2006, I was inducted into the LSU
Engineering Hall of Distinction.
I am currently President of Bourgoyne Enterprises, Inc., which offers Petroleum Engineering
consulting services to the Oil and Gas Industry. I have consulted extensively with Pennington
Oil and Gas, LLC in their drilling and completion of deep, high-temperature, high-pressure wells
in the Tuscaloosa Trend Area of Louisiana. I have also served as an expert witness on blowout
and well control matters.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The blowout prevention practices and equipment used in the oil and gas industry are
designed to maintain redundant and verifiable barriers to an uncontrolled release of formation
fluids.
For a blowout to occur there generally must be a “perfect storm” series of both
equipment failures and human failures (mistakes) to circumvent all of the intended barriers. The
Deepwater Horizon tragedy was not an exception to this rule. As many of the publicly available
reports have concluded, the equipment failures required for the blowout to occur included (1) the
failure of the cement to seal the annular space through the oil and gas zone, (2) the failure of the
cement to seal the shoe track of the production casing, and (3) the failure of the blowout
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preventers to stop the flow at the seafloor. The human failures (mistakes) required for the
blowout to occur included (1) the failure to correctly interpret a critical negative pressure test of
the cement seals, (2) the failure to detect the influx of formation fluids into the casing, and (3)
the failure to use the diverter system to vent overboard the oil and gas that reached the surface.
The human failures are especially hard to understand because there are multiple groups on
the rig tasked with constantly monitoring the well during all operations, including the
Transocean rig crew and the Sperry-Sun mud loggers.
The ability to detect an influx of
formation fluid of less than 30 barrels is an expected normal response, and numerous drills are
generally conducted while drilling to test this response. An influx of over 600 barrels was
required for the formation fluids to reach the seafloor undetected and begin entering the marine
riser. It is unknown why standard well control training concepts were not followed that night. If
the situation was such that rig pumps were shut down at 9:30, standard well control would
dictate that the well be checked for flow, and shut in if flowing, before taking any other steps.
Both a driller and a toolpusher were evaluating the well at that time. Yet, on that night, the next
action taken was to bleed the drill pipe. Additionally, negative pressure tests involve simple
hydrostatic pressure concepts that form the basis of many rig site calculations and the needed
hydrostatic pressure concepts are always included in well control training.
The parties
interpreting the negative pressure test made a mistake in determining that the negative pressure
tests run by Transocean’s rig crew were successful.
I reviewed the BP Daily Operational Summaries for the Macondo Well, real time data
collected during drilling and other rig operations, deposition transcripts, discovery materials,
expert reports issued by other parties and the reports of investigative bodies issued in regard to
the tragic accident that occurred. See Appendix D. I saw no evidence that BP drilled this well in
a careless or reckless manner with disregard for safety in order to save money and drill fast.
There are always advantages and disadvantages to various design options considered when
drilling and completing a well. On any given issue, it is normal for members of a drilling team
in a large organization to have differences of opinion as to which option is better. In my opinion,
all of the final choices made in regard to planning fell within the range of normal drilling and
completion practices. A critical review of the planning decisions must recognize that the well
was successfully drilled, the production casing was successfully run to bottom, and cement was
circulated into the well as planned.
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SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
I have reached the following opinions to a reasonable engineering certainty in this matter:
First, this well was drilled to total depth safely and successfully and consistent with industry
practices.
The Deepwater Horizon crew and BP’s team followed industry practices in
conducting formation integrity tests, interpreting those tests and properly managing their mud
weights to safely drill each interval.
Second, the use of the Loss Circulation Material (LCM) spacer during the temporary
abandonment procedures on April 20, 2010 likely resulted in fluids being displaced in a manner
that the rig crew did not fully understand.
Third, the negative pressure test was not properly understood, but the parties involved
allowed the displacement to continue. While everyone involved had every incentive to get it
right and had no incentive to cut corners, they did not properly interpret the test.
Fourth, the rig crew failed to properly monitor the well on April 20, 2010 and allowed a kick
to go unnoticed until it turned into a blowout. Even after recognizing that signs of a kick were
present, the Transocean rig crew failed to shut in the well immediately.
DEEPWATER DRILLING A ND BP PRESSURE INTEG RITY TESTS
Several issues related to normal drilling practice have arisen in this litigation. These issues
are best understood after a discussion of how the practice evolved as the industry moved from
land and shallow water operations offshore to floating drilling operations in deep water. A
background discussion of my perspective on these issues is provided regarding:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Historical Perspective
Evolution of Roles and Responsibilities
Pore Pressure
Overburden Stress
Fracture Gradients
Pressure Integrity Test
Drilling Margins
Safe Drilling Margins
Negative Pressure Test
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1
Offshore drilling began in California in 1887 in an area where wells drilled nearest to the
ocean tended to be better producers. Wharfs were constructed that served as the first platforms
for offshore drilling, the longest extending almost a quarter mile offshore. In the early 1930s
along the Louisiana and Texas inland waters, rigs built on steel barges were constructed that
could be towed to a well’s location and sunk to rest on bottom with the top of the barge still
above water. At the end of the job, the derrick was lowered, the barge pumped out to a floating
position, and the rig towed to another location.
The use of barge rigs was gradually extended from inland waters in the coastal areas to
shallow waters offshore. To extent the water depth ranged to about 40 feet, shell mats were
deposited at the well location and the barge was sunk onto the shell mat. The barge rigs evolved
into submersible rigs and jackups to further extend the water depth. The first submersible rig
was basically an upper and lower barge type structure connected by steel columns. The jackup
design was a barge with long legs that could be raised when moving the rig and lowered to jack
the barge up to a safe height above the waves. For development wells, offshore platforms were
designed to allow a rig to be put on the platform and used to drill multiple directional wells.
The submersible rig evolved into the semisubmersible rig, which could be anchored over the
well location and the well drilled from a floating position.
The semisubmersible “Ocean
Driller,” launched in 1963, was the first drilling vessel designed to drill in a floating position.
Since that time, a variety of mobile offshore drilling units and production facilities have been
designed (Figure 1). These designs have allowed the search for oil and gas to extend beyond the
continental shelf into the deep water of the continental slope.
Anchoring becomes more difficult as water depth increases.
Dynamically positioned
drillships and semisubmersibles were developed capable of keeping the drilling vessel on
location over the well without the use of anchors. Tension Leg Platforms, Compliant Towers,
and Spars are used for field development with multiple wells drilled directionally through a
template at the seafloor.
Deepwater wells are generally capable of producing at very high flow rates because of the
characteristics of the turbidite sands found in deepwater. Deepwater drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico offers one of the best opportunities for increasing domestic oil production.
1
This background section is based on my professional experience as summarized in Appendix C, my drilling book,
(footnote continued)
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Figure 1: Deepwater Drilling Units and Production Facilities
EVOLUTION OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
I have seen the roles and responsibilities for companies involved in drilling operations
change during my 46 years of association with the oil and gas industry. In the earlier portion of
my career, the oil and gas operators did most of the engineering work. The oil companies were
in the final stages of shifting from owning the drilling rigs and manning the rigs with their
employees to contracting for rigs and drilling services with drilling contractors. Some oil
companies still maintained a few rigs but had sold most of their equipment during the bust of the
1950s that followed the boom after World War II.
Petroleum engineering enrollments had dwindled to a trickle as jobs were scarce during this
period of contraction. Petroleum engineering enrollments hit bottom in 1963 and began growing
again over the next decade.
During this period, almost all of the petroleum engineering
graduates went to work for major oil companies. Oil company employees did almost all of the
engineering work associated with drilling, completing, producing, and managing the oil and gas
reservoirs. Most of the major oil companies had active research and development organizations
and my papers on petroleum engineering manpower supply and demand.
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and almost all of the technical papers written and presentations on new technology made at
technical conferences and meetings of the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) were by
employees of oil companies and a few large service companies.
companies was primarily at the field technician level.
Work done by service
Procedures used in the field were
developed largely by the well operators and both engineering and operational supervision was
provided almost exclusively by the oil company.
The Arab oil embargo created a domestic oil crisis and oil and gas activities quickly ramped
up during the 1970s in response to increasing oil prices. During the boom period that followed,
national petroleum engineering enrollment grew from about 2,000 in 1975 to over 10,000 in
1982 in response to high demand and starting salaries. However, the boom ended with another
bust before many of these students could graduate. The enrollment fell just as fast as it went up
as major changes again took place in the way the oil companies did business. Oil companies
became more international and began contracting out more of their engineering work to service
companies. While I was serving on the board of directors of SPE in the mid 1980’s, the society
made major changes towards becoming a truly international technical society in response to
these changes in the industry.
During the 1990s, service companies grew, conducted more research and development, and
achieved leadership positions in many technical fields associated with oil and gas drilling.
Gradually, the number of technical papers and presentations on new developments at SPE
conferences and meetings that were made by engineers employed by service companies
increased and became dominant. Service companies increased their training programs and began
hiring new graduates as well as experienced engineers. The number of major domestic oil
companies decreased and the independent oil companies began to play a major role in domestic
operations. This trend has continued through the 2000s with mergers and acquisitions of both
major oil companies and service companies as they positioned themselves for competition in a
more global economy. The latest boom in oil prices began in 2003.
Drilling for oil and gas in deep water requires teamwork from many specialists. Service
company personnel have offices in oil company facilities and work together with oil company
personnel in planning and coordinating field operations.
The well operator has overall
responsibility for drilling, completion, production, and reservoir management. However, the
operator transfers some of these responsibilities to service companies when they hire them to use
highly specialized procedures and equipment on their behalf. The shared responsibility is
controlled by contracts, work agreements and applicable law. The operator’s representative on
the rig generally does not have the specialized knowledge to supervise all of the work. The
operator’s representative coordinates the implementation of the procedures provided to him,
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helps to coordinate logistics, sees that company policy is followed, and reports on the progress
being made.
BP’s representatives on the rig are called Well Site Leaders. They are trained in company
safety policies, well control policy and approved operational procedures. General planning
documents are generally discussed in meetings (Spud Meetings) held prior to the well starting.
Training is provided so that procedures given the Well Site Leaders in outline or abbreviated
form can be implemented according to BP’s Drilling and Well Operations Practice (DWOP)
manual, Well Control manuals, and other safety policies. This is a common industry practice.
The drilling contractor is responsible for the operation of the drilling vessel and the work
done by the rig crew. They have a responsibility for the safety of those aboard their vessel.
They too are trained in well control and safety procedures appropriate for their level of job
responsibility.2 The driller and his rig crew are highly trained in recognizing the signs of a kick
and closing the blowout preventers to stop the flow with the influx still near the well bottom.
They are also trained in the use of a diverter to divert flow overboard and away from the rig
when hydrocarbons enter the marine riser above the blowout preventer at the seafloor. 3 Two
diverter lines are available to always allow downwind diversion. The chain of command from
the Well Site Leader to the rig crew is through the drilling contractor’s Offshore Installation
Manager and Senior Toolpusher.4 The Offshore Installation Manager and Senior Toolpusher
have the responsibility to stop work when asked to perform an unsafe operation.5 Any member
of the crew can call for work to be stopped if an unsafe condition is seen.
2
Transocean’s policies and procedures are consistent with this general industry standard. Examples include MDL
Ex. 1454, Transocean’s Well Control Handbook §1.3 at p. 2; MDL Ex. 1452, Transocean’s Field Operations
Handbook §3, 1.3 at pgs. 1-3; MDL Ex. 1453 Transocean Deepwater Horizon Emergency Response Manual, Vol. 1
§7.2. Many Transocean witnesses testified to these responsibilities as well, including Mr. Newman (S. Newman
9/30/11 Dep. Tr. at 177-78. I am also familiar with the IADC Well Cap training that Transocean uses as part of its
training program. MDL Ex. 1454, Transocean Well Control Handbook, §1.4. TRN-MDL-0028687-88.
3
Examples of Transocean’s policy on this point include: (i) TRN-INV-01131807-813. On page 811, it provides
that “Currently accredited IADC Well Control programs are taught in Transocean, Introductory, Fundamental, and
Supervisory. All three provide instruction on how to use these [MGS and Diverter] systems for well control,” (ii)
MDL Ex. 1454, Transocean Well Control Handbook at 1.4, and (iii) the Driller and Assistant Driller On the Job
Training Module there are tasks (Driller Task 45,46 & Assistant Driller Task 35, 36, 37) covering the diverter that
must be completed and signed by a supervisor to be deemed competent. TRN-MDL-00576075-114 (Driller
Module) and TRN-MDL-00398653-398722 (Assistant Driller Module). Additionally, the Well Control Handbook
states “At any time, if there is a rapid expansion of gas in the riser, the diverter must be closed, if not already and
the flow diverted overboard.” MDL Ex. 1454 at 8.4.9.2, TRN-MDL-0286973.
4
MDL Ex. 1453, Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon Emergency Response Manual at TRN-MDL-00048168; MDL
Ex. 5644 Transocean Management System - HSE Management at TRN-MDL-02865361.
5
Stop the Job authority is something that is common among rig personnel – they should know that if something is
unsafe, they stop the job and correct it. See MDL Ex. 1449, Transocean’s HSE Policies and Procedures Manual at
(footnote continued)
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Mud logging services are generally provided by a service company specializing in rig
monitoring and drilling data acquisition and transmission. Mud loggers monitor the entrained
gas and rock cuttings that are circulated in the drilling mud to the surface as well as monitoring
real time data.6 Mud loggers are responsible for monitoring the well at all times, for being aware
of the status of the well at all times, for recognizing the signs that formation fluids are entering
the well and alerting the crew to shut-in the well. They provide a redundant level of eyes and
ears for watching the well in addition to the driller and rig crew.
Cementing services and equipment are generally provided by a service company specializing
in oil and gas well cementing. This is a complex and highly technical service that requires a
large organization to carry out.
Cementing companies have a research group to develop
improved proprietary cement compositions and placement techniques, highly trained engineers
to properly design the cement job, trained technicians for performing the needed testing and
quality control function, and trained field technicians for carrying out the cement placement into
the well using their specialized equipment.
Numerous other service companies provide specialty services regarding well logging,
downhole equipment and subsea equipment. All of the service companies can have some
responsibility in accidents caused by failure of their equipment.
It is now common industry practice for oil companies, such as BP, to work together with
specialized, expert contractors in order to successfully drill deepwater wells in the Gulf of
Mexico.
PORE PRESSURE
Well design and casing depth placement is largely controlled by how formation pore pressure
and fracture pressure vary with increasing depth. The depths of casing strings are initially
established based on predicted pore pressure and fracture gradient values, which then are reevaluated as drilling operations are conducted and actual pore pressure measurements are
established. If pre-drilling pore pressure predictions are off (which is common in the Gulf of
Mexico), then the casing strings may be set deeper or shallower than originally planned and
additional casing strings may be added to the well design.
TRN-MDL-00046468. Steve Newman also noted the stop the job authority for all personnel on the rig in his
deposition. S. Newman 9/30/11 Dep. Tr. at 160-61.
6
I conducted independent review and analysis of much of the real time data from the rig, including the data
monitored by the Sperry-Sun mudloggers.
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The term pore pressure is used to refer to the pressure in the pore space of a rock. The
sediments that we drill into in the Gulf of Mexico have been eroded from the North American
Continent, carried to the sea by ancient rivers like the present Mississippi river, and laid down in
the ancient gulf waters over geologic time. Pore pressure is easier to visualize if we think in
terms of a sand bottom offshore from a sand beach (Figure 2a). The pore space is the space
between the sand grains and the pore pressure is the pressure of the sea water in the pore space.
Since water can flow freely between the grains in this situation, the magnitude of the pore
pressure is controlled by the depth of the water column above the point of interest and the
density of the seawater. The pressure gradient in a fluid in psi per foot can be obtained by
multiplying the density in pounds per gallon by 0.052. Seawater has a density of 8.5 pounds per
gallon so that the pressure increases by 0.44 psi for each foot of depth. Note in Figure 2a that the
pore pressure at points A, B, and C are all equal to 4.4 psi since all three points are at a depth of
10 feet. If we removed the sediments by drilling a hole at point B, pore fluid would fill the hole.
If we refilled the hole with sand, the pressure in the pore space at the bottom of the hole would
remain unchanged. This is because the pore fluid can move through the pore space and be in
hydrostatic equilibrium with the ocean.
The pore pressure is said to be “normal” when it is in hydrostatic equilibrium with the
surface. The average pore water density in the Gulf of Mexico area is a little higher than the
density of today’s seawater because of additional dissolved minerals so that the normal
formation pore pressure increases by 0.465 psi per foot of depth. In south Louisiana, the
prevalent formation type is sandstone down to a depth of approximately 10,000 feet and the
sediments are nearly in hydrostatic equilibrium with the surface. Thus, the normal formation
pore pressure gradient is 0.465 psi/ft and the pore pressure expected in this area at 10,000 feet is
4,650 psi.
The porosity of rock is the fraction of the total rock volume that is pore space. Permeability
is a measure of how easily pore fluid can flow through the rock. A sandstone formation made
from the deep burial of sand grains such that one would find on a beach would have a high
porosity, typically on the order of 25%, and a high permeability. Such a rock would be an
excellent reservoir rock if it contained oil and gas because it could contain a large oil volume
that could flow easily into a well. Porosity decreases with depth of burial in normal pressure
formations as pore water is squeezed out towards the surface.
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Figure 2a: Pore pressure in hydrostatic equilibrium with surface water
Figure 2b: Pore Pressure is controlled by Mud Pressure
Figure 2: What is Pore Pressure?
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When very fine grained clay is converted into shale rock by the elevated temperature and
pressure of deep burial, it has an extremely low permeability such that pore fluid can flow only
with extreme difficulty. Water is bound up in the crystalline structure of the clays as well as
being present as free pore water. Shale can form a good seal so that when thick layers of shale
are present, the hydrostatic equilibrium with the surface is interrupted. It becomes more difficult
for pore water to escape as sediments are buried more deeply. In addition, more free water is
released from the conversion of clay mineral structures from one form to another, e.g.,
conversion of montmorillonite clay to illites, chlorites, and kaolinite clays. The pore pressure
increases and is said to be abnormal pore pressure. As one moves farther offshore into deep
water, the top of abnormal pressure is encountered at more shallow depths.
Figure 3: What is Mud Weight?
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Pore pressure at any given vertical depth is often expressed as a pore pressure gradient by
dividing the pore pressure by the depth. The pore pressure gradient is also commonly expressed
as an equivalent density. The pore pressure gradient in pounds per gallon is obtained by dividing
the pore pressure gradient in psi per foot by 0.052. This tells the rig crew that a mud (Figure 3)
having at least this density is needed to prevent pore fluids from flowing into the well.
The mud weight at the surface is measured with a mud balance to the nearest 0.1 pounds per
gallon. The mud weight in the well varies slightly with depth due to the effect of increasing
temperature and pressure on the density of the synthetic oil and emulsified water in the mud.
The annular mud weight can also be slightly affected by the rock cuttings and pore fluids being
carried to the surface by the mud.
OVERBURDEN STRESS
Just as the density of a fluid determines the increase in pressure exerted by the fluid with
increasing depth, the density of the sediments controls the vertical pressure or overburden stress
within the sediments. This concept is more easily visualized if we go back to the example of
beach sand. If one is buried under a foot of slightly submerged beach sand, the pressure that is
felt is due to the combined density of the water and the sand grains. This average density, called
the bulk density, is weight per unit volume of sediment with the pore water in the sediments.
The bulk density of the sediments is not a constant but increases with depth because the grains
rearrange and get closer together as they are buried deeper and subject to higher overburden
stress. Water is squeezed out towards the surface as the porosity decreases.
Overburden stress cannot be measured directly and must be calculated from sediment density
values provided using well logging tools.
The well logging tools do not make a direct
measurement of sediment density. Density values are computed from measurements such as
sonic travel time through the rock and neutron absorption. Figure 4 is a plot of bulk density and
overburden stress versus depth estimated from well logs run in the Macondo Well.
Since the rock grains or matrix tend to interlock and resist moving in a direction
perpendicular to the overburden stress, the horizontal stress is usually less than the overburden
stress in a tectonically relaxed region like the Gulf of Mexico. The horizontal stress can vary
with horizontal directions and is expected to have a minimum value in a direction perpendicular
to local fault lines. However, near salt domes or other intrusions, the horizontal stress can
become higher than the overburden stress.
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Drilling a borehole through the sediments can create local stress concentrations near the
borehole wall. After the borehole is drilled, the stress in the sediments close to the borehole
increases to accommodate load that was previously borne by material removed.
Figure 4: Overburden Stress calculated from Macondo Well Logs
FRACTURE GRADIENT
If the pressure in the borehole is increased significantly above the minimum horizontal stress
so that rock tensile strength and local stress concentrations are exceeded, the rock of the
borehole wall will crack vertically along the wall parallel to the axis of the hole. The crack will
begin to open (Figure 5) and mud will enter the crack. The pressure at which the crack begins to
open and take mud is called the fracture pressure. The fracture gradient in units of psi per foot is
the fracture pressure in psi divided by the vertical depth of the fracture below the rig floor in
feet. The fracture gradient can be expressed in pound per gallon by dividing by 0.052. This tells
the drill crew that a static mud having this density or higher could fracture the formation.
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Figure 5: What is Fracture Gradient
There are a number of correlations that have been developed for estimating the formation
fracture gradient. However, because of the wide variability found in nature, there is often
considerable disagreement between the predicted and observed fracture gradients. There is no
foolproof way of determining the fracture pressure of a section of hole. The best available
method is to intentionally create a small fracture at the top of section and measure the pressure
required to do so. This operation is called a Leak-off Test (LOT). Figure 6 is a comparison of
predicted fracture pressure and Leak-off test results made by one my students using Leak-off test
data and presented at the 1994 LSU/MMS Workshop.7 If the measured Leak-off test value for
7
Rocha, L.A. and Bourgoyne, A.T., Session II, Presentation 8, LSU/MMS Well Control Workshop, March 30-31,
1994.
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fracture gradient, shown in Figure 6 as a point, agrees with the calculated value of fracture
gradient, shown as a dashed line, the point would fall on the line. Note that the measured values
for fracture gradient often disagreed with the calculated value by as much as two pounds per
gallon. Three different published methods for calculating the fracture gradient were used in the
comparison. The Leak-off test data was from the Green Canyon Area of the Gulf of Mexico.
Figure 6: Comparison of Calculated and Observed Leak-off Test Results
In some cases, the formation fracture pressure is higher than needed to finish the next section
of hole and the pressure integrity test is stopped before creating a small fracture. The Pressure
integrity test does not always go all the way to Leak-off.
PRESSURE INTEGRITY TESTS
Pressure integrity tests provide information about the effectiveness of the cement seal at the
bottom of the casing and about the resistance of the formation just below the casing to hydraulic
fracturing. This is generally done after setting each casing string. Leakage past the cement is
indicated by a non-linear, slower than expected pressure build-up that does not reach the
minimum expected pressure. If leakage past the cement outside of the casing is detected, cement
is squeezed into the leak and allowed to harden. The cement is again drilled out and the Pressure
Integrity Test is repeated. This sequence is repeated until leakage past the cement is no longer
seen. Running multiple pressure integrity tests is common.
These tests involve two steps. First, after the cement has hardened, a casing pressure test is
made to insure that there are no leaks in the casing. A recorded plot of pressure versus time is
made during the casing pressure test. The blowout preventer is closed and mud is pumped into
the well at a low pump rate (typically 0.25 or 0.5 barrels per minute) in order to impose the
desired pressure on the casing. After reaching the desired test pressure, the pump is stopped and
pressure continues to be recorded for at least 30 minutes. The pressure during the shut-in can
change slightly due to temperature changes in the mud. MMS (now BOEMRE) limits the
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observed decline in pressure to no more than 10% during a 30 minute period. The onsite
operator’s representative signs and dates the casing pressure test as being correct. The driller’s
report includes the time, date, and results of the test.
Second, following a successful casing pressure test, the hardened cement is drilled out of the
bottom portion of the casing and then a short interval of formation (typically 5 to 10 feet onshore
and 10 to 50 feet offshore) is drilled below the casing. After circulating cuttings out of the well,
the blowout preventer is closed and mud is pumped into the well at a low pump rate (typically
0.25 or 0.5 barrels per minute). BP’s procedure calls for pumping down both the drill pipe and
the casing to minimize the effect of the frictional pressure loss between the surface and the
casing seat.8 This also reduces the effect of mud gelation when starting and ending the test. The
pump pressure and volume pumped is recorded at even time increments (typically after each
minute of pumping). If the cement seal around the bottom of the casing is good, a straight line
trend of increasing pressure with volume pumped is seen. If the pressure reaches a value
corresponding to the formation strength needed to drill the next section of hole, the test may be
terminated prior to creating a small fracture.
If the fracture initiation pressure is to be
determined, the test is continued until two or three points fall significantly to the right of the
straight line trend indicating that mud is beginning to enter a small fracture. BP’s procedure
calls for continuing a Leak-off test until the same pressure or a lessor pressure is seen at the
previous value recorded.
BP’s procedure is consistent with industry practices and my
understanding is that BP informed the MMS (now BOEMRE) of their testing procedures in a
meeting in February 2009.9
Upon fracture initiation, the rock tends to crack vertically, parallel to the axis of the
borehole. The borehole acts as a notch in the rock from which the fracture grows. Fracture
resistance is determined by creating a small vertical fracture and then stopping the test. Fracture
growth is limited so that it does not extend upward past the casing seat into weaker rock. When
the pressure is allowed to bleed off, the small fracture will close. Usually the rock will not be
weakened significantly because natural cracks and imperfections are already present and only
have to be opened by the mud pressure.
Once it is decided that the pressure integrity test will be terminated, the pump is stopped and
pressure readings are then taken at a regular time interval. BP’s procedure calls for recording the
8
9
MDL Ex. 4025 FIT/LOT Worksheet and instructions.
MDL Ex. 4734; MDL Ex. 4735; MDL Ex. 4736; M. Saucier 7/27/11 Dep. Tr. at 172-78; D. Trocquet 9/23/11 Dep.
Tr. at 171-73.
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shut-in pressures for a minimum of 10 minutes if performing a Formation Integrity Test (FIT). 10
The rate of decline in pump pressure is affected by the permeability of the zone exposed, by the
size of the fracture created (if any), and by the rate of increase in mud gel strength. If the test is
conducted with only low permeability shale exposed below the casing, the Leak-off rate after the
pump is stopped will be much slower that if sand is exposed, and will be negligible if a fracture
was not initiated. It is common practice to record the volume of mud bled back at the end of the
test when the pressure is released. This volume can then be compared to the volume pumped
during the test to estimate the volume leaked-off during the test.
A graph of pump pressure versus volume pumped is generally prepared to assist in the
interpretation of a Leak-off test. The casing pressure test is often plotted as a reference for
system compressibility expected. This helps in interpreting the test in regard to whether or not
the cement seal at the bottom of the casing is leaking. Typical pressure test results to be
expected are shown in Figure 7 for a Leak-off test (LOT) and Figure 8 for a Formation Integrity
Test (FIT) not taken to Leak-off. Two cases are illustrated in Figure 7. The upper plot is for the
case in which a smooth borehole is drilled into impermeable shale that does not have any natural
cracks or imperfections and has a significant tensile strength. Rocks are generally weak in
tension but previously unbroken rock often has a tensile strength of about 5% of it compressive
strength.
When interpreting a Leak-off test, the first few data points after pumping begins can fall off
trend and are ignored because any air trapped in the surface piping needs to be compressed
sufficiently before it has a negligible effect on the trend line. This can cause the few points to
fall to the left of the subsequent straight line trend. After sufficient air compression and before
initiation of leakage into a formation fracture or past the cement sheath around the bottom of the
casing, the points will fall approximately on a straight line. After the leak begins, the pressure
vs. volume pumped plot will begin to depart from a linear relationship, i.e., the points will begin
to fall to the right of the straight line trend. The leak may be past the cement sheath around the
bottom of the casing or into a fracture that is being initiated. After the fracture begins to grow,
the pump pressure will reach a maximum value and in some cases will begin decreasing with
increased volume pumped as the fracture is extended away from the borehole.
10
Although nomenclature varies somewhat in industry practice, an FIT in this context is taken to be a Pressure
Integrity Test (PIT) that does not go all the way to Leak-off.
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Figure 7: Typical Leak-Off Test Plot
The maximum pressure reached is called the breakdown pressure when the shape of the test
is similar to upper plot of Figure 7. This is also done by some operators when the shape of the
test is similar to the lower plot of Figure 7. Industry practice varies on whether the leak
initiation pressure or the breakdown pressure measured at a low pump rate is used to compute
the formation integrity expressed as a maximum equivalent mud weight. The maximum pressure
seen when the shape of the test is similar to the lower plot of Figure 7 can be sensitive to how
fast the mud is being pumped during the test. The leak initiation pressure is not as sensitive to
the pump rate used during the test. The computation of fracture gradient using either the fracture
initiation pressure or a breakdown pressures measured at a low pump rate clearly falls within
normal industry practice. To my knowledge, MMS does not take a position on what constitutes
the best available technology for running and interpreting a Pressure Integrity Test and will
accept either approach described above.11
11
MDL Ex. 4731; MDL Ex. 4023; M. Saucier 7/27/11 Dep. Tr. at 166-67; F. Patton 7/13/11 Dep. Tr. at 230-31.
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.
Figure 8: Typical Pressure Integrity Test Plot
Points in the table are most often obtained every ¼ barrel while pumping at ¼ barrels per
minute. However, when the hole-volume is large the test time required becomes unnecessarily
large and points are obtained every ½ barrel while pumping at ½ barrels per minute or every
barrel while pumping at one barrel per minute. Pump rates higher than one barrel per minute
during a Leak-off test are unusual. When the points are too far apart, it becomes more difficult
to determine the pressure at which the departure from linearity occurred. A common practice is
to draw a straight line through the points on the linear trend and also draw a straight line though
the first two or three points that fall to the right of the linear trend. The leak initiation pressure is
then determined from the intersection point of these two lines. When pumping is stopped after
pumping only a small volume into the fracture, the fracture will close quickly and the Initial
Shut-In Pressure (ISIP) will be only slightly higher than the pressure to re-initiate the fracture.
This will often yield the same results as the point of departure from the straight-line trend. Also,
with the pump off, there is no frictional pressure loss down the drill string.
The interpretation of leak of tests is not an exact science and I have observed significant
differences in interpretations among practicing professionals attending my well control class.
During the mid-1990’s, my graduate students collected Leak-off test data from a number of
offshore operators in an effort to develop improved fracture gradient prediction methods. It was
clear that there was variability in the selection of the formation breakdown pressure from the
Leak-off test results.
Data from softer, less consolidated formations are sometimes more
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difficult to interpret. Experience in some areas has shown that small leakage rates can be
tolerated or controlled with loss circulation material.
Dr. Alan Huffman has concluded that in drilling the Macondo Well, BP departed from the
standards that would be met by any prudent operator. This was in part based on his analysis of
the pressure integrity tests conducted at the bottom of each casing or liner. In some cases Dr.
Huffman focuses on reporting errors made in submissions to MMS (now BOEMRE) and in other
cases he questions the validity of the tests conducted. As discussed below, I disagree with Dr.
Huffman’s assertions.
Figure 9: Approximate effect of Water Depth on Fracture Gradient at 3500 feet
DRILLING MARGINS
For conventional drilling in deepwater, there is a narrow margin between the mud weight
needed to control pore pressure and the mud weight that would cause an exposed formation to
fracture. Figure 9 is a comparison of fracture gradients below casing set with a sediment
penetration of 3500 ft. Note the drastic decrease in fracture gradient for a casing string cemented
3500 feet into the sediments as water depths increase. The narrower margin requires the use of
more casing strings than for the same well in shallow water. This occurs because the open hole
must support a column of mud that is heavier than seawater and that extends far above the sea
floor to the floating drilling vessel at the surface.
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Every operator in deepwater wells encounters narrow drilling margins. The way to manage
narrow drilling margins is to carefully monitor the well at all times and set more casing strings.
The Macondo well was not unusual in that regard.
Figure 10: What is a Kick?
As shown previously in Figure 2b, the mud weight should be sufficient to maintain the
pressure within a borehole at any given depth above the pore pressure of a permeable formation
exposed to the borehole at that depth. If this is not done, fluids from the rock pores can flow into
the well. An influx of formation fluid into the well is called a kick (Figure 10) because in an
extreme case it can “kick” the mud out of the well onto the rig floor. The rig crews are trained to
recognize a kick early when signs are much less obvious and to close the blowout preventer.
Formation fluids entering the well cause the mud to flow out of the well faster than it is being
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pumped and cause the fluid level in the pits to rise. Pit drills, in which a false indication of a pit
level increase is created, are routinely conducted to test the response of the crew.12
Kicks are not desired but happen on many wells drilled in the Gulf of Mexico because of the
presence of abnormal pressure. Mud logging service companies such as Sperry-Sun display a
number of indicators that show when the pore pressure could be increasing. None of this
technology is 100% accurate, so occasionally a well will become underbalanced and formation
fluids will enter the well. Normally the influx of fluid is detected quickly from either a pit level
increase or an increase in the flow returning from the well and the well is shut-in with only a
small pit gain. The required mud weight (kill mud weight) is calculated from the observed shutin drill pipe pressure. The mud service company prepares the kill mud and it is circulated around
with the blowout preventers closed and flow from the well taken through an adjustable choke.
Formation fluid is circulated out of the well and kill mud is circulated to the surface. After it is
verified that the well is dead, normal operations can be resumed. Redundant well control
systems and good training practices have been established for many years. Such an event can be
handled in a routine manner.
When pulling the drill pipe out of the well to “trip” for a new bit, the pressure at the bottom
of the well decreases slightly below that of a static well. Thus, the mud weight must be
maintained slightly above the pore pressure gradient in order to prevent a kick. The additional
mud weight maintained over the pore pressure gradient is called the “trip margin.”
The mud weight should also be less than the fracture gradient at the bottom of the casing,
which is referred to as the “casing seat” or the “casing shoe” or sometimes just “shoe.” As shown
in Figure 11, it is important to prevent the development of a very large fracture that could grow
upward outside of casing into weaker sediments previously protected by the casing. This can
cause an inability to keep the hole full of mud and lead to an “underground blowout,” (Figure
12). Underground blowouts are very expensive to control and usually require sealing off and
losing at least the bottom portion of the well. In some cases, the entire well is lost. If the casing
penetration is not very deep (less than about 2500 feet) and there are no shallow sands or shell
beds to take the flow, the sediments can be broached all the way to the surface and cause a large
crater to develop. This is dangerous for bottom supported rigs, since they are not easily moved.
12
Transocean’s procedures require pit drills to be conducted weekly, along with other well control drills on the rig.
See MDL Ex. 1454, Transocean Well Control Handbook at TRN-MDL-00286823-26.
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When circulating the mud, or when running drill pipe or casing into the well, the pressure at
the bottom of the well increases slightly above that of a static well. Thus the mud weight should
be maintained below the fracture gradient to prevent loss of mud to a formation fracture. The rig
crew is trained to quickly detect when mud is being lost and to take appropriate measures to stop
the loss. There have been numerous advancements in the design and use of loss circulation
material to “heal” the fracture so that normal operations can be resumed.
Figure 11: Shoe Strength protects Weaker Sediments Above
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Figure 12: What is an Underground Blowout?
When a kick is taken and the blowout preventers are closed, the surface drill pipe pressure
increases by the amount that the pore pressure exceeds the mud pressure in the well. The casing
pressure increases higher than the drill pipe pressure by an amount equal to the difference in
hydrostatic pressure of the mud in the drill pipe and the kick contaminated mud in the annulus.
When the kick is detected quickly and the kick volume is small, the casing pressure is only
slightly higher than the drill pipe. The shut-in pressure causes the downhole pressures to be
higher than static downhole pressure when no kick is present. A higher mud weight must be
circulated into the well at a low pump rate and under pressure with the blowout preventers closed
before normal operations can be resumed.
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SAFE DRILLING MARGIN
The initial drilling plan must be made before starting the well. For the first well drilled in a
new prospect area, prediction of how formation pore pressure and fracture gradient will vary
with depth is especially difficult and is usually not accurate. This is especially true when the
normal trend of increasing pore pressure and fracture gradient with increasing depth is not
present. The bottom part of the Macondo well had a reversal of the normal trend in which both
formation pore pressure and fracture gradient decreased with increasing depth.13
Changes in the casing program based on information learned while drilling is a common
occurrence. The estimation of pore pressure and fracture gradient becomes more accurate after
data from previously drilled nearby wells are available. For example, BP was able to use data
obtained drilling the original Macondo well to drill a nearby relief well with no delays.14
When planning a section of hole in a well below casing, it is clearly desirable for the operator
to plan to use a mud weight below the fracture gradient to allow for circulating, running pipe, or
taking an unexpected kick. Since the fracture gradient is known at the casing seat and fracture
gradient normally increase with depth, normal practice is to base the planned margin between
fracture pressure and mud weight on the Pressure Integrity Test results. The reference to safe
drilling margin is in 30 C.F.R. § 250.427 covering the requirements for pressure integrity tests.
The fracture gradient included in the Application for Permit to Drill (APD) provided BOEMRE
(previously MMS) must be included in a single plot containing estimated pore pressures,
formation fracture gradients, proposed drilling fluid weights, and casing setting depths in true
vertical measurements. The regulations do not specify how the estimate is made or what safety
margins to use. Approval of the plan is at the discretion of the District Manager of MMS based
on the information presented. Once the plan is approved, and drilling commences, the plan in
the APD defines the approved safety margin. For example, if the planned maximum mud weight
is 0.5 pounds per gallon less that the estimated fracture pressure for the hole section, then the
approved safety margin is 0.5 pounds per gallon.
It is recognized that the approved APD is based on estimates and that data obtained while
drilling must be recorded in the daily drilling reports as the well is being drilled. The regulations
state:
13
MDL Ex. 1 BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010 at 16-17; MDL Ex. 986
Chief Counsel’s 2011 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Report at
59-61; MWD/LWD real time data recorded on the rig and cited in Appendix D.
14
Daily Drilling Reports for the relief wells are identified in Appendix D.
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You must use the pressure integrity test and related hole-behavior observations, such as porepressure test results, gas-cut drilling fluid, and well kicks to adjust the drilling fluid program and
the setting depth of the next casing string. You must record all test results and hole-behavior
observations made during the course of drilling related to formation integrity and pore pressure
in the driller's report.15
This recognizes that mud weights must be allowed to deviate from the APD based on what is
seen while drilling. MMS does not specify how to interpret the information that you must
record, but they want the ability to be able to inspect the available information. In my opinion, it
is extremely important for the team on the rig to be able to change mud weights when needed for
proper well control and safety without having to wait for approval.
Dr. Alan Huffman expresses the opinion that if mud is lost while drilling, this event is
equivalent to an “open-hole pressure integrity test” and requires immediate recalculation of the
drilling margin. He states that regulations require that if the mud weight cannot be safely
reduced within the approved safe drilling margin (as re-calculated based on loss return incident),
then the operator must cease drilling immediately and get approval from BOEMRE to drill ahead
with a reduced drilling margin or to set casing immediately. He further indicated that BOEMRE
would not allow drilling to continue if the recalculated drilling margin was less than 0.3 pounds
per gallon and would require casing to be set immediately. I do not agree with any of this for the
following reasons:16
x
In deepwater drilling, the margin between pore pressure and fracture gradient is often so
small that permeable formations encountered while drilling will initially fracture at mud
weights significantly lower than the shoe strength. The fracture resistance of these zones
can usually be raised to that of the confining shale by treatment with modern loss
circulation material. When the use of loss-circulation-material allows full circulation to
be regained, the mud weight that the well will hold can often be gradually increased.
There is no way to calculate what the final fracture gradient will be after multiple
treatments.
Geo-Tap tools can measure pore pressure but do not measure fracture
pressure. BP has specialists for calculating fracture gradient from other observations, but
these are just estimated and are often inaccurate. The drilling team leader uses this group
to provide input, but he must weigh their input against other potential problems and
operational risks.
15
30 C.F.R. § 250.427
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In my opinion, normal drilling practice is to drill through a sandstone interval whenever
circulation can be established, even if some mud losses continue. Setting casing in the
middle of a sandstone formation would be extremely unwise because the weak zone
would still be exposed and it would be much more difficult to get a good cement job on
the casing.
Furthermore, the formation pore pressure gradient within a permeable
formation cannot increase with additional penetration to the bottom of the sandstone
formation. The mud weight in use will be sufficient to control formation pore pressure.
Care will have to be taken when pulling pipe out of the hole, but again, there are standard
drilling practices for not allowing the bottom-hole pressure to fall when pulling pipe out
of the hole. This is especially true on modern rigs which allow mud to be pumped when
pulling pipe.
x
Efforts to heal the loss circulation zone would continue while drilling through the
permeable zone and there would be no basis for accurate re-determination of the final
fracture gradient. When the use of loss-circulation-material allows full circulation to be
regained, the mud weight that the well will hold can often be gradually increased.
x
I would expect the District Manager of BOEMRE (previously MMS) and experienced
field inspectors to recognize normal practice in such situations.
If regulation
enforcement was a simple enforcement of pre-determined drilling margins as indicated
by Dr. Huffman, then this would be written into the regulations. There would be a many
more issuances of non-compliance made in the Gulf of Mexico region if every case of
drilling ahead with hole-ballooning seen in a field inspection resulted in one being
issued. If casing had to be run every time loss circulation or hole-ballooning was
experienced, there would be very few wells successfully drilled in the Gulf of Mexico
area.
Dr. Huffman found examples of reporting errors made in documents submitted to BOEMRE
(previously MMS).
In my opinion, the few errors found in the large amount of material
submitted to BOEMRE (previously MMS) do not warrant the leap Dr. Huffman makes to a
conclusion that BP intentionally hid information so that they could operate in an unsafe and
imprudent manner.
16
Transocean recognized many of these aspects of deepwater drilling as well, as reflected in their “Drilling
Deepwater Wells” powerpoint presentation. TRN-MDL-00868570.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 36
Dr. Huffman also based his conclusions regarding purported imprudent practices in part on
BP not reporting Pressure Integrity Test results to the nearest hundredth of a pound per gallon.
In my opinion, normal engineering practice is not to exceed expected accuracy when reporting
test results. Mud weights are measured to the nearest tenth of a pound per gallon. BP used a
Pressure While Drilling (PWD) tool above the drill bit on the Macondo well. This tool is not
required and the use of this tool is an indication of using the best available technology and
incurring extra costs to improve safety. The accuracy of a very good pressure gauge seldom is
better than one percent and it is difficult to rely on a PWD tool to be accurate to a hundredth of a
pound per gallon when measuring downhole conditions. In my opinion, it is normal practice to
record mud weights and equivalent mud weights to the nearest tenth of a pound per gallon. Also,
it is my understanding that the MMS’s (now BOEMRE) electronic eWells system requires data
to be reported in tenths.17
Dr. Huffman expressed an opinion that the pressure integrity tests that were conducted below
the 13-5/8 inch liner and the 9-7/8 inch liner were not valid tests. I was asked to do independent
analyses of these pressure integrity tests and to provide an opinion as to whether or not these
tests were valid. Both tests were valid pressure integrity tests.
BP’S PRESSURE INTEGRITY TEST PROCEDURE
BP’s written procedure for conducting a Pressure Integrity Test is as follows:
PRE-JOB CONSIDERATIONS:
·
·
·
Graph casing pressure test versus volume pumped and use as a baseline for the
PIT test.
Use cement unit and cement unit gauges. Ensure sufficient mud supply to the
cement unit.
Calculate estimated Leak-off Test (LOT)/Formation Integrity Test (FIT) pressure
and test lines to 1000 psi over expected LOT/FIT pressure.
OPERATIONS
x
x
x
17
1. Drill out the cement shoe track, cleanout rat-hole, and drill 10-ft of new
formation or as otherwise specified in well specific program
Technical Note:
MMS regulations require a minimum of 10-ft md and a maximum of 50-ft md of
new formation.
F. Patton 7/13/11 Dep. Tr. at 271:2-6 (“Q. Mr. Patton, the eWell submission, the computer submission, you can
only submit data in tenths, correct? A. That is correct, yes.”)
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
P AGE 37
2. Circulate cuttings out of the well or at least above the BOPs. If minimal
cuttings have been drilled, circulate a minimum of 1,000-ft above the Bottomhole Assembly. Ensure consistent mud weight with surface samples with
pressurized scales.
3. Pull bit back into shoe and space out to close the appropriate BOPs.
4. While keeping drill string still, circulate up consistent downhole equivalent
static densities (ESDs) from the pressure while drilling (PWD) tool to achieve <
0.05 pound per gallon consistency.
5. Displace the appropriate choke or kill line to fresh mud.
Technical Note:
The test will be performed pumping down the drill pipe and down the annulus
simultaneously via the appropriate choke or kill line to reduce friction pressure.
6. Rig up to pump down the drill pipe and down choke or kill line with the
cement unit.
7. Break circulation down the drill pipe and down the choke or kill line.
8. Close the appropriate surface valve on the drill pipe side, and the appropriate
choke/kill line valve at the BOP stack. Test lines to 1,000 psi over anticipated
maximum LOT or FIT surface pressure.
9. Bleed off test pressure but do not completely drain lines. Open valves and
break circulation down drill pipe and down the choke or kill line.
10. Shutdown and re-zero pressure gauge at cement unit to account for
hydrostatic between cement unit and rig floor.
11. Close appropriate BOP and monitor return line to ensure no returns during
PIT.
12. Perform LOT/FIT, pumping a maximum of ½ barrel per minute (bpm).
13. Record volume pumped and surface pressure consistent with pump rate. For
example, if pumping ½ bpm, record data every ½ bbl. If pumping
¼ bpm, record data every ¼ bbl.
14. Graph data on a Surface Pressure versus Volume Pumped/Time graph.
Technical Note:
Note 1: If performing an FIT, once desired surface pressure is achieved, shutdown
and monitor pressure for a minimum of 10 minutes.
Note 2: If performing a LOT, continue pumping until the pressure flatten or
decreases (pump until the subsequent pressure is equal or less than the last
pressure). This is the shut-down point.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 38
BP’S PRESSURE INTEGRITY TEST OF THE 13-5/8 INCH LINER SHOE
The Pressure Integrity Test on the 13-5/8 inch liner shoe was conducted on March 21, 2010
with R. Sepulvado listed the Well Site Leader supervising the test.18 The measured depth of the
hole was 13,150 feet, which corresponded to a True Vertical Depth of 13,140 feet. The bottom
of the liner was at a measured depth of 13,145 feet which corresponded to a True Vertical Depth
of 13,135 feet. The well was vertical on bottom (inclination angle of zero). The top cement plug
was at the float collar at 01:30 hours on March 21, 2010. The casing was pressure tested at
about 17:00 hrs. The volume of 12.5 pound per gallon mud pumped during the casing test to
achieve a test pressure of 2415 psi was 14.0 barrels and the data recorded during the pressure
build-up was as follows:
Casing Test
18
Volume
Pumped
(bbl)
Pump
Pressure
(psi)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
0
240
322
405
500
575
670
765
845
930
1020
1100
1180
1260
1345
1425
1505
1590
1670
1750
The data underlying this discussion comes from Daily Operations Reports for March 20 and 21, 2010 (BP-HZNMBI00013815-26); IADC Drilling Report for March 20 and 21, 2010 (BP-HZN-2179MDL00060910-12, 916-18);
Daily Geological Reports for March 20 and 21, 2010 (BP-HZN-2179MDL00060910-12, 16-18), and MDL Ex.
4025 - FIT/LOT Worksheet and the realtime downhole MWD/PWD data referenced in Appendix D.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
P AGE 39
1830
1900
1980
2060
2140
2220
2310
2400
2490
The pressure after 30 minutes was 2370 psi, which was about a 2% decline in 30 minutes and
thus much less than the 10% allowed for a successful test. The volume bled back after the test
was 14 barrels.
By 10:30 hours the next day, the drilling assembly had been run to bottom and cement was
drilled out from 13,100 feet to 13,150 feet. It was reported that the bit exited the shoe at 13,145
feet and cement was drilled in the rat hole from 13,145 feet to 13,150 feet. Ten feet of new
formation was drilled from 13,150 feet to 13,160 feet (measured depth). The cuttings were
pumped from bottom to the wellhead. A static bottom bole pressure equivalent to 12.72 pounds
per gallon was reported with a surface mud weight of 12.5 pounds per gallon when circulating at
a measure depth of 13,140 feet. The Pressure Integrity Test was performed at about 13:00 hours
using a pump rate of 0.5 barrels per minute. The midpoint of the new formation drilled was a
measured depth of 13,155 feet and a true vertical depth of 13,145 feet. The following data was
recorded:
Pressure Integrity Test
Volume
Pumped
(bbl)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Pump
Pressure
(psi)
0
140
205
270
350
438
520
600
680
760
Shut-in Data
Time (min)
(min)
0.17
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pump
Pressure
(psi)
1416
1322
1217
1200
1190
1187
1183
1180
1178
1177
1175
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
P AGE 40
840
930
1010
1090
1170
1250
1330
1420
1480
1480
The volume of mud bled back at the end of the test was 9.25 barrels. Note that 9.5 barrels
was pumped into the well when increasing the pressure. This indicates that 0.25 barrels of mud
and mud filtrate leaked into the formation during the test.
The results of my analysis are shown graphically in Figure 13. Basing the fracture gradient
on the observed fracture initiation pressure of 1480 psi, the fracture gradient is calculated to be
equivalent to a surface mud weight of 14.7 pounds per gallon. On this test, the fracture initiation
pressure was the breakdown pressure. This is consistent with the 10 feet of formation being
exposed consisting of an impermeable smooth borehole with no pre-existing defects or cracks
and significant tensile strength and stress concentration near the borehole wall.
The fracture pressure at 13,145 feet calculated using the equivalent mud weight on bottom as
measured by the Pressure While Drilling (PWD) tool was 10,175 psi. The overburden stress at a
measured depth of 13,155 feet (true vertical depth of 13,145 feet), due to the weight of the
sediments above, was calculated from well logs to be 9,632 psi. Thus the Leak-off test gave a
value for fracture pressure that was about 543 psi higher than the calculated overburden stress.
This is a reasonable value for the tensile strength for impermeable rock that was not previously
fractured.
The shut-in pressure versus time plot is indicative of a fracture that closed slowly over a two
minute period after pumping was stopped. The fracture closure pressure appears to be about
1,200 psi, which is equivalent to a surface mud weight equivalent to 14.3 pounds per gallon.
However, fracture closure pressure generally cannot be accurately measured in mud because the
mud starts to gel as soon as pumping is stopped.
Dr. Huffman indicated that Pressure Integrity Test was a bad test because of the following
“problems”:
x
The slope of the pressure build-up curve for the Pressure Integrity Test was very
close to the slope of the casing pressure test build-up curve.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
x
x
x
x
P AGE 41
The leak-off pressure and the propagation pressure was nearly the same.
An initial shut-in pressure that is lower than Dr. Huffman would expect relative to
the apparent leak-off pressure.
An anomalously steep decline in pressure during the shut-in period.
The fracture gradient indicated by the test was higher than expected and higher
than the overburden stress computed from well logs.
Figure 13: Pressure Integrity Test at 13-5/8 inch Liner Shoe
I do not agree that the above observations indicate that the test was bad. I find the test results
to be consistent with 10 feet of borehole drilled below casing into low permeability rock that was
not previously fractured. A point by point response to Dr. Huffman’s list follows.
x
The volume being compressed for the casing and leak-off tests are almost the
same. Adding 60 more feet to the 13,100 feet of well depth does not add much to
the volume that has to be compressed. The length of drill string in the hole was
less for the casing test. Thus, for low permeability rock, the slope would be
expected to be nearly the same.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
x
x
x
x
P AGE 42
I do not find it strange for the breakdown and propagation pressure to be the
same. Sometimes the breakdown is very sharp and the first point after breakdown
is lower than the breakdown pressure as shown in Figure 7. In this case we have
only one point and not a continuous curve.
The Initial Shut in Pressure falls 75 psi below the final pumping pressure on the
casing test and 64 psi on the Leak-off test. I find that this is consistent with
opening a very small fracture and leaking only 0.25 barrels of mud and mud
filtrate into the fracture.19
I did not find the decline in pressure after shut-in to be anomalous. I find it to be
consistent with a small fracture not penetrating all the way through the region of
higher stress concentration surrounding a borehole drilled through rock not
previously fractured.
It is true that the test result was higher than expected and was likely not to be
representative of the entire hole-section. However, it did indicate that the shoe
strength was strong enough to proceed with drilling the next section, which was
the main purpose of the test. BP eventually adjusted the fracture gradient curves
to calculated values more representative of the hole section.
BP’S PRESSURE INTEGRITY TEST OF THE 9-7/8 INCH LINER SHOE
The Pressure Integrity Test on the 9-7/8 inch liner shoe was conducted on April 2, 2010 with
Lee and Price listed as the Well Site Leaders supervising the test.20 The measured depth of the
hole was 17,183 feet, which corresponded to a True Vertical Depth of 17,173 feet. The bottom
of the liner was at a measured depth of 17,168 feet which corresponded to a True Vertical Depth
of 17,158 feet. The well was nearly vertical on bottom (inclination angle of 0.5 degrees). The
cement was in place at 11:00 hours on March 31, 2010. The casing was pressure tested at about
13:00 hours on April 1, 2010. The volume of 14.1 pound per gallon mud pumped during the
19
20
The volume pumped into the well was 9.5 barrels and the volume bleed back after the test was 9.25 barrels.
The data for this discussion comes from the Daily Operations Report for April 2, 2010 (BP-HZN-MBI0001389096), the IADC Drilling Report for April 2, 2010 (BP-HZN-2179MDL00251188-91), Daily Geological Reports for
April 2, 2010 (BP-HZN-2179MDL00059370-71), MDL Ex. 4025 - FIT/LOT worksheet, and the real time
downhole MWD/PWD data referenced in Appendix D.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 43
casing test to achieve a test pressure of 914 psi was 5.75 barrels and the data recorded during the
pressure build-up was as follows:
Casing Test
Volume
Pumped
(bbl)
Pump
Pressure
(psi)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
0
207
257
365
438
507
582
656
731
795
875
950
The pressure after 30 minutes was 887 psi, which was about a 3% decline in 30 minutes and
thus much less than the 10% allowed for a successful test. The volume of mud bled back after
the test was 5.5 bbl.
By 05:00 hours on April 2, 2010, the drilling assembly had been run to bottom and cement
was drilled out from 17,000 feet to 17,173 feet. Ten feet of new formation was drilled from
17,173 feet to 17,183 feet (measured depth). The cuttings were pumped from bottom to above
the blowout preventers. A static bottom bole pressure equivalent to 14.52 pounds per gallon was
reported with a surface mud weight of 14.3 pounds per gallon when circulating at a measured
depth of 17,183 feet. The Pressure Integrity Test was performed at about 09:00 hours using a
pump rate of 0.5 barrels per minute at the liner shoe at 17,168 feet (measured depth). The
midpoint of the new formation drilled was a measured depth of 17,178 feet and a true vertical
depth of 17,173 feet. The following data was recorded:
Pressure Integrity Test
Volume
Pumped
(bbl)
Pump
Pressure
(psi)
0
40
Shut-in Data
Time (min)
(min)
0.17
1
2
Pump
Pressure
(psi)
1500
1500
1500
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
Pressure Integrity Test
0.5
146
1
215
1.5
293
2
365
2.5
435
3
510
3.5
587
4
660
4.5
735
5
805
5.5
880
6
952
6.5
1020
7
1092
7.5
1164
8
1235
8.5
1306
9
1380
9.5
1450
10
1520
Shut-in Data
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
P AGE 44
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
1500
The volume of mud bled back at the end of the test was 10.0 barrels. Note that 10.0 barrels
was pumped into the well when increasing the pressure. This test did not go to Leak-off. The
equivalent mud weight on bottom as measured by the Pressure While Drilling (PWD) tool was
reported to be equivalent to 16.22 pounds per gallon. The results of my analysis are shown
graphically in Figure 14. Using the pressure of 1,520 psi when the test was terminated, the shoe
strength is calculated to be equivalent to a surface mud weight of 16.0 pounds per gallon.
The overburden stress at a true vertical depth of 17,173 feet, due to the weight of the
sediments above, was calculated from well logs to be 13,772 psi. The pressure measured with
the PWD tool was 16.22 pounds per gallon or 14,470 psi. Thus the Formation Integrity Test
gave a strength value that was 698 psi above the calculated overburden stress. This is a
reasonable number for 10 feet of formation being exposed consisting of an impermeable smooth
borehole with no pre-existing defects or cracks and significant tensile strength and stress
concentration near the borehole wall.
Dr. Huffman has suggested that this was not a valid test because of its high value and BP was
not a prudent operator because they did not continue testing. I saw no evidence that this was
true. There is often a wide variation in shoe test results when comparing results obtained on
different wells and when comparing observed results to calculated results. Calculation results
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 45
also vary depending on the correlation used in the calculation. An example of variations on the
order of two pounds per gallon was shown previously in Figure 6.
Figure 14: Pressure Integrity Test at 9-7/8 inch Liner Shoe
Dr. Huffman pointed out that the slope of the buildup curve was nearly the same as the
casing test and compared the test to the test at the 16 inch shoe which had more difference in
slope. The decrease in slope of the straight line buildup curve (between the casing test and the
formation test in a deep well with 10 feet of open borehole) depends primarily on the rate at
which mud filtrate is being lost during the test. If the 10 feet of borehole is good shale with a
very low permeability, then one would expect the slopes to be nearly the same. The permeability
of shale is in the nanodarcy range,21 which is about a million times less permeable than
21
Discussion of shale permeability in “Shale Water as a Pressure Support Mechanism in Gas Reservoirs having
Abnormal Formation Pressure,” Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, 3 (1990) 305-319.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 46
sandstone, and would be expected to behave much like steel pipe from the standpoint of allowing
fluid to enter the borehole wall when no cracks are present.
Dr. Huffman pointed out internal e-mails within the BP organization discussing the high shoe
strength. Various reasons were suggested including the possibility that the driller did not know
what depth he was at when he drilled out the shoe.22 This issue was brought up in regard to both
tests that produced unexpectedly high fracture gradients. BP’s team members that supervised the
test recognized that the results were higher than expected and BP even repeated a portion of the
test.23 It is not plausible that they would not have checked for possible pipe tally errors and that
the driller was off by more than 10 feet. Another speculation is that not all of cement in the five
feet of rat hole below the casing had been drilled out. This speculation was partially based on a
report of abundant cement mixed with shale cuttings when drilling new formation below the 135/8 inch shoe. When cementing with a short rat hole below the casing, the cement is not
expected to displace all of the mud out of the rat hole, but sometimes good cement fills the entire
rat hole. Good cement in the entire rat hole results in more cement cuttings being circulated to
the surface when drilling ahead.
I have examined the daily operational reports, cuttings
evaluations, penetration rate data, and gamma ray logs and found the speculation about the tests
being conducted in casing or cement not being drilled out to be unfounded for both tests. The
data is consistent with the depths reported in the operational records and confirmed that both
tests were conducted in newly drilled formation below previously drilled larger hole.
It should also be pointed out that cement is often squeezed at the shoe to repair a leaking
cement seal. The drilled out cement after a squeeze job is not strong enough in tension to
interfere with the Pressure Integrity Test conducted after the squeeze job. Sometimes multiple
squeeze jobs must be done to repair the cement seal around the bottom of the casing.
The fact that BP has on its staff a number of scientists that specialize in pore pressure and
fracture gradient calculations is an indication to me that it was not trying to cut corners to save
money but instead was employing the best available technology to support and advise its
experienced team leader. Filings by BP and the number of individuals focused on pore pressure
prediction and estimates show a strong emphasis by BP towards obtaining as accurate as possible
data related to pore pressure and estimated fracture gradients. The specialists often see only
their side of an issue and do not recognize the risk versus benefit of taking additional data. If
drilling was stopped to do a Leak-off test in the extended borehole, the risk of getting stuck
22
MDL Ex. 1343, M. Albertin April 2, 2010 email discussing FIT test.
23
MDL Ex. 3734, BP-HZN-2179MDL00247809
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 47
would increase. If the test was carried to a high value, the risk of unnecessarily causing a leak at
the liner top had to be considered. Even if the test gave a value close to what was calculated by
the specialists, this would not necessarily be representative of formations not yet drilled. The
test had accomplished its main objective of demonstrating that the shoe was strong enough to
proceed with drilling the next section of hole. Additionally, it is my understanding that the
author of the email quoted by Dr. Huffman concluded that the test was valid after he sent the
email.24
The resistance of a rock to fracture is controlled primarily by the overburden stress in the
sediments caused by the weight of sediments above and other local tectonics. The overburden
stress always increases with depth so that the weaker sediments exposed by an open borehole
will usually be near the top of the open borehole. However, rock fracture resistance is also
affected by pore pressure, permeability, mineral composition, and cementation. Mother Nature
is not uniform and large variability in fracture resistance is to be expected. Figure 15, taken
from one of my old lectures, shows the common assumptions made to do fracture mechanics
modeling on a picture of what Mother Nature has to offer. Fortunately, the technology for
healing downhole fractures has been improved. When drilling in deep water, care must be taken
to keep a good supply of loss circulation material on hand.
24
M. Albertin 7/13/11 Dep. Tr. at 583-85 (discussing FIT test and stating that after discussion, BP believed it was a
valid test of rock stronger than they expected); G. Vinson 6/23/11 Dep. Tr. at 274-75 (same).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 48
Figure 15: Common Assumptions in Fracture Modeling
(Homogeneous Layers, Isotropic Media, Elastic Behavior)
EFFECT OF SPACER ON NEGATIVE PRESSURE TE ST INTERPRETATION
The discussion of the previous section was regarding the Pressure Integrity Test conducted
after setting each casing string or liner required to complete the drilling operations. Once the
production casing is run and cement is circulated as planned, additional pressure tests are
conducted before completing the well to put it on production or to temporarily cap the well. A
temporary cap allows the drilling rig to be released to drill other wells and a smaller rig moved
on the well to complete the well and make it ready for production.
An overarching principle of well control that industry follows in drilling and completing
wells is to always maintain two independently verified barriers to an uncontrolled release of
formation fluids from the well.25 When drilling ahead in deep water, the two barriers are the
hydrostatic pressure of the mud and the blowout preventer stack at the seafloor. The blowout
preventer stack has redundant blowout preventers so that it can be closed on any size or shape of
pipe in the hole or when nothing is in the hole. Provisions are also made for multiple blowout
preventers for the same size range of pipe and for pipe to be stripped into the well under
pressure. The hydrostatic pressure of the mud is verified to be a barrier simply by keeping the
well filled with mud and observing that it does not flow. The blowout preventers are pressure
tested on a routine schedule to verify their ability to function as a barrier.
After cementing casing, the casing and cement work together and isolate the rock formations
from the inside of the well. However, the casing/cement system must be pressure tested to verify
that it serves as a barrier. A positive pressure test of the production casing is conducted in the
same manner that the other casing strings and liners are tested. The positive pressure test
verifies that the casing is intact and does not leak from the inside of the casing to the outside of
the casing from the wellhead to the Top Plug landed on the float collar at the bottom of the
casing. However, before the hydrostatic head of the mud in the well can be reduced below
formation pressure, a Negative Pressure Test is conducted in which the hydrostatic head is
temporarily removed in a controlled manner to observe whether or not fluid can leak past the
cement around the outside of the casing and the cement remaining in the bottom portion of the
casing. The casing joints below the float collar are called the shoe joints. The purpose of the
25
Transocean’s well control handbook includes a discussion of multiple barriers, consistent with industry practice.
See Ex. 1454, Transocean Well Control Handbook at TRN-MDL00286776.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 49
negative test is to verify that formation fluids cannot enter the well from the outside at the
negative pressure difference that was imposed in the test.
Once the negative test is passed, the mud that was in the marine riser and in the top part of
the well can be replaced with seawater. At this time the two verified barriers would be the tested
casing/cement system and the blowout preventer stack. A cement plug could then be set in the
top part of the casing.26 The cement plug would have no pressure differential across it and could
be verified by tagging it with pipe to insure the cement had hardened and was in place. BP was
planning to test the top plug in the Macondo well to 1000 psi, although there was no regulatory
requirement to do so. Once the upper plug was in place, the Marine Riser could be pulled back
and laid down on the drilling vessel and the temporary well cap put in place. There would be
three barriers in place after the temporary cap was installed.
Figure 16 is a schematic showing the Macondo well after circulating cement. The left side of
the schematic shows an overview of the well and various casing strings and liners. The right
side of the schematic is an enlargement of the bottom part of the production casing and the
sediments penetrated below the 9-7/8 inch liner. Figure 17 is a schematic of how the well would
have been configured at the end of the temporary capping operation. Note that the change in
fluid density occurs only above the depth of the plug (8,367 feet), where the 14 pound per gallon
mud is replaced by seawater having a density of about 8.5 pounds per gallon. Everything else
remains the same.
NEGATIVE TEST NOMENCLATURE
It is customary to reference a negative pressure test in terms of the depth to which the
hydrostatic pressure will change or the depth of the equipment being tested. For the negative
pressure test needed for the temporary capping operation, the negative test had to be conducted
to an equivalent mud weight of 8.5 pounds per gallon at the plug depth of 8,367 feet. As shown
in Figure 18, this is also equivalent to an 11.5 pound per gallon mud at the top of the shoe track
at a vertical depth of approximately 18,100 feet.
26
Regulations require that the plug be at least 100 feet in length and be set no more than 1000 feet below the
seafloor. However, BP had sought and received permission to set the plug about 3,400 feet below the seafloor, but
would use a 300 foot plug. MDL Ex. 2236 (BP-HZN-2179MDL00048427-531). Setting the plug deeper would
facilitate using more weight of pipe to set the casing lockdown device in the subsea wellhead at the seafloor.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 50
Figure 16: Schematic of Macondo Well after Circulating Cement
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 51
Figure 17: Planned Configuration of Macondo Well with Temporary Cap
I know of no industry standard regarding Negative Pressure Tests. The most common way to
conduct a negative pressure test is to pump water down the drill pipe to a depth sufficient to
cause the desired reduction in well hydrostatic pressure. To do this, the needed depth and
volume required to fill the drill pipe to that depth is first calculated. The rig crew then pumps the
calculated water volume down the drill pipe. When pumping is stopped, the surface drill pipe
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 52
pressure will be equal to the desired reduction in hydrostatic pressure. The blowout preventers
are then closed and the surface drill pipe pressure is bled down to zero while the volume of water
bled back is measured. When the drill pipe pressure reaches zero, the volume bled back should
be the expansion volume of the fluids in the well corresponding to the pressure decrease. The
system is then left static for the duration of the test. For a 30 minute negative test, this period
would be 30 minutes. If no fluid flows from the drill pipe, the negative test is passed and
reported as a good test. If the drill pipe pressure cannot be bled to zero or bleeds down and then
increases, or water continues to flow from the drill pipe, the negative test is said to have failed.
As shown in Figure 21 and as will be discussed in more detail later in this report, the system is
easily understood using a U-tube analogy with the drill pipe being the high pressure side of the
U-tube and the annulus being the low pressure side of the U-tube.
The rig crew should know not to let a significant influx of fluid into the well. The test is
terminated quickly if the well is flowing. At the end of the test, the pump is started and the drill
pipe pressure is increased back to the initial value seen when the blowout preventer was closed.
The pressure on the drill pipe is slowly bled through a choke while the annulus kept full of mud
by filling through a choke of kill line. This removes the water or synthetic base oil from the drill
pipe and returns the well to its initial condition before the test.
On a deepwater rig with the blowout preventer at the seafloor, the luxury of additional piping
(the choke and kill lines) down to the seafloor is present. Water or some other low density fluid
such as synthetic oil can be pumped down the choke line instead of the drill pipe. This option is
often preferred because it simplifies the bleed back part of the test. However, the depth of the
choke line is fixed, so the hydrostatic pressure reduction achieved during the test is limited by
the lowest density fluid available for pumping down the choke line.
The rig crew does not have to be told how to run a negative test. This should be a routine
operation that fits within their training. A typical procedure sent to the rig would say simply to
conduct a negative test to an equivalent density of so many pounds per gallon at a depth of so
many feet. The procedure could also say to conduct a negative pressure test at a depth of so
many feet to a pressure differential of so many psi. The operator’s representative and the rig
crew would be expected to know the proper procedure for running the test.
I have reviewed several of Transocean’s written procedures for Performing Negative Flow
Tests. These included tests conducted by pumping a low density fluid down the drill string27 and
27
The procedure labeled TRN-INV-00760141 is basically the general procedure described above in which low
density fluid is pumped down the drill pipe to create the desired differential.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 53
tests conducted by pumping a low density fluid down the choke line. They also included a
negative test run in conjunction with displacing the top part of the well from mud to seawater
(separated by a spacer) as was being done on the Macondo Well at the time of the blowout.28
I reviewed several written Transocean procedures for conducting a Negative Pressure Test
after pumping synthetic oil down the choke line and/or kill line.29 Transocean’s Task Specific
THINK procedure for the Deepwater Horizon for performing a Negative Flow Test using the
choke and kill lines is a variation of this procedure that uses both the choke line and kill line as
the high pressure side of the U-Tube.30 One of the hazards warned about in the THINK
procedure is that a closed flow path can give a false indication of no flow.
Figure 18: Use of Equivalent Mud Weights in Negative Test Nomenclature
28
The procedure labeled TRN-MDL-01323432 uses a spacer between the seawater and mud and pumps the spacer
above the BOP stack before closing the Blowout Preventer and performing a Negative Test.
29
The procedure labeled TRN-INV-00760143 does not use the drill pipe and annulus as the two sides of the Utube, but instead uses the choke line and kill line. The procedure labeled TRN-INV-00760142 is a slight variation of
this procedure that uses the annular Blowout Preventer instead of the blind/shear rams. The procedure labeled BPHZN-2179MDL03287798 used the choke line and the marine riser as the two sides of the U-tube.
30
TRN-MDL-01995569
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 54
FLUID DISPLACEMENT
The removal of the mud from the top part of the well and from the marine riser requires what
is called a fluid displacement. This is accomplished by placing the drill string at the depth to be
displaced. The replacement fluid is pumped from mud tanks on the rig into the drill pipe while
taking return flow of existing well fluid to different mud tanks on the rig.
The displacement of a heavy oil base mud by sea water is complicated by the fact that mixing
between the two fluids will take place during the displacement and contamination of the mud by
sea water can cause the mud to become unstable. If this happens, the mud solids dispersed in the
oil phase can start clumping together in the seawater. In order to avoid this mud chemistry
problem, the drilling fluid specialist must design a spacer fluid to pump between the mud being
removed from the well and the seawater being pumped into the well. The spacer must be
compatible with the mud on the leading edge and the seawater on the trailing edge. The drilling
fluid specialist is generally in charge of the displacement.31 He is trained in this operation and
the operator depends on him to make sure that the displacement goes well.32 The displacement
of oil base fluids by water base fluids or vice versa have been known to go bad and create a
highly contaminated well that is hard to clean.
MI-SWACO SPACER
MI-Swaco provided drilling fluid and drilling fluid waste management services on the rig for
BP. The MI-Swaco drilling fluid specialist wrote procedures and supervised displacement of
various fluids into the well.33 At the end of drilling operations, there was a significant volume of
loss circulation material that had been mixed as a contingency in case there was another event of
loss circulation. The spacer for the fluid displacement was composed of a blend of two lost
circulation material (LCM) pills left over from the drilling operations plus some additional
31
B. Billon 6/23/11 B. Billon Dep. Tr. at 109:11-21 (MI-Swaco personnel “in most cases, always prepare a
[displacement] procedure”); B. Billon 6/24/11 Dep. Tr. at 471-482 (discussing M-I Swaco responsibilities); L.
Lindner 9/14/11 Dep. Tr. at 231-33 (discussing development of M-I Swaco displacement procedure).
32
MDL Dep. Ex. 567; B. Billon 6/23/11 Dep. Tr. at 109:11-21; L. Lindner 9/15/11 Dep. Tr. at 549:12-17. In
addition to the M-I Swaco personnel preparing the displacement procedure and calculating the pumps necessary, the
Transocean rig crew would also have evaluated the displacement procedure. Wyman Wheeler’s interview notes
reflect the collaborative process involved in displacement when he answered the question about displacement
figures and said that displacement figures are evaluated by the Transocean rig crew and that the Assistant Driller,
the Driller and the Toolpusher all have to agree before the procedure goes forward. W. Wheeler interview notes,
TRN-INV-00004991-97. Leo Lindner also testified that he provided the displacement procedure to the mudloggers,
Transocean crew, MI-Swaco personnel on shore and BP’s company man to review. L. Linder 9/14/11 Dep. Tr. at
268-69.
33
L. Lindner 9/14/11 Dep. Tr. at 564-65 (discussing M-I Swaco internal discussions regarding the spacer and
Lindner testifying that he “got the idea from Doyle [Maxie of M-I Swaco]”); L. Lindner 9/14/11 Dep. Tr. at 231-33
(discussing development of M-I Swaco displacement procedure); MDL Ex. 2810.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 55
weight material and viscosity enhancer.34 MI-Swaco had not previously used LCM pills for this
purpose but believed the mixture could be used effectively and at the same time better manage
waste by providing a beneficial re-use of material.35 The mixture chemistry was adjusted by not
adding the cross linking chemical so that it would not function in the same manner that it would
if used to stop loss circulation. Without the cross linking chemical, the polymers present could
not link and make the spacer too thick. The fibers and ground limestone that were in the mixture
were inert materials that are routinely circulated in the mud without problems. MI-Swaco
personnel has circulated this idea within their organization and also told BP that this was their
plan.36
Figure 19: Displacement Planned by MI-Swaco Drilling Fluid Specialist
The basic displacement that was planned is shown in Figure 19. Note how the spacer
separates the seawater from the 14 pound per gallon mud. In the drill pipe, the thick 16 pound
34
MDL Ex. 1, BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report at Appendices P and Q.
35
MDL Dep. Ex. 567; L. Lindner 9/15/11 Dep. Tr. at 583:22-25; B. Billon 6/24/11 Dep. Tr. at 522:6-12.
36
B. Billon 6/24/11 Dep. Tr. at 510-512 (discussing M-I Swaco internal emails regarding displacement); MDL Ex.
2810 (internal M-I Swaco emails regarding the spacer); L. Lindner 9/15/11 Dep. Tr. at 554-561.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 56
per gallon spacer displaces the mud below it. The spacer is about 14% heavier than the mud, but
little mixing would take place at the interface because the spacer is so thick. The water displaces
the spacer from the drill pipe and since water is only half as dense as the spacer, there would be
little mixing between the water and the spacer in the drill pipe. In the annular space outside of
the drill pipe, the spacer efficiently displaces the mud upward because it is heavier than the mud
and more viscous. Note that the spacer gets shorter when it enters the large-diameter Marine
Riser. When the water pushes the spacer up the Marine Riser, a less efficient displacement takes
place and there is some mixing of the water and the spacer. However, the spacer contains only
non-toxic material that could be released to the environment along with the seawater.
The final instructions sent to the rig regarding the temporary capping procedure included the
following steps:37
1. Test Casing per Application for Permit to Drill to a low pressure test of 250
psi and a high pressure test of 2500 psi.
2. Run in the hole to 8,367 feet.
3. Displace to seawater from there to above the wellhead.
4. With seawater in the kill line, close the annular blowout preventer and do a
negative test to a pressure differential of approximately 2350 psi.
5. Open annular blowout preventer and continue displacement.
6. Set a 300 foot balanced cement plug with 5 barrels in the drill pipe.
7. Pull out of hole about 100 to 200 feet above the top of cement and drop a nerf
ball. Then circulate a drill string38 volume.
8. Spot corrosion inhibitor in the open hole.
9. Pull out of the hole to just below the wellhead or above with the 3-1/2 inch
stinger39. (If desired, wash with the 3-1/2 inch stinger but do not rotate. A
separate run will not be made to wash since the displacement will clean up the
wellhead.
10. Pull out of the hole and make Lead Impression Tool/Lock-Down Sleeve
runs.40
37
MDL Ex. 545.
38
The term drill string is used to refer to all of the drill pipe sections and bottom-hole assembly (if any) as a whole.
In this case it was composed of a section of 6-5/8” drill pipe on top, 5-1/2” drill pipe in the middle and 3-1/2” pipe
in the bottom section.
39
A section of small diameter pipe on bottom is called a stinger. It is best to set a balanced cement plug using a
small diameter pipe to reduce disturbing the slurry when pulling the stinger out of the cement after it is placed.
40
A Lead Impression Tool is used to provide an imprint of the area in the wellhead where the top of the production
casing has been landed and the seals installed. The impression made into the soft lead block can confirm that the
wellhead at the seafloor is properly configured to accept the lock down sleeve that will lock the top of the casing so
that upward movement is prevented.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 57
11. Test casing and surface plug to 1000 psi with seawater as required by BP’s
Drilling and Well Operations Practice (DWOP).
a. Confirm volume in barrels needed to pressure up on original casing
test versus volume in barrels to test the surface plug. Less volume
should be required to test the surface plug because of differences in
well fluid volume and compressibility. (seawater versus synthetic oil
bas mud).
b. Plot on chart and send to Houston for confirmation.
The negative test procedures included in this plan appear very similar to what was used
previously by Transocean on the Kodiak Well in Mississippi Canyon 727 #2.41 After cementing,
the drill pipe was pulled to the planned depth of the displacement. The Boost line, Choke Line,
and Kill Line were displaced to seawater. They then pumped water base spacer down the
drillpipe and displaced the drill pipe and hole with seawater to the top of the BOP Stack to
perform the negative test. The differential pressure was put back using the Halliburton Pump,
the annular preventer was opened, and the displacement to seawater was completed. This
negative test, which was run on January 28, 2010, used essentially the same procedure as used
on the Macondo Well.
MI-Swaco’s drilling fluid specialist included the negative test of Step 4 in the displacement
procedure that he prepared. This procedure is given as Appendix P in BP’s Deepwater Horizon
Accident Investigation Report issued September 8, 2010.42
displacing the boost line,
43
choke line, and kill line
44
The procedure called for first
to seawater and then closing the lower
valve where these lines enter the Marine Riser. The MI-Swaco Procedure called for pumping:
x
x
x
x
x
73 barrels of seawater or 579 strokes to displace the Boost Line,
8 barrels of seawater or 63 strokes to displace surface lines plus 100 barrels or
794 strokes to displace the choke line (total of 857 strokes),
100 barrels of seawater or 794 strokes to displace the kill line,
425 barrels of 16 pound per gallon spacer or 3373 strokes into the drill pipe,
Follow spacer with seawater until 775 barrels or 6150 strokes were pumped.
41
TRN-MDL-00600984.
42
MDL Ex. 1 at Appendix P; MDL Ex. 567.
43
The boost line is attached to the outside of the Marine Riser and enters the Marine Riser above the Blowout
Preventer Stack. By pumping down the boost line with the boost pump, the upward fluid velocity in the Marine
Riser can be increased. Boosting the fluid velocity in the Marine Riser can help carry the cuttings to the surface in
this large diameter pipe.
44
The choke line and kill line are attached to the outside of the Marine riser and provide two high pressure fluid
paths to or from the well when the blowout preventers are closed.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 58
At this point in the displacement, the spacer was intended to be above the upper annular in
the blowout preventer with only seawater below the blowout preventer down to the planned
cement plug depth of 8,367 feet.
45
The blowout preventer would then be closed to run the
Negative Pressure Test.
Implementation of the procedure by the Transocean Rig Crew began at about 3:00 pm on
April 20, 2010. An overview of the first part of the displacement is shown in Table 1.
Activity
Event
No.
1
Displaced
mud from
Booster,
Choke, and
Kill lines
Displaced
mud from
Drill pipe and
Riser
2
Action
Displaced boost line
mud to seawater
Tested surface lines
Description
Time
Pump 1 used to displace boost line from 14-ppg mud to seawater.
15:03 - 15:15
Pump 2 used to test the surface lines.
15:15 - 15:21
3
Displaced choke line
mud to seawater
Pump 2 used to displace choke line from 14-ppg mud to seawater.
15:21 - 15:38
4
Displaced kill line
mud to seawater
Pump 2 pumped used to displace kill line from 14-ppg mud to seawater.
15:38 - 15:55
5
Pumped spacer
through drillpipe
into well
Pumps 3 and 4 used to pump about 454 bbls of 16-ppg spacer from Pit 5 into the
15:55 - 16:27
well displacing 14-ppg mud.
6
Pumped seawater
through drillpipe
into well
Pumps 3 and 4 used to pump 353 bbl of seawater behind the spacer to place the
16:27 - 16:53
theoretical spacer/water interface above the BOP. Pumps are shut down.
Table 1 –Summary of Events during the Initial Displacement
Sperry-Sun Real Time Data indicated the following:
x
x
x
x
x
616 strokes of seawater was pumped (Boost Line),
872 strokes of seawater was pumped (Surface line and Choke Line),
845 strokes of seawater was pumped (Kill Line),
3607 strokes were pumped down drill pipe from the tank containing the
spacer,
Pumping continued with seawater down drill pipe until total stroke count of
6408 (807 barrels) were pumped.
At this point, the pumps were stopped and the blowout preventer was closed to conduct the
negative test.
45
Leo Lindner, a MI-Swaco Drilling Fluid Specialist testified that he had calculated that the spacer would be 17
feet above the Blowout Preventer. L. Lindner 9/14/11 Dep. Tr. at 271-72. See also MDL Ex. 1 at page 84, BP
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report at 84 and Appendix Q (spacer calculated to be 12 feet above
BOP).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 59
The intent of the procedure was to place the entire spacer above the upper annular in the
blowout preventer. The actual position of the bottom of the spacer at the time pumping was
stopped to do the negative pressure test cannot be accurately determined. If the spacer tank
contained 454 barrels of spacer,46 the interface would be below the bottom of the blowout
preventer. In addition, the pump pressure observed when pumping was stopped indicated that
the effective height of the spacer was greater than expected for all of the spacer to be above the
blowout preventer.
I would expect mixing at the spacer seawater interface during the
displacement because the spacer was almost twice the density of the water. Once pumping
stopped, the rate of settling of solids from the spacer into the seawater below would have
increased. Spacers are designed to separate fluids for circulating conditions and not for static
conditions. In my opinion, the procedure followed did not place all of the spacer above the
blowout preventer and spacer material was in and below the blowout preventer.
NEGATIVE PRESSURE TEST
A summary of the actions taken by the rig crew during the first Negative Pressure Test is
shown in Table 2. A plot of data recorded in real time and transmitted to shore bases by the
Sperry-Sun well monitors is shown in Figure 20.
The first action was to close the blowout preventer and bleed fluid from the drill pipe. The
Transocean Rig crew conducting the negative pressure test should have expected the drill pipe
pressure and choke line pressure to both bleed to zero after bleeding about 4 barrels of water
from the drill pipe. Estimates of the initial amount of fluid bled back were in the range of 15 to
25 barrels and the pressure did not bleed to zero. This was an indication that the Negative
Pressure Test had failed, but it also could be explained by fluid leaking past the closed blowout
preventer. With some additional checking and bleeding, it was seen that the annular preventer
was leaking and allowing fluid from above the blowout preventer to leak into the casing that was
intended to contain only seawater. The leak was stopped by increasing the closing pressure to
the annular in the blowout preventer. An estimate of the amount of fluid that was required to
refill the casing was in the range of 50-65 barrels.47 This is an indication that the 50-65 barrels
of seawater had been bled from the well before the leak was found. This would have moved
additional spacer material down into the area where the choke line and kill line connect with the
46
The MI-Swaco Drilling Fluid Specialist testified that the volume of spacer in the tank was measured to be 454
bbl. L. Lindner 9/14/11 Dep. Tr. at 151, 268.
47
MDL Ex. 1 BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report at 84; Macondo Well Incident Transocean
Investigation Report, Vol. 1 at 96.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 60
well and substantially further down into the drill pipe casing annulus inside the narrower
diameter production casing.
Activity
Event
No.
7
8
9
10
Action
Closed BOP
Description
The annular BOP is closed.
The drill pipe is opened and an estimated 25 bbl of fluid are bled from the drill
pipe, and the drill pipe pressure decreases to 1,250 psig. The drill pipe is then
Bled drill pipe
closed.
Opened subsea kill
The subsea kill valve is opened. The drill pipe pressure increases to 1400 psig
valve
and the kill line pressure decreases to 680 psig.
Bled drill pipe and Resume bleeding drill pipe and bleed kill line. The kill line pressure bleeds to 0
kill line
psig while the drill pipe pressure decreases to approximately 340 psig.
Time
16:53 - 16:54
16:54 - 16:57
16:57 -16:58
16:58 - 16:59
11
Bled drill pipe; Fluid
Continue bleeding drill pipe. The drill pipe pressure decreases to approximately
leaked through BOP;
240 psig before increasing. Discovered fluid level in riser has fallen indicating 16:59 - 17:05
Spacer moved
leak of annular BOP and downward movement of the spacer.
downward
12
The drill pipe is closed and the drill pipe pressure increases rapidly to 830 psig,
more slowly to 1,250 psig, and then decreases to 1,200 psig. Early in this period
17:05 - 17:26
the annular preventer is sealed preventing any further movement of 16 ppg
spacer into BOP. Based on the volume used to refill the riser, approximately 50
bbl of spacer passed the BOP during the leak.
Crew
conducts NPT
on Drill pipe
13
14
Closed drill pipe;
Annular BOP sealed
The drill pipe is opened and approximately 15 bbl bled. Compressibility
calculations indicate that only 3.5 bbl of the fluid bled can be attributed to liquid
Bled drill pipe
17:26 - 17:32
expansion, suggesting an cement seal is leaking. The drill pipe pressure
decreases to approximately 0 psig.
Well becomes underbalanced to formation; hydrocarbons leak into well until pressure builds up to
~17:30
equalize with formation pore pressure.
Table 2 – Summary of Actions Taken during the First Negative Pressure Test
The Transocean rig crew was responsible for placing the fluids in the correct position and for
maintenance of the blowout preventer. After refilling the well, it should have been obvious that
the spacer was not correctly positioned for the planned negative test using the Kill Line. I would
have expected that the situation would have been discussed with the MI-Swaco mud specialist
and that allowance would have been made for mixing of seawater and spacer to have taken place
while the leaking blowout preventer was being diagnosed and the well refilled. The well had
been static so long, it is questionable that a valid 8.5 pound per gallon negative test at 8,367 feet
could have been run using the Kill line without first displacing the well back to mud and starting
over. Unfortunately, nothing to rectify the situation was done; there was no attempt to circulate
the 65 barrels that was known to have leaked below the blowout preventer back to the correct
position above it.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 61
Figure 20: Plot of Real Time Data Recorded during Negative Pressure Test
After stopping the leakage past the annular blowout preventer, the rig crew bled an additional
approximately 15 barrels from the drill pipe to bring the pressure to zero. This was three times
the volume that should have been required and should have caused the test to be interpreted as a
failed test. The Well Site Leader decided to re-test using the kill line since the kill line was
specified in the procedure approved by MMS (now BOEMRE).48
Table 3 shows a summary of the actions taken during the second Negative Pressure Test.
After making the appropriate valve changes to line up for testing using the kill line, the kill line
was bled to zero. Estimates of the volume bled were in the range of 3-15 barrels. The surface
kill line valve was closed and the drill pipe pressure slowly increased to 1400 psi. This was a
direct indication that the second negative test had also failed and that formation fluid was leaking
past the cement seals into the well. The leak stopped after the pressure in the well became in
balance with the formation pore pressure and the observed drill pipe pressure. This is indicated
by the stabilized drill pipe pressure readings.
48
MDL Ex. 2236 (outlining temporary abandonment plan).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
Activity
Event
No.
Action
Description
Time
15
Lined up to monitor
test with kill line
System lined up to perform negative pressure test on kill line. Pressure likely
had built-up on the drill pipe due to leakage past cement seals.
17:32 - 17:52
16
Bled drill pipe and
kill line
17
Crew
conducts NPT
on Kill Line
P AGE 62
A valve is opened exposing a gauge to the drill pipe pressure. After rapidly
increasing to 770 psig, the pressure is again bled off. Kill line is opened and
17:52 - 18:00
witnesses report that between 3 and 15 bbls of seawater flowed from the well,
and that the flow spurted before being shut in.
Crew change time for certain individuals.
~18:00
18
Closed drill pipe;
Opened kill subsea
valve
19
Well potentially
brought into
balance; Drill pipe
pressure stabilizes
20
Fluid is pumped into the kill line and the pressure spikes to 490 psig, suggesting
the kill line was full. The kill line pressure is then bled off. A slight reduction in
Pumped down kill
the drill pipe pressure is noted on two occasions with no corresponding response 18:40 - 19:07
line; Bled kill line
on the kill line pressure. The kill line pressure increases while drill pipe pressure
decreases suggesting the columns of fluid in drill pipe and kill line equalized.
21
22
Bled Kill line
The drill pipe is closed and the drill pipe pressure gradually increases to 1,200
psig. A slight pressure increase is recorded on the the kill line, suggesting the
subsea kill valve was opened.
18:00 - 18:35
The drill pipe pressure increases to 1,400 psig and the kill line pressure increases
to 140 psig, suggesting the well is in communication with the formation. The
18:35 - 18:40
drillpipe pressure becomes relatively stable at this value throughout the
duration of the negative pressure test. This drillpipe pressure conicides with the
well near balance with the formations.
The kill line valves at BOP and surface are opened and the pressure is bled off,
returning a small volume of liquid (0.2 bbl). At least 3 bbl of spacer in BOP is
potentially drawn into 150 ft of kill line.
19:07 - 19:15
The negative test is conducted by monitoring the kill line for flow. The drill pipe is stable at 1,400 psig
19:15 - 19:54
and the kill line is open with no flow.
Table 3 – Summary of Actions Taken during the Second Negative Pressure Test
The Transocean Toolpushers and BP Well Site Leaders had considerable discussions in an
effort to resolve the conflicting information. They appeared to be working together to reach a
consensus as to the reason for the conflicting test data. Witness testimony49 indicated that the
Toolpusher proposed that the drill pipe pressure was caused by a “bladder effect” that he had
seen before. This explanation was accepted by everyone and a conclusion was reached that the
Negative Pressure Test had passed, when in actuality it was not.
I find this misinterpretation by experienced people trained in well control extremely hard to
understand. Figure 21 is a U-tube analogy that is always taught to be used to understand
differences in surface pressures and how surface pressure is related to downhole pressure.50 In
this case, if the well was configured as intended with seawater everywhere in the hydraulic path
49
See MDL Ex. 1 at pgs. 25 and 86; L. Lambert 5/9/11 Dep. Tr. at 245-46 (testifying regarding discussions about
negative test); L. Lambert 5/10/11 Dep. Tr. at 444 (same).
50
Rig workers are taught in Well Control training to use a U-tube analogy where the drill pipe is one side of the UTube or manometer and the annular fluid path is the other side of the U-tube.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
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between the surface drill pipe pressure and the surface kill line pressure, both the drill pipe
pressure and the kill line pressure would have to be zero for the negative test pressure to be
good.
As shown in Figure 18, the hydrostatic pressure computed at the top of the shoe joint using a
surface mud weight of 14 pounds per gallon is 10,784 psi. Adding a stabilized surface drill pipe
pressure of 1,400 psi to the hydrostatic pressure gives a pressure of 12,184 psi at the top of the
shoe joint. This is equivalent to a 12.95 pressure gradient, which is close to the measured
formation pore pressure. This calculation does not account for low density oil that may have
occupied an unknown height above the Shoe Track. The effect of the oil would be to slightly
lower the equivalent density calculated and make it even closer to the measured formation pore
pressure. This calculation also does not account for the potential effect of the fluid column
height of spacer below the blowout preventer, which could also impact the pressure reading.
The reason that the kill line did not flow during the 30 minute test cannot be completely
resolved. It could have been caused by a sufficient effective height of spacer material 51 on the
kill line side of the U-tube, by a plugged kill line due to settling of barite and loss of circulation
material, or a closed valve. We know that a pressure relief valve actuated later when trying to
start pumping down the kill line. This could have been caused by a plugged kill line or a closed
valve. There were other instances of pressure relief valve actuations reported in the drilling
records.
If plugging did occur due to spacer, in my opinion, the plugging would be related more to the
placement of the spacer than to the inclusion of loss circulation material in the spacer. Barite
was by far the predominant solid in the spacer. A 16 pound per gallon spacer with no loss
circulation material will contain about 30% barite by volume. The barite is about twice as dense
as loss circulation material and would settle readily from a 16 pound per gallon mud that is
mixing freely with seawater in a static condition. Barite is a good plugging agent and is
sometimes intentionally used to plug off an underground blowout. If a 16 pound per gallon
spacer had been used that had no loss circulation material included, placement of the spacer
opposite the kill line prior to a negative test would have still been undesirable.
51
Some spacer material would have to be in the kill line and below the closed blowout preventer to have sufficient
hydrostatic head.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
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Figure 21: U-tube analogy for Negative Test being conducted (pressures equal)
WELL MONITORING FAILURE
The blowout preventer upper annular was opened after the negative test and the hydrostatic
head of the mud and spacer above the preventer returned the well to an overbalanced condition
in which the well could not flow. However, by proceeding with the displacement of mud from
the riser, it was just a matter of time until the well began flowing again. Once the barrier of mud
weight was removed, normal kick detection practices became extremely important. It was
clearly the responsibility of the Transocean Rig Crew and the Sperry-Sun mud loggers to do so.
The Deepwater Horizon was a top of the line rig with approximately 20 mud tanks that could
have been configured to properly monitor the well. This would have required organizing the
active system52 so that the volume of mud returning from the well could always be compared to
52
Well monitoring systems allow the total volume in the mud tanks designated as included in the circulation system
to be constantly monitored. The active system includes the tanks from which fluid is being pumped into the well and
the tanks to which fluid is being returned from the well.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 65
the volume of the spacer or seawater being pumped into the well. Regulations, BP Policy, and
Transocean policy require that the well be continually monitored. The well must be continually
monitored even if you have a tested downhole barrier in addition to the hydrostatic pressure of
the mud and especially when the hydrostatic pressure barrier is being intentionally removed.53
Mud to be offloaded to a boat should have been pumped from tanks that were isolated from
the active system while offloading from those tanks. If this was not practical, then offloading
should have been done through a flow meter so that off-loaded volumes could be tracked and
included in the pit gain/pit loss determination.54 When pumping from the sea chest, the total
pump strokes times the pump volume factor is an accurate measure of the volume pumped into
the well and could have easily been included in the effective pit gain/pit loss calculation. The
accuracy of volumes measured from pump strokes is second only to volumes measured in a
metering tank.55
In addition to constantly monitoring the total volume removed from the well, the total rate of
flow out of the well, less the total rate of flow into the well, should have been monitored. This is
generally done by monitoring the total pump strokes per minute for flow into the well and flow
meter readings for flow out of the well. When pumping overboard, the Sperry-Sun flow-out
meter was bypassed. However, flow was passing through a second flow meter that was part of
the rig sensor package.56 This meter should have been maintained in working order and flow
should have been monitored at all times through this sensor. It is clear from the size of the kick
taken that the overboard flow was not being monitored.
If flow overboard could not be
accurately monitored, the seawater should have been returned to tanks included in the active
system. A full tank could be removed from the active system before dumping overboard.
Changes in pump pressure can also be used to detect an influx into the well, but normally the
well is shut-in long before trends of changing pump pressure would be seen. Figure 22 is a plot
53
MDL Ex. 1761 (Sedco 711 Investigation Report) (TRN-MDL-00607583-621); MDL Ex. 2197 (email and report
discussing Sedco 711 incident) (TRN-MDL-01288237-284); and TRN-INV-01128907-909 at ¶ 13 (discussing need
to monitor well during displacement).
54
The pit gain/pit loss value is the total volume of fluid removed from the well minus the total volume of fluid
pumped into the well. If this volume difference is positive, it is equal to the total volume of formation fluids that
have entered the well. If it is negative, it is equal to the total loss of mud from the well into an underground or
subsea leak. Alarms are generally set to alarm if the pit gain/pit loss is greater than 10 to 30 barrels.
55
56
A trip tank is a metering tank. Metering tanks are also included with cementing pumps.
Transocean’s report confirms that the second flow meter was capable of monitoring flow at this time. Macondo
Well Incident, Transocean Investigation Report, Vol. 2, App. G. at pg. 106 (“data from the Hi-Tec flow sensor was
still available to all personnel on the rig.”)
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
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of real time data taken when the first sign of a kick became evident on pump pressure. Several
clear sign that the well was flowing are shown in this plot of the real time data.
Figure 22: Real Time Data Showing Kick Indications that were not detected
The failure of so many people to detect the flow of oil into the well until after it had passed
through the blowout preventer stack at the seafloor is a human failure that is hard to understand.
Big kicks are taken very seriously in industry practice. A failure to detect a pit gain of more than
50 barrels would be considered a major error that could require an internal investigation and a
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 67
report to management.57 The pit gain was more than 600 barrels and the flow rate was very high
on the Deepwater Horizon when the oil flow passed through the blowout preventers and began
displacing the Marine Riser. When anomalous pressures were noticed, the rig crew began trying
to diagnose the meaning of the kick indicators instead of immediately closing the blowout
preventers. The failure to shut-in the well and investigate, as opposed to investigating before
shut-in, is inconsistent with well control training and guidance.
Wyman Wheeler, a Transocean Toolpusher who was injured in the accident, indicated in
answering questions about kick detection that the location of the line may have precluded visual
observation of flow. He reportedly said, “you use to be able to visually see flow, but you
couldn’t see it in this rig ... you had to trust the gauges.” He also indicated that the position of
the return valve on the trip tank cannot be observed visually and that you can only see it on the
computer.58
The diverter was closed but flow was not directed overboard away from the rig.59 Two
diverter lines were available to always allow downwind diversion. The system should have been
set-up for automatic routing to the overboard lines. In the early days of diverter design for
bottom supported rigs, failures occurred because the diverter would sometimes be closed before
the side valve was opened. This possibility was eliminated by designing systems that would
automatically open the valve before closing the diverter. Concern for pollution was the likely
cause for having the diverter lined up to flow to a mud gas separator. However, it would be
relatively easy to have the overboard lines open up automatically above an appropriately low
threshold pressure. When displacing mud with seawater from the top part of the well, I would
have expected that the diverter would be lined up to go overboard before starting the
displacement.
Answers to questions60 about the mud gas separator and diverter and Transocean Well
Control Training manuals clearly showed that their policy was to divert overboard if a kick is
taken that goes undetected and a significant gas volume enters the riser. It was also recognized
in Transocean presentation material that I reviewed that the Marine Riser could unload quickly
57
I have served as an external reviewer for Diamond Offshore to review an event on one of their rigs when a 98
barrel kick was taken. This review was presented to upper management.
58
W. Wheeler interview notes, TRN-INV-00004991-97 at 95-97.
59
The Transocean Investigation Report (page 31) indicates that flow went to the mud gas separator at 9:45 p.m.
The BP Investigation Report (pages 103-04,113) indicates this occurred at 9:41 p.m.
60
TRN-INV-01131807
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
when gas begins breaking out of solution.61
P AGE 68
The training material that I reviewed was
appropriate and of a high quality. What may have been lacking were adequate emergency drills
simulating high flow rate conditions. Training intensity for dangerous but very rare events is
always hard to maintain. When an event does happen, the response has to be automatic. There
might not be time to think about it.
61
See also MDL Ex. 2188 (Transocean Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment for the Deepwater Horizon
discussing gas in the riser) (TRN-MDL-01184580 at 588 and 777).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
APPENDIX A
STATEMENT OF COMPENS ATION
x
Adam T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D. P.E.
x
Engineering support
x
Computer Graphics Support
x
Travel
$300 per hour
$108 per hour
$60 per hour
Reimbursed at cost
P AGE 69
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF EXPERT DEPOS ITION A ND TRIAL TESTIMONY S INCE 2000
Petroleum Engineering Testimony before the Commissioner of Conservation, Office of
Conservation, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Docket No. 04-102,
January 27, 2004 regarding BolMex 3 Sand, Reservoir D, Broussard Field in
Lafayette Parish.
Chevron Texaco vs. INTCO, Inc.; In the Matter of INTCO, Inc., as owner of the C-4 for
Exoneration or Limitation of Liability; U.S.D.C. E.D.La. CA No. 00-2566;
Retained by Michael Golemi of of Liskow and Lewis; Deposition Only
Marathon and Texaco vs. Transocean Offshore (U.K.) Inc., et al; U.S.D.C. E.D.La. CA
No. 00-0760 c/w No. 00-2154, Sec. J, Mag. 2; Review of Claim of Lost
Production from Platform due to rupture of Pipeline; Retained by Mr. Dan Picou
and Ms Mary K. Denard of Larzelere, Picou, and Wells, L.L.C.; Deposition only.
Denbury Management, Inc. vs. Certain Underwriters; Retained by Charles Talley of
Lemle Kelleher, LLP, New Orleans, Louisiana. Deposition only.
Basin Exploration, Inc. vs. BJ Services Company, USA, et al; Retained by Ken Klemm
of Lemle Kelleher, LLP, New Orleans, Louisiana. Deposition only.
Mobil Exploration and Producing U. S. Inc. vs. Certain Underwriters; Retained by
George H. Robinson with Liskow and Lewis of Lafayette, Louisiana and Mark
Brosseau with Kerr Friedrich Brosseau Bartlett, LLC in Denver, Colorado
regarding underground blowout and associated lost production; (Deposition in
Lafayette, LA. in November, 1999 and trial testimony in Franklin, LA. during
January, 2000).
NONE IN LAST FIVE YE ARS
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
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APPENDIX C
RESUME OF ADAM T. (T ED) BOURGOYNE, JR., PH.D., P.E. (LA # 15 776)
President
Bourgoyne Enterprises, Inc.
Professor Emeritus of Petroleum Engineering
Louisiana State University (since 1999)
Member of Faculty of Petroleum Engineering
Louisiana State University (since 1971)
Registered Professional Engineer (Petroleum)
in Louisiana, No. 15776.
6006 Boone Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70808-5005
Voice: 225 766 6536
Fax: 225 766 3779
Email: Ted@BourgoyneEnterprises.com
EDUCATION
Louisiana State University
B. S. in Petroleum Engineering, Cum Laude, 1966
M. S. in Petroleum Engineering, 1967
Inducted into Engineering Hall of Distinction, 2006
University of Texas at Austin
Ph.D. in Petroleum Engineering, 1969
Recognized as Distinguished Engineering Graduate, 2001
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ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE
Current Title:
Professor Emeritus of Petroleum Engineering
(Retired December, 1999)
Administrative Assignments:
Dean of the College of Engineering
January, 1997 to January, 2000
Director of Petroleum Engineering Research and Technology Transfer Laboratory
May 1987 – June 1990
Acting Dean of the College of Engineering
December 1985 – May 1987
Chairman of Petroleum Engineering Department
May 1977 – July 1983
INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENC E PRIOR TO ACADEMIC SERVICE
Continental Oil Company – Houston, TX (1969–70)
Senior Systems Engineer in Production Engineering Services Group working on
computer applications in drilling and production.
acquisition,
abnormal
pressure
detection,
Work included drilling data
optimization
of
drilling
hydraulics,
optimization of bit weight and rotary speed, multiphase pipeline networks, design of
submersible electric pump installations.
Continental Oil Research Laboratory – Ponca City, OK (Summer, 1968)
Performed experimental laboratory evaluation of new surfactant system for enhanced oil
recovery
Chevron Oil Research Laboratory – La Habra, CA (Summer, 1967)
Reservoir Engineer assisting with reservoir simulation of fields in Saudi Arabia and
development of new computer programs for analysis of drill-stem tests and well
interference tests.
Texaco, Inc. – Morgan City, LA (Summer, 1966)
Assistant Drilling Engineer involved with well planning and drilling optimization for
offshore area.
Mobil Oil Company – Morgan City, LA (Summer, 1965)
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Assistant Production Engineer involved with planning and economic justification of well
workover operations on offshore platforms.
Mobil Oil Company – Cameron, LA (Summer, 1964)
Roustabout involved with installation of automation equipment on offshore production
platforms.
Mobil Oil Company – Opelousas, LA (Summer, 1963)
Roustabout in field produced by gas cycling method.
RECENT CONSULTING AC TIVITIES
Pennington Oil and Gas Company Co. – 2001-present
Consultation on drilling, production, and reservoir engineering matters.
Diamond Offshore Drilling, Incorporated - 2000-2003
Well Control training activities.
Shell Offshore/DeepStar - 1997-1999
Computer simulations of deepwater well control operations.
Wild Well Control, Inc. – 1993-2000
Computer simulations of alternative well control operations.
Weatherford – 1993-2001
Research and development advisor for rotating control head applications
PROFESSIONAL SOCIETI ES AND ACTIVITIES
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)
Chairman, Twenty-Five Year/Century Club Committee, 1996
Chairman, Drilling Engineering Award Selection Committee, 1996–98
Chairman, Reprint Series Committee, 1996-98
Board of Directors, 1984–87
Chairman, Manpower Committee, 1981–82
Education and Accreditation Committee, 1980–83
Pass Point Evaluation Committee for Professional Engineering Exam, 1996
Distinguished Lecturer, 1997
American Petroleum Institute
Committee concerning the determination of formation pore pressures and fracture
gradients
American Association of Drilling Engineers
Charter Member, Houston Chapter
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Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET)
Adhoc committee, ABET, 1983-1990
Advisory committee, AIME Engineering Accreditation Commission Member, 1983–86
Minerals Management Service
Conducted Annual Well Control Research Workshops, 1983-1999
Three U.S. Patents related to Well Drilling
Sigma Xi Scientific Research Society, LSU Chapter
OTA-US Congress (Advisor on Technology for Deep Water Oil and Gas Development,
1984–85)
National Bureau of Standards
Chaired Workshop Panel on Use of Risk Analysis in Offshore Oil and Gas Operation,
Gaithersburg, Maryland, March 1984
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Chaired Workshop Session on Reliability of Offshore Operations, Gaithersburg,
Maryland, March 20–22, 1991
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC)
Chairman, Committee for Well Control Instructor Certification Standards
Member of Steering Committee for development of IADC Deepwater Well Control
Guidelines, 1998
International Well Control Symposium
Chairman, Symposium co-sponsored by US Minerals Management Service, UK
Department of Energy, American Association of Drilling Engineers, and International
Association of Drilling Contractors, Baton Rouge, LA, Nov. 27–29, 1989.
American Association of Drilling Engineers
Session Chairman, Deepwater Drilling Forum, Lafayette, LA, Feb. 15, 1990.
Chairman, Technical Panel, Advanced Well Control Forum, New Orleans, LA, April 3,
1991.
The Oilman’s Editorial
Advisory Board member, 1993-95
Elsevier Science Publishing
Associate Editor, Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, 1989–1995.
LSU Workshop on Horizontal Drilling in Louisiana
Chairman, New Orleans, LA, June 4–5, 1991.
American Filtration Society
Session Chairman, Fall Meeting, Baton Rouge, October 29–30, 1990
Petroleum Engineer International
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
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Advisory Board, 1995-96
Technical Advice Working Group to Integrated Ocean Drilling Program
Chairman, 2000-2001
HONORARY SOCIETIES A ND AWARDS
Distinguished Lecturer
selected 1997
topic -- Well Control Aspects of Underbalanced Drilling
Foreign Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
elected 1996
Kapitsa Gold Medal of Honor (Russian)
citation - “For outstanding contributions to the field of drilling engineering”
Society of Petroleum Engineers Distinguished Member
selected 1990
Charter Member of American Association of Drilling Engineers
selected 1989, No. 0159
Society of Petroleum Engineers Drilling Engineering Award
selected for 1988
citation – “For distinguished contributions to petroleum engineering in the area of
drilling technology”
Pi Epsilon Tau National Petroleum Engineering Honor Society Diploma of Honor
Selected 1988,
citation – “For outstanding contributions to the petroleum industry”
Society of Petroleum Engineers Distinguished Achievement Award
for Petroleum Engineering Faculty, selected 1981
Tau Beta Pi, member
Pi Epsilon Tau, member
Outstanding Alumnus of Redemptorist High School, selected 1989
Citation for Distinguished Service
Louisiana House of Representatives, passed 2000
Distinguished Engineering Graduate of University of Texas at Austin, selected 2001
Albert Einstein Gold Medal of Honor
US Section of Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, awarded 2002
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
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PUBLICATIONS
REFEREED ARTICLES
“Numerical Simulation of Drillstem Tests as an Interpretation Technique,” J.P. Brill,
A.T. Bourgoyne, and T.N. Dixon, Journal of Petroleum Technology, (November
1969).
“The Effect of Interfacial Films on the Displacement Efficiency of a Waterflood,”
Transactions, AIME (1971).
“A Multiple Regression Approach to Optimal Drilling and Abnormal Pressure
Detection,” A.T. Bourgoyne and F.S. Young, Transactions, AIME (1974).
“Factors Affecting Bubble Rise Velocity of Gas Kicks,” D.W. Rader, A.T. Bourgoyne
and R.E. Ward, Journal of Petroleum Technology (May 1975).
“A Feasibility Study on the Use of Subsea Chokes in Well Control Operations on
Floating Drilling Vessels,” J.L. Mathews and A.T. Bourgoyne, Journal of
Petroleum Technology (May 1982) and Transactions, Society of Petroleum
Engineers, (1982).
“Frictional Pressure Losses for Single Phase and Two-Phase Flow of Drilling Muds,”
F.A. Elfaghi, J.P. Langlinais, A.T. Bourgoyne, and W.R. Holden, Transactions of
the ASME, (September 1983) Vol. 105, pp. 372–78.
“Petroleum Engineering Manpower Supply,” Journal of Petroleum Technology (March
1984) pp. 407–11.
“An Experimental Study of Well Control Procedures for Deepwater Drilling Operations,”
A.T. Bourgoyne and W.R. Holden, Journal of Petroleum Technology, (July 1985)
and Transactions, Society of Petroleum Engineers, (1985) pp. 1239–1250, also
SPE Reprint Series, Vol. 42, March 1996, pp. 110–121.
“Frictional Pressure Losses for Annular Flow of Drilling Mud and Mud Gas Mixtures,”
J.P. Langlinais, A.T. Bourgoyne and W.R. Holden, Transactions of the ASME
(March 1985) Vol. 107, pp. 142–51.
“Manpower Supply - Analysis of Survey Data,” Journal of Petroleum Technology
(March 1986) pp. 303–305.
“An Experimental Study of Gas Solubility in Oil-Based Drilling Fluids,” P.L. O’Bryan,
A.T. Bourgoyne, T.G. Monger, and D.P. Kopsco, SPE Drilling Engineering
(March 1988) pp. 33–42.
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“PDC Applications in the Gulf of Mexico with Water-Based Drilling Fluids,” A.D.
Gault, H. Knowlton, H.E. Goodman and A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., SPE Drilling
Engineering, (June 1988) pp. 117–24.
“Fracture Gradient Prediction for Offshore Wells,” W.D. Constant and A.T. Bourgoyne,
SPE Drilling Engineering, (June 1988) pp. 136–40.
“Methods for Handling Drilled Gas in Oil-Based Drilling Fluids,” P.L. O’Bryan and A.T.
Bourgoyne, SPE Drilling Engineering, (September 1989), pp. 237–246.
“Shale Water as a Pressure Support Mechanism in Gas Reservoirs Having Abnormal
Formation Pressure,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Journal of Petroleum Science and
Engineering, Vol. 3, No. 4, (January 1990), pp. 305–319.
“Experimental Study of Gas Slip Velocity and Liquid Holdup in an Inclined Eccentric
Annulus,” E.Y. Nakagawa and A.T. Bourgoyne, FED–Vol. 144, ASME,
(November 1992), pp. 71–80.
“How to Handle a Gas Kick Moving Up a Shut-In Well,” J.E. Mathews and A.T.
Bourgoyne, Jr., SPE Reprint Series, Vol. 42, (March 1996), pp. 22–28.
“Method for Determining the Feasibility of Dynamic Kill of Shallow Gas Flows,” W. L.
Koederitz, F. E. Beck, J. P. Langlinais, and A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., SPE Reprint
Series, Vol. 42, (March 1996), pp. 66–77.
“Recognizing Downhole Casing Failure During Well Control Operations,” A.T.
Bourgoyne, Jr., SPE Reprint Series, Vol. 42, (March 1996), pp. 202–206.
“A New Simple Method to Estimate Fracture Pressure Gradient,” L.A. Rocha and A.T.
Bourgoyne, Jr., SPE Drilling and Completion, (September 1996), pp. 153–159.
“Use of Soil Borings Data for Estimating Break-down Pressure of Shallow Marine
Sediments,” C.V. Bender, A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr. and J.N. Suhayda, Journal of
Petroleum Engineering, Vol. 14, (1996), pp. 101–114.
“Failure of Wellbores During Well Control Operations,” M. E. Chenevert, A. T.
Bourgoyne, Jr. and C. F. H. Fonseca, Turkish Journal of Oil and Gas, Vol. 3
(June 1997) p 22.
“A Computer Assisted Well Control Safety System for Deep Ocean Well Control,” O. A.
Kelly, W. R. Holden, and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Turkish Journal of Oil and Gas,
Vol. 3 (June 1997) p 30.
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“Experimental Study of Gas Slip Velocity and Liquid Holdup in an Inclined Eccentric
Annulus,” Nagakawa, E. Y. and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Turkish Journal of Oil and
Gas, Vol. 3 (October 1997) p 22.
“An Analysis of the Design Loads placed on a Well by a Diverter System,” Beck, F. E.
and J. P. Langlinais and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Trans. ASME, Vol. 120 (March
1998).
“An Analysis of the Design Loads placed on a Well by a Diverter System,” Beck, F. E.
and J. P. Langlinais and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Journal of Energy Resource
Technology (June 1998).
“Co-current and Countercurrent Migration of Gas Kicks in ‘Horizontal’ Wells,” Baca,
H., Nikitopoulos, J. Smith, and A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Trans. ASME, Vol. 121
(June 1999) p 96.
“New Model to Analyze Non-Linear Leak-off Test Behavior,” Altun, G. and E.
Shirman, J. P. Langlinais, and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., accepted for publication by
JERC.
BOOKS AND CHAPTERS
“Drilling Practices,” A Chapter in Encyclopedia of Chemical Processing and Design,
Vol. 16, Edited by John J. Mcketta and William A. Cunningham, Marcel Dekker,
Inc. New York 10016 (1982), pp 359– 394.
Applied Drilling Engineering, A.T. Bourgoyne, K.H. Milheim, M.E. Chenevert, and F.S.
Young, Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME, Dallas, TX (SPE Textbook
Series Vol. 2) (1986), 502 pages.
“Shallow Abnormal Pressure Hazards,” Chapter 10 in Studies in Abnormal Pressure,
Edited by W.H. Fertl, Richard Chapman, and Rod F. Hotz, Elsevier Scientific
Publishing Co., New York, (1994), pp. 281– 317.
“Shallow Gas Blowouts”, Bourgoyne, A. T. Zwald, E. A., and Abel, L. W., Chapter 4 in
Firefighting and Blowout Control, by L. William Abel, Joe R. Bowden, Sr., and
Patrick J. Campbell, Wild Well Control, Inc., Houston, TX (1994), pp 83–121.
TRADE JOURNALS
“Graphs Simplify Drilling Hydraulics,” World Oil, (January 1969).
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“Computer Graphics Improve Drilling Hydraulics,” A.T. Bourgoyne and R.E. McKee,
Petroleum Engineer, (September 1970).
“Porosity and Pore Pressure Logs,” A.T. Bourgoyne, J.A. Rizer and G.M. Myers, The
Drilling Contractor, (June 1971).
“A Graphic Approach to Overpressure Detection While Drilling,” Petroleum Engineer,
(September 1971).
“Graphic Approach to Kick Severity Calculations,” Petroleum Engineer, (September
1976).
“Well Control Procedures for Deepwater Drilling - Part 1,” A.T. Bourgoyne, W.R.
Holden, B.R. Hise and R.S. Sullins, Ocean Resources Engineering (April 1978).
“Well Control Procedures for Deepwater Drilling - Part 2: Control of Shallow Kicks,”
A.T. Bourgoyne, W.R. Holden, B.R. Hise, and R.S. Sullins, Ocean Resources
Engineering, (October 1978).
“Well Control Procedures for Deepwater Drilling - Part 3: Initiation of Well Control
Operations,” A.T. Bourgoyne, W.R. Holden, B.R. Hise and R.S. Sullins, Ocean
Resources Engineering, (December 1978).
“University Uses On-Campus Abandoned Well to Simulate Deep Water Well Control
Operations,” Oil& Gas Journal, (May 31,1982), pp. 138–141.
“Bubble Chopping— A New Way to Control Large, Deep Gas Kicks,” World Oil,
(December 1984) pp. 75–82.
“Changing Drilling Technology— What Three Experts Say,” J. Smith, D. Hammet, and
A.T. Bourgoyne, Petroleum Engineer International (September 1985).
“Integration of MWD & Well Control Technologies,” A.T. Bourgoyne and R.
Desbrandes, Offshore (September 1986) pp. 49–52.
“MWD Transmission Data Rates Can Be Optimized,” R. Desbrandes, A.T. Bourgoyne,
and J.A. Carter, Petroleum Engineer International (June 1987) pp. 46–52.
“Identifying Crater Potential Improves Shallow Gas Kick Control,” L.A. Rocha and A.T.
Bourgoyne, Oil & Gas Journal, (December 27, 1993) pp 93–98.
“Rotating Control Head Applications Increasing,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Oil & Gas Journal,
(October 9, 1995), pp. 72–77.
“Annual Editorial Advisor’s Section: Current Issues in Well Control,” A.T. Bourgoyne,
Petroleum Engineer International, (February 1996), pp. 27–28.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 80
“New Ideas for Shallow Gas Well Control,” A.T. Bourgoyne, O.A. Kelly, and C.L.
Sandoz, World Oil, (June 1996), pp. 50–51.
“New Model Rotating Control Head Tested,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., The Brief, Murphy
Publishing, Inc., (October 1996), pp. 25–27.
“Applications and Limitations of Underbalanced Drilling and Completion Technology”,
Oil and Gas Reporter (April, 2000).
“Case Histories bring Reality to Well Control Training,” J.R. Smith, A. T. Bourgoyne,
Jr., S. M. Waly, and E.B. Hoff, World Oil, (June 2000), Vol. 221 No. 8, p 39-46.
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
“A Critical Examination of Rotary Drilling Hydraulics,” Proceedings of Second SPE
Conference on Drilling and Rock Mechanics; Austin, TX (January 1968).
“The Determination of Porosity and Pore Pressure Logs from Drilling Data,” A.T.
Bourgoyne, J.A. Rizer, and G.M. Myers, Transactions of the Ninth Annual
AAODC Rotary Drilling Conference, Houston, TX (February 1971) pp. 15–22.
“The Use of Drillability Logs for Formation Evaluation and Abnormal Pressure
Detection,” A.T. Bourgoyne and F.S. Young, Proceedings of SPWLA Fourteenth
Annual Logging Symposium; Lafayette, LA (May 1973).
“A University View of the Status and Future of Petroleum Engineering Education,”
Proceedings of the First Annual Engineering Manpower Conference of SPE;
Houston, TX (June 1978).
“The Dynamics of Well Control,” Proceedings of the Second Research and Development
Conference for OCS Oil and Gas Operations; Reston, VA (April 1980).
“Development of Improved Blowout Prevention Procedures for Deepwater Drilling
Operations,” Proceedings of the Third Research and Development Conference for
OCS Oil and Gas Operations: Reston, VA (November 1981).
“Risk Analysis in Design, Operation, and Maintenance of Offshore Oil and Gas
Facilities,” International Workshop on the Application of Risk Analysis to
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg,
Maryland (March 1984).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 81
“Development of Improved Blowout Prevention Procedures for Deepwater Drilling
Operations,” Proceedings of the Fourth Research and Development Conference
for OCS Oil and Gas Operations, Reston, VA (March 1984) pp. 275–86.
“Improved Gas Diverter Systems,” Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Gulf of Mexico
Information Transfer Meeting, US Department of Interior, New Orleans, LA
(October 1985) pp. 29–30.
“Experimental Study of Diverters,” Proceedings of the Fifth Research and Development
Conference for OCS Oil and Gas Operations, Reston, VA (1986) pp. 175–82.
“An Experimental Study of Fluidic Mud Pulser,” Proceedings of the Fifth Research and
Development Conference for Oil and Gas Operations, Reston, VA (1986) pp.
183–191.
“Technological Developments for Improved Well-Control Procedures,” Proceedings for
the Fifth Research and Development Conference for Oil and Gas Operations,
Reston, VA (1986) pp. 192–199.
“Petroleum Engineering Manpower Supply - Results of the 1986 Survey,” Proceedings of
the Annual Fall Meeting of SPE, New Orleans, LA (October 1986) SPE 15459.
“Experimental and Theoretical Considerations for Diverter Evaluation and Design,” F.E.
Beck, J.P. Langlinais, and A.T. Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the 56th California
Regional Meeting of SPE, Oakland, CA (April 1986) SPE 15111.
“An Analysis of the Design Loads Placed on a Well by a Diverter System,” F.E. Beck,
J.P. Langlinais, and A.T. Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the 1987 SPE/IADC Rotary
Drilling Conference, New Orleans, LA (March 1987) SPE/IADC 16129.
“Petroleum Engineering Manpower Supply - Results of the 1987 Survey,” Proceedings of
the Annual Fall Meeting of SPE, Dallas, TX (September 1987) SPE 16834.
“Joint Industry/Government/University Programs of Research and Development,”
Proceedings of the Annual Fall Meeting of SPE, Dallas, TX (September 1987)
SPE 16825.
“Petroleum Engineering Manpower Supply - Results of the 1988 Survey,” A.T.
Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the Annual Fall Meeting of SPE, Houston, TX
(October 2–5, 1988) SPE 18336.
“Generation, Migration, and Transportation of Gas Contaminated Regions of Drilling
Fluid,” A.T. Bourgoyne and V. Casariego, Proceedings of the Annual Fall
Meeting of SPE, Houston, TX (October 2–5, 1988) SPE 18020.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 82
“Experimental Study of Erosion of Diverter Systems Due to Sand Production,” A.T.
Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the 1989 SPE/IADC Rotary Drilling Conference, New
Orleans, LA (February 28–March 3, 1989) SPE/IADC 18716, pp. 807-816.
“Experimental Study of Diverter Systems Used in Offshore Drilling Operations,” A.T.
Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the 1988 Technology Assessment and Research
Program for Offshore Minerals Operations, OCS Study MMS 88-0057, U.S.
Department of Interior (April 6–7, 1989) pp. 6-10.
“A Microcomputer Aided Experimental Gas Reservoir Simulator for Well-Control
Operations,” A.T. Bourgoyne, SPE Petroleum Computer Conference: Technology
for the 90’s Efficiency, Productivity, Applications, (June 26, 1989).
“Experimental Bench Mark Data for Testing Well Control Computer Models,” V.
Casariego and A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., International Well Control Symposium,
(November 27–29, 1989).
“Blowout Prevention in Deepwater Drilling,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., Proceedings of the
11th Annual Information Transfer Meeting, Gulf of Mexico (OCS) Region,
(November 13–15, 1990), New Orleans, LA.
“General Computerized Well Control Kill Sheet for Drilling Operations with Graphic
Display Capabilities,” H.C. Leitao, E.E. Maidla, and A.T. Bourgoyne,
Proceedings of SPE Computer Conference, Denver, CO (June 25–26, 1990), SPE
20327.
“Reliability of Offshore Drilling Operations,” A.T. Bourgoyne, G.L. Lever, and B. Berry,
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Reliability of Offshore Operations,
National Bureau of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland (March
20–22, 1991).
“Computerized Kill Sheet for Most Drilling Operations,” H.C. Leitao, E.E. Maidla, O.A.
Santos, F.A. Notto, and A.T. Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the 1992 IADC/SPE
Drilling Conference, New Orleans, LA (February 18–21, 1992) (IADC/SPE
23933).
“Improved Method of Predicting Wellhead Pressure During Diverter Operations,” A.T.
Bourgoyne, Proceedings of IADC's Third Annual European Well Control
Conference, Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands (June 2–4, 1992).
“A Spreadsheet Approach to Diverter Design Calculations,” A.T. Bourgoyne,
Proceedings of the IADC Well Control Conference of the Americas, Houston, TX
(November 17–19, 1992).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 83
“General Access Well Information Database,” A.T. Bourgoyne, V.K. Sinha and L.A.
Rocha, Proceedings of the SPE Petroleum Computer Conference, Dallas, TX,
(July 31-August 3, 1994) (SPE 28232).
“Advanced Control System Developed for Well Control Operations,” O.A. Kelly and
A.T. Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the IADC Well Control Conference of the
Americas, Houston, TX (November 16–17, 1994).
“Integration of MWD and Process Control Technology Into an Advanced Well Control
System,” O.A. Kelly and A.T. Bourgoyne, Proceedings of the IADC Well Control
Conference of the Americas, Houston, TX, (November 16–17, 1994).
“Experimental Study of Erosion Resistant Materials for Use in Diverter Components,” A.
Jain and A.T. Bourgoyne, SPE International Student Paper, Proceedings of the
SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, Dallas, TX, (October 22–25,
1995).
“Well Control Aspects of Underbalanced Drilling,” A.T. Bourgoyne, IADC Well Control
Training Roundtable, Plano, TX, (April 2, 1996).
“Manpower Trends in the Petroleum Industry,” presented to the Gulf Coast Section of the
Society of Petroleum Engineers, Houston, TX, (May 9, 1996).
“A Method for Planning Well Control Operations Involving an Induced Fracture,” A. F.
Negrao and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., proceedings of the ASME Petroleum Division
Conference, Houston, TX, (1996).
“New Developments in Computer Modeling of Blowout Control Operations,” A. T.
Bourgoyne, D. Barnett, and D. Eby, proceedings of the IADC Well Control
Conference of the Americas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, (July 31-August 2, 1996).
“Feasibility Study of Dual Density Mud System for Deepwater Drilling Operations,” C.
A. Lopes and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., proceedings of the Offshore Technology
Conference, Houston, TX, (May 5-8, 1997).
“Well Control Considerations for Deepwater Drilling Operations,” A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr.,
proceedings of the IBC Deepwater Technologies Conference, Houston, TX, (July
28-29, 1997).
“Computer-Assisted Well Control System for Deep Ocean Drilling Environments,” O. A.
Kelly and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., proceedings of the IADC International Deep
Water Well Control Conference, (September 15-16, 1997).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 84
“Case History-Based Training for Control and Prevention of Underground Blowouts,” J.
R. Smith and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., proceedings of the SPE Annual Technical
Conference and Exhibition, San Antonio, TX, (October 5 - 8, 1997).
“Well Control Considerations for Underbalanced Drilling,” A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr.,
proceedings of the SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, San
Antonio, TX, (October 5 - 8, 1997).
“A Relief Well Model for Deep Water Drilling and Production Systems,” Bourgoyne, A.
T. Jr. and D. Barnett and D. Eby, proceedings of the IADC Well Control
Conference, Houston, August 26-27, 1998.
“A Subsea Rotating Control Head for Riserless Drilling Applications,” Bourgoyne, D. A.
and Bourgoyne, A. T. Jr and D. Hannegan, proceedings of the IADC Well Control
Conference, Houston, August 26-27, 1998.
“Circulating Kick Tolerance for Deepwater Drilling,” Ohara, S. and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr.,
proceedings of the IADC Well Control Conference of the Americas, Caracas,
October 29-30, 1998.
“Sustained Casing Pressure in Offshore Producing Wells,” OTC 11029, Bourgoyne,
Adam T., Jr., Stuart L. Scott, and James B. Regg, presented at the Offshore
Technology Conference, Houston, 3–6 May 1999.
“Case Histories Bring Reality to Well Control Training,” Smith, J.R., Bourgoyne, A. T.,
Waly, S.M., and Hoff, E.B., IADC Well Control Conference of the Americas
,Houston, TX, August 25-26, 1999.
“Deepwater Drilling with Lightweight Fluids: Essential Equipment Required,” D.M.
Hannegan and A. T. Bourgoyne, Jr., World Oil, March 2001.
“Counter-current and Co-current Gas Kicks in Horizontal Wells: Non-Newtonian
Rheology Effects,” H. Baca, D.E. Nikitopoulos, J.R. Smith, and A.T. Bourgoyne,
Proceedings of ETCE/OMAE2000 Joint Conference, (February 14-17, 2000),
New Orleans, LA. Paper No. ETCE2000/DRIL-10117.
COURSES TAUGHT
UNDERGRADUATE COURSES
CS 1241
FORTRAN Programming
PETE 2020
Introduction to Petroleum Engineering
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
PETE 3025
Petroleum Economics
PETE 3031
Reservoir Fluid Flow
PETE 3032
Phase Behavior of Hydrocarbon Systems
PETE 3033
Petrophysics Laboratory
PETE 3034
Phase Behavior Laboratory
PETE 3990
Undergraduate Special Projects
PETE 4045
Drilling Engineering
PETE 4046
Well Design—Production
PETE 4051
Reservoir Engineering
PETE 4059
Drilling Fluids Laboratory
PETE 4060
Prevention of Oil and Gas Well Blowouts
P AGE 85
PETE 4086
Advanced Drilling Engineering
GRADUATE COURSES
PETE 7201
Advanced Reservoir Engineering
PETE 7241
Horizontal Well Technology
PETE 7242
Risk Analysis in making Economic Decisions in the Petroleum Industry
PETE 7256
Special Problems in Petroleum Engineering
PETE 7280 Reservoir Simulation
EXTENSION COURSES
PETE 4045
Drilling Engineering, USGS Office, Metairie, LA 1979–80
PETE 7241 Horizontal Drilling, UNO Downtown Center, New Orleans, LA 1996
SHORT COURSES
Well Control Training leading to MMS Certification, 1971-1998
Well Completion Short Courses and Drilling Engineering Practicum, 1978-1980
Hydraulic Fracturing School, Rock Mechanics Section, 1996
RESEARCH DIRECTED
GRANTS AND CONTRACTS
“A Multiple Regression Approach to Optimal Drilling and Abnormal Pressure
Detection,” Bariod Division of N.L. Industries, Inc., $11,649, 1972–73.
“The Determination of Abnormal Formation Pressure Using a Computerized
Mathematical Model of the Rotary Drilling Process,” Bariod Division of N.L.
Industries, Inc., $9,200, 1973–74.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 86
“Experimental Research on New Surfactant Placement Techniques for Enhanced
Recovery of Petroleum by Water Displacement,” O.K. Kimbler, A.T. Bourgoyne,
Jr., and W.R. Whitehead, $28,000, 1976–77.
“Development of Improved Laboratory and Field Procedures for Determining the
Carrying Capacity of Drilling Fluids,” Milchem, Inc., $12,072.
“Investigation of Enhanced Oil Recovery Through Use of Carbon Dioxide,” W.R.
Whitehead, O.K. Kimbler, W.R. Holden, and A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., U.S.
Department of Energy, $161,120, 1978–79.
“Technical Support for Geopressured Well Activities in Louisiana,” Z. Bassiouni, W.J.
Bernard, and A.T. Bourgoyne, $85,500, 1978–79.
“Development of Improved Blowout Prevention Procedures to be Used in Deepwater
Drilling Operations,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., W.R. Holden, and B.R. Hise, U.S.
Department of the Interior, $822,962, 1978–82.
“A Proposal for the Expansion of the LSU-IADC Blowout Prevention Training Center,”
Various companies in petroleum industry, $2,000,000, 1980–82.
“A Feasibility Study of the Integration of Measurements While Drilling (MWD)
Technology and Well Control Technology,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., and W.R.
Holden, U.S. Minerals Management Service, $90,000, 1983.
“The Development of Improved Blowout Prevention Systems for Offshore Drilling
Operations,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., W.R. Holden, and J.P. Langlinais, U.S.
Minerals Management Service, $1,800,000, 1983–88.
“Well Control Problems Associated with Gas Solubility in Oil-Base Muds,” Drilling
Engineering Association Project 4, $160,000, 1984–87.
“Field Analysis of Well Control,” Drilling Engineering Association, Project 7,
$1,061,505, 1986–88.
“Fluid Dynamics of Oil Storage and Production Cycles in the Weeks Island Strategic
Petroleum Reserve,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., S. Acharya and A. Wojtanowicz,
Sandia Laboratories, $50,000, 1988–89.
“Improved Contingency Procedures for Complications Arising During Offshore Blowout
Prevention Operations,” Minerals Management Service, $950,000, 1988–94.
“Use of Vector Processor for Locating Large Area of Bypassed Oil,” with Moore and
Tyler, Louisiana Education Quality Support Fund, $322,000, 1988–90.
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 87
“Memorandum of Understanding - Annex I (Bypassed Oil Study),” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr.,
C.A. Groat, R. Sassen, and B. Baumann, U.S. DOE, $750,000, 1989–90.
“Improved Procedures for Handling Underground Blowouts in a Marine Environment,”
Minerals Management Service, A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr., A. Wojtanowicz, and O.A.
Kelly, $1,600,000, 1994–99.
“Improved Methods for Selecting Kick Tolerance During Deepwater Drilling
Operations,” A.T. Bourgoyne, Jr. and O.A. Kelly, Petrobras, $99,215, 1994–96.
“Improved Recovery from Gulf of Mexico Reservoirs,” Z. Bassiouni, A.T. Bourgoyne,
Jr. and C. Kimbrell, DOE, $950,000, 1995–96.
THESES DIRECTED
Mannarino, Remo: “The Effects of Sealing and Non-Sealing Faults on Pressure Build-Up
and Pressure Draw-down Analysis” (August, 1971).
Lavaquial, Fernando P.: “Water Influx Into Petroleum Reservoirs from Adjacent Shales”
(August, 1971).
Rader, David W.: “Movement of Gas Slugs Through Newtonian and Non-Newtonian
Liquids in Vertical Annuli” (May, 1973).
Simmons, Richard D.: “A Comparison of Horizontal Multiphase Flow Pressure Loss
Correlations” (May, 1973).
McKenzie, Michael F.: “Factors Affecting Surface Casing Pressure During Well Control
Operations,” (August, 1974).
Ward, Robert H.: “Movement of Gas Slugs Through Static Liquids in Large Diameter
Annuli,” (August, 1974).
Koederitz, W.L.: “The Mechanics of Large Bubbles Rising in an Annulus,” (May, 1976).
Mathews, Gerald L.: “A Microscopic Investigation of the Use of Preferentially Oil
Soluble Surface Active Agents to Enhance Oil Recovery,” (May, 1977).
Ofoh, EberePaulinus: “The Effect of Flood Rate on Displacement Efficiency When Using
Oil Soluble Surface Active Agents to Enhance Oil Recovery,” (May, 1978).
Sample, Kenneth John: “Development of Improved Procedures for Determining the
Carrying Capacity of Drilling Fluids,” (August, 1978).
Bizanti, Mohamed: “New Bit Designs for Reducing Bottom Hole Pressure While
Drilling,” (December, 1978).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 88
Mathews, Jeffrey L.: “Upward Migration of Gas Kicks in a Shut-in Well,” (May, 1980).
Casariego, Vicente G.: “Experimental Study of Two Phase Flow Patterns Occurring in a
Well During Pressure Control Operations,” (May, 1981).
Redmann, Kerry P.: “Flow Characteristics of Commercially Available Drilling Chokes
Used in Well Control Operations,” (May, 1982).
McFadden, Peter G.: “The Pressure Behavior of a Shut-in Well Due to the Upward
Migration of a Gas Kick,” (December, 1984).
O’Bryan, Patrick L.: “Experimental and Theoretical Study of Methane Solubility in an
Oil-Base Drilling Fluid,” (December, 1985).
Johnson, Paul: “Experimental Study of Erosion in a Model Diverter System" (December,
1987).
Bourgeois, Steve, "The Evaluation of a Horizontal Well Completion for Recovery of
Bypassed Oil in a South Louisiana Bottom Water Drive Reservoir,” (May, 1989).
Cooke, M. Scott, “Reservoir Study of the Lafitte Field in South Louisiana,” (December,
1990).
Hebert, Lance, “An Experimental Study of Water Coning in Horizontal Wellbores,”
(May, 1990).
Rocha, Luiz Alberto Santos, “A Critical Analysis of Petrobras Data System,” (December,
1991).
Ghosh, Biswajit, “Experimental Study of Erosion in a Fluidic Vortex Valve,” (January
1992).
Mendes, Pedro Paulo Melo, “Two Phase Flow in a Vertical and Inclined Eccentric
Annulus,” (January, 1992).
Gautam, Anurag, “Effect of Cell Geometry on Pulser Performance for MWD
Applications,” (December, 1992).
Franklin, Bernard, “Effect of Produced Gas-Water Ratio on Erosion Rate in a Diverter,”
(August, 1993).
Wang, Y.: “Gas Slip Velocity through Water and Non-Newtonian Liquids in Vertical and
Inclined Eccentric Annuli.” M.S. Thesis, LSU, Baton Rouge, LA. (Dec. 1993).
Jain, Alok, “Experimental Study of Erosion Resistant Materials for Use in Diverter
Components,” (May, 1995).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 89
Smith, John Rogers, “Drilling Overpressured Shales with PDC Bits,” (December, 1995).
DISSERTATIONS DIRECTED
Almedia, Mauricio de A.: “Computer-Aided Analysis of Formation Pressure Integrity
Tests Used in Oil Well Drilling” (December, 1986).
Casariego, Vicente G.: “Generation, Migration, and Transportation of Gas Contaminated
Regions of Drilling Fluid” (December, 1987).
Santos, Otto Luiz A., “A Dynamic Model of Diverter Operations for Handling Shallow
Gas Hazards in Oil and Gas Exploratory Drilling,” (May, 1989).
Nakagawa, Edson, “Gas Kick Behavior During Well Control Operations in Vertical and
Slanted Wells,” (November 1990).
Rocha, Luiz, “Mechanisms leading to Crater formation while Drilling for Oil and Gas,”
(December 1993).
Negrao, Alvero “Relief Well Requirements for Dynamic Kill of Underground Blowouts,”
(May 1995).
Koederitz, W.: “Gas Kick Behavior during Bullheading Operations in Vertical Wells,”
(May 1995).
Ohara, Shiniti, “Experimental Study of Plugging Techniques for Underground
Blowouts,” (May 1996).
Kelly, O. Allen, “Development of a Prototype Computer-Assisted Well Control System
for Deep Ocean Drilling Environments,” (May 1997).
Lopes, Clovis, “Feasibility Study on the Reduction of Hydrostatic Pressure in a Deep
Water Riser Using a Gas-Lift Method,” (May 1997).
Smith, John Rogers, “Diagnosis of Poor PDC Bit Performance in Deep Shales,” (August
1998).
Gursat, Altun, “Methods for Determining Fracture Resistance of Upper Marine
Sediments,” (May, 1999).
E XPERT R EPORT OF A DAM T. (T ED ) B OURGOYNE , J R ., P H .D., P.E.
P AGE 90
APPENDIX D
MATERIALS CONSIDERED AS OF OCTOBER 17, 20 11
IN SUPPORT OF EXPERT REPORT AND OPINIONS
BP-HZN-BLY00045778
BP-HZN-BLY00043862
BP-HZN-BLY00043868
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079414
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079415
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079416
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079417
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079418
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079419
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079420
BP-HZN-2179MDL00075243
BP-HZN-2179MDL00075244
BP-HZN-BLY0024879
BP-HZN-2179MDL00063085
BP-HZN-BLY00190158
BP-HZN-BLY00176372
BP-HZN-2179MDL00269030
HAL_0123040
HAL_0197883
HAL_0205627
HAL_0234194
HAL_0234245
HAL_0234447
HAL_0243170
BP-HZN-BLY00045778
BP-HZN-BLY00043862
BP-HZN-BLY00043868
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079414
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079415
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079416
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079417
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079418
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079419
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079420
BP-HZN-2179MDL00075243
BP-HZN-2179MDL00075244
BP-HZN-BLY00242955
BP-HZN-2179MDL00063085
BP-HZN-BLY00190158
BP-HZN-BLY00176372
BP-HZN-2179MDL00269030
HAL_0123040
HAL_0197883
HAL_0205627
HAL_0234194
HAL_0234245
HAL_0234447
HAL_0243170
End Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079413
BP-HZN-2179MDL00079413
Beg Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
MC252_001_ST00BP01_APR 15 - Apr 20_ASCII (BP-HZN-BLY00190158).txt
TimeSDLStats 05April 20April2010 (BP-HZN-BLY00176372).las
WellSpace Documents, Copy of BP-001318 - CD of data and files
MC252_32306_3_Time ADT Vib_10 July 10_AM.emf
MC252 BP01 Pressure Log TVD.emf
MC252 BP01 Pressure Log TVD.emf
MC252_001_ST00BP00_RUN_600.EMF
7026939bp1 GT.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #4_17722MD_17711TVD.emf
Macondo BP1_Pits_Time_RT.emf
Macondo Shallow Hazard Assessment - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000001
Macondo BP Surface Parameters RT (4.22.2010)
Macondo BP Surface Parameters Time RT Log
Macondo BP Pits (4/21/2010)
Halliburton Well and Mudlogging Data - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000002
Halliburton MWD/LWD Data - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000003
Halliburton Well and Mudlogging Data - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000004
Halliburton MWD/LWD Data - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000005
Halliburton Well and Mudlogging Data - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000006
Schlumberger - MDT Report - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000007
Schlumberger - DLIS, LIS Depth/Time LAS, PDS Reports - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000008
Schlumberger - DLIS/LAS/PDS w/ MDT/MMS & Processed Data BP-HZNSNR00000009 - CD of data and files
Schlumberger - Dual MBMI PDS, LAS & WellEye Files - CD of data and files
BP-HZN-SNR00000010
BP - TO11000827 (BP-HZN-BLY00242955-4879).pdf
MC252_001_ST00BP01_APR 15 - Apr 20_ASCII (BP-HZN-2179MDL00063085).txt
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00437874
BP-HZN-2179MDL00438600
BP-HZN-2179MDL00438601
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434278
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434277
BP-HZN-2179MDL00438602
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434279
BP-HZN-2179MDL00437875
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434280
BP-HZN-2179MDL00437876
BP-HZN-2179MDL00438601
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434278
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434275
BP-HZN-2179MDL00438602
BP-HZN-2179MDL00434279
BP-HZN-2179MDL00437875
End Bates
HAL_0251624
HAL_0252072
HAL_0255960
HAL_0257929
HAL_0265325
HAL_0272677
HAL_0285003
HAL_0292765
HAL_0313088
HAL_0321414
HAL_0328767
HAL_0330878
HAL_0342497
HAL_0349596
HAL_0358453
HAL_0369989
HAL_0373388
HAL_0386159
HAL_0388483
HAL_0391333
HAL_0439200
HAL_0453127
HAL_0466223
HAL_0467694
HAL_0498853
HAL_0251624
HAL_0252072
HAL_0255960
HAL_0257929
HAL_0265325
HAL_0272677
HAL_0285003
HAL_0292765
HAL_0313088
HAL_0321414
HAL_0328767
HAL_0330878
HAL_0342497
HAL_0349596
HAL_0358453
HAL_0369989
HAL_0373388
HAL_0386159
HAL_0388482
HAL_0391333
HAL_0439200
HAL_0453127
HAL_0466223
HAL_0467694
HAL_0498853
Beg Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Macondo BP_Time SDL_4-21-2010.txt
Macondo BP_Cementing_4-21-2010.txt
Macondo BP_Mudlog.emf
Macondo BP1_SurfaceParameters_RT_4-22-10.emf
EmfView3.123
Macondo BP_MWD BAT.emf
Macondo BP1_SurfaceParameters_Time_RT.emf
Macondo BP1_Pits_Time_RT.emf
MC252#1_1in MD_Composite_5067_12350_PM_2_24_10.emf
Macondo BP1_Pits_Time_RT.emf
Recorded MC252 BP01 PWD Eng Log MD.emf
Macondo 5 in Combo MD Final.emf
Recorded MC252 BP01 Pressure Log TVD.emf
Recorded MC252 BP01 Pressure Log TVD.emf
Recorded MC252 BP01 PWD Eng Log MD.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #6_17723MD_17712TVD.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #2_16512MD_16501TVD.emf
7026939bp1 comp.emf
MC252 BP01 PWD Eng Log MD.emf
MC252#1_5in MD_Composite_5067_12350_PM_2_24_10.emf
Macondo 5 in Combo TVD Final.emf
Macondo 1 in Combo MD Final.emf
MC252#1_MWD_Survey_RT_2_18_10.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #3_17723MD_17712TVD.emf
Macondo PWD Engineering Log Final.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #8_18089MD_18078TVD.emf
000004442746.pdf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #5_17724MD_17713TVD.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #1_16513MD_16502TVD.emf
MC252 BP01 PWD Eng Log MD.emf
MC 252 BP01_ GEOTAP TEST #7_18090MD_18079TVD.emf
Macondo Pressure Log Final.emf
Macondo 1 in Combo TVD Final.emf
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00438603
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00440511
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Macondo BP_Pits_4-21-2010.txt
BP-Mudlogging Data.xlsx - Bourgoyne created file
Macondo Displacement Volumes.xlsx - Bourgoyne created file
Macondo Overburden vs. Depth.xlsx - Bourgoyne created file
Negative Test Analysis.xlsx - Bourgoyne created file
Pressure Integrity Test Analysis.xlsx - Bourgoyne created file
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Appendix D
Appendix D-3: Materials From The 2179MDL Litigation
In addition to the materials cited in my report, Appendix D-3 lists the materials from the
2179MDL litigation provided to me for my consideration. These materials include deposition
transcripts, reports from various experts or investigative bodies, materials produced in the
litigation and materials used as deposition exhibits, among other items.
BP-HZN-2179MDL00000001
N/A
BP-HZN-2179MDL00161084
BP-HZN-2179MDL00211407
BP-HZN-2179MDL00239630
BP-HZN-2179MDL02470626
BP-HZN-2179MDL02747482
BP-HZN-2179MDL02859913
BP-HZN-2179MDL02859918
BP-HZN-BLY00245945
IMS023-014842
IMS026-010823
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057858
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057862
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057963
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058005
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058035
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058050
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058055
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058086
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058107
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058251
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058265
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058285
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058321
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058326
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058333
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058342
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058345
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058348
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058365
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058450
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058458
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00161085
BP-HZN-2179MDL00211407
BP-HZN-2179MDL00239631
BP-HZN-2179MDL02470626
BP-HZN-2179MDL02747483
BP-HZN-2179MDL02859913
BP-HZN-2179MDL02859918
BP-HZN-BLY00245947
IMS023-014843
IMS026-010825
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057859
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057863
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057964
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058006
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058036
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058051
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058058
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058087
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058108
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058253
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058266
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058286
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058322
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058328
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058334
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058343
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058346
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058350
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058366
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058451
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058459
BP-HZN-2179MDL00000760
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report and appendices
BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report Video - available at www.bp.com
Email from S. Douglas to H. Powell re MW increase request
Email from B. Morel to S. Douglas re PPFGMW Charts
Email from S. Douglas to M. Hafle re MW increase request
Email from S. Douglas to J. Hafle et al re Verbal Approval
Email from S. Douglas to L. Carter re MW Change Request
Email from L. Carter to S. Douglas re MW change Request
Email from S. Douglas to B. Morel et al re F. Patton approval for MW increase
Email from D. Trocquet to S. Douglas re MC 252 Plugback Approval Requested
Email from J. Levine to F. Patton et al re Test Program Protocols
Email from D. Trocquet to G. Woltman et al re question about pressure for LOT
GeoReport_10-25-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-27-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-08-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-22-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-30-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-15-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-17-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-12-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-20-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-30-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-18-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-14-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-22-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-05-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-21-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-23-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-14-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-26-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-17-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-13-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-13-10_Macondo.doc
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058467
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058504
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058509
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058521
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058532
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058539
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058600
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058604
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058613
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058634
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058665
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058684
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058733
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058769
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058833
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058841
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058912
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058918
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058954
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058959
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059018
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059052
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059126
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059135
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059142
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059177
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059182
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059185
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059209
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059220
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059291
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059321
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059367
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058468
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058507
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058511
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058522
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058533
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058540
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058601
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058605
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058614
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058636
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058666
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058685
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058734
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058770
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058834
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058842
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058913
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058919
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058955
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058960
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059019
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059053
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059127
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059136
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059143
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059178
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059183
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059186
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059210
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059222
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059292
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059323
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059368
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
GeoReport_04-06-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-03-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-29-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-03-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-11-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-09-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-12-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-23-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-09-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-04-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-11-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-10-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-08-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-24-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-28-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-19-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-31-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-07-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-12-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-15-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-04-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-20-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-25-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-11-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-23-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-13-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-05-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-15-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-26-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-19-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-29-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-18-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-24-09_Macondo.doc
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059370
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059378
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059404
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059427
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059483
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059527
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059573
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059626
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059678
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059710
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059721
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059772
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059797
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059805
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059852
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059866
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059869
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059892
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059895
BP-HZN-MBI00014039
BP-HZN-MBI00014045
BP-HZN-MBI00014041
BP-HZN-MBI00014033
BP-HZN-MBI00014035
BP-HZN-MBI00014037
BP-HZN-MBI00014047
BP-HZN-MBI00014050
BP-HZN-MBI00014043
BP-HZN-MBI00014052
BP-HZN-MBI00014054
BP-HZN-MBI00014056
BP-HZN-MBI00014058
BP-HZN-MBI00014060
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059371
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059379
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059405
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059428
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059484
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059528
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059574
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059629
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059679
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059711
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059723
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059773
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059798
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059806
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059853
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059867
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059870
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059893
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059896
BP-HZN-MBI00014040
BP-HZN-MBI00014046
BP-HZN-MBI00014042
BP-HZN-MBI00014034
BP-HZN-MBI00014036
BP-HZN-MBI00014038
BP-HZN-MBI00014049
BP-HZN-MBI00014051
BP-HZN-MBI00014044
BP-HZN-MBI00014053
BP-HZN-MBI00014055
BP-HZN-MBI00014057
BP-HZN-MBI00014059
BP-HZN-MBI00014061
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
GeoReport_04-02-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-10-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-01-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-21-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-01-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-26-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-07-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-24-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-16-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-28-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_10-28-09_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-31-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-06-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-25-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_04-10-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-02-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-27-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_03-27-10_Macondo.doc
GeoReport_02-14-10_Macondo.doc
2009.05.03 Daily Operations Report (Report 01) (Printed 100514 AM)
2009.05.04 Daily Operations Report (Report 02) (Printed 100622 AM)
2009.05.05 Daily Operations Report (Report 03) (Printed 100614 AM)
2009.05.06 Daily Operations Report (Report 04) (Printed 100531 AM)
2009.05.07 Daily Operations Report (Report 05) (Printed 100539 AM)
2009.05.08 Daily Operations Report (Report 06) (Printed 100547 AM)
2009.05.09 Daily Operations Report (Report 07) (Printed 100606 AM)
2009.05.10 Daily Operations Report (Report 08) (Printed 100557 AM)
2009.05.11 Daily Operations Report (Report 09) (Printed 100523 AM)
2009.05.16 Daily Operations Report (Report 10) (Printed 095223 AM)
2009.05.17 Daily Operations Report (Report 11) (Printed 095231 AM)
2009.05.18 Daily Operations Report (Report 12) (Printed 095239 AM)
2009.05.19 Daily Operations Report (Report 13) (Printed 095246 AM)
2009.05.20 Daily Operations Report (Report 14) (Printed 095254 AM)
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00014062
BP-HZN-MBI00014064
BP-HZN-MBI00014066
BP-HZN-MBI00014068
BP-HZN-MBI00014070
BP-HZN-MBI00014072
BP-HZN-MBI00014074
BP-HZN-MBI00014076
BP-HZN-MBI00014078
BP-HZN-MBI00014031
BP-HZN-MBI00014083
BP-HZN-MBI00014086
BP-HZN-MBI00014089
BP-HZN-MBI00014092
BP-HZN-MBI00014096
BP-HZN-MBI00014101
BP-HZN-MBI00014110
BP-HZN-MBI00014106
BP-HZN-MBI00014113
BP-HZN-MBI00014117
BP-HZN-MBI00014123
BP-HZN-MBI00014127
BP-HZN-MBI00014131
BP-HZN-MBI00014191
BP-HZN-MBI00183819
BP-HZN-MBI00014188
BP-HZN-MBI00182328
BP-HZN-MBI00181059
BP-HZN-MBI00179040
BP-HZN-MBI00014185
BP-HZN-MBI00073003
BP-HZN-MBI00014182
BP-HZN-MBI00014178
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00014063
BP-HZN-MBI00014065
BP-HZN-MBI00014067
BP-HZN-MBI00014069
BP-HZN-MBI00014071
BP-HZN-MBI00014073
BP-HZN-MBI00014075
BP-HZN-MBI00014077
BP-HZN-MBI00014079
BP-HZN-MBI00014032
BP-HZN-MBI00014085
BP-HZN-MBI00014088
BP-HZN-MBI00014091
BP-HZN-MBI00014095
BP-HZN-MBI00014100
BP-HZN-MBI00014105
BP-HZN-MBI00014112
BP-HZN-MBI00014109
BP-HZN-MBI00014116
BP-HZN-MBI00014122
BP-HZN-MBI00014126
BP-HZN-MBI00014130
BP-HZN-MBI00014134
BP-HZN-MBI00014195
BP-HZN-MBI00183822
BP-HZN-MBI00014190
BP-HZN-MBI00182330
BP-HZN-MBI00181061
BP-HZN-MBI00179042
BP-HZN-MBI00014187
BP-HZN-MBI00073005
BP-HZN-MBI00014184
BP-HZN-MBI00014181
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2009.05.21 Daily Operations Report (Report 15) (Printed 095303 AM)
2009.06.02 Daily Operations Report (Report 16) (Printed 095310 AM)
2009.06.03 Daily Operations Report (Report 17) (Printed 095317 AM)
2009.06.04 Daily Operations Report (Report 18) (Printed 095325 AM)
2009.06.05 Daily Operations Report (Report 19) (Printed 095333 AM)
2009.06.06 Daily Operations Report (Report 20) (Printed 095340 AM)
2009.06.07 Daily Operations Report (Report 21) (Printed 095348 AM)
2009.06.08 Daily Operations Report (Report 22) (Printed 095356 AM)
2009.06.09 Daily Operations Report (Report 23) (Printed 095405 AM)
2009.06.10 Daily Operations Report (Report 24) (Printed 095414 AM)
2009.09.30 Daily Operations Report (Report 01) (Printed 052810 AM)
2009.10.01 Daily Operations Report (Report 02) (Printed 051644 AM)
2009.10.02 Daily Operations Report (Report 03) (Printed 053028 AM)
2009.10.03 Daily Operations Report (Report 04) (Printed 052954 AM)
2009.10.04 Daily Operations Report (Report 05) (Printed 053542 AM)
2009.10.05 Daily Operations Report (Report 48) (Printed 063107 AM)
2009.10.06 Daily Operations Report (Report 01) (Printed 053614 AM)
2009.10.06 Daily Operations Report (Report 49) (Printed 053602 AM)
2009.10.07 Daily Operations Report (Report 02) (Printed 045026 AM)
2009.10.08 Daily Operations Report (Report 03) (Printed 051742 AM)
2009.10.09 Daily Operations Report (Report 04) (Printed 051936 AM)
2009.10.10 Daily Operations Report (Report 05) (Printed 045723 AM)
2009.10.11 Daily Operations Report (Report 06) (Printed 052618 AM)
2009.10.12 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 07) (Printed 072434
2009.10.12 Daily Operations Report (Report 07) (Printed 052538 AM)
2009.10.13 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 08) (Printed 072348
2009.10.13 Daily Operations Report (Drilling) (Report 08) (Printed 053750 AM)
2009.10.13 Daily Operations Report (Drilling) (Report 08) (Printed 074313 AM)
2009.10.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 09) (Printed 071909
2009.10.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 09) (Printed 072255
2009.10.14 Daily Operations Report (Drilling) (Report 09) (Printed 075346 AM)
2009.10.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 10) (Printed 072206
2009.10.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 11) (Printed 072109
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00183835
BP-HZN-MBI00014175
BP-HZN-MBI00014171
BP-HZN-MBI00014166
BP-HZN-MBI00014161
BP-HZN-MBI00014135
BP-HZN-MBI00014140
BP-HZN-MBI00014145
BP-HZN-MBI00014151
BP-HZN-MBI00014156
BP-HZN-MBI00014196
BP-HZN-MBI00186129
BP-HZN-MBI00183882
BP-HZN-MBI00183887
BP-HZN-MBI00014201
BP-HZN-MBI00014206
BP-HZN-MBI00014210
BP-HZN-MBI00014214
BP-HZN-MBI00014217
BP-HZN-MBI00014220
BP-HZN-MBI00014223
BP-HZN-MBI00014226
BP-HZN-MBI00014229
BP-HZN-MBI00014232
BP-HZN-MBI00014238
BP-HZN-MBI00178940
BP-HZN-MBI00014235
BP-HZN-MBI00014241
BP-HZN-MBI00014244
BP-HZN-MBI00014247
BP-HZN-MBI00014250
BP-HZN-MBI00014253
BP-HZN-MBI00014256
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00183837
BP-HZN-MBI00014177
BP-HZN-MBI00014174
BP-HZN-MBI00014170
BP-HZN-MBI00014165
BP-HZN-MBI00014139
BP-HZN-MBI00014144
BP-HZN-MBI00014150
BP-HZN-MBI00014155
BP-HZN-MBI00014160
BP-HZN-MBI00014200
BP-HZN-MBI00186133
BP-HZN-MBI00183886
BP-HZN-MBI00183891
BP-HZN-MBI00014205
BP-HZN-MBI00014209
BP-HZN-MBI00014213
BP-HZN-MBI00014216
BP-HZN-MBI00014219
BP-HZN-MBI00014222
BP-HZN-MBI00014225
BP-HZN-MBI00014228
BP-HZN-MBI00014231
BP-HZN-MBI00014234
BP-HZN-MBI00014240
BP-HZN-MBI00178942
BP-HZN-MBI00014237
BP-HZN-MBI00014243
BP-HZN-MBI00014246
BP-HZN-MBI00014249
BP-HZN-MBI00014252
BP-HZN-MBI00014255
BP-HZN-MBI00014258
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2009.10.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 12) (Printed 050617
2009.10.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 12) (Printed 072008
2009.10.18 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 13) (Printed 071907
2009.10.19 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 14) (Printed 071807
2009.10.20 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 15) (Printed 071653
2009.10.21 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 16) (Printed 055113
2009.10.22 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 17) (Printed 054327
2009.10.23 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 18) (Printed 051345
2009.10.24 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 19) (Printed 055205
2009.10.25 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 20) (Printed 054622
2009.10.26 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 21) (Printed 085923
2009.10.26 Daily Operations Report (Drilling) (Report 21) (Printed 070034 AM)
2009.10.27 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 22) (Printed 054408
2009.10.28 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 23) (Printed 070707
2009.10.29 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 24) (Printed 045642
2009.10.30 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 25) (Printed 051025
2009.10.31 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 26) (Printed 050026
2009.11.01 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 27) (Printed 072442
2009.11.02 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 28) (Printed 071049
2009.11.03 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 29) (Printed 045635
2009.11.04 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 30) (Printed 050511
2009.11.05 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 31) (Printed 054745
2009.11.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 32) (Printed 065355
2009.11.07 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 33) (Printed 055830
2009.11.08 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 34) (Printed 081755
2009.11.08 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 34) (Printed 095038
2009.11.09 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 35) (Printed 040054
2009.11.10 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 36) (Printed 053847
2009.11.11 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 37) (Printed 050919
2009.11.12 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 38) (Printed 051625
2009.11.13 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 39) (Printed 050502
2009.11.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 40) (Printed 050754
2009.11.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 41) (Printed 051438
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00014259
BP-HZN-MBI00183954
BP-HZN-MBI00014262
BP-HZN-MBI00014265
BP-HZN-MBI00014268
BP-HZN-MBI00014271
BP-HZN-MBI00014274
BP-HZN-MBI00014277
BP-HZN-MBI00014280
BP-HZN-MBI00014287
BP-HZN-MBI00014294
BP-HZN-MBI00014302
BP-HZN-MBI00014307
BP-HZN-MBI00014312
BP-HZN-MBI00014315
BP-HZN-MBI00014318
BP-HZN-MBI00014321
BP-HZN-MBI00014324
BP-HZN-MBI00014327
BP-HZN-MBI00014330
BP-HZN-MBI00014333
BP-HZN-MBI00014336
BP-HZN-MBI00014339
BP-HZN-MBI00014343
BP-HZN-MBI00014346
BP-HZN-MBI00014350
BP-HZN-MBI00014353
BP-HZN-MBI00014356
BP-HZN-MBI00014359
BP-HZN-MBI00014363
BP-HZN-MBI00014366
BP-HZN-MBI00014369
BP-HZN-MBI00014373
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00014261
BP-HZN-MBI00183956
BP-HZN-MBI00014264
BP-HZN-MBI00014267
BP-HZN-MBI00014270
BP-HZN-MBI00014273
BP-HZN-MBI00014276
BP-HZN-MBI00014279
BP-HZN-MBI00014286
BP-HZN-MBI00014293
BP-HZN-MBI00014301
BP-HZN-MBI00014306
BP-HZN-MBI00014311
BP-HZN-MBI00014314
BP-HZN-MBI00014317
BP-HZN-MBI00014320
BP-HZN-MBI00014323
BP-HZN-MBI00014326
BP-HZN-MBI00014329
BP-HZN-MBI00014332
BP-HZN-MBI00014335
BP-HZN-MBI00014338
BP-HZN-MBI00014342
BP-HZN-MBI00014345
BP-HZN-MBI00014349
BP-HZN-MBI00014352
BP-HZN-MBI00014355
BP-HZN-MBI00014358
BP-HZN-MBI00014362
BP-HZN-MBI00014365
BP-HZN-MBI00014368
BP-HZN-MBI00014372
BP-HZN-MBI00014375
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2009.11.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 42) (Printed 054839
2009.11.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 42) (Printed 072314
2009.11.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 43) (Printed 051125
2009.11.18 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 44) (Printed 043343
2009.11.19 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 45) (Printed 050113
2009.11.20 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 46) (Printed 050704
2009.11.21 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 47) (Printed 045741
2009.11.22 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 48) (Printed 050602
2009.11.23 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 49) (Printed 052026
2009.11.24 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 50) (Printed 051723
2009.11.25 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 51) (Printed 044656
2009.11.26 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 52) (Printed 044843
2009.11.27 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 53) (Printed 045038
2009.11.28 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 54) (Printed 044435
2009.11.29 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 55) (Printed 045841
2009.11.30 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 56) (Printed 094324
2009.12.01 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 57) (Printed 064308
2009.12.02 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 58) (Printed 054227
2009.12.03 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 59) (Printed 051512
2009.12.04 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 60) (Printed 051323
2009.12.05 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 61) (Printed 052115
2009.12.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 62) (Printed 050319
2009.12.07 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 63) (Printed 053240
2009.12.08 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 64) (Printed 050805
2009.12.09 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 65) (Printed 051413
2009.12.10 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 66) (Printed 051608
2009.12.11 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 67) (Printed 051302
2009.12.12 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 68) (Printed 051619
2009.12.13 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 69) (Printed 052320
2009.12.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 70) (Printed 050655
2009.12.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 71) (Printed 052921
2009.12.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 72) (Printed 052726
2009.12.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 73) (Printed 050656
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00014376
BP-HZN-MBI00014379
BP-HZN-MBI00014080
BP-HZN-MBI00013592
BP-HZN-MBI00013596
BP-HZN-MBI00013621
BP-HZN-MBI00013599
BP-HZN-MBI00013617
BP-HZN-MBI00100992
BP-HZN-MBI00020885
BP-HZN-MBI00013991
BP-HZN-MBI00020881
BP-HZN-MBI00178838
BP-HZN-MBI00013607
BP-HZN-MBI00013603
BP-HZN-MBI00013611
BP-HZN-MBI00013625
BP-HZN-MBI00013630
BP-HZN-MBI00013636
BP-HZN-MBI00013643
BP-HZN-MBI00013649
BP-HZN-MBI00013655
BP-HZN-MBI00013661
BP-HZN-MBI00013666
BP-HZN-MBI00013673
BP-HZN-MBI00013680
BP-HZN-MBI00013687
BP-HZN-MBI00013694
BP-HZN-MBI00013700
BP-HZN-MBI00013995
BP-HZN-MBI00013707
BP-HZN-MBI00013714
BP-HZN-MBI00014002
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00014378
BP-HZN-MBI00014381
BP-HZN-MBI00014082
BP-HZN-MBI00013595
BP-HZN-MBI00013598
BP-HZN-MBI00013624
BP-HZN-MBI00013602
BP-HZN-MBI00013620
BP-HZN-MBI00100994
BP-HZN-MBI00020887
BP-HZN-MBI00013994
BP-HZN-MBI00020884
BP-HZN-MBI00178841
BP-HZN-MBI00013610
BP-HZN-MBI00013606
BP-HZN-MBI00013616
BP-HZN-MBI00013629
BP-HZN-MBI00013635
BP-HZN-MBI00013642
BP-HZN-MBI00013648
BP-HZN-MBI00013654
BP-HZN-MBI00013660
BP-HZN-MBI00013665
BP-HZN-MBI00013672
BP-HZN-MBI00013679
BP-HZN-MBI00013686
BP-HZN-MBI00013693
BP-HZN-MBI00013699
BP-HZN-MBI00013706
BP-HZN-MBI00014001
BP-HZN-MBI00013713
BP-HZN-MBI00013720
BP-HZN-MBI00014006
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2009.12.18 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 74) (Printed 050238
2009.12.19 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 75) (Printed 052029
2009.12.20 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 76) (Printed 053845
2010.01.31 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 01) (Printed
2010.02.01 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 02) (Printed
2010.02.02 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 03) (Printed
2010.02.03 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 04) (Printed
2010.02.04 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 05) (Printed
2010.02.05 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 06) (Printed
2010.02.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 07) (Printed 061828
2010.02.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 77) (Printed 050432
2010.02.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (MOBILIZATION) (Report 07) (Printed
2010.02.07 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 08) (Printed 054025
2010.02.07 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 78) (Printed 065834
2010.02.08 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 79) (Printed 061500
2010.02.09 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 80) (Printed 054913
2010.02.10 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 81) (Printed 054311
2010.02.11 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 82) (Printed 061549
2010.02.12 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 83) (Printed 055840
2010.02.13 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 84) (Printed 055916
2010.02.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 85) (Printed 060954
2010.02.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 86) (Printed 060226
2010.02.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 87) (Printed 053209
2010.02.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 88) (Printed 062102
2010.02.18 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 89) (Printed 054559
2010.02.19 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 90) (Printed 054416
2010.02.20 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 91) (Printed 052928
2010.02.21 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 92) (Printed 055323
2010.02.22 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 93) (Printed 064622
2010.02.23 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 94) (Printed 051128
2010.02.24 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 95) (Printed 053912
2010.02.25 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 96) (Printed 055210
2010.02.26 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 97) (Printed 051345
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00178719
BP-HZN-MBI00014007
BP-HZN-MBI00178713
BP-HZN-MBI00014013
BP-HZN-MBI00178708
BP-HZN-MBI00178699
BP-HZN-MBI00013721
BP-HZN-MBI00014019
BP-HZN-MBI00178686
BP-HZN-MBI00013728
BP-HZN-MBI00013735
BP-HZN-MBI00013741
BP-HZN-MBI00013747
BP-HZN-MBI00013753
BP-HZN-MBI00013759
BP-HZN-MBI00013764
BP-HZN-MBI00014025
BP-HZN-MBI00013770
BP-HZN-MBI00013777
BP-HZN-MBI00013782
BP-HZN-MBI00013787
BP-HZN-MBI00013793
BP-HZN-MBI00178609
BP-HZN-MBI00013796
BP-HZN-MBI00013803
BP-HZN-MBI00013809
BP-HZN-MBI00013815
BP-HZN-MBI00013821
BP-HZN-MBI00013827
BP-HZN-MBI00013834
BP-HZN-MBI00013839
BP-HZN-MBI00013844
BP-HZN-MBI00013850
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00178723
BP-HZN-MBI00014012
BP-HZN-MBI00178718
BP-HZN-MBI00014018
BP-HZN-MBI00178712
BP-HZN-MBI00178707
BP-HZN-MBI00013727
BP-HZN-MBI00014024
BP-HZN-MBI00178691
BP-HZN-MBI00013734
BP-HZN-MBI00013740
BP-HZN-MBI00013746
BP-HZN-MBI00013752
BP-HZN-MBI00013758
BP-HZN-MBI00013763
BP-HZN-MBI00013769
BP-HZN-MBI00014030
BP-HZN-MBI00013776
BP-HZN-MBI00013781
BP-HZN-MBI00013786
BP-HZN-MBI00013792
BP-HZN-MBI00013795
BP-HZN-MBI00178614
BP-HZN-MBI00013802
BP-HZN-MBI00013808
BP-HZN-MBI00013814
BP-HZN-MBI00013820
BP-HZN-MBI00013826
BP-HZN-MBI00013833
BP-HZN-MBI00013838
BP-HZN-MBI00013843
BP-HZN-MBI00013849
BP-HZN-MBI00013855
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2010.02.26 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 97) (Printed 054400
2010.02.27 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 98) (Printed 051505
2010.02.27 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 98) (Printed 053914
2010.02.28 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 99) (Printed 051638
2010.02.28 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 99) (Printed 053430
2010.03.01 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 100) (Printed 053215
2010.03.02 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 101) (Printed 060433
2010.03.03 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 102) (Printed 051827
2010.03.03 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 102) (Printed 055526
2010.03.04 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 103) (Printed 055921
2010.03.05 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 104) (Printed 055518
2010.03.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 105) (Printed 054836
2010.03.07 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 106) (Printed 053130
2010.03.08 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 107) (Printed 054009
2010.03.09 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 108) (Printed 054431
2010.03.10 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 109) (Printed 054812
2010.03.11 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 110) (Printed 051951
2010.03.12 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 111) (Printed 061815
2010.03.13 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 112) (Printed 062051
2010.03.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 113) (Printed 055042
2010.03.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 114) (Printed 055426
2010.03.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 115) (Printed 040143
2010.03.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 115) (Printed 054502
2010.03.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 116) (Printed 055658
2010.03.18 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 117) (Printed 053507
2010.03.19 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 118) (Printed 051516
2010.03.20 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 119) (Printed 060520
2010.03.21 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 120) (Printed 055129
2010.03.22 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 121) (Printed 060512
2010.03.23 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 122) (Printed 054812
2010.03.24 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 123) (Printed 052417
2010.03.25 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 124) (Printed 054951
2010.03.26 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 125) (Printed 071233
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00013856
BP-HZN-MBI00013863
BP-HZN-MBI00013868
BP-HZN-MBI00013874
BP-HZN-MBI00013879
BP-HZN-MBI00178515
BP-HZN-MBI00013884
BP-HZN-MBI00013890
BP-HZN-MBI00013897
BP-HZN-MBI00013905
BP-HZN-MBI00013911
BP-HZN-MBI00013916
BP-HZN-MBI00013921
BP-HZN-MBI00013926
BP-HZN-MBI00013935
BP-HZN-MBI00013941
BP-HZN-MBI00013947
BP-HZN-MBI00013951
BP-HZN-MBI00013955
BP-HZN-MBI00013960
BP-HZN-MBI00013557
BP-HZN-MBI00013970
BP-HZN-MBI00013562
BP-HZN-MBI00013567
BP-HZN-MBI00013573
BP-HZN-MBI00013578
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058074
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058147
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058175
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058470
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058851
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058858
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058921
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00013862
BP-HZN-MBI00013867
BP-HZN-MBI00013873
BP-HZN-MBI00013878
BP-HZN-MBI00013883
BP-HZN-MBI00178520
BP-HZN-MBI00013889
BP-HZN-MBI00013896
BP-HZN-MBI00013904
BP-HZN-MBI00013910
BP-HZN-MBI00013915
BP-HZN-MBI00013920
BP-HZN-MBI00013925
BP-HZN-MBI00013934
BP-HZN-MBI00013940
BP-HZN-MBI00013946
BP-HZN-MBI00013950
BP-HZN-MBI00013954
BP-HZN-MBI00013959
BP-HZN-MBI00013964
BP-HZN-MBI00013561
BP-HZN-MBI00013974
BP-HZN-MBI00013566
BP-HZN-MBI00013572
BP-HZN-MBI00013577
BP-HZN-MBI00013584
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058075
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058149
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058177
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058473
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058853
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058859
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058922
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2010.03.27 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 126) (Printed 054858
2010.03.28 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 127) (Printed 053340
2010.03.29 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 128) (Printed 051614
2010.03.30 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 129) (Printed 050658
2010.03.31 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 130) (Printed 061554
2010.04.01 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 131) (Printed 060659
2010.04.01 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 131) (Printed 083006
2010.04.02 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 132) (Printed 061314
2010.04.03 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 133) (Printed 055103
2010.04.04 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 134) (Printed 061228
2010.04.05 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 135) (Printed 065442
2010.04.06 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 136) (Printed 055107
2010.04.07 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 137) (Printed 054418
2010.04.08 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 138) (Printed 063816
2010.04.09 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 139) (Printed 055857
2010.04.10 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 140) (Printed 060623
2010.04.11 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 141) (Printed 055615
2010.04.12 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 142) (Printed 055419
2010.04.13 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 143) (Printed 053325
2010.04.14 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 144) (Printed 053749
2010.04.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Completion) (Report 01) (Printed
2010.04.15 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 145) (Printed 055228
2010.04.16 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Completion) (Report 02) (Printed
2010.04.17 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Completion) (Report 03) (Printed
2010.04.18 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Completion) (Report 04) (Printed
2010.04.19 Daily Operations Report - Partners (Completion) (Report 05) (Printed
PP Report Macondo 8011MD.doc
PP Report Macondo 11010MD.pdf
PP Report Macondo 13305.pdf
PP Report Macondo 12350.pdf
PP Report Macondo BP01 18088MD.pdf
PP Report Macondo BP01 17761MD.pdf
PP Report Macondo 8878MD.doc
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058967
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059079
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059091
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059237
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059401
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059440
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059457
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059474
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059488
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059546
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059558
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059632
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059692
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059783
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
BP-HZN-CEC020494
BP-HZN-CEC028826
BP-HZN-MBI00099088
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-CEC020510
BP-HZN-CEC028840
BP-HZN-MBI00099102
BP-HZN-2179MDL00058969
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059080
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059092
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059239
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059403
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059443
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059459
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059475
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059489
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059547
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059560
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059633
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059694
BP-HZN-2179MDL00059785
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
PP Report Macondo 8050MD.doc
PP Report Macondo BP01 15175.pdf
PP Report Macondo 8500MD.doc
PP Report Macondo BP01 15113.pdf
PP Report Macondo 11887MD.pdf
PP Report Macondo BP01 13780.pdf
PP Report Macondo 12350.pdf
PP Report Macondo 8970MD.doc
PP Report Macondo 8000MD.doc
PP Report Macondo BP01 11838.pdf
PP Report Macondo BP01 16460.pdf
PP Report Macondo BP01 18260MD.pdf
PP Report Macondo 9090MD.doc
PP Report Macondo BP01 13150.pdf
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Albertin, Martin
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Alberty, Mark
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Lacy, Stuart
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Paine, Kate
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Patton, Frank
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Trocquet, David
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Vinson, Graham
2011-09-23 Expert Report of Calvin Barnhill (Transocean)
2011-08-26 Expert Report of David Pritchard (PSC)
2011-08-26 Expert Report of Allan Huffman (US)
Macondo Well Incident - Transocean Investigation Report Volumes 1 and 2 and
Chief Counsel's 2011 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Deposition Transcript & Exhibits of O'Bryan, Patrick
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Sprague, John
Deposition Transcripts & Exhibits of Billon, Brad
Deposition Transcript & Exhibits of Lindner, Leo
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-04 Drilling Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
Appendix D
BP-HZN-MBI00116697
BP-HZN-MBI00126181
BP-HZN-MBI00140193
BP-HZN-MBI00140211
BP-HZN-MBI00140216
BP-HZN-MBI00140234
BP-HZN-MBI00140251
BP-HZN-MBI00140300
BP-HZN-MBI00140318
BP-HZN-MBI00140336
BP-HZN-MBI00140354
BP-HZN-MBI00140447
BP-HZN-MBI00140461
BP-HZN-MBI00140475
BP-HZN-MBI00140493
BP-HZN-MBI00140522
BP-HZN-MBI00140564
BP-HZN-MBI00140599
BP-HZN-MBI00140601
BP-HZN-MBI00141096
BP-HZN-MBI00141119
BP-HZN-MBI00141205
BP-HZN-MBI00141257
BP-HZN-MBI00141297
BP-HZN-MBI00141317
BP-HZN-MBI00141400
BP-HZN-MBI00141493
BP-HZN-MBI00141737
BP-HZN-MBI00142014
BP-HZN-2179MDL00031758
BP-HZN-2179MDL01917793
BP-HZN-MBI00014321
Native production
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-MBI00116706
BP-HZN-MBI00126200
BP-HZN-MBI00140201
BP-HZN-MBI00140213
BP-HZN-MBI00140233
BP-HZN-MBI00140250
BP-HZN-MBI00140270
BP-HZN-MBI00140317
BP-HZN-MBI00140335
BP-HZN-MBI00140353
BP-HZN-MBI00140379
BP-HZN-MBI00140460
BP-HZN-MBI00140473
BP-HZN-MBI00140492
BP-HZN-MBI00140509
BP-HZN-MBI00140530
BP-HZN-MBI00140598
BP-HZN-MBI00140600
BP-HZN-MBI00140617
BP-HZN-MBI00141118
BP-HZN-MBI00141137
BP-HZN-MBI00141221
BP-HZN-MBI00141276
BP-HZN-MBI00141316
BP-HZN-MBI00141336
BP-HZN-MBI00141411
BP-HZN-MBI00141512
BP-HZN-MBI00141746
BP-HZN-MBI00142034
BP-HZN-2179MDL00031766
BP-HZN-2179MDL01917797
BP-HZN-MBI00014323
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-04 Drilling Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
2009-09 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-01 Drilling Plan Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-03 Drilling Pieces
2010-04 Drilling Pieces
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 100) (Printed 055633 AM)
Daily Operations Report
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) (Report 57) (Printed 064308 AM)
MDL Ex. 4025 - MC 252 Formation PIT Reporting Worksheet
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00060898
BP-HZN-BLY00242520
BP-HZN-2179MDL00327116
BP-HZN-2179MDL00335948
BP-HZN-2179MDL00336410
BP-HZN-2179MDL00336762
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057261
BP-HZN-SNR00000018
BP-HZN-SNR00000024
BP-HZN-SNR00000406
BP-HZN-SNR00000409
BP-HZN-SNR00000425
Bp-HZN-SNR00000426
BP-HZN-SNR00000441
BP-HZN-SNR00000493
BP-HZN-SNR00000509
BP-HZN-SNR00000513
BP-HZN-SNR00000575
Bp-HZN-SNR00000586
BP-HZN-SNR00000616
BP-HZN-SNR00000625
Bp-HZN-SNR00000651
BP-HZN-SNR00000713
BP-HZN-SNR00000727
BP-HZN-SNR00000770
BP-HZN-SNR00000786
BP-HZN-SNR00000944
BP-HZN-SNR00000948
BP-HZN-SNR00000957
BP-HZN-SNR00000959
BP-HZN-SNR00000978
BP-HZN-SNR0000122
BP-HZN-SNR-0000271
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00060900
BP-HZN-BLY00242523
BP-HZN-2179MDL00327511
BP-HZN-2179MDL00336409
BP-HZN-2179MDL00336757
BP-HZN-2179MDL00336889
BP-HZN-2179MDL00057372
BP-HZN-SNR00000018
BP-HZN-SNR00000051
BP-HZN-SNR00000408
BP-HZN-SNR00000409
BP-HZN-SNR00000425
BP-HZN-SNR00000440
BP-HZN-SNR00000450
BP-HZN-SNR00000500
BP-HZN-SNR00000512
BP-HZN-SNR00000520
BP-HZN-SNR00000585
BP-HZN-SNR00000593
BP-HZN-SNR00000624
BP-HZN-SNR00000632
BP-HZN-SNR00000663
BP-HZN-SNR00000716
BP-HZN-SNR00000727
BP-HZN-SNR00000782
BP-HZN-SNR00000788
BP-HZN-SNR00000947
BP-HZN-SNR00000956
BP-HZN-SNR00000958
BP-HZN-SNR00000974
BP-HZN-SNR00000990
BP-HZN-SNR00000150
BP-HZN-SNR-000000391
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
IADC Daily Drilling Report for February 14, 2010
IADC Daily Drilling Report for March 15, 2010
BP EX0083 - Transocean Well Control Handbook (03.31.2009)_MDL Bates.PDF
BP Well Control Manual Vol. 1_MDL Bates.PDF
BP Well Control Manual Vol. 2_MDL Bates.PDF
BP Well Control Manual Vol. 3_MDL Bates.PDF
Drilling and Well Operations Practice, E&P Defined Operating Practice
Form MMS 144 - Rig Movement Notification Report
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Permit to Drill New Well
Form MMS 125 - End of Operations Report
Ltr from W. Brantley to M. Griffitt re Initial Exploration Plan for MC 252
Ltr from M. Tolbert to S. Douglas re Revised Exploration Plan for MC 252
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Bypass
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised Bypass
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 124
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised Bypass
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 124
Form MMS 124
Form 144 - Rig Movement Notification Report
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 133
Form MMS 124
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised New Well
Form MMS 125 - End of Operations Report
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised Bypass
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Revised Bypass
Form MMS 123A/123S - Application for Permit to Drill New Well (MMS Approval)
Initial Exploration Plan - Mississippi Canyon Block 252
Appendix D
BP-HZN-SNR-0000392
BP-HZN-2179MDL02567444
BP-HZN-2179MDL01045307
BP-HZN-2179MDL00004060
BP-HZN-2179MDL00005009
BP-HZN-2179MDL00005129
BP-HZN-2179MDL00007076
BP-HZN-2179MDL00007111
BP-HZN-2179MDL00210163
BP-HZN-2179MDL00211240
BP-HZN-2179MDL00213246
BP-HZN-2179MDL00290025
BP-HZN-2179MDL00302808
BP-HZN-2179MDL00302811
BP-HZN-2179MDL00302813
BP-HZN-2179MDL01906814
BP-HZN-2179MDL01906827
BP-HZN-2179MDL01952111
BP-HZN-2179MDL01993372
BP-HZN-2179MDL01995296
BP-HZN-2179MDL02709676
BP-HZN-2179MDL02962143
BP-HZN-BLY00241259
BP-HZN-MBI00170673
BP-HZN-MBI00170742
BP-HZN-2179MDL00247809
IIG013-037711
IMS017-000338
IMS017-025030
IMS019-008027
IMS020-011185
IMS022-030558
IMS023-016635
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-SNR-00000394
BP-HZN-2179MDL02567557
BP-HZN-2179MDL01045323
BP-HZN-2179MDL00004060
BP-HZN-2179MDL00005010
BP-HZN-2179MDL00005129
BP-HZN-2179MDL00007077
BP-HZN-2179MDL00007111
BP-HZN-2179MDL00210280
BP-HZN-2179MDL00211241
BP-HZN-2179MDL00213246
BP-HZN-2179MDL00290026
BP-HZN-2179MDL00302810
BP-HZN-2179MDL00302812
BP-HZN-2179MDL00302813
BP-HZN-2179MDL01906815
BP-HZN-2179MDL01906828
BP-HZN-2179MDL01952112
BP-HZN-2179MDL01993374
BP-HZN-2179MDL01995296
BP-HZN-2179MDL02709683
BP-HZN-2179MDL02962175
BP-HZN-BLY00241261
BP-HZN-MBI00170673
BP-HZN-MBI00170742
BP-HZN-2179MDL00247809
IIG013-037715
IMS017-000341
IMS017-025031
IMS019-008030
IMS020-011237
IMS022-030558
IMS023-016636
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Initial Exploration Plan - Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (Section 14.0)
NAE Transcript for Halliburton (Transcript 3 of 4)
9-26-2010 Halliburton Presentation to NAE
Email from G. Bennett to M. Albertin et al re Macondo Update 3pm
Email from F. Patton to S. Douglas re BOP extension
Email from B. Morel to D. Vidrine re Modification of Permit to Bypass
Email from F. patton to S. Douglas re MC 252 LOT
Email from S. Douglas to F. Patton re 16" Casing Test Pressure
Final Report - Blow-out Prevention Equipment Reliability Joint Industry Project
Email from S. Douglas to T. Fleece et al re BOP Stack Change Request
Email from S. Douglas to D. Vidrine et al re MMS approval to set plug and pull stack
Email from L. Herbst to J. Grant re MMS Director Trip
Email from J. Grant to J. Grant et al re BP National MMS SAFE Award Finalist
MMS SAFE Award Program
MMS District SAFE Award Recipients
Email from S. Douglas to H. Powell re BOP Stack Change Request
Email from S. Douglas to J. Guide et al re Plugnback approval requested
Letter from D. Trocquet to G. Gray re Notification of Incident of Noncompliance
Email from F. Patton to S. Douglas re SEPLA no 2 failed recovery
MC 252 Prospect Overview
MMS Incident Report
Emergency Evacuation Plan - MC 252 - Deepwater Horizon
Email from S. Douglas to B. Morel et al re Test Pressure
Ltr from S. Douglas re Initial Exploration Plan for MC 252
Email from F. Patton to S. Douglas re Cement Volume Change
Email from Morel to Burns re FIT/LOT test
MMS Test C Key - Drilling
Minutes of Field Operations Drilling Engineers' Meeting
Minutes of Drilling Engineers Meeting
Email from D. Trocquet to M. Saucier re MMS Quesitons
Standard Operating Procedures - Drilling Operations Field Operations GOM
Email from F. Patton to A. Laplante re MC776 Permit Detail
Email from J. Levine to F. Patton et al re MMS Drill Test B (Attachments are at Tab 53
Appendix D
HAL_0539979
HAL_0117330
HAL_0117384
BP-HZN-2179MDL00539696
BP-HZN-2179MDL00470501
BP-HZN-2179MDL03074252
BP-HZN-2179MDL01578862
BP-HZN-2179MDL01327828
BP-HZN-SNR00000014
BP-HZN-SNR00000017
BP-HZN-SNR00000023
BP-HZN-SNR00000113
BP-HZN-SNR00000153
BP-HZN-SNR00000156
BP-HZN-SNR00000241
BP-HZN-SNR00000398
BP-HZN-SNR00000402
BP-HZN-SNR00000412
BP-HZN-SNR00000416
BP-HZN-SNR00000490
BP-HZN-SNR00000492
HAL_0117330
HAL_0117352
BP-HZN-2179MDL00539685
BP-HZN-2179MDL00470489
BP-HZN-2179MDL03074329
BP-HZN-2179MDL01578858
BP-HZN-2179MDL0132814
BP-HZN-SNR00000011
BP-HZN-SNR00000015
BP-HZN-SNR00000019
BP-HZN-SNR00000111
BP-HZN-SNR00000151
BP-HZN-SNR00000154
BP-HZN-SNR00000240
BP-HZN-SNR00000395
BP-HZN-SNR00000400
BP-HZN-SNR00000410
BP-HZN-SNR00000413
BP-HZN-SNR00000488
BP-HZN-SNR00000491
End Bates
IMS023-016643
IMS023-016650
IMS023-045400
IMS-026000800
IMS026-003775
IMS026-009754
IMS026-013830
IMS026-047063
IMS026-049598
IMS181-000001
IMS023-016637
IMS023-016644
IMS023-045399
IMS-026000799
IMS026-003774
IMS026-009754
IMS026-013830
IMS026-047062
IMS026-0490598
IMS181-000001
Publicly Available
Publicly Available
HAL_0539960
Beg Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
MMS Test B Key - Drilling
MMS Test B - Drilling
Email from F. Patton to J. Chady (Shell) re MMS Approval to Set Contingency 7-5/8"
Email from F. Patton to G. Crane re MC 782
Email from F. Patton to J. Camp re MC 956
Email from D. Trocquet to G. Crane re MC 782
Email from D. Trocquet to G. Crane re MC 782
Email from G. Wiltz to F. Patton re MC 520 Dispensations
Email from C. Lynard to F. Patton et al re MC 250 request to deepen casing setting
MMS New Orleans District Record of Conversation
MDL Ex. 4019 - BOEMRE - National Office Potential Incident of Noncompliance
30 CFR 250.427
BP America Production Company Macondo #1, 9 7/8" X 7" Production Casing Design
BP America Production Company Macondo #1, 9 7/8" X 7" Production Casing Design
BP America Production Company Macondo #1, 9 7/8" X 7" Production Casing Design
EPT Drilling, Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for Macondo Prospect, Missippi
EPT Drilling, Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for Macondo Prospect, Missippi
EPT Drilling, Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for Macondo Prospect, Missippi
EPT Drilling, Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for Macondo Prospect, Missippi
EPT Drilling, Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for Macondo Prospect, Missippi
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Appendix D
End Bates
BP-HZN-SNR00000595
BP-HZN-SNR00000712
BP-HZN-SNR00000719
BP-HZN-SNR00000722
BP-HZN-SNR00000726
BP-HZN-SNR00000917
BP-HZN-SNR00000977
BP-HZN-SNR00000994
BP-HZN-BLY00096527
TRN-MDL-02130871
TRN-INV-01131807
TRN-INV-01131813
HAL_0468846
TRN-HCEC-00005797
BP-HZN-MBI00167575
TRN-HCEC00005236
TRN-HCEC-00012001
TRN-HCEC-00006783
TRN-MDL-00287162
TRN-MDL-00047754
TRN-MDL-01146607
TRN-INV-00690290
TRN-INV-00000007
TRN-INV-00000028
TRN-INV-00000033
TRN-INV-00000046
TRN-INV-00000051
TRN-INV-00000083
TRN-INV-00000090
TRN-INV-00000096
TRN-INV-00000115
TRN-INV-00000121
TRN-INV-00000138
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-SNR00000594
BP-HZN-SNR00000710
BP-HZN-SNR00000717
BP-HZN-SNR00000720
BP-HZN-SNR00000723
BP-HZN-SNR00000913
BP-HZN-SNR00000975
BP-HZN-SNR00000992
BP-HZN-BLY00096490
TRN-MDL-02130770
TRN-INV-01131807
TRN-INV-01131808
HAL_0468825
TRN-HCEC-00005402
BP-HZN-MBI00167534
TRN-HCEC000004727
TRN-HCEC-00011574
TRN-HCEC-00006423
TRN-MDL-00286767
TRN-MDL-00047535
TRN-MDL-01146603
TRN-INV-00690288
TRN-INV-00000001
TRN-INV-00000008
TRN-INV-00000029
TRN-INV-00000034
TRN-INV-00000047
TRN-INV-00000052
TRN-INV-00000084
TRN-INV-00000091
TRN-INV-00000097
TRN-INV-00000116
TRN-INV-00000122
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Form MMS 124
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Weekly Activity Report
Project Spacer report
2005 DWH THINK Plans
October 5, 2010 Farr to Ambrose email re Mud Gas Diverter questions
Attachment to October 5, 2010 Farr to Ambrose email
MDL Dep. Ex. 609: Sperry Sun materials
MDL Dep. Ex. 674: TO Well Control Handbook
MDL Dep. Ex. 571: TO Safety Drills
MDL Dep. Ex. 1449: TO HSE Manual
MDL Dep. Ex. 1452: TO Field Ops Handbook
MDL Dep. Ex. 1453: TO ERM Vol. 1
MDL Dep. Ex. 1454: TO ERM Vol. 1
MDL Dep. Ex. 2187: TO MAR on DWH
MDL Dep. Ex. 2194: TO Emails
MDL Dep. Ex. 4902: TO Email re kick tolerance
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00000139
TRN-INV-00000144
TRN-INV-00000161
TRN-INV-00000166
TRN-INV-00000178
TRN-INV-00000182
TRN-INV-00000189
TRN-INV-00000199
TRN-INV-00000202
TRN-INV-00000208
TRN-INV-00000228
TRN-INV-00000233
TRN-INV-00000248
TRN-INV-00000254
TRN-INV-00000267
TRN-INV-00000272
TRN-INV-00000284
TRN-INV-00000288
TRN-INV-00000296
TRN-INV-00000307
TRN-INV-00000351
TRN-INV-00000355
TRN-INV-00000361
TRN-INV-00000370
TRN-INV-00000395
TRN-INV-00000400
TRN-INV-00000418
TRN-INV-00000424
TRN-INV-00000443
TRN-INV-00000449
TRN-INV-00000463
TRN-INV-00000469
TRN-INV-00000481
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00000143
TRN-INV-00000160
TRN-INV-00000165
TRN-INV-00000177
TRN-INV-00000181
TRN-INV-00000188
TRN-INV-00000198
TRN-INV-00000201
TRN-INV-00000207
TRN-INV-00000227
TRN-INV-00000232
TRN-INV-00000247
TRN-INV-00000253
TRN-INV-00000266
TRN-INV-00000271
TRN-INV-00000283
TRN-INV-00000287
TRN-INV-00000295
TRN-INV-00000306
TRN-INV-00000350
TRN-INV-00000354
TRN-INV-00000360
TRN-INV-00000369
TRN-INV-00000394
TRN-INV-00000399
TRN-INV-00000417
TRN-INV-00000423
TRN-INV-00000442
TRN-INV-00000448
TRN-INV-00000462
TRN-INV-00000468
TRN-INV-00000480
TRN-INV-00000486
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00000487
TRN-INV-00000514
TRN-INV-00000519
TRN-INV-00000528
TRN-INV-00000532
TRN-INV-00000548
TRN-INV-00000551
TRN-INV-00000557
TRN-INV-00000561
TRN-INV-00000573
TRN-INV-00000579
TRN-INV-00000594
TRN-INV-00000599
TRN-INV-00000622
TRN-INV-00000626
TRN-INV-00000636
TRN-INV-00000640
TRN-INV-00000658
TRN-INV-00000664
TRN-INV-00000696
TRN-INV-00000700
TRN-INV-00000720
TRN-INV-00000725
TRN-INV-00000740
TRN-INV-00000747
TRN-INV-00000767
TRN-INV-00000772
TRN-INV-00000781
TRN-INV-00000785
TRN-INV-00000792
TRN-INV-00000798
TRN-INV-00000811
TRN-INV-00000816
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00000513
TRN-INV-00000518
TRN-INV-00000527
TRN-INV-00000531
TRN-INV-00000547
TRN-INV-00000550
TRN-INV-00000556
TRN-INV-00000560
TRN-INV-00000572
TRN-INV-00000578
TRN-INV-00000593
TRN-INV-00000598
TRN-INV-00000621
TRN-INV-00000625
TRN-INV-00000635
TRN-INV-00000639
TRN-INV-00000657
TRN-INV-00000663
TRN-INV-00000695
TRN-INV-00000699
TRN-INV-00000719
TRN-INV-00000724
TRN-INV-00000739
TRN-INV-00000746
TRN-INV-00000766
TRN-INV-00000771
TRN-INV-00000780
TRN-INV-00000784
TRN-INV-00000791
TRN-INV-00000797
TRN-INV-00000810
TRN-INV-00000815
TRN-INV-00000831
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00000832
TRN-INV-00000836
TRN-INV-00000843
TRN-INV-00000848
TRN-INV-00000863
TRN-INV-00000869
TRN-INV-00000887
TRN-INV-00000892
TRN-INV-00000898
TRN-INV-00000905
TRN-INV-00000925
TRN-INV-00000937
TRN-INV-00000974
TRN-INV-00000978
TRN-INV-00000992
TRN-INV-00000998
TRN-INV-00001016
TRN-INV-00001023
TRN-INV-00001041
TRN-INV-00001045
TRN-INV-00001062
TRN-INV-00001067
TRN-INV-00001094
TRN-INV-00001099
TRN-INV-00001117
TRN-INV-00001122
TRN-INV-00001140
TRN-INV-00001145
TRN-INV-00001163
TRN-INV-00001168
TRN-INV-00001183
TRN-INV-00001189
TRN-INV-00001205
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00000835
TRN-INV-00000842
TRN-INV-00000847
TRN-INV-00000862
TRN-INV-00000868
TRN-INV-00000886
TRN-INV-00000891
TRN-INV-00000897
TRN-INV-00000904
TRN-INV-00000924
TRN-INV-00000936
TRN-INV-00000973
TRN-INV-00000977
TRN-INV-00000991
TRN-INV-00000997
TRN-INV-00001015
TRN-INV-00001022
TRN-INV-00001040
TRN-INV-00001044
TRN-INV-00001061
TRN-INV-00001066
TRN-INV-00001093
TRN-INV-00001098
TRN-INV-00001116
TRN-INV-00001121
TRN-INV-00001139
TRN-INV-00001144
TRN-INV-00001162
TRN-INV-00001167
TRN-INV-00001182
TRN-INV-00001188
TRN-INV-00001204
TRN-INV-00001210
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00001211
TRN-INV-00001231
TRN-INV-00001235
TRN-INV-00001246
TRN-INV-00001253
TRN-INV-00001266
TRN-INV-00001273
TRN-INV-00001293
TRN-INV-00001299
TRN-INV-00001319
TRN-INV-00001324
TRN-INV-00001339
TRN-INV-00001343
TRN-INV-00001355
TRN-INV-00001361
TRN-INV-00001387
TRN-INV-00001392
TRN-INV-00001407
TRN-INV-00001411
TRN-INV-00001422
TRN-INV-00001429
TRN-INV-00001464
TRN-INV-00001465
TRN-INV-00001475
TRN-INV-00001508
TRN-INV-00001512
TRN-INV-00001521
TRN-INV-00001525
TRN-INV-00001534
TRN-INV-00001539
TRN-INV-00001551
TRN-INV-00001558
TRN-INV-00001579
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00001230
TRN-INV-00001234
TRN-INV-00001245
TRN-INV-00001252
TRN-INV-00001265
TRN-INV-00001272
TRN-INV-00001292
TRN-INV-00001298
TRN-INV-00001318
TRN-INV-00001323
TRN-INV-00001338
TRN-INV-00001342
TRN-INV-00001354
TRN-INV-00001360
TRN-INV-00001386
TRN-INV-00001391
TRN-INV-00001406
TRN-INV-00001410
TRN-INV-00001421
TRN-INV-00001428
TRN-INV-00001463
TRN-INV-00001464
TRN-INV-00001474
TRN-INV-00001507
TRN-INV-00001511
TRN-INV-00001520
TRN-INV-00001524
TRN-INV-00001533
TRN-INV-00001538
TRN-INV-00001550
TRN-INV-00001557
TRN-INV-00001578
TRN-INV-00001585
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Witness statement
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00001586
TRN-INV-00001609
TRN-INV-00001617
TRN-INV-00001642
TRN-INV-00001648
TRN-INV-00001673
TRN-INV-00001678
TRN-INV-00001689
TRN-INV-00001694
TRN-INV-00001703
TRN-INV-00001708
TRN-INV-00001748
TRN-INV-00001753
TRN-INV-00001767
TRN-INV-00001775
TRN-INV-00001798
TRN-INV-00001802
TRN-INV-00001813
TRN-INV-00001819
TRN-INV-00001839
TRN-INV-00001843
TRN-INV-00001856
TRN-INV-00001861
TRN-INV-00001865
TRN-INV-00001877
TRN-INV-00001887
TRN-INV-00001915
TRN-INV-00001919
TRN-INV-00001930
TRN-INV-00001936
TRN-INV-00001971
TRN-INV-00001975
TRN-INV-00001982
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00001608
TRN-INV-00001616
TRN-INV-00001640
TRN-INV-00001647
TRN-INV-00001672
TRN-INV-00001677
TRN-INV-00001688
TRN-INV-00001693
TRN-INV-00001702
TRN-INV-00001707
TRN-INV-00001747
TRN-INV-00001752
TRN-INV-00001766
TRN-INV-00001774
TRN-INV-00001797
TRN-INV-00001801
TRN-INV-00001812
TRN-INV-00001818
TRN-INV-00001838
TRN-INV-00001842
TRN-INV-00001855
TRN-INV-00001860
TRN-INV-00001864
TRN-INV-00001876
TRN-INV-00001886
TRN-INV-00001912
TRN-INV-00001918
TRN-INV-00001929
TRN-INV-00001935
TRN-INV-00001970
TRN-INV-00001974
TRN-INV-00001981
TRN-INV-00001986
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00001987
TRN-INV-00002010
TRN-INV-00002017
TRN-INV-00002046
TRN-INV-00002049
TRN-INV-00002054
TRN-INV-00002060
TRN-INV-00002081
TRN-INV-00002087
TRN-INV-00002100
TRN-INV-00002104
TRN-INV-00002114
TRN-INV-00002124
TRN-INV-00002163
TRN-INV-00002168
TRN-INV-00002192
TRN-INV-00002197
TRN-INV-00002218
TRN-INV-00002223
TRN-INV-00002238
TRN-INV-00002245
TRN-INV-00002275
TRN-INV-00002282
TRN-INV-00002303
TRN-INV-00002317
TRN-INV-00002420
TRN-INV-00002424
TRN-INV-00002434
TRN-INV-00002438
TRN-INV-00002455
TRN-INV-00002461
TRN-INV-00002487
TRN-INV-00002492
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00002009
TRN-INV-00002016
TRN-INV-00002045
TRN-INV-00002048
TRN-INV-00002053
TRN-INV-00002059
TRN-INV-00002080
TRN-INV-00002086
TRN-INV-00002099
TRN-INV-00002103
TRN-INV-00002113
TRN-INV-00002123
TRN-INV-00002162
TRN-INV-00002167
TRN-INV-00002191
TRN-INV-00002196
TRN-INV-00002217
TRN-INV-00002222
TRN-INV-00002237
TRN-INV-00002244
TRN-INV-00002274
TRN-INV-00002281
TRN-INV-00002302
TRN-INV-00002316
TRN-INV-00002419
TRN-INV-00002423
TRN-INV-00002433
TRN-INV-00002437
TRN-INV-00002454
TRN-INV-00002460
TRN-INV-00002486
TRN-INV-00002491
TRN-INV-00002507
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00002508
TRN-INV-00002514
TRN-INV-00002533
TRN-INV-00002539
TRN-INV-00002555
TRN-INV-00002561
TRN-INV-00002576
TRN-INV-00002580
TRN-INV-00002606
TRN-INV-00002613
TRN-INV-00002628
TRN-INV-00002631
TRN-INV-00002645
TRN-INV-00002653
TRN-INV-00002693
TRN-INV-00002699
TRN-INV-00002725
TRN-INV-00002730
TRN-INV-00002740
TRN-INV-00002743
TRN-INV-00002758
TRN-INV-00002763
TRN-INV-00002778
TRN-INV-00002783
TRN-INV-00002789
TRN-INV-00002793
TRN-INV-00002831
TRN-INV-00002835
TRN-INV-00002858
TRN-INV-00002862
TRN-INV-00002873
TRN-INV-00002879
TRN-INV-00002894
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00002513
TRN-INV-00002532
TRN-INV-00002538
TRN-INV-00002554
TRN-INV-00002560
TRN-INV-00002575
TRN-INV-00002579
TRN-INV-00002605
TRN-INV-00002612
TRN-INV-00002627
TRN-INV-00002630
TRN-INV-00002644
TRN-INV-00002652
TRN-INV-00002692
TRN-INV-00002698
TRN-INV-00002724
TRN-INV-00002729
TRN-INV-00002739
TRN-INV-00002742
TRN-INV-00002757
TRN-INV-00002762
TRN-INV-00002777
TRN-INV-00002782
TRN-INV-00002788
TRN-INV-00002792
TRN-INV-00002830
TRN-INV-00002834
TRN-INV-00002857
TRN-INV-00002861
TRN-INV-00002872
TRN-INV-00002878
TRN-INV-00002893
TRN-INV-00002899
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00002900
TRN-INV-00002924
TRN-INV-00002928
TRN-INV-00002934
TRN-INV-00002939
TRN-INV-00002955
TRN-INV-00002956
TRN-INV-00002962
TRN-INV-00002973
TRN-INV-00002978
TRN-INV-00002988
TRN-INV-00002996
TRN-INV-00003072
TRN-INV-00003076
TRN-INV-00003087
TRN-INV-00003094
TRN-INV-00003114
TRN-INV-00003118
TRN-INV-00003191
TRN-INV-00003200
TRN-INV-00003244
TRN-INV-00003250
TRN-INV-00003270
TRN-INV-00003276
TRN-INV-00003298
TRN-INV-00003306
TRN-INV-00003344
TRN-INV-00003349
TRN-INV-00003357
TRN-INV-00003360
TRN-INV-00003365
TRN-INV-00003368
TRN-INV-00003378
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00002923
TRN-INV-00002927
TRN-INV-00002933
TRN-INV-00002938
TRN-INV-00002954
TRN-INV-00002955
TRN-INV-00002961
TRN-INV-00002972
TRN-INV-00002977
TRN-INV-00002987
TRN-INV-00002995
TRN-INV-00003071
TRN-INV-00003075
TRN-INV-00003086
TRN-INV-00003093
TRN-INV-00003113
TRN-INV-00003117
TRN-INV-00003190
TRN-INV-00003199
TRN-INV-00003243
TRN-INV-00003249
TRN-INV-00003269
TRN-INV-00003275
TRN-INV-00003297
TRN-INV-00003305
TRN-INV-00003341
TRN-INV-00003348
TRN-INV-00003356
TRN-INV-00003359
TRN-INV-00003364
TRN-INV-00003367
TRN-INV-00003377
TRN-INV-00003382
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Witness statement
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00003383
TRN-INV-00003406
TRN-INV-00003413
TRN-INV-00003418
TRN-INV-00003447
TRN-INV-00003451
TRN-INV-00003473
TRN-INV-00003477
TRN-INV-00003483
TRN-INV-00003497
TRN-INV-00003543
TRN-INV-00003549
TRN-INV-00003563
TRN-INV-00003567
TRN-INV-00003586
TRN-INV-00003596
TRN-INV-00003627
TRN-INV-00003628
TRN-INV-00003633
TRN-INV-00003654
TRN-INV-00003664
TRN-INV-00003692
TRN-INV-00003696
TRN-INV-00003706
TRN-INV-00003710
TRN-INV-00003715
TRN-INV-00003719
TRN-INV-00003730
TRN-INV-00003734
TRN-INV-00003746
TRN-INV-00003751
TRN-INV-00003763
TRN-INV-00003767
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00003405
TRN-INV-00003412
TRN-INV-00003417
TRN-INV-00003446
TRN-INV-00003450
TRN-INV-00003472
TRN-INV-00003476
TRN-INV-00003482
TRN-INV-00003496
TRN-INV-00003542
TRN-INV-00003548
TRN-INV-00003562
TRN-INV-00003566
TRN-INV-00003585
TRN-INV-00003595
TRN-INV-00003626
TRN-INV-00003627
TRN-INV-00003632
TRN-INV-00003653
TRN-INV-00003663
TRN-INV-00003691
TRN-INV-00003695
TRN-INV-00003705
TRN-INV-00003709
TRN-INV-00003714
TRN-INV-00003718
TRN-INV-00003729
TRN-INV-00003733
TRN-INV-00003745
TRN-INV-00003750
TRN-INV-00003762
TRN-INV-00003766
TRN-INV-00003773
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Witness statement
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00003774
TRN-INV-00003781
TRN-INV-00003792
TRN-INV-00003796
TRN-INV-00003807
TRN-INV-00003812
TRN-INV-00003828
TRN-INV-00003832
TRN-INV-00003846
TRN-INV-00003853
TRN-INV-00003875
TRN-INV-00003888
TRN-INV-00003937
TRN-INV-00003941
TRN-INV-00003947
TRN-INV-00003950
TRN-INV-00003961
TRN-INV-00003965
TRN-INV-00003988
TRN-INV-00003993
TRN-INV-00004008
TRN-INV-00004012
TRN-INV-00004019
TRN-INV-00004023
TRN-INV-00004034
TRN-INV-00004040
TRN-INV-00004060
TRN-INV-00004066
TRN-INV-00004091
TRN-INV-00004098
TRN-INV-00004118
TRN-INV-00004121
TRN-INV-00004126
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00003780
TRN-INV-00003791
TRN-INV-00003795
TRN-INV-00003806
TRN-INV-00003811
TRN-INV-00003827
TRN-INV-00003831
TRN-INV-00003845
TRN-INV-00003852
TRN-INV-00003874
TRN-INV-00003887
TRN-INV-00003936
TRN-INV-00003940
TRN-INV-00003946
TRN-INV-00003949
TRN-INV-00003960
TRN-INV-00003964
TRN-INV-00003985
TRN-INV-00003992
TRN-INV-00004007
TRN-INV-00004011
TRN-INV-00004018
TRN-INV-00004022
TRN-INV-00004033
TRN-INV-00004039
TRN-INV-00004059
TRN-INV-00004065
TRN-INV-00004090
TRN-INV-00004097
TRN-INV-00004117
TRN-INV-00004120
TRN-INV-00004125
TRN-INV-00004130
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00004131
TRN-INV-00004145
TRN-INV-00004154
TRN-INV-00004200
TRN-INV-00004209
TRN-INV-00004239
TRN-INV-00004244
TRN-INV-00004262
TRN-INV-00004266
TRN-INV-00004283
TRN-INV-00004288
TRN-INV-00004303
TRN-INV-00004309
TRN-INV-00004324
TRN-INV-00004330
TRN-INV-00004349
TRN-INV-00004354
TRN-INV-00004374
TRN-INV-00004379
TRN-INV-00004388
TRN-INV-00004391
TRN-INV-00004396
TRN-INV-00004401
TRN-INV-00004418
TRN-INV-00004422
TRN-INV-00004428
TRN-INV-00004434
TRN-INV-00004448
TRN-INV-00004454
TRN-INV-00004476
TRN-INV-00004480
TRN-INV-00004485
TRN-INV-00004490
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00004144
TRN-INV-00004153
TRN-INV-00004199
TRN-INV-00004208
TRN-INV-00004238
TRN-INV-00004243
TRN-INV-00004261
TRN-INV-00004265
TRN-INV-00004282
TRN-INV-00004287
TRN-INV-00004302
TRN-INV-00004308
TRN-INV-00004323
TRN-INV-00004329
TRN-INV-00004348
TRN-INV-00004353
TRN-INV-00004373
TRN-INV-00004378
TRN-INV-00004387
TRN-INV-00004390
TRN-INV-00004395
TRN-INV-00004400
TRN-INV-00004417
TRN-INV-00004421
TRN-INV-00004427
TRN-INV-00004433
TRN-INV-00004447
TRN-INV-00004453
TRN-INV-00004475
TRN-INV-00004479
TRN-INV-00004484
TRN-INV-00004489
TRN-INV-00004499
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00004500
TRN-INV-00004508
TRN-INV-00004529
TRN-INV-00004535
TRN-INV-00004552
TRN-INV-00004556
TRN-INV-00004562
TRN-INV-00004566
TRN-INV-00004573
TRN-INV-00004578
TRN-INV-00004587
TRN-INV-00004591
TRN-INV-00004601
TRN-INV-00004614
TRN-INV-00004674
TRN-INV-00004683
TRN-INV-00004716
TRN-INV-00004720
TRN-INV-00004735
TRN-INV-00004741
TRN-INV-00004757
TRN-INV-00004764
TRN-INV-00004789
TRN-INV-00004796
TRN-INV-00004834
TRN-INV-00004836
TRN-INV-00004840
TRN-INV-00004852
TRN-INV-00004858
TRN-INV-00004873
TRN-INV-00004877
TRN-INV-00004886
TRN-INV-00004891
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00004507
TRN-INV-00004528
TRN-INV-00004534
TRN-INV-00004551
TRN-INV-00004555
TRN-INV-00004561
TRN-INV-00004565
TRN-INV-00004572
TRN-INV-00004577
TRN-INV-00004586
TRN-INV-00004590
TRN-INV-00004600
TRN-INV-00004613
TRN-INV-00004673
TRN-INV-00004682
TRN-INV-00004715
TRN-INV-00004719
TRN-INV-00004734
TRN-INV-00004740
TRN-INV-00004756
TRN-INV-00004763
TRN-INV-00004788
TRN-INV-00004795
TRN-INV-00004832
TRN-INV-00004835
TRN-INV-00004839
TRN-INV-00004851
TRN-INV-00004857
TRN-INV-00004872
TRN-INV-00004876
TRN-INV-00004885
TRN-INV-00004890
TRN-INV-00004904
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Witness statement
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00004905
TRN-INV-00004911
TRN-INV-00004930
TRN-INV-00004935
TRN-INV-00004953
TRN-INV-00004959
TRN-INV-00004991
TRN-INV-00004998
TRN-INV-00005019
TRN-INV-00005024
TRN-INV-00005043
TRN-INV-00005049
TRN-INV-00005066
TRN-INV-00005070
TRN-INV-00005082
TRN-INV-00005086
TRN-INV-00005095
TRN-INV-00005103
TRN-INV-00005143
TRN-INV-00005148
TRN-INV-00005162
TRN-INV-00005169
TRN-INV-00005185
TRN-INV-00005189
TRN-INV-00005211
TRN-INV-00005214
TRN-INV-00005218
TRN-INV-00005230
TRN-INV-00005233
TRN-INV-00005239
TRN-INV-00005246
TRN-INV-00005252
TRN-INV-00005282
Beg Bates
TRN-INV-00004910
TRN-INV-00004929
TRN-INV-00004934
TRN-INV-00004952
TRN-INV-00004958
TRN-INV-00004990
TRN-INV-00004997
TRN-INV-00005018
TRN-INV-00005023
TRN-INV-00005042
TRN-INV-00005048
TRN-INV-00005065
TRN-INV-00005069
TRN-INV-00005081
TRN-INV-00005085
TRN-INV-00005094
TRN-INV-00005102
TRN-INV-00005142
TRN-INV-00005147
TRN-INV-00005161
TRN-INV-00005168
TRN-INV-00005184
TRN-INV-00005188
TRN-INV-00005210
TRN-INV-00005213
TRN-INV-00005217
TRN-INV-00005229
TRN-INV-00005232
TRN-INV-00005238
TRN-INV-00005245
TRN-INV-00005251
TRN-INV-00005281
TRN-INV-00005285
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Witness statement
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
Filename Or Description
Appendix D
TRN-INV-00005286
TRN-INV-00005294
TRN-INV-00005299
TRN-MDL-00868570
BP-HZN-MBI00136447
TRN-MDL-00600984
TRN-MDL-00600990
TRN-INV-00760143
TRN-INV-00760142
TRN-INV-00760141
TRN-MDL-01323431
BP-HZN-2179MDL03287798
TRN-MDL-01995569
n/a
BP-HZN-2179MDL00010720
BP-HZN-2179MDL00015195
BP-HZN-2179MDL00056402
BP-HZN-2179MDL00161670
BP-HZN-2179MDL00251013
BP-HZN-2179MDL00251038
BP-HZN-2179MDL00262940
BP-HZN-2179MDL00262945
BP-HZN-2179MDL00267726
BP-HZN-2179MDL00312988
BP-HZN-BLY00071636
BP-HZN-2179MDL00015195
BP-HZN-BLY00141575
BP-HZN-MBI00135085
BP-HZN-MBI00135365
BP-HZN-2179MDL00003310
BP-HZN-2179MDL00007230
BP-HZN-2179MDL00008035
BP-HZN-BLY00098875
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00010722
BP-HZN-2179MDL00015195
BP-HZN-2179MDL00056557
BP-HZN-2179MDL00161714
BP-HZN-2179MDL00251013
BP-HZN-2179MDL00251038
BP-HZN-2179MDL00262944
BP-HZN-2179MDL00262950
BP-HZN-2179MDL00267790
BP-HZN-2179MDL00312988
BP-HZN-BLY00071636
BP-HZN-2179MDL00015195
BP-HZN-BLY00141599
BP-HZN-MBI00135090
BP-HZN-MBI00135370
BP-HZN-2179MDL00003313
BP-HZN-2179MDL00007230
BP-HZN-2179MDL00008036
BP-HZN-BLY00098902
TRN-INV-00005293
TRN-INV-00005298
TRN-INV-00005311
TRN-MDL-00868612
BP-HZN-MBI00136567
TRN-MDL-00600989
TRN-MDL-00600995
TRN-INV-00760143
TRN-INV-00760142
TRN-INV-00760141
TRN-MDL-01323432
BP-HZN-2179MDL03287798
TRN-MDL-01995570
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
TO Interview Notes
TO Interview Memo
TO Interview Notes
Drilling Deepwater Wells
May 12, 2010 Opticem model
Daily Drilling Report #143
MDL Dep. Ex. 3465: Daily Drilling Report #142
Negative Test procedures
Negative Test procedures
Negative Test procedures
Negative Test procedures
Negative Test procedures
Deepwater Horizon Task Specific Think Procedure
Deposition transcripts & exhibits of Robinson, Steve
Email from J. Hoggan to L. Lindner
Rheliant Displacement Procedures Macondo OCS-G 32306
Contract For Gulf Of Mexico Strategic Performance Unit Offshore Well Services
Interview notes
Email from D. Maxie to J. LeBleu re FAS and FAS AK
Email from D. Maxie to J. LeBleu re Waterbased FAS pills
Daily Drilling Report
Daily Operaions Report - Partners (Drilling)
Drilling Fluids Program
Email from T. Dyer to D. Maxie, et al. re Disposal
Email from L. Lindner to R. Kaluza re Macondo Displacement Procedure
BP/Deepwater Horizon Rheliant Displacement Procedure
Intertek Potential for Settlement Form-A-Squeeze & Form-A-Set Blends
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling)
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling)
MDL Dep. Ex. 697: Email from J. LeBleu to B. Morel, et al. re Proposed Procedure for
MDL Dep. Ex. 1004: Email from J. LeBleu to J. Guide, et al re Critical need for
MDL Dep. Ex. 1008: Email from J. LeBleu to J. McFaddin, et al. re MI Swaco NCR
MDL Dep. Ex. 1019: Draft BP Project Spacer PowerPoint
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL00016162
M-I 00003180
BP-HZN-MBI00129240
M-I 00002310
M-I 00003186
M-I 00003685
M-I 00003727
M-I 00006769
M-I 00007029
M-I 00007031
M-I 00007180
M-I 00007677
M-I 00007753
M-I 00007995
M-I 00008631
M-I 00009782
M-I 00009912
M-I 00010848
M-I 00010853
M-I 00010891
M-I 00011507
M-I 00011653
M-I 00011674
M-I 00011765
M-I 00011769
M-I 00011784
M-I 00011798
M-I 00011852
M-I 00012598
M-I 00012623
M-I 00013372
M-I 00013373
M-I 00013374
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL00016226
M-I 00003185
BP-HZN-MBI00129241
M-I 00002312
M-I 00003189
M-I 00003687
M-I 00003730
M-I 00006769
M-I 00007029
M-I 00007034
M-I 00007180
M-I 00007677
M-I 00007753
M-I 00007995
M-I 00008631
M-I 00009782
M-I 00009912
M-I 00010849
M-I 00010856
M-I 00010891
M-I 00011507
M-I 00011653
M-I 00011674
M-I 00011768
M-I 00011770
M-I00011785
M-I 00011799
M-I 00011853
M-I 00012600
M-I 00012624
M-I 00013372
M-I 00013373
M-I 00013376
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
MDL Dep. Ex. 1026: Drilling Fluids Program
MDL Dep. Ex. 1030: Email from T. Armand to D. Maxie re Lesson Learned Form A
Email from J. LeBleu to A. Pere, et al. re Riser Displacement Spacer
Email from D. Maxie to A. Wilde re Waterbased FAS pills
Email from T. Armand to D. Maxie re Waterbased FAS pills
Email from J. Hoggan to L. Lidner, et al. re Question about seawater discharge
Email from J. Manuel to D. Maxie, et al. re Waterbased FAS pills
8-1/2" x 9-7/8" Tandem Pill
Email from T. Armand to E. David, et al. re PFM High level
Email from L. Lindner to C. Detiveaux re Question about seawater discharge
Email from C. Detiveaux to D. Patterson re Riser Clean-Out
Compliance Check Sheet
MI Swaco BP Exploration Report
Email from W. Bush to C. Boquet re Horizon
BP Horizon LCM Load outs by Product and date for current well
MI Swaco Equipment Performance Report
MI Swaco Report Number 78
Email from D. Maxie to J. Smith re Notes
Tamdem Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Mixing and Spotting Procedures
Email from L. Lindner to J. Smith re Not So Good
Mixing Times Report
Email from B. Toups to T. Armand re Horizon LCM
Email from A. Wilde to T. Armand, et al. re Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Tandem
Email from T. Armand to J. Barry re EMI 1820
Email from T. Armand to A. Popplestone re EMI 1820
Email from T. Armand to D. Maxie re FAS Draft 2
Email from T. Armand to D. Maxie re SPM
Email from T. Armand to J. Bacho, et al. re Horizon update
Email from D. Maxie to F. Enriquez re FAS AK
Oil-Base Mud Report
Email from V. Visinescu to M. Freeman, et al. re Form-A-Set AK pills for Horizon
Email from D. Maxie to T. Quebodeaux, et al. re final draft
Tandem Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Mixing and Spotting Procedures
Appendix D
M-I 00013548
M-I 00013549
M-I 00013552
M-I 00013555
M-I 00013571
M-I 00013575
M-I 00013576
M-I 00013705
M-I 00013730
M-I 00014236
M-I 00014249
M-I 00014252
M-I 00015330
M-I 00015686
M-I 00015962
M-I 00018779
M-I 00022768
M-I 00031942
M-I 00031957
M-I 00031984
M-I 00031987
M-I 00031990
M-I 00032508
M-I 00034183
M-I 00034340
M-I 00079488
M-I 00011628
BP-HZN-BLY00038424
M-I 00032516
M-I 00032517
BP-HZN-SEC00793010
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477012
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477021
Beg Bates
M-I 00079489
M-I 00011631
BP-HZN-BLY00038461
M-I 00032516
M-I 00032517
BP-HZN-SEC00793013
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477015
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477024
M-I 00013548
M-I 00013551
M-I 00013554
M-I 00013555
M-I 00013574
M-I 00013575
M-I 00013576
M-I 00013707
M-I 00013733
M-I 00014237
M-I 00014250
M-I 00014252
M-I 00015333
M-I 00015688
M-I 00016047
M-I 00018780
M-I 00022771
M-I 00031946
M-I 00031960
M-I 00031986
M-I 00031988
M-I 00031991
M-I 00032510
M-I 00034185
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Email from D. Maxie to J. Brown re FAS
Tandem Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Mixing and Spotting Procedures
Tandem Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Mixing and Spotting Procedures
Form-A-Set AK Mixing Formulation
PFM Recap Executive Summary
Email from D. Maxie to J. Yearwood, et al. re Displacement
Rheliant Displacement Procedures Macondo OCS-G 32306
Email from T. Armand to V. Visinescu, et al. re Form-A-Set AK pills for Horizon
Email from D. Maxie to B. Billon re Question about seawater dischargeM-I 00014236
Email from B. Cart to A. Heck re Kwik seal
BP NCR LCM Material
MI SWACO Incident Investigation
Tandem Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Mixing and Spotting Procedures
Email from J. Smith to D. Cullum re "Tandem" pill procedure for inclusion in Baroid
MI SWACO Response to Questions
Email from A. Wilde to A. McLean, et al. re Leo Linder Testimony - Coast Guard
Tandem Form-A-Squeeze/Form-A-Set AK Mixing and Spotting Procedures
Email from D. Maxie to A. Wilde re Waterbased FAS pills
Email from A. Wilde to D. Maxie re Waterbased FAS pills
Email from L. Lindner to D. Maxie re Waterbased FAS pills
Email from B. Morel to D. Maxie, et al. re FAS and FAS AK
Email from D. Maxie to B. Billon re FAS and FAS AK
Email from J. Bacho to P. Hanson, et al. re DW Horizon Investigation Fluids
Email from D. Maxie to T. Armand re Lessons captured
Email from D. Maxie to J. LeBleu re FAS FAS AK
Bradley Billon CV
Email from J. Manuel to D. Maxie, et al. re Waterbased FAS pills
MDL Dep. Ex. 1018: Project Spacer report
Form-A-Set AK and Form-A-Squeeze report
Form-A-Squeeze Product Bulletin
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477025
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477029
BP-HZN-SEC00794730
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477040
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477052
BP-HZN-2179MDL04474699
BP-HZN-2179MDL00602441
BP-HZN-2179MDL00600241
BP-HZN-SEC00581425
BP-HZN-2179MDL01200230
BP-HZN-SEC00600802
BP-HZN-2179MDL01215657
BP-HZN-SEC00771434
BP-HZN-2179MDL01407169
BP-HZN-2179MDL01341283
BP-HZN-SEC00604663
BP-HZN-2179MDL03701169
BP-HZN-2179MDL03693988
BP-HZN-2179MDL03695607
BP-HZN-2179MDL01215494
BP-HZN-2179MDL09637493
BP-HZN-2179MDL03705289
BP-HZN-2179MDL04419758
BP-HZN-2179MDL04427052
BP-HZN-2179MDL04418905
BP-HZN-2179MDL04412050
BP-HZN-2179MDL02365705
BP-HZN-2179MDL04419085
BP-HZN-2179MDL04429259
BP-HZN-2179MDL04419014
BP-HZN-SEC00851789
BP-HZN-2179MDL02368090
BP-HZN-SEC00852618
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477028
BP-HZN-2178MDL04476989
BP-HZN-SEC00794735
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477044
BP-HZN-2179MDL04477059
BP-HZN-2179MDL04474705
BP-HZN-2179MDL00602445
BP-HZN-2179MDL00600245
BP-HZN-SEC00581430
BP-HZN-2179MDL01200236
BP-HZN-SEC00600807
BP-HZN-2179MDL01215662
BP-HZN-SEC00771439
BP-HZN-2179MDL01407174
BP-HZN-2179MDL01341286
BP-HZN-SEC00604670
BP-HZN-2179MDL03701175
BP-HZN-2179MDL03693994
BP-HZN-2179MDL03695612
BP-HZN-2179MDL01215499
BP-HZN-2179MDL03697497
BP-HZN-2179MDL03705293
BP-HZN-2179MDL04419763
BP-HZN-2179MDL04427058
BP-HZN-2179MDL04418912
BP-HZN-2179MDL04412055
BP-HZN-2179MDL02365709
BP-HZN-2179MDL04419089
BP-HZN-2179MDL04429263
BP-HZN-2179MDL04419020
BP-HZN-SEC00851794
BP-HZN-2179MDL02368096
BP-HZN-SEC00852621
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #02
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Appendix D
BP-HZN-SEC00852797
BP-HZN-2179MDL02349773
BP-HZN-2179MDL02351752
BP-HZN-2179MDL02359781
BP-HZN-2179MDL01215572
BP-HZN-2179MDL02356085
BP-HZN-2179MDL02360716
BP-HZN-2179MDL02344688
BP-HZN-2179MDL02340822
BP-HZN-2179MDL02349550
BP-HZN-2179MDL02374906
BP-HZN-2179MDL02379098
BP-HZN-2179MDL01214956
BP-HZN-2179MDL02341006
BP-HZN-2179MDL00882008
BP-HZN-2179MDL02344286
BP-HZN-2179MDL02343097
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296664
BP-HZN-2179MDL02357318
BP-HZN-2179MDL02364482
BP-HZN-2179MDL02350638
BP-HZN-2179MDL00582085
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296944
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294721
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295041
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295925
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296849
AE-HZN-2179MDL00049826
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293901
BP-HZN-2179MDL00581350
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294106
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295248
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294131
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-SEC00852803
BP-HZN-2179MDL02349779
BP-HZN-2179MDL02351757
BP-HZN-2179MDL02359787
BP-HZN-2179MDL01215577
BP-HZN-2179MDL02356091
BP-HZN-2179MDL02360723
BP-HZN-2179MDL02344694
BP-HZN-2179MDL02340830
BP-HZN-2179MDL02349557
BP-HZN-2179MDL02374911
BP-HZN-2179MDL02379104
BP-HZN-2179MDL01214963
BP-HZN-2179MDL02341012
BP-HZN-2179MDL00882015
BP-HZN-2179MDL02344293
BP-HZN-2179MDL02343105
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296672
BP-HZN-2179MDL02357324
BP-HZN-2179MDL02364488
BP-HZN-2179MDL02350643
BP-HZN-2179MDL00582089
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296951
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294727
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295047
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295927
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296854
AE-HZN-2179MDL00049830
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293906
BP-HZN-2179MDL00581355
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294112
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295253
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294136
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292617
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296657
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296801
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296386
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292915
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295196
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292789
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293725
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293049
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295322
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296457
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294631
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294190
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296836
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294302
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296992
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293518
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296483
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294785
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293663
BP-HZN-2179MDL01591285
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293111
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293197
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296983
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294080
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293098
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296906
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295645
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296442
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296718
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293167
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293998
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294573
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292623
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296662
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296807
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296392
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292922
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295202
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292796
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293732
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293055
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295329
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296464
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294637
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294196
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296843
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294309
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296998
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293527
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296491
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294794
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293671
BP-HZN-2179MDL01591292
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293117
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293204
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296990
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294087
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293104
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296911
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295645
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296447
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296723
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293172
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294003
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294579
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294639
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295669
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293529
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292907
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292635
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292317
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296507
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296228
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293480
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293511
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292523
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295696
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296417
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295204
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296475
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294271
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293698
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296037
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296600
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296576
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296543
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293148
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292664
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295960
BP-HZH-2179MDL03296953
BP-HZN-2179MDL00599531
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294448
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292422
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293778
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295803
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296171
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296147
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296592
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294645
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295675
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293534
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292913
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292640
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292324
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296512
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296228
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293486
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293516
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292528
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295702
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296423
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295209
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296481
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294276
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293704
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296041
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296605
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296581
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296548
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293151
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292669
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295965
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296958
BP-HZN-2179MDL00599536
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294453
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292427
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293785
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295808
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296176
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296153
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296598
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Appendix D
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292876
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295288
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293126
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295296
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292250
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293347
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295632
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294714
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293460
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293738
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295892
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296043
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292536
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296000
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296030
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293678
BP-HZN-2179MDL03297006
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295584
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295499
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292429
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293706
Beg Bates
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292882
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295294
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293133
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295302
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292254
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293352
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295637
BP-HZN-2179MDL03294719
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293465
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293745
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295897
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296048
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292541
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296001
BP-HZN-2179MDL03296035
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293684
BP-HZN-2179MDL03297012
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295590
BP-HZN-2179MDL03295505
BP-HZN-2179MDL03292434
BP-HZN-2179MDL03293713
End Bates
Expert Report of Adam T. (Ted) Bourgoyne, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Filename Or Description
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Daily Operations Report - Partners (Drilling) MC 252 #03
Appendix D